LEARN TO LEAD - Civil Air Patrol

In controlling performance, Chapin was able to usemeasures like profit and market share, to decomposethose objectives to subobjectives for lower levels of theorganization and to measure the performance of managersof particular models, areas, divisions. Cost accountingrules permitted him to compare plants within AMCand to compare AMC’s purchases, production, and evenadministration with the best practice in the industry.Managing External ConstituenciesAs chief executive officer, Chapin had to deal onlywith the Board. For Costle, within the executive branchbut beyond his agency lay many actors critical to theachievement of his agency objectives: the president andthe White House, Energy, Interior, the Council on EnvironmentalQuality, OMB. Actions each could take, eitherindependently or after a process of consultation in whichthey disagreed with him, could frustrate his agency’sachievement of its assigned mission. Consequently, hespent considerable time building his agency’s reputationand capital for interagency disputes.Dealing with independent external organizations wasa necessary and even larger part of Costle’s job. Since hisagency, mission, strategy, authorizations, and appropriationsemerged from the process of legislation, attention tocongressional committees, congressmen, congressmen’sstaff, and people who affect congressmen and congressionalstaffers rose to the top of Costle’s agenda. In thefirst year, top-level EPA officials appeared over 140 timesbefore some 60 different committees and subcommittees.Chapin’s ability to achieve AMC’s objectives couldalso be affected by independent external organization:competitors, government (the Clean Air Act that waspassed in 1970), consumer groups (recall Ralph Nader),and even suppliers of oil. More than most private managers,Chapin had to deal with the press in attempting tochange the image of AMC. Such occasions were primarilyat Chapin’s initiative and around events that Chapin’spublic affairs office orchestrated, for example, the announcementof a new racing car. Chapin also managed amarketing effort to persuade consumers that their tastescould best be satisfied by AMC products.Costle’s work was suffused by the press: in the dailyworking of the organization, in the perception by keypublics of the agency and thus the agency’s influencewith relevant parties, and even in the setting of theagenda of issues to which the agency had to respond.For Chapin, the bottom line was profit, market share,and the long-term competitive position of AMC. For Costle,what are the equivalent performance measures? Blumenthalanswers by exaggerating the difference betweenappearance and reality: “At Bendix, it was the reality ofthe situation that in the end determined whether we succeededor not. In the crudest sense, this meant the bottomline. You can dress up profits only for so long – ifyou’re not successful, it’s going to be clear. In governmentthere is no bottom line, and that is why you can be successfulif you appear to be successful – though, or course,appearance is not the only ingredient of success.” 20 Rumsfeldsays, “In business, you’re pretty much judged by results.I don’t think the American people judgegovernment officials this way…In government, too oftenyou’re measured by how much you seem to care, howhard you seem to try – things that do not necessarily improvethe human condition…It’s a lot easier for a Presidentto get into something and end up with a few days ofgood public reaction than it is to follow through, to pursuepolicies to a point where they have a beneficial effecton human lives.” 21 As George Shultz says, “In governmentand politics, recognition and therefore incentives go tothose who formulate policy and maneuver legislativecompromise. By sharp contrast, the kudos and incentivesin business go to the persons who can get somethingdone. It is execution that counts. Who can get the plantbuilt, who can bring home the sales contract, who cancarry out the financing, and so on.” 22This casual comparison of one public and one privatemanager suggests what could be done if the issue of comparisonswere pursued systematically, horizontally acrossorganizations and at various levels within organizations.While much can be learned by examining the chief executiveofficers of organizations, still more promisingshould be comparisons among the much larger numbersof middle managers. If one compared, for example, a regionaladministrator of EPA and an AMC division chief,or two comptrollers, or equivalent plant managers, somefunctions would appear more similar, and other differenceswould stand out. The major barrier to such comparisonsis the lack of cases describing problems andpractices of middle-level managers. 23 This should be ahigh priority in further research.The differences noted in this comparison, for example,in the personnel area, have already changed with theCivil Service Reform Act of 1978 and the creation of theSenior Executive Service. Significant changes have alsooccurred in the automobile industry: under current circumstances,the CEO of Chrysler may seem much morelike the administrator of EPA. More precise comparisonof different levels of management in both organizations,for example, accounting procedures used by Chapin tocut costs significantly as compared to equivalent proceduresfor judging the costs of EPA mandated pollutioncontrol devices, would be instructive…78