Medical Logistics - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army

The use of automation to transfer data among units is a definite combat
multiplier. However, units experience diminishing returns
when they focus more heavily on the systems used to transmit data than
on the integrity of the data.
resupply missions. An easy-to-use battle rhythm does
not require reports during normal hours of limited
operations since reports at such times often produce
unverified or inaccurate data.
The use of automation to transfer data among units is
a definite combat multiplier. However, units experience
diminishing returns when they focus more heavily on
the systems used to transmit data than on the integrity
of the data. BCS3 allows for exceptional visibility of
brigade- and unit-level assets. Using BCS3 and other
information management systems should not prevent
regular face-to-face or voice communication between
the supporting and supported units.
Backhaul Versus Emergency Resupply
Maneuver battalions facing conflicting mission
requirements at NTC tend to delay or neglect the LOG-
STAT report since the first-order effect of not reporting
logistics is not as distressing as that of not accomplishing
a tactical mission. In fact, the third- and fourthorder
effects of poor logistics management may be as
destructive as the “flash-to-bang” first-order effects of
any other tactical mission.
It is important for logisticians
to remain aware of the effects
of their forecasts and schedules.
Logistics planners and executers constantly face the
difficulty of determining the requirements, capabilities,
and shortfalls of the logistics system. They direct
their efforts toward ensuring that no tactical mission is
jeopardized because of logistics challenges. However,
the absence of accurate and timely reporting by supported
units often creates the need to choose between
two courses of action: either pushing supplies based
on incomplete data and thereby risking the need to
move inordinate amounts of backhaul (planned or
unplanned loads carried back with a transporter to the
point of origin); or delaying the planning process until
accurate information is gathered and thereby risking
the need to make an emergency resupply to a unit that
is dangerously low on a commodity like fuel, water, or
ammunition.
ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS
No matter what decisionmaking process is used,
backhaul and emergency resupply missions still mean
additional U.S. and coalition forces personnel on the
road. Emergency missions, in particular, may entail
the hasty assembling of personnel and equipment and
the bypassing of proper precombat checks and inspections.
The possible loss of life and equipment resulting
from poor planning should give every logistician
excellent grounds for insisting on compliance with
the battle rhythm and the integrity of the LOGSTAT
report. Proactive and predictive logistics is paramount
for tactical victory over the enemy.
It is important for logisticians to remain aware of
the effects of their forecasts and schedules. The SPO
should endeavor to provide sustainment to supported
units in a relatively normal and predictable manner;
this will reduce the need to have to push emergency
resupply commodities, regardless of cost. Comparing
the commodities backhauled with the commodities
sent by emergency resupply will give logistics
planners and executers an idea of where their LCOP
is deficient.
Making effective and sustained changes to the logistics
battle rhythm is often a protracted process requiring
excellent lateral coordination and earnest command
emphasis to be successful. Nonetheless, the gains of
an improved LCOP are tremendous, including greater
tactical flexibility, less logistics unpredictability, and,
in turn, better management of our greatest resource:
the Soldier. Professional logisticians understand that
the life of the Soldier resides in the third-order effect
of logistics and act accordingly.
Persons desiring updated information on the logistics
training trends at NTC or teaching products for
their command can email the author at timothy.mccarter@us.army.mil
or contact the Goldminer team at
(760) 380–5805 or DSN 470–5805. ALOG
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