Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

STEPHEN D.PARSONSthis act of reflection as one of the ‘categorical elements of choice’.Certain elements Mises wishes to exclude from praxeologicalconsideration appear not to be capable of omission. Thus, accordingto Mises: ‘The ultimate judgements of value and ultimate ends ofhuman action are given for any kind of scientific inquiry; they arenot open to further analysis’ (1949:21).However, if these ends are not merely ‘given’ to the actor, butarrived at through reflection, and thus they are subject to furtheranalysis by the actor, how can praxeology ignore this feature ofhuman action, yet claim to grasp ‘the categorical essence of choiceand action as such’ (Mises 1990:21)? If it is part of the ‘essence ofchoice’ that ends are reflected upon, this must form part of thepraxeological concern. Lachmann himself saw problems withMises’s account here, arguing that ‘since ends lie in the unknowablefuture, how can they be “given” to us?’ (Lachmann 1982:38).The severity of this problem for Mises can be appreciated if anattempt is made to modify his account to accommodate thisproblem. It could be argued that human action must be taken ascorresponding to an ‘unconditional’ or ‘all out’ evaluativeproposition that an action is desirable. 10 Thus, in the case of the visitto the dentist, after weighing various considerations, I would arriveat an ‘all out’ judgement that going to the dentist was desirable. AsBratman (1985) points out, this indicates that evaluativeconclusions are both implicitly comparative and concern particularactions, not types of actions: for example, certain ways of doingthings may be undesirable.Yet if evaluative conclusions concern particular actions, not typesof action, then they would appear not to be of any concern forpraxeology, for whom the particular is the concern of history.However, if human action necessarily entails evaluative conclusions,yet these refer to particular actions, not types of actions, then wehave a universal feature of human action that can only be madesense of in connection with particular actions. Mises’s claim thatpraxeology, as a priori, is concerned with ‘the pure elements ofsetting aims and applying means’ (1990:21) becomes highly suspect,as the ‘purity’ of these elements is directly threatened: the ‘elementsof setting aims’ only appear comprehensible in the context ofspecific actions.Mises desires to establish the investigation of human action on ana priori basis. However, if individuals do have incompatible ends,then any ‘setting’ of aims must refer to the actual context withinwhich an action occurs. Further, if an individual is indifferent between44