Medical Logistics - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army

had to be adapted into a workable interorganizational
network to provide logistics as an ongoing learning-whiledoing
project. Knowledge is less stable here because,
unlike science, there is no such thing as “best practice”
resulting from one experience that can be generalized to
others. As the ancient philosopher Heraclitus might have
put it, logisticians cannot step into the same river twice.
In that regard, action research (dynamic experimentation)
may be the appropriate methodology.
Action research is a concept developed in the 1940s
by the late Massachusetts Institute of Technology
social-psychology professor Kurt Lewin. He turned the
field away from solving complex problems with a bestpractice
approach, which is the idea behind military
concept development, doctrine, and lessons-learned
programs. Instead, he demonstrated a dynamic, realtime
method of theorizing-while-practicing (analogous
to today’s “white boarding”), resulting in continuous
personal and (inter-) organizational development.
Prosecuting the simultaneity and complexity of the
full range of military operations would require more of
an action research approach to logistics. Variations on
this methodology have included action science, cooperative
and collaborative inquiry, action learning, and
interactive science.
Logistics Sensemaking
The upper-right section represents the integration
of old and the creation of new knowledge developed
as the professional logistician borrows and mixes
knowledge from the other three quadrants. Sensemaking
about military logistics becomes more clinical and
intuitive as the situation is viewed as more subjective
and complex. It is difficult to capture this type of
knowledge for two reasons. First, the knowledge is
fleeting. It is developed experientially as the logistician
deals with making sense of the complex situation at
hand. As the situation quickly changes, the knowledge
is rendered obsolete. Second, the knowledge is tacit.
Tacit knowledge is difficult to share. This is knowledge
that, according to Michael Polanyi in his book The
Tacit Dimension, is experienced when “we know more
than we can tell.” The inability to describe what they
know helps explain why combatant commanders often
have difficulty telling DOD and service school houses
what they need and want in their logisticians (but they
will “know it when they see it”).
Synthetic Views
Various knowledge perspectives can be synthesized
from this framework. The quadrants on the left indicate
that many aspects of school learning can be transferred
from the field, based on the assumption of generalizable
knowledge. The quadrants on the right signify the
need for innovative logisticians who can work their
ARMY LOGISTICIAN PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF UNITED STATES ARMY LOGISTICS
way through complexity. The upper quadrants reveal
the need for military logisticians to have well-honed
interpretation and explanation skills. (Professor Karl
E. Weick at the University of Michigan refers to this
as the ability to create “rich description.”) The lower
quadrants demonstrate that the physical aspects of complicated
dealings can be arranged by appreciating both
traditional science and complexity science at the same
time. The scope and methods of logistics involve learning
associated with blending all knowledge approaches
until something is workable (like explaining the difference
between an “immature” and a “mature” theater of
operations in the same way that improvisational jazz is
compared to orchestral sheet music).
Competency Mapping Issues
With the integrated model in place, we now can
see some of the inherent weaknesses of competency
mapping. In situations of high complexity that require
subjective judgment, we tend to seek lower-left knowledge
solutions despite the danger that the preconceived
competencies found or developed there can become
“solutions looking for problems.” Competency mapping
is equivalent to focusing only on the left quadrants of
knowledge, where simplification is the dominant value.
At the very least, proponents of competency mapping
wish to document narrative stories into an upper-left
quadrant type of knowledge, such as “history,” “best
practices,” or “lessons learned.”
In many cases, such as in our military training and
organizational design models, we are tempted to objectify
and simplify learning to the point that the complex
interplay of variables is lost. In the quest for simplification
by reducing knowledge to tasks, conditions,
and standards, we tend to force knowledge produced
in the right quadrants into one of the left quadrants (for
example, tactics, techniques, and procedures; doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, and facilities [DOTMLPF] solutions;
or case studies) when this may be inappropriate to the
type of knowledge at work.
Competency mapping signals a propensity to want
to attach competency levels to organizational and
positional levels in order to promote the logisticians
we need in a more “objective” way. Hence, we have illconceived
notions of tactical, operational, and strategic
logistics knowledge (associated with the lower-left
quadrant) that drives our educational processes along
the lines of developing people engineered to a corresponding
rank and position.
The integrated framework presented in this article
should give us pause because determining whether or
not knowledge is strategic, operational, or tactical should
depend on its contribution to the achievement of theater
or national objectives and should not be confused with
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