brief - Iran 911 Case
brief - Iran 911 Case brief - Iran 911 Case
their divisions and join against the common enemy‖ – the West. 9/11 REPORT, p. 61; seealso Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 57, 132. Osama bin Laden, whose own ―vision mirroredthat of Sudan‘s Islamist leader, Turabi,‖ ―seemed willing to include in the confederationterrorists from almost every corner of the Muslim world.‖ 9/11 REPORT, pp. 60-61.Iran‘s thinking was in accord with al Turabi‘s as well. ―Iran has long tried tobridge the Shi‘a-Sunni divide . . . for strategic reasons – . . . Iran seeks influence andstature with [Middle Eastern] peoples – and because Iran sees itself as the leader of theMuslim world and a revolutionary power that transcends sectarian differences.‖ Ex. 3,Byman Affid. 23; see also 18-22, 24-28. 47In October 1991, Iran invited al Turabi to speak at its international conference insupport of Palestinians. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 47. In 1991-92, Iran founded a neworganization, al Majma‟ al Alami lil-Taqrib bayna al Madhahib al Islamiyyah(International Institute for Rapprochement Among the Islamic Legal School) to promotepublicly a reconciliation of the rival Sunni and Shiite sects. Ex. 2, Timmerman 2ndAffid. 47. Casting aside the historic bitterness between the Sunni and Shi‘a sects ofIslam, al Turabi and Iran‘s political leadership and intelligence agencies proceeded toestablish close ties – the beginnings of a united Sunni-Shiite front against the UnitedStates and the West. Id., 48; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 132-33.Hassan al Turabi and Ayman al Zawahiri both became key links between thevarious radical Islamic terrorists assembled in Sudan and Iran. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid.54. In 1991, al Zawahiri paid a clandestine visit to Iran to ask for help in his campaignto overthrow the government of Egypt. There, and in subsequent visits to Iran, al47 For many years, a special department within the Supreme Leader‘s office known as ―Rahman alRahim‖ had been devoted to supporting both Shiite and Sunni jihadi organizations. Ex. 2, Timmerman2nd Affid. p. 14, n. 12.55
Zawahiri met with Imad Mughniyah, who convinced him of the power of suicidebombing, a significant event because suicide was prohibited by most Islamic clerics, bothSunni and Shi‘a. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 51.In December 1991, Iran‘s President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, IntelligenceMinister Ali Fallahian, IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezai, and Defense Minister AliAkbar Torkan paid an official visit to Sudan where, in meetings also attended by ImadMughniyah, they committed to send weapons shipments and as many as 2,000Revolutionary Guards to Sudan. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 136.―In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranianoperatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support – even if onlytraining – for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States. Not longafterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to Iran to receive training inexplosives.‖ 9/11 REPORT, p. 61. Ayman al Zawahiri made efforts to connect Osama binLaden with Iran, and bin Laden sent some of his senior aides to Iran for training with theIRGC and to Lebanon for training with Hizballah. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 58.(Witnesses Y and Z provide evidence about this terrorist training.) See also Baer, See NoEvil, p. 250 (regarding IRGC training of Saudi Hizballah terrorist cadres in Lebanonduring this time frame).2. The 1993 Meeting in Khartoum. In 1993, in a meeting in Khartoum,Sudan, arranged by Ali Mohamed (a confessed al Qaeda terrorist and trainer, see Ex.31 48 ), Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri met directly with Iran‘s master terrorist48 Ali Mohamed was convicted for his role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania andKenya. As part of his guilty plea, Ali Mohamed attested to his role in setting up the Khartoummeeting:56
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Zawahiri met with Imad Mughniyah, who convinced him of the power of suicidebombing, a significant event because suicide was prohibited by most Islamic clerics, bothSunni and Shi‘a. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 51.In December 1991, <strong>Iran</strong>‘s President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, IntelligenceMinister Ali Fallahian, IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezai, and Defense Minister AliAkbar Torkan paid an official visit to Sudan where, in meetings also attended by ImadMughniyah, they committed to send weapons shipments and as many as 2,000Revolutionary Guards to Sudan. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 136.―In late 1991 or 1992, discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and <strong>Iran</strong>ianoperatives led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support – even if onlytraining – for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States. Not longafterward, senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers traveled to <strong>Iran</strong> to receive training inexplosives.‖ 9/11 REPORT, p. 61. Ayman al Zawahiri made efforts to connect Osama binLaden with <strong>Iran</strong>, and bin Laden sent some of his senior aides to <strong>Iran</strong> for training with theIRGC and to Lebanon for training with Hizballah. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 58.(Witnesses Y and Z provide evidence about this terrorist training.) See also Baer, See NoEvil, p. 250 (regarding IRGC training of Saudi Hizballah terrorist cadres in Lebanonduring this time frame).2. The 1993 Meeting in Khartoum. In 1993, in a meeting in Khartoum,Sudan, arranged by Ali Mohamed (a confessed al Qaeda terrorist and trainer, see Ex.31 48 ), Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri met directly with <strong>Iran</strong>‘s master terrorist48 Ali Mohamed was convicted for his role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania andKenya. As part of his guilty plea, Ali Mohamed attested to his role in setting up the Khartoummeeting:56
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