View cases - Stewart McKelvey

- 35 -44 For example, in R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, La Forest J., writing forthe minority (but not on this point), opined, at p. 295:Assuming the sincerity of his convictions, I would agree that the effectof the School Act does constitute some interference with the appellant’sfreedom of religion. For a court is in no position to question the validity ofa religious belief, notwithstanding that few share that belief. [Italics added.]2004 SCC 47 (CanLII)Although La Forest J. did not explicitly state that all that must be shown is a sincerity ofbelief, it is implicit in his reasons. Indeed, this position was subsequently explicitlyadopted by this Court in Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R.825, at para. 70, where La Forest J. reasoned that “it is not the role of this Court todecide what any particular religion believes”.45 In the United States, where there is a richness of jurisprudence on thismatter, the United States Supreme Court has similarly adopted a subjective, personal anddeferential definition of freedom of religion, centred upon sincerity of belief. Forexample, in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450U.S. 707 (1981), the court held that it was the plaintiff’s subjective beliefs, and not theofficial position of the particular religion, which must be considered in evaluating thefree exercise guarantees under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Indelivering the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger stated, at pp.715-16:. . . the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are sharedby all of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area,it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquirewhether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the