brief - Iran 911 Case

196-97.The 9/11 REPORT specifically concluded that, ―Iran made a concerted effort tostrengthen relations with al Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole. . . .‖9/11 REPORT, p. 240; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 264. Although the 9/11 REPORT notesthat an al Qaeda detainee (―Khallad‖, see 9/11 REPORT Ch. 7, n. 120, and p. 19, supra)told American interrogators that Osama bin Laden rebuffed this overture ―because BinLadin did not want to alienate his supporters in Saudi Arabia,‖ this assertion means onlythat bin Laden, always concerned about recruiting, sought to downplay the relationshippublicly and deflect unwanted attention from an ―alliance of convenience.‖ Ex. 3,Byman Affid. 39. 62 Indeed, as the 9/11 REPORT finds, Iran, Hizballah, and al Qaedawould have extremely important and sensitive dealings over the next few months.F. Iran’s Contingency Plans for Terrorist Operations Against the U.S.Witnesses X, Y, and Z, taken together, provide significant evidence concerningIran‘s contingency plans for asymmetrical warfare, with specific evidence concerningIran‘s development, in the late 1980s, of contingency plans employing many of the sametactics as those of the 9/11 hijackers. Further, the defector witnesses testify to Iran‘sforeknowledge of the means and time of the 9/11 attacks. According to the U.S. StateDepartment‘s 1987 Patterns of Global Terrorism report, ―during the summer of 1987Iran began to formulate contingency plans for anti-US terrorist operations.‖ Ex. 13 at p.56; see Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 74. Thus, the State Department‘s 1987 terrorism reportprovides corroboration for significant parts of the sealed evidence submitted in this case.As Dr. Patrick Clawson explains, the U.S. State Department‘s annual report on62 Nor is the meaning of Khallad‘s statement to interrogators especially clear, although it does confirmthe existence of prior relations between Iran and al Qaeda. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 112.67