Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

MISES AND LACHMANN ON HUMAN ACTIONHowever, action and thought are quite distinct: because ‘the mind’ isnecessary to identify action does not mean we can ‘read off certaintruths about action directly from it. Mind might be necessary foridentification, but it is not sufficient: we also require the actionsthemselves. Mises thus obliterates the differences betweencomprehending human action and performing valid deductionsfrom the axioms of marginal analysis, between establishing thenecessary conditions for comprehending action and establishingcertain a priori ‘truths’.In summarising the above, two points are worth emphasising.First, certain of the concepts Mises defines as ‘a priori’ appear morebasic, in the sense of possibly being universal, than others withregard to human action. Concepts such as ‘rationality’ and‘purposive’ are significantly more general than concepts such as‘buying’ or ‘profits’. The less generalised concepts appear in theanalysis because Mises confuses comprehending action withexplaining action with the assistance of marginal theory. Second, wecannot, solely from an investigation into the contents ofconsciousness, recognise things in the world to which conceptsapply. In order to justify our ‘having’ a concept, it is not sufficient toindicate how it coherently integrates with other concepts.Expanding on the first of these points: the question of theuniversality of a priori concepts raises problems for Mises’s analysis.As noted, Mises lists the concepts of ends and means as a prioripraxeological categories. He also refers to the concept of causalityas ‘a category or an a priori of thinking and acting’ (1962:20), yetadmits that the concepts of means and ends presuppose the categoryof causality (1958:92). This suggests that Mises acknowledges someform of hierarchy within the various a priori categories. Now it maybe plausible to defend the category of causality as a priori, as Kanthimself argued. 7 However, as Mises himself recognises (1958:92),the category of causality is also applicable in the natural sciences.Consequently, within the hierarchy of a priori categories, some, likecausality, are universally applicable, whilst others, such as meansand ends, are only applicable to human action. However, thisimplies that we must already know, prior to using any a prioricategories of human action, that we are applying them to humanaction, and not to natural events. Yet it seems that it is only becauseof the a priori categories that we can comprehend anything ashuman action. Thus we must have comprehended certainmovements as human actions, and not natural events, prior to thepossibility of us being capable of so comprehending them.41