1. THE EXPERT WITNESSESThe Havlish Plaintiffs submit affidavits from ten experts in the fields ofinternational terrorism, intelligence, and the <strong>Iran</strong>ian state, including <strong>Iran</strong>‘s government,politics, and revolutionary institutions. They also discuss the relationship between Shi‘aIslam (<strong>Iran</strong> is Shi‘a) and Sunni Islam (al Qaeda, e.g., is a Sunni organization). Theevidence from these ten experts alone provides clear and convincing evidence of thePlaintiff‘s allegations in this case.These experts provide detailed analyses of the factual evidence and/or thoroughdiscussions of, inter alia, the historical record of <strong>Iran</strong>‘s involvement in terrorism and itssponsorship of, and relationships with, both Shi‘a and Sunni terror groups. 16Additionally, several of the experts analyze the 9/11 REPORT itself and provide detailsabout the discoveries that led to the inclusion of pages 240 and 241. The expertwitnesses analyze the 9/11 REPORT, U.S. State Department terrorism reports, U.S.Treasury Department reports, court records, FBI and INTERPOL notices, declassifiedintelligence agency materials, other governmental documents, open source information,and information from intelligence sources. 17 Plaintiffs‘ expert witnesses conclude that,based on this information alone, there is clear and convincing evidence that <strong>Iran</strong> and its16 Evidence of <strong>Iran</strong>‘s extensive record of involvement in, and sponsorship of terrorism, including its useof proxies to engage in terrorist operations other than 9/11, is admissible in this case as proof ofmotive, intent, preparation, plan, and knowledge. Rule 404(b), Fed.R.Evid. See Huddleston v. UnitedStates, 485 U.S. 681 (1988)(similar acts evidence should be admitted under Rule 404(b) if there issufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the similar act). Indeed, many ofthese terrorist acts have themselves been adjudicated to judgment against <strong>Iran</strong> in other federal courts.See Section I.A., supra, and Appendix A. Moreover, the experts may use facts relating to suchterrorist acts to inform their expert opinions in this case. Rule 703, Fed.R.Evid.17 The term ―open source‖ refers to information or data obtained from overt, available sources in thepublic sector, as opposed to covert, secret, or classified material. See Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. p. 19,n. 8.21
officials provided direct and material support to al Qaeda for their involvement in the9/11 terrorist attacks.In addition, two of the experts, Clare Lopez and Dr. Bruce Tefft, intensivelyscrutinized the fact testimony of the four <strong>Iran</strong>ian defectors (including former presidentBanisadr). Some of the expert affidavits contain particular factual information known bythe affiants (Timmerman, Bruguière, Snell, Kephart, Bergman, and Adamson). Whilenone of the affiants can reveal classified information, none of them attests to anyinformation or expert opinion which is in conflict with what he or she knows to be truebased on classified information.Plaintiffs also cite the published works of noted Middle East terrorism expertRobert Baer, a former career case officer of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)from 1976 to 1997.The Experts. The first three experts listed below are former 9/11 Commissionstaff members, Dietrich Snell, Daniel Byman, and Janice Kephart, who provide affidavitsaddressing significant factual information known to them as a result of their work on the9/11 Commission staff. These three 9/11 Commission staffers‘ affidavits detail, interalia, critical information which puts in context the conclusions set forth on pages 240-241of the 9/11 REPORT and which demonstrate <strong>Iran</strong>‘s and Hizballah‘s material and directsupport of al Qaeda in regard to the 9/11 attacks.a. Dietrich L. Snell was a Senior Counsel on the Commission and the teamleader in charge of the staff group that investigated the 9/11 conspiracy itself. A highlyexperienced state and federal prosecutor, Mr. Snell was involved in the investigation andprosecution of high-profile terrorism cases, including, among others, Ramzi Yousef and22
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see Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 148
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that the ―senior Hezbollah operat
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Thus, Iran‘s facilitation of the
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the present day. Testifying before
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The January 16, 2009, Treasury desi
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Indeed, Iran permitted al Qaeda to
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The fact is that many important ―
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little other than KSM‘s own self-
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terrorism operations against the U.
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of Mughniyah‘s offices in Beirut.
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provided material support to al Qae
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Walter S. Batty, Jr. (PA Bar No. 02
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