mandates or resolutions that would affect our proposedoperations or interests. Nongovernmental organizationsmay also be willing to help—or perhaps require help.Each of these concerns is legitimate and makes the internationalenvironment the most challenging and unfamiliarof them all.This framework for the components of the strategic environmentis simple in design yet complicated in practice.Most US government personnel are intimately familiarwith the national security and military environmentssince they are linked (i.e., military strategy follows directlyfrom national security decisions). But strategic leadersmust recognize that the two greatest influences on theirdecisions come from the domestic and international environments.To lead effectively, they should use what ismost familiar and be able to synthesize what influencestheir strategic decisions.The four components of the strategic environment presenta challenge for strategic leaders. The national securityenvironment, with its many taskmasters, will drive bothstrategic decisions and military strategy. Leaders will feelgreat influence from the familiar domestic environmentand must have its support for strategic action. Further,strategic leaders can be surprised and their decisionsthwarted if they fail to understand the international environmentsufficiently. Knowing the disparate componentsof the strategic environment is the first step in graspingstrategic leadership. Understanding the nature of thestrategic environment and strategic decisions is thesecond step.NATURE OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTThe strategic-leadership environment differs from theclimate at lower levels of leadership. We should view thenature of this environment both broadly—examiningconsequential decisions and changes in performancerequirements—and narrowly.CONSEQUENTIAL DECISIONSBy nature, strategic leadership requires consequentialdecision making. All decisions have consequences, but inthe strategic context, they take on a different character—specifically, they are planned, generally long term, costly,and profound.Consequential decisions occur only at the higher levelswithin organizations. Generally, decision makers in thetop 20 percent of the organization—the people who haveultimate control of resources—plan and execute suchdecisions. They also think out the implications of theirdecisions in advance. That is to say, the decision makersanalyze and evaluate the possible, probable, and necessaryramifications of a decision beforehand. Some peopleargue that the sergeant on patrol in Kosovo or the bombercrew over Afghanistan can make strategic decisions in asplit second and thus become strategic decision makers.No doubt, armed forces and government officials do makelethal, destructive, and sometimes regrettable decisions.However, these determinations are considered tacticalopportunities or, worse, operational blunders rather thanplanned, consequential decisions. Planning becomesmore important when one considers the long-term natureof consequential decisions.Such decisions require years to play out. Indeed, in mostcases strategic decision makers may not be around to witnessthe actual consequences of the decision, making it allthe more essential that they carefully consider all implicationsbefore taking action. Clearly, a hasty consequentialdecision can become very costly.One may classify these attendant costs as either immediateor mortgaged. For instance, some consequential decisions—suchas declaring war or beginning hostilities—canhave immediate costs or effects. The cost in lives couldbecome very heavy in a matter of days. World economiccosts could mount within weeks while markets collapsewithin hours. Mortgaged costs of consequential decisions,however, refer to lost opportunities and “sunk” costs. Wesee such consequences, for example, when organizationscommit to huge purchases for weapons systems over adecade-long time frame. Of course in the strategic environment,costs are measured not only in dollars but alsoin influence (e.g., the costs of supporting one nation overanother or the costs of not supporting a particular position).Many times, the decision becomes a matter of sunkcosts—gone forever with no chance of recovery. Up to thispoint, we have considered only the negative effects ofcosts on consequential decisions. Suffice it to say thatmany consequential decisions have the aim of decreasing,avoiding, or postponing costs. In fact, some of the leastcostly consequential decisions turn out to be the mostprofound (e.g., expanding free-trade agreements and theNA<strong>TO</strong> alliance, reducing the number of nuclear arms, etc.).Consequential decisions are profound because they havethe potential to create great change, lead trends, alter thecourse of events, make history, and initiate a number ofwide-ranging effects. They can change societies andadvance new disciplines. Most importantly, an entireorganization, a segment of society, a nation, or humanityin general recognizes such decisions as profound.12
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTSThe stratified systems theory of T. Owen Jacobs andElliott Jaques classifies the performance requirements forleaders in organizations as direct, general, and strategic(in military parlance: tactical, operational, and strategic,respectively). 2 Distinct elements define the leadershipenvironment within each level. Unmistakable differencesamong the three levels include complexity, time horizon,and focus.Most people spend their careers leading at the direct ortactical level (squadron or battalion commander, branchchief, or below). In this environment, the leader interactsdirectly with the same people every day by maintaininga direct span of control, all the while executing plans,following policies, and consuming resources with adefined goal in mind. The time horizon is very short—normally less than one year. At the direct level of leadership,communications generally occur within the sameorganization and focus exclusively on the internal audience.Because leaders spend more time at this level than anyother, it becomes familiar and comfortable.Some leaders, however, will mature and move to the generalor operational level, where performance requirementsbegin to change. Direct leadership diminishes as the spanof control shrinks. At this level, leaders develop plans,write some policies, and allocate resources among subordinateorganizations. The time horizon also increases—toas much as five years. Operational leaders begin to shiftthe focus of communication and energy outside theorganization, recognizing and questioning how the externalenvironment will affect their organizations. Groupcommanders, brigade commanders, and division chiefsrepresent this general, analytic level of leadership.From the perspective of budding strategic leaders, performancerequirements for the strategic level change themost and are the least familiar. The power of influencebecomes more important than the power of the position.Conceptual ability and communications become essential.Both focus not only on how the external environment willaffect the organization, but also—and more importantly—on how the organization can influence that environment.The most challenging of the performance requirements isthe time frame for making decisions, which can extend to20 years and beyond. The leader at this level must think interms of systems and use integrative thinking—the abilityto see linkages and interdependencies within large organizations(or systems) so that decisions in one system willnot adversely affect another system. 3 The challenges aregreat, the stakes are high, and the performance requirementsare stringent.VOLATILITY, UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY,AND AMBIGUITYFraming the nature of the strategic environment in abroad context helps us understand the magnitude of thechallenge. Strategic leaders operate in an environment thatdemands unique performance requirements for makingconsequential decisions. If we look more closely at thisenvironment, we discover four characteristics that definethe challenge to strategic leadership in a narrow sense:volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. 4Now that the world is no longer bipolar, the strategiclandscape has become more volatile. Violence erupts inthe most unlikely places and for seemingly innocuousreasons. The last few years have given us a glimpse of thisvolatility: ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, war andterrorism in the Middle East, and terrorism within theUnited States. The challenge for strategic leaders lies inanticipating volatile scenarios and taking action to avertviolence.In most cases, these leaders will be asked to conduct thisaction in a landscape of uncertainty—the deceptive characteristicof the strategic environment. They face situationsin which the intentions of competitors are not known—perhaps deliberately concealed. 5 At other times, they willeven have reservations about the actual meaning of truthfulinformation. Their challenge is to penetrate the fog ofuncertainty that hugs the strategic landscape. Comprehendingthe nature of the strategic environment constitutesthe first step toward solving its complexity.The interdependence of the components in the strategicenvironment produces complexity—its most challengingcharacteristic. Integrative thinking is essential to recognizingand predicting the effects of a decision on this“system of systems.” If leaders are to anticipate the probable,possible, and necessary implications of the decision,they must develop a broad frame of reference or perspectiveand think conceptually.The ambiguous character of the strategic environmentstems from different points of view, perspectives, andinterpretations of the same event or information. Strategicleaders have to realize that broad perspectives (e.g., usingteam approaches to solve problems and gain consensus)help eliminate ambiguity and lead to effective strategicdecisions. 6The nature of the strategic environment is challengingbecause of the consequences of decisions and unique performancerequirements. Although faced with an environmentcharacterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity,13
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Smucker, 1999).The Internal Revenue
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culture is necessary to ensure the
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13.4 The New Look of TransparencyBy
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13.5 Public and Private Management:
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TABLE 1:FUNCTIONS OF GENERAL MANAGE
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3. Career System. The model corpora
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islative charter - the Clean Air Ac
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In controlling performance, Chapin
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carry it out. Their daylight raids
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14.4 Basic Air Force DoctrineAF Doc
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earthquake-stricken Haiti. The worl
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Command and ControlCommand and cont
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form of human government.” 20 Dem
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15CHAPTER 15ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
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Review. This action strives to unco
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gram will serve and then having the
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Many years of working with change p
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At the least, the areas of concern
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTSIn an ever-chang
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global issues. Businesses that poss
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— Sees the big picture—the shif
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16CHAPTER 16STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION
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16.1 Principles of Strategic Commun
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hidden areas can act as cultural ho
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25 Mitchell R. Hammer, “Chapter 1
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interests and, at worst, as a gun s
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Public diplomacy is surely about mu
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Photo courtesy of the familyThe LEA
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THE CADET OATHI pledge that I will