Command and ControlCommand and control is the exercise of authority and directionby a properly designated commander over assignedand attached forces in the accomplishment of themission. Command and control functions are performedthrough an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,facilities, and procedures employed by acommander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controllingforces and operations in the accomplishment ofthe mission. This core function includes all of the C2-relatedcapabilities and activities associated with air, space,cyberspace, nuclear, and agile combat support operationsto achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance,and ReconnaissanceGlobal Integrated ISR is the synchronization and integrationof the planning and operation of sensors, assets, andprocessing, exploitation, dissemination systems acrossthe globe to conduct current and future operations. Thesub-elements of this function are:• Planning and Directing• Collection• Processing and Exploitation• Analysis and Production• Dissemination and IntegrationGlobal Precision AttackGlobal Precision Attack is the ability to hold at risk orstrike rapidly and persistently, with a wide range of munitions,any target and to create swift, decisive, and preciseeffects across multiple domains. The sub-elements of thisfunction are:• Strategic Attack• <strong>Air</strong> Interdiction• Close <strong>Air</strong> SupportSpecial OperationsSpecial Operations are operations conducted in hostile,denied, or politically sensitive environments to achievemilitary, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectivesemploying military capabilities for which there isno broad conventional force requirement. These operationsmay require covert, clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities.Special operations are applicable across theROMO. They can be conducted independently or in conjunctionwith operations of conventional forces or othergovernment agencies and may include operationsthrough, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Specialoperations differ from conventional operations in degreeof physical and political risk, operational techniques,mode of employment, independence from friendly support,and dependence on detailed operational intelligence andindigenous assets. The sub-elements of this function are:• Agile Combat Support• Aviation Foreign Internal Defense• Battlefield <strong>Air</strong> Operations• Command and Control• Information Operations• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance• Military Information Support Operations• Precision Strike• Specialized <strong>Air</strong> Mobility• Specialized RefuelingRapid Global MobilityRapid Global Mobility is the timely deployment, employment,sustainment, augmentation, and redeployment ofmilitary forces and capabilities across the ROMO. It providesjoint military forces the capability to move fromplace to place while retaining the ability to fulfill theirprimary mission. Rapid Global Mobility is essential to virtuallyevery military operation, allowing forces to reachforeign or domestic destinations quickly, thus seizing theinitiative through speed and surprise. The sub-elementsof this function are:• <strong>Air</strong>lift• <strong>Air</strong> Refueling• Aeromedical EvacuationPersonnel RecoveryPersonnel Recovery (PR) is defined as the sum of military,diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and executethe recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. It isthe ability of the US government and its internationalpartners to affect the recovery of isolated personnelacross the ROMO and return those personnel to duty. PRalso enhances the development of an effective, global capacityto protect and recover isolated personnel whereverthey are placed at risk; deny an adversary‘s ability to exploita nation through propaganda; and develop joint, in-104
teragency, and international capabilities that contributeto crisis response and regional stability. The sub-elementsof this function are:• Combat Search and Rescue• <strong>Civil</strong> Search and Rescue• Disaster Response• Humanitarian Assistance Operations• Medical Evacuation/Casualty EvacuationAgile Combat SupportAgile Combat Support is the ability to field, protect, andsustain <strong>Air</strong> Force forces across the ROMO to achieve jointeffects. The sub-elements of this function are:• Ready the Total Force• Prepare the Battlespace• Position the Total Force• Protect the Total Force• Employ Combat Support Forces• Sustain the Total Force• Recover the Total ForceBuilding PartnershipsBuilding Partnerships is described as <strong>Air</strong>men interactingwith international airmen and other relevant actors to develop,guide, and sustain relationships for mutual benefitand security. Building Partnerships is about interactingwith others and is therefore an inherently inter-personaland cross-cultural undertaking. Through both words anddeeds, the majority of interaction is devoted to buildingtrust-based relationships for mutual benefit. It includesboth foreign partners as well as domestic partners andemphasizes collaboration with foreign governments, militariesand populations as well as US government departments,agencies, industry, and non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs). To better facilitate partnering efforts,<strong>Air</strong>men should be competent in the relevant language,region, and culture. The sub-elements of thisfunction are:• Communicate• ShapeCONCLUSIONIf there is one attitude more dangerous thanto assume that a future war will be just likethe last one, it is to imagine that it will be soutterly different that we can afford to ignoreall the lessons of the last one.— <strong>Air</strong> Marshall Sir John C. SlessorMore and more often, our national leadership is callingupon airpower as the military instrument of first choice,and they are asking it to accomplish tasks previously heldunworkable—to coerce and to compel. <strong>Air</strong>power offersjoint force commanders options, including the ability togo to the heart of an enemy and attain a variety of effectsdirectly at the strategic level. To support our nationalleadership, <strong>Air</strong>men, as military professionals, must thinkabout how to accomplish a spectrum of missions. Wemust understand the potential of airpower, and be able toplan and employ it to its maximum effect, and to articulateit within the context of joint operations. This is especiallytrue in contemporary irregular warfare operations,in which airpower plays an important role, but largelycomplementing surface operations.<strong>Air</strong> Force doctrine development is never totally complete—itis a continuous work in progress. We must remainaware of the lessons of the past—alert and receptiveto future technologies and paradigms that may alter theart of air, space, and cyberspace warfare. We should notassume that things have not or will not change; above all,doctrine should be continually interpreted in light of thepresent situation. A too-literal reading of doctrine mayfail to accommodate new operational realities.Doctrine application requires informed judgment. Certainprinciples—like unity of command, objective, and offensive—havestood the test of time. Other ideas—likeunescorted daytime bombing, decentralized command,and the preeminence of nuclear weapons—have not. If weignore the potential of integrated air, space, and cyberspaceoperations and the global and strategic potential ofairpower, we may commit the same sins as our forebearsby preparing for the “wrong war.” If we ignore the realitythat adaptive, thinking adversaries will seek asymmetricstrategies, anti-access capabilities, and favorable arenaswithin which to influence and engage us, we risk failure.Tomorrow, a new set of conditions and requirements willlikely emerge. In fact, some new conditions and environmentsare already emerging, and national security requirementsare changing. The best hedge is aninstitutional commitment to learn from experience and toexploit relevant ideas and new technologies so we may beready for the future, while retaining those fundamentalprinciples that remain constant over time.105
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12CHAPTER 12INTRODUCTION TO STRATEG
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12.1 Strategic Leadership: Defining
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mandates or resolutions that would
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A systemic approach to failure is m
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The late W. T. Grant Company is a r
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the resources - setting the directi
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focal point for describing and inte
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Web, can be viewed as a CS attempt
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How to evaluate users and contribut
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13CHAPTER 13LEADING PUBLIC &VOLUNTE
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13.1 Leadership for Volunteers:The
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13.2 Take Root: Volunteer Managemen
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QualificationsClearly list educatio
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and effectively track their volunte
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• Understand rules for recognitio
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interests and, at worst, as a gun s
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Public diplomacy is surely about mu
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But public diplomats do not have th
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Photo courtesy of the familyThe LEA
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THE CADET OATHI pledge that I will