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Subjectivism and Economic Analysis: Essays in memory of Ludwig ...

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MISES AND LACHMANN ON HUMAN ACTIONthat the various ‘theorems’ <strong>of</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>al analysis that have beendeductively arrived at are also necessary to comprehend humanaction, then this is a substantially stronger claim. In other words,why exactly are the concepts <strong>of</strong> ‘buy<strong>in</strong>g’, ‘sell<strong>in</strong>g’, etc., be<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> connection with ‘praxeological reason<strong>in</strong>g’?One way <strong>of</strong> reconstruct<strong>in</strong>g the argument is as follows. Mises doesrecognise that, <strong>in</strong> order to ‘have’ a concept, we must both be able toth<strong>in</strong>k coherently with it <strong>and</strong> to recognise th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> the world towhich it applies. Consequently, Mises could be taken as argu<strong>in</strong>gthat, unless we know how to use the concept <strong>of</strong>, say, ‘buy<strong>in</strong>g’, wewould discern only un<strong>in</strong>telligible motions. We must be capable <strong>of</strong>apply<strong>in</strong>g the type concept ‘buy<strong>in</strong>g’ to any <strong>in</strong>dividual actions that fallunder this type. Further, presumably if we are to construct aneconomic theory concerned with the activity <strong>of</strong> buy<strong>in</strong>g, then wemust be able to locate this concept, <strong>and</strong> thus use it <strong>in</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g,with<strong>in</strong> a system <strong>of</strong> other concepts.However, if Mises’s argument is reconstructed <strong>in</strong> this form, thena number <strong>of</strong> problems surface. First, it is not clear why suchconcepts can claim an a priori status: they may just be learned, say,through socialisation. Second, the a priori categories Mises isconcerned with must be both necessary <strong>and</strong> universal. This couldmean either that all concepts are required <strong>in</strong> order to comprehendall possible human actions, or that all are required <strong>in</strong> order tocomprehend each <strong>in</strong>dividual action. The former is considerablyweaker than the latter, <strong>and</strong> would seem to run foul <strong>of</strong> the problemdiscussed <strong>in</strong> more detail below. It would seem to require that weknow which concepts to apply to which actions, although it is onlythrough these concepts that we can comprehend any actions at all.This leaves the third possible <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> Mises’s argument,which appears relevant to statements such as:No report about any man’s conduct can do without referenceto the praxeological a priori. There is no human action thatcan be dealt with without reference to the categoricalconcepts <strong>of</strong> ends <strong>and</strong> means, <strong>of</strong> success <strong>and</strong> failure, <strong>of</strong> costs,pr<strong>of</strong>it or loss.(Mises 1990:49)This implies that, <strong>in</strong> order to conceive the mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> any actionwhatsoever, we must be able to apply concepts such as ‘costs’ <strong>and</strong>loss’ to it. This suggests that Mises is attempt<strong>in</strong>g to establish thatconceiv<strong>in</strong>g the mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> any action requires all the concepts39

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