Imad Mughniyah and <strong>Iran</strong>ian officials, Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 58-61; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 137-38; Ex. 8, Clawson Affidavit 58, including IRGC Brigadier GeneralMohammad Baqr Zolqadr, ―a multipurpose member of the <strong>Iran</strong>ian terrorist structure.‖Ex. 11, Banisadr testimony, pp. 17-18, 31; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 49-51. 49These representatives of <strong>Iran</strong>, Hizballah, and al Qaeda worked out an alliance of jointcooperation and support on terrorism. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 135, 137-39; Ex. 7,Bergman Affid. 58-61; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 48-52. (Witness X testifies tohis own discussions with an <strong>Iran</strong>ian representative to this meeting and the creation of theterrorist alliance bridging the Sunni-Shi‘a divide.)As he had previously done with Ayman al Zawahiri, Mughniyah convincedOsama bin Laden of the effectiveness of suicide bombings in driving the U.S. out ofLebanon in the 1980s. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 58. From 1983 until his death inFebruary 2008, Imad Mughniyah was a major connection point between <strong>Iran</strong> and alQaeda. Id. 59. Indeed, Osama bin Laden had been a guerilla fighter in Afghanistan andit was Mughniyah who made bin Laden into an accomplished terrorist. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 187. (Witness Z provides additional testimony about the Mughniyah-alZawahiri relationship.)I was aware of certain contacts between al Qaeda and al Jihad organization,on one side, and <strong>Iran</strong> and Hezbollah on the other side. I arranged security for ameeting in the Sudan between Mughniyah, Hezbollah's chief, and Bin Laden.Hezbollah provided explosives training for al Qaeda and al Jihad. <strong>Iran</strong>supplied Egyptian Jihad with weapons. <strong>Iran</strong> also used Hezbollah to supply explosivesthat were disguised to look like rocks.Ex. 31, Plea allocution, USA v. Ali Mohamed, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2000), p. 28.49 General Zolqadr is a deputy commander of the IRGC and head of its ―Shiraz‖ group; he works with the―hardliners of the regime.‖ Ex. 11, Banisadr testimony, pp. 17-18. By 1996, General Zolqadr woulddirect the regime‘s ―Special Operations Committee‖ that set policy and selected targets for <strong>Iran</strong>ianbackedterror attacks. Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 49-50 and n. 13. That ―committee . . . chosethe targets to be assassinated,‖ after which the Supreme Leader would approve the target and give theorder to assassinate. Ex. 11, Banisadr testimony, pp. 17-18.57
The historic 1993 meeting in Khartoum led to an ongoing series ofcommunications, training arrangements, and operations among <strong>Iran</strong> and Hizballah and alQaeda. Osama bin Laden sent more terrorist operatives, including Saef al Adel (whowould become number 3 in al Qaeda and its top ―military‖ commander), to Hizballahtraining camps operated by Mughniyah and the IRGC in Lebanon and <strong>Iran</strong>. Among othertactics, these operatives learned how to bomb large buildings. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid.151-52; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 56-59. Another al Qaeda group traveled tothe Bekaa Valley in Lebanon to receive training in explosives from Hizballah, as well astraining in intelligence and security. 9/11 REPORT, p. 61; see also Ex. 6, Lopez-TefftAffid. 151. <strong>Iran</strong>‘s Charge d‟Affaires in Khartoum, Sudan, Majid Kamal, an IRGCcommander, coordinated the training expeditions; Kamal had performed the samefunction in Beirut, Lebanon, in the early 1980s during the formation of Hizballah. Ex. 6,Lopez-Tefft Affid. 152. 50 (Appendix I discusses evidence of financial connectionsbetween Osama bin Laden‘s al Shamal Bank and <strong>Iran</strong> during the mid-1990s. Appendix Jdiscusses evidence of the operation of terrorist training camps by <strong>Iran</strong> and Hizballah.Witnesses X, Y, and Z all provide additional evidence regarding these terrorist trainingcamps.)The terrorist alliance 51 among <strong>Iran</strong>, Hizballah, and al Qaeda created in 1991-199650 At the same time, the Muslim cause in Kosovo and Bosnia in the 1990s gave <strong>Iran</strong> and al Qaeda anopportunity to work together in jihad. See Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 153-57; Ex. 7, Bergman Affid.65. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri both visited the training camps in Albania and Bosniabetween 1994 and 1996. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 156. Money from al Qaeda arrived throughMuslim charities, while the <strong>Iran</strong>ians channeled money via their embassies in Sarajevo and Vienna; the<strong>Iran</strong>ians sent arms shipments through an airfield at Visoko, northwest of Sarajevo. Thousands ofHizballah and mujahedin fighters arrived to fight for the Bosnian Muslims; they were trained by theIRGC, and even today, many mujahedin connected to extremist Islamic organizations across the world,and to <strong>Iran</strong>, remain in Bosnia. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 65-66; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 155-57.51 An ―informal agreement to cooperate,‖ id., an ―alliance of convenience,‖ Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 54;Ex. 3, Byman Affid. 39, 41-43; a ―quiet cooperation,‖ or a ―tactical cooperation,‖ Ex. 3, Byman58
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