demand more or different evidence than it would ordinarily receive in order to render adecision. Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 242 (2nd Cir.1994). In evaluating the plaintiff‘s proofs, a court may ―accept as true the plaintiffs‘uncontroverted evidence,‖ Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of <strong>Iran</strong>, 510 F.Supp.2d101, 103 (D.C. 2007); Elahi v. Islamic Republic of <strong>Iran</strong>, 124 F.Supp.2d 97, 100 (D.D.C.2000), and a plaintiff may establish proof by affidavit. Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of<strong>Iran</strong>, 184 F.Supp.2d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2002). While a plaintiff must demonstrate only aprima facie case to obtain a judgment of liability in a FSIA case, a plaintiff must showentitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence. Peterson v. IslamicRepublic of <strong>Iran</strong>, 264 F.Supp.2d 46, 48 (D.D.C. 2003).IV.OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE OF IRAN’S DIRECT AND MATERIAL SUPPORT OFAL QAEDA GENERALLY, STARTING IN THE EARLY 1990S, AND FOR THE 9/11ATTACKSSupporting their Motion for Entry of Judgment, the Havlish Plaintiffs presentclear and convincing evidence demonstrating that culpability for the 9/11 terrorist attackson the United States lies not only with al Qaeda, but also with the Islamic Republic of<strong>Iran</strong> and Hizballah. The evidence establishes that <strong>Iran</strong> provided material support to alQaeda generally, starting in the early 1990s, and direct and material support to al Qaedaspecifically for the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon,and the target of the attack on Washington, D.C. that resulted in the crash of a hijackedairliner near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.<strong>Iran</strong>‘s material support to al Qaeda began years before September 11, 2001, as<strong>Iran</strong> and its proxy terrorist organization, Hizballah, entered into a terrorist alliance with alQaeda reaching back to the early 1990s. Thereafter, <strong>Iran</strong>, Hizballah, and al Qaeda11
cooperated and coordinated with, and assisted each other in, the planning, training for,and implementation of a series of terrorist attacks against American and Western interestsabroad. This terrorist alliance continued throughout the preparations for the 9/11 attacks,involving planning, facilitation of the hijackers‘ travel, and training. After the 9/11attacks, <strong>Iran</strong> and Hizballah again gave material support to al Qaeda by facilitating theescape of some of al Qaeda‘s leadership, as well as many of its operatives, and theirfamilies, from the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. <strong>Iran</strong> thereafter provided – and to thepresent day continues to provide – safe haven for al Qaeda leaders and rank-and-filemembers inside <strong>Iran</strong>. From that post-9/11 safe haven inside <strong>Iran</strong>, senior al Qaedamembers have continued to direct terrorist operations against the U.S. and its allies.In sum, <strong>Iran</strong> has directly and materially supported al Qaeda generally before,during, and after 9/11, and gave direct and material support to al Qaeda specifically inregard to the September 11, 2001 attacks upon America.Contemporaneously with filing this Memorandum, Plaintiffs are filing a MotionFor Leave to File Under Seal additional evidence comprising videotaped testimony anddocuments from three fact witnesses, Witnesses ―X,‖ ―Y,‖ and ―Z,‖ who are all defectorsfrom the <strong>Iran</strong>ian government. Ex. S-1 through S-8. The evidence from Witnesses X, Y,and Z circumstantially and directly implicates <strong>Iran</strong> and Hizballah in the 9/11 attacks,through <strong>Iran</strong>‘s and Hizballah‘s foreknowledge of, and complicity in, the overall designof, and preparations for, the 9/11 attacks, involving, but not limited to, facilitation of thehijackers‘ international travel, training, and through <strong>Iran</strong>‘s provision of safe haven for alQaeda after the attacks. Plaintiffs discuss the sealed evidence of <strong>Iran</strong>‘s material anddirect support of al Qaeda, which covers many areas not addressed at all in this <strong>brief</strong>, in12
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the issuance of INTERPOL Red Notice
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investigators concluded the operati
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symbols. Ex. 6, Lopez-Tefft Affid.
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worldwide terrorism is ―a report
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AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, pp. 65-66. Mo
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see Ex. 2, Timmerman 2nd Affid. 148
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that the ―senior Hezbollah operat
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the present day. Testifying before
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The January 16, 2009, Treasury desi
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Indeed, Iran permitted al Qaeda to
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The fact is that many important ―
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little other than KSM‘s own self-
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terrorism operations against the U.
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of Mughniyah‘s offices in Beirut.
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provided material support to al Qae
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Walter S. Batty, Jr. (PA Bar No. 02
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