brief - Iran 911 Case

40, 55-60, 110-12, 132-39, 163, 174, 186, 310, 351, 352, 356; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2ndAffid. 112-13. Indeed, both Iran and al Qaeda ―can be ruthlessly pragmatic, cuttingdeals with potential future adversaries 41 to advance their cause in the short-term.‖ Ex. 3,Byman Affid. 41-42; see also Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 4. 42 ―Because of thispragmatism, the Sunni-Shi‘a split and the jihadist hostility toward Iran does not preventtactical cooperation. . . . Iran has sought to rise above Sunni-Shi‘a differences, andseveral Sunni leaders have also done so.‖ Ex. 3, Byman Affid. 43.Members of the Shiite and Sunni sects – particularly at the leadership level –often work together on terrorist operations. The religious differences, to the extent theyretain any vitality at the leadership level, 43 are trumped by the leaders‘ desire to confrontand oppose common enemies, particularly the U.S. and Israel. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid.46;; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 57, 186; Ex. 3, Byman Affid. 41-44; Ex. 2,Timmerman 2nd Affid. 112-13. Thus, Iran, though Shiite, is willing to use, co-opt, andsupport Sunnis as proxies to carry out acts of terrorism. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 46; Ex.6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 58; Ex. 3 Byman Affid. 41-44; Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 36, 66;Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 112-13; Baer, The Devil We Know, pp. 168-73.41 For Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, ―‗the gravity of the situation requires al Qaeda topursue its interests by any means available; conventional morality impinges on its political thoughtonly with regard to its utility in manipulating others. . . . [E]ven Ayman al Zawahiri, who is consideredmore doctrinaire than bin Laden, wanted to delay the conflict with the Shi‘a until the short-term goal ofdefeating the United States is met. For these leaders, the reasons to keep cooperation with Iran at alow profile are primarily driven by a fear of losing recruits, money, and prestige rather than a deepseatedantipathy toward working with a Shi‘a power.‖ Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 41, quoting S. Bar andY. Minzili, see n. 21.42 Indeed, Iran even worked with Israel and the United States to obtain weapons parts, which led to theIran-Contra Affair during the 1980s. After the Iran-Iraq War, Iran worked with its nemesis SaddamHussein to counter United Nations sanctions by helping Saddam smuggle Iraqi oil past UN monitors toworld markets. More recently, Iran has provided ―opportunistic support‖ to the Taliban even as itpublicly worked with the pro-U.S. Karzai regime in Afghanistan. Ex. 3, Byman Affid. 42.43 As former Iranian president Banisadr explained, Iran‘s hard-line leaders ―have no real tie to Islam, andthey don‘t care about Islam, they only care about power. . . . [They only use Islam as a rationale] inorder to appear more legitimate.‖ Ex. 11, Banisadr testimony, p. 23.53