Ex. 5, Snell Affid. 17 (emphasis added). (Dietrich Snell was Senior Counsel to the 9/11Commission and its staff Team Leader investigating the al Qaeda conspiracy. He was aprincipal author and editor of Chapters 5 and 7 of the 9/11 REPORT. In the latter appearsthe section entitled ―Assistance from Hezbollah and <strong>Iran</strong> to al Qaeda.‖ Id., 7.)Indeed, the 9/11 Commission had information about significant pre-9/11 <strong>Iran</strong>-Hizballah-al Qaeda connections: ―while in Sudan, senior managers in al Qaedamaintained contacts with <strong>Iran</strong> and the <strong>Iran</strong>ian-supported worldwide terrorist organizationHezbollah‖ and ―[a]l Qaeda members received advice and training from Hezbollah.‖9/11 REPORT, p. 240. Information about these connections became more specific in late2000. The Commission found evidence showing that:[i]n October 2000, a senior operative of Hezbollah visited Saudi Arabia tocoordinate activities there. He also planned to assist individuals in SaudiArabia in traveling to <strong>Iran</strong> during November. A top Hezbollahcommander and Saudi Hezbollah contacts were involved.Id. The 9/11 Commission also detailed singular confluences in the travels – into <strong>Iran</strong>and Beirut 13 – of the 9/11 hijackers and ―a senior Hezbollah operative‖ and his―associate‖:Also in October 2000, two future muscle hijackers . . . flew from<strong>Iran</strong> to Kuwait. In November, [another muscle hijacker] apparently flewto Beirut, traveling – perhaps by coincidence – on the same flight as a13 Beirut is the capital of Lebanon and Lebanon‘s largest city. Beirut has a major international airport,which sits adjacent to the poor suburb of „Ayn-al-Dilbah, a Hizballah recruiting ground where ImadMughniyah grew up. The Bekaa Valley, located to the east of Beirut, and its principal city, Balabaak,are controlled by Hizballah and the IRGC, and they have terrorist training camps there. The Bekaawas the first area in Lebanon where the IRGC established a presence in the early 1980s. In November1982, the IRGC, using the Lebanese militant group Islamic Amal as a proxy, seized the SheikhAbdallah army barracks from the Lebanese government‘s police force at Balabakk in the BekaaValley, renaming it ―Camp Imam Ali.‖ This camp became the headquarters of Hizballah and theIRGC in Lebanon, and it would be the place where many kidnapped hostages were imprisoned,including CIA station chief William Buckley. Ex. 7, Bergman Affid. 28; Baer, See No Evil, pp. 73,100-02; Baer, The Devil We Know, pp. 59-64, 67-68, 78-79; Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 109, 151,162, 186-87, 255, 288, 293.15
senior Hezbollah operative. Also in November, [yet another musclehijacker] apparently flew from Saudi Arabia to Beirut.In mid-November, . . . three of the future muscle hijackers . . . allof whom had obtained their U.S. visas in late October, traveled in a groupfrom Saudi Arabia to Beirut and then onward to <strong>Iran</strong>. An associate of asenior Hezbollah operative was on the same flight that took the futurehijackers to <strong>Iran</strong>. Hezbollah officials in Beirut and <strong>Iran</strong> were expectingthe arrival of a group during the same time period. The travel of thisgroup was important enough to merit the attention of senior figures inHezbollah.Later in November, two future muscle hijackers . . . flew into <strong>Iran</strong>from Bahrain. In February 2001, [another hijacker] may have taken aflight from Syria to <strong>Iran</strong>, and then traveled further within <strong>Iran</strong> to a pointnear the Afghan border.9/11 REPORT, pp. 240-41. The expert affidavits of Janice Kephart, Dietrich Snell, andClare Lopez-Bruce Tefft add insights into the significance of the 9/11 Commission‘sfindings on the <strong>Iran</strong>ian government‘s facilitation of the 9/11 hijackers‘ travel through <strong>Iran</strong>into and out of Afghanistan. Further, the expert affidavits of Kenneth Timmerman,Ronen Bergman, and Clare Lopez-Bruce Tefft provide details about the role of ImadMughniyah – the ―senior Hezbollah operative‖ – in <strong>Iran</strong>‘s sponsorship of terrorism.Finally, taken together, the sealed testimony of Witnesses X, Y, and Z contain revelationsabout Mughniyah, his integral role in the <strong>Iran</strong>-Hizballah-al Qaeda terror alliance, and inthe 9/11 attacks.The <strong>Iran</strong>-Hizballah connection to the 9/11 hijackers was only <strong>brief</strong>ly andcryptically stated at the end of section 7.3 in Chapter 7 of the 9/11 REPORT – and notfurther developed. The reason is that, other than the FBI‘s Penttbom investigationinformation, the evidence came from intelligence reports of which the Commission staffhad only discovered and reviewed, ―at virtually the last moment of the Commission‘sexistence and only a week before publication of the 9/11 Report.‖ Ex. 5, Snell Affid.19. According to two of the Havlish experts and a respected journalist, this evidence lay16
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symbols. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid.
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