Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

MISES AND LACHMANN ON HUMAN ACTION2 whether the design and execution of such a plan are in factconsistent with whatever else is known about the intentions,circumstances, etc. of the individual whose action is the subjectunder study (ibid.: 20).However, Lachmann does not appear to acknowledge the differencebetween following a plan and acting according to a plan (Brand1984). An individual may have a consistent plan, and the executionof this plan may ‘account for the known facts’, but this does notentail that the individual is following the plan correctly. Forexample, an individual may be presented with a complicatedmathematical puzzle, may indicate what plan they will pursue inattempting to arrive at a solution, may arrive at the correct solution,yet may not have followed the plan correctly. That is, the individualmay have made mistakes, yet arrived at the correct conclusion.Consequently, even if we know what an individual’s plan is, andknow that this is coherent, and can explain the ‘known facts’ withthis plan, we cannot conclude that, therefore, there is some form ofcausal relationship between the plan and the ‘known facts’. We needto know that the plan has been followed correctly, and thisinevitably introduces a normative element into the investigation: weneed to establish how the individual ought to have acted, not justhow he or she did act.The question of the relationship between Lachmann’s ownanalysis and that provided by Weber raises further problems for theformer’s account. In connection with the question of meaning,Lachmann notes that ‘natural phenomena have no “meaning”’, andthus sides with Weber against Menger: there are no ‘exact laws’governing economic conduct analogous to those found in nature. 13As the study of economic conduct requires the understanding ofmeaning, then it is committed to the ‘method of Verstehen’.Lachmann consequently describes his own theory of action as‘inspired by the Weberian notion that action derives its meaningfrom the mind of the actor’ (Lachmann 1971:9).However, from Weber’s perspective, there is a problem with thisargument. For Weber, reference to the individual mind is neithernecessary nor sufficient for understanding meaning:The ‘conscious motives’ may well, even to the actor himself,conceal the various ‘motives’ and ‘repressions’ whichconstitute the real driving force of his action. Thus in suchcases even subjectively honest self-analysis has only a relative51