LEARN TO LEAD - Civil Air Patrol

3. The first and absolute requirement of strategic airpower in this war was control of the air in order to carryout sustained operations without prohibitive losses. Thestrategic offensive would not have been possible withoutthe long-range fighter escort.4. We profited by the mistakes of our enemies. The Germanswere land-minded. In planning their aggressionthey did not allot their air force an independent missionof strategic offensive. Consequently they failed to meettheir one historic opportunity to win decisively andquickly in 1940. Possibly their military leaders were fatallyhandicapped by the Nazi dictatorship. At any rate,they never recovered the advantage of air superiority innumbers over Britain, which later was to become theAmerican base. They discovered too late the fatality oftheir lack of heavy bombers. They had been divertingplant capacity from making fighters to making V-1's andV-2's. But these arrived too late to affect the course of thewar. Had they used the V-1 against shipping in the Britishports prior to D-Day the invasion might perforce havebeen postponed for another year. After our inspection oftheir underground installations, we realized that theirmanufacture of jet fighters, and even jet bombers, couldhave reached dangerous proportions in another sixmonths. These had been assigned first priority on thedwindling German oil supply. Given the super-speed ofthe jet-fighters, and given a sufficient supply of them(planned production: 1,200 per month), the Germansmight have regained control of the air over Germanywhile we were waiting for our own jet production tocatch up. In that contingency anything might have happened.Certainly, the end of the war would have been delayed.To rely on the probability of similar mistakes by our unknownenemies of the future would be folly. The circumstancesof timing, peculiar to this last war, and whichworked out to our advantage, will not be repeated. Thismust not be forgotten.5. Strategic Air Power could not have won this war alone,without the surface forces. The circumstances of timingdid not permit. The full potential of sufficient strikingpower was attained only in the winter of 1943-44. By 1944much of German war industry was going underground.Further, the invasion by land was necessary in order toforce the diversion of German manpower from production,and even from manning the Luftwaffe. Thus, thiswar was won by the coordination of land sea and airforces, each of the Allies contributing its essential shareto the victory. Air power, however, was the spark to successin Europe. And it is interesting to note that Japanwas reduced by air power, operating from bases capturedby the coordination of land, sea and air forces, and thatshe surrendered without the expected invasion becomingnecessary.Another war, however distant in the future, would probablybe decided by some form of air power before the surfaceforces were able to make contact with the enemy inmajor battles. That is the supreme military lesson of ourperiod in history.NOTES1 Editor's Note [to Original Article]: General Spaatz, then aLieutenant-Colonel, was air observer, attached to theAmerican Embassy in London, from May to September1940. His official report that the Blitz would fail throughGerman misuse of air power was one of the influentialpredictions of the war.ABOUT THE AUTHORGeneral Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz was the top operationalairman in charge of strategic bombing during WWII.After the war, he became the first Chief of Staff of thenewly-created U.S. Air Force, and later served as CAP’sfirst Chairman of the National Board.From: Gen Carl Spaatz, “Strategic Air Power: Fulfillment of aConcept,” Foreign Affairs 24 (1945/1946): 385-396. Used withpermission.87