elease the last hostages).3. Hijackings. During the same time period, <strong>Iran</strong>‘s proxies carried out awave of civilian aircraft hijackings, including the 1984 hijacking of Kuwait Airlinesflight 221, during which two USAID officials were murdered and their bodies dumped onan airport tarmac, Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 29-31, and the 1985 hijacking ofTWA Flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver, Robert Stethem, was murdered in coldblood on an airport tarmac in full view of rolling television cameras. Stethem v. IslamicRepublic of <strong>Iran</strong>, 201 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C. 2002). Authorities later found Mughniyah‘sfingerprints in TWA 847‘s lavatory, which led to his indictment. Baer, The Devil WeKnow, pp. 79-80; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 34-37.4. Assassinations. During the 1980s and 90s, particularly following the endof the <strong>Iran</strong>-Iraq War, the Islamic regime assassinated scores of <strong>Iran</strong>ian dissidents inside<strong>Iran</strong> and on foreign soil. See, e.g., Elahi v. Islamic Republic of <strong>Iran</strong>, 124 F.Supp.2d 97(D.D.C. 2000). The most notorious of these assassinations outside of <strong>Iran</strong> was themassacre of four Kurdish leaders in Berlin‘s Mykonos restaurant in September 1992,which led to a diplomatic crisis between the European Union countries and <strong>Iran</strong>.Domestically, the gruesome killings of Dariush Forouhar and his wife ParvanehEskandari revealed MOIS‘ role in the ―Chain Murders‖ of scores of intellectuals andpolitical dissidents inside <strong>Iran</strong>. 38 Significantly, during this era, ―MOIS was granted anextraordinary degree of authority to assassinate, attack, kidnap, and kill <strong>Iran</strong>ian dissidentsand exiles but also . . . to forge alliances with like-minded Islamic jihadist entities . . . .These jihadist foreign policy objectives made <strong>Iran</strong>‘s consolidation of ties with al Qaeda a38 See Ex. 32, Timmerman, ―Banisadr Fingers Top Leadership in Murders,‖ The <strong>Iran</strong> Brief, Sept. 7, 1996;Safa Haeri, ―Double-wiring of the Forouhar Residence Led to the Murderers,‖ <strong>Iran</strong> Press Service,February 2, 1999.51
predictable occurrence.‖ Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 176 (emphasis omitted). (WitnessesX, Y, and Z all provide additional information about the <strong>Iran</strong>ian regime‘s use ofassassination and murder, internationally and domestically, to further its policy goals.)Importantly, every attack, car-bombing, kidnapping, hijacking, and assassinationcarried out by <strong>Iran</strong>‟s proxies, such as Hizballah, the IJO, and the PFLP-GC, wasapproved by the IRGC and <strong>Iran</strong>‟s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, or, after hisdeath, his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei. Baer, The Devil We Know, pp. 64-65, andSee No Evil, p. 264; see Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 36, 58; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 30;Ex. 32. (Witness X testifies regarding his personal knowledge of the Supreme Leaderblessing the perpetrators of such crimes before they carried them out.)D. Bridging the Sunni-Shi’a Divide: The <strong>Iran</strong>-Hizballah-al QaedaTerrorist AllianceSome Western analysts continue to believe in the now-outdated conventionalwisdom that the centuries-old historical religious rift between Sunnis (such as al Qaeda)and Shi‘a (such as <strong>Iran</strong> and Hizballah) somehow precludes their working together, evenin areas of common interest. 39 Although common Sunnis and Shi‘a may hold suchgrudges based on religious differences, 40 the public myth that a historical religious-basedenmity precludes all cooperation between Shi‘a and Sunni terrorists is simply mistaken,an old school analysis that has not kept pace with current knowledge and realities. Baer,The Devil We Know, pp. 68-71; Ex. 3, Byman Affid. 41-43; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid.39 Some members of the U.S. intelligence community are belatedly reassessing the conventional wisdom.As stated by former State Department Counterterrorism official Larry Johnson, ―‗when you seesomeone like Mughniyah meeting with bin Laden, and Mughniyah moves freely back and forthbetween the Bekaa Valley and <strong>Iran</strong> – and the Bekaa Valley is where the explosives come out . . . , allof a sudden, you need to step back and say, ‗okay, maybe this is not quite as we pictured it.‘‖ Ex. 6,Lopez-Tefft Affid. 186.40 The existence of the historic rift may be one reason <strong>Iran</strong> kept its terrorist training camps segregatedalong sectarian, and even nationality, lines. See Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 62-66, 112, and n. 37.52
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