foreign terrorist organizations in particular, Israeli investigative journalist and scholarRonen Bergman provides an 80-paragraph affidavit (Ex. 7, redacted, and S-13,unredacted) addressing, inter alia, the early and continuing connections between <strong>Iran</strong> andal Qaeda, and <strong>Iran</strong>‘s material aid and support to al Qaeda before and after September 11,2001. Dr. Bergman discusses <strong>Iran</strong>‘s long terrorist history, its place ―at the center of therise of modern terrorism,‖ its methods, geopolitical motivations, and the founding of itsterrorist proxy organization, Hizballah. Dr. Bergman details the cooperation among <strong>Iran</strong>,Hizballah (prominently, Imad Mughniyah), and al Qaeda. Dr. Bergman‘s affidavitincludes revelations about the nature and extent of <strong>Iran</strong>ian sponsorship of internationalterrorism known to him as a product of his special relationships with top level Israeliintelligence and military officials.. . . [I]t is my expert opinion that Islamic Republic of <strong>Iran</strong> was, andis, a benefactor of, and provided material aid, resources, and support toOsama bin Laden and al Qaeda, both before and after the attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001, on the United States. Further, it is my expert opinionthat the Islamic Republic of <strong>Iran</strong> stands at the center of the rise of modernterrorism, and that <strong>Iran</strong> consistently supports terrorist operations against anumber of targets throughout the world, including the United States.. . . . This facilitation enabled the acquisition of important traveldocuments, passports, and visa and therefore, entry into the United States.. . . . The [May 14, 2001] memo mandates that the intelligenceapparatus of the Office of the Supreme Leader is to directly supervise alloperations, and it conveys the Supreme Leader‘s ―full support in theimplementation of its future plans.‖ Finally, and significantly, the [May14, 2001] memorandum ―emphasizes that, with regard to cooperation withal Qaeda, no traces must be left that might have negative and irreversibleconsequences, and that [the activity] must be limited to existing contactswith Mughniyah and al Zawahiri.Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 16-17, 75-76 and Ex. B thereto (emphasis omitted).f. Dr. Patrick Clawson. Noted <strong>Iran</strong> expert Dr. Patrick L. Clawson has testified as anexpert in dozens of federal court cases regarding <strong>Iran</strong>‘s state sponsorship of terrorism.27
Perhaps the leading expert on <strong>Iran</strong> in the United States, Dr. Clawson has lecturedthroughout the world on the topic of <strong>Iran</strong> and terrorism. Over the last twenty-five years,Dr. Clawson has served as a consultant to the Central Intelligence Agency, the DefenseDepartment, the State Department, the National Security Agency, and the DefenseIntelligence Agency, while also consulting with U.S. military officials. Widelypublished, Dr. Clawson has also testified before many U.S. House and SenateCommittees. Dr. Clawson attests, in a 73-paragraph affidavit (Ex. 8, redacted, and Ex. S-14, unredacted), to the political, religious, and cultural structure that produces <strong>Iran</strong>‘s statesponsorship of terrorism, and he analyzes the economics of <strong>Iran</strong>‘s support for terrorism.He also discusses U.S. governmental and non-governmental judgments on <strong>Iran</strong> and <strong>Iran</strong>‘srole as a state sponsor of terrorism, and he explains why the factual and expert evidencein this case compels the conclusion that <strong>Iran</strong> provided material support to al Qaeda inconnection with the 9/11 attacks upon America. Dr. Clawson also highlights an oftenoverlooked fact, stated in the 9/11 REPORT at p. 241, that ―‗[a]fter 9/11 <strong>Iran</strong> and Hizbollahwish[ed] to conceal any past evidence of cooperation with Sunni terrorist[s] associatedwith al Qaeda.‘‖ Ex. 8, Clawson Affid. 50 (emphasis omitted).In addition to the State Department Annual Report, the mostauthoritative U.S. government sources have issued repeated and detaileddescriptions of <strong>Iran</strong>ian material support to al Qaeda before, during andafter the 9/11 attacks. . As seen in the 9/11 Commission Report and theUS Treasury Designations, the evidence is clear and convincing.. . . .It is my expert opinion that <strong>Iran</strong> has provided material support toal-Qaeda before, during and after the events of September 11, 2001.<strong>Iran</strong>ian support of al-Qaeda through its instrumentalities, theRevolutionary Guard and MOIS, is consistent with its foreign policy ofsupporting terrorism against the United States.. . . . [T]he central assistance of material support provided by <strong>Iran</strong>to al Qaeda regarding September 11, 2001 is . . . travel facilitation and safehaven.28
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