Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

STEPHEN D.PARSONSintention we have all the necessary materials for a satisfactorytreatment of future-directed intentions;4 combining 2 and 3 above: the reduction of future-directedintentions to appropriate desires and beliefs.It has been argued above that assumption 2 raises problems forMises’s own theory. However, assumptions 3 and 4 also raiseproblems, a possible resolution of which leads directly intoLachmann’s theory of human action.According to Bratman (1987), the attempt to extend anintentional account of action to deal with future-directed casesresults in two problems. The first problem is analogous to theproblem encountered by Buridan’s ass. Bratman argues that rationalintentions should be agglomerate. That is, if at one and the sametime I rationally intend, or aim, to A and rationally intend, or aim,to B then it should be both possible and rational for me, at the sametime, to intend or aim to A and to B. Thus, if two actions are knownto be compatible, I can have the intention or aim to perform both, aswell as the separate intention or aim to perform each. Also, if twoactions are known to be incompatible, I cannot have the intention oraim to perform both. However, suppose, on my way back fromwork one evening, I can stop at either of two book shops, but not atboth, and that both options are attractive. That is, I form an all-outjudgement that stopping at one is as desirable as stopping at theother. In this case, do I have both intentions or aims, or do I haveneither intention nor aim?The second problem can be illustrated as follows. Suppose I wantto buy copies of two books, and I know I will be in a certainbookstore. Further, I know that the bookstore will have one of thebooks, but not both, and do not know which one. In this case,although I intend or have an aim to buy both books, I believe Icannot. However, as I cannot intend or aim to do what I do notbelieve, then I cannot have the required intention or aim.Bratman argues the problems with theories sharing the aboveassumptions is that they do not recognise that we form futureintentions as parts of larger plans whose role is to aid the coordinationof activities over time. Consequently, Bratman arguesthat the desire/belief/reason model can only have relevance if it issituated within the context of plans. Practical reason thus has twolevels. On one level there are prior intentions and plans, which bothpose problems and provide filters on options as potential solutions.On another level are desires, beliefs and reasons, which enter as46