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Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

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SUBJECTIVISM AND IDEAL TYPESthis or that, or some ‘true’ version <strong>of</strong> subjectivism, I’d rather create aclean term<strong>in</strong>ological slate, <strong>and</strong> argue that Lachmann’s views can bebest described as belong<strong>in</strong>g to the general category <strong>of</strong> methodologicalsolipsism.I consider methodological solipsism as a variety <strong>of</strong> methodological<strong>in</strong>dividualism. 1 The programme <strong>of</strong> methodological solipsism seemsto be especially relevant to a thorough underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> themethodological underp<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> economic theory.Methodological solipsism, just like methodological <strong>in</strong>dividualism,is founded on a dist<strong>in</strong>ct <strong>and</strong> def<strong>in</strong>ite view <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> socialreality. Methodological solipsism s ontological doctr<strong>in</strong>e, as a moreor less coherent picture <strong>of</strong> the world, can be reconstructed on thebasis <strong>of</strong> scattered remarks <strong>in</strong> the works <strong>of</strong> Hayek, Mises, Lachmann<strong>and</strong> others.The world, more precisely the world <strong>of</strong> human action is, accord<strong>in</strong>gto these authors, unimag<strong>in</strong>ably complex, <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>and</strong> multifaceted(see Hayek 1952a; Mises 1940). Its elements are constantly chang<strong>in</strong>g(Lachmann 1976) <strong>and</strong> its phenomena are <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itely diverse (Hayek1952b, 1964). These complex phenomena <strong>and</strong> states <strong>of</strong> affairs areproduced by the <strong>in</strong>terplay <strong>of</strong> an endless number <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividualcircumstances <strong>and</strong> qualitatively different causal sequences; <strong>and</strong> theyare always given to us as a tangled web <strong>of</strong> countless <strong>in</strong>dividual causes<strong>and</strong> effects (Mises 1940:45). Everyth<strong>in</strong>g hangs together witheveryth<strong>in</strong>g else <strong>in</strong> the world <strong>of</strong> human action, but social reality lacksany k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> objective structure. It doesn’t comprise regulatorypr<strong>in</strong>ciples that would br<strong>in</strong>g order <strong>in</strong>to the chaos <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividualphenomena. I want to emphasise, however, that, accord<strong>in</strong>g to theauthors whose views we are discuss<strong>in</strong>g here, the world <strong>of</strong> naturalsciences, as opposed to social reality or the realm <strong>of</strong> human action, ishomogeneous, ordered <strong>and</strong> governed by causal uniformities (Hayek1964:25; Mises 1940:63).In Lachmann’s words:From a methodological po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> view we may regard theeconomic thought <strong>of</strong> the last hundred years as marked by along drawn-out struggle between two contend<strong>in</strong>g forces,subjectivity <strong>and</strong> formalism. While the formalists present modelscharacterized by constant relationships between formal entities(even though these are <strong>in</strong> general supposed to reflect measurablemagnitudes), subjectivists see social phenomena as the outcome<strong>of</strong> human action guided by plans (even though these <strong>of</strong>ten fail)<strong>and</strong> prompted by mental acts. While subjectivist models also81

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