hidden areas can act as cultural hooks that hang us upand lead to ambiguity, confusion, and misunderstanding.BehaviorsYour ability to interpret behaviors when negotiating indivergent cultural contexts is important. You may neverlearn to make the distinctive “snap” that ends a Liberianhandshake or use stainless steel chopsticks as deftly as aKorean. And that’s OK. What is important is being opento divergent cultural behaviors and withholding judgment.Of course, no matter how hard you try, you will still makemistakes. Once as a member of an American negotiatingteam in Japan, I was asked to present a proposal to aJapanese university’s chief administrators. I felt proficientenough to outline the proposal in Japanese. To lighten theatmosphere, I decided to begin by telling a rather blandjoke about jetlag. I practiced until I had it down pat.Much to my chagrin, however, the punch-line was metwith stony silence. What I learned afterwards was that inJapan jokes are inappropriate in formal contexts. I wouldhave been better served had I begun with a humble apologyfor the inadequacies of our proposal. Humility, not humor,is the acceptable opening for such proceedings. Fortunately,in spite of my clumsy introduction, the proposal was accepted.These kinds of cultural mistakes are part of the learningprocess. Most people will understand if you acknowledgeyou have made a mistake and seek to make amends.In fact, such mistakes will occur frequently in any situationwhere people from diverse cultural contexts collaborateand work together. Coalition teams, for example, providefertile ground for misunderstandings and conflict. Theability to resolve cultural conflict issues requires patienceand openness to differences in behaviors and institutionalpractices.Cultural Values, Beliefs, and AssumptionsCultural values, beliefs, and assumptions are powerfulforces within a culture. They are passed down from generationto generation through the family, schools, themedia, and religious institutions. Although hidden fromour view below the “waterline,” these shared concepts arethe foundation for all those aspects that are easily perceived.Although it may be convenient to categorize culturesby their values and norms, some caution is needed.In any culture, not all members display or “buy into”these psychological structures. Everyone in a culture isnot the same. Therefore, when talking about values,beliefs, and assumptions it is wise to frame them as generalizations.It is better to say that Iraqis, for example, “tendto be” collectivist or that American institutions “in general”support individualist values. To do otherwise is to fallinto the trap of stereotyping. 10InstitutionsInstitutions, according to Brett, are “economic, social,political, legal, religious institutional environments thateffect negotiation.” 11 This includes governmental organizationssuch as the military. Like behaviors, institutionalstructures are linked to cultural values and beliefs. Forexample, the fictional nation of Leonia is an Arab Muslimculture situated in the Maghreb region of NorthernAfrica. Cultures in this region tend to be much more hierarchicalthan those in the West. Yet there are benefits tothis type of organizational structure. In some cases, suchhierarchies allow even low level functionaries to havedirect access to management at a much higher level thanwould be common or even acceptable in the U.S. Sometimesit simply means finding out whom to contact togain access to decision-makers. This requires the formingof alliances, locating third-party intermediaries, and thedevelopment of friendships and strong working relationshipswith host country nationals.ReframingWhen we call someone lazy, we are making a judgmentabout that person’s character. When applied to a group,the judgment has been transformed into a negativestereotype because the attribution is not to just one person,but an entire group and by extension an entire culture.This kind of stereotyping is inappropriate. Before makingsuch sweeping judgments, [you] must clearly define thenegative behavior and then determine the cause. Theroots of the behavior are more likely tied to values relatedto cultural domains such as kinship, education, or institutionalprocesses. “Reframing” is a helpful process formoving beyond stereotyping and judgmental language.Stella Ting-Toomey and Leeva Chung, two recognizedexperts in the field of intercultural conflict resolution,described “reframing” as a communication skill that uses“neutrally toned (to positively-toned) language…to reducetension and increase understanding.” 12 The AFINT instructorscould begin the process of understanding theproblem by framing their descriptions of behavior in nonjudgmentalterms:Judgmental Statement“The students are lazy.”“The students are unmotivated.”Reframed StatementSome students turn in their homework either late orincomplete.Some students come to class 5 to 15 minutes late.Some students have missed up to three days of class.Values-Based NegotiationThe story of the sisters and the orange highlights theimportance of understanding the interests of all parties142
concerned. And, as previously stated, interests are theunderlying reason for entering a negotiation. Brett’s suggestionfor discovering the interests of the other party is toask the questions “Why?” and “Why not?” But Brett alsocautioned that “such direct questioning might not workeverywhere in the world.” 13 In many other cultures, askingdirect questions is seen as aggressive and intrusive behavior.When engaging in cross-cultural negotiation, one is betterserved by uncovering both values and interests. Quiteoften the two are entwined. As John Forester pointed outin his article “Dealing with Deep Value Differences,”“values run deeper than interests.” 14 He goes on to explainhow interests—such as time or money—are shed moreeasily than cultural values because:When we give up something we value, we often feel wegive up part of ourselves, and that’s very difficult, verythreatening, and hardly compensated by some gain somewhereelse. 15If we return to the situation at the Camp David Accords,we can see how closely cultural factors are enmeshedwith interests. Carter wrote that “there was no compatibilityat all” between Sadat and Begin. 16 Yet with the U.S.president acting as a bridge, Sadat and Begin were able toovercome cultural and political differences. The culturalfactors ran deep on both sides. Begin’s decision to removethe Israeli settlements was a difficult one for a man whosepeople had forged a new nation in what they believed tobe their Promised Land after centuries of persecution.Carter called this concession “a remarkable demonstrationof courage, political courage, on the part of PrimeMinister Begin.” 17As Carter did with Sadat and Begin, [you] would do wellto discover the values influencing the institutional andpersonal behavior causing conflict before [you] commenceany formal attempts to resolve the issues.To summarize, cross-cultural negotiations and conflictresolution require attention to values, beliefs, and otherpsychological aspects of culture that go hand in hand witha group’s specific interests. An understanding of theseareas is the key to a satisfactory resolution or agreement.INTERCULTURAL CONFLICT STYLESIn their book, Managing Intercultural Conflict Effectively,Stella Ting-Toomey and John Oetzel, define crossculturalconflict as:The experience of emotional frustration in conjunctionwith perceived incompatibility of values,norms,…goals, scarce resources, processes, and/oroutcomes between…parties from different culturalcommunities. 18Clearly, negotiation and conflict are closely linked.Understanding how conflict is displayed in divergent culturalcontexts can benefit planners engaged in crossculturalnegotiations. It also serves as a helpful guide inpreparing for any negotiation. This section will introduceyou to the phenomena of thin-slicing, mind-blindness,and the ICS-DEAD model of intercultural conflict styles.Thin-Slicing and Mind-BlindnessIn his bestselling book Blink, Malcolm Gladwell describedthe phenomenon of rapid cognition known as thin-slicing. 19Thin-slicing is the human ability to use “our unconsciousto find patterns in situations and behavior based on verynarrow slices of experience.” 20 Thin-slicing is used constantlyin human interaction as we read the meaning of aglance or a tone of voice. We also thin-slice our waythrough disagreements and conflict situations. Althoughthe ability to thin-slice is innate, the patterns that frameour ability to slice and dice are learned.The inability to thin-slice is a condition common to thosesuffering from autism. People with autism, according toGladwell,“find it difficult, if not impossible to…[interpret]nonverbal cues, such as gestures and facial expressionsor putting themselves inside someone else’shead or drawing understanding from anythingother than the literal meaning of words.” 21This is exactly what happens when human beings crossinto new cultural terrain. In a cross-cultural situation,this temporarily autistic condition, a mental state thatGladwell calls “mind-blindness,” causes us to miss thecues and clues that in our own culture—in an instant—would tell us what is happening. 22 To overcome thiscultural mind-blindness, it is essential that we build theintercultural skills that widen our emotional radar andother sensory receptors and pick up those clues andawarenesses we would otherwise miss.Intercultural Conflict Styles—The DEAD ModelMitchell Hammer defined conflict style as interactionalbehavior that “reflects specific…patterns or tendenciesfor dealing with disagreements across a variety of situations.”23 To offset the effects of mind-blindness, recognizecultural differences, and help us read the dynamics ofcross-cultural conflict situations, Hammer has devised aneasy to understand framework that identify differences inconflict style when negotiating across cultures. An awardwinningauthor 24 and researcher in the field of crisismediation and conflict resolution, Hammer’s InterculturalConflict Styles (ICS-DEAD) framework looks at crossculturalconflict from a culturally generalizable perspective.The ICS-DEAD describes four general cultural patterns143
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