FROM INFANT POINTING TO THE PHASE: GRAMMATICALIZING DEICTIC REFERENCEWolfram H<strong>in</strong>zen & Txuss Martín, Department of Philosophy, Durham UniversityColourless green ideas sleep furiously differs from Furiously sleep ideas green colourlessnot merely <strong>in</strong> grammaticality, but also <strong>in</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g. No grammatical expression is mean<strong>in</strong>gless.How we should characterize <strong>the</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d of mean<strong>in</strong>g that necessarily goes with grammaris an open question. A novel foundational idea ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that ‘UG primarily constra<strong>in</strong>s <strong>the</strong>“language of thought” (Chomsky 2007:22), which entails that no <strong>in</strong>dependent generativesystem, like <strong>the</strong> ‘Language of Thought’ (LOT, Fodor, 2008) exists that could provide for<strong>the</strong> structure and content of thought. The evolution of language, <strong>the</strong>refore, is <strong>the</strong> evolutionof a sapiens-specific mode of thought, an idea supported by evidence that no such modepre-existed <strong>the</strong> arrival of full language and our species, and is absent <strong>in</strong> any o<strong>the</strong>r liv<strong>in</strong>gspecies today (Penn et al., 2008). There is, <strong>the</strong>n, no ‘semantic component’ located on <strong>the</strong>nonl<strong>in</strong>guistic side of an ‘<strong>in</strong>terface’ to which <strong>the</strong> organization of grammar is ‘answerable’.Grammar transforms <strong>the</strong> space of mean<strong>in</strong>gs available, and pre-l<strong>in</strong>guistic Conceptual-Intentional systems (C-I), confronted with <strong>the</strong> outputs of grammar, would simply not beable to ‘read’ <strong>the</strong>m (H<strong>in</strong>zen, 2009). Berwick & Chomsky (2011) even suggest that lexicalatoms do not pre-exist our species. In short, <strong>the</strong> organization of grammar, <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sically, is<strong>the</strong> organization of <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g that corresponds to <strong>the</strong> contents of sapiens-specificthoughts. The ‘Strong M<strong>in</strong>imalist Thesis’ is thus true but trivially so: for <strong>the</strong>re is no <strong>in</strong>terface.A novel argument for <strong>in</strong>nateness follows, too: it is conceptually coherent that languagesare learned; but not that thought is. There is a field of language acquisition, but notof thought acquisition. If grammar is thought, grammar is not learned.But how will grammar create a novel thought system: how could it, if it reduces toMerge? There has only been one solution so far: grammar makes thought productive andsystematic by mak<strong>in</strong>g it compositional. Yet semantic compositionality (Heim & Kratzer,1998) precisely deprives grammar of play<strong>in</strong>g an explanatory role <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> genesis of propositionalmean<strong>in</strong>g: if mean<strong>in</strong>g is compositional <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> standard sense, all content is ultimatelylexical content, and grammar/Merge merely comb<strong>in</strong>es it. Lexical content, however, makesno predictions for how such content will be used referentially: MAN, as a lexical concept,cannot refer to a particular man, several specific men, manhood, mank<strong>in</strong>d, man-meat, etc. –leav<strong>in</strong>g reference, aside from <strong>the</strong> lexical content that enters any act of reference, undecided.Nor does reference arise from compos<strong>in</strong>g lexical contents: man-hunter, stir-fry, etc., rema<strong>in</strong>generic and <strong>in</strong>capable for objectual and specific reference (di Sciullo, 2005).(Intentional) reference, ra<strong>the</strong>r, arises uniquely where grammar is <strong>in</strong>volved, turn<strong>in</strong>ggrammar <strong>in</strong>to a unique device for reference that no o<strong>the</strong>r known device <strong>in</strong> ei<strong>the</strong>r humans ornon-humans matches. Ants perform<strong>in</strong>g computations over complex mental representationsdo not refer to objects as fall<strong>in</strong>g under some concept that, unlike percepts, <strong>the</strong>se referentsdo not determ<strong>in</strong>e. They do not and need not th<strong>in</strong>k, form<strong>in</strong>g beliefs about what path <strong>the</strong>ycompute, which are true or false (Davidson, 2004). This answers our <strong>in</strong>itial question: <strong>the</strong>essence of grammatical mean<strong>in</strong>g is not computation or representation, but reference, basedon concepts. Grammar mediates <strong>the</strong> conversion of a lexical content <strong>in</strong>to an act of reference,and no complete grammatical derivation is ever do<strong>in</strong>g anyth<strong>in</strong>g else.Such a conversion is first manifest <strong>in</strong> declarative po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, which is specific to humansthat are genetically normal <strong>in</strong> regards to UG, disturbed <strong>in</strong> autism (Liebal et al., 2008)and schizophrenia (McKenna & Oh, 2003), both of which centrally <strong>in</strong>volve language abnormalities,and not found among non-l<strong>in</strong>guistic be<strong>in</strong>gs (Tomasello, 2008). Unlike any
non-human communication, which rema<strong>in</strong>s dyadic, declarative po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g is triadic even <strong>in</strong>pre-l<strong>in</strong>guistic <strong>in</strong>fants, communicat<strong>in</strong>g propositional <strong>in</strong>formation based on a shared concept:say, that <strong>the</strong>re is an airplane <strong>the</strong>re, which is seen jo<strong>in</strong>tly with <strong>the</strong> adult (Tomasello,2008:114; Csibra & Gergely 2009). No speech act is ever free of po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this sense:speakers do not speak ‘<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> abstract’, but po<strong>in</strong>t to objects, properties, facts, or propositions.Grammar not only regulates reference, but also this formal ontology of semantics.Specifically, <strong>the</strong> smallest mean<strong>in</strong>gful units of grammatical organization is <strong>the</strong> cycle/phase,and <strong>the</strong> three phases commonly assumed carve out <strong>the</strong> basic formal-ontological triad ofobjects (first phase = ‘DP’), events (second phase = ‘vP’), and propositions (third phase =‘CP’), with f<strong>in</strong>er formal-ontological dist<strong>in</strong>ctions depend<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal make-up of <strong>the</strong>phases. Each of <strong>the</strong>se is thus a unit of referential-deictic significance (Arsenijevic & H<strong>in</strong>zen,2012), and <strong>the</strong>y all <strong>in</strong>stantiate a s<strong>in</strong>gle template that is first visible <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>fant po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g:[EDGE☞ [INT AIRPLANE]].Longobardi (2005) proposes that <strong>the</strong> forms of reference are mapped ‘topologically’from this template: specifically, object-reference iff movement to <strong>the</strong> edge/expletiveassociateCHAIN, as seen <strong>in</strong> overt N-to-D movement/CHAIN <strong>in</strong> Italian and its covert parallel<strong>in</strong> Germanic. Sheehan & H<strong>in</strong>zen (2012) identify <strong>the</strong> topological pr<strong>in</strong>ciple as one of ‘mov<strong>in</strong>gtowards <strong>the</strong> edge’ as referentiality and extensionality <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> forms of reference <strong>in</strong>crease,from purely predicative nom<strong>in</strong>als that require no edge, to scope-tak<strong>in</strong>g nom<strong>in</strong>als that require<strong>the</strong> edge filled, to rigid nom<strong>in</strong>als (names) requir<strong>in</strong>g movement by substitution of N toD/CHAIN. They <strong>the</strong>n extend this topology to <strong>the</strong> reference of clauses, where <strong>the</strong> exact sameforms of reference are found, governed by <strong>the</strong> same pr<strong>in</strong>ciple (T-to-C movement/ CHAIN):purely predicative (nonreferential) TPs denote propositions, referential ones denote facts,rigid ones <strong>in</strong> matrix positions denote truths. These two proposals cover <strong>the</strong> forms of referenceup to <strong>the</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t of 3rd-person propositional reference, but do not cover <strong>the</strong> case of 1stand 2nd person reference – i.e. <strong>the</strong> ‘pure’ or ‘essential’ <strong>in</strong>dexicals (Kaplan, 1977; Perry,1993). Mart<strong>in</strong> & H<strong>in</strong>zen (2012) extend <strong>the</strong> extended topology by reference to <strong>the</strong> Romanceclitic system, demonstrat<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> source of essential <strong>in</strong>dexicality is purely grammaticalra<strong>the</strong>r than lexical or semantic, and that <strong>the</strong> personal pronouns are <strong>the</strong> most grammaticalizedand hence least lexical forms of reference to which <strong>the</strong> grammatical reference-systemstretches. Our approach <strong>the</strong>refore shows how UG is or becomes a new ‘Language ofThought’. The grammaticalization of lexical content, first visible <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>fant po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g, leads to<strong>the</strong> world whose formal ontology, which is purely grammatical, standard semantic <strong>the</strong>ory(mis-) describes <strong>in</strong> semantic or metaphysical terms. If <strong>the</strong> grammaticalization of our m<strong>in</strong>dchanges <strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d’s metaphysics and reformats its representations, giv<strong>in</strong>g rise to an <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itedeictic space marked by a novel formal ontology, talk of a ‘C-I-<strong>in</strong>terface’ must give way <strong>in</strong>favor of a conception of gramar as a device of extended deixis.SELECTED REFERENCES: Arsenijević, B. & W. H<strong>in</strong>zen 2012 On <strong>the</strong> absence of X-with<strong>in</strong>-X. LI43:423-440; Berwick. R. & N. Chomsky 2011 The Biol<strong>in</strong>guistic Program. OUP; Chomsky, N. 2007 Ofm<strong>in</strong>ds and language. Biol<strong>in</strong>guistics 1:1009–27; Davidson, D. 2004. Problems of rationality. OUP; Fodor, J.2008 LOT 2. OUP; H<strong>in</strong>zen, W. 2009 Hierarchy, Merge, and Truth. In Piattelli-Palmar<strong>in</strong>i, M. et al, eds. Ofm<strong>in</strong>ds and language: A Dialogue with Noam Chomsky <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Basque Country. OUP, 123-141; Longobardi,G. 2005 Toward a unified grammar of reference. Z. f. Sprachwissenschaft 24:5-44; Mart<strong>in</strong>, T. & W. H<strong>in</strong>zen2012 The grammar of <strong>the</strong> essential <strong>in</strong>dexical, Ms. Durham Univ.; McKenna, P. & T. Oh 2005 Schizophrenicspeech. CUP; Penn, D. et al. 2008 Darw<strong>in</strong>’s mistake. BBS 31:109-130; Perry, J. 1993 The Problem of <strong>the</strong>Essential Indexical and O<strong>the</strong>r Essays. OUP; Sheehan, M. & W. H<strong>in</strong>zen 2011 Mov<strong>in</strong>g towards <strong>the</strong> edge. L<strong>in</strong>guisticAnalysis 37:405-458; Tomasello, M. 2008 Orig<strong>in</strong>s of Human Communication. MIT Press.
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GLOW Newsletter #70, Spring 2013Edi
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INTRODUCTIONWelcome to the 70 th GL
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Welcome to GLOW 36, Lund!The 36th G
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REIMBURSEMENT AND WAIVERSThe regist
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STATISTICS BY COUNTRYCountry Author
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15:45-16:00 Coffee break16:00-17:00
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14:00-15:00 Adam Albright (MIT) and
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17:00-17:30 Anna Maria Di Sciullo (
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16.10-16.50 Peter Svenonius (Univer
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GLOW 36 WORKSHOP PROGRAM IV:Acquisi
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The impossible chaos: When the mind
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17. Friederici, A. D., Trends Cogn.
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Second, tests replicated from Bruen
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clusters is reported to be preferre
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occur (cf. figure 1). Similar perfo
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argument that raises to pre-verbal
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Timothy Bazalgette University of
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. I hurt not this knee now (Emma 2;
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Rajesh Bhatt & Stefan Keine(Univers
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SIZE MATTERS: ON DIACHRONIC STABILI
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A Dual-Source Analysis of GappingDa
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[9] S. Repp. ¬ (A& B). Gapping, ne
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of Paths into P path and P place is
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Deriving the Functional HierarchyGi
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Reflexivity without reflexivesEric
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Reuland, E. (2001). Primitives of b
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on v, one associated with uϕ and t
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Merge when applied to the SM interf
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1 SachsThe Semantics of Hindi Multi
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Covert without overt: QR for moveme
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Morpho-syntactic transfer in L3 acq
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one where goals receive a theta-rel
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follow Harris in assuming a ranked
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changing instances of nodes 7 and 8
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Sam Steddy, steddy@mit.eduMore irre
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Fleshing out this model further, I
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(5) Raman i [ CP taan {i,∗j}Raman
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properties with Appl (introduces an
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Word order and definiteness in the
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Visser’s Generalization and the c
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the key factors. The combination of
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Parasitic Gaps Licensed by Elided S
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Stages of grammaticalization of the