front common challenges like violent extremism, nuclearproliferation, climate change, and a changing global economy.That is precisely the reason we should strengthen enforcementof international law and our commitment toengage and modernize international institutions andframeworks. Those nations that refuse to meet theirresponsibilities will forsake the opportunities that comewith international cooperation. Credible and effectivealternatives to military action—from sanctions to isolation—must be strong enough to change behavior, just as wemust reinforce our alliances and our military capabilities.And if nations challenge or undermine an internationalorder that is based upon rights and responsibilities, theymust find themselves isolated.We succeeded in the post-World War II era by pursuingour interests within multilateral forums like the UnitedNations—not outside of them. We recognized that institutionsthat aggregated the national inter-ests of many nationswould never be perfect; but we also saw that theywere an indispensable vehicle for pooling internationalresources and enforcing international norms. Indeed, thebasis for international cooperation since World War IIhas been an architecture of international institutions, organizations,regimes, and standards that establishes certainrights and responsibilities for all sovereign nations.In recent years America’s frustration with internationalinstitutions has led us at times to engage the United Nations(U.N.) system on an ad hoc basis. But in a world of transnationalchallenges, the United States will need to investin strengthening the international system, working frominside interna¬tional institutions and frameworks to facetheir imperfections head on and to mobilize transnationalcooperation.We must be clear-eyed about the factors that have impededeffectiveness in the past. In order for collective action tobe mobilized, the polarization that persists across region,race, and religion will need to be replaced by a galvanizingsense of shared interest. Swift and effective internationalaction often turns on the political will of coalitions ofcountries that comprise regional or international institutions.New and emerging powers who seek greater voiceand representation will need to accept greater responsibilityfor meeting global challenges. When nations breachagreed international norms, the countries who espousethose norms must be convinced to band together to enforcethem.We will expand our support to modernizing institutionsand arrangements such as the evolution of the G-8 to theG-20 to reflect the realities of today’s international environment.Working with the institutions and the countriesthat comprise them, we will enhance international capacityto prevent conflict, spur economic growth, improvesecurity, combat climate change, and address the challengesposed by weak and failing states. And we will challengeand assist international institutions and frameworks toreform when they fail to live up to their promise.Strengthening the legitimacy and authority of internationallaw and institutions, especially the U.N., will require aconstant struggle to improve performance.Furthermore, our international order must recognize theincreasing influence of individuals in today’s world.There must be opportunities for civil society to thrivewithin nations and to forge connections among them.And there must be opportunities for individuals and theprivate sector to play a major role in addressing commonchallenges—whether supporting a nuclear fuel bank, promotingglobal health, fostering entrepreneurship, orexposing violations of universal rights. In the 21st century,the ability of individuals and nongovernment actors toplay a positive role in shaping the international environmentrepresents a distinct opportunity for the United States.Within this context, we know that an international orderwhere every nation upholds its rights and responsibilitieswill remain elusive. Force will sometimes be necessary toconfront threats. Technology will continue to bring withit new dangers. Poverty and disease will not be completelyabolished. Oppression will always be with us. But if werecognize these challenges, embrace America’s responsibilityto confront them with its partners, and forge newcooperative approaches to get others to join us in overcomingthem, then the international order of a globalizedage can better advance our interests and the commoninterests of nations and peoples everywhere.STRENGTHENING NATIONAL CAPACITY—A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACHTo succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all ofthe tools of American power and work with our allies andpartners to do the same. Our military must maintain itsconventional superiority and, as long as nuclear weaponsexist, our nuclear deterrent capability, while continuingto enhance its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats, preserveaccess to the global commons, and strengthen partners.We must invest in diplomacy and development capabilitiesand institutions in a way that complements and reinforcesour global partners. Our intelligence capabilitiesmust continuously evolve to identify and characterizeconventional and asymmetric threats and provide timelyinsight. And we must integrate our approach to homelandsecurity with our broader national security approach.20
We are improving the integration of skills and capabilitieswithin our military and civilian institutions, so they complementeach other and operate seamlessly. We are alsoimproving coordinated planning and policymaking andmust build our capacity in key areas where we fall short.This requires close coopera-tion with Congress and adeliberate and inclusive interagency process, so that weachieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitoroperations, policies, and strategies. To initiate thiseffort, the White House merged the staffs of the NationalSecurity Council and Homeland Security Council.However, work remains to foster coordination acrossdepartments and agencies. Key steps include more effectivelyensuring alignment of resources with our nationalsecurity strategy, adapting the education and training ofnational security professionals to equip them to meetmodern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanismsto implement and coordinate assistance programs, andother policies and programs that strengthen coordination.• Defense: We are strengthening our military to ensurethat it can prevail in today’s wars; to prevent and deterthreats against the United States, its interests, and ourallies and partners; and prepare to defend the UnitedStates in a wide range of contingencies against state andnonstate actors. We will continue to rebalance our militarycapabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency,stability operations, and meeting increasinglysophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force isready to address the full range of military operations.This includes preparing for increasingly sophisticatedadversaries, deterring and defeating aggression in antiaccessenvironments, and defending the United Statesand supporting civil authorities at home. The most valuablecomponent of our national defense is the men andwomen who make up America’s all-volunteer force. Theyhave shown tremendous resilience, adapt¬ability, andcapacity for innovation, and we will provide our servicemembers with the resources that they need to succeedand rededicate ourselves to providing support and carefor wounded warriors, veterans, and military families. Wemust set the force on a path to sustainable deploymentcycles and preserve and enhance the long-term viabilityof our force through successful recruitment, retention,and recognition of those who serve.• Diplomacy: Diplomacy is as fundamental to ournational security as our defense capability. Our diplomatsare the first line of engagement, listening to our partners,learning from them, building respect for one another, andseeking common ground. Diplomats, development experts,and others in the United States Government must be ableto work side by side to support a common agenda. Newskills are needed to foster effective interaction to convene,connect, and mobilize not only other governments and internationalorganizations, but also nonstate actors such ascorporations, foundations, nongovern¬mental organizations,universities, think tanks, and faith-based organizations,all of whom increasingly have a distinct role to play onboth diplomatic and development issues. To accomplishthese goals our diplomatic personnel and missions mustbe expanded at home and abroad to support the increasinglytransnational nature of 21st century security challenges.And we must provide the appropriate authorities andmechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programsand grow the civilian expedi¬tionary capacityrequired to assist governments on a diverse array of issues.• Economic: Our economic institutions are crucialcomponents of our national capacity and our economicinstruments are the bedrock of sustainable nationalgrowth, prosperity and influence. The Office of Managementand Budget, Departments of the Treasury, State,Commerce, Energy, and Agriculture, United States TradeRepresentative, Federal Reserve Board, and other institutionshelp manage our currency, trade, foreign investment,deficit, inflation, productivity, and national competitiveness.Remaining a vibrant 21st century economic poweralso requires close cooperation between and among developednations and emerging markets because of the interdependentnature of the global economy. America—like other nations—is dependent upon overseas marketsto sell its exports and maintain access to scarce commoditiesand resources. Thus, finding overlapping mutual economicinterests with other nations and maintaining thoseeconomic relationships are key elements of our nationalsecurity strategy.• Development: Development is a strategic, economic,and moral imperative. We are focusing on assisting developingcountries and their people to manage securitythreats, reap the benefits of global economic expansion,and set in place accountable and democratic institutionsthat serve basic human needs. Through an aggressiveand affirmative development agenda and commensurateresources, we can strengthen the regional partners weneed to help us stop conflicts and counter global criminalnetworks; build a stable, inclusive global economy withnew sources of prosperity; advance democracy andhuman rights; and ultimately position ourselves to betteraddress key global challenges by growing the ranks ofprosperous, capable, and democratic states that can beour partners in the decades ahead. To do this, we are expandingour civilian development capability; engagingwith international financial institutions that leverage ourresources and advance our objectives; pursuing a developmentbudget that more deliberately reflects our policies21
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13.5 Public and Private Management:
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TABLE 1:FUNCTIONS OF GENERAL MANAGE
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3. Career System. The model corpora
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islative charter - the Clean Air Ac
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In controlling performance, Chapin
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14CHAPTER 14AIRPOWER ASSTRATEGIC LA
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14.1 Strategic Air Power: Fulfillme
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carry it out. Their daylight raids
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you did not rely on strategic bombi
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14.2 Warden and the Air Corps Tacti
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tification, and a Jominian claim to
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courage the rapid and widespread ex
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it to influence physical players in
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14.4 Basic Air Force DoctrineAF Doc
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earthquake-stricken Haiti. The worl
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perspective. Airmen do not divide u
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Command and ControlCommand and cont
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14.5 Should the US Maintain the Nuc
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form of human government.” 20 Dem
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obtainable goal. See the Global Zer
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15CHAPTER 15ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
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15.1 Organizational CultureBy Doria
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Review. This action strives to unco
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gram will serve and then having the
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ticipating the changes being made b
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Many years of working with change p
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At the least, the areas of concern
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15.4 Developing an Innovative Cultu
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTSIn an ever-chang
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global issues. Businesses that poss
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— Sees the big picture—the shif
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16CHAPTER 16STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
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16.1 Principles of Strategic Commun
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16.2 The Art of NegotiationBy Brend
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16.3 Negotiating Effectively Across
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hidden areas can act as cultural ho
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and four conflict styles. Hammer be
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maintaining the relationship. As th
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25 Mitchell R. Hammer, “Chapter 1
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tural, socioeconomic, and psycholog
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for the win-win," during which time
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interests and, at worst, as a gun s
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Public diplomacy is surely about mu
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But public diplomats do not have th
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Photo courtesy of the familyThe LEA
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THE CADET OATHI pledge that I will