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Guidance for Use of CSM Recommendation - ERA - Europa

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European Railway Agency<br />

Collection <strong>of</strong> examples <strong>of</strong> risk assessments and <strong>of</strong> some possible tools<br />

supporting the <strong>CSM</strong> Regulation<br />

<br />

[G 1] In general, the proposer will decide what risk acceptance principle is the most appropriate <strong>for</strong><br />

controlling the identified hazards based on the specific requirements <strong>of</strong> the project, as well as<br />

on the proposer's experience with the three principles.<br />

[G 2] It is not possible always to evaluate the risk acceptability at the system level through the use<br />

<strong>of</strong> only one <strong>of</strong> the three risk acceptance principles. The risk acceptance will <strong>of</strong>ten be based<br />

on a mix <strong>of</strong> these principles. If <strong>for</strong> a significant hazard, more than one risk acceptance<br />

principles need to be applied <strong>for</strong> controlling the associated risk, the related hazard needs to<br />

be divided into sub-hazards so that each individual sub-hazard is adequately controlled by<br />

only one risk acceptance principle.<br />

[G 3] The decision <strong>for</strong> controlling a hazard by a risk acceptance principle needs to take into<br />

account the hazard and the causes <strong>of</strong> the hazard already identified during the hazard<br />

identification phase. Thus, if two different and independent causes are associated to the<br />

same hazard, the hazard needs to be sub-divided into two different sub-hazards. Each subhazard<br />

will then be controlled by a single risk acceptance principle. The two sub-hazards<br />

need to be registered and managed in the hazard record. For example, if the hazard is<br />

caused by a design error this can be managed by the application <strong>of</strong> a code <strong>of</strong> practice,<br />

whereas if the cause <strong>of</strong> the hazard is a maintenance error, the code <strong>of</strong> practice alone may<br />

not be sufficient; the application <strong>of</strong> another risk acceptance principle is then needed.<br />

[G 4] The reduction <strong>of</strong> risk to an acceptable level might need several iterations between the risk<br />

analysis and risk evaluation phases until appropriate safety measures are identified.<br />

[G 5] The present residual risk returned from experience on the field <strong>for</strong> the existing systems and<br />

<strong>for</strong> the systems based on the application <strong>of</strong> codes <strong>of</strong> practice is recognised to be acceptable.<br />

The risk resulting from explicit risk estimation is based on expert's judgement and different<br />

assumptions taken by the expert during the analyses, or on data bases related to accident or<br />

operational experience. There<strong>for</strong>e the residual risk from explicit risk estimation cannot be<br />

confirmed immediately by return from the field. Such a demonstration requires time <strong>for</strong><br />

operating, monitoring and getting a representative experience <strong>for</strong> the related system(s). In<br />

general, the application <strong>of</strong> codes <strong>of</strong> practice and comparison with similar reference systems<br />

has the advantage to avoid the over specification <strong>of</strong> unnecessarily strict safety requirements<br />

that can result from excessively conservative (safety) assumptions in explicit risk<br />

estimations. However it could happen that some safety requirements from codes <strong>of</strong> practice<br />

or similar reference systems need not to be fulfilled <strong>for</strong> the system under assessment. In<br />

that case, the application <strong>of</strong> explicit risk estimation would have the advantage to avoid an<br />

unnecessary overdesign <strong>of</strong> the system under assessment and would enable to provide a<br />

more cost effective design that has not been tried be<strong>for</strong>e.<br />

[G 6] If the identified hazards and the associated risk(s) <strong>of</strong> the system under assessment cannot<br />

be controlled by the application <strong>of</strong> codes <strong>of</strong> practice or similar reference systems, an explicit<br />

risk estimation is per<strong>for</strong>med, based on quantitative or qualitative analyses <strong>of</strong> hazardous<br />

events. This situation arises when the system under assessment is entirely new (or the<br />

design is innovative) or when the system deviates from a code <strong>of</strong> practice or a reference<br />

system. The explicit risk estimation will then evaluate whether the risk is acceptable (i.e.<br />

further analysis is not needed) or whether additional safety measures are needed to reduce<br />

the risk further.<br />

[G 7] <strong>Guidance</strong> <strong>for</strong> risk reduction and risk acceptance can also be found in section § 8. <strong>of</strong> the<br />

EN 50 126-2 Guideline {Ref. 9}.<br />

[G 8] The used risk acceptance principle and its application need to be evaluated by the assessment<br />

body.<br />

<br />

Reference: <strong>ERA</strong>/GUI/02-2008/SAF Version: 1.1 Page 36 <strong>of</strong> 105<br />

File Name: Collection_<strong>of</strong>_RA_Ex_and_some_tools_<strong>for</strong>_<strong>CSM</strong>_V1.1.doc<br />

European Railway Agency ● Boulevard Harpignies, 160 ● BP 20392 ● F-59307 Valenciennes Cedex ● France ● Tel. +33 (0)3 27 09 65 00 ● Fax +33 (0)3 27 33 40 65 ● http://www.era.europa.eu

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