Cleveland Clinic Health System Obligated Group - FMSbonds.com
Cleveland Clinic Health System Obligated Group - FMSbonds.com Cleveland Clinic Health System Obligated Group - FMSbonds.com
Ohio HCAP ProgramOhio currently has in place a program known as the “Hospital Care Assurance Program” (“HCAP”) thatimposes an assessment on hospitals to create a pool of funds for redistribution to hospitals based upon an indigentcare factor. Under the HCAP, ODJFS helps hospitals pay for uncompensated costs of treating indigent people. TheDepartment does so by levying a provider tax against hospitals to generate a basic funding source that is joined withmatching federal Medicaid funds. The pooled funds are then redistributed to hospitals based on the relative level ofeach hospital’s indigent care services. The BBA imposed reductions on the level of matching federal fundsavailable with respect to the HCAP and similar programs in other states. The pool of funds available to hospitalsunder the HCAP is therefore expected to decrease in the future. In the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007, theObligated Group received HCAP fund net distributions of approximately $7.3 million. There is no guarantee that, inthe future, the Obligated Group will continue to receive distributions at this level or that the Obligated Group willreceive any aggregate net amount from HCAP.State Children’s Health Insurance ProgramThe State Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”) is a federally funded insurance program forchildren whose families earn too much money to be eligible for Medicaid, but yet cannot afford commercial healthinsurance. CMS administers the CHIP, but each state creates its own program based upon minimum federalguidelines. Ohio has implemented a CHIP. A CHIP can either be part of a state’s Medicaid program, or acompletely separate state program.While generally considered to be beneficial for both patients and providers by reducing the number ofuninsured children, it is difficult to assess the fiscal impact of CHIP on the payments to the Obligated Group.Moreover, states must periodically submit their CHIP plan to CMS for review to determine if it meets the federalrequirements. If it does not meet the federal requirements, a state can lose its federal funding for its program.Finally, the CHIP currently is only funded by the federal government through March 31, 2009. A state’s decision toelevate the eligibility requirements, thereby decreasing the number of children eligible for CHIP, the loss of federalapproval for a state’s program and the failure of the federal government to appropriate additional funds for CHIPafter March 2009 could each have a material adverse effect on the financial condition and results of operations of theObligated Group.Florida Medicaid ProgramFlorida Medicaid provides a variety of health care services at varying levels of coverage to eligible personswho meet certain income and asset limits. The Medicaid Program in Florida is administered by AHCA throughvarious systems of payment, including a fee for service system and a managed care program.Reimbursement for care provided to Florida Medicaid patients is subject to appropriation by the Floridalegislature of sufficient funds to pay incurred patient obligations. In Florida, Medicaid reimbursement rates forhospitals, nursing facilities and other institutional providers are determined by the Medicaid Program AnalysisBureau. Currently, hospitals are reimbursed for inpatient hospital services prospectively based on fixed per diemrates, subject to caps, regardless of diagnosis or level of care delivered to such patients. An exception is made fordiagnostic laboratory procedures, which are reimbursed at the lesser of the provider’s customary fee or themaximum Medicaid fee.As a result of Florida Medicaid reimbursement methodologies that limit payments to providers of Medicaidservices and continuing Florida budget cuts reducing the level of benefits paid, there can be no assurance that thepayments for services provided by the Obligated Issuers to Florida Medicaid patients will be sufficient to cover theactual costs of providing such services to such Medicaid beneficiaries.30
Federal Regulatory and Contractual MattersAnti-Fraud and Abuse LawsThe federal Anti-Kickback Statute makes it a felony to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit or receiveremuneration, directly or indirectly, in order to induce business that is reimbursable under any federal health careprogram. The statute has been interpreted to cover any arrangement where one purpose of the remuneration was toobtain or pay money for the referral of services or to induce further referrals. Violation of the Anti-Kickback Statutemay result in imprisonment for up to five years and/or fines of up to $25,000 for each act. In addition, the OIG hasthe authority to impose civil assessments and fines and to exclude hospitals engaged in prohibited activities from theMedicare, Medicaid, TRICARE (a health care program providing benefits to dependents of members of theuniformed services), and other federal health care programs for not less than five years. In addition to certainstatutory exceptions to the Anti-Kickback Statute, the OIG has promulgated a number of regulatory “safe harbors”under the Anti-Kickback Statute designed to protect certain payment and business practices. A party may seek anadvisory opinion to determine whether an actual or proposed arrangement meets a particular safe harbor; however,the failure of a party to seek an advisory opinion may not be introduced into evidence to prove that the partyintended to violate the provisions of the statute. Failure to comply with a statutory exception or regulatory safeharbor does not mean that an arrangement is unlawful but may increase the likelihood of challenge.The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) created a new programoperated jointly by HHS and the United States Attorney General to coordinate federal, state and local lawenforcement with respect to fraud and abuse including the Anti-Kickback Statute. HIPAA also provides forminimum periods of exclusion from a federal health care program for fraud related to federal health care programs,provides for intermediate sanctions and expands the scope of civil monetary penalties. The BBA expanded theauthority of the OIG to exclude persons from federal health care programs, increased certain civil and monetarypenalties for violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute and added a new monetary penalty for persons who contractwith a provider that the person knows or should know is excluded from the federal health care programs. Finally,actions which violate the Anti-Kickback Statute or similar laws may also involve liability under the federal civilFalse Claims Act, which prohibits the knowing presentation of a false, fictitious or fraudulent claim for payment tothe United States government. Actions under the civil False Claims Act may be brought by the United StatesAttorney General or as a qui tam action brought by a private individual in the name of the government.Pursuant to the mandates of HIPAA, increased emphasis is being placed on federal investigations andprosecutions of Medicare and Medicaid “fraud and abuse” cases, and increases in personnel investigations andprosecuting such cases have been reported, which will most likely result in a higher level of scrutiny of hospitals andhealth care providers, including the Obligated Issuers.The management of the Cleveland Clinic believes that the Obligated Issuers are in material compliancewith the Anti-Kickback Statute and the state anti-kickback laws. However, because of the breadth of the these lawsand the narrowness of the safe harbor regulations, there can be no assurance that regulatory authorities will not takea contrary position or that the Obligated Issuers will not be found to have violated the Anti-Kickback Statute or thestate anti-kickback laws, and that such contrary position or finding will not have a material adverse effect on thefuture operations or financial condition of the Obligated Issuers.31
- Page 1 and 2: NEW ISSUEBOOK ENTRY ONLYSee “RATI
- Page 3 and 4: TABLE OF CONTENTSINTRODUCTORY STATE
- Page 5 and 6: OFFERING CIRCULARRelating to$452,34
- Page 7 and 8: Security and Sources of Payment for
- Page 9 and 10: Upon issuance of the Series 2008A B
- Page 11 and 12: (ii) acquisition of magnetic resona
- Page 13 and 14: $147,200,000 Term Bonds Due January
- Page 15 and 16: that the redemption is conditional
- Page 17 and 18: Use of Certain Terms in Other Secti
- Page 19 and 20: County BondsThe Cleveland Clinic an
- Page 21 and 22: The Cleveland Clinic regularly revi
- Page 23 and 24: ESTIMATED SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS
- Page 25 and 26: DEBT SERVICE COVERAGEThe following
- Page 27 and 28: MedicareGeneralApproximately 29% of
- Page 29 and 30: there is no assurance that the Obli
- Page 31 and 32: Medicare Conditions of Participatio
- Page 33: fiscal year’s budget that are in
- Page 37 and 38: Stark-type statutes have fewer exce
- Page 39 and 40: party or for any services rendered
- Page 41 and 42: typically in a position to refer pa
- Page 43 and 44: OhioOhio Certificate of Need Progra
- Page 45 and 46: performance demonstration programs
- Page 47 and 48: manifest injustice would otherwise
- Page 49 and 50: and properties owned or operated by
- Page 51 and 52: plan of reorganization, with one ex
- Page 53 and 54: percentage may be composed wholly o
- Page 55 and 56: The Internal Revenue Service Form 9
- Page 57 and 58: Charity Care, Underinsured and Unin
- Page 59 and 60: • Proposals to eliminate the tax-
- Page 61 and 62: acting in the capacity of underwrit
- Page 63 and 64: Frederick R. Nance, Regional Managi
- Page 65 and 66: FINANCIAL POSITION — D. BALANCE S
- Page 67 and 68: The CommissionBecause the Series 20
- Page 69 and 70: APPENDIX ACLEVELAND CLINIC HEALTH S
- Page 71 and 72: TABLE OF CONTENTSPageINTRODUCTION .
- Page 73 and 74: This Appendix to the Offering Circu
- Page 75 and 76: A. ORIGINS AND FUNDAMENTAL MISSIONT
- Page 77 and 78: C. GOVERNANCE OF THE CLEVELAND CLIN
- Page 79 and 80: Voting Members of theBoard of Trust
- Page 81 and 82: Voting Members of theBoard of Trust
- Page 83 and 84: Principal Operating Officers. The d
Federal Regulatory and Contractual MattersAnti-Fraud and Abuse LawsThe federal Anti-Kickback Statute makes it a felony to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit or receiveremuneration, directly or indirectly, in order to induce business that is reimbursable under any federal health careprogram. The statute has been interpreted to cover any arrangement where one purpose of the remuneration was toobtain or pay money for the referral of services or to induce further referrals. Violation of the Anti-Kickback Statutemay result in imprisonment for up to five years and/or fines of up to $25,000 for each act. In addition, the OIG hasthe authority to impose civil assessments and fines and to exclude hospitals engaged in prohibited activities from theMedicare, Medicaid, TRICARE (a health care program providing benefits to dependents of members of theuniformed services), and other federal health care programs for not less than five years. In addition to certainstatutory exceptions to the Anti-Kickback Statute, the OIG has promulgated a number of regulatory “safe harbors”under the Anti-Kickback Statute designed to protect certain payment and business practices. A party may seek anadvisory opinion to determine whether an actual or proposed arrangement meets a particular safe harbor; however,the failure of a party to seek an advisory opinion may not be introduced into evidence to prove that the partyintended to violate the provisions of the statute. Failure to <strong>com</strong>ply with a statutory exception or regulatory safeharbor does not mean that an arrangement is unlawful but may increase the likelihood of challenge.The <strong>Health</strong> Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) created a new programoperated jointly by HHS and the United States Attorney General to coordinate federal, state and local lawenforcement with respect to fraud and abuse including the Anti-Kickback Statute. HIPAA also provides forminimum periods of exclusion from a federal health care program for fraud related to federal health care programs,provides for intermediate sanctions and expands the scope of civil monetary penalties. The BBA expanded theauthority of the OIG to exclude persons from federal health care programs, increased certain civil and monetarypenalties for violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute and added a new monetary penalty for persons who contractwith a provider that the person knows or should know is excluded from the federal health care programs. Finally,actions which violate the Anti-Kickback Statute or similar laws may also involve liability under the federal civilFalse Claims Act, which prohibits the knowing presentation of a false, fictitious or fraudulent claim for payment tothe United States government. Actions under the civil False Claims Act may be brought by the United StatesAttorney General or as a qui tam action brought by a private individual in the name of the government.Pursuant to the mandates of HIPAA, increased emphasis is being placed on federal investigations andprosecutions of Medicare and Medicaid “fraud and abuse” cases, and increases in personnel investigations andprosecuting such cases have been reported, which will most likely result in a higher level of scrutiny of hospitals andhealth care providers, including the <strong>Obligated</strong> Issuers.The management of the <strong>Cleveland</strong> <strong>Clinic</strong> believes that the <strong>Obligated</strong> Issuers are in material <strong>com</strong>pliancewith the Anti-Kickback Statute and the state anti-kickback laws. However, because of the breadth of the these lawsand the narrowness of the safe harbor regulations, there can be no assurance that regulatory authorities will not takea contrary position or that the <strong>Obligated</strong> Issuers will not be found to have violated the Anti-Kickback Statute or thestate anti-kickback laws, and that such contrary position or finding will not have a material adverse effect on thefuture operations or financial condition of the <strong>Obligated</strong> Issuers.31