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- 56 -persuaded that the purported prohibition comes more squarely under s. 2.6.3b) thanunder s. 9.3. On the contrary, both deal with the enclosure of balconies. However,unlike s. 2.6.3b), s. 9.3 does not create an absolute prohibition; rather, it permits thecovering and enclosure of balconies, but only with the consent of the co-owners or thedirectors.95 This inherent ambiguity obviates any question of waiver or implicit2004 SCC 47 (CanLII)agreement on the part of the appellants. For if the prohibition can properly be construedas falling under s. 9.3, and if that clause does not contain an absolute prohibition butsimply requires soliciting the consent of the co-owners to enclose one’s balcony, thenthe appellants’ signing of the declaration of co-ownership cannot possibly be construedas a waiver or as an implicit agreement not to build succahs; it simply recognizes theneed to obtain consent from the co-owners before setting up a succah.96 Second, by its very nature, waiver of any right must be voluntary, freelyexpressed and with a clear understanding of the true consequences and effects of sodoing if it is to be effective: see Richard, supra, at para. 22.97 Looking at our jurisprudence, in Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3S.C.R. 844, for example, La Forest J. stated that a right holder who has no other choicebut to renounce a right cannot be said to have truly waived his or her right. In that case,an employee of the City of Longueuil was faced with the following choice: undertaketo maintain her permanent residence in Longueuil for the duration of her employmentor quit and seek employment elsewhere. In the words of La Forest J., at para. 72:Stated simply, the respondent in this case had no opportunity to negotiatethe mandatory residence stipulation and, consequently, she cannot in any