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within file cabinets full of thousands of hard-copy documents at the Fort Meadeheadquarters of the National Security Agency (―NSA‖), some of which had been movedto the 9/11 Commission‘s reading room in Washington. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 102;Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 120-29; see Shenon, Phillip, The Commission, pp. 155-57; 371-73, Twelve / Grand Central Publishing, Hatchette Book Group USA (2008). TheNSA documents, which included electronic intercepts, were described by one of theCommission staff members who reviewed them as ―‗a gold mine, full of criticalinformation about al Qaeda and other terrorist groups dating back to the early 1990s.‘‖Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 103. Among the NSA materials were seventy-five (75)critical documents comprising a record of operational ties between Iran and al Qaedaduring the critical months just prior to September 11, 2001. Ex. 2, Timmerman 2ndAffid. 120-23. As described by the 9/11 Commission‘s conspiracy Team Leader, theintelligence reports found ―at virtually the last moment‖provid[ed] clear evidence that as many as ten of the 14 Saudi musclehijackers involved in the 9/11 attack traveled into or out of Iran betweenOctober 2000 and February 2001, a critical period in the life of theconspiracy when those operatives had to interrupt their training inAfghanistan to obtain U.S. visas in Saudi Arabia before returning for thefinal training in Afghanistan and Pakistan that would precede theireventual journey to the United States. Moreover, . . . [the intelligencereports] established a series of links between travel apparently conductedby various muscle hijackers during this stage of the plot and facilitationactivities of senior members of Hezbollah, the Iranian-supportedinternational terrorist organization.Ex. 5, Snell Affid. 19. Based on other sources, it is known that these intelligencereports were NSA materials that showed Iran had facilitated the travel of the al Qaedaoperatives and that Iranian border inspectors had been ordered not to place telltale stampsin the operatives‘ passports, thus keeping their travel documents clean. Ex. 2,17
Timmerman 2nd Affid. 124. 14Although there was not time for substantial analysis or investigation of the NSAevidence, the Commission did seek out corroboration beyond the FBI‘s Penttbominvestigation briefings. ―Given the inconclusive nature of this last-minute evidenceapparently linking certain travel in furtherance of the 9/11 plot with Iran and Hezbollah,the Commission staff recognized the importance of obtaining some measure ofcorroboration before including the evidence in the Report. Such corroboration wasobtained.‖ Ex. 5, Snell Affid. 20. The Commission staff drafted pertinent questions tobe put, through U.S. intelligence, to Guantanamo detainees Ramzi Binalshibh (al Qaeda‘sliaison to the Mohammad Atta cell in Hamburg, Germany, see 9/11 REPORT, pp. 167-68;225) and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (―KSM‖ who claims to be the mastermind of the9/11 attacks, see 9/11 REPORT, pp. 145, 149-50). Responses were received on July 16,2004, days before publication of the final 9/11 REPORT on July 22, 2004. Ex. 5, SnellAffid. 20.Both Binalshibh and KSM ―‗confirmed that several of the 9/11 hijackers (at leasteight, according to Binalshibh) transited Iran on their way to or from Afghanistan, takingadvantage of the Iranian practice of not stamping Saudi [al Qaeda] passports.‘‖ Id., 21,quoting 9/11 REPORT, p. 241. ―Thus, both detainees provided information tending tocorroborate the evidentiary support that already existed for the Penttbom team‘s theoryregarding the important role played by Iran in facilitating the 9/11 attack.‖ Ex. 5, Snell14 Kenneth Timmerman first published the story of the Commission‘s late discovery of the NSA material.Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid., 120-29. The NSA material was also discussed in a book by NEWYORK TIMES reporter Phillip Shenon. According to Shenon, 9/11 Commission Executive DirectorPhillip Zelikow, commenting on the NSA files, said that ―critical evidence about bin Laden‘s terroristnetwork sat buried in government files, unread to this day.‖ Shenon, The Commission, pp. 155-57;371-73.18
Page 2: FOREIGN STATE DEFENDANTS: ::THE ISL
Page 12 and 13: D. CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF NON-U.S. NAT
Page 15 and 16: In order to revise its pleading to
Page 17 and 18: cooperated and coordinated with, an
Page 19 and 20: Indeed, the 9/11 REPORT notes a num
Page 21: senior Hezbollah operative. Also in
Page 25 and 26: facilitating the travel of the 9/11
Page 27 and 28: officials provided direct and mater
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Page 33 and 34: Perhaps the leading expert on Iran
Page 35 and 36: INTERPOL, Edgar A. Adamson attests,
Page 37 and 38: 2. THE ROBERT BAER PUBLICATIONSForm
Page 39 and 40: Iran provided material and direct s
Page 41 and 42: Iran‘s anticipation of a retaliat
Page 43 and 44: every year since 1984. Ex. 3, Byman
Page 45 and 46: Testimony of Witness X, February 23
Page 47 and 48: unning through the contemporary Mid
Page 49 and 50: We Know, p. 127; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft
Page 51 and 52: Department reports on global terror
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Page 59 and 60: The factual reality - as found by t
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Page 63 and 64: The historic 1993 meeting in Kharto
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worldwide terrorism is ―a report
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AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, pp. 65-66. Mo
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see Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 148
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that the ―senior Hezbollah operat
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actual foreknowledge of the plannin
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Thus, Iran‘s facilitation of the
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the present day. Testifying before
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January 16, 2009; Ex. 2, Timmerman
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The January 16, 2009, Treasury desi
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Indeed, Iran permitted al Qaeda to
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The fact is that many important ―
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little other than KSM‘s own self-
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terrorism operations against the U.
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of Mughniyah‘s offices in Beirut.
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provided material support to al Qae
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Walter S. Batty, Jr. (PA Bar No. 02
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APPENDICESPLAINTIFFS’ FIRST MEMOR
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