brief - Iran 911 Case

their divisions and join against the common enemy‖ – the West. 9/11 REPORT, p. 61; seealso Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 57, 132. Osama bin Laden, whose own ―vision mirroredthat of Sudan‘s Islamist leader, Turabi,‖ ―seemed willing to include in the confederationterrorists from almost every corner of the Muslim world.‖ 9/11 REPORT, pp. 60-61.Iran‘s thinking was in accord with al Turabi‘s as well. ―Iran has long tried tobridge the Shi‘a-Sunni divide . . . for strategic reasons – . . . Iran seeks influence andstature with [Middle Eastern] peoples – and because Iran sees itself as the leader of theMuslim world and a revolutionary power that transcends sectarian differences.‖ Ex. 3,Byman Affid. 23; see also 18-22, 24-28. 47In October 1991, Iran invited al Turabi to speak at its international conference insupport of Palestinians. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 47. In 1991-92, Iran founded a neworganization, al Majma‟ al Alami lil-Taqrib bayna al Madhahib al Islamiyyah(International Institute for Rapprochement Among the Islamic Legal School) to promotepublicly a reconciliation of the rival Sunni and Shiite sects. Ex. 2, Timmerman 2ndAffid. 47. Casting aside the historic bitterness between the Sunni and Shi‘a sects ofIslam, al Turabi and Iran‘s political leadership and intelligence agencies proceeded toestablish close ties – the beginnings of a united Sunni-Shiite front against the UnitedStates and the West. Id., 48; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 132-33.Hassan al Turabi and Ayman al Zawahiri both became key links between thevarious radical Islamic terrorists assembled in Sudan and Iran. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid.54. In 1991, al Zawahiri paid a clandestine visit to Iran to ask for help in his campaignto overthrow the government of Egypt. There, and in subsequent visits to Iran, al47 For many years, a special department within the Supreme Leader‘s office known as ―Rahman alRahim‖ had been devoted to supporting both Shiite and Sunni jihadi organizations. Ex. 2, Timmerman2nd Affid. p. 14, n. 12.55