verbally congratulated. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 163-68; 9/11 REPORT, p. 60. 59 Twomonths later, in August 1996, Osama bin Laden would cite the Khobar Towers bombingin his first fatwa, a ―Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land ofthe Two Holy Places‖: ―The crusader army became dust when we detonated al Khobar . .. .‖ Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 52, 166, p. 66, n. 29 (emphasis added). (Witness Zprovides additional evidence of <strong>Iran</strong>ian involvement in the Khobar Towers attack.)8. 1998: Osama bin Laden’s Second Fatwa. On February 23, 1998, Osamabin Laden issued his second public fatwa in the name of a ―World Islamic Front‖ againstAmerica, calling for the murder of Americans ―as the individual duty for every Muslimwho can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.‖ It would not be long beforeone of his terrorist cells, trained by Hizballah, struck another direct blow against the U.S.9/11 REPORT, pp. 47-48, 69.9. 1998: U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. On August 7, 1998, twonearly simultaneous truck bombings destroyed the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya,and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than three hundred (300) persons andwounding more than five thousand (5,000). Although known to have been committed byal Qaeda operatives (due to the confession of Ali Mohamed, who led the team thatstudied the embassy in Nairobi, beginning as early as December 1993, shortly after theKhartoum meeting, 9/11 REPORT, p. 68, Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 180), the twin EastAfrica U.S. Embassy bombings also bore the unmistakable modus operandi of ImadMughniyah: multiple, simultaneous, spectacular suicide bombings against American59 Former CIA analyst and 9/11 Commission staff member Douglas MacEachin subsequently testifiedthat ―. . . intelligence . . . showed a far greater potential for collaboration between Hezbollah and alQaeda than many had previously thought.‖ ―In sum, . . . we have seen now strong but indirectevidence that bin Laden‘s organization did in fact play some as yet unknown role in the Khobarattack.‖ Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 163; see also 168 (citations omitted).65
symbols. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 178-83. Further, the al Qaeda operatives whocarried out the attacks were trained by Hizballah in handling the sophisticated explosivesused in the East Africa bombings. See 9/11 REPORT, p. 68; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid.179; 182-83. One of the specific types of training Hizballah provided was in blowingup large buildings. Among those who trained at the Hizballah camps was Saef al Adel,the al Qaeda chief of terrorist operations, who was convicted in absentia in the U.S. forhis role in the twin embassy bombings, and who would spend the years after 9/11 in safehaven inside <strong>Iran</strong>. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 194-95; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid.57-59 and Ex. B-4 thereto. 6010. 2000: the U.S.S. Cole. On October 12, 2000, al Qaeda suicide bombersattacked the U.S.S. Cole in the harbor of Aden, Yemen, killing seventeen sailors andinjuring thirty-nine. At just that time, a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency analyst wasalerting his superiors to a web of connections he was finding between and among alQaeda, the <strong>Iran</strong>ian intelligence agencies controlled by <strong>Iran</strong>‘s Supreme Leader, Hizballah,and other active terrorist groups. See Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 188-192. 61 As lateranalysis would reveal, the explosives used to damage the Cole were a trademarkHizballah ―shaped charge‖ similar to what was used in the Marine barracks bombings.According to a U.S. government official who spoke to the press, ―‗It‘s a trademark ofbombs made by Hizballah and raises the question of the involvement of <strong>Iran</strong>.‘‖ Id.60 Telephone records obtained by American prosecutors investigating the East Africa embassy bombingsrevealed that ten percent (10%) of the calls made from the satellite phone used by Osama bin Ladenwere to <strong>Iran</strong>. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 185.61 One such connection was a secret meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000 attended by a Malaysianarmy captain affiliated with al Qaeda who would later be linked to the U.S.S. Cole bombing (and whowould help Zacharias Moussaoui obtain a U.S. visa), and two of the eventual 9/11 hijackers. The twofuture hijackers were observed to have spent the night at the <strong>Iran</strong>ian embassy. Ex. 6, Lopez-TefftAffid. 191.66
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