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at the very heart of a free and democratic society: see Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993]1 S.C.R. 554, at page 615.[77] As identified in section 2 [as am. by S.C. 1998, c. 9, s. 9] of the Act, the purpose of thelegislation is to ensure that individuals have an equal opportunity to make for themselves the life thatthey are able and wish to have, without being hindered by discriminatory practices based uponconsiderations such as race, sex and age, amongst others.[78] Human rights legislation has been described as “the final refuge of the disadvantaged and thedisenfranchised”: see Zurich Insurance Co. v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [1992] 2 S.C.R.321, at page 339. As such, the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly warned of the dangers ofstrict or legalistic approaches which would restrict or defeat the purpose of such a quasiconstitutionaldocument: see Mossop, at page 612.[79] Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed on numerous occasions that human rights legislationis to be given a large, purposive and liberal interpretation in a manner consistent with its overarchinggoals, so as to ensure that the remedial goals of the legislation are best achieved: see, for example,Mossop, at page 611. See also Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink et al., [1982]2 S.C.R. 145; O’Malley, previously cited; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (CanadianHuman Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114.2009 FC 367 (CanLII)[80] This means that ambiguous language must be interpreted in a way that best reflects theremedial goals of the statute. It follows that a strict grammatical analysis may be subordinated to theremedial purposes of the law: see New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) v. PotashCorporation of Saskatchewan Inc., 2008 SCC 45, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 604, at paragraph 67.[81] That is, “it is inappropriate to rely solely on a strictly grammatical analysis, particularly withrespect to the interpretation of legislation which is constitutional or quasi-constitutional in nature”:Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City);Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Boisbriand (City),2000 SCC 27, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665, at paragraph 30 (citing Gould v. Yukon Order of Pioneers, [1996]1 S.C.R. 571, and O’Malley).[82] This interpretive approach does not, however, permit interpretations which are inconsistentwith the wording of the legislation: see Potash Corporation, at paragraph 19.[83] Finally, while human rights legislation is generally to be broadly interpreted, this is not so withrespect to the defences provided for in the human rights statute in question, which are to beinterpreted narrowly: see Brossard (Town) v. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne), [1988]2 S.C.R. 279.(ii) Where the onus lies in relation to paragraph 15(1)(c) of the CHRA[84] No issue has been taken by either Air Canada or ACPA with respect to the Tribunal’sconclusion that the onus was on Air Canada and ACPA to establish that Messrs. Vilven and Kellywere retired in accordance with the normal age of retirement for similar positions.[85] I agree that once a complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination on thebasis of a proscribed ground such as age, the burden shifts to the responding parties to bringthemselves within one of the exemptions identified in section 15 of the Canadian Human Rights Act,such that there exists a bona fide justification for the action taken: see Quebec (Commission desdroits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Maksteel Québec Inc., 2003 SCC 68, [2003] 3S.C.R. 228.