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Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

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MISES AND LACHMANN ON HUMAN ACTIONAustrian economics. If human actions can only be understoodwith<strong>in</strong> a context, then any claim that certa<strong>in</strong> truths concern<strong>in</strong>ghuman action can be arrived at deductively is simply wrong.Further, if emphasis is now placed on the <strong>in</strong>tersubjective contextwith<strong>in</strong> which any human action occurs, then the much vaunted‘subjectivism’ <strong>of</strong> Austrian economics would seem to becompromised. The Cartesian privileg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> ‘the subject’ fits ratheruneasily, if at all, with<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tellectual traditions stress<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>tersubjectivity. 15 These are major issues that clearly warrant moredetailed exam<strong>in</strong>ation. However, it is difficult to appreciate how‘Austrian economies’ can avoid confront<strong>in</strong>g them. Unless thedifficulties <strong>in</strong> Mises’s project can be resolved <strong>in</strong> an alternativemanner, then, despite the possibility <strong>of</strong> defend<strong>in</strong>g a weak notion <strong>of</strong>‘the a priori’, Lachmann’s analysis would seem to form a viablestart<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t for any Austrian discussion <strong>of</strong> human action.Notes1 As Ebel<strong>in</strong>g observes ‘but Mises believed that Weber had rema<strong>in</strong>ed toomuch the child <strong>of</strong> the German Historical School, with its theoreticalrelativism’ (Ebel<strong>in</strong>g 1994:86).2 Lachmann himself does not explore how his theory differs fromrational choice theory.3 In a recent collection <strong>of</strong> essays devoted to Austrian economics (Boettke<strong>and</strong> Prychitko 1994), several authors refer to ‘plans’. However, theredoes not appear to be any awareness that this emphasis raisesquestions for rational choice theories.4 Rickert was a lead<strong>in</strong>g Neo-Kantian philosopher. For a more detaileddiscussion <strong>of</strong> Mises’s relationship to Rickert, see Parsons (1990).5 Rickert’s reference to the irrationality <strong>of</strong> reality was meantphenomenologically: it referred to our experience <strong>of</strong> reality. As notedbelow, Mises tends to confuse phenomenological <strong>and</strong> epistemologicalquestions.6 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Mises, historical concepts are type concepts, or ‘idealtypes’,which organise data <strong>in</strong>to classes. As such, they are ‘<strong>in</strong>exact’ <strong>in</strong>the sense that, as mental constructs, they simplify reality. To useMises’s own example, the type concept ‘entrepreneur’ refers to a class<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuals engaged <strong>in</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess who, <strong>in</strong> other regards, differgreatly. In contrast, <strong>in</strong> economics, the concept ‘entrepreneur’ refers toa ‘specific function, that is the provision for an uncerta<strong>in</strong> future. Inthis respect everybody is an entrepreneur…it is not the task <strong>of</strong> thisclassification <strong>in</strong> economic theory to dist<strong>in</strong>guish men, but todist<strong>in</strong>guish functions’ (Mises 1990:14). Aga<strong>in</strong>, as economics is notconcerned with <strong>in</strong>dividuality, it does not matter that all <strong>in</strong>dividualsare not only entrepreneurs, or that they perform this function <strong>in</strong>different ways.57

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