attacks. Kephart‘s analysis concludes that <strong>Iran</strong> provided material and direct support forthe 9/11 operation in the form of facilitation of the hijackers‘ travel, which was critical tothe success of the 9/11 plot.This Affidavit concludes that (1) facilitation of terrorist travel iscritical material support to terrorist operations; and (2) <strong>Iran</strong>‘s facilitationof al Qaeda operative travel, including at least eight 9/11 hijackers,amounted to essential material support, indeed, direct support that furtherenabled al Qaeda to perpetrate the 9/11 attacks successfully. <strong>Iran</strong> itself,and through its surrogate, Hizballah, gave direct support to the 9/11conspirators . . . . Al Qaeda‘s complex and well-executed travel plan that,at a minimum, required complicity by <strong>Iran</strong>ian government officials,including transit through <strong>Iran</strong> to Afghanistan and into <strong>Iran</strong> after acquisitionof U.S. visas (likely for next-phase training or meetings), contributed tothe success of the 9/11 operations.. . . . Keeping [the hijackers‘] passports ―clean‖ of <strong>Iran</strong>ian orAfghani travel stamps was essential now that the critical step in acquiringU.S. visas [was] achieved.. . . .. . . . Thus, <strong>Iran</strong>‘s facilitation of the hijackers‘ ―terrorist travel‖operation, involving Imad Mughniyah, constituted material support –indeed, direct support – for al Qaeda‘s 9/11 attacks.Ex. 4, Kephart Affid. 3, 4, 71 (emphasis omitted).d. Clare Lopez and Dr. Bruce Tefft. With over fifty years of undercover caseoperations and intelligence analysis work throughout the world, distinguished formercareer CIA operatives Clare M. Lopez and Dr. Bruce D. Tefft combined to produce a144-page, 369-paragraph affidavit (Ex. 6, redacted, and Ex. S-12, unredacted), settingforth a thorough analysis of open source material on <strong>Iran</strong> and terrorism. This materialincludes the 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, with significant analysis of pages 240-241, aswell as of twenty-five years of State Department reports on international terrorism, U.S.Treasury designations of terrorist entities, and an enormous amount of material on thehistory of terrorism and <strong>Iran</strong>‘s prominent place as the leading state sponsor of terror inthe world. Ms. Lopez and Dr. Tefft discuss <strong>Iran</strong>‘s long history of using terrorism as an25
instrument of foreign and domestic policy, and they debunk the prior conventionalwisdom that Sunni and Shi‘a terror groups cannot and do not work together. (The lateOsama bin Laden‘s al Qaeda are Sunni; <strong>Iran</strong> and Hizballah are Shi‘a.) They describehow the <strong>Iran</strong>ian state makes decisions and the critical roles played by the SupremeLeader, the IRGC, the MOIS, and other parts of the state apparatus in matters ofterrorism. Ms. Lopez and Dr. Tefft discuss how <strong>Iran</strong> controls proxy terroristorganizations, most notably its own creation, Hizballah, <strong>Iran</strong>‘s close relationship withHizballah‘s master terrorist Imad Mughniyah, and how the <strong>Iran</strong>-Hizballah-al Qaedarelationship began and developed over time. Additionally, the Lopez-Tefft Affidavitexamines the testimony of the three MOIS defectors, Witnesses X, Y, and Z, and former<strong>Iran</strong>ian president Abolhassan Banisadr, and the reasons for crediting the testimony ofeach of those witnesses.We conclude that Imad Mughniyah, the most notable and notoriousworld terrorist of his time, an agent of <strong>Iran</strong> and a senior operative ofHizballah, facilitated the international travel of certain 9/11 hijackers toand from <strong>Iran</strong>, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, and perhapsvarious other locations for the purpose of executing the events ofSeptember 11, 2001. This support enabled two vital aspects of theSeptember 11, 2001 plot to succeed: (1) the continued training of thehijackers in Afghanistan and <strong>Iran</strong> after securing their United States visasin Saudi Arabia, and (2) entry into the United States.. . . .We conclude that the material support provided by <strong>Iran</strong>/Hizballahto al Qaeda both BEFORE and AFTER the events of September 11, 2001involved, among other matters, planning, recruitment, training, financialservices, expert advice and assistance, lodging and safe houses, falsedocumentation and identification, communications equipment, facilities,weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, and travel facilitation.Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 35, 37 (emphasis omitted).e. Dr. Ronen Bergman. Considered one of the principal experts on theIsraeli intelligence community‘s assessment of <strong>Iran</strong> in general, and the <strong>Iran</strong>ian support of26
- Page 2: FOREIGN STATE DEFENDANTS: ::THE ISL
- Page 12 and 13: D. CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF NON-U.S. NAT
- Page 15 and 16: In order to revise its pleading to
- Page 17 and 18: cooperated and coordinated with, an
- Page 19 and 20: Indeed, the 9/11 REPORT notes a num
- Page 21 and 22: senior Hezbollah operative. Also in
- Page 23 and 24: Timmerman 2nd Affid. 124. 14Althoug
- Page 25 and 26: facilitating the travel of the 9/11
- Page 27 and 28: officials provided direct and mater
- Page 29: after September 11, 2001, in the fo
- Page 33 and 34: Perhaps the leading expert on Iran
- Page 35 and 36: INTERPOL, Edgar A. Adamson attests,
- Page 37 and 38: 2. THE ROBERT BAER PUBLICATIONSForm
- Page 39 and 40: Iran provided material and direct s
- Page 41 and 42: Iran‘s anticipation of a retaliat
- Page 43 and 44: every year since 1984. Ex. 3, Byman
- Page 45 and 46: Testimony of Witness X, February 23
- Page 47 and 48: unning through the contemporary Mid
- Page 49 and 50: We Know, p. 127; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft
- Page 51 and 52: Department reports on global terror
- Page 53 and 54: terrorist recruits from a variety o
- Page 55 and 56: and al Qaeda, of the ―most formid
- Page 57 and 58: predictable occurrence.‖ Ex. 6, L
- Page 59 and 60: The factual reality - as found by t
- Page 61 and 62: Zawahiri met with Imad Mughniyah, w
- Page 63 and 64: The historic 1993 meeting in Kharto
- Page 65 and 66: continuing terrorist training of al
- Page 67 and 68: the issuance of INTERPOL Red Notice
- Page 69 and 70: investigators concluded the operati
- Page 71 and 72: symbols. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid.
- Page 73 and 74: worldwide terrorism is ―a report
- Page 75 and 76: AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, pp. 65-66. Mo
- Page 77 and 78: see Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 148
- Page 79 and 80: that the ―senior Hezbollah operat
- Page 81 and 82:
actual foreknowledge of the plannin
- Page 83 and 84:
Thus, Iran‘s facilitation of the
- Page 85 and 86:
the present day. Testifying before
- Page 87 and 88:
January 16, 2009; Ex. 2, Timmerman
- Page 89 and 90:
The January 16, 2009, Treasury desi
- Page 91 and 92:
Indeed, Iran permitted al Qaeda to
- Page 93 and 94:
The fact is that many important ―
- Page 95 and 96:
little other than KSM‘s own self-
- Page 97 and 98:
terrorism operations against the U.
- Page 99 and 100:
of Mughniyah‘s offices in Beirut.
- Page 101 and 102:
provided material support to al Qae
- Page 103 and 104:
Walter S. Batty, Jr. (PA Bar No. 02
- Page 105 and 106:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 107 and 108:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 109 and 110:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 111 and 112:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 113 and 114:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 115 and 116:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 117 and 118:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 119 and 120:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 121 and 122:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 123 and 124:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 125 and 126:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
- Page 127:
APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR