talanx group annual report 2011 en
talanx group annual report 2011 en
talanx group annual report 2011 en
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42<br />
The Talanx Group Strategy Enterprise<br />
managem<strong>en</strong>t<br />
Talanx Group. Annual Report <strong>2011</strong><br />
Research and<br />
developm<strong>en</strong>t<br />
The continuing low interest-rate <strong>en</strong>vironm<strong>en</strong>t is becoming an<br />
increasingly serious chall<strong>en</strong>ge for Germany’s life insurers. Whereas<br />
in <strong>2011</strong>, it was still possible for the industry to g<strong>en</strong>erate adequate net<br />
returns on its capital investm<strong>en</strong>ts, cross-sector announcem<strong>en</strong>ts on<br />
reducing shared profits suggest that the tr<strong>en</strong>d, should it continue, is<br />
likely to affect life insurance b<strong>en</strong>efits in the future.<br />
Legal and regulatory <strong>en</strong>vironm<strong>en</strong>t<br />
The business of the Talanx Group is subject to regulatory rules and<br />
requirem<strong>en</strong>ts that are both numerous and detailed. The supervisory<br />
authorities of the countries in which Talanx operates <strong>en</strong>joy<br />
far-reaching authorities and powers of interv<strong>en</strong>tion. Observing<br />
these regulations and requirem<strong>en</strong>ts, and continually adjusting its<br />
business and products to new laws, <strong>en</strong>tails a considerable financial<br />
outlay on the part of Talanx. Talanx curr<strong>en</strong>tly sees itself confronted<br />
by far-reaching changes in the regulatory <strong>en</strong>vironm<strong>en</strong>t in which it<br />
operates, particularly in the wake of rec<strong>en</strong>t national and international<br />
efforts aimed at avoiding another financial crisis.<br />
A global tr<strong>en</strong>d is now discernible towards tight<strong>en</strong>ing the regulatory<br />
and supervisory framework governing banks and insurance companies<br />
– including ev<strong>en</strong> stress tests, along with increased requirem<strong>en</strong>ts<br />
in terms of capital adequacy. A particular focal point is a<br />
financial institution’s “system relevance”. Companies whose collapse<br />
would have unforeseeable consequ<strong>en</strong>ces for the <strong>en</strong>tire financial<br />
and insurance industry will face much more string<strong>en</strong>t regulatory<br />
requirem<strong>en</strong>ts in the future, especially with regard to their capital<br />
base. This is in line with a resolution drawn up on 4 November <strong>2011</strong><br />
in Cannes, by the G-20 <strong>group</strong> of key industrialised and emerging nations,<br />
which named 29 banks deemed “too big to fail”. The International<br />
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) has be<strong>en</strong> giv<strong>en</strong> the<br />
task of verifying, by the G-20 summit in June 2012, whether certain<br />
conv<strong>en</strong>tional insurance companies – contrary to industry assessm<strong>en</strong>ts<br />
– should also be giv<strong>en</strong> the “globally system-relevant” stamp.<br />
It has also be<strong>en</strong> asked to develop appropriate test criteria, and,<br />
where necessary, id<strong>en</strong>tify these top global insurance players. The<br />
Talanx Group, too, is involved in this assessm<strong>en</strong>t process. The latest<br />
opinion of the administrative court in Frankfurt suggests, however,<br />
that the Group is not deemed system-relevant within the above<br />
meaning of the term. Other proposed reforms curr<strong>en</strong>tly under<br />
debate relate e.g. to the introduction of a financial transaction tax<br />
in the European Union.<br />
Markets and<br />
g<strong>en</strong>eral conditions<br />
Business developm<strong>en</strong>t<br />
Assets and<br />
financial position<br />
Rec<strong>en</strong>t times have also se<strong>en</strong> fundam<strong>en</strong>tal changes made to<br />
the structure of supervisory bodies, particularly at EU level. On<br />
1 January <strong>2011</strong>, the new Frankfurt-based European Insurance and<br />
Occupational P<strong>en</strong>sions Authority (EIOPA) replaced the former<br />
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational P<strong>en</strong>sions<br />
Supervisors (CEIOPS). The EIOPA’s main task is to draw up technical<br />
standards, recomm<strong>en</strong>dations and guidelines for coordinating<br />
the national supervisory authorities. Although the EIOPA has no<br />
authority per se over German insurance companies, it can request<br />
that a national supervisory authority justify any diverg<strong>en</strong>ce in its<br />
own supervisory practices from those set down by the EIOPA (what<br />
is known as the comply-or-explain principle). In exceptional cases,<br />
the EIOPA can also issue instructions to national authorities and, in<br />
the case of non-compliance, take action directly in the form of binding<br />
decisions applicable to the insurance companies in question.<br />
Furthermore, in accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of<br />
the European Union, the EIOPA – in some cases with only limited<br />
control by the European Parliam<strong>en</strong>t – is set to play a key role in the<br />
rulemaking process for substantiating the Solv<strong>en</strong>cy II Directive that<br />
has yet to come into force. There is no doubt that the EIOPA’s work<br />
will have significant practical implications for Germany’s insurers;<br />
ev<strong>en</strong> in the curr<strong>en</strong>t preparatory stage, it has resulted in a barely<br />
manageable proliferation of supervisory rules and regulations<br />
across the whole sector.<br />
What is more, the so-called Omnibus Directive is curr<strong>en</strong>tly implem<strong>en</strong>ting<br />
changes to certain details of the Solv<strong>en</strong>cy II Directive.<br />
Although precise details of the Directive’s cont<strong>en</strong>t and how it is<br />
to be implem<strong>en</strong>ted and transposed into the national laws of EU<br />
member states are not yet known, it is certain to result in the<br />
wholesale harmonisation of supervisory legislation across the EU.<br />
The quantitative and qualitative tight<strong>en</strong>ing of supervision already<br />
incorporated in the Directive, together with requirem<strong>en</strong>ts for<br />
greater transpar<strong>en</strong>cy – in particular through more string<strong>en</strong>t capital<br />
adequacy requirem<strong>en</strong>ts and demands for in-house risk control<br />
systems, as well as <strong>report</strong>ing and docum<strong>en</strong>tation processes – is being<br />
addressed by German legislators in the form of a curr<strong>en</strong>t draft<br />
bill to am<strong>en</strong>d the country’s Insurance Supervisory Act (VAG). Against<br />
this backdrop, Talanx int<strong>en</strong>ds to submit an application for the approval<br />
of its own in-house risk model. Developed on a proprietary<br />
basis by Talanx, the risk model will be used instead of the alternative<br />
standard formula in the Solv<strong>en</strong>cy II Directive in order to <strong>en</strong>able<br />
solv<strong>en</strong>cy capital requirem<strong>en</strong>ts for the Talanx Group to be calculated<br />
with greater precision. Developed in constant dialog with the supervisory<br />
body, the in-house model aims to take maximum possible<br />
account of the Group’s individual business model, its legal structure<br />
and, above all, its risk structure. European and national supervisory<br />
bodies alike have expressed the wish that the major insurance<br />
<strong>group</strong>s develop in-house models as early as possible.