Medical Logistics - Army Logistics University - U.S. Army

so we could use this short-range asset to investigate
historic indirect fire points of origin. We also used it
to get a bird’s-eye view of the area around the FOB
and monitor civilian activity in the area.
Force protection of convoys. The threat of improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), precision small-arms
fire, and rocket-propelled grenades made convoys
our most dangerous missions in Iraq. Finding the
optimal routes and times for convoy travel required
a constant assessment of when attacks occurred. The
IED “hot spots” and attack engagement areas changed
constantly, and so did our preferred routes and tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP).
Route trafficability. Civilian activity, fallen or low
overpasses, and many other factors affect the logistician’s
ability to provide support. More than any other
factor, the geographic and political expanse of the
logistics area of interest makes the intelligence support
that logisticians require different from that required
by the maneuver battalion. When an overpass on a
corps MSR was damaged by a vehicle-borne IED,
I realized the true nature of our area of interest; an
event that occurred outside of our division boundary
was directly affecting our ability to support customer
units. So, I trained my shop to
be constantly aware of events
throughout the Iraqi theater of
operations—including political
changes, attack trends, spectacular
bridge attacks, and dust
storms—that could slow the
speed at which we received
supplies.
Disseminating Intelligence
One of our most important
challenges was packaging
intelligence so that logisticians
could see how it was relevant
to their operations. Once we
arrived in Baghdad, I was able
to borrow and modify some
tools in order to develop our
own unique perspective of our
area of operations. The tools I
used included the weekly route
analysis beyond green-amberred,
an IED threat trend slide,
and convoy briefings.
Weekly route analysis
beyond green-amber-red. The
BSB whose area of operations
(AO) we fell in on gave us the
idea of doing a weekly route
analysis to identify trends on
10
the major MSRs and ASRs within our brigade AO.
The route analysis was similar to the “trail book”
concept that is popular for theater support units. This
analysis tool showed the attacks by location and type
on a particular route and compared them to attacks
from the previous week.
Over time, my analysts improved and enhanced the
route analysis tool. By reviewing the recent activity on
our routes, we could identify shifts in enemy TTP and
changes in the locations of activity hot spots. We plotted
every attack on a map of each route in our AO. The
key was that we always plotted every route whether
there was significant activity or not—even if we had
not used that route in months. This forced the analysts
to review all the information on each significant activity
and identify trends in the type of attacks that were
occurring across the AO. We then made a chart showing
the attack times during the past week and compared
them to the current week. As unpredictable as an insurgency
can be, insurgents are still human beings, and
humans are fundamentally creatures of habit. Although
not infallible, using the trends in attack times on a
particular route to identify optimal movement times
proved to be successful.
S–2 personnel brief a lieutenant before a convoy.
NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 2008