confession of the ―mastermind‖ of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (―KSM‖).Summary: The expert affiants provide substantial analysis of the evidenceaddressing the following topics:<strong>Iran</strong>‘s role as the world‘s preeminent sponsor of international terrorism;<strong>Iran</strong>‘s motivations for engaging in and sponsoring terrorism as a matter offoreign and domestic policy, in particular, its goals of regional hegemony andeliminating U.S. presence and influence, in the Middle East;<strong>Iran</strong>‘s methodology of supporting terrorist operations and the roles of <strong>Iran</strong>‘sSupreme Leader and his special intelligence apparatus, the <strong>Iran</strong>ianRevolutionary Guard Corps (―IRGC‖), and the Ministry of Information andSecurity (―MOIS‖), in providing direct and material support for terroristorganizations, as well as <strong>Iran</strong>‘s unlimited usage of the agencies andinstrumentalities of the <strong>Iran</strong>ian state and government, including even privateentities, to engage in and support terrorism;<strong>Iran</strong>‘s creation and sponsorship of proxy terrorist organizations as appendagesof the <strong>Iran</strong>ian state, most notably, Hizballah, and linkages between Hizballah,particularly through the master terrorist Imad Mughniyah, and al Qaeda;<strong>Iran</strong>‘s connections to, material support for, and direct support of andpartnership with, international terrorist groups, most importantly for thepresent case, al Qaeda;<strong>Iran</strong>‘s strategy and actions to move beyond the centuries-old historical splitbetween Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims in order to form a cooperative alliance ofconvenience for the purpose of unifying and expanding Islamic opposition tothe West, particularly the U.S. and Israel, and employing terrorism as a meansto that end; and<strong>Iran</strong>‘s strategy of leading the Muslim world‘s opposition to the leadership ofthe United States while preserving itself and creating plausible deniability ofits role in global terrorism.Altogether, the expert analyses, considered in the context of the Baer publications,compel the conclusions that <strong>Iran</strong> provided material support to al Qaeda generally in theyears before September 11, 2001, that <strong>Iran</strong> provided material and direct support to alQaeda in the preparation for and implementation of the 9/11 plot, and that, after the fact,33
<strong>Iran</strong> provided material and direct support by aiding and abetting al Qaeda members whoevaded the American-led military forces that uprooted al Qaeda and overthrew theTaliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001. ―Few if any noted terrorism experts woulddispute that <strong>Iran</strong> provides material support to al-Qaeda within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.Section 2339A(b)1.‖ Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 56 (emphasis omitted).3. THE FACT WITNESSESThe Havlish Plaintiffs also submit, under seal at present, approximately twentyeight(28) hours of sworn fact witness testimony, via videotaped depositions of four<strong>Iran</strong>ian witnesses. Three of these witnesses are defectors from the <strong>Iran</strong>ian governmentwho testify to their knowledge of <strong>Iran</strong>ian government complicity in the 9/11 attacks –before, contemporaneously with, and after, the attacks, supported by government lettersand memoranda, photographs, and organizational charts. The factual evidence alsoincludes a sealed affidavit of an American investigative journalist who corroboratescertain aspects of the sealed testimony, provides details concerning the Havlish fieldinvestigation which produced the factual testimony of the four <strong>Iran</strong>ian witnesses, anddiscloses additional supporting facts and sources.a. Witnesses X, Y, and Z. Three of the Havlish fact witnesses are defectors<strong>Iran</strong>‘s secretive Ministry of Information and Security (―MOIS‖), roughly the equivalentof the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, who worked in positions that gave them accessto sensitive information regarding <strong>Iran</strong>‘s state sponsorship of terrorism. Very little of theevidence contained in the sealed testimony of Witnesses X, Y, and Z (Ex. S-1, S-2, S-3,S-4, S-5, S-6, and S-7), discussed in Plaintiffs‘ Second (Sealed) Memorandum, has beenbrought to light in any public forum, although some of it is apparently known to the U.S.34
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The January 16, 2009, Treasury desi
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Indeed, Iran permitted al Qaeda to
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The fact is that many important ―
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little other than KSM‘s own self-
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terrorism operations against the U.
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of Mughniyah‘s offices in Beirut.
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provided material support to al Qae
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Walter S. Batty, Jr. (PA Bar No. 02
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