Medical Logistics - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army

Logistics Status Reports
and the Logistics Common
Operating Picture
by Chief Warrant offiCer (W–4) ti M o t hy n. MCCarter, sr.
To avoid third-order effects that can cost Soldiers’ lives, logistics
planners must be able to develop a complete logistics operating picture
of the battlespace. But that picture cannot be achieved unless units
provide timely and accurate logistics status reports.
We had finally established our logistics operation
at Forward Operating Base Detroit
in Ghazi Province. However, neither the
brigade S–4 nor the brigade support battalion (BSB)
support operations officer (SPO) had received any of
the brigade’s logistics status (LOGSTAT) reports at
0800 hours. That was the first indicator that we were
going to have a bad day. Then the need to support
high-priority tactical missions precluded the convening
of the brigade logistics synchronization meeting
scheduled for 1000 hours. The SPO began to wonder
what else could possibly go wrong.
This scenario vividly demonstrates
that failure to submit accurate
LOGSTAT reports in a timely
fashion undermines the ability
of units to achieve an accurate
LCOP, and lacking an accurate
LCOP can lead to deadly third-order
effects on the battlefield.
That was when the Battle Command Sustainment
Support System (BCS3), used for collecting, analyzing,
and publishing data, lost connectivity. Since the
brigade had not practiced any alternate methods of
transmitting LOGSTAT information, we were unable
to synchronize our efforts with the echelons-abovebrigade
support battalion that was responsible for supply
distribution to our brigade.
By 1600 hours, the brigade combat team (BCT)
S–4 had received only three of the eight required
reports from the brigade’s units. The SPO had to make
ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS
a decision based on the incomplete logistics common
operating picture (LCOP) he had before him. Based on
the shortages listed on the LOGSTAT he had in hand,
he decided to schedule an emergency resupply convoy
to transport water and fuel from the BSB to a forward
operating base. The convoy left the BSB at 1930 hours.
Along the route, it encountered an improvised explosive
device that detonated at 2010 hours, killing two
BSB Soldiers and destroying a fuel tanker.
Fortunately for everyone, this sequence of events
occurred at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort
Irwin, California, and not in the hostile environment
the Army faces every day in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Soldiers who were notionally “killed” were “resurrected”
24 hours later, along with their “new” tanker. The
greatest irony of this scenario was that the LOGSTAT
report received by the SPO—on which he based his
decision to send the emergency resupply convoy—was
inaccurate. The unit did not need an emergency resupply
because its report did not show actual quantities on
hand. The unit had sent a duplicate of a previously submitted
report in order to meet the brigade commander’s
reporting requirement. In other words, the unit sent the
report in order to “check the block.”
This scenario vividly demonstrates that failing to
submit accurate LOGSTAT reports in a timely fashion
undermines the ability of units to achieve an accurate
LCOP, and lacking an accurate LCOP can lead
to deadly third-order effects on the battlefield. What
follows are some thoughts for improving LOGSTAT
report management—and thus the LCOP—based on
observations and practices at NTC.
A Common Operating Picture for Logistics
The LCOP is essentially a function of the common
operational picture (COP). Field Manual 3–0, Operations,
defines a COP as “a single display of relevant
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