Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

STEPHEN D.PARSONS7 For a defence of Mises’s argument concerning the a priori status of thecategory of causality along Kantian lines, see Parsons (1997).8 Boettke and Prychitko argue that a formal, deductive theory is one ofthe defining characteristics of Austrian theory, stating thatpraxeology is:a strictly formal, logically deductive approach that starts fromallegedly self-evident axioms (such as the claim that individualsact purposively), and attempts to derive apodictically certain(logically irrefutable) conclusions…a praxeological economictheory which is grounded upon an absolutely true axiom (or setof axioms) generates absolutely true conclusions.(Boettke and Prychitko 1994:288–9)I have argued that a distinction must be made between any a prioriconcepts relevant to comprehending human action and the axioms ofmarginal analysis. If a formal deductive approach is a definingcharacteristic of Austrian theory, then this approach requiresconsiderably more defence.9 This is also the view espoused by Bhaskar: ‘Aristotle was correct: theconclusion of a practical syllogism is an action’ (Bhaskar 1979:122).10 This discussion of the problem with the Aristotelian syllogism andsubsequent attempt at modification reflect the problems that Davidson(1980) came to recognise with his own account of human action.Initially, Davidson characterised intentional action as actionexplicable, in appropriate ways, by appealing to the agents’ reasons foracting, where these reasons are appropriate pairs of agents’ desires andbeliefs. Consequently, in acting for a reason, there is an appropriatedesire-belief pair that causes the action—hence, the practical syllogism.For an attempt to introduce a causal theory of action into Austrianconcerns, see Mäki (1990). Unfortunately, and somewhat surprisingly,Mäki does not discuss Davidson.11 At issue here is not only Mises’s claim that ‘what we know about ouraction under given conditions is derived not from experience, but fromreason’ (Mises 1981:13–14), but also his claim that ‘economics toocan make predictions in the sense in which this ability is attributed tothe natural sciences’ (ibid.: 118). If desires or preferences areincompatible, or there is indifference between means, then predictionsare not possible.12 The introduction of intentionality does not remove the problemsdiscussed above.13Weber denied Menger’s contention that the ‘laws’ governingeconomic conduct (among which was Menger’s own creation,the law of marginal utility) are ‘exact laws’ in the same sense asthose found in nature.…In fact, abstract economic theoryconsisted essentially of rational schemes in which the conditionsof successful action were defined in such a way as to require58