Affid. 63; see also Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 35; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 24-25.The fact that the IRGC has provided funding and training for Hizballah, HAMAS,and al Qaeda terrorist operations targeting American and Israeli citizens has been welldocumented for more than two decades. Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 36. For more than aquarter century since its creation, <strong>Iran</strong> has provided Hizballah with $100 million to $300million in direct financial support annually. Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 66; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 31; Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 26.In providing support to these three organizations, the IRGC isacting as an official agency whose activities are tightly andcarefully controlled by the <strong>Iran</strong>ian government through theSupreme Leader and his representatives. The terrorism trainingprovided to Hizbollah, HAMAS, and al Qaeda by the IRGC is partof an official policy of the <strong>Iran</strong>ian government.Id. (emphasis omitted). Less than two weeks after 9/11, on September 23, 2001, the U.S.Treasury Department designated the IRGC-Qods Force as a terrorist organization for―providing material support to the Taliban and other terrorist organizations,‖ and, on June28, 2005, the U.S. State Department designated the IRGC as a ―foreign terroristorganization.‖ Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 65 (emphasis omitted).The MOIS (in Farsi, VEVAK) is <strong>Iran</strong>‘s world-class intelligence agency. With30,000 employees, it is the largest intelligence agency in the Middle East. Its annualbudget is somewhere between $100 million and $400 million. Ex. 8, Clawson Affid.38; Ex. 11, Banisadr testimony, p. 12. Created in 1985 after the ouster of presidentAbolhassan Banisadr, its predecessor was not the Shah‘s intelligence agency, SAVAK,which had been dissolved, but rather Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini‘s ownintelligence service, which had no name and was engaged in the business ofassassinations. Ex. 11, Banisadr testimony, pp. 11-12. Many of the U.S. State45
Department reports on global terrorism refer to MOIS as <strong>Iran</strong>‘s key facilitator anddirector of terrorist attacks. See Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 39; Ex. 13. After the discoveryof MOIS‘ role in a series of assassinations of intellectuals, writers, and dissidents in thelate 1990s, known in <strong>Iran</strong> as the ―Chain Murders,‖ see Banisadr testimony at 15-16 andinfra at p. 50, led to so-called ―reformists‖ gaining influence within MOIS, the SupremeLeader, Ayatollah Khamenei, would again form a special, unnamed intelligence servicethat operated directly under his control. 29Further, the entire apparatus of the <strong>Iran</strong>ian state and government, and many partsof the private sector, including corporations (e.g., National <strong>Iran</strong>ian Oil Company, <strong>Iran</strong>Air, <strong>Iran</strong> Shipping Lines), banks (e.g., Central Bank, Bank Sepah), state-run media (e.g.,IRIB television, the Islamic Revolution News Agency (―IRNA‖), KAYHAN and otherdaily newspapers), private individuals, and even charities are at the service of theSupreme Leader, the IRGC, and the MOIS when it comes to support of terrorism. Ex.11, Banisadr testimony, pp. 19-20; Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 91-96, 190-212.(Witness X provides additional evidence concerning the usage of the entire apparatus ofthe <strong>Iran</strong>ian government in the service of terrorism, as well as the use of private entities asfront companies, and the co-opting of other types of private entities and individuals forservice in <strong>Iran</strong>‘s network of terror.) And <strong>Iran</strong>‘s extended apparatus of terrorism is verywell funded:You won‘t find in the budget . . . a line item for that type of activity[terrorism]. It began under Mr. Rafsanjani, where every one of theseorgans involved in overseas terrorist activities would have its ownfinancial setup to finance its operations. For instance Vevak, or MOIS,had many companies that supported its operations, and especially the29 Witnesses X, Y, and Z all provide significant additional evidence about the roles of MOIS, thepresident, and the Supreme Leader in the ―Chain Murders,‖ and about the existence, organization, andfunctioning of the intelligence apparatus of the Supreme Leader.46
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