Guidance for Use of CSM Recommendation - ERA - Europa

More documents

Recommendations

Info

European Railway Agency Collection of examples of risk assessments and of some possible tools supporting the CSM Regulation C.6.3. In comparison to the CSM process, the following steps were applied (see also Figure 1): (a) significance of the change [Article 4]: The railway undertaking performed a preliminary risk assessment which concluded that the operational change was significant. As the drivers had to run on new routes, and possibly outside their usual working hours, the potential of passing signals at danger, of over speeding or of ignoring temporary speed restrictions could not be neglected. When comparing this preliminary risk assessment with the criteria in Article 4 (2) of the CSM Regulation, the change could be also categorised as significant based on the following criteria: (1) safety relevance: the change is safety related as the impact of modifying the drivers' way of working could be catastrophic; (2) failure consequence: the drivers' errors mentioned here above have the potential to lead to a catastrophic consequences; (3) novelty: potentially the RU could be introducing new ways of working for the drivers; (4) complexity of the change: modifying the driving hours could be complex as this could require a complete assessment and modification to existing working conditions; (b) system definition [section 2.1.2]: The system definition initially described: (1) the existing working conditions: working hours, shift patterns, etc.; (2) the changes of the working hours; (3) the interface issues (e.g. with the infrastructure manager) During the different iterations, the system definition was updated with the safety requirements resulting from the risk assessment process. Key staff representatives were involved in this iterative process for the hazard identification and system definition update. (c) hazard identification [section 2.2]: The hazards and possible safety measures were identified by a brainstorming of a group of experts, including drivers' representatives, for the new routes and shift patterns. The drivers' tasks for the new conditions were looked at in order to assess whether they were affecting the drivers, their workload, the geographical scope and the time of the work shift system. The RU also consulted the worker unions to see if they could provide additional information and reviewed the risk of fatigue and sickness levels that could be induced by a possible increase of overtime due to extended journeys on unknown routes. Each of the hazards was assigned a level of severity of risk and consequences (high, medium, low) and the impact of the proposed change reviewed against them (increased, unchanged, decreased) risk. (d) use of codes of practice [section 2.3]: Codes of practice related to working hours and human fatigue risks were used to revise the existing working conditions and to determine the new safety requirements. The necessary operational rules were written according to the codes of practice for the new work shift system. All necessary parties were involved in the revised operational procedures and in the agreement to proceed with the change. (e) demonstration of the system compliance with the safety requirements [section 3]: Reference: ERA/GUI/02-2008/SAF Version: 1.1 Page 78 of 105 File Name: Collection_of_RA_Ex_and_some_tools_for_CSM_V1.1.doc European Railway Agency ● Boulevard Harpignies, 160 ● BP 20392 ● F-59307 Valenciennes Cedex ● France ● Tel. +33 (0)3 27 09 65 00 ● Fax +33 (0)3 27 33 40 65 ● http://www.era.europa.eu
European Railway Agency Collection of examples of risk assessments and of some possible tools supporting the CSM Regulation The revised operational procedures were introduced in the RU safety management system. They were monitored and a review process was put in place to ensure that the identified hazards continue to be correctly controlled during the operation of the railway system. (f) hazard management [section 4.1]: See point here above as for the railway undertakings the hazard management process can be part of their safety management system for recording and managing risks. The identified hazards were registered in a hazard record with the safety requirements (i.e. reference to the revised operational procedures) controlling the associated risk. The revised procedures were monitored, and reviewed when needed, to ensure that the identified hazards continue to be correctly controlled during the operation of the railway system. (g) independent assessment [Article 6]: The risk assessment and risk management process were assessed by a competent person within the RU‘s company who was independent from the assessment process. The competent person assessed both the process and the results, i.e. the identified safety requirements. The RU has based its decision to put the new system into effect on the independent assessment report produced by the competent person. C.6.4. The example shows that the principles and process used by the railway undertaking are in line with the common safety method. The risk management and risk assessment process fulfilled all the requirements from the CSM. C.7. C.7.1. Risk assessment example of a technical significant change (CCS) Remark: this example of risk assessment was not produced as a result of the application of the CSM process; it was carried out before the existence of CSM. The purpose of the example is: (a) to identify the similarities between the existing risk assessment methods and the CSM process; (b) to give traceability between the existing process and the one requested by the CSM; (c) to provide justification of the added value of performing the additional steps (if any) required by the CSM. It must be stressed that this example is given for information only. Its purpose is to help the reader understanding the CSM process. But the example itself shall not be transposed to or used as a reference system for another significant change. The risk assessment shall be carried out for each significant change in compliance with the CSM Regulation. C.7.2. The example is related to a technical change of the control command system. It was considered significant by the related manufacturer. A risk assessment based approach was applied to evaluate the change. C.7.3. C.7.4. Description of the change: the change consists to replace a trackside loop located before a signal by a "radio infill + GSM " sub-system (see Figure 16). Concern: maintain the safety level of the system after the change. Reference: ERA/GUI/02-2008/SAF Version: 1.1 Page 79 of 105 File Name: Collection_of_RA_Ex_and_some_tools_for_CSM_V1.1.doc European Railway Agency ● Boulevard Harpignies, 160 ● BP 20392 ● F-59307 Valenciennes Cedex ● France ● Tel. +33 (0)3 27 09 65 00 ● Fax +33 (0)3 27 33 40 65 ● http://www.era.europa.eu
Page 1 and 2:
European Railway Agency Collection
Page 3 and 4:
Page 5 and 6:
Page 7 and 8:
Page 9 and 10:
Page 11 and 12:
Page 13 and 14:
Page 15 and 16:
Page 17 and 18:
Page 19 and 20:
Page 21 and 22:
Page 23 and 24:
INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT System Defin
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28: European Railway Agency Collection
Page 33 and 34: BOX 1 BOX 2 European Railway Agency
Page 77: European Railway Agency Collection
Page 105: European Railway Agency Collection
show all

Guidance for Use of CSM Recommendation - ERA - Europa

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?