brief - Iran 911 Case

Indeed, the 9/11 REPORT notes a number of significant facts linking Iran and its terroristproxy, Hizballah, to al Qaeda and the 9/11 hijackers, including ―the persistence ofcontacts between Iranian security officials and senior al Qaeda figures after Bin Ladin‘sreturn to Afghanistan‖ in 1996, ―a concerted effort‖ by Iran ―to strengthen relations withal Qaeda after the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole,‖ and ―the willingness of Iranianofficials to facilitate the travel of al Qaeda members through Iran, on their way to andfrom Afghanistan‖ by ―not . . . plac[ing] telltale stamps in the passports of these travelers. . .‖, ―[s]uch arrangements [being] particularly beneficial to Saudi members of al Qaeda.‖9/11 REPORT, p. 240. 11Both the U.S. State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation hadalready found similar connections between Iran and al Qaeda. In its 2001 Patterns ofGlobal Terrorism, the State Department noted ―reports that Arab Afghans, including alQaeda members, used Iran as a transit route to enter and leave from Afghanistan.‖ 12 SeeEx. 13. The FBI‘s criminal investigation of the 9/11 attacks (the ―Penttbominvestigation‖) had found the same linkage:a substantial number of the 19 al Qaeda operatives who hijacked the fourtargeted U.S. airliners likely transited through Iran on their way to andfrom Pakistan and Afghanistan, during and in furtherance of theconspiracy. According to the Penttbom team, the willingness of Iranianborder officials to refrain from stamping the passports of al Qaedamembers helped explain the absence of a clear document trail showing thetravels of those members to and from Afghanistan, the center of al Qaedatraining starting in the late 1990s and leading up to September 11, 2001.11 Islamic words and names (e.g., bin Laden, al Qaeda, Hizballah) are spelled differently in differentsources. Plaintiffs have strived for consistency as much as possible, but original spellings aremaintained in quoted sources.12 In the ensuing years, the U.S. State Department cited Iranian support for al Qaeda after the 9/11attacks. ―Al Qaeda members have found virtual safehaven there and may even be receiving protectionfrom elements of the Iranian Government.‖ Ex. 13, 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism; see also id.,2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism, and Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid. 88-90.14