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34[118] The Tribunal also disagrees with CN’s argument that an open-ended concept of familystatus would open up the floodgates and that it would have the potential of causing disruption andgreat mischief in the workplace. As the Human Rights and Citizenship Commission of Albertanoted at para. 242 of its decision in Rawleigh v. Canada Safeway Ltd, decision rendered onSeptember 29, 20009, “every case must be weighed on its own merits and unique circumstances.To support the belief that the floodgate may be opened to opportunistic individuals is verydangerous and possibly discriminatory.”[119] The Tribunal also wished to remind that the Supreme Court of Canada and other Courtshave consistently held that that human rights must be interpreted in a large and liberal manner. InCNR v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) (Action Travail des Femmes), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114,the Court stated, at paragraph 24 :2010 CHRT 23 (CanLII)24. Human rights legislation is intended to give rise, amongst other things, toindividual rights of vital importance, rights capable of enforcement, in the finalanalysis, in a court of law. I recognize that in the construction of such legislationthe words of the Act must be given their plain meaning, but it is equally importantthat the rights enunciated be given their full recognition and effect. We should notsearch for ways and means to minimize those rights and to enfeeble their properimpact. Although it may seem commonplace, it may be wise to remind ourselvesof the statutory guidance given by the federal Interpretation Act which asserts thatstatutes are deemed to be remedial and are thus to be given such fair, large andliberal interpretation as will best ensure that their objects are attained.[120] From the above analysis, the Tribunal concludes that there are two different interpretationsin the case law with regard to a prima facie case of discrimination based on family status: the onein Campbell River and the one in Hoyt. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the effect of theapproach in Campbell River is to impose a hierarchy of grounds of discrimination, some grounds,as the ground of family status, being deemed less important than others. This approach is notsupported by the purpose of the CHRA. Furthermore, all the permutations of the approach appliedto the ground of family status in British Columbia subsequent to the Campbell River decision,support the Tribunal’s conclusion that family status should not be singled out for a different andmore onerous or more stringent prima facie standard. The only solution is to apply the same test