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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

Reports From <strong>The</strong> New-York Times<br />

(1887-1904)<br />

Compiled by:<br />

Ronald Ramdayal<br />

&<br />

Odeen Ishmael<br />

Editor:<br />

Odeen Ishmael


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

Reports From <strong>The</strong> New-York Times<br />

(1887-1904)<br />

Compiled by:<br />

Ronald Ramdayal<br />

&<br />

Odeen Ishmael<br />

Editor:<br />

Odeen Ishmael


Copyright Statement<br />

<strong>The</strong> copyright of the articles, reports <strong>and</strong> editorials<br />

in this collection is owned by <strong>The</strong> New York Times Company.<br />

Released by GNI Publications, 2010<br />

E-mail: GNI.publication@gmail.com<br />

This volume is published as a public service<br />

<strong>and</strong> is not to be sold.<br />

GNI Publications<br />

Georgetown Caracas Boston Toronto<br />

ii


Contents<br />

Introduction v<br />

Part 1. 1887 - 1892 1<br />

Part 2. January-November 1895 25<br />

Part 3. 1-18 December 1895 77<br />

Part 4. 19-20 December 1895 133<br />

Part 5. 21-23 December 1895 195<br />

Part 6. 24-25 December 1895 259<br />

Part 7. 26-31 December 1895 309<br />

Part 8. January 1896 351<br />

Part 9. February-April 1896 407<br />

Part 10. May-July 1896 467<br />

Part 11. August-December 1896 503<br />

Part 12. 1897 - 1898 539<br />

Part 13. 1899 - 1904 573<br />

iii


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

Introduction<br />

During the second half of the nineteenth century, a major dispute broke out between <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> Great Britain over the location of the frontier between its colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>* <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Spanish-speaking republic. A flurry of diplomatic exchanges over the territorial dispute took place<br />

between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain <strong>and</strong> various proposals on finding a solution were presented by<br />

both sides, but no agreement was ever possible. Each side proposed boundary lines; <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

insisted that the boundary should be as far east as the Essequibo River while Great Britain, on<br />

behalf of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, claimed the entire Cuyuni basin <strong>and</strong> insisted that the colony’s boundary in<br />

the north-west should stretch as far as the mouth of the Orinoco River.<br />

With each side disagreeing with the other’s territorial claims, a diplomatic stalemate thus existed.<br />

But the situation took a new turn in the 1880s when the government of the United States of<br />

America decided to support the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n contention. At the start of the 1890s the United States<br />

became very vociferous in support of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> from 1895 it, almost in all respects, carried the<br />

diplomatic <strong>and</strong> political campaign with the <strong>British</strong> government on behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong><br />

American government dem<strong>and</strong>ed that the dispute involving the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claim to all territory<br />

west of the Essequibo River should be settled by arbitration, but the <strong>British</strong> government refused to<br />

accept this proposal. However, the <strong>British</strong> government did agree to a limited form of arbitration<br />

with respect to the territory it claimed <strong>and</strong> occupied west of the “Schomburgk line”, drawn at a<br />

minimum distance of about one hundred miles west of the Essequibo River. This survey line was<br />

marked as the proposed boundary between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> in 1840 by the <strong>British</strong>appointed<br />

surveyor, the German-born naturalist Robert Schomburgk.<br />

<strong>The</strong> American president, Grover Clevel<strong>and</strong>, himself became totally involved in the matter <strong>and</strong> in<br />

December 1895, in a special message to the US Congress, he issued an ultimatum to the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government to agree to arbitrate the dispute. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, with the support of the Congress, even<br />

established a special boundary commission to investigate the issue <strong>and</strong> decide where the boundary<br />

between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> should be drawn.<br />

In the United States, the border dispute spurred up much animosity against the <strong>British</strong> with<br />

some leading American politicians <strong>and</strong> newspapers, in support of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claim, openly<br />

advocating war against the <strong>British</strong>. <strong>The</strong> American army <strong>and</strong> navy were even placed in readiness in<br />

case of such an eventuality.<br />

However, with the <strong>British</strong> government in late 1896 finally agreeing to arbitration, the American<br />

commission was disb<strong>and</strong>ed, but all its research materials were made available to the government of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> which hired a team of American lawyers, including ex-US President Benjamin Harrison,<br />

to argue its case before the arbitral tribunal. <strong>The</strong> five-member tribunal, which met in Paris, also<br />

included two American judges who were chosen by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n government.<br />

As could be expected, the American newspapers carried numerous reports of the American<br />

involvement in support of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in its territorial claims. <strong>The</strong> New-York Times, in particular,<br />

reported regularly on various aspects of the border dispute, <strong>and</strong> the majority of its reports <strong>and</strong><br />

commentaries expressed support for the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n contention. In fact, the newspaper reflected the<br />

general view of the American government which throughout the decade of the 1890s rigidly backed<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n government.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se reports were especially intensive during December 1895 <strong>and</strong> the early month of 1896<br />

when American involvement was at its height, <strong>and</strong> when anti-<strong>British</strong> emotions in the US were<br />

v


Introduction<br />

relatively strong. <strong>The</strong> meetings of the arbitral tribunal in Paris in 1899 <strong>and</strong> its final decision were also<br />

prominently featured by the newspaper.<br />

(More than six decades later when <strong>Venezuela</strong> reopened its claim based its allegation of nullity of<br />

the territorial award, that country carried the line that the award was biased <strong>and</strong> was based on a<br />

collusion between the Americans <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> against <strong>Venezuela</strong>n interests. But these report, articles<br />

<strong>and</strong> editorials in this collection completely debunk that theory as they accurately captured the mood<br />

during the moment of the anti-<strong>British</strong> sentiments by the United States government <strong>and</strong> the vigour<br />

<strong>and</strong> almost warlike st<strong>and</strong> it took in support of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.)<br />

This volume presents a compilation of those reports by <strong>The</strong> New-York Times between 1887 <strong>and</strong><br />

1904. <strong>The</strong> collection, culled from the online published archives of the newspaper, is presented in<br />

this volume in a chronological order. It should be noted that no reports on the dispute for the years<br />

1893 <strong>and</strong> 1894 could be located.<br />

Readers will observe variations in the spelling of important names in the reports. “Essequibo”<br />

<strong>and</strong> “Schomburgk”, for example, along with the names of many rivers <strong>and</strong> persons involved in this<br />

historical period, were presented in different spelling forms by the reporters of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se various spellings are reproduced in this collection as they appeared in the original news<br />

reports. And regarding the headlines, they are shown in this compilation as they appeared in the<br />

newspaper—totally upper case in some <strong>and</strong> lower case in others.<br />

It is interesting to note that up to the early years of the twentieth century, “New York” was a<br />

hyphenated name. Also, at the period of the late nineteenth <strong>and</strong> early twentieth centuries, the<br />

American spelling “system” had not yet dispensed totally with that of the <strong>British</strong>, <strong>and</strong> this was<br />

reflected clearly in the reports <strong>and</strong> articles in American newspapers, including <strong>The</strong> New-York Times.<br />

Finally, I must thank Mr. Ronald Ramdayal, a Guyanese petroleum engineer currently residing in<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, for his collaboration in putting together this compilation. Mr. Ramdayal worked<br />

assiduously with me in gathering the reports, articles <strong>and</strong> editorials which, hopefully, will provide<br />

greater illumination to the history of <strong>Guyana</strong> during the period when the border dispute <strong>and</strong> the<br />

work of the arbitration tribunal grabbed the international spotlight in the closing decade of the<br />

nineteenth century.<br />

Odeen Ishmael<br />

Editor<br />

Caracas, October 2010<br />

* On 26 May 1966, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> achieved political independence <strong>and</strong> was officially renamed <strong>Guyana</strong>, a name which was already being<br />

used by pro-government politicians since 1962.<br />

vi


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- Part 1 -<br />

1887-1892<br />

1


1887 - 1892<br />

2


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 1 -<br />

SECRETARY BAYARD’S VIEW<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 16.—Secretary of State Bayard smiled to-night when he heard that a<br />

circumstantial account had been published of the intention of Great Britain to seize gold mining<br />

territory in <strong>Venezuela</strong> on the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> border, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>Venezuela</strong> would call upon the United<br />

States to apply the Monroe doctrine. “Doesn’t that strike you as absurd?” was Mr. Bayard’s reply to<br />

a question about the truth of the story. “How can the United States apply the Monroe doctrine,” he<br />

added, “when three Governments were there before the United States were here? <strong>The</strong> trouble<br />

between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain is of long st<strong>and</strong>ing, <strong>and</strong> so far as is known in the State<br />

Department here, there is nothing new in it. It is a dispute about the boundaries or <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> its settlement would be much more easily accomplished if President Guzman<br />

Blanco, who spends most of his time in Europe, had not seen fit to break off diplomatic relations<br />

with Great Britain. It is regarded here as not at all unlikely that some of the subjects of Great Britain<br />

have taken up l<strong>and</strong> on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n side of the disputed boundary line. <strong>The</strong> United States has<br />

been quietly using its good offices to promote peace <strong>and</strong> harmony between the disputing<br />

Governments, but it does not expect to apply the Monroe doctrine in the case nor to be drawn into<br />

any controversy over which timid people may be alarmed.”<br />

[17 February 1887]<br />

- 2 -<br />

SOUTH AMERICAN GOLD MINING<br />

From the Pall Mall Gazette, London<br />

<strong>The</strong> necessity for a prompt settlement of the boundary dispute with the republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is<br />

strikingly illustrated by a few items of intelligence we take almost at r<strong>and</strong>om from the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

newspapers just to h<strong>and</strong>. One item tells of about 200 laborers <strong>and</strong> others—the laborers would be<br />

chiefly negroes—leaving Georgetown in one day for the gold mining districts in the tributaries of<br />

the Massaruni River. Another tells of a digger selling his placer claim to a private company in<br />

Georgetown for $30,000 – no less than 45 pounds of gold having been taken by him from this claim<br />

in one month. <strong>The</strong> district of the Puruni seems to be passing rich in mineral wealth. According to an<br />

expert examined by a commission appointed by the local Government to frame mining regulations,<br />

quartz abounds in “thous<strong>and</strong>s of tons” in the Puruni creeks. In 1885 but 903 ounces of bullion were<br />

exported from the colony, whereas in 1886 the total export was over 6,500 ounces. <strong>The</strong> total for<br />

1887 promises to surpass that of 1886 as the total for that year excels that for 1885. That is, of<br />

course, if the home Government guarantees security to the enterprise now being shown by keeping<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> to her own domain<br />

[10 April 1887]<br />

3


1887 - 1892<br />

- 3 -<br />

ENGLAND AND THE GUIANA FRONTIER<br />

<strong>The</strong> Agencia Pumar, a <strong>Venezuela</strong>n news agency, thus summarizes the situation of affairs<br />

respecting the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> frontier question with <strong>Venezuela</strong>: “<strong>The</strong> English have taken possession<br />

of all the territory up to Borua <strong>and</strong> Amacuro, thus depriving us of the exclusive dominion on the<br />

Orinoco River. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government claimed this territory should be evacuated, but the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Minister claimed that this action of his Government was correct. Answer was made to him<br />

that this action violated the 1850 treaty, which stipulates that neither party would exercise<br />

jurisdiction beyond Pomar, <strong>and</strong> that if, prior to the meeting of the Boundary Commissioners,<br />

matters were not placed on the same footing on which they stood in 1850, friendly relations would<br />

be interrupted <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> would protest. This was done on Feb. 21, but up to latest dates from<br />

Caracas the English Minister had not asked for his passport.”<br />

[17 April 1887]<br />

- 4 -<br />

FRANCE AND SPAIN OFFER TO MEDIATE<br />

<strong>The</strong> controversy between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> over the frontier of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> is not yet<br />

settled. <strong>The</strong> former insists that the recent English advance into the disputed territory violates the<br />

treaty of 1850, which stipulates that neither should go beyond Pomar. It is now said that France <strong>and</strong><br />

Spain have offered to act as mediators, <strong>and</strong> that Italy <strong>and</strong> Belgium could also be relied upon for this<br />

purpose. It is fortunate that arbitrators can be so easily had, as the dispute is a very old one <strong>and</strong> by<br />

no means easy to settle. <strong>The</strong> English want all the region west of the Essequibo which is drained by<br />

its tributaries. <strong>The</strong>re are several of these smaller streams between that river <strong>and</strong> the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>British</strong> dominion would be carried far toward the latter. <strong>The</strong> boundary has never been determined1<br />

although it is nearly a century since the western part of <strong>Guiana</strong> passed from the h<strong>and</strong>s of the Dutch<br />

into those of the English.<br />

[4 June 1887]<br />

- 5 -<br />

VENEZUELA’S BOUNDARY<br />

<strong>The</strong> application of the Monroe doctrine which <strong>Venezuela</strong> invokes, or at least suggests to the<br />

United States in her dispute with Great Britain, may not be entirely clear. <strong>The</strong> question at issue is not<br />

the acquisition of a foothold in the New World by a European power, but simply a dispute as to the<br />

proper boundary of territorial possessions which already exist.<br />

4


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>The</strong> controversy between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> as to their mutual frontier is one that<br />

dates back through generations. It arose out of the fact that the Dutch established a colony<br />

something like three centuries ago in the region of the Essequibo River, which, two centuries later,<br />

was united to Demerara, <strong>and</strong>, after once being captured by the <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> afterward restored,<br />

eventually passed into the permanent possession of Great Britain under the treaty of 1814. As the<br />

exact boundary claims of the Dutch against the Spanish were somewhat obscure, the difficulty<br />

naturally continued when <strong>Venezuela</strong> secured her independence, <strong>and</strong> the matter became the less likely<br />

to receive proper adjustment from the fact that after the republic of Colombia was formed by<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, New Grenada, <strong>and</strong> Ecuador, these States again separated in 1831, <strong>and</strong> an almost<br />

constant state of political disorder subsisted in <strong>Venezuela</strong> for about thirty years.<br />

During that period a <strong>British</strong> authority had assumed to lay out the western boundary of <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> according to what he considered geographical principles by including in it the valley of the<br />

River Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> also the entire watershed of the affluents of that stream. While this boundary<br />

was said to consort with nature’s indications it also gratified the people of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, since it<br />

added to the latter an exceedingly large tract of l<strong>and</strong> beyond what <strong>Venezuela</strong> considered to be the<br />

true boundary. <strong>Venezuela</strong>, however, went no further at that tine in practical opposition to this claim<br />

than pulling up the <strong>British</strong> l<strong>and</strong>marks. Her first definite effort to procure the settlement of the<br />

question was made about seventeen years ago, during the Presidency of Guzman Blanco, who, as<br />

was recently noted, gave up the few remaining months of his late Presidential term for the sake of<br />

going to Europe as a Commissioner with full powers to arrive at some settlement of the dispute.<br />

Once before, we believe, he went on a similar mission, <strong>and</strong> it appears to be rather doubtful whether<br />

he will achieve all the success he desires in the present undertaking.<br />

<strong>The</strong> serious character of the controversy arises, not only from the large amount of territory<br />

disputed, which is something like 40,000 square miles, but also <strong>and</strong> perhaps chiefly from the fact<br />

that of late years the settlers from <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> have pushed their way gradually, until now they<br />

will practically comm<strong>and</strong>, unless they should be driven out, a position at the mouth of the Orinoco<br />

itself. It can readily be understood why <strong>Venezuela</strong> is anxious to retain the control of this great<br />

waterway which furnishes the outlet for so much of her trade, <strong>and</strong> also communicates with the very<br />

heart of her dominions. She is made additionally anxious by the fact that her aggressive neighbor is a<br />

great maritime power with whose resources <strong>and</strong> capabilities of controlling <strong>and</strong> diverting trade she is<br />

not able to compete. On her part Great Britain fully appreciates the advantage of retaining such a<br />

foothold, while the country which she has, whether rightly or wrongly, overrun is valuable alike for<br />

its timber <strong>and</strong> its gold mines. <strong>Venezuela</strong> seems willing to submit the matter to arbitration, <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain, having lately sounded the praises of this method of settling international disputes, apparently<br />

ought not to refuse such an arrangement.<br />

[26 September 1887]<br />

- 6 -<br />

SEIZED BY GREAT BRITAIN<br />

ANNEXING A PART OF VENEZUELAN TERRITORY<br />

A REGION RICH IN GOLD IS TAKEN—THE VENEZUELANS<br />

5


1887 - 1892<br />

ASKING THIS COUNTRY FOR PROTECTION<br />

<strong>The</strong> Consul of <strong>Venezuela</strong> at this port claims that Engl<strong>and</strong> has made another grab of l<strong>and</strong> in<br />

South America, <strong>and</strong> this time has annexed a large portion of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory said to be an<br />

exceedingly rich mining region, especially in respect to gold. This annexation, he says, virtually gives<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> control or the South American Continent tram the Caribbean Sea to Patagonia. <strong>The</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns are not only urging the United States Government to interfere, on the ground that the<br />

stealing of territory by Great Britain is a violation of the Monroe doctrine, but a distinct menace to<br />

the commerce of the United States in South America.<br />

<strong>The</strong> territory seized by the <strong>British</strong> Government is what is known as the Yuruari region. Under<br />

the treaty of 1850, Great Britain owned 64,000 square miles of territory in tide region, the western<br />

boundary of which abutted on the vast mining section of Yuruari. It seems, however, that the <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> German colonists were continually encroaching on the disputed territory, <strong>and</strong> the question of<br />

boundary has been under advisement for several years. In the Yuruari region are 14 mines, the<br />

average production of which is $3,000,000 a year. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> residents of Demerara had<br />

considerable interest in the mines <strong>and</strong> had put some money into the scheme. <strong>The</strong>n came a happy<br />

thought of annexing the country, <strong>and</strong>, accordingly, early in the present year, the Yuruari country was<br />

invaded by an armed force of <strong>British</strong> cavalry, <strong>and</strong> the following proclamation distributed:<br />

BRITISH GUIANA<br />

By his Excellency Charles Bruce, Esq. Companion of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael <strong>and</strong> St.<br />

George, Lieutenant-Governor <strong>and</strong> Comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-Chief in <strong>and</strong> over the Colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, Vice Admiral<br />

<strong>and</strong> ordinary of the same, etc.<br />

Whereas, it has come to the knowledge of the Government of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> that certain concessions have<br />

been granted by the President, <strong>and</strong> by <strong>and</strong> with the sanction of the Government of the United States of <strong>Venezuela</strong>,<br />

purporting to give <strong>and</strong> grant certain rights <strong>and</strong> privileges for constructing a railway to Guacipati, <strong>and</strong> in <strong>and</strong> over<br />

certain territories <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong>s within <strong>and</strong> forming part of the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>,<br />

Now, therefore, I do hereby intimate to all whom it may concern hat no alleged rights purporting to be claimed<br />

under any such concession will be recognized within the said colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> that till persons found<br />

trespassing on or occupying the l<strong>and</strong>s of the colony without the authority of the Government of this colony will be<br />

dealt with as the law directs.<br />

Given under my h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the public seal of the colony, Georgetown, Demerara, this 31st day of December,<br />

1887, <strong>and</strong> in the fifty-first year of her Majesty’s reign. God save the Queen!<br />

By his Excellency’s comm<strong>and</strong>,<br />

GEORGE MELVILLE<br />

Acting Government Secretary<br />

<strong>The</strong> Englishmen claim that it was necessary to settle once <strong>and</strong> for all this long-pending boundary<br />

question, <strong>and</strong> that in order that it should not again cause trouble, took the entire territory from the<br />

boundary of 1850, to the Orinoco River, including all the valuable mines. <strong>The</strong> seized district is<br />

computed to be about the size of the State of New-York. <strong>The</strong> English further claimed that the<br />

question of boundary had been in status quo for a period of nearly half a century, to the detriment<br />

of the colony, <strong>and</strong> to the retardment of the internal growth <strong>and</strong> development of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y also made the statement that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns had gradually extended their jurisdiction, mile by<br />

mile, to the south, until they actually trespassed on <strong>British</strong> territory, <strong>and</strong> that their motive for so<br />

doing was doubtless due to the large discoveries of gold in recent years. <strong>The</strong>y allege that hardly 100<br />

of the residents south of the Yuruari are <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns, but that on the contrary they are English <strong>and</strong><br />

German, all desirous of a change of rule. <strong>The</strong> English have already taken steps for the formation of<br />

6


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

a road from Demerara to the mines in the Yuruari region. That the English <strong>and</strong> German element is<br />

much larger than the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n in the Yuruari region is quite true, so that the conquest of the<br />

country was very easily achieved.<br />

All this has of course greatly irritated the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns <strong>and</strong> they are looking to the United States<br />

Government as their only friend in the controversy on the ground that this new acquisition of<br />

territory <strong>and</strong> change of form of government in America by a European power directly violates the<br />

Monroe doctrine. <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns are in Washington endeavoring to influence the United States<br />

Government to move in the matter.<br />

Gen. Francisco A. de Silva, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Consul at this port, said yesterday: “<strong>The</strong> English<br />

invasions in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory are shameful <strong>and</strong> bare-faced. On Nov. 29 it was proposed in<br />

the Colonial Legislature of Demerara to construct a road which, crossing the rivers Mazaruni <strong>and</strong><br />

Cuyuni, would extend to the boundary line of the colony. During the discussion it was claimed by<br />

the Queen’s Counselor that the Yuruari district was included within the limits. An army was sent to<br />

the Yuruari <strong>and</strong> no resistance on the part of <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns was then feared, as they numbered only<br />

about 100 <strong>and</strong> all the rest of the inhabitants were English. A decree of the Governor of Demerara,<br />

dated Dec. 31, 1887, does not recognize the validity at a contract made with the Government of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> for the opening of a railroad between Ciudad Bolivar <strong>and</strong> Guacipati. <strong>The</strong>refore they do<br />

not only want the Yurauri, the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> the Amacuro, but Ciudad Bolivar.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> have given no excuse for the act. <strong>The</strong>y simply wanted the territory took it. Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

has also violated her treaty with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, made in 1884, when she agreed not to interfere with any<br />

other portion of the country than Demerara. I consider the act an outrage, an insult, <strong>and</strong> a robbery,<br />

<strong>and</strong> if the United States does not interfere <strong>Venezuela</strong> will fight rather than submit. We can raise an<br />

army of 50,000 men. It seems as if Engl<strong>and</strong> desired to make a second India of South America.”<br />

In Wall-street it was difficult to get any expression of opinion in the matter, but among shipping<br />

merchants <strong>and</strong> others engaged in South American trade there was an almost unanimous belief that<br />

the annexation of this large territory by Engl<strong>and</strong> could not do otherwise than injure business here.<br />

W. H. Crossman of the firm of Crossman & Brother, merchants, at 77 Broad Street, said: “I<br />

have no doubt that it will injure business with South America. It will naturally have the effect of<br />

increasing <strong>British</strong> trade there. I don’t know that the United States can do anything in the matter, for<br />

it generally happens that when Great Britain grabs anything she keeps a tight hold.”<br />

J. M. Slydan, of Talbord Brothers, 85 Broad-street, was also of the opinion that it would<br />

produce a falling off in trade. “Still,” he said “I don’t know that it makes very much difference what<br />

country rules <strong>Venezuela</strong>, for while raw materials are taxed at the present high rate we cannot<br />

manufacture goods for South America at the prices charged by English merchants.”<br />

Ex-Mayor Grace said the matter did not affect his firm, their business being confined to Peru.<br />

Still he imagined it was an important matter for those interested in trade at that point.<br />

A. F. Fitz-Gerald of V<strong>and</strong>erveer & Holmes said: “I have not doubt that it will injure South<br />

America. Still, we could never do much business with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong>ir staple product is sugar. For<br />

the sake of protecting a few sugar planters in the South we put a high protective tariff on sugar.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> admits sugar practically free <strong>and</strong> consequently <strong>Venezuela</strong> gets most of her merch<strong>and</strong>ise<br />

from that country.”<br />

[17 February 1888]<br />

7


1887 - 1892<br />

- 7 -<br />

THE AFFAIRS OF BRITAIN<br />

A DENIAL OF REPORTS ABOUT VENEZUELA<br />

NO MILITARY OR NAVAL ACTION TAKEN—<br />

THE AGRICULTURAL DEPRESSION DISCUSSED<br />

LONDON, Feb. 20.—In the House of Commons this evening Sir James Fergusson,<br />

Parliamentary Secretary of the Foreign Office, declared that there was no truth whatever in the<br />

report that any military or naval action was being taken or was contemplated against <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Negotiations had been carried on respecting doubtful territory between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> the latter had proposed that the matter be submitted to arbitration. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong><br />

Government were not averse to the principle of arbitration, but they were unable to accept the basis<br />

that <strong>Venezuela</strong> proposed. <strong>The</strong> negotiations were temporarily stopped in consequence of the<br />

suspension of diplomatic relations by the late President Blanco.<br />

[21 February 1888]<br />

- 8 -<br />

THE YURUARI DISPUTE<br />

<strong>The</strong> circular just issued to <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s representatives in foreign countries by Minister Urbaneja<br />

declares that the Caracas Government is prepared to defend its territory by arms against the<br />

encroachments of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, though backed up by the overwhelming power of Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Should Great Britain really undertake to maintain by force her claims to the disputed mining region<br />

on the Upper Yuruari she would have every advantage. From her base at Trinidad Isl<strong>and</strong>, opposite<br />

the delta of the Orinoco, she could send her warships up that that broad <strong>and</strong> deep river to the<br />

Carony, <strong>and</strong> with her smaller craft hold the line of the latter river, while dispatching her troops to<br />

take possession of the entire territory eastward between it <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. But there is no good<br />

reason why this, like other boundary disputes, should not be submitted to arbitration, as <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

desires.<br />

If the case of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> is as strong as the recent Exeter Hall meeting, under the<br />

Chairmanship of Sir Richard Temple, recently declared, there could, of course, be no difficulty in<br />

convincing a competent referee of that fact.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Yuruari gold mines have now been known for many years, <strong>and</strong> while it is a strong point in<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n case that the present assertion of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>’s claims to this region have been<br />

made only since the richness of these mines was discovered, yet the boundary dispute in a different<br />

form has existed for more than half a century, <strong>and</strong> indeed was an inheritance of the English from<br />

the Dutch, who formerly owned the Essequibo country. It must also be admitted that English<br />

capital has largely been concerned, in the deve1opment of the mining district. Half a dozen of the<br />

mines are owned by English companies, with perhaps eight more owned by <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns <strong>and</strong> two by<br />

French companies. It will be seen therefore that Engl<strong>and</strong> has a large vested interest in the region,<br />

8


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>and</strong> English subjects form a considerable proportion of the laborers, who largely come from her<br />

West India isl<strong>and</strong>s, as well as the mining engineers <strong>and</strong> officials.<br />

But if these facts, which the richness of the country <strong>and</strong> the promise of future developments,<br />

account for <strong>British</strong> interest in is region, still more do they justify the resolution of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, as<br />

announced by Minister Urbaneja, to hold it for herself at all hazards. <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns own not only the<br />

greatest number of the principal mines in addition to the small claims of single individuals, but the<br />

richest of all, those of the Callao Company, which alone yield more than a million a year <strong>and</strong> have<br />

been worked steadily from the first. In this region, also, are <strong>Venezuela</strong>n towns like Tupuquen <strong>and</strong><br />

Caratal, <strong>and</strong> like Callao, Guacipati, Piacoa, <strong>and</strong> Las Tablas. Should Great Britain seize the whole<br />

region south of the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> East of the Carony, she would have something like 60,000 square<br />

miles more than she claimed under the boundary drawn in her interest by Schomburgk nearly fifty<br />

years ago, which boundary was deemed by <strong>Venezuela</strong> so unjust that the indicating marks were torn<br />

up <strong>and</strong> the claim to so westerly an extension of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> repudiated whenever it afterward<br />

came up in formal discussion. Besides, such an annexation would give Great Britain the right bank<br />

of the Orinoco, <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s great water highway, for a long distance from its mouth, although to be<br />

sure, just now the Yuruari region is in dispute.<br />

<strong>The</strong> interests of our country are mainly those of friendly solicitude that a neighboring republic<br />

shall not be despoiled through the exercise of force by a European power. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine<br />

does not enter into the case, as there is no threatened acquisition of a new foothold by a European<br />

power or overthrow of republican institutions. It is simply an ordinary boundary dispute like the one<br />

between Costa Rica <strong>and</strong> Nicaragua, just settled at Washington. Like that dispute it ought to be left to<br />

the determination of a competent referee, <strong>and</strong> while <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s resolve not to submit to force is<br />

natural, it would be unworthy of modern civilization to apply the law of the stronger to such a<br />

controversy.<br />

[25 February 1888]<br />

- 9 -<br />

THE DISPUTE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND VENEZUELA<br />

<strong>The</strong> rumor that the <strong>British</strong> Government had sent troops into that part of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

known as the territory of Yuruari has been officially contradicted by the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office.<br />

Whether the English troops have or have not been sent into Yuruari has nothing whatever to do<br />

with the collection of the moneys which were undoubtedly paid over by <strong>Venezuela</strong> to Great Britain<br />

in the early part of the present Winter. If Lord Salisbury contemplates sending a force into the<br />

district in question it will be for the sole purpose of putting Engl<strong>and</strong> in a position to urge with better<br />

chances of prompt success her claims to certain territories which she asserts belong to her by reason<br />

of the terms of a treaty made with Holl<strong>and</strong> one hundred years or more ago.<br />

<strong>The</strong> claims which were settled satisfactorily to Great Britain in December last were for indemnity<br />

for the capture of two schooners, (the Henrietta <strong>and</strong> another,) which at the time of their capture<br />

were flying the <strong>British</strong> flag <strong>and</strong> were said to belong to <strong>British</strong> subjects. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns assert that<br />

these two vessels were engaged in contrab<strong>and</strong> trade—that is to say, in smuggling — <strong>and</strong> all the facts<br />

9


1887 - 1892<br />

in the case warrant very much more than a slight suspicion that their captors were right in detaining<br />

the schooners at least until the skippers in comm<strong>and</strong> of them could clear their skirts of the grave <strong>and</strong><br />

well-supported charge that they were indeed contrab<strong>and</strong>istas. It was clearly a case, as lawyers would<br />

say, “for a jury to decide,” <strong>and</strong> when Great Britain bluntly insisted on being indemnified without any<br />

discussion of the subject the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities requested that sufficient delay be granted to try<br />

the case in the courts, guaranteeing a fair trial—indeed, they expressed themselves, it is said, willing<br />

to submit the whole matter to the arbitration of disinterested panics. This, on the basis proposed by<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, Engl<strong>and</strong> promptly refused, following up her refusal by anchoring two men-of-war off<br />

the town of La Guayra (the seaport of Caracas) <strong>and</strong> boldly announcing that if the sum of $40,000<br />

was not paid in seven days <strong>Venezuela</strong> would have cause to bitterly regret the delay. After vainly<br />

attempting to persuade the English Admiral to withdraw his ultimatum so hat they would not be<br />

obliged to pay the money under duress (promising meanwhile that the total sum would be promptly<br />

forthcoming) the Government at Caracas paid under protest the sum claimed, thus settling the affair<br />

of the Henrietta <strong>and</strong> her consort, <strong>and</strong> the English gunboats sailed away from La Guayra.<br />

Now for the much-vexed <strong>and</strong> little-understood boundary question which will be better<br />

understood after consulting the above official map. Engl<strong>and</strong> bases her principal claims to the<br />

territory she now seeks to occupy on the terms of a treaty with Holl<strong>and</strong>, made more than a century<br />

ago, whereby Great Britain acquired her rights to the colony now known as <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, which is<br />

bounded on the west by the Essequibo River. Her right to stile territory east of the Essequibo River<br />

has never been in dispute. She has, however, from time to time, claimed that certain of the territory<br />

west of that river belonged to her, although just how far west her jurisdiction extended she never<br />

definitely stated until after <strong>Venezuela</strong> had succeeded in freeing herself from Spanish rule in 1821.<br />

Spain admitted the right of her ancient colonies to self-government in 1830, <strong>and</strong> in 1840 Sir Robert<br />

Schomburgk visited <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. Schomburgk was a German by birth, but he was sent to <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

by the London Geographical Society, <strong>and</strong> was afterward, in 1847, <strong>British</strong> Consul at San Domingo,<br />

so that it can be claimed for him that he was countenanced in his work by the <strong>British</strong> Government.<br />

He surveyed <strong>and</strong> somewhat imperfectly marked out a boundary line to the westward of the<br />

Essequibo River, which for a time limited the claim of Engl<strong>and</strong> to territory then admittedly under<br />

the jurisdiction of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government.<br />

In 1842 this line was repudiated by the <strong>British</strong> Government, which then made an offer to accept<br />

the Moroca River as the western boundary; this was declined by <strong>Venezuela</strong> but under Gladstone’s<br />

Government, in 1881, Engl<strong>and</strong> secured an outlet to the sea through the Orinoco River.<br />

In 1870 valuable mines were discovered at Callao (pronounced Calya-o). <strong>The</strong> stock of the<br />

company owning the mines was floated in Engl<strong>and</strong>. Until 1875 no dividends were paid, but since<br />

that time this wonderful bonanza has paid its lucky owners such profits that, for an original share of<br />

the mine which cost but 1,000 bolivares, 475,000 bolivares have been offered <strong>and</strong> declined. <strong>The</strong><br />

shares are now quoted at 208,500 bolivares, <strong>and</strong> each original shareholder has received 13,000<br />

bolivares per annum on each 1,000 invested in Callao.<br />

<strong>The</strong> discovery of gold <strong>and</strong> copper in this district has caused a flow of English <strong>and</strong> German<br />

emigration into it, <strong>and</strong> now Engl<strong>and</strong> renews, not her pretensions to the territory as far as to the line<br />

of Schomburgk or to the Moroca River, but claims all the country as far west as the Rio Caroni, a<br />

territory as large as, if not larger than, the State of New York. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns base their claims on<br />

the following facts among others: When they drove the Spaniards out or their territory the mother<br />

country was in undisturbed possession of the Yuruari district, <strong>and</strong> by their treaties of peace with<br />

Spain they fell heirs to all the country then under the jurisdiction of the Spaniards. <strong>The</strong>y also allege<br />

10


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

that 40 years ago the <strong>British</strong> Minister in Caracas made a recommendation to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Government that it should build a lighthouse at Barima Point, [see map] in order to render safer<br />

navigation at the mouths of the Orinoco River.<br />

11


1887 - 1892<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns claim that by making this recommendation Engl<strong>and</strong> recognized the right of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> to jurisdiction over Barima Point, <strong>and</strong> therefore to the territory to the west of it, a claim<br />

that certainly has at least some color of reasonableness. Undoubtedly Engl<strong>and</strong> desires to get control<br />

of the district, the riches of which even Sir Walter Raleigh romances about in a wonderful way,<br />

saying that the gold that might he taken from its mines would load the ships of an armada. A few<br />

years ago the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government notified navigators that they intended to build a lighthouse<br />

on Barima Point, as recommended by the <strong>British</strong> Minister before mentioned.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government then informed the authorities at Caracas, that while <strong>Venezuela</strong> might<br />

build the lighthouse if she saw fit, it would not be regarded by Engl<strong>and</strong> as an admission of the right<br />

of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns to claim jurisdiction over the territory to the west of that point. After much<br />

negotiation <strong>and</strong> correspondence Guzman Blanco then President of <strong>Venezuela</strong> ordered St. John, then<br />

Minister to Caracas, to leave the country.<br />

Lately the Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong> expressed a desire to leave the matter to arbitration, <strong>and</strong><br />

suggested that the arbitrator be the United States or Commissioners appointed to meet at<br />

Washington. Lord Salisbury met this proposition by promptly declining to communicate with the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government until <strong>Venezuela</strong> of her own motion renewed diplomatic relations with<br />

Downing Street by inviting the <strong>British</strong> Minister to return to Caracas. <strong>The</strong>re the matter rests. What<br />

will be the result of the next phase of this interesting question, who can tell? Engl<strong>and</strong> is all-powerful<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> is apparently, indeed, practically is, at her mercy, but her people are not likely to<br />

submit tamely to any invasion of their territory.<br />

[23 February 1888]<br />

- 10 -<br />

THE CONTROL OF THE ORINOCO<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns are becoming unpleasantly awakened by the fact that <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> is establishing<br />

herself in the delta of the Orinoco with an evident purpose to stay. This in some respects is quite as<br />

important an encroachment upon what they consider their territory as the grabbing of the Yuruari<br />

gold tract in the interior. <strong>The</strong> Orinoco is the great highway of commerce for the northern slope of<br />

South America. With its multitudinous affluents it drains almost every part of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> its<br />

possession is a source of pride as well as of profit for that republic. Point Barima, where the officials<br />

of Georgetown hare established a customs post, is at the junction of a river of the same name, with<br />

the Orinoco at its broad mouth. Its possession, of course, implies the extension of the boundary of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong>, in fact, the line now claimed by the latter strikes the right bank of the Orinoco<br />

considerably further to the west than Point Barima.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is not much doubt that in the boundary dispute which has been going on for a long time<br />

between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> both sides have advanced extreme pretensions. <strong>Venezuela</strong>,<br />

for example, cannot expect to confine the <strong>British</strong> to the Essequibo as their western limit. She derives<br />

her rights, of course, through Spain, having proclaimed her independence in 1811, <strong>and</strong>, after some<br />

vicissitudes, achieved it several years later. Great Britain takes her title from the Dutch, who ceded<br />

to her the colonies of Essequibo, Demerara, <strong>and</strong> Berbice in 1796, but reacquired them half a dozen<br />

years later, then parted with them again to Great Britain, this disposition being confirmed in 1814.<br />

12


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>The</strong> present question is therefore simply the old one between the Spaniards <strong>and</strong> the Dutch, who had<br />

frequent disputes over it. But what is clear from the treaty of Munster, made in 1648, is that the<br />

Spanish were recognized as possessed of the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> the Dutch of the Essequibo. So in the<br />

extradition treaty of the two nations made in 1691, the Essequibo colonies were spoken of as<br />

belonging to the Dutch <strong>and</strong> the Orinoco colonies to the Spaniards. But it would be rather a stranger<br />

interpretation that the entire valley of the Orinoco was intended in the one case <strong>and</strong> only half of the<br />

valley of the Essequibo in the other. In fact, the remains of what unquestionably were Dutch forts<br />

are found on the Pomazon River, which flows into the sea west of the Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> also at the<br />

junction of the Tapuru with the Cuyuni, which last is a western tributary of the Essequibo. <strong>The</strong>re is<br />

little doubt that Dutch possession could be proved as far north on the coast as the Maruco.<br />

This, however, is quite a different matter from carrying the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary completely<br />

up to the Orinoco on the coast <strong>and</strong> then westward in the interior almost to the Caroni, a branch of<br />

the Orinoco flowing about parallel to the Essequibo. <strong>The</strong> ground taken by the <strong>British</strong> is that the<br />

whole region drained by the Essequibo belonged to the Dutch, as that of the Orinoco belonged to<br />

the Spanish. This claim might not be seriously resisted save that the great tributary of the Essequibo,<br />

the Cuyuni, rises far to the west, beyond the rich Caratal gold fields, whose possession is one of the<br />

chief elements in the present controversy.<br />

But oven were the <strong>British</strong> claim to the entire watershed both of the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> its branches<br />

conceded, that itself would not give them Point Barima or any of the adjoining territory immediately<br />

south of the Orinoco. <strong>The</strong> reason is that between the valley of the latter river <strong>and</strong> that of the Cuyuni<br />

there is a range of mountains called the Imataca which makes a decided division line According to<br />

Guzman Blanco, in 1836 the <strong>British</strong> Legation at Caracas spontaneously recognized the sovereignty<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong> at Point Barima by asking to have a lighthouse put there to aid the navigation of the<br />

Orinoco. Five years later, it is true, a <strong>British</strong> engineer, Schomburg, put up posts as far as Barima, but<br />

these were objected to <strong>and</strong> removed. So far as geographical conditions can rule, the Imataca<br />

Mountains, forming a watershed which carries all the streams on one side of it northward into the<br />

Orinoco, whereas those on the opposite side flow southward into the Cuyuni, would seem a<br />

thorough example of a natural boundary. This could be completed by the river Maruco, which flows<br />

from this range eastward into the Atlantic about forty miles north of the mouth of the Essequibo.<br />

No doubt those persons interested in the English mines of the Yuruari region would be content<br />

with this boundary could they at the same time secure possession of the gold tract south of it. But<br />

the importance of holding a firm foothold on the Orinoco itself causes <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> to maintain<br />

herself there in spite of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n protests.<br />

[19 January 1889]<br />

- 11 -<br />

A MEDDLING CONSUL<br />

It is a little more than two years since <strong>Venezuela</strong> broke off diplomatic relations with Engl<strong>and</strong> on<br />

the refusal of the latter power to evacuate posts within the disputed territory lying between<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong>. As to the wisdom of that action or as to the merits of the controversy which<br />

13


1887 - 1892<br />

led up to it we do not propose to inquire. It is certainly worth noting, however, that the effort to<br />

involve this country in the dispute is being renewed. Such seems at least to be a fair inference from<br />

the attitude assumed by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Consul-General in this city, Señor Mijares. In an interview<br />

granted to a reporter of the Sun of March 1, in addition to a necessarily ex parte statement of the<br />

difficulty between his own Government <strong>and</strong> that of Great Britain, he spoke strongly of what he<br />

called the large American interests involved, <strong>and</strong> thought that it was high time this country should<br />

take steps to express its disapproval of the alleged usurpations of Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

This is an altogether improper <strong>and</strong> ill-advised position for the Consul to take. If <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

desires to ask for the good offices of this country in her dispute with Engl<strong>and</strong> she has her own<br />

legation at Washington, <strong>and</strong> there is the ace <strong>and</strong> there the means for her to make whatever<br />

representations she may choose. Unless, which is. not to be supposed, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister<br />

directly inspired the words of the Consul, the latter is acting in a way wholly insulting to the former<br />

<strong>and</strong> ought at once to be called to book for his imprudence. It would be bad enough for the Minister<br />

himself to be found endeavoring to embroil this country in the disputes of foreign powers through<br />

the medium of the public press; that was the kind of thing for which Washington insisted upon the<br />

recall of the French Minister, Genet; but for a Consul to undertake it is not only an act of<br />

insubordination, but would be altogether ridiculous if there were not some likelihood that it may be<br />

mischievous.<br />

That it was the latter is the judgment of the organ of the Spanish-American republics in this city,<br />

Las Novedades, which strongly advised Señor Mijares to keep his fingers out of pies with which he<br />

had no concern. And in the same newspaper appeared shortly after a long letter from a <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

citizen giving an outline of the whole trouble <strong>and</strong> reprobating the interference of the Consul as likely<br />

to do far more harm than good.<br />

According to this gentleman the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government has already seen reason to repent of<br />

the high tone it took with Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the precipitate rupture of diplomatic relations into which it<br />

rushed. However strong its case might be, it was folly to try to bully Engl<strong>and</strong>. In fact, so this writer<br />

says, <strong>Venezuela</strong> is just about ready to ask Engl<strong>and</strong> to resume diplomatic relations as a preliminary to<br />

a peaceful arbitration of the difficulty between the two countries. And it is understood that the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Government will meet the request in the most friendly manner, Mr. Labouchère recently<br />

declared in his newspaper, Truth, that such would be the case. Certainly the history of the entire<br />

controversy reveals a succession of attempts on the part of Great Britain to settle the question by<br />

mutual concessions.<br />

It is not very rash to associate this outbreak of the Consul with the change in Administration. He<br />

has probably heard of Mr. Blaine <strong>and</strong> of the rigorous foreign policy which is that gentleman’s<br />

delight, <strong>and</strong> may have particularly remembered his exploits in South American affairs on a former<br />

occasion. A man who could decide off-h<strong>and</strong> the disputed boundary between Mexico <strong>and</strong><br />

Guatemala, even if it turned out that he was egregiously in the wrong <strong>and</strong> had to withdraw from his<br />

first position, would be just the Secretary, so the innocent Consul may have though, to haul down<br />

the <strong>British</strong> flag on the right bank of the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> tell the English that they had no rights there.<br />

Possibly, too, the Consul may have divined that sentence of the President’s inaugural address, in<br />

which he says that this country expects that no European power will attempt to found a colony on<br />

this continent.<br />

If the boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> should be pushed 125 miles further along the ocean that might<br />

be interpreted as the equivalent of founding a colony. At any rate, the Consul cannot be blamed for<br />

thinking, after all that was promised us last Summer, that Mr. Blaine would manage our foreign<br />

14


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

affairs with a high h<strong>and</strong>, once in the Department of State again, or for believing that a newspaper cry<br />

for spirited action would be just the sort of influence to bring to bear upon the new Secretary.<br />

[16 March 1889]<br />

- 12 -<br />

BLAINE’S TORTUOUS POLICY<br />

VENEZUELA FINDS HIS REPUTATION AS A TAIL TWISTER UNDESERVED<br />

WASHINGTON, April 19.—One of the best-kept secrets of thee Pan-American Congress has<br />

been the efforts made by <strong>Venezuela</strong> to get help in her quarrel with Great Britain. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

delegates came to the conference in the highest hopes that they would be able to secure substantial<br />

moral aid <strong>and</strong> comfort, even if not something more tangible. <strong>The</strong>y were encouraged in these hopes<br />

by the attitude of the Secretary of State’s personal organ in New York which paper indulged in a<br />

good deal of talk about the great advantage which would result to <strong>Venezuela</strong> from Mr. B1aine’s lofty<br />

ideas of all-American solidarity. In the congress itself they have been eagerly watching their<br />

opportunity to get the expression they desired.<br />

As it has long been their hope to have their dispute with Engl<strong>and</strong> submitted to arbitration, they<br />

naturally felt that their best chance would be in connection with the recommendations made by the<br />

congress in favor of a broad system of arbitration among all the nations of this continent.<br />

Accordingly they proposed <strong>and</strong> strenuously advocated a clause solemnly calling upon Engl<strong>and</strong>, in<br />

the name of the international congress <strong>and</strong> in the face of the civilized world, to recede from her<br />

present position <strong>and</strong> consent to arbitrate her difficulty with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Many or the South American<br />

delegates ardently supported the proposition. But alas! for the delusive promises made by the<br />

Tribune, energetic objection was made by Mr. Blaine’s representative, Mr. Trescot, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

suggestion of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns was rejected. <strong>The</strong> most they could get was the vague resolution<br />

reported by the Welfare Committee, expressing the benevolent hope that European powers would<br />

be willing to resort to arbitration in any dispute that might arise with an American nation.<br />

<strong>The</strong> disappointment of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s delegates would not be so great if they had not been misled<br />

by Mr. Blaine’s reputation as the great American twister or the lion’s tail. Yet a recurrence to the<br />

history of their efforts to secure the intervention or the United States in their behalf should have<br />

shown them that Mr. Blaine’s tail twisting was confined to the stump, <strong>and</strong> was never exhibited in the<br />

Department of State. <strong>The</strong> first approach made to the United States was in 1876 when the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister of Foreign affairs appealed to Mr. Fish, requesting the United States to “lend<br />

their powerful moral support” to his country, at the same time submitting an outline of the case<br />

against Great Britain, which is, by the way, an almost overwhelming argument for the justice of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s position. No reply appears to have been made to this application, <strong>and</strong> things ran along<br />

until just at the close of the Hayes Administration. <strong>The</strong>n Secretary Evarts was appealed to on the<br />

occasion of fresh <strong>British</strong> aggressions, Ho responded with an expression of the “deep interest which<br />

the Government of the United States takes in all transactions tending to attempted encroachments<br />

of foreign powers upon the territory of any of the republics of this continent.” A month later he<br />

sent a second note to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, saying that “the severe pressure of public business at<br />

15


1887 - 1892<br />

the close of an Administrative term” would prevent him from following up the matter, but adding<br />

that he did not doubt that “your representations will have like earnest <strong>and</strong> solicitous consideration in<br />

the h<strong>and</strong>s of my successor.”<br />

Naturally the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns had no doubt of it either, as “my successor” was the intense<br />

American <strong>and</strong> anti-English statesman, James G. Blaine. It was not long, therefore, before a formal<br />

application was made by <strong>Venezuela</strong> to the American Department of State for “the support, in some<br />

form, of the Government of the United States.” Will it be believed that to this urgent appeal Mr.<br />

Blaine retuned no reply except a cold acknowledgment of its receipt. Yet that is all the official<br />

correspondence shows. <strong>The</strong> only truly American Secretary left it to the English sympathizer,<br />

Frelinghuysen, <strong>and</strong> the English tool, Bayard, to take up <strong>and</strong> actively press the case of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, as<br />

they faithfully <strong>and</strong> persistently did.<br />

<strong>The</strong> attitude of Engl<strong>and</strong> throughout the whole dispute has been little short of outrageous. Little<br />

by little edging her way northward from her possessions in <strong>Guiana</strong>, she has passed far beyond the<br />

Essequibo, the boundary fixed in all the maps <strong>and</strong> recognized universally as the proper terminus of<br />

English <strong>Guiana</strong>, until now she has occupied the south bank of the Orinoco. <strong>Venezuela</strong> has all along<br />

protested against this advance, <strong>and</strong> has been so sure of her rights that she has even offered to submit<br />

the case to a board of arbitrators composed entirely of Englishmen, provided they were personally<br />

disinterested <strong>and</strong> competent. Under the late Liberal Government, some progress toward peaceful<br />

settlement making.<br />

Lord Granville proposed arbitration under certain conditions, <strong>and</strong> Lord Rosebery offered a<br />

compromise. With the advent of Lord Salisbury to power, however, all was changed. He brusquely<br />

declined to be bound by the promises of his predecessor—a breach of diplomatic propriety, to say<br />

tine least. His tone grew so increasingly high that finally <strong>Venezuela</strong>, early in 1888, lost patience, <strong>and</strong><br />

said that if the <strong>British</strong> did not at once retire the English Minister would receive his passports. Of<br />

course, Engl<strong>and</strong> never gives in to threats from a power like <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> so the only result has<br />

been to break off diplomatic relations.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> has steadily gone on just the same, asserting sovereignty over the disputed territory <strong>and</strong><br />

pushing on colonization. Unless <strong>Venezuela</strong> consents to eat humble pie <strong>and</strong> beg for the renewal of<br />

diplomatic relations, there is no prospect whatever that Engl<strong>and</strong> will even consider the question of<br />

arbitrating the dispute. To judge by the inaugural address of the new <strong>Venezuela</strong>n President, his<br />

country is in no mood to make a craven submission to Great Britain. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n delegates say<br />

that his talk about an attack on the English troops <strong>and</strong> colonists within the disputed area, in case all<br />

peaceful measures fall, is by no means to be considered as buncombe. It represents, they say, the<br />

prevailing national sentiment. <strong>The</strong>y are fully aware of the hopeless nature of the struggle with<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, though they maintain that it would be an immense undertaking for any foreign power to<br />

attempt to subjugate their country. It would be impossible to stamp out a guerrilla warfare among<br />

their vast forests <strong>and</strong> inaccessible mountains <strong>The</strong>y point to the example or France in Mexico <strong>and</strong> say<br />

that <strong>Venezuela</strong> would repeat the Mexican tactics against the French. It the Liberal Party should be<br />

restored to power in Engl<strong>and</strong> they would have good hopes of more decent treatment <strong>and</strong> of<br />

ultimate peaceful settlement of the long-st<strong>and</strong>ing difficulty. At present they consider the outlook<br />

gloomy <strong>and</strong> think that an armed collision may occur. <strong>The</strong>n they expect to be cut off from the rest of<br />

the world by an English fleet, <strong>and</strong> what the end will be they cannot imagine. Meanwhile they do not<br />

conceal their disappointment at not getting from the Pan-American Congress the support they have<br />

asked or their special surprise that their greatest difficulty should have been encountered in the<br />

person of a delegate from the United States.<br />

16


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

[20 April 1890]<br />

- 13 -<br />

DRIVEN OUT OF VENEZUELA<br />

TWO MAP CANVASSERS FROM NEW YORK BANISHED<br />

<strong>The</strong>re seems to be a possibility that the United States Government will become involved in the<br />

dispute of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> as to the boundary line between the latter country <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> manner in which our Government becomes interested is peculiar. Early last<br />

May Gaylord Wilson, the map publisher of this city sent two canvassers, Charles A. Conolly <strong>and</strong> W.<br />

T. Stevens, to <strong>Venezuela</strong> to sell his new map of South America <strong>and</strong> a book in which he is interested.<br />

<strong>The</strong> first intimation that the ways of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n are not our ways was conveyed in a letter<br />

written by Conolly at Caracas on May 16, in which he said he had been “prohibited from offering<br />

maps because they say boundaries are wrong. Came very near having all the maps confiscated.” But<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n thunderbolt was launched May 22, when Conolly wrote: “Since writing you last I<br />

have been ordered to leave the country within twenty-four hours, owing to what they call the<br />

illegality of the map of South America.”<br />

Conolly appealed to the United States Minister, William L. Scruggs, who interceded with the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities in his behalf, but without success, <strong>and</strong> the men were forced to leave. Conolly<br />

went to Trinidad while Stevens went to Barbados. <strong>The</strong> decree of banishment was published in a<br />

Caracas paper with extended comments. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n objection to the map is that it agrees with<br />

the English <strong>and</strong> German official maps fixing the eastern boundary of <strong>Venezuela</strong> at the River<br />

Amacura, while the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government claims the territory extending further eastward to the<br />

River Essquiba, which all these maps place in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

Mr. Watson said yesterday to a Times reporter: “<strong>The</strong> matter has been brought, I underst<strong>and</strong>, to<br />

the attention at our Government by the United States Minister, but I do not know that any action<br />

has been taken in regard to it. I have not myself appealed to the Government yet, because I am<br />

waiting for full particulars, <strong>and</strong> I think it probable that Mr. Conolly will be here himself in a few<br />

days. I think this is a chance for Mr. Blaine to give an exhibition of his vigorous foreign policy.”<br />

[19 June 1890]<br />

- 14 -<br />

TROUBLE IN VENEZUELA<br />

A BRITISH GUNBOAT CAPTURES A GOVERNMENT VESSEL<br />

MONTREAL, Quebec, Aug. 26.—A private dispatch received to-day by Mr. Barnet Lawrence,<br />

Consul for <strong>Venezuela</strong>, states that the <strong>British</strong> gunboat Ready, from Demerara, with Commissioner<br />

McTurck on board, arrived at Barima, at the mouth of the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> ordered the Captain of the<br />

Faro, a <strong>Venezuela</strong>n man-of-war, to haul down his colors. <strong>The</strong> Captain submitted to superior force.<br />

17


1887 - 1892<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government has sent a commission to the spot to investigate, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>er of the Faro will be tried by court-martial for having yielded without making a proper<br />

show of resistance. <strong>The</strong> press of Caracas suggests that another vessel be sent with her guns shotted<br />

<strong>and</strong> the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n flag nailed to the mast, <strong>and</strong>, if worsted, that an appeal be made to the United<br />

States <strong>and</strong> sister republics of South America <strong>and</strong> to the Parliament of Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

A dispute has existed for some time between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> as to a portion of the<br />

territory lying between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the mouth of the Orinoco River, which is the natural<br />

outlet for the produce of the country. Lately two Canadians named William Try Stevens <strong>and</strong> Charles<br />

A. Connolly, representing themselves as Americans from New-York, were expelled from the<br />

country for selling maps in the city of Caracas showing this belt of l<strong>and</strong> as being disputed territory.<br />

[27 August 1890]<br />

- 15 -<br />

THE CONTROL OF THE ORINOCO<br />

Whatever the special circumstances attending the recent treatment of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n flag at<br />

Point Barima by the <strong>British</strong> gunboat Ready, the act indicates that Great Britain is determined to<br />

maintain her foothold at that place. Point Barima is at the westerly end of Barima Isl<strong>and</strong>, at the<br />

mouth of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s great river, the Orinoco. <strong>The</strong> establishment of officials there, whose authority<br />

is supported by <strong>British</strong> naval vessels, apparently shows that, against the protest of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the<br />

frontier line of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> is to be carried to <strong>and</strong> beyond Point Barima, so as to bring the mouth<br />

of this river under <strong>British</strong> control Even Mr. Hugh Watt, M.P., the Chairman of the New Chili Gold-<br />

Mining Company, which has urged the <strong>British</strong> Government to possess itself of the Yuruari gold<br />

fields in the interior of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, hardly thinks it right to make so great a seizure upon the coast,<br />

“Should the Government,” he once wrote, “in order to effect a peaceable <strong>and</strong> amicable settlement,<br />

decide to declare by the river now called Yuruari, I would suggest that the Punta Barima be given to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, so that she could comm<strong>and</strong> the mouth of the Orinoco, which, I do not hesitate to say,<br />

was intended by the treaty of Munster.” This treaty, made in 1648, was the one in which Spain<br />

recognized certain conquests of the Dutch in <strong>Guiana</strong> that had formed part of the Captain Generalcy<br />

of Caracas. Even at that time, or soon after, disputes arose as to the exact boundary line. <strong>The</strong>se<br />

disputes continue to the present day, <strong>Venezuela</strong> having, in 1810, inherited by her independence the<br />

rights of Spain, whatever they were, <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, in 1814, the rights of the Dutch to the<br />

colonies of the Essequibo, Berbice, <strong>and</strong> Demerara. But even in 1691 an extradition treaty of the<br />

Spaniards <strong>and</strong> the Dutch spoke of the Orinoco colonies as belonging to the former <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Essequibo colonies as belonging to the latter. If, accordingly, the English claim, this agreement<br />

refers to settlements on both banks of the Essequibo instead of only on the east bank, as the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns claim, it must by the same reasoning accord to the latter both banks of the Orinoco.<br />

That the English have never until late years practically sought to exercise jurisdiction upon the<br />

Orinoco seems clear. It is true that about fifty years ago Engineer Schomburg marked out as the<br />

western boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> a line scores of miles beyond the Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> striking the<br />

Orinoco considerably west even of Point Barima. But this appears to have been in the main a purely<br />

18


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

arbitrary or experimental line, <strong>and</strong> only five years earlier the <strong>British</strong> legation bad inferentially<br />

recognized the sovereignty of <strong>Venezuela</strong> at Punta Barima by asking the construction of a lighthouse<br />

there in order to make the navigation of the Orinoco safer. However, on the remonstrance of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, the posts <strong>and</strong> other boundary marks of Schomburg were removed, <strong>and</strong> a few years later,<br />

in 1844, the <strong>British</strong> suggested as the boundary line the River Moroco, a small stream which enters<br />

the Atlantic very far south of the mouth of the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> much nearer the Essequibo. Still later,<br />

Lord Granville intimated that Engl<strong>and</strong> would accept line twenty-nine miles east of the Barima River.<br />

It is unfortunate for <strong>Venezuela</strong> that she declined to accept the former suggestions, which would<br />

have been a fair compromise. <strong>The</strong> Dutch, crossing the Essequibo centuries ago, founded a colony<br />

about forty miles north of the latter, on the River Pomaron, which empties into the Atlantic at the<br />

same point as the Moroco. Relics of Dutch settlement show this, <strong>and</strong> it is also known that the<br />

English, shortly after their acquisition of the country from the Dutch, proceeded across the<br />

Essequibo to the same points. <strong>The</strong> River Moroco, which runs more directly east, would have given<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> only the same coast acquisition as a line bounded by the Pomaron, with a little more<br />

of the interior. Of course, the subsequently proposed line, running only twenty-nine miles to the east<br />

of Barima, would dem<strong>and</strong> more; still, even that would have left the Orinoco wholly in <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

control. But the diplomacy of the republic has been conducted rather bunglingly, <strong>and</strong> with a foolish<br />

unwillingness to recognize that delay may be dangerous in dealing with a much stronger power.<br />

After having first proposed a joint convention for mutually settling the boundary dispute, to which<br />

Great Britain responded by proposing to add sundry <strong>British</strong> pecuniary claims against <strong>Venezuela</strong> for<br />

adjustment, <strong>Venezuela</strong> changed her ground to a dem<strong>and</strong> for arbitration. This change seems to have<br />

been made on the ground that her Constitution prohibited any voluntary cession of territory. Great<br />

Britain apparently was indisposed to quibble about the notions of a Spanish-American country on<br />

that point, doubtless holding that she did not ask <strong>Venezuela</strong> to cede any of her own territory, but<br />

only to come to an agreement as to what was <strong>British</strong> territory <strong>and</strong> ab<strong>and</strong>on that. Still, the present,<br />

like most other boundary disputes, is eminently adapted to international arbitration, <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain, as the stronger power, might well accept it. In view, too, of the agreements of 1850 between<br />

the two countries not to occupy territory in dispute, she should are refrain from encroachment upon<br />

the Orinoco, even if these are made on the ground of securing the free navigation of that river.<br />

[2 September 1890]<br />

- 16 -<br />

EDITORIAL<br />

[ENGLAND AND VENEZUELA SHOULD AGREE ON ARBITRATION]<br />

Since France <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong> have very sensibly concluded to settle the question of boundary<br />

between French <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> Dutch <strong>Guiana</strong> by arbitration, the Emperor of Russia consenting to act<br />

as the referee, why should not Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> resort to the same method for settling the<br />

disputed boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>? <strong>The</strong> three <strong>Guiana</strong>s have experienced many changes of<br />

ownership. Surinam, or Dutch <strong>Guiana</strong>, was visited by the French in 1640, taken by the English in<br />

1650, occupied by the Dutch in 1667, retaken by the English, ceded to the Dutch in 1669, again<br />

19


1887 - 1892<br />

taken by the English in 1796, given to the Dutch in 1802, recaptured by the English in 1804, <strong>and</strong><br />

given up to Holl<strong>and</strong> in 1814. Meanwhile Cayenne, or French <strong>Guiana</strong>, had been previously held by<br />

the French, the English, the Dutch, the French, the <strong>British</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the French. <strong>The</strong>re was plenty of<br />

opportunity for confusion in boundaries with all these changes, <strong>and</strong> that a like difference in claims<br />

should exist between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, or Demerara, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> is not strange, considering the<br />

vicissitudes of possession through which they also passed. That the dispute still exists is partly<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s fault, since she had the opportunity in past years, by making a not wholly unreasonable<br />

concession to Great Britain, to settle the affair. Since then, John Bull has gone to the mouth of the<br />

Orinoco on the coast, <strong>and</strong> has had his eyes on the Yuruari gold fields in the interior, <strong>and</strong> now may<br />

be harder to satisfy. But the other <strong>Guiana</strong>s have set this one a good example.<br />

[2 October 1890]<br />

- 17 -<br />

ENGLAND IN VENEZUELA<br />

AFRAID TO SUBMIT HER ALLEGED RIGHTS TO ARBITRATION<br />

To the Editor of the New-York Times:<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> has for several years had a frontier dispute with Engl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> region of <strong>Guiana</strong>,<br />

claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, as successor of Spain, was undoubtedly discovered by Spaniards. It was only<br />

after they had taken possession of it that some English adventurers, among them Sir Walter Raleigh,<br />

visited the country, simply to be driven out again. From that day Spain held peaceful possession of<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> as far as the Essequibo River, though the boundary with the then Dutch colony was never<br />

well defined. Until the discovery of gold there, however, that fact remained without practical<br />

importance, since the entire region was believed to be valueless <strong>and</strong> peopled by savages. But the<br />

instant it was discovered that <strong>Guiana</strong> abounded with gold, Engl<strong>and</strong> awoke <strong>and</strong> manifested an<br />

intention to seize everything. In fact, she has almost done so, <strong>Venezuela</strong> having neglected to lay a<br />

firm hold upon what is undoubtedly her own.<br />

Hence the quarrel. <strong>The</strong>re can be no question as to where the right belongs. <strong>The</strong>re can be no<br />

doubt that it does not belong to Engl<strong>and</strong>, though she claims an abundance of documentary proof of<br />

her title to the country as far as the Cuyuni River. But if this be so, why does she so obstinately<br />

refuse arbitration? This would be the quickest way of settlement. That Engl<strong>and</strong> refuses creates the<br />

suspicion that she fears to come out second best. <strong>The</strong> manner in which that vast empire is scattered<br />

frequently brings her into boundary collisions, <strong>and</strong> the policy she adopts is modified according to<br />

her antagonist’s resources. To rampant Russia, she offers the suaviter in modo; to puny Portugal, the<br />

fortiter in re. And when of “weaker vessels” she dem<strong>and</strong>s a prompt acceptance of her ultimatums, the<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> is apt to be accompanied by a threat ill disguised beneath diplomatic phraseology.<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States has taken a certain interest in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, but should take more.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> is a sister republic. Our Government, instead of remaining neutral, should protest against<br />

the plundering of the weak by the strong, <strong>and</strong> should vigorously urge upon Engl<strong>and</strong> the justice <strong>and</strong><br />

propriety of a recourse to arbitration. “Let him take who as the chance, <strong>and</strong> let him keep who can”<br />

20


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

is merely a brutal elaboration of “might makes right.” We live in the bright age, not the dark, <strong>and</strong><br />

ought to have developed beyond the reach of such selfish sophistry.<br />

FRANK VINCENT<br />

New-York, Tuesday, March 3, 1891<br />

[8 March 1891]<br />

- 18 -<br />

CRUISERS OFF FOR VENEZUELA<br />

EX-SECRETARY BAYARD TALKS ON THE OBJECT OF THEIR VISIT<br />

WILMINGTON, Del., Sept 14.—<strong>The</strong> departure from Brooklyn last Sunday morning of the<br />

cruisers Chicago <strong>and</strong> Philadelphia, under the pennant at Rear Admiral John G. Walker, under sealed<br />

orders for La Guayra, <strong>Venezuela</strong>, has given rise to much speculation concerning the mission for<br />

these two vessels of war. One theory is that the object of the movement is an inquiry into the recent<br />

encroachment of the <strong>British</strong> Government upon the territorial possessions of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Another is<br />

that the war ships are sent out to enforce the rights of American citizens <strong>and</strong> investigate the seizure<br />

by Gen. Urdaneta of ex-refugees found on the Red D steamship <strong>Venezuela</strong> several weeks ago, while<br />

that steamer was in <strong>Venezuela</strong>n waters.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Hon. Thomas F. Bayard, who, while Secretary of State under President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, gave<br />

considerable official attention to the subject of <strong>British</strong> aggressions in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, in an interview with<br />

a reporter this afternoon, said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> question of the boundaries of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, where they approach those of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, has<br />

been for a long time a vexed question between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Government of Great Britain, or,<br />

rather, private companies of <strong>British</strong> subjects engaged in gold mining in what is known as the<br />

Orinoco region.<br />

“From time to time maps have been delineated of the supposed boundaries of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

territory <strong>and</strong> jurisdiction. Serious complaints were made by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n representatives in<br />

Washington of the encroachment of <strong>British</strong> jurisdiction <strong>and</strong> of claims to navigate the Orinoco River<br />

to such an extent as would penetrate the interior of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> destroy the independent<br />

authority of that country over a vast region of valuable commerce which that country claimed as her<br />

own exclusively.<br />

“I was never disposed to believe, after pretty full examination of the subject, that there was any<br />

design upon the part of Great Britain to exp<strong>and</strong> her jurisdiction as a nation over the territory in<br />

dispute; but I believe, <strong>and</strong> I think a true history of the case will show, that the differences had their<br />

origin in large mining concessions obtained by <strong>British</strong> subjects, as private en enterprises, from the<br />

Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong>, consequently, the investment of a great deal of <strong>British</strong> capital in the<br />

development of these rich mining regions.<br />

“After these investments were made <strong>and</strong> property became valuable, these private owners found<br />

themselves not only without that protection of established law which alone gives property its<br />

security, but that they were subjected from time to time to the exactions <strong>and</strong> tyrannical dem<strong>and</strong>s of<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n officials.<br />

21


1887 - 1892<br />

“<strong>The</strong>refore, it was that they claimed <strong>British</strong> protection against spoliation by <strong>Venezuela</strong>n officials,<br />

<strong>and</strong> were desirous of seeing <strong>British</strong> jurisdiction extended over the territory in which their mining<br />

operations were conducted.<br />

“It was only another instance of the dependence of the institution of property upon just laws<br />

honestly administered. <strong>The</strong> region in regard to which these boundary differences exist is remote,<br />

thinly settled, <strong>and</strong> unhealthful, with very few incidents of civilized government. <strong>The</strong> miners prefer<br />

<strong>British</strong> laws to <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authority, <strong>and</strong> have encouraged, undoubtedly, the expansion of the<br />

<strong>British</strong> boundaries so as to give them <strong>and</strong> their property security under <strong>British</strong> laws.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> United States continued to proffer their good offices to both Governments—<strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> Great Britain—but the conduct of Guzman Blanco in abruptly breaking off diplomatic relations<br />

with Great Britain prevented Lord Salisbury from entering into negotiations until diplomatic<br />

intercourse had been restored.<br />

“It was expected, <strong>and</strong>, in fact quite openly charged, that Guzman Blanco, the President of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, was creating difficulties in order to compel certain English mining companies to sell him<br />

or give him their stock; but it is certain that his actions stood in the way of an <strong>and</strong> amicable<br />

adjustment or the boundary question.<br />

“Mr. Blaine’s last note of May 2, 1890, is the final publication on the subject, excepting a note<br />

from Mr. Adee of July 2, 1890, to the same general effect. No volume of foreign relations<br />

correspondence has been published for 1891, as has been the custom heretofore.<br />

“As the attitude of the United States was to be one of impartial friendship toward both<br />

Governments, the present concentration of naval forces is not explained by anything in the<br />

published correspondence thus far.<br />

“Whether the more than doubtful claim of jurisdiction by the United States within the territorial<br />

waters of another Government, which was apparently implied, rather than asserted in the Barrundia<br />

case,* is now to be repeated remains to be seen.<br />

“Certain it is, the United States would promptly enforce its own jurisdiction over all persons<br />

charged with a violation of its laws who were found within its territory, whether of l<strong>and</strong> or water. If<br />

we deny this to other nations, or to some <strong>and</strong> not to others, our own position will be very difficult<br />

to maintain when we seek to execute our domestic laws within our own jurisdiction.”<br />

[16 September 1892]<br />

*<strong>The</strong> killing of General Barrundia on board the Pacific mail steamer Acapulco, while anchored in transit in the port<br />

of San Jose de Guatemala, dem<strong>and</strong>ed careful inquiry. Having failed in a revolutionary attempt to invade Guatemala<br />

from Mexican territory, General Barrundia took passage at Acapulco for Panama. <strong>The</strong> consent of the<br />

representatives of the United States was sought to effect his seizure, first at Champerico, where the steamer<br />

touched, <strong>and</strong> afterwards at San Jose. <strong>The</strong> captain of the steamer refused to give up his passenger without a written<br />

order from the United States minister. <strong>The</strong> latter furnished the desired letter, stipulating as the condition of his<br />

action that General Barrundia's life should be spared <strong>and</strong> that he should be tried only for offenses growing out of<br />

his insurrectionary movements. This letter was produced to the captain of the Acapulco by the military comm<strong>and</strong>er<br />

at San Jose as his warrant to take the passenger from the steamer. General Barrundia resisted capture <strong>and</strong> was killed.<br />

It being evident that the minister, Mr. Mizner, had exceeded the bounds of his authority in intervening, in<br />

compliance with the dem<strong>and</strong>s of the Guatemalan authorities, to authorize <strong>and</strong> effect, in violation of precedent, the<br />

seizure on a vessel of the United States of a passenger in transit charged with political offenses, in order that he<br />

might be tried for such offenses under what was described as martial law, I was constrained to disavow Mr. Mizner's<br />

act <strong>and</strong> recall him from his post.<br />

22


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 19 -<br />

WELCOME IN VENEZUELA<br />

CRESPO PLEASED WITH RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES.<br />

SOUTH PORTLAND’S ARRIVAL FROM TRINIDAD AND THE DISPOSAL<br />

OFTHE SHIP—CAPTURE OF BARCELONA AND THE TROOPS<br />

UNDER ARMS – NEW TROUBLE AT BOLIVAR<br />

CARACAS, <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Oct. 28.—Assurances received from the from the United States that<br />

Crespo’s Government had been recognized by the Washington authorities were warmly welcomed<br />

here. “I would rather,” says Crespo, “have that satisfaction than the knowledge that all the rest of<br />

the foreign powers had acknowledged me.”<br />

“<strong>The</strong> United States has over been ready to lend the Southern republics a helping h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> with<br />

its acquiescence in our plans <strong>and</strong> measures we can well afford to go ahead <strong>and</strong> develop our country,<br />

so rich in all that is required to make us prosperous,” said one of the leading Senators.<br />

It is said that the proposal to give to the United States the property in the eastern section of the<br />

country over which Engl<strong>and</strong> has had a dispute for a number of years has been very favorably<br />

considered. Little can, however, be done in this matter until some more definite arrangement is<br />

made with <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, or, in other words, with the home Government in Engl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> section<br />

of the country referred to contains the richest mining districts in <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> arrival of the steamer South Portl<strong>and</strong> from Trinidad <strong>and</strong> the capture of Barcelona <strong>and</strong> the<br />

few remaining troops still under arms in that vicinity against Señor Crespo are the chief military<br />

topics that have been under discussion here for the past week. <strong>The</strong> South Portl<strong>and</strong> is no doubt by<br />

name familiar in the United States. She was at one time seized for having warlike material aboard to<br />

assist a party in rebellion against at Government with which the United States was at peace. She was<br />

released <strong>and</strong> allowed to clear from New-York for the Isl<strong>and</strong> of Trinidad. Mr. Gonsalez, a<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n, who negotiated the bargain for the arms <strong>and</strong> ammunition, came down here by another<br />

steamer from the United States, <strong>and</strong> disembarked at Curaçao with the intention of going over to<br />

Trinidad, a distance of almost five hundred miles, in a small schooner. A severe storm arose, <strong>and</strong><br />

nothing has since been heard from Señor Gonsalez; so it is feared that he <strong>and</strong> his frail craft are lost.<br />

Capt. Smith or the South Portl<strong>and</strong>, having remained as long as he dared at Trinidad, left for La<br />

Guayra, whore he arrived about ten days ago. Just what to do with his 4,000 rifles, his Gatlings, <strong>and</strong><br />

his 1,500,000 cartridges was quite a question, as the bill was a big one, the war was over, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

chief party in the deal was not on h<strong>and</strong>. In view, however, of the possible trouble in the Spring,<br />

when another uprising is probable, it was finally decided to take the arms, store them in the Custom<br />

house at La Guayra, <strong>and</strong> have them h<strong>and</strong>y. It was then proposed to use the vessel as a transport to<br />

take troops to the eastward,[sic] where, in the Maracaibo district, there is still more or less opposition<br />

to Señor Crespo’s rule: but the agent of the American Red Line said: “No one steamer can do all the<br />

transporting that is necessary, <strong>and</strong> the money for such work is ours by right, as we pulled Crespo’s<br />

party through <strong>and</strong> established it firmly in its present position.” And so ends the matter of the<br />

Portl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

In the Barcelona district, which was one of the last of the eastern divisions to hold out against<br />

Crespo’s authority, an Indian General was in comm<strong>and</strong>. His prowess <strong>and</strong> ability were such that he<br />

was greatly respected as an antagonist, <strong>and</strong> it was not until troops outnumbering his own four to one<br />

23


1887 - 1892<br />

had been sent against him that he was subdued. When he was finally defeated <strong>and</strong> taken prisoner<br />

Crespo sent a dispatch saying that his life was to be spared <strong>and</strong> that he was to be sent to Caracas, as<br />

he, Crespo, was extremely desirous of taking by the h<strong>and</strong> a man whose valor <strong>and</strong> wisdom were<br />

admitted to be of the highest order.<br />

A new trouble has recently been developed at Bolivar, which is some 250 miles or more up the<br />

Orinoco River, right in the heart of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It seems that a former United States Consul at that<br />

place, a Mr. Underwood, has gotten into such serious trouble with the local authorities that the<br />

presence of a United States man-of-war has been deemed necessary, <strong>and</strong> the corvette Kearsarge will<br />

leave almost immediately to investigate the difficulty. This Mr. Underwood became very much<br />

interested in the Bolivar water works, so much so than he gave up, or was obliged to give up, his<br />

Consular position.<br />

As such matters quite often turn out in foreign countries, Underwood got into serious difficulties<br />

with the native authorities, which finally resulted in his being thrown into jail. His wife, fearing that<br />

in the chaotic state of the country <strong>and</strong> the prevailing looseness of law <strong>and</strong> order her husb<strong>and</strong> would<br />

lose his life, communicated as soon as she could with our Consul in Trinidad, <strong>and</strong> through him with<br />

the State Department at Washington. She herself barely escaped being put into jail, <strong>and</strong> had the<br />

utmost difficulty in getting away from Bolivar.<br />

[5 November 1892]<br />

24


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- Part 2 -<br />

January - November 1895<br />

25


January - November 1895<br />

26


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 20 -<br />

BRITISH GUIANA BOUNDARIES<br />

Appeal to Lord Kimberley for Arbitration with <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

LONDON, Jan. 2.—<strong>The</strong> International Arbitration Society has sent to Lord Kimberley,<br />

Secretary of the Foreign Office, a resolution of the committee concerning the delay in the settlement<br />

of Great Britain’s dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong> as to the boundaries of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> committee directs attention to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s reference to the subject in his last<br />

message, <strong>and</strong> emphasizes the seriousness of Great Britain’s responsibility in the matter. After<br />

speaking of the society’s previous letters on the subject, the committee’s communication continues:<br />

“We beg the Government to state what <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claims are unsuited to arbitration. We learn<br />

that <strong>Venezuela</strong> would willingly enter into explanations likely to lead to a modification of such claims.<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> must have been duly advised when he deliberately suggested that the subject as<br />

a whole could be fairly comprised within the terms of amicable arbitration.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> committee expresses approval of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s suggestion that the first step toward a<br />

settlement should be an effort to restore diplomatic relations between the countries, <strong>and</strong> prays the<br />

Government to make friendly advances to this end.<br />

[3 January 1895]<br />

To the Editor of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times:<br />

- 21 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA BOUNDARY<br />

Ex-Minister Scruggs Writes About the <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> dispute referred to in your editorial of the 5th inst. in relation to the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

boundary dates as far back as 1827, <strong>and</strong> has been a source or constant irritation ever since. <strong>The</strong><br />

territory in dispute contains an area as large as the States of New-York <strong>and</strong> New-Jersey, <strong>and</strong> is one<br />

of the most fertile <strong>and</strong> productive regions on the continent.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, as the successor in title of Spain in 1810, has always consistently <strong>and</strong> persistently<br />

claimed the entire territory on the Atlantic coast between the Esequibo <strong>and</strong> Orinoco Rivers, <strong>and</strong><br />

southward from the coast to the Brazilian border. She supports this claim by an unbroken chain of<br />

title, beginning with the treaty of Munster of 1648 between Spain <strong>and</strong> the United Netherl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong><br />

by subsequent public treaties <strong>and</strong> ordinances down to 1845, when Spain formally ceded to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> the entire <strong>Guiana</strong> territory west of the Esequibo <strong>and</strong> southward to the Brazilian border.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, as the successor in title of the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s in 1814, first extended her claim westward of<br />

the Esequibo to the Pumaron River, <strong>and</strong> she subsequently extended it indefinitely, first to the mouth<br />

of the Moroca, <strong>and</strong> then to the Guiama, then to the Barima, <strong>and</strong> finally to the Orinoco, including<br />

the main channel which connects the Orinoco with the Atlantic Ocean. She has likewise extended<br />

her claim indefinitely southward hundreds of leagues into the gold-bearing districts of Yuruari. She<br />

27


January - November 1895<br />

supports this claim, not by any additional concessions since 1814, nor by any title derived from<br />

Holl<strong>and</strong> as evinced by public documents, but by some pretended treaty with Indian tribes, very<br />

much as any European power might pretend to sovereignty in Dakota in virtue of pretended treaties<br />

with the aborigines in North America. And a remarkable feature of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s present pretensions is<br />

that she now claims <strong>and</strong> occupies <strong>and</strong> has actually set up de facto Governments within a vast region<br />

of country which she herself has more than once acknowledged to be legitimately <strong>and</strong> indisputably<br />

within the domain <strong>and</strong> jurisdiction of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Unable to repel these bold aggressions in the manner usually adopted by strong Governments in<br />

the last resort, <strong>Venezuela</strong> has appealed to the moral sense of the civilized world in the hope that<br />

some just <strong>and</strong> honorable termination of the dispute by arbitration may be brought about through<br />

the mediation of friendly powers. <strong>The</strong> United States has not been indifferent to these appeals, nor<br />

could our Government afford to be in view of its well-known policy <strong>and</strong> traditions since 1823. Time<br />

<strong>and</strong> again it has tendered its good offices as the impartial friend of both parties; <strong>and</strong> it has even<br />

made formal tender of its services as impartial arbitrator, if acceptable to both parties. It did this<br />

with the less hesitancy because the dispute turns upon simple <strong>and</strong> readily ascertainable historical<br />

facts. And this, be it remembered, is all that <strong>Venezuela</strong> asks, or has ever asked since 1841.<br />

And yet, as if conscious of the unjust <strong>and</strong> flimsy character of her claim, Engl<strong>and</strong> persists in her<br />

refusal to submit the matter to arbitration; but disregarding all remonstrances, including those of the<br />

United States <strong>and</strong> ten Of the Spanish-American republics, to say nothing of those made by Spain as<br />

early as 1886, Engl<strong>and</strong> has gone on absorbing <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, until now the dismemberment<br />

of the republic is directly threatened, <strong>and</strong> the territorial integrity <strong>and</strong> sovereignty of at least two other<br />

South-American republics are indirectly menaced.<br />

Washington, D. C., Jan. 12, 1895.<br />

[17 January 1895]<br />

- 22 -<br />

BOUNDARY LIMITS IN GUIANA<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain Should Refer to Arbitration<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 31.—<strong>The</strong> House Foreign Affairs Committee to-day ordered a favorable<br />

report upon the Livingston resolution that “the President’s suggestion in his last annual message to<br />

Congress that Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> refer their dispute as to boundary limits in <strong>Guiana</strong> to<br />

friendly arbitration, be most earnestly commended to the favorable consideration of both the parties<br />

in interest.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> preamble to the resolutions recites that the foregoing boundary dispute naturally comes<br />

within the scope <strong>and</strong> range of matters that can be consistently arbitrated, in that it turns exclusively<br />

upon simple <strong>and</strong> readily ascertainable historical facts, <strong>and</strong> that it would be , moreover, extremely<br />

gratifying to impartial friends of both parties to see this matter thus adjusted, in order that<br />

international complications be avoided <strong>and</strong> American public law <strong>and</strong> traditions maintained.<br />

<strong>The</strong> adoption of this resolution is a practical response to the argument which Mr. W. H.<br />

Cremer, the English member of Parliament, made before the committee recently in favor of the<br />

adoption of the principle of arbitration by the United States.<br />

28


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

[1 February 1895]<br />

- 23 -<br />

GOOD ADVICE TO ENGLAND<br />

Requested to Arbitrate the <strong>Guiana</strong> Boundary Case<br />

HOUSE PASSES A JOINT RESOLUTION<br />

Indorsement of the Suggestion of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> Contained in<br />

His Last Annual Message.<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 6.—Mr. Livingston (Dem. Ga.,) asked in the House to-day unanimous<br />

consent for consideration of the following joint resolution relative to the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>-<strong>Guiana</strong><br />

boundary dispute:<br />

Whereas, In the present enlightened age of the world, when international disputes in general, <strong>and</strong> more<br />

particularly those pertaining to boundary, are in constant process of adjustment by joint commission of by outside<br />

arbitration; <strong>and</strong><br />

Whereas. Since the existing boundary dispute in <strong>Guiana</strong>, between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, ought not to<br />

constitute an exception to the general rule, but should more naturally come within the scope <strong>and</strong> range of modern<br />

international precedent <strong>and</strong> practice, in that it turns exclusively upon simple <strong>and</strong> readily ascertainable historical facts;<br />

<strong>and</strong><br />

Whereas, Since it would be extremely gratifying to all peace-loving peoples, <strong>and</strong> particularly to the impartial<br />

friends of both parties to see this long-st<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> disquieting boundary dispute in <strong>Guiana</strong> adjusted in a manner<br />

just <strong>and</strong> honorable alike to both, to the end that possible international complications be avoided <strong>and</strong> American<br />

public law <strong>and</strong> traditions maintained; there fore, be it<br />

Resolved, That the President’s suggestion made in his last annual message to this body, namely, that Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> refer their dispute as to boundary limits in <strong>Guiana</strong> to friendly arbitration, be most earnestly<br />

recommended to the favorable consideration of both the parties in interest.<br />

Mr. Sayers (Dem., Texas) asked the reasons for the passage of the resolution, saying he did not<br />

see why Congress shou1d be putting its h<strong>and</strong>s into the affairs of other countries.<br />

Mr. Livingston said the necessity lay in the condition of the dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, which, having continued for a period of nearly seventy years, had reached a culminating<br />

point. <strong>The</strong> substance of the resolution, he said, was in harmony with the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> with<br />

the policy of the Government. <strong>The</strong> dispute in question could no longer remain open without very<br />

serious consequences to South American republics.<br />

It not only directly threatened the hopeless dismemberment of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, but indirectly<br />

menaced the political autonomy of one or two other trans-Caribbean neighbors of the United States.<br />

This Government could not afford to be indifferent to a controversy like this. <strong>The</strong> possession of the<br />

mouth of the Orinoco River <strong>and</strong> its tributaries in such a power as Great Britain would in a very few<br />

years revolutionize the commerce <strong>and</strong> political institutions of at least three South American<br />

republics.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> had been asking Great Britain for half a century to submit her claim to friendly<br />

arbitration, but, steadily declining al overtures, Great Britain has gone on absorbing territory in the<br />

valley of the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> on the Atlantic coast until she now occupied an area west of the Esequibo<br />

River twice as large as the State of New-York. It was well known, said Mr. Livingston, that Great<br />

29


January - November 1895<br />

Britain had no title to territory in <strong>Guiana</strong> other than that derived from Holl<strong>and</strong> in 1814, <strong>and</strong> from<br />

that date back to 1640 the Esequibo River was universally regarded as the divisional line between<br />

Spain <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> aggressions of Great Britain, he said, could not be justified; to do so would be to unsettle, if<br />

not invalidate, the title to more than half the public domain of the United States. <strong>The</strong>re was no more<br />

territory on the American continent open to conquest <strong>and</strong> occupancy by European powers.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> unable to repel these bold aggressions upon her territory, had appealed to the moral<br />

sense of the civilized world, <strong>and</strong> our Government, said Mr. Livingston, had not been indifferent to<br />

those appeals.<br />

<strong>The</strong> executive department had more than once tendered its good offices, <strong>and</strong> had even gone so<br />

far as to extend its services as arbitrator, if acceptable to both parties. Spain. It is understood, had<br />

made similar overtures, <strong>and</strong> no less than ten South American republics had addressed the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government in like sense.<br />

But Great Britain, ready <strong>and</strong> willing enough to submit her boundary disputes, <strong>and</strong> United States<br />

to arbitration, had persistently denied to <strong>Venezuela</strong> what she had ever been ready to ask of stronger<br />

powers. For the honor of the great English-speaking race, <strong>and</strong> for the credit of Christian civilization,<br />

Mr. Livingston said he hoped Great Britain might reconsider her course in this matter, <strong>and</strong> agree to<br />

submit her claim to arbitration.<br />

“Even at this moment,” he said, “there is understood to be a special envoy in this capital bearing<br />

a petition signed by a majority of the <strong>British</strong> House of Commons, praying the President of the<br />

United States agree to submit all differences between that country <strong>and</strong> this to friendly arbitration.<br />

That is praiseworthy <strong>and</strong> commendable. But why not begin the good work by petitioning their own<br />

Government at St. James to accede to <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s st<strong>and</strong>ing offer to refer the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary<br />

dispute to the decision of arbitration?<br />

“<strong>The</strong>n the Parliament of Great Britain might, with entire consistency, <strong>and</strong> with a conscious<br />

rectitude of purpose, ask this Government to refer all its differences with Engl<strong>and</strong> to arbitration.”<br />

Mr. Dingley (Rep., Me.,) asked if the matter had not better be left with the Executive. It seemed<br />

to him to be establishing a mischievous precedent. He could see no good in it <strong>and</strong> did not like it, but<br />

would make no objection to the passage of the resolution.<br />

Mr. Hitt (Rep., Ill.,) said that there were precedents for the proposed action, where Congress, in<br />

response to suggestions by Presidents <strong>and</strong> Secretaries of State, had expressed its sense of approval of<br />

the principle of arbitration. He objected to the form of the resolution, saying that it amounted<br />

almost to a comm<strong>and</strong>.<br />

No objection, however, was made to the consideration of the joint resolution, <strong>and</strong> it was agreed<br />

to.<br />

[7 February 1895]<br />

- 24 -<br />

VENEZUELA BOUNDARY DISPUTE<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s Recommendation to Arbitrate Is Approved<br />

30


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

WASIHINGT0N Feb. 21.—<strong>The</strong> President has approved the joint resolution of Congress<br />

relative to the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary dispute, which declares that the President’s<br />

suggestion made in his last annual message that Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> should refer their<br />

dispute to friendly arbitration, be earnestly recommended to the favorable consideration of both<br />

parties in interest.<br />

While the <strong>British</strong> Government will undoubtedly learn officially of this formal declaration of the<br />

United States, it is doubtful if any stronger representation of our attitude in the matter can be made<br />

than has already been insistently pressed by Ambassador Bayard under instructions issued by<br />

Secretary Gresham.<br />

This territorial dispute, involving the contest of territory in which valuable gold deposits have<br />

been discovered <strong>and</strong> of which Great Britain has taken possession, made the subject of diplomatic<br />

correspondence for ten years or more, without the slightest indication of a definite termination.<br />

[22 February 1895]<br />

- 25 -<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> Is Not In Arms<br />

LONDON, March 5.—<strong>The</strong> Foreign Office has no knowledge of the report published in a New-<br />

York newspaper, in an alleged special dispatch, of <strong>British</strong> troops having been massed on the frontier<br />

of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. If troops have been massed there, which is not believed, the movement was not<br />

made in pursuance of orders from the London Government, as the so-called dispatch asserts as no<br />

such orders have been given.<br />

[6 March 1895]<br />

- 26 -<br />

VENEZUELA BOUNDARY DISPUTE<br />

Ambassador Bayard’s Influence for an Amicable Settlement<br />

WASHINGTON, March 6.—It appears from the annual volume of Foreign Relations, devoted<br />

to diplomatic correspondence of the United States for the past year, which will be published shortly,<br />

that the great bulk of Ambassador Bayard’s work since he went to London has been devoted to the<br />

encroachments of Great Britain on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory.<br />

This question has had Mr. Bayard’s unceasing attention under instructions from his<br />

Government, <strong>and</strong> to the exclusion of all other vexed matters, except that of Bluefields, he has<br />

pressed for an amicable settlement of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary dispute.<br />

Although Great Britain some years ago declined to submit the controversy to friendly<br />

arbitration, when suggested by the United States, it is understood that a year ago Mr. Bayard<br />

informed the <strong>British</strong> Government that, upon representations of <strong>Venezuela</strong> of the injustice of the<br />

31


January - November 1895<br />

continued encroachments, this country looked upon the matter with deeper concern than heretofore<br />

<strong>and</strong> felt impelled to persist more strenuously in its effort to prevent probable disturbance on this<br />

continent, involving a weak <strong>and</strong> friendly neighbor, who properly looked to the United States for sup<br />

port<br />

This is about as far as Ambassador Bayard could go without declaring that the United States was<br />

ready to suspend diplomatic relations. <strong>The</strong> correspondence will show that Mr. Bayard’s persistence<br />

has modified Great Britain’s attitude considerably, <strong>and</strong> that the long controversy is in a fair way to<br />

reach a termination satisfactory to all concerned.<br />

[7 March 1895]<br />

- 27 -<br />

GREAT BRITAIN AND VENEZUELA<br />

Sir Edward Grey’s Statement of the <strong>Dispute</strong> About Boundary<br />

LONDON, March 14.—In the House of Commons to-day Sir Edward Grey, Parliamentary<br />

Secretary to the Foreign Office, said, in reply to a question, that Great Britain had no diplomatic<br />

representative at Caracas, the capital of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>British</strong> interests there, he said, had been for some<br />

time in charge of the German representative.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government was ready to take steps for an amicable arrangement of the differences<br />

existing between the two countries, <strong>and</strong> had communicated that fact to <strong>Venezuela</strong> in 1890 <strong>and</strong> again<br />

in 1893.<br />

<strong>The</strong> latter communication had never been answered by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Great Britain must<br />

therefore maintain the provisional boundary settled upon, which, however, does not embrace the<br />

whole of the <strong>British</strong> claim.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> has been informed that Great Britain is willing to submit the question of possession<br />

of territory outside of the Schomberg line to arbitration, but that she could not agree to arbitration<br />

in regard to territory which had long been settled as part of the <strong>British</strong> colony.<br />

[15 March 1895]<br />

- 28 -<br />

DIFFICULTIES OF VENEZUELA<br />

Great Britain Insisting on Proper Reparation for Arrests<br />

LONDON, March 18.—In the House of Commons to-day Sir George Baden-Powell,<br />

Conservative, asked it the Government had fixed a date for the initiation of measures against<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> in the event of her failure to give satisfaction for the arrest <strong>and</strong> detention of a number of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> policemen.<br />

32


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

Sir Edward Grey, Parliamentary Secretary for the Foreign Office, replied that it was impossible<br />

to make a statement in regard to the question at the present time, but he declared that the matter<br />

would not be dropped until proper reparation was made by <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Sir Edward Grey further said that no progress had been made toward resuming diplomatic<br />

relations with <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[19 March 1895]<br />

- 29 -<br />

VENEZUELA AND GREAT BRITAIN<br />

Congress Made Difficult Arbitration of the Boundary <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, March 21.—Gossipy persons determined to promote activity in the State<br />

Department, have conveyed the impression that the Administration is to encourage in <strong>Venezuela</strong> the<br />

hope that the boundary dispute with Great Britain will be soon settled by arbitration.<br />

What course the Administration may take for the benefit of <strong>Venezuela</strong> without embarrassment<br />

to the United States it is not easy to see. Congress expressed the opinion, by a joint resolution, that<br />

the United States should recommend to Great Britain arbitration of the boundary question. But the<br />

same Congress refused to appropriate $425,000 for an arbitration to which the United States<br />

submitted, which was won by Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> which we have repudiated. Congress not only<br />

refused to appropriate a sum which would have settled the dispute before the arbitration, but<br />

refused also to appropriate money for the expenses of a commission to agree upon terms of a<br />

settlement.<br />

Under such circumstances it is doubtful whether Great Britain will receive cordially any<br />

suggestion to have the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary arbitrated. If the United Status is to take any part in the<br />

matter, Great Britain is in a position to express doubts about good faith, <strong>and</strong> determination to abide<br />

by the findings of an arbitrator.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Congress that refused to permit a settlement approved by the President <strong>and</strong> by Secretary<br />

Gresham exhibited its stupidity <strong>and</strong> ignorance in pushing through the resolution urging arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> body was evidently in favor of arbitration if it could be sure that it would go against the other<br />

party.<br />

—<br />

Col. Angel Polibio Chaves of Ecuador, who recently attended a celebration held by<br />

representatives of several Central <strong>and</strong> South American republics in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, arrived in this city<br />

yesterday on the Philadelphia from La Guayra. In speaking of affairs in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, he said:<br />

When I left, political affairs in <strong>Venezuela</strong> were becoming exciting. <strong>The</strong> trouble rose over the dismissal of the<br />

French <strong>and</strong> Belgian Ministers. Many of the people were opposed to President Crespo, <strong>and</strong> even the Congress was<br />

divided, there being a strong opposition to the Government. <strong>The</strong> administration was considered to be very poor,<br />

<strong>and</strong> was held accountable for the poor condition of business in the country.<br />

<strong>The</strong> country is getting poorer <strong>and</strong> poorer. <strong>The</strong>n Crespo became friendly with ex-President Guzman Blanco,<br />

who is hated <strong>and</strong> feared by most of the people. <strong>The</strong> people were on the verge of starting another revolution to turn<br />

out Gen. Crespo. He is very strong with the army, <strong>and</strong> any such revolution would be doubtful of success.<br />

33


January - November 1895<br />

But the trouble over the disputed boundary with Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the dismissal of the French <strong>and</strong> Belgian Ministers<br />

changed political action. It was felt that the dignity of the country had been outraged by their conduct.<br />

<strong>The</strong> people became greatly excited, <strong>and</strong> there was danger that personal violence would be done to the Ministers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> matter was discussed by the people <strong>and</strong> in the newspapers. <strong>The</strong> excitement had reached such a high pitch that<br />

President Crespo placed a military guard about the residences of the Ministers, <strong>and</strong> also caused the arrest <strong>and</strong><br />

imprisonment of a number of people. He thought such a course necessary to prevent an open outbreak. It was<br />

thought for a time that the people would kill the Ministers.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y are determined to sustain Crespo in his action in dismissing them, no matter what the consequences may<br />

be, even if they are forced to fight.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y feel profoundly grateful to the people <strong>and</strong> the Congress of this country for the st<strong>and</strong> they have taken in<br />

upholding <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s claim to arbitration. <strong>The</strong>y say that the United States is the only country that can prevent<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> from swallowing up <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> other South <strong>and</strong> Central American republics.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y bless the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> were stirred profoundly by the speeches in Congress at Washington<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>ing arbitration. <strong>The</strong>y are now circulating a petition of thanks to be sent to those Congressmen who<br />

championed their cause.<br />

[23 March 1895]<br />

- 30 -<br />

VENEZUELA’S MARTIAL SPIRIT<br />

<strong>The</strong> People Will Fight Rather than Yield Territory to Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

WASHINGTON, April 6.—Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the expressed opinion of State Department <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>British</strong> officials that nothing but peace may come from the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute, those<br />

familiar with the temper of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government <strong>and</strong> people declare that <strong>Venezuela</strong> will go<br />

to war if Great Britain retains its present attitude <strong>and</strong> refuses to submit to arbitration the right to the<br />

territory which <strong>Venezuela</strong> claims has been usurped by <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. This, in the face of the<br />

overwhelming disparity of force between the two contestants <strong>and</strong> the apparent hopelessness of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s entering upon such a struggle unaided.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no question that <strong>Venezuela</strong>, in the event of trouble between herself <strong>and</strong> Great Britain,<br />

would look to the United States for moral, financial <strong>and</strong> material support, but <strong>Venezuela</strong> insists that<br />

self-respect will not permit her to remain passive one minute after it becomes clearly evident that<br />

Great Britain purposes retaining possession of the disputed country.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> contains a population of two <strong>and</strong> a half million people. Her army on a peace footing<br />

does not exceed 8,000 men, but it is claimed she could in an emergency place 100,000 troops in the<br />

field within sixty days.<br />

Many of these troops are veterans who have seen service in the several rebellions in the country<br />

during the last few decades, <strong>and</strong> her military force, therefore, would be one not to be despised. <strong>The</strong><br />

city of Caracas, the capital of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, is situated so far inl<strong>and</strong> as to be safe from the attacks of a<br />

hostile fleet.<br />

<strong>The</strong> ports of La Guayra, Maracaibo, <strong>and</strong> Port Barima would be, however, it the mercy of any<br />

strong naval power, <strong>and</strong> their destruction would be a serious embarrassment to the commercial<br />

interests of the republic.<br />

La Guayra is an important port, which is connected with the outside world by lines of<br />

steamships to the United States, Spain, Engl<strong>and</strong>, France, Germany, Italy, <strong>and</strong> other European<br />

34


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

countries. Not infrequently as many as twenty <strong>and</strong> thirty large merchant vessels swing at one time at<br />

their moorings in the harbor while receiving or discharging freight.<br />

[7 April 1895]<br />

- 31 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Has Not Replied to Britain<br />

LONDON, April 8.—Replying to a question by Sir George Baden-Powell, Sir Edward Grey said<br />

that the Government had not yet received any response from <strong>Venezuela</strong> in regard to Engl<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> for an explanation of the recent insult to the <strong>British</strong> flag in <strong>British</strong> South American territory.<br />

[9 April 1895]<br />

- 32 -<br />

TEMPER OF VENEZUELANS<br />

A Church Will St<strong>and</strong> in the Way of Britain’s Advance<br />

THE MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT CRESPO<br />

Popular Expression of Gratefulness for the Resolution Adopted<br />

by the North American Republic<br />

WASHINGTON, April 9.—Advices received from <strong>Venezuela</strong> state that the Chief Magistrate of<br />

the Amacuro region has been directed by the Caracas Ministry to erect a church on the banks of the<br />

Amacura River, which is to form the nucleus of a new settlement.<br />

This settlement will be situated on the river directly opposite to that now occupied by the<br />

<strong>British</strong>, <strong>and</strong> is intended as an intimation that <strong>Venezuela</strong> regards that part of the territory as her own,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that the <strong>British</strong> colonists must not encroach upon it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government <strong>and</strong> people appear to have accepted the action of the United<br />

States Congress in passing a resolution favoring arbitration as indicating a sure <strong>and</strong> certain issue out<br />

of all their boundary troubles.<br />

On Feb. 6 the House of Representatives adopted the resolution offered by Mr. Livingston of<br />

Georgia <strong>and</strong> favorably reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, “that the President’s<br />

suggestion made in his last annual message to this body, namely, that Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

refer their dispute as to boundary limit in <strong>Guiana</strong> to friendly arbitration be most earnestly<br />

recommended to the favorable considerations at both the parties in interest.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolution subsequently passed the Senate <strong>and</strong> was approved by President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, Feb.<br />

21. March 29 the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Rejas, sent to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Congress, which is now in session, the following communication, addressed to the President of the<br />

Congress:<br />

35


January - November 1895<br />

I have the honor to present to your high body, through this communication, inasmuch as the state of my health<br />

prevents me from doing it personally. a message from the President of the United States of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in relation to<br />

the noble attitude which the First Magistrate <strong>and</strong> the Congress of the great Republic of the North have just assumed<br />

regarding the pending question between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> by reason of the boundary with the Demerara<br />

colony. I renew to the honorable Congress of the Republic the testimony of my profoundest respect.<br />

<strong>The</strong> communication to which Secretary Rejas referred was addressed by President Crespo to the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Senate <strong>and</strong> House of Representatives, <strong>and</strong> was in these words:<br />

MESSAGE BY VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT CRESPO TO THE VNEZUELAN CONGRESS<br />

[29 March 1895]<br />

<strong>The</strong> high powers of the United States have just given on the occasion or the pending question between<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> a proof of the extent to which the principle of human justice prevails in the spirit of the<br />

great northern people. <strong>The</strong> Chief Magistrate of that powerful Republic, being persuaded at the peril which involves<br />

the American interests in the prolongation of a conflict of so grievous a nature, expressed in his annual message to<br />

Congress a strong wish <strong>and</strong> the disposition of inducing Great Britain to put an end to the dispute through the<br />

arbitration earnestly proposed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> American Congress in February last, as a consequence of the wise advice contained in President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s annual message, passed a resolution to this effect which has been inserted in the preliminary edition of<br />

the Yellow Book of this year. <strong>The</strong> terms of this resolution disclose the noblest interest in having this long<br />

controversy settled in conformity with the principles of justice <strong>and</strong> reason. <strong>The</strong>rein it is earnestly recommended that<br />

the two contending parties adopt the course indicated by the President of the United States in order peacefully to<br />

settle the dispute, as has been suggested by <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> legislative act referred to was approved by both the branches of the American Congress, <strong>and</strong> his Excellency<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> affixed his seal thereto February 21. Such tokens of the spirit of justice with which the<br />

overshadowing question at the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary is studied <strong>and</strong> considered by the Chief Magistrate <strong>and</strong> legislators of<br />

the great Republic of the north requires from <strong>Venezuela</strong> a significant act of special gratitude which only you can<br />

sanction so as to interpret the thought of the whole republic. I am sure that this idea will have the most enthusiastic<br />

acceptance in the hearts of the worthy legislators of my country.<br />

Both branches of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress, when the foregoing communications were read to them,<br />

at once adopted a joint resolution expressing their hearty appreciation of the friendly interest<br />

manifested in their dispute with Great Britain by the American people, as expressed by President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Congress. This resolution will be forwarded to Minister Andrade <strong>and</strong> by him<br />

presented to Secretary Gresham.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Caracas papers received to-day say that the enthusiasm of the enthusiasm of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns as a result of the friendly attitude of the American people is so great that the citizens of<br />

the several States will forward to Mr. Andrade, also to be presented to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>,<br />

testimonials containing the names of hundreds of thous<strong>and</strong>s of <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns.<br />

[10 April 1895]<br />

- 33 -<br />

GRATITUDE OF VENEZUELANS<br />

A Testimonial Accompanied by Expressions Against Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

36


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

ATLANTA, Ga., May 10.—Congressman Livingston has received a h<strong>and</strong>somely designed<br />

testimonial signed by Gen. Medardo Bello, Juan Velasquez. Isodoro Flores, <strong>and</strong> several other<br />

distinguished <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns expressing their gratitude for the st<strong>and</strong> taken by Mr. Livingston in behalf<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> communication reads: “Against Engl<strong>and</strong>, that eternal usurper of territories<br />

belonging to nations less strong than herself.” <strong>The</strong> testimonial further expresses the hope that the<br />

Guayana question may be settled by arbitration, <strong>and</strong> if not, <strong>Venezuela</strong> shall show Engl<strong>and</strong> that her<br />

sons are willing to die with honor for the protection of their national dignity.<br />

[11 May 1895]<br />

- 34 -<br />

GREAT BRITAIN AND VENEZUELA<br />

Details of the Difficulty . . . of Crespo’s Administration<br />

WASHINGTON, May 21.—<strong>The</strong> statement made by Sir Edward Grey in the <strong>British</strong> Parliament,<br />

yesterday, that no explanation had been received from <strong>Venezuela</strong> with reference to the hauling down<br />

of the <strong>British</strong> flag <strong>and</strong> imprisonment of her Majesty’s police officers, will be better understood when<br />

read in the light of the following facts:<br />

In November last several <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns were engaged in cutting wood on the right bank of the<br />

Cuwuni River. Inspector Barnes of the <strong>British</strong> police force ordered them away. <strong>The</strong>y refused to<br />

obey, claiming that they were on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soil. <strong>The</strong>y were notified that if they remained after a<br />

certain date they would be expelled. <strong>The</strong>y continued to remain, <strong>and</strong> were driven across the river.<br />

<strong>The</strong>reupon a body of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n police went over to Inspector Barnes’s headquarters <strong>and</strong><br />

arrested him <strong>and</strong> several of his men. <strong>The</strong>y were taken to Upata, in the State of Bolivar, <strong>and</strong> there<br />

released by order of the Caracas Government. Inspector Barnes claimed that his house was entered<br />

by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns <strong>and</strong> some of its contents stolen.<br />

At the request of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities, he made <strong>and</strong> estimate of the damage suffered by<br />

him, <strong>and</strong> was immediately reimbursed. Inspector Barnes reported his attest to his superior officers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government dem<strong>and</strong>ed an explanation through the German Minister at Caracas,<br />

diplomatic relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> being suspended. Up to the present time,<br />

the Caracas Government has failed to furnish the explanation dem<strong>and</strong>ed.<br />

[22 May 1895]<br />

- 35 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN CONTEST<br />

Its Progress As Described h the “Official Yellow Book”<br />

THE UNITED STATES A TRUE FRIEND<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> End <strong>The</strong>ir Differences<br />

Without Appealing to Arms as a Remedy<br />

37


January - November 1895<br />

Important official news regarding the controversy between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> has just<br />

reached this city, <strong>and</strong> is made public through the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Yellow Book. This volume is the<br />

report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the National Government <strong>and</strong> corresponds with the<br />

annual report of our State Department. It contains full details of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s attitude toward<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s aggressions in the Guayanas, <strong>and</strong> shows that our little neighbor on the shores of the<br />

Caribbean is determined to hold her territory at all hazards. <strong>The</strong> document in question shows<br />

firmness, combined with discretion, <strong>and</strong> reflects great credit upon the statesmanship <strong>and</strong> patriotism<br />

of Dr. P. Ezequiel Rojas, who has been at the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs for the<br />

past three years, <strong>and</strong> under whom the <strong>Guyana</strong> question has assumed its present phase.<br />

Referring to the boundary controversy, the Yellow Book first calls attention to the fact that the<br />

Congress of the United States has done its utmost to bring the question to arbitration; in fact, has<br />

even gone so far as to request Engl<strong>and</strong> to settle the dispute in this way. It also states that the press<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> all English corporations doing business there have also endeavored to bring about<br />

the same end. Even the Pope has interested himself in the controversy <strong>and</strong> offered his friendly<br />

services.<br />

Other important steps taken by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government were its efforts to prevent the<br />

circulation of incorrect maps of the country, <strong>and</strong> a request to the Washington Government that the<br />

international office would make such changes in the maps published by Engl<strong>and</strong> as would do justice<br />

to the rights of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Full <strong>and</strong> detailed explanations are given of the <strong>Guyana</strong> incident, which<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n press has been discussing so freely. <strong>The</strong> notes that have passed between Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> regarding the route from Barima to the Upper <strong>Guyana</strong> are also given in full.<br />

<strong>The</strong> report closes with these significant words: “After having explained all the measures taken by<br />

the present Government in this important matter from the day of its inauguration, the English have<br />

not advanced one step into the territory of the republic, <strong>and</strong> it is impossible for them to do so<br />

without having a collision with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities.”<br />

[3 June 1895]<br />

- 36 -<br />

VENEZUELA’S BOUNDARY DISPUTE<br />

WASHINGTON, June 8.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n officials regard the dispute with Great Britain over<br />

the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary question as definitely settled by the American Congress resolution that it be<br />

referred to arbitration.<br />

Formal expression was given to this belief by Señor J. Calucano Mathieu, President of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Senate, in his address to that body upon the adjournment of the National Legislature a<br />

few days ago.<br />

Señor Mathieu referred to the interest manifested by the American Congress, <strong>and</strong> expressed the<br />

opinion that Great Britain now had no alternative but to be governed by the wishes of the American<br />

people.<br />

<strong>The</strong> efforts which the Clevel<strong>and</strong> Administration has made through Mr. Bayard for a peaceful<br />

settlement of the controversy are also highly appreciated by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns.<br />

38


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

[9 June 1895]<br />

- 37 -<br />

VENEZUELA’S HOMAGE TO GRESHAM<br />

<strong>The</strong> National Flag at Half Mast on All Public Buildings<br />

WASHINGTON, June 11.—<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s tribute to Secretary Gresham has been received in the<br />

following form, addressed to Señor José Andrade, Minister of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to Washington, <strong>and</strong> signed<br />

by the Minister of Foreign Affairs:<br />

Caracas, May 29, 1895.<br />

Sir: Yesterday, at a late hour, I received your telegram, announcing the death of his Excellency,<br />

Mr. Gresham. This calamity must sensibly affect all who, in the last two years, have followed with<br />

any degree of interest the course of the foreign policy of the United States, in which that<br />

distinguished Statesman was displaying the great gifts of his intellect.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> is necessarily one of the countries of America in which this event has caused the<br />

greatest sorrow, inasmuch as that noble gentleman had displayed, on various occasions <strong>and</strong> in an<br />

eloquent manner, the cordial feelings by which he was actuated toward this republic.<br />

Please convey the expression of these sincere sentiments to the Department of State, in order<br />

that it may be communicated to his Excellency, President Clevel<strong>and</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> national flag has this day been ordered to be kept at half mast for three days on all public<br />

buildings. This official demonstration is made in memory of the efforts made by Mr. Gresham to<br />

secure a just <strong>and</strong> amicable settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n-<strong>British</strong> dispute.<br />

[12 June 1895]<br />

- 38 -<br />

GREAT BRITAIN AND VENEZUELA<br />

Arbitration Will Be Accepted Only Within Certain Limits<br />

LONDON, June 17.—In the House of Commons to-day Sir Edward Grey, Under Foreign<br />

Secretary, said that in January last United States Ambassador Bayard informed Lord Kimberley,<br />

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the United States Government would gladly lend its good<br />

offices to arbitrate the dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> position was explained to Mr. Bayard, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> Government was ready to submit to<br />

arbitration within certain limits, but they could not agree in regard to the extensive reference upon<br />

which <strong>Venezuela</strong> insisted.<br />

[18 June 1895]<br />

39


January - November 1895<br />

- 39 -<br />

AT THE NATIONAL CAPITAL<br />

WASHINGTON, June 24.—Americans who assume that the change of Ministry in Engl<strong>and</strong> will<br />

remove the danger of complications growing out of <strong>British</strong> aggressions in <strong>Venezuela</strong> unquestionably<br />

will see their mistake before Lord Salisbury’s Government has long been in power. Examination of<br />

the facts in connection with the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary dispute shows that Salisbury has always favored<br />

<strong>British</strong> encroachments on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soil. As far back as 1880, Lord Salisbury, in a note to the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister at London, claimed not only all the territory within the old “Schomburgk line”<br />

but a vast <strong>and</strong> fertile region far beyond it.<br />

Referring to <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s claim that the Essequibo River was the ancient line between the Dutch<br />

<strong>and</strong> Spanish possessions, <strong>and</strong> that it could not be considered as a boundary, he said Great Britain<br />

already had some 40,000 subject living west of that river, <strong>and</strong> that it could not be considered as a<br />

possible boundary. It was convenient for his Lordship to ignore the fact that every one of these<br />

40,000 <strong>British</strong> subjects had settled west of the Essequibo, knowing full well that it was <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

territory. <strong>The</strong>se settlers encroached upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soil with the knowledge that such action was<br />

in line with the <strong>British</strong> policy of extending <strong>British</strong> interests in that region.<br />

Lord Salisbury’s past propositions to <strong>Venezuela</strong> are regarded in that country as much less<br />

favorable even than those offered by Lord Rosebery. William L. Scruggs, late Minister of the United<br />

States to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, writing on the subject of <strong>British</strong> aggressions in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, has this to say of the<br />

proceedings with which Lord Salisbury has been closely connected:<br />

“Previous to the year 1840 Great Britain had not extended her occupancy beyond the Pomaron,<br />

nor even intimated a purpose to lay claim to any territory beyond that river. Suddenly, in the latter<br />

part of that year, she made an attempt to extend her occupancy westward <strong>and</strong> southward, as far as<br />

the mouth of the Barima River, where she arbitrarily fixed the starting point of a frontier line known<br />

as ‘the Schomburgk line.’<br />

“In 1844 she disclaimed this line <strong>and</strong> proposed what afterward became known as ‘the Aberdeen<br />

line,’ beginning near the mouth of the Pomaron River. In 1881 she again removed the starting point<br />

of a divisional line to a distance of twenty-nine miles west of the Moroco River, generally referred to<br />

as ‘Lord Granville’s line.’<br />

“In 1886 she again shifted position <strong>and</strong> proposed what is known as ‘the first Rosebery line,’<br />

beginning west of the Guaima River. In 1890 she shifted position again <strong>and</strong> proposed what is known<br />

as ‘the Salisbury line,’ beginning at the mouth of the Amacura River—thus claiming, control of the<br />

main outlet of the Orinoco.<br />

“And finally in 1893, still advancing westward <strong>and</strong> southward into what had never before been<br />

disputed as <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, she proposed a boundary line from the southwest of the Amacura<br />

River, running so as to include the headwaters of the Cumano <strong>and</strong> the Sierra of Usupano.”<br />

<strong>The</strong>se facts ought to be convincing that the new Salisbury Cabinet will have nothing to offer to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> in the way of an honorable settlement of the boundary dispute. <strong>The</strong>y may also give rise to<br />

the apprehension that the value of the Monroe doctrine may be put to the test in the next year.<br />

When Lord Salisbury last was at the head of the <strong>British</strong> Ministry he displayed a willingness to cooperate<br />

with this Government in the prevention of illegal sealing in Bering Sea which was directly at<br />

variance with Lord Rosebery’s subsequent attitude. With Salisbury again at the <strong>British</strong> helm, there<br />

40


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

may be a little more fairness in connection with the attempt to protect the seal herd from<br />

extermination. <strong>The</strong> silver men will look to the new Ministry for signs favorable to an international<br />

conference, but Americans, who are guided largely in their views by the teachings of the past, will<br />

not expect the new <strong>British</strong> Government to take any step which shall involve a radical change in<br />

<strong>British</strong> methods.<br />

[25 June 1895]<br />

- 40 -<br />

AT THE NATIONAL CAPITAL<br />

WASHINGTON, June 29.—<strong>The</strong>re seems to be a curious expectation on the part of South <strong>and</strong><br />

Central American diplomats that the new <strong>British</strong> Cabinet will be more favorable to an adjustment of<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute by arbitration than was its predecessor. This expectation is<br />

apparently based upon the supposed friendship toward the United States of the two statesmen into<br />

whose h<strong>and</strong>s this question will naturally fall—Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the<br />

Colonies, <strong>and</strong> Mr. U. N. Curzon, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Each of these gentlemen has<br />

an American wife, Mr. Chamberlain having married the daughter of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s first<br />

Secretary of War, Mr. Endicott of Massachusetts, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Curzon having recently married the<br />

daughter of Mr. L. Zelter of Chicago.<br />

<strong>The</strong> diplomatic correspondence in regard to the encroachments of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> on <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

has reached a point where it is thought the friendly intervention of the United States could be<br />

accepted. That intervention has been strongly exerted by Mr. Bayard in favor of arbitration, <strong>and</strong> it is<br />

regarded as quite possible that the incoming Government may not find itself embarrassed by the<br />

objections which the outgoing Administration had interposed to the adoption of this course.<br />

Whether or not these anticipations have any solid foundation in fact, they are undoubtedly<br />

entertained, <strong>and</strong> it is further hinted that the Nicaragua-Corinto affair may have, indirectly, some<br />

bearing on the settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary question. <strong>The</strong> little republics of South <strong>and</strong><br />

Central America are not by any means harmonious, <strong>and</strong> though sentimentally they express regret at<br />

lesson given Nicaragua by Great Britain in regard to respecting the flag or a foreign nationality, yet,<br />

as a matter of fact, there is said to have been some quiet gratification on the assumption that, as<br />

Great Britain had been permitted to assert its national dignity in this matter, it might not find it so<br />

difficult to waive points in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy. This is undoubtedly a curious intermixing of<br />

two apparently entirely dissimilar incidents, but the fact that they are connected together in this<br />

manner is indisputable.<br />

[30 June 1895]<br />

41


January - November 1895<br />

- 41 -<br />

VENEZUELA AND GREAT BRITAIN<br />

Fears that the New <strong>British</strong> Cabinet May Make War Inevitable<br />

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5.—<strong>The</strong> accession of Lord Salisbury to the head of the <strong>British</strong> Cabinet is<br />

causing a good deal of anxiety among the friends of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong>y fear that it means a return to<br />

the policy of territorial aggression against <strong>Venezuela</strong> which was pursued by the English under the<br />

former Conservative Ministry, with even more insolence than under the Liberal administration.<br />

Lord Salisbury was at the head of the Government when diplomatic relations were broken off<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the policy of arbitration, which had been encouraged by<br />

Lord Granville, was repudiated by the new Government.<br />

President Guzman Blanco went to Engl<strong>and</strong> in 1884, <strong>and</strong> negotiations for submitting the<br />

boundary dispute to arbitration were so far advanced in June, 1885, that the convention was about<br />

to be signed.<br />

A memor<strong>and</strong>um of the Foreign Office of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, submitted to the United States<br />

representative at Caracas on June 15, 1887, declared that, “in fact, Lord Granville had accepted the<br />

application of arbitration to all disagreements which should arise between the two countries,<br />

including that on boundaries.<br />

In the meantime, Lord Salisbury came into office, <strong>and</strong> one of his first steps was to withdraw<br />

what had been agreed upon with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, while at the same time he fulfilled the promises made to<br />

Russia, condemning as opprobrious, the breaking of them, although they had been made by his<br />

predecessors.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Foreign Office went on to recite that <strong>British</strong> invasions “became more <strong>and</strong> more marked<br />

from July, 1886, decrees being issued through the Governor of Demerara, by which the latter’s<br />

jurisdiction was extended from the Pomaron to the Amacuro; the grants of l<strong>and</strong> made by the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government were declared to be void, if they referred to those under controversy, <strong>and</strong>,<br />

finally, all that territory claimed by her Majesty was declared to be <strong>British</strong>.” It was during the<br />

Salisbury administration also, <strong>and</strong> only a few months after the last communication, that the <strong>British</strong><br />

war steamer Pylades was sent from Trinidad to La Guayra, <strong>and</strong> ordered to levy $40,000 upon the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government for subjecting two English schooners to legal process for violating<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n law.<br />

<strong>The</strong> proceeding was similar to the recent levy upon Nicaragua, <strong>and</strong> seven days were given to the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government to pay the money before the application of force. <strong>The</strong> representative of<br />

the United States interceded for the withdrawal of the threatening note of the Governor of Trinidad<br />

upon he ground that it was an affront to the dignity <strong>and</strong> independence of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Governor himself asked permission to withdraw the note <strong>and</strong> substitute a less forcible one.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Salisbury Government informed the Governor by telegraph that this arrangement could not<br />

be sanctioned, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns, after paying the money, filed a solemn protest with the<br />

diplomatic representatives of foreign countries at Caracas against the unfriendly <strong>and</strong> insulting<br />

attitude of the <strong>British</strong> Government. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed<br />

about that time, <strong>and</strong> have never been resumed.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n people have been growing very restive under <strong>British</strong> aggressions, even under the<br />

Rosebery Government, <strong>and</strong> the more hot-headed have been advocating war with Great Britain in<br />

42


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

the belief that the United States would be forced to interfere. <strong>The</strong>re is grave apprehension that a<br />

collision on the boundary, with great resulting embarrassments to this country, can no longer be<br />

avoided if Lord Salisbury resumes the offensive policy which he carried out under his former<br />

administration.<br />

[6 August 1895]<br />

- 42 -<br />

BRITISH GUIANA GOLD MINING<br />

Condition of the Colony as Viewed by Chief Justice Edward O’Malley<br />

WASHINGTON. Sept. 3.—<strong>The</strong> gold-mining industry of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, which is so closely<br />

involved in the territorial dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, has not yet reached the<br />

point of assured success, according to the testimony of Sir Edward O’Malley, Chief Justice of that<br />

colony, who is now in Washington. Explaining his visit here as being entirely non-political, Sir<br />

Edward said:<br />

“I am simply taking a trip to get a little needed change <strong>and</strong> rest. It is delightful to get back to<br />

civilization once more, after sojourning among the non-progressive people of Demerara. Life in that<br />

country is rather tame <strong>and</strong> monotonous to an Englishman or a citizen of the United States, <strong>and</strong><br />

those of us who can get away are glad to escape occasionally. I have lived in <strong>Guiana</strong> only since last<br />

January. <strong>The</strong> country is not in a prosperous condition.<br />

“Its chief industry is sugar planting, <strong>and</strong> owing to the very low prices of that product the<br />

business is in a deplorable state. A good many estates are closed up completely, <strong>and</strong> few of the<br />

planters are able to make more than a bare living. This is in spite of the fact that the Government<br />

gives them substantial aid by admitting farming materials free of duty, <strong>and</strong> also by helping to pay for<br />

the transportation of the coolie laborers, who do nearly all the plantation work.<br />

“Thous<strong>and</strong>s of these are brought in every year, mostly from Madras, under a five years’ contract.<br />

When that term expires most of them remain in the country as free laborers. <strong>The</strong> natives, Indians<br />

<strong>and</strong> colored creoles, are too lazy for any use in the cane fields, <strong>and</strong> live in a h<strong>and</strong>-to-mouth fashion<br />

on the least amount of work.<br />

“About the only hope of better times is in the development of our gold mines, which are<br />

beginning to attract a great deal of attention A number of explorers have come in from Australia,<br />

<strong>and</strong> are so well satisfied with the prospects that they have started a number of camps, a few of which<br />

have begun to produce very satisfactorily.”<br />

[4 September 1895]<br />

- 43 -<br />

VENEZUELA AND GREAT BRITAIN<br />

American Concessions Said to be in <strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory, Never Used<br />

43


January - November 1895<br />

WASHINGTON, Sept 28.—<strong>The</strong> facts in regard to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute, as nearly as they can<br />

be ascertained from the best sources of information, are these:<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States is still awaiting a reply, through Secretary Bayard, to a presentation of the<br />

boundary dispute as laid before the United States by <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> as investigated by the United<br />

States, which presentation was accompanied by a friendly but earnest suggestion that the matters<br />

thus placed in controversy should be referred to arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> mining concession granted by <strong>Venezuela</strong> to an American syndicate, which, it has been<br />

suggested, may involve the United States in <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s quarrel with Great Britain, is no new thing,<br />

<strong>and</strong> plays no part in the controversy. This concession was originally granted eleven years ago, when<br />

Gen. Crespo, the present Chief Executive of the republic, filled that office.<br />

<strong>The</strong> parties to whom the concession was given for unexplained reasons did not make use of the<br />

privilege, <strong>and</strong> a few years later, during the Presidency of Guzman Blanco, it was given to another<br />

American syndicate, which, like its predecessor, allowed it to lapse. It is now understood that the<br />

principal members of the present syndicate are among those to whom the concession was originally<br />

granted.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Legation have no information, official or otherwise, regarding the purpose of<br />

the syndicate to develop the territory embraced in the concession. It contains 15,000 square miles,<br />

<strong>and</strong> is about half the size of some of the States in this country. It is rich in minerals, hard woods <strong>and</strong><br />

petroleum. A part of the l<strong>and</strong> lay, at the time the was granted, in the territory in dispute between<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> it is now said that since Great Britain has extended her boundary<br />

further into <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s domain the entire tract is claimed by the <strong>British</strong> Government<br />

As far back as 1891, the <strong>British</strong> Minister at <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Mr. Mansfield, protested against the<br />

granting of the charter by <strong>Venezuela</strong> for the foregoing reasons. It would be not unlikely, therefore,<br />

that Great Britain would protest vigorously against any occupation of the country by the American<br />

syndicate. But, inasmuch as neither of the American syndicates has ever attempted to expend a<br />

dollar in breaking ground <strong>and</strong> taking possession, this contingency seems a remote one.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, Mr. Andrade, was asked by a United Press reporter to-day what<br />

protection against <strong>British</strong> aggressions would be given by his country to the syndicate. He replied that<br />

he knew nothing regarding the matter, <strong>and</strong> that everything would depend upon the character of the<br />

concession. If, in this concession, <strong>Venezuela</strong> had agreed to protect the syndicate in its rights, it<br />

would do so beyond question. Should not this protection be stipulated, however, he assumed that<br />

the syndicate would occupy the territory at its own risk.<br />

[29 September 1895]<br />

- 44 -<br />

GREAT BRITAIN AND VENEZUELA<br />

America Counsels Arbitration <strong>and</strong> the English Are Excited<br />

LONDON, Oct. 3.—<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette, in an article under the caption “Turn About Is Fair<br />

Play,” says:<br />

44


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

“<strong>The</strong> other day Lord Salisbury sent an ultimatum to China, <strong>and</strong> now, according to dispatches received from<br />

Washington, Ambassador Bayard has been instructed to notify Great Britain that unless the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question is<br />

submitted to arbitration within ninety days the United States Government will enforce the Monroe doctrine. It is to<br />

be hoped that if settlement of the question can be hurried up Lord Salisbury will do it, but surely President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> cannot wish to rush us out of just claims.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette says:<br />

“Isn’t it awful? But it might be still more awful if we only knew exactly what the blessed Monroe doctrine was<br />

or what on earth the United States Government has got to do with a quarrel between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> another<br />

independent State.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Post will to-morrow say that inquiries made at the American Embassy elicited the<br />

information that nothing was known there of the report that Ambassador Bayard had been<br />

instructed by his Government to notify Great Britain that unless the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question shall be<br />

submitted to arbitration within ninety days the United States. Government would enforce the<br />

Monroe doctrine.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Embassy officials added that no such letters of instruction had been received. <strong>The</strong> Post says<br />

that the report could hardly be treated seriously.<br />

[4 October 1895]<br />

- 45 -<br />

MONROE DOCTRINE AND BRITAIN<br />

A Powerful Presentation of the Claims of <strong>Venezuela</strong> Against the<br />

Aggressions of the Disputant<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 4.—<strong>The</strong> idea conveyed in recent dispatches sent from Washington that<br />

the Secretary of State has sent an ultimatum to Great Britain on the subject of the <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

boundary line dispute is entirely misleading. <strong>The</strong> State Department has not been instructed to go to<br />

this extreme.<br />

Congress alone can authorize ultimatums, <strong>and</strong> it has not yet decided that Great Britain’s<br />

aggressions in <strong>Venezuela</strong> call for an attitude or the part of the United States Government which an<br />

ultimatum would accurately represent.<br />

<strong>The</strong> dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> regarding the boundary line has occasioned<br />

much interest in the United States. In his last annual message, the President referred to it in these<br />

words:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> still remains in dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Believing that<br />

its early settlement on some just basis alike honorable to both parties is in the line of our established policy to<br />

remove from this hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the sea. I shall renew the efforts<br />

heretofore made to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations between the disputants, <strong>and</strong> to induce a<br />

reference to arbitration, a resort which Great Britain so conspicuously favors in principle <strong>and</strong> respects in practice,<br />

<strong>and</strong> which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversary.”<br />

45


January - November 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong> House, in February last, passed a joint resolution, introduced by Representative Livingston<br />

of Georgia, urging that the President’s suggestion regarding this dispute be recommended to both<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Senate adopted this resolution, after making slight amendments.<br />

<strong>The</strong> State Department lost no time in bringing this recommendation to the notice of the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government. Great Britain replied that her right to a part of the territory in question could be<br />

submitted to arbitration, but that the question of the ownership of the other portion involved in the<br />

dispute could not be thus adjudicated. This reply was unsatisfactory, <strong>and</strong> Secretary Olney has<br />

forwarded another dispatch to Ambassador Bayard, in which the desirability of an arbitration<br />

covering every point in the long-drawn-out controversy between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> is<br />

presented in a forcible manner.<br />

As might have been, the question of the Monroe doctrine figured largely in the Secretary’s<br />

communication. More than six months ago, Mr. Olney, who was then Attorney General, made an<br />

exhaustive investigation of the successive boundary lines dividing <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> from <strong>Venezuela</strong>,<br />

claimed by the <strong>British</strong> Government. Every available paper <strong>and</strong> bit of diplomatic correspondence<br />

between the two countries bearing upon the question was carefully examined by Mr. Olney. It is<br />

claimed by those who read Mr. Olney’s report that it constituted a very able defense of the Munroe<br />

doctrine. Mr. Olney’s latest letter to Ambassador Bayard is in line with the determination of the<br />

Administration to insist upon the application of the Monroe doctrine to the case in h<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> more<br />

the case is studied by the officers of the Government, the more impressed are they with the strength<br />

of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n position.<br />

For more than fifty years <strong>Venezuela</strong> has been asking Great Britain to submit her claim to<br />

friendly arbitration. Declining all these overtures, Engl<strong>and</strong> has gone on absorbing territory in the<br />

Valley of the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> on the Atlantic Coast, until she now occupies an area west of the<br />

Essequibo River more than twice as large as the State of New York.<br />

Great Britain derived her title to territory in <strong>Guiana</strong> from Holl<strong>and</strong> in 1814. For a century <strong>and</strong><br />

three-quarters the Essequibo was recognized as the rightful boundary between the old Spanish <strong>and</strong><br />

Holl<strong>and</strong> possessions. <strong>The</strong>re have been no concessions since 1814, <strong>and</strong> in 1810 <strong>Venezuela</strong> succeeded<br />

to the title held by Spain. <strong>The</strong>re is no justification for Great Britain’s aggressions west of the<br />

Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> it is not surprising that the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office should refuse to arbitrate the<br />

entire question.<br />

Secretary Olney’s latest communication to Mr. Bayard on the subject embodies all the points<br />

developed by him in his recent study of the boundary question. It leaves no room for doubt that this<br />

Government regards the attitude of Great Britain as antagonistic to the principles of the Monroe<br />

doctrine, <strong>and</strong> conveys in diplomatic language the intimation that the refusal of Great Britain to<br />

accede to the appeal of <strong>Venezuela</strong> may lead to serious complications. <strong>The</strong> present position of the<br />

Administration regarding the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n difficultly does not deviate in the least from that assumed<br />

by it when the first note was sent to Mr. Bayard on the subject.<br />

It is expected that all of the correspondence will be published in the near future. <strong>The</strong>re is no<br />

doubt that if Great Britain shall persist in her refusal, an effort will be made in the next Congress to<br />

bring the matter to a final determination of some sort. Representative Livingston said to-day that he<br />

would introduce a measure when Congress convenes providing for the appointment of a joint<br />

committee of the Senate <strong>and</strong> House to take up this question <strong>and</strong> determine upon a policy to be<br />

followed by the Government. This policy, he believed, will be thoroughly in harmony with the<br />

declarations of the Monroe doctrine.<br />

46


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

[5 October 1895]<br />

- 46 -<br />

MONROE DOCTRINE AND BRITAIN<br />

Foreign Office Embarrassed by the State Department’s<br />

Protest Against <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Coercion<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 16.—A cable dispatch from London received to-night, says that the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Foreign Office has been made acquainted with the contents of a dispatch forwarded by<br />

Secretary Olney to Ambassador Bayard, bearing on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute. <strong>The</strong> tone of<br />

this dispatch, it added, is such that the Ministry will be forced to give much time to its consideration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> dispatch in question is the one referred to in <strong>The</strong> New-York Times a fortnight ago, <strong>and</strong> has<br />

erroneously been termed an ultimatum of the United States to Great Britain. It was the second one<br />

written by Secretary Olney since the adjournment of Congress, <strong>and</strong> was communicated to Lord<br />

Salisbury by Mr. Bayard on the latter’s return from Scotl<strong>and</strong> a few days ago.<br />

Last February the House passed a joint resolution, introduced by Representative Livingston of<br />

Georgia, urging that the President’s suggestion that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary difficulty be referred<br />

to arbitration, be recommended to both Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> resolution was adopted<br />

by the Senate with slight modifications, <strong>and</strong> the State Department immediately brought this<br />

recommendation to the notice of the <strong>British</strong> Government. <strong>The</strong> reply of Great Britain was that her<br />

rights to a part of the territory in question could be submitted to arbitration, but that the question of<br />

the ownership of the other portion involved in the dispute could not thus be adjudicated.<br />

This reply was in line with previous utterances of Great Britain on this important topic. It was,<br />

of course, unsatisfactory to the State Department, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney wrote his second note. As already<br />

announced in these dispatches, it embodies all the points developed by him in his recent study of the<br />

boundary question.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se, in brief, are that Great Britain received her title to territory in <strong>Guiana</strong> from Holl<strong>and</strong> in<br />

1814; that for a century a <strong>and</strong> three-quarters the Essequibo was recognized as the rightful boundary<br />

between the old Spanish <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong> possessions; that there have been no concessions since 1814;<br />

that in 1810 <strong>Venezuela</strong> succeeded t the title held by Spain.<br />

Mr. Olney, in his last dispatch to Mr. Bayard, made it clear that this Government regards the<br />

attitude of Great Britain as antagonistic to the principles at the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> that serious<br />

complication may fallow the refusal of Great Britain to permit the reference of the entire boundary<br />

question to a court of arbitration. <strong>The</strong> Secretary’s communication is understood to be so worded<br />

that the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office will find it difficult to defend persistence in its present course.<br />

<strong>The</strong> English Government has prided itself upon its willingness to arbitrate matters of grave<br />

dispute with other nations. This being the case, refusal now to arbitrate the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter<br />

would be conclusive proof that this is not an ordinary boundary question, but one which directly<br />

affects the Monroe doctrine.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President <strong>and</strong> his Secretary of State are determined to uphold this doctrine against Great<br />

Britain or any other nation that may seek to nullity it, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney’s dispatch undoubtedly reveals<br />

this intention.<br />

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January - November 1895<br />

It is believed here that the determined st<strong>and</strong> taken by the United States will result in the<br />

ab<strong>and</strong>onment by Great Britain of its high-h<strong>and</strong>ed attitude.<br />

Should Lord Salisbury tall to reply to Secretary Olney’s dispatch before Congress meets, it is<br />

certain that an effort will be made in both houses to bring the matter to a head. Friends of the<br />

Administration in Washington are much gratified with its position in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter, <strong>and</strong> are<br />

confident that it will meet with the approval of the country.<br />

[17 October 1895]<br />

- 47 -<br />

BRITAIN’S VENEZUELAN CLAIMS<br />

Schomburgk’s Line Was Only Tentative, Aberdeen Said, <strong>and</strong><br />

Salisbury Must Yield to Monroe Doctrine<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 17.—Now that the attitude of this country with relation to the boundary<br />

dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> has been made known to the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office,<br />

popular interest in the outcome of the controversy is increasing. <strong>The</strong> cable dispatch from London<br />

referred to in these dispatches last night bore out the assertion previously made that Secretary<br />

Olney’s last dispatch on the subject was calculated to develop the <strong>British</strong> position.<br />

<strong>The</strong> editorial in <strong>The</strong> London Times which declares that it is begging the question to assume that the<br />

<strong>British</strong> claim is for fresh territory, <strong>and</strong> that the <strong>British</strong> claim rests wholly upon the vindication of<br />

Great Britain’s original right, is regarded in Washington as significant of the reply which Lord<br />

Salisbury will make to Secretary Olney’s note.<br />

It should be borne in mind that Lord Salisbury has long been opposed to the plans submitted by<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> for bringing the boundary dispute to a head. <strong>The</strong> Schomburgk line, which has frequently<br />

been referred to in connection with <strong>British</strong> aggressions in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, was run in 1840 by Sir Robert<br />

Schomburgk, an English Commissioner, who conducted his work without the knowledge or<br />

concurrence of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. This line allots to Great Britain not only the entire Atlantic coast between<br />

the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> the Orinoco, but also a large section of fertile country in the Interior, of which<br />

Holl<strong>and</strong>, from which Great Britain secured title to <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, never laid claim.<br />

Several years after Schomburgk’s line had been run the <strong>British</strong> Government, under the Aberdeen<br />

Administration, disclaimed any intention to occupy this territory, or to claim the Schomburgk line as<br />

a possible boundary. Lord Aberdeen explained to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government that “the so-called<br />

Schomburgk line” was never designed to be other than “merely tentative,” or for convenience in<br />

future negotiations.<br />

He then proposed a conventional boundary line, which, though very disadvantageous to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, in that it would have deprived her of an immense territory which rightfully belongs to<br />

her, would probably have been accepted as a compromise but for the conditions imposed. Aberdeen<br />

said that his Government was disposed to cede to <strong>Venezuela</strong> the territory indicated on condition<br />

that <strong>Venezuela</strong> would agree not to alienate any portion of it to a third power.<br />

As this involved an acknowledgment of territorial rights in <strong>Guiana</strong>, which Great Britain did not<br />

possess, it had to be rejected. In 1890 Lord Salisbury, then the English Premier, claimed not only all<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

the territory within the old Schomburgk line, but a vast region far beyond it. He ignored the<br />

proposition once made by Lord Aberdeen, <strong>and</strong> declared that the Essequibo could not be considered<br />

as a possible boundary. Subsequently the <strong>British</strong> took formal possession of the territory within the<br />

Schomburgk line. This led to the severance in 1887 of diplomatic relations between Great Britain<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Lord Salisbury, it is believed here, has not changed his views concerning the territory in question.<br />

If he shall accept the recommendation of Secretary Olney that the entire question be submitted to<br />

arbitration, it will be due to his belief that the United States means to thrust the Monroe doctrine<br />

into the controversy <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong> by it to the bitter end. At the State Department there is little hope<br />

that his position will change. <strong>The</strong> Administration is determined that the <strong>British</strong> contention as<br />

indicated in <strong>The</strong> London Times’s editorial, that the Monroe doctrine is not involved, <strong>and</strong> therefore will<br />

not be discussed, shall not be permitted to st<strong>and</strong>.<br />

It is probable that some time will elapse before Lord Salisbury’s reply to Secretary Olney’s note<br />

is received. <strong>The</strong>re is much commendation here of the course of the Administration <strong>and</strong> an absence<br />

of suggestion that it is desirous of avoiding the logical consequence of that course. It is certain that if<br />

no conclusion is reached before Congress assembles that body will take action designed to<br />

strengthen the position of the President.<br />

[18 October 1895]<br />

- 48 -<br />

BRITAIN AND VENEZUELA<br />

Evidence of a Determination to Defend the Schomburgk Line.<br />

MAXIM GUNS TO BE PLACED AT URUAN<br />

America’s First Diplomatic Definition of the Monroe Doctrine<br />

<strong>and</strong> First Assertion of Territorial Guardianship.<br />

LONDON. Oct 18.—It is ascertained on high authority that the memor<strong>and</strong>um in relation to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n affairs presented by Ambassador Bayard to the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office in August last<br />

embodies, for the first time in diplomatic correspondence, a definition of the so-called Monroe<br />

doctrine, <strong>and</strong> an assertion that the United States regarded the acquisition of territory by European<br />

powers on the American continent as a menace to republican institutions, which would not be<br />

encouraged by the American people.<br />

It is understood that to this communication no reply beyond a formal acknowledgment has yet<br />

been given, but that a more detailed reply has been promised at an early date.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St James’ Gazette, referring to the action of the Combined Court in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> in refusing<br />

to vote money for the purpose of purchasing Maxim guns, in accordance with the dispatch sent by<br />

Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sept. 7, says the dispatch was followed by a<br />

cablegram from Mr. Chamberlain to Sir C. Cameron Lees, Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, directing<br />

him to obtain without delay a vote for the purchase of two Maxim guns, one of them to be stationed<br />

at Uruan or elsewhere on the frontier where the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns may attempt to cross. <strong>The</strong> Gazette adds:<br />

49


January - November 1895<br />

“Mr. Chamberlain has decided that the frontier within the Schomburgk line shall be held by<br />

force, if necessary.”<br />

Regarding the attitude of the newspapers in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> in ridiculing Mr. Chamberlain, <strong>The</strong><br />

Gazette says: “Mr. Chamberlain is a better judge of the moral influence of a few Maxim guns than<br />

are the attorneys of absentee sugar planters.”<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 18.—<strong>The</strong> aggressive policy of the <strong>British</strong> Government in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, as<br />

outlined in the dispatches to-day from London, has caused excited comment in diplomatic circles. It<br />

is taken as an indication in some quarters that her Majesty’s Government will not, under any<br />

circumstances, arbitrate a foot of the territory in dispute between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> to which<br />

the former lays claim.<br />

Whether the fortification of the frontier at Uruan will be followed by hostilities between the<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns cannot at present be foretold. Uruan is a point which is occupied by the<br />

forces of both Governments. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> hold the right bank of the river, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns the<br />

left. <strong>The</strong> military posts of the two Governments are situated at the junction of three rivers—the<br />

Cuyuni, Uruan, <strong>and</strong> Yuruari. No overt act, it is said, is likely to follow the planting of one or more<br />

Maxim guns on the <strong>British</strong> side of the Uruan, provided the <strong>British</strong> soldiery remain on the right bank<br />

of the stream, which they regard as the limit of their possessions.<br />

While the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns will look with strong disfavor upon Great Britain’s action, they will not, it<br />

is said, cross the river or so conduct themselves as to justify the <strong>British</strong> in crossing. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Government will, in all probability, send national troops to this point, but this, it is believed, will be<br />

a mere precautionary measure, <strong>and</strong> not with any intention of engaging the <strong>British</strong> forces.<br />

If the suggestion of the Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, the <strong>British</strong> Secretary of State for the<br />

Colonies, that a road be cut from Port Barima to the Cuyuni River is adopted, the United States is<br />

likely to be drawn into the affair, inasmuch as the proposed road will run through a part of the<br />

territory recently granted by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government to the American syndicate. All this<br />

territory is claimed by her Majesty’s Government, <strong>and</strong> this claim the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n ridicule. <strong>The</strong><br />

American syndicate is making its arrangements to develop its concessions, <strong>and</strong> it is evidently<br />

constrained to believe that the United States Government will see that it is protected in its rights.<br />

<strong>The</strong> new developments in <strong>Venezuela</strong> have had the effect at calling attention anew to the report,<br />

telegraphed from Rio Janeiro several days ago, that a body of <strong>British</strong> troops was marching through<br />

Brazilian territory on its way to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It is believed, by well-posted diplomats, that this report is<br />

well founded; that the force in question consists probably of a limited number of <strong>British</strong> police in<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>; that it has marched in a southerly direction along the line of the Esequibo River,<br />

until it reached the neutral territory in dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> Brazil, <strong>and</strong> that it is now<br />

crossing this with the view of entering a part of <strong>Venezuela</strong> not occupied by the native troops. If it<br />

shall be shown that this is really the case, the purpose of the <strong>British</strong> Government is sending this<br />

force into <strong>Venezuela</strong> can only be conjectured, but it is not doubted that a definite purpose lies<br />

behind it.<br />

It is learned to-day that the proposed road between Port Barima, which lies in the northerly part<br />

of the <strong>British</strong> possessions in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, near the Orinoco River, to the Cuyuni River, a distance of<br />

about 100 miles, was first suggested half a dozen years ago by the Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>The</strong><br />

<strong>British</strong> Government at that time declined to vote the money to construct the road, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

proposition now to do what was denied years ago is regarded as another indication that the<br />

development of the country along the line of the proposed routes is a part of the plan not to<br />

surrender it<br />

50


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>The</strong> reference to the “Uruan incident,” in the dispatches from London to-day, requires some<br />

explanation. Several months ago a <strong>British</strong> Sergeant of Police, named Behrens, <strong>and</strong> two assistants,<br />

crossed the river at Uruan <strong>and</strong> planted the <strong>British</strong> flag on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n side. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

police tore down the flag, drove the intruders across the stream, <strong>and</strong> subsequently arrested them.<br />

While en route with their prisoners to Cuidad Bolivar, in the State of Bolivar, they were instructed<br />

from Caracas to proceed no further, but to release the Englishmen, <strong>and</strong> permit them to return to<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. Subsequently Sergeant Behrens was called to London, where his report of the affair<br />

was made in person to the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office. It is to prevent, ostensibly, a repetition of this<br />

trouble that Joseph Chamberlain has ordered the stationing of at least one Maxim gun at that point.<br />

[19 October 1895]<br />

- 49 -<br />

PERIL ABOUT VENEZUELA<br />

Great Britain Has Sent An Ultimatum to President Crespo<br />

A DECISION TAKEN A MONTH AGO<br />

LONDON, Oct. 19.—<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette says it is in a position to say that Lord Salisbury has<br />

sent to President Crespo of <strong>Venezuela</strong> an ultimatum dem<strong>and</strong>ing reparation for the arrest of<br />

policemen at Uruan <strong>and</strong> stating the terms upon which Great Britain will definitely determine the<br />

boundary dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> ultimatum is either on the way to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, or, possibly, by<br />

this time has been actually delivered.<br />

Lord Salisbury <strong>and</strong> Mr. Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, <strong>The</strong> Gazette says, decided upon a final<br />

course in the matter before Mr. Chamberlain started on his vacation, a month ago, <strong>and</strong> both agreed<br />

that it was necessary to end the frontier dispute at once, even if it had to he accomplished by force.<br />

<strong>The</strong> officials of the Foreign Office practically confirm the statement made by <strong>The</strong> St. James’s<br />

Gazette that Lord Salisbury has forwarded an ultimatum to the President of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Republic.<br />

[20 October 1895]<br />

- 50 -<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

LONDON, Oct. 20.—<strong>The</strong> Daily Graphic, in an article to-morrow on the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

dispute will say: “President Cespo will not fail to underst<strong>and</strong> that <strong>British</strong> patience in this ancient<br />

quarrel has become exhausted. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns have lately adopted a perfectly intolerable attitude.”<br />

[21 October 1895]<br />

51


January - November 1895<br />

- 51 -<br />

THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND IN THE VENEZUELAN CONTROVERSY<br />

<strong>The</strong>re has been much interesting speculation during the last month, both in the American <strong>and</strong><br />

the English press, about the tenor of the diplomatic communications from our Government to the<br />

Court of St. James in the present revival of the great <strong>and</strong> very grave questions of territorial rights at<br />

issue between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain. While no confirmation has been afforded of the positive<br />

announcement made by several Washington correspondents that President Clevel<strong>and</strong> had either<br />

dispatched or determined on a practical ultimatum to Engl<strong>and</strong>, menacing an enforcement of the<br />

Monroe doctrine if she should persevere in her extreme attitude, there are good grounds for<br />

believing that this correspondence has been conducted by the Administration with marked firmness.<br />

It is perfectly well known that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> has strong convictions on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question,<br />

<strong>and</strong> his decided resistance to the pretensions of Great Britain in the territory in controversy is one of<br />

the prominent features of his policy.<br />

During his first administration, in February, 1888, Secretary of State Bayard, in a note to Mr.<br />

Phelps, our Ambassador in London, said, in substance, that it would be a matter for grave<br />

consideration if it should appear that no bounds were to be placed upon the <strong>British</strong> territorial claims.<br />

Secretary Gresham, in a dispatch to Minister Bayard July 13, 1894, wrote that he could see only<br />

two possible ways in which to reach an appropriate solution of the controversy: First, by<br />

determining through arbitration the rights of the contending parties as historical successors<br />

respectively to the sovereign rights of Holl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Spain; second, by the establishment of a new<br />

boundary line in agreement with the requirements of practical deliberations on both sides.<br />

As an instance of the President’s earnest <strong>and</strong> recognized sentiments in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter, it<br />

is known by some of his friends that there is in the possession of a gentleman in this city a letter of<br />

great significance, written by the Chargé d’Affaires of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in the United States in 1888, highly<br />

lauding him as the powerful <strong>and</strong> never-yielding friend of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in her difficulty with Great<br />

Britain.<br />

At the time of the “Sackville-West incident” of the Presidential campaign of 1888 this letter was<br />

placed at the disposal of the Democratic National Committee, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Brice anxiously desired to<br />

publish it as a counteractive of the ferocious Anglophobist accusations against the tariff-reform<br />

hero. But Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, when his consent was sought, took a lofty <strong>and</strong> conscientious attitude, <strong>and</strong><br />

refused to be a party to such electioneering claptrap, even if his success at the polls depended on it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> publication of the letter, with the connecting circumstances, would present one of the most<br />

characteristic chapters in Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s personal <strong>and</strong> political history.<br />

Seriousness of the <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

In view of the President’s record on this important issue, it seems, therefore, fairly certain that<br />

when the latest correspondence is laid before Congress, it will be found to emphasize the strong<br />

disapproval hitherto expressed by the United States Government of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s constant westward<br />

extension of her <strong>Guiana</strong> frontiers <strong>and</strong> stubborn refusal to submit her case with <strong>Venezuela</strong> to<br />

arbitration. Whatever the terms employed in renewing this disapproval—whether practically<br />

aggressive or discreetly guarded—their large moral significance for the future is unquestionable. <strong>The</strong><br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

mere fact of the persistence of the United States as an interested <strong>and</strong> alert party to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

controversy must give that controversy weighty aspects until it is settled.<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States has deliberately thrown herself in the way of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s arbitrary enlargement<br />

of her dominions in South America; <strong>and</strong> when it is considered that this is a substantial interference<br />

with one of the most cherished <strong>and</strong> craftiest schemes of <strong>British</strong> diplomacy, it is manifest that an<br />

issue of much delicacy is shaping.<br />

Moreover, study of the conditions makes it easily conceivable that our issue with Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

respecting <strong>Venezuela</strong> may far transcend in seriousness <strong>and</strong> exceed in unpleasantness the Alabama<br />

<strong>and</strong> seals disputes. Those disputes, the most embarrassing that the State Department has had to deal<br />

with since the war, concerned exclusively the direct <strong>and</strong> immediate National rights of the United<br />

States.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, we own no territory at or near the seat of this quarrel, or, for tint matter,<br />

anywhere on the South American Continent; we have no immediate Nationa1 rights of any<br />

description to safeguard in that quarter; <strong>and</strong> it is even doubtful whether American citizens have any<br />

vested interests there to dem<strong>and</strong> our attention, for, as will be shown in this article, the so-called<br />

“Manoa Concession” of which so much has been said by writers who barely underst<strong>and</strong> the<br />

elements of the situation, rests at best on an exceedingly uncertain footing, <strong>and</strong>, considering the<br />

peculiar history <strong>and</strong> status of the Manoa Company, certainly cannot afford the slightest incidental<br />

basis for a serious policy of State.<br />

Consequently, the position of the United States is essentially that or gratuitous <strong>and</strong> sharp<br />

intervention between two remote powers that are at odds. She declares, in purport, that she cannot<br />

admit the right of the stronger of these powers to determine the matter b arbitrary assumptions.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> has never been accustomed to complacently receive such pointed suggestions from a nation<br />

which, without having sovereign claims at stake, steps forward to formally thwart her territorial<br />

designs.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Joint Resolution of Congress<br />

It is not alone the executive department of our Government that is committed to antagonism of<br />

Great Britain’s uncompromising attitude toward <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Congress has several times given special<br />

consideration to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, which indeed, is becoming one of the st<strong>and</strong>ing themes for<br />

set speeches <strong>and</strong> significant action in that body. At the last session the following joint resolution was<br />

passed unanimously:<br />

Whereas, In the present enlightened age of the world, when international disputes in general, <strong>and</strong> more<br />

particularly those pertaining to boundary, are in constant process of adjustment by joint commission or by outside<br />

arbitration; <strong>and</strong><br />

Whereas, Since the existing boundary dispute in <strong>Guiana</strong> between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> ought not to<br />

constitute an exception to the general rule, but should more naturally come within the scope <strong>and</strong> range of modern<br />

international precedent <strong>and</strong> practice, in that it turns exclusively upon simple <strong>and</strong> readily ascertainable historical facts;<br />

<strong>and</strong><br />

Whereas, Since it would be extremely gratifying to all peace-loving peoples, <strong>and</strong> particularly to the impartial<br />

friends of both parties, to see this long-st<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> disquieting boundary dispute in <strong>Guiana</strong> adjusted in a manner<br />

just <strong>and</strong> honorable alike to both, to the end that possible international complications be avoided <strong>and</strong> American<br />

public law <strong>and</strong> traditions maintained; therefore,<br />

Be It resolved by the Senate <strong>and</strong> House of Representatives, &c., that the President’s suggestion, made in his last<br />

annual message to this body—namely, that Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> refer their dispute as to boundary limits in<br />

53


January - November 1895<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> to friendly arbitration—be most earnestly recommended to the favorable consideration at both parties in<br />

interest.<br />

While this, on its face, is a strictly courteous expression of mere sentiment, it goes to the<br />

foundations of the practical issue, <strong>and</strong> in terms, perhaps, as distasteful to Engl<strong>and</strong> as if it were an ex<br />

parte statement of the case. Arbitration is what Engl<strong>and</strong> refuses most obstinately as the one<br />

expedient inconsistent with her established policy in this matter; <strong>and</strong>, on the contrary, it is what<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> puts to the front as her sole programme. Engl<strong>and</strong> has again <strong>and</strong> again repeated her<br />

determination to settle the dispute by exclusive dealings with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, deliberately<br />

pronouncing Engl<strong>and</strong> a “usurper” in the whole domain in question, has as steadfastly declined to<br />

treat with her on every successive basis of compromise proposed by the <strong>British</strong> Cabinet,<br />

Extremely weighty considerations of empire <strong>and</strong> trade are wrapped up in Engl<strong>and</strong>’s resolve not<br />

to hazard by the chance of arbitration the valuable territory which she can, of course, hold<br />

indefinitely against a feeble State like <strong>Venezuela</strong>. While neither claiming nor admitting any rigid<br />

boundary line between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> her colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, there is one fixed point at which<br />

she purposes to originate such a line, <strong>and</strong> from which she will not deviate. This point is on the coast,<br />

right at the centre of the littoral of the Boca Gr<strong>and</strong>e, or gr<strong>and</strong> mouth of the Orinoco River, where<br />

the small river Amacuro flows into the sea. Any boundary line projected southward from that point<br />

would include within <strong>British</strong> possessions the Barima arm (Brazo Barima) of the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

whole isl<strong>and</strong> of Barima. Thus, the essential feature of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s territorial contention is her claim to<br />

full equality with <strong>Venezuela</strong> in ownership <strong>and</strong> authority at the main mouth of the Orinoco.<br />

Importance of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Claim<br />

<strong>The</strong> importance of this position for Engl<strong>and</strong> is enormous, <strong>and</strong> even incalculable. It would give<br />

her the finest strategic situation on the continent of South America, with absolute control of the<br />

Orinoco <strong>and</strong> its numerous branches, connecting with the Amazon through the navigable stream of<br />

Cassiquiari—a network or rivers draining about half the continent.<br />

<strong>The</strong> centre of the Boca Gr<strong>and</strong>e coast line as the starting point of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s boundary is identical<br />

with the terminating point of the famous “Linea Caprichosa” of Sir Robert Schomburgk. In 1841<br />

Schomburgk, an engineer in the <strong>British</strong> service, entered the disputed territory entirely without the<br />

concurrence of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government, <strong>and</strong> proceeded to run a line from the Brazilian frontier<br />

to the Boca Gr<strong>and</strong>e, which was intended to establish a definite boundary between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>The</strong> Schomburgk line, arbitrarily traced as it was, without any warrant of mutual<br />

consent, was not at first claimed by the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office as official, <strong>and</strong>, indeed, has not until<br />

very recently been designated in <strong>British</strong> diplomatic correspondence as Engl<strong>and</strong>’s primary base. But<br />

in 1890, Mr. Lincoln, the United States Minister in London, obtained from Lord Salisbury a formal<br />

declaration describing all the country to the east of the Schomburgk line as unequivocally <strong>British</strong>.<br />

Mr. Lincoln had proposed a conference of representatives of Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the United<br />

States to settle the question, <strong>and</strong> Lord Salisbury replied that, while he was ready to agree to an<br />

arbitration commission, he must insist that the only subject to be decided by such a commission<br />

should be the ownership of the territory west of the Schomburgk line. This was a practical<br />

suggestion that Engl<strong>and</strong> regarded herself as entitled to portions of the country not allotted to her by<br />

Schomburgk, <strong>and</strong>, in fact, her acts in the last few years have been quite in keeping with her new<br />

dictum, for it is well known that she has steadily advanced westward, occupying the country <strong>and</strong><br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

establishing posts, until to-day there exists a <strong>British</strong> police station at Cuyuni Mine, at the confluence<br />

of the Yuruari <strong>and</strong> Cuyuni Rivers, not far from the gold mines of El Callao, the new El Dorado.<br />

<strong>The</strong> scale on which her continued encroachments are prosecuted is impressively shown by a<br />

glance at the map. Cuyuni Mine, for instance, is quite as far to the westward from the Schomburgk<br />

line as the Schomburgk line is from the Esequibo River—the original <strong>and</strong> only legitimate boundary<br />

(according to <strong>Venezuela</strong>) of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

In bringing her pretensions to their existing complexion Engl<strong>and</strong> has, however, involved herself<br />

in numerous inconsistencies, some of which are startling in their contrasts.<br />

Origin of <strong>British</strong> Title<br />

She acquired her title to the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> by treaty from Holl<strong>and</strong> in 1814, the<br />

provinces transferred being those of Esequibo, Demerara, <strong>and</strong> Berbice. <strong>Venezuela</strong>, as the successor<br />

to Spain, has always insisted, without the slightest wavering, that the extreme western limit of the<br />

territory thus ceded by Holl<strong>and</strong> was the Esequibo River; <strong>and</strong>, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing her willingness at all<br />

times to arbitrate, she has never recognized that Engl<strong>and</strong> enjoys legal right to a single foot of ground<br />

west of the Esequibo.<br />

<strong>The</strong> earliest assertions of Great Britain to dominion beyond the Esequibo were vague <strong>and</strong><br />

hesitating. <strong>The</strong>y were based on representations that the Dutch settlements had spread into that<br />

region, <strong>and</strong> that treaties had been executed with the Indians entitling the English to l<strong>and</strong>s of<br />

comprehensive extent. To these arguments it was replied that the original title was vested in Spain by<br />

virtue of discovery <strong>and</strong> sovereignty; that it had never been alienated or relinquished in any manner,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that it passed directly to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Thus the case stood until Sir Robert Schomburgk drew his “arbitrary line” of demarkation in<br />

1841. He set up posts to indicate <strong>British</strong> dominion at Point Barima, Amacuro, <strong>and</strong> other localities.<br />

<strong>The</strong>reupon the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government made a vigorous protest, <strong>and</strong> Lord Aberdeen promptly<br />

ordered the posts removed. Aberdeen was so far from urging extraordinary claims that in 1844 be<br />

spontaneously proposed to Dr. Fortique, <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Plenipotentiary in London, a boundary line as<br />

follows:<br />

Beginning on the coast at the mouth of the River Moroco, it runs straight to the point where the River Barima<br />

joins the Guaima; from there up the Barima as far as the Aunama, which it follows upward to the place where this<br />

creek reaches its shortest distance from the Acarabisi; then it descends the said Acarabisi as far as its confluence<br />

with the Cuyuni, following afterward the last river up stream until it reaches the high l<strong>and</strong>s in the immediate<br />

neighborhood of Mount Roraima, which divides the waters flowing to the Esequibo from those running into the<br />

Rio Branco.<br />

This Aberdeen proposition of 1844 was the first specific definition of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s pretended<br />

rights, <strong>and</strong> the sole foundation for it in international law was the shadowy allegation that Dutch<br />

settlements <strong>and</strong> Indian treaties justified Great Britain in instituting authority over a portion of the<br />

trans-Esequibo regions, the exact geographical limits of which had never been adjusted. Lord<br />

Aberdeen, as soon as his attention was called to the daring usurpations contemplated by the<br />

Schomburgk line, shrank from accepting responsibility for them, <strong>and</strong>, instead of presuming to<br />

dominion on the coast of the gr<strong>and</strong> mouth of the Orinoco, he was content to start his line from the<br />

mouth of the Moroco, which is very far removed even from the Barima approach to the Orinoco. It<br />

is true he sought some recompense for this forbearance by a sweeping projection of the boundary<br />

55


January - November 1895<br />

beyond the Schomburgk line in the interior, but this sinks into insignificance when his absolute<br />

resignation to <strong>Venezuela</strong> of the entire Orinoco coast country is considered. And let it be especially<br />

observed, in this connection, that whatever territory west of the Esequibo Engl<strong>and</strong> may conceivably<br />

have fallen heir to in consequence of Dutch settlement must have had its widest extension along the<br />

coast, since no occupation of the interior was attempted in those early times, <strong>and</strong>, for that matter,<br />

the interior in the parts in question still remains almost unexplored.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s shifting policy<br />

In brief, it appears that Lord Aberdeen, in undertaking to trace <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>’s extreme rightful<br />

bounds—thereby fixing a precedent for future <strong>British</strong> Foreign Secretaries—could find no excuse on<br />

the score of Dutch settlement for carrying them further than the mouth of the Moroco. Yet to-day<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> not only claims the coast up to the terminus of the Schomburgk line at the mouth of the<br />

Amacuro, but has encroached in the interior considerably beyond the furthest westward bend of the<br />

Aberdeen line.<br />

While the Aberdeen boundary project was under advisement Dr. Fortique, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Plenipotentiary, died. Nothing further was done until the celebrated status quo of 1850 was<br />

established, whereby Great Britain agreed no to occupy or encroach upon the territory in dispute or<br />

to sanction such occupation or encroachment by her authorities, in consideration of a similar<br />

agreement on the part of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. What was implied by the term “territory in dispute” was not<br />

stated in the agreement. <strong>The</strong> status quo of 1850 has never been abrogated. Whatever interpretation<br />

may be made of its wording, there cannot be the least doubt that Engl<strong>and</strong> has repeatedly violated it<br />

by overt acts, including the invasion of the country far beyond both the Schomburgk <strong>and</strong> Aberdeen<br />

lines.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> maintain that violations have likewise been perpetrated by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, notably in the<br />

case of the Manoa Concession, embracing a part of the territory east of the Schomburgk line; but<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> insists that the particular territory was never properly in dispute. She avers that it has<br />

always been her underst<strong>and</strong>ing that the status quo of 1850, far from applying to the vitally<br />

important territory between the Moroco <strong>and</strong> the Amacuro, concerned only the insignificant strip<br />

between the Pumeron (lying to the east of the Moroco) <strong>and</strong> the Esequibo.<br />

From 1850 to 1886 Engl<strong>and</strong>’s diplomatic course was very shifty.<br />

In 1881 Lord Granville, after rejecting proposals for compromise from Señor Roias, <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s<br />

agent in Engl<strong>and</strong>, presented an altogether new boundary scheme, as follows:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> starting point shall be fixed in a place on the seacoast, distant nine miles due east from the right bank of<br />

the River Barima, <strong>and</strong> the line shall run toward the south, passing over the mountain or hill called Tarabita. on the<br />

original map of Schomburgk, situated in 8 degrees north latitude; thence to the west on the same parallel of latitude<br />

till it intersects the boundary line proposed by Schomburgk, laid down on the said map; further on it shall follow the<br />

course of the Acarabisi to its confluence with the Cuyuni, <strong>and</strong> then the left bank of the River Cuyuni up to its<br />

headwaters, whence it shall turn to the south-east, to meet the line proposed by Schomburgk to the Esequibo <strong>and</strong><br />

Corantin.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> line here suggested by Lord Granville, while varying but slightly from the Aberdeen line in<br />

its interior prolongation, departed radically from it on the seacoast. This second official<br />

pronunciamento on behalf of the <strong>British</strong> Government carried the frontier limits on the Atlantic<br />

from the mouth of the Moroco River almost to the mouth of the Barima arm or the Orinoco. But<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

conciliatory explanations accompanied Lord Granville’s correspondence on this point which cannot<br />

readily be reconciled with present claims. Lord Granville urged that the new boundary would satisfy<br />

the reasonable pretensions <strong>and</strong> exigencies of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> prevent all occasion for further dispute,<br />

since it left to the republic what might be styled the Dardanelles of the Orinoco—the complete<br />

dominion over its mouth—while it insured to <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> a natural frontier well defined in<br />

almost its whole length, with the exception of the first fifty miles from the sea into the interior,<br />

where it would be necessary to trace an arbitrary line in order to give <strong>Venezuela</strong> the undisturbed<br />

possession of the mouth of the Orinoco.<br />

This was equivalent to a formal disavowal by Engl<strong>and</strong> of any design upon the Boca Gr<strong>and</strong>e of<br />

the Orinoco—in the most positive style the exclusive control at the great river was assigned to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Failure to Arbitrate<br />

In 1883 (Lord Granville being still at the head of the Foreign Office) her Britannic Majesty made<br />

overtures to the Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in behalf of simultaneous <strong>and</strong> amicable arrangement of<br />

these three questions—territorial limits, differential duties or treaty of commerce, <strong>and</strong> pecuniary<br />

reclamations. Gem Guzman Blanco was thereupon dispatched to London by the republic as Envoy<br />

Extraordinary, with full powers to deal definitively with all these issues. For the first time <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

was now represented at the Court of St. James by a diplomat of the highest order of ability. Guzman<br />

Blanco, instead of dallying with vexing <strong>and</strong> impracticable plans of boundary compromise,<br />

concentrated all his efforts to give the controversy a new direction—in favor of arbitration. In this<br />

endeavor he arrived at the very verge of brilliant success. June 18, 1885, Earl Granville assented to<br />

the draft of a treaty between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> which embraced an article providing that any<br />

difference not adjustable by the usual means of friendly negotiation should be submitted “to the<br />

arbitration of a third power, or of several powers, in amity with both countries, without resorting to<br />

war,” <strong>and</strong> that the result of such arbitration should be binding upon both Governments.<br />

This great diplomatic stroke of Guzman Blanco, absolutely bringing Engl<strong>and</strong> to bay on the<br />

boundary question, was, however, immediately made of no avail by the overturn of the Gladstone<br />

Ministry. Lord Salisbury, who took office a few days later, promptly rescinded the arbitration clause<br />

of the purposed treaty. Since that time Engl<strong>and</strong> has persistently declined every proposal to arbitrate<br />

the matter, <strong>and</strong>, not satisfied with repudiating the comparatively moderate boundary designations<br />

originated by Aberdeen <strong>and</strong> Granville, has enlarged her territorial claims with the utmost<br />

recklessness <strong>and</strong> has systematically prosecuted forcible aggr<strong>and</strong>izements.<br />

In April, 1885, not long before Lord Granville’s agreement to the principle of arbitration, the<br />

authorities of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> had flagrantly violated the pacific underst<strong>and</strong>ing of 1850. Michael<br />

McTurk, a Magistrate from that colony, “by order of his Excellency the Governor of <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>” proceeded to the Amacuro River, the extreme coast limit of the Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong><br />

posted notices declaring that any person infringing the right of her Majesty or acting in<br />

contravention of the laws of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> would be prosecuted according to law. It is much to the<br />

point to bear in mind that the Amacuro region, where this transpired, had never been, even<br />

suggestively claimed as <strong>British</strong> territory in diplomatic correspondence, <strong>and</strong> that the most recent<br />

correspondence concerning the limits of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s possessions on the coast (Earl Granville’s, in<br />

1881) had explicitly proposed that all the littoral bordering on the mouth of the Orinoco should<br />

belong to <strong>Venezuela</strong> alone.<br />

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January - November 1895<br />

Moreover, even after the expunging of the arbitration clause of the treaty negotiated by Guzman<br />

Blanco, the English Foreign Secretary hesitated to assert jurisdiction so far as the coast limit of the<br />

Schomburgk line. July 30. 1886, Lord Rosebery, as Foreign Secretary of the Gladstone Cabinet,<br />

which followed the short-lived Tory Government, recommended that the boundary should be fixed<br />

somewhere between the lines designated, respectively, by Señor Rojas <strong>and</strong> Lord Granville in 1881,<br />

merely specifying that her Majesty attached “especial importance to the possession of the River<br />

Guaima by <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.” In other words, as late as 1886 the <strong>British</strong> were content to let the line<br />

exclude completely from their territory every part of the Orinoco mouth.<br />

After 1886 Engl<strong>and</strong> cast aside all pretense of recognition of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s sovereignty over the<br />

Boca Gr<strong>and</strong>e. Lord Salisbury, replying in 1890 to United States Minister Lincoln, indicated by<br />

implication that his Government was unalterably resolved to share equally with <strong>Venezuela</strong> the<br />

control of that important region. Meantime the absorption of the interior has progressed without<br />

restraint, the manifest aim being to assert undisputed mastery over the extraordinarily rich gold<br />

districts of Yuruari.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se districts lie very far away from the Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong> considerably outside the<br />

Aberdeen line; wherefore Engl<strong>and</strong> broadens out her claims to neutralize such inconvenient<br />

circumstances.<br />

Instances of English Assurance<br />

Two amazing instances of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s assurance will illustrate her uniform course in the interior:<br />

1. Ciudad Bolivar is a <strong>Venezuela</strong>n town on the main Orinoco, some 200 miles inward from the<br />

Boca Gr<strong>and</strong>e. It is the principal port for that entire region, including the Yuruari gold mines.<br />

Recently a company was organized to build a railroad from Bolivar to Guacipati, in order to facilitate<br />

the transportation of the product of the mines. <strong>The</strong> Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, learning of this,<br />

put forth an intimation that the projected railway would penetrate to <strong>British</strong> territory, <strong>and</strong> that those<br />

interested should take notice accordingly.<br />

2. <strong>The</strong> latest <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Yellow Book contains some remarkably pithy correspondence between<br />

Mr. Bodman, German Minister at Caracas, <strong>and</strong> Acting Charge d’Affaires for Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> P.<br />

Ezequiel Rojas. <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Secretary of State. Mr. Bodman, in behalf of the <strong>British</strong> Government,<br />

July 12, 1894, addressed a note marked “urgent” to Señor Rojas protesting against <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

intrusion on the right bank of the Cuyuni River. To this the Secretary replied that the complaint<br />

could not be entertained since any recognition of it validity would imply tacit acknowledgment of<br />

<strong>British</strong> right to <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory <strong>and</strong> overthrow the status quo of 1850.<br />

While <strong>Venezuela</strong> has ab<strong>and</strong>oned, since 1886, regular diplomatic relations with Engl<strong>and</strong>, she has<br />

made repeated attempts again to persuade the <strong>British</strong> Government to arbitration. In these later<br />

endeavors it cannot be doubted that she has sorely missed the powerful influence, distinguished<br />

ability, <strong>and</strong> sagacious judgment which Gen. Guzman Blanco brought to the discharge of his mission<br />

ten years ago.<br />

Estimated by their results, Gen. Blanco’s services were of transcendent value to his country, for<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, having once been induced to concede the admissibility of arbitrating this question, will<br />

necessarily st<strong>and</strong> at a disadvantage in the sight of an impartial world until she returns to that<br />

voluntary, amicable disposition. Regarded quite apart from its practical achievement, the Blanco<br />

correspondence deserves an eminent place in diplomatic literature, both for its solid <strong>and</strong> its brilliant<br />

merits.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

Considering the increasing gravity of the situation, it is not strange that rumors arc frequently<br />

heard of a movement for Gen. Blanco’s return to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. During the last several years he has<br />

been living in retirement in Paris. His energies, however, have not been in any wise impaired, which<br />

is amply demonstrated by the great increase of his wealth through bold financial enterprises.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Situation Summed Up<br />

In summing up the whole territorial controversy, the present exact claims of each party as to the<br />

extreme limits of possible <strong>British</strong> ownership west of the Esequibo will be clearly <strong>and</strong> carefully set<br />

forth:<br />

1. <strong>Venezuela</strong>, while insisting that Engl<strong>and</strong>’s inheritance from Holl<strong>and</strong> embraced no country<br />

whatever west of the Esequibo, is willing to admit a possible <strong>British</strong> title as far as the River<br />

Pumeron, but no further. (<strong>The</strong> Pumeron is the first stream emptying into the Atlantic to the west of<br />

the Esequibo.) Absolutely the only territory which <strong>Venezuela</strong> regards as in dispute is that bounded<br />

on the east by the Esequibo, on the north by the ocean, on the west by the Pumeron, <strong>and</strong> on the<br />

south by the Cuyuni River. In recognizing that the ownership of this small strip may be in doubt,<br />

she considers that she goes to the utmost extreme of courteous concession to Engl<strong>and</strong> on the<br />

ground of alleged Dutch settlement beyond the Esequibo antedating 1810. As to the declaration of<br />

the <strong>British</strong> that treaties with Indian tribes give them dominion far westward in the interior,<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> utterly denies that such treaties could by any construction of law or precedent have<br />

rightfully alienated ownership from her as the immediate successor to the dominion of Spain over<br />

the entire country. <strong>Venezuela</strong> naturally does not attach the least weight to the circumstance that the<br />

English have long enjoyed de facto possession of the interior by actual occupation; she holds that<br />

this occupation is mere invasion <strong>and</strong> usurpation, as transparently <strong>and</strong> unquestionably so as forcible<br />

occupation by the United States of any of the unsettled portions of <strong>British</strong> Columbia would be. An<br />

interesting point made concerning this issue of de facto sovereignty is that notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>British</strong><br />

occupation, the inhabitants view <strong>Venezuela</strong> as their ruler, because the priests <strong>and</strong> missionaries who<br />

visit the villages periodically to perform marriage ceremonies <strong>and</strong> other clerical functions in all cases<br />

belong to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n diocese.<br />

<strong>The</strong> various propositions of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to the <strong>British</strong> Crown for settling the question have been<br />

in the interest of conciliation. <strong>The</strong>ir distinguishing feature has been the urging of arbitration, instead<br />

of summary boundary-line compromises. It is true that in 1881 Señor Rojas, <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s diplomatic<br />

representative in London, suggested a compromise line, which would have given Engl<strong>and</strong> a far<br />

larger territory than the Esequibo-Pumeron-Cuyuni strip, which <strong>Venezuela</strong> contends is the only tract<br />

fairly in dispute. But the Rojas offer was occasioned by emergent conditions or long st<strong>and</strong>ing.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> was sick of <strong>British</strong> encroachments upon her vital possessions, <strong>and</strong> in order to check them<br />

was glad to yield something. All <strong>Venezuela</strong>n official maps indicate the Esequibo as the boundary<br />

line, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n diplomatic maps uniformly place the limit of disputed territory at the Pumeron.<br />

As an illustration of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s continued insistence that the territory indisputably belonging to her<br />

extends at least as far as Pumeron, the latest map of the Manoa Company’s concession, based on<br />

alleged reaffirmation of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n grant, June 18, 1895, shows the Pomeron to be the eastern<br />

confine of the grant. <strong>The</strong> Manoa Company, whose concessions of rights still require the<br />

indorsement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress to give them substantial effect, would certainly not<br />

compromise the disposition of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in the international boundary question by issuing an<br />

exaggerated map of the grant. Another illustrative case in point is the fact that in May, 1894, the<br />

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January - November 1895<br />

Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong> made an energetic protest concerning the inaccuracies of certain<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n maps printed by United States publishers—embraced in R<strong>and</strong>, McNally & Co.’s<br />

“Enlarged Business Atlas <strong>and</strong> Shippers’ Guide for 1894,” <strong>and</strong> Appleton & Co.’s “Library Atlas of<br />

Modern Geography for 1894.” <strong>The</strong>se maps were compiled from <strong>British</strong> sources, <strong>and</strong> were based<br />

essentially on the Schomburgk line as the western boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Government did not confine its action to a protest, but excluded them from the country.<br />

Dividing Lines Are Conjectured<br />

2. Any line pretending to define <strong>British</strong> territorial claims as they are to-day must be somewhat<br />

conjectural. <strong>The</strong> starting point is fixed at the mouth of the Amacuro River, where the Schomburgk<br />

line reaches the gr<strong>and</strong> mouth of the Orinoco. But there are no data from which to determine<br />

absolutely the course of the proposed <strong>British</strong> boundary through the interior. Taking, however, what<br />

is known of <strong>British</strong> occupation <strong>and</strong> pretension in the gold regions—including the existence of a<br />

police station at Cuyuni Mine, the protest of the Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> against a railroad from<br />

Ciudad Bolivar to Guicipati, <strong>and</strong> the recent assertion of dominion as far as the source of the<br />

Usapamo Rivet—it is easy to draw an approximately correct line. All the points named lie in the<br />

high country limited on the north by the Imataca Mountain range, which originates not far from the<br />

Caroni River an runs almost due east, just below the eighth degree of north latitude. Hence the<br />

present <strong>British</strong> line, beginning at the end of the Schomburgk line, bears south-west until it strikes the<br />

mountains, proceeds along their base throughout their westward extent, <strong>and</strong> then, describing an arc,<br />

proceeds to reunite with the Schomburgk line at the southern boundary of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It is probably<br />

no exaggeration to say that this cuts off from <strong>Venezuela</strong> about one-sixth of the territory which she<br />

regards as indefeasibly her own.<br />

Although <strong>Venezuela</strong>, like South American countries in general, has been at not infrequent<br />

intervals disturbed by revolutions <strong>and</strong> other violent dissensions, she presents, on the whole, a<br />

favorable <strong>and</strong> pleasing aspect as a nation. Her finances, as the result of policies instituted by<br />

Guzman Blanco when President, are on a basis of conservatism <strong>and</strong> security. Her debt is but<br />

$22,000,000, <strong>and</strong> 10 percent annually of the revenues would provide for its amortization. She takes<br />

an extreme position in her monetary system, having no paper currency of any kind in circulation. A<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n one-hundred-bolivar gold piece will bring as much as 100f. of France at any money<br />

changer’s, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n sliver dollar ranks with the best silver of the world.<br />

Aside from political reasons for regarding the <strong>British</strong> aggressions with disfavor, the United States<br />

has exceptional occasions for friendship toward <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It was that country which gave to the<br />

world the Washington of South America—Simon Bolivar—<strong>and</strong> in Caracas the movement for South<br />

American freedom originated. Our shipping trade with <strong>Venezuela</strong> has exceedingly satisfactory<br />

conditions, superior, so far as the Atlantic seaboard is concerned, to those existing with any other of<br />

our sister republics.<br />

<strong>The</strong> most important American line of steamers plying from New-York to South American ports<br />

is the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n, or Red D Line. <strong>Venezuela</strong> is singular among South American countries, in that<br />

she buys more merch<strong>and</strong>ise from the United States than from Engl<strong>and</strong>. In 1888-9 her imports from<br />

New-York aggregated 19,861,432 bolivars, against 16,230,840 from Liverpool. <strong>The</strong> value of exports<br />

from New-York to <strong>Venezuela</strong> during the year ended June 30, 1895, was $4,897,084. <strong>The</strong> Red D Line<br />

brings annually to New-York about $10,000,000 worth of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n coffee. This is a conservative<br />

estimate.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

American Interests<br />

Capt. E. H. Plumacher, our veteran Consul at Maracaibo, who has served there continuously for<br />

seventeen years, returned last week to his post of duty after a vacation of several months in the<br />

United States. <strong>The</strong>re is probably no more trustworthy authority on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n concerns than Capt.<br />

Plumacher. To the writer of this article he spoke with enthusiasm about the spirit <strong>and</strong> prospects of<br />

the country, <strong>and</strong> particularly the disposition of <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns to exp<strong>and</strong> their commerce with us in all<br />

its branches. American machinery <strong>and</strong> American goods of every description, he said, are constantly<br />

growing in favor there, <strong>and</strong> American capitalists are largely <strong>and</strong> increasingly interested in <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

railway construction, mining <strong>and</strong> other enterprises, which they find to be safe <strong>and</strong> fruitful<br />

investments. Hitherto Germany <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> have had this field to themselves.<br />

<strong>The</strong> decided practical interest which some or our wide-awake countrymen display in the<br />

generous inclinations of <strong>Venezuela</strong> for the United States has been conspicuously illustrated by the<br />

obtainment from her Congress of grants to enormous tracts of territory. It is not the interest of this<br />

article to enter in detail into the bewildering history of the “Manoa Company Limited”—the<br />

original concession, deed of transfer, revocation, <strong>and</strong> subsequent alleged renewal of charter,<br />

capitalization, financiering, law suits, judgments, proposed restructuring into the “Orinoco<br />

Company,” &c. A brief explanation or the bearing (or rather non-bearing) of the Manoa <strong>and</strong> all like<br />

grants upon the international <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question is all that is required here.<br />

An impression prevails that the Manoa Company (or Orinoco Company, as it has been<br />

rechristened) is a time-honored corporation of American citizens, actively developing certain<br />

resources in the Orinoco Delta country, under a perfectly substantial <strong>Venezuela</strong>n grant, which grant<br />

includes a part or the domain claimed by Engl<strong>and</strong>; <strong>and</strong> that the company, because of the American<br />

citizenship or the persons comprising it, is entitled to the formal protection of our Government<br />

against <strong>British</strong> interference with its property rights.<br />

This impression is all wrong in its main features. <strong>The</strong> old Manoa Company, a Brooklyn<br />

corporation, acquiring its title by deed of transfer June 14, 1884, from Cyrenius C. Fitzgerald, the<br />

original grantee, (whose concession was dated at Caracas Sept. 22, 1883.) enjoyed but a brief career<br />

of recognized st<strong>and</strong>ing. Though capitalized on paper at $5,000,000, it failed to fulfill the conditions<br />

or the grant, which called for active industrial operations, colonization, <strong>and</strong> the like within a<br />

specified time. Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the pretensions to $5,000,000 of capital, it has been stated to the<br />

writer, on the authority of an officer of the company, that not more than $25,000 was laid out<br />

altogether for the purposes prescribed in the grant. <strong>The</strong> company did, however, make some showing<br />

of expenditure in these directions, building a sawmill near Morajuana, <strong>and</strong> there its representatives<br />

were found by McTurk, the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> magistrate when he made his progress through the<br />

country in April, 1885, to warn intruders off. But the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government was not satisfied with<br />

the Manoa Company’s performance of its contract, <strong>and</strong>, accordingly, Sept. 3, 1886, the whole grant<br />

was voided.<br />

After that the Manoa Company had no status whatever until June 18, 1895, when the Federal<br />

Council of <strong>Venezuela</strong> gave its consent to a renewal of the concession. But this does not restore the<br />

territory to the company, for, while the Federal Council may revoke a grant, it cannot revive one<br />

without the approval of Congress. Congress, at latest reports, had not acted on the question of<br />

revival, <strong>and</strong> therefore, while the Manoa Company is reconstructing itself under the laws of the State<br />

of Washington, <strong>and</strong> attempting to recapitalize itself, it still remains uncertain whether the partially<br />

resuscitated grant will ever amount to anything tangible.<br />

61


January - November 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong> Turnbull Investments<br />

<strong>The</strong> Manoa Company, moreover, has a competitor in George Turnbull, an American citizen<br />

residing in Boston, who, after the revocation of the original Manoa concession, obtained from the<br />

Congress of <strong>Venezuela</strong> (April 28, 1887) a grant to a large part of the same territory. Mr. Turnbull’s<br />

representatives in this city maintain that he kept in good faith, his contract with the Government,<br />

except when prevented from doing so by revolution, <strong>and</strong> that he spent some $165,000 developing<br />

his interests. But on June 18, 1895, (the same day when the Manoa Company received its seeming<br />

new lease of life,) the Federal Council rescinded Turnbull’s whole concession, including the specular<br />

hematite iron mines of Imataca Isl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong>se mines <strong>and</strong> the regions immediately adjacent, Mr.<br />

Turnbull’s representatives say, belong to him by actual purchase <strong>and</strong> by a deed separate <strong>and</strong> apart<br />

from any concessionary rights, <strong>and</strong> cannot legally be thus taken away from him <strong>and</strong> regranted. On<br />

the other h<strong>and</strong>, it is expressly provided, in the new “Mining Code of <strong>Venezuela</strong>,” (adopted April 18,<br />

1893,) that “mines may not be worked, even by the owners of l<strong>and</strong>, without a concession from the<br />

Federal Government.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> whole subject of concessions to American citizens within the limits of the territory in<br />

dispute between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> is thus involved in controversy. Whatever the merits of the<br />

discussion may prove to be ultimately, there is at present no established condition of American<br />

ownership of grants made by <strong>Venezuela</strong> to l<strong>and</strong>s claimed by Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> even if there shall in<br />

future come to pass an unquestionable revival of either of the two old grants in that region, the<br />

United States Government would certainly have no disposition to seek a quarrel with Engl<strong>and</strong> on<br />

the score or the latter’s failure to admit <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s exclusive territorial jurisdiction. <strong>The</strong> question of<br />

the Manoa <strong>and</strong> Turnbull concessions has never come up as a feature of our Government’s<br />

correspondence with Engl<strong>and</strong> on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n topic. <strong>The</strong> United States, in a dignified way, insists<br />

on arbitration as the only decent <strong>and</strong> suitable course. This is her sole <strong>and</strong> simple issue with Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

<strong>and</strong> she will not foolishly let it be complicated.<br />

W. W. SPOONER<br />

62


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

[21 October 1895]<br />

63


January - November 1895<br />

- 52 -<br />

BAYARD ON THE SITUATION<br />

He Has Heard Nothing of Britain’s Project from Salisbury<br />

LONDON, Oct. 21.—<strong>The</strong> Chronicle will to-morrow publish an interview with Ambassador<br />

Bayard, in which the American representative says that he knows nothing of Great Britain’s action in<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter beyond what he has read in the newspapers.<br />

His latest mission was to effect, if possible, in a friendly spirit <strong>and</strong> with all good intention on the<br />

part of the United States, the resumption of those negotiations on the frontier questions that were<br />

so abruptly stayed last year. He had brought this matter before Lord Salisbury, who listened to his<br />

arguments with the best spirit.<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States, Mr. Bayard declares, is only desirous of bringing about a peaceful reopening<br />

of the boundary question between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. With regard to the delay of Lord Salisbury<br />

in answering his last attempt at reconciliation, Mr. Bayard says that the Prime Minister had been<br />

abroad spending a holiday. Since his return, he has doubtless been very busy at the Foreign Office.<br />

Mr. Bayard is, however, momentarily expecting an answer. <strong>The</strong> many disputes that had arisen<br />

between the United States <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Mr. Bayard says, have always been amicably arranged by<br />

boards of conciliation, <strong>and</strong> he does not see why the same plan should not be adopted by Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[22 October 1895]<br />

- 53 -<br />

GREAT BRITAIN STUBBORN<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Must Yield Boundaries of Cuyuni <strong>and</strong> Auracura<br />

OPINIONS OF VARIOUS NEWSPAPERS<br />

Sensational Rumors of Preparation at the Washington Navy Yard<br />

Gunshops Are Disproved by the Facts<br />

LONDON, Oct. 21.—<strong>The</strong> Globe publishes a note saying that, as the <strong>British</strong> ultimatum to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> has not yet reached its destination, it is not considered desirable to publish any of its<br />

details. It is proper to state, however, that the document is worded in terms of firmness <strong>and</strong> force.<br />

<strong>The</strong> communication, <strong>The</strong> Globe also says, was not transmitted through any representative of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> in Engl<strong>and</strong>, diplomatic relations between the two countries having been broken off some<br />

years ago <strong>and</strong> no longer existing. <strong>The</strong> note further says that the ultimatum informs the Government<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong> that the Government of Great Britain will not permit any overstepping by <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

of the boundaries marked by the course of the Cuyuni <strong>and</strong> Auracura Rivers.<br />

Great Britain, however, expresses willingness to submit to arbitration the question of other<br />

territories in dispute beyond that limit. <strong>The</strong> announcement of the ultimatum contained in the note<br />

published in <strong>The</strong> Globe is officially authorized.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette asserts that the ultimatum will be presented through Señor Rodriguez,<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Consul in London.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette says that, should it be decided by the Government to take naval action<br />

against <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the movement would be confided to Vice Admiral James Elphinstone Erskine, in<br />

comm<strong>and</strong> of the North American <strong>and</strong> West Indian squadron. <strong>The</strong> disposition of his fleet at the time<br />

of his last communication with the Admiralty, Navy Department, in Whitehall, was as follows:<br />

Crescent at Halifax, Canada at Barbadoes, Magicienne, Tartar, <strong>and</strong> Rambler at the Bermudas;<br />

Mohawk <strong>and</strong> Tourmaline at Jamaica; Partridge at the Bahamas, <strong>and</strong> Cleopatra, Pelican, <strong>and</strong> Buzzard<br />

in Newfoundl<strong>and</strong> waters.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette, in an article on the situation of the dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> United States Government has serious grievances of its own against <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> it<br />

would best become its position as a great civilized power to join in bringing these Spanish-Indian<br />

barbarians to order. A good lesson given to <strong>Venezuela</strong> would be equally profitable to both the<br />

United States <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> co-operation of the United States would also be humane, since it<br />

would have a tendency to make the lesson bloodless, convincing the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns of the folly of<br />

resistance.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette says: “<strong>Venezuela</strong>, like Nicaragua, after much fuss, will probably prove to<br />

be small beer. No doubt the less scrupulous of the New-York papers will talk big about what they<br />

are going to do with the lion’s tall, but Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States are not going to be set by<br />

the ears by a pack of <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Globe says: “Even if the Monroe doctrine was an axiom of international law, it could have no<br />

bearing upon our dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Its widest application can only be held to insist that no<br />

European power shall effect a fresh lodgment in America, so it does not affect the decision of<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> not to allow <strong>Venezuela</strong> to occupy part of the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.”<br />

[22 October 1895]<br />

- 54 -<br />

BRITAIN AND VENEZUELA<br />

Dispatch to Crespo Transmitted by Berlin Foreign Office<br />

IT DOES NOT MENTION BOUNDARIES<br />

Diplomats in Washington Are Skeptical About London’s Information—<br />

<strong>The</strong> Dispatch Not an Ultimatum<br />

LONDON, Oct. 22.—<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette says the statement is absolutely untrue that the<br />

peremptory dispatch or ultimatum to <strong>Venezuela</strong> was delivered to Señor Rodriguez, <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Consul here. As the German Government has consented to temporarily take charge of the interests<br />

of <strong>British</strong> subjects in <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Gazette says the dispatch to President Crespo will naturally be<br />

dispatched through the Foreign Office in Berlin.<br />

<strong>The</strong> ultimatum, it is asserted, makes no reference to the boundary question, which Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

declines to regard as unsettled, but simply deals with the matter of the arrest of the <strong>British</strong><br />

Inspectors, Barnes <strong>and</strong> Baker, in regard to which Lord Salisbury informed the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Government that if proper reparation should not he given within a specified time, Great Britain<br />

would hold herself at liberty to seek it by other means.<br />

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January - November 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong> measures taken will probably resemble those pursued in the Nicaraguan affair, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Admiral in those Waters will doubtless receive instructions to seize the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n ports <strong>and</strong><br />

collect the customs duties,<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette, in a leading editorial on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n situation, says that the case is not<br />

one for arbitration, <strong>and</strong> adds: <strong>The</strong> good offices of the United States would be tendered with greater<br />

authority <strong>and</strong> better grace if that Government paid the indemnity it is required to pay by the Bering<br />

Sea award. We were absurdly overtaxed by the Alabama decision.”<br />

[23 October 1895]<br />

- 55 -<br />

VENEZUELA AGAINST INVASION<br />

If United States Is Inactive, Great Britain Will Not Retain More L<strong>and</strong> in <strong>Guiana</strong> than Ships’<br />

Guns Cover<br />

Special Cable Dispatch to <strong>The</strong> New-York Times<br />

LIMA, Peru, via Galveston, Oct. 23.—A leading article in the Comercio says that if the United<br />

States is to retain its prestige it must make its influence impressive in the question at issue between<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

If the United States remains inactive <strong>and</strong> suffers a blockade of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Engl<strong>and</strong> may not yet<br />

be triumphant. <strong>The</strong> result would possibly be nothing more than that Engl<strong>and</strong> would retain of the<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> coast only so much as the guns of her ships could cover.<br />

[24 October 1895]<br />

To the Editor of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times:<br />

- 56 -<br />

VENEZUELA AND THE NEWSPAPERS<br />

Criticism of <strong>The</strong> Evening Post’s Discussions<br />

I was disgusted in taking up <strong>The</strong> Evening Post of to-day <strong>and</strong> reading its telegraph dispatches from<br />

inconsequential journals (all <strong>British</strong>) praising its un-American <strong>and</strong> superficial course—superficial, for<br />

<strong>The</strong> Post’s discussion of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question has never touched the merits of the subject.<br />

It has been purely technical, political, <strong>and</strong> along English diplomatic lines. If <strong>The</strong> Post would treat<br />

the subject on its merits, if it would answer the elaborate articles in Harper’s Weekly <strong>and</strong> <strong>The</strong> New-York<br />

Times, <strong>and</strong> if it would devote some attention to the all but exhaustive pamphlet of ex-Minister W. L.<br />

Scruggs, (published in Philadelphia, where it can be had for 25 cents,) it could claim some hearing<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

for its advocacy of the position of the Marquis of Salisbury, for whom <strong>The</strong> Post’s editor seems to<br />

hold a brief.<br />

I imagine I am not alone among those knowing of <strong>The</strong> Post’s course as to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, who<br />

decidedly object to its daily offering of vacant chaff for grain.<br />

In conclusion, let me thank <strong>The</strong> Times for the solid information <strong>and</strong> able treatment which to-day’s<br />

Times supplies. I am constrained to ask you to publish this, my indignant protest against <strong>The</strong> Post’s<br />

superficial <strong>and</strong> unfair treatment of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. It is the only remedy at the comm<strong>and</strong><br />

of a READER.<br />

New-York, Oct. 21, 1895.<br />

[24 October 1895]<br />

- 57 -<br />

BRITISH GUIANA LIMITS<br />

Stead’s Opinion of the American Expression of Sentiment—<br />

An American Vice Consul’s View<br />

LONDON, Oct. 24.—William T. Stead, former editor of <strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette, publishes an<br />

article in <strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette, in which he says that Engl<strong>and</strong> ought not to belittle the significance<br />

of the outburst of American sentiment over the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. <strong>The</strong> Americans, he says, have<br />

built up a navy which they have reason to be proud of, <strong>and</strong> the Monroe doctrine is now one of<br />

national faith.<br />

When the twentieth century dawns upon us,” he continues, “we will have to recognize the<br />

United States as a naval power of the first class. Nevertheless,” he concludes, “our case is so strong<br />

that we need not fear to refer the question to any honest arbitrator, but first reparation must be<br />

made for violation of our territory.”<br />

WASHINGTON. Oct 24.—Dr. Spaight, Vice Consul of the United States at Georgetown,<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, now in the city, to a United Press reporter to-night, made an emphatic denial of the<br />

newspaper reports that he was summoned here for a conference with State Department officials in<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n affairs. Dr. Spaight characterized the report as an “entire fabrication without a shadow<br />

of foundation.”<br />

“I am here,” said he, “simply because it was my pleasure to come. I have lived in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

for twenty-seven years, <strong>and</strong> am off now on one of my periodical vacations. I did not intend, when I<br />

left home, to come to America <strong>and</strong> only came here because my people live in the vicinity of<br />

Springfield, Mass. I was here last in 1891.<br />

“Neither Secretary Olney nor any other official sent for me, <strong>and</strong> I leave town to-morrow<br />

morning. I would not know Mr. Olney if I saw him. I called upon Mr. Uhl for a moment only, <strong>and</strong><br />

left my card. That is the extent at my visit to the department.”<br />

Mr. Spaight has at home one of the maps showing the boundary between <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

proposed before thee year 1800. This map is rare, only a few copies being in existence. Dr. Spaight is<br />

quoted as saying that this map proves the territory where gold has been found to be English soil,<br />

<strong>and</strong> he is further quoted as saying that <strong>Venezuela</strong> never claimed it until gold was discovered, <strong>and</strong><br />

67


January - November 1895<br />

that the United States will make a mistake if she endeavors to assert the Monroe doctrine in<br />

connection therewith.<br />

[25 October 1895]<br />

- 58 -<br />

CHAMBERLAIN IS RIDICULED<br />

If a Maxim Gun Were Stationed on the Uruan<br />

It Would Be Taken<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25.—<strong>The</strong> Daily Chronicle of Sept 27, a newspaper published at<br />

Georgetown, Demerara, containing the full text of the Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain’s letter to<br />

the Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, was received here to-day. <strong>The</strong> salient points of the letter appeared<br />

in the London dispatches of <strong>The</strong> United Press a week ago.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se were, briefly, that Mr. Chamberlain recommended the placing of a Maxim gun at the point<br />

on the Uruan River where the Colonial Inspector <strong>and</strong> his assistants were arrested by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

forces, <strong>and</strong> the establishment of a similar gun at another point along the frontier.<br />

Mr. Chamberlain’s letter also suggested the advisability of cutting a wagon road from Port<br />

Berema, a distance of 150 miles southeast through the rich gold fields in the disputed territory, <strong>and</strong><br />

coupled with this was a request that the merchants of Georgetown should furnish the money to<br />

build it. Appreciating the scarcity of the police force at Georgetown, Mr. Chamberlain<br />

recommended that the corps of firemen in the city be abolished <strong>and</strong> their membership added to that<br />

of the local police in order to augment the latter’s ranks.<br />

Mr. Chamberlain’s recommendations, if <strong>The</strong> Daily Chronicle fairly reflects public opinion in<br />

Demerara, do not meet the wishes of the colonists. <strong>The</strong> Chronicle editorially ridicules the <strong>British</strong><br />

Secretary for the Colonies. It says that the only effect of the planting of a Maxim gun on the Uruan<br />

would be its capture by the infuriated <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns, thus affording an instructive object lesson of<br />

<strong>British</strong> incapacity to protect her own interests, inasmuch as the <strong>British</strong> constabulary at that place are<br />

so few in numbers that they could be easily overcome by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns on the opposite bank of<br />

the river.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle shows that it would take seven weeks at least to transport the gun from<br />

Georgetown, <strong>and</strong> that the citizens of that place are too poor to consider seriously the proposition to<br />

build the road to the gold fields at their own expense. So far as abolishing the corps of firemen is<br />

concerned, that suggestion, the paper said, should not be tolerated for a moment.<br />

Mr. Chamberlain’s letter to the Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> was written about the 1st of<br />

September, a fortnight or so after the receipt of Secretary Olney’s memor<strong>and</strong>um to Lord Salisbury,<br />

in which he elaborated the interpretation put by this Government upon the Monroe doctrine. <strong>The</strong><br />

shortness of time which elapsed between the issuance of Mr. Olney’s note <strong>and</strong> the forwarding of<br />

Mr. Chamberlain’s letter to the Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> is regarded by diplomats as an odd<br />

coincidence, if it be not full of significance.<br />

Although the arrest of the colonial police occurred a year ago, no notice was taken of the matter<br />

by the <strong>British</strong> authorities except a sharp note dem<strong>and</strong>ing an explanation, <strong>and</strong> requesting from<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> a promise that her soldiers should not cross to the right bank of the Uruan.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

To these requests the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government, it is said, replied with an emphatic negative,<br />

since a promise to remain on one side of the stream would be a tacit admission that the remainder<br />

of the territory was a <strong>British</strong> possession, an admission that <strong>Venezuela</strong> cannot, it is claimed, be<br />

persuaded to make.<br />

<strong>The</strong> revival of the incident at this late day is construed by diplomats to mean that the boundary<br />

dispute is the inspiration of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s so-called ultimatum, <strong>and</strong> that for this reason her request for<br />

an apology <strong>and</strong> a possible indemnity will meet with an emphatic refusal.<br />

[26 October 1895]<br />

- 59 -<br />

VENEZUELA YELLOW BOOK<br />

A Summary in Two Letters of the Quarrel with Great Britain<br />

BARON DE BODMAN’S OBSERVATIONS<br />

Reply of Minister Rojas, Saying that a Peaceful Settlement<br />

of the Boundary Lines Is Desired<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n yellow book for 1894, which has been received<br />

here, contains two letters of special interest at the present time, in view of the situation between<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Both of these concern the Uruan incident, which in the yellow book is<br />

called the “incident on the right hank of the Cuyuni.” <strong>The</strong> first is from Baron de Bodman, Chargé<br />

d’Affaires of Germany <strong>and</strong> of the protection of <strong>British</strong> interests in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the other is the<br />

answer of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom Baron de Bodman’s note was<br />

addressed. <strong>The</strong> text of Baron de Bodman’s note follows:<br />

Last Thursday, in consequence of a telegraphic communication from my Government, I had the honor, in my<br />

capacity as Chargé of the protection of <strong>British</strong> interests in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, to protest, in the name of the Royal Cabinet<br />

of Great Britain, against a violation of the frontier of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> committed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soldiers on the<br />

Cuyuni River. At the same time I expressed the wish of the English Government that the officer comm<strong>and</strong>ing the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n troops on the Cuyuni River should receive orders to prohibit his soldiers from crossing the river, as well<br />

as from cutting down trees on its right bank.<br />

Your Excellency had the goodness to promise me a reply, after consulting the Council of Ministers. As I am<br />

desirous of settling the matter in a satisfactory manner to the parties interested, I would be very much obliged to<br />

your Excellency if you would give me an answer as soon as possible.<br />

<strong>The</strong> following is Minister Rojas’ answer:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government of the republic has taken into consideration your Excellency’s<br />

communication, which reached this department day before yesterday, when I was absent from<br />

Caracas, in which your Excellency referring to the telegram of which you had been informed in<br />

our conference of last Thursday, <strong>and</strong> in your capacity of Chargé of the protection of <strong>British</strong><br />

interests in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, urgently requests a reply as to the supposed violation of the frontier of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> on the Cuyuni River, which reply, as is inferred from your Excellency’s language,<br />

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January - November 1895<br />

is expected to give assurances that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soldiers shall not cross that river, nor cut trees<br />

on its right bank.<br />

Your Excellency has doubtless already seen that this matter relates to the well-known<br />

question of the boundary between the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> the English colony of<br />

Demerara. As soon as Engl<strong>and</strong> decided not long ago upon an occupation of the portion of<br />

territory in dispute, which did not originally include the Cuyuni region to which the telegram<br />

refers, <strong>and</strong> which is well known to be <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, the republic made a solemn protest,<br />

<strong>and</strong> reserved to itself the right to prove its title by very fair means, which, induced by a spirit of<br />

conciliation, it has ever since earnestly urged upon her Majesty’s Government. Successive<br />

advances of the line of <strong>British</strong> occupation gave rise to new protests, which finally became the<br />

repeated appeal to the rights which the republic evidently possesses in this dispute.<br />

Thus, on the 20th February, 1887, the 15th June, <strong>and</strong> 29th October, 1888, the 16th<br />

December, 1889, the 1st September, 1890, the 30th December, 1891, <strong>and</strong> lastly on the 26th<br />

August <strong>and</strong> 6th October, 1893, that is to say, every time that any measure of the colonial<br />

authorities appeared to be extending the space of the occupation to the open violation of the<br />

status quo agreed upon in~ 1850, <strong>Venezuela</strong> opposed the voice of right <strong>and</strong> justice to the acts<br />

exercised by Great Britain within a territory which the republic regards as belonging to itself, as<br />

shown by geographical historical documents of high reputation, many of them English, by local<br />

traditions deserving of respect, <strong>and</strong> by acts of jurisdiction on the part of the commissioners or<br />

agents of his Catholic Majesty, extant in public treaties, prior to that of Aug. 13, 1814 by which<br />

Holl<strong>and</strong> ceded to Great Britain her colonies of Demerara, Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> Berbice.<br />

According to the reports, of which the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government is already in possession, the<br />

incident on the right bank of the Cuyuni was occasioned by a threat addressed by an agent of the<br />

Government of Demerara, calling himself inspector of that district, to a <strong>Venezuela</strong>n named<br />

Loreto Lira, a farmer, who has been settled there for many years, <strong>and</strong> by the clearing of some<br />

l<strong>and</strong> by some of Lira’s countrymen, who arrived some days after the celebration on that bank of<br />

the river, of the festival in commemoration of the independence of <strong>Venezuela</strong> (July 5) at Lira’s<br />

house, <strong>and</strong> at the house of a woman named Manuela Casanas.<br />

It is known that this same colonial agent who had addressed the threat to Lira told him<br />

subsequently that he might continue his work without the slightest uneasiness; <strong>and</strong> it is also<br />

shown that after the patriotic demonstrations indulged in on the 5th of July at the houses of Lira<br />

<strong>and</strong> Señora Casanas, by a Captain <strong>and</strong> eight soldiers coming from the general commissariat of<br />

the Upper Cuyuni, Inspector Gallagher’s successor, named Douglas Barnes, asked permission to<br />

cross the river <strong>and</strong> present his friendly respects to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities.<br />

In spite of the manner in which the colonial agents have been acting in the occupation of<br />

territory which <strong>Venezuela</strong> regards as included within her boundaries, the authorities established<br />

by the republic within that district have always been instructed in the most earnest manner to<br />

avoid, so far as consistent with the National honor, all cause of collision with the Demerara<br />

agents, as the Government is desirous of settling the boundary question by peaceful means,<br />

without embittering this old dispute.<br />

<strong>The</strong> assurances which are now requested would be equivalent, in view of the aspect which<br />

the question now presents, <strong>and</strong> as your Excellency will easily perceive, to a tacit declaration in<br />

favor of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s designs, <strong>and</strong> would be in actual opposition to the protests previously made by<br />

the republic, which she maintains in all their force, <strong>and</strong> which I have just enumerated for the<br />

sake of greater clearness, <strong>and</strong> in making this communication to your Excellency I fulfill my<br />

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instructions to renew to the <strong>British</strong> Government, through your kind intervention, the expression<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s earnest desire to put an end to this vexatious dispute by the peaceful measures<br />

recommended by modern law, to which Engl<strong>and</strong> herself frequently appeals, like the enlightened<br />

nation that she is, which has co-operated so greatly in the work of modern civilization.<br />

[26 October 1895]<br />

- 60 -<br />

ENGLAND’S TROUBLE IN VENEZUEA<br />

A New View of the Monroe Doctrine Advanced by Sir George Baden-Powell<br />

<strong>and</strong> Advocated by the Press<br />

By <strong>The</strong> United Press<br />

LONDON, Oct. 26.—. . . [T]he [English] papers are almost unanimous in their expressions with<br />

regard to the dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, not only as regards reparation for the arrest of <strong>British</strong> officers,<br />

but also as regards the rejection of the suggestion that the difficulty regarding the boundary be<br />

arbitrated. <strong>The</strong> papers declare that the different frontiers are due to <strong>Venezuela</strong>n aggression, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

the Schomburgk line is now the minimum frontier.<br />

So far as the Monroe doctrine is concerned, Sir George Baden-Powell <strong>and</strong> other Conservative<br />

members of the House of Commons have taught the press of their party an ingenious argument.<br />

<strong>The</strong> papers on Wednesday last published a letter from Sir George Baden-Powell, in which he said<br />

that Great Britain was an established American power in the West Indies <strong>and</strong> all the great Canadian<br />

dominions long before the United States came into existence, <strong>and</strong> in <strong>British</strong> Honduras <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> since early in this century. <strong>British</strong> interests were domiciled in America before the United<br />

States were ever dreamed of. It is as an American power that Great Britain has the duty <strong>and</strong> privilege<br />

of working with the other American powers to enforce respect for international obligations <strong>and</strong> to<br />

promote the prosperity of those portions of the American continent for which she is responsible.<br />

<strong>The</strong> greater portion of the press, both Conservative <strong>and</strong> Liberal, is beginning to develop this idea<br />

with parrotlike complacency. <strong>The</strong> only notable hostile voice is that of <strong>The</strong> Tablet, the recognized <strong>and</strong><br />

influential organ of the Catholics. After asking why Great Britain persists in her refusal to arbitrate<br />

the questions in dispute, <strong>The</strong> Tablet to-day proceeds to say that, as there cannot be an independent<br />

future for a <strong>British</strong> settlement in South America, there could be no objection to allowing <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

to purchase the <strong>British</strong> rights. This suggestion will fall heedless on <strong>British</strong> ears, for, as <strong>The</strong> Speaker<br />

to-day says, the <strong>British</strong> are destined to witness a revival of Jingoism, <strong>and</strong>, for the moment, the anti-<br />

Jingo party is virtually defunct.<br />

[27 October 1895]<br />

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January - November 1895<br />

- 61 -<br />

NO DESIRE FOR TROUBLE<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> Not Anxious to Quarrel with the United States<br />

THE VENEZUELAN MEMORANDUM<br />

LONDON, Nov. 2.—Prime Minister Salisbury has h<strong>and</strong>ed over to the Right Hon. Joseph<br />

Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, the memor<strong>and</strong>um transmitted to him by the<br />

United States Government, through Ambassador Bayard, relative to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. Mr.<br />

Chamberlain still holds the opinion that the United States has no right to interfere in Great Britain’s<br />

dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, but he will draft a detailed reply to the memor<strong>and</strong>um, which Lord Salisbury<br />

will shortly send to Mr. Bayard. <strong>The</strong> tone of the reply will probably be moderate <strong>and</strong> amicable as the<br />

Government has no desire to become involved in a dispute with the United States, its attention now<br />

being fully devoted to matters that are more important than the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary question.<br />

Mr. Chamberlain will begin immediately a consideration of the details of his great plan to<br />

develop the Crown colonies. This subject will occupy most of his time until the reassembling of<br />

Parliament, on Nov. 15. <strong>The</strong> plan largely concerns Africa, but it will also aim to encourage the<br />

commercial interests of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> to assist Dominica. . .<br />

[3 November 1895]<br />

- 62 -<br />

BRITISH ULTIMATUM ASTRAY<br />

Caracas Has No <strong>News</strong> of Even a Note of Inquiry to <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, D. C., Nov. 8.—Mail advices from Caracas received to-day, bearing date of<br />

Nov. 1, say that no ultimatum from Great Britain with reference to the Uruan incident had yet<br />

reached the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n capital.<br />

<strong>The</strong> belief which has long been entertained at Washington that the so-called ultimatum is only a<br />

short note of inquiry is shared by official circles in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, who claim that it does not appear that<br />

even this admonition has yet been delivered by the German Chargé d’Affaires, to whom, in the<br />

absence or a <strong>British</strong> representative at Caracas, it is supposed is to have been intrusted.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Caracas newspapers have no information with respect to the matter except <strong>The</strong> United<br />

Press dispatches which were cabled to them from New York.<br />

[9 November 1895]<br />

- 63 -<br />

BRITISH GUIANA WARLIKE<br />

Crisis in <strong>Dispute</strong> with <strong>Venezuela</strong> on Boundaries Approaching<br />

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ENTHUSIASM OF THE COLONISTS<br />

Forces Drilled, Police at Rifle Practice, Inspectors at Uruan,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Appropriation for Expense Voted<br />

GEORGETOWN, Demerara, B. G., Nov. 8.—That the crisis in the dispute between Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> as to the boundaries of the republic is approaching cannot longer be doubted.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Administrator of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, acting upon Instructions from the imperial Government.<br />

has made a declaration to the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> Legislature which clearly indicates that unless<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> withdraws her claims to the greater part of the territory in dispute the imperial<br />

Government is prepared to assert the rights of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> by force of arms, <strong>and</strong> the colonial<br />

Legislature has voted to the Governor in executive council an open check for war expenses for<br />

colonial <strong>and</strong> imperial forces.<br />

<strong>The</strong> situation now generally accepted here is that this long-st<strong>and</strong>ing dispute will only be settled<br />

by force of arms, <strong>and</strong> that it is only a question of weeks before the roar of cannon <strong>and</strong> clash of arms<br />

are heard again in the South American Republic, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>ians openly boast that they<br />

have the men <strong>and</strong> the money for the assertion of their territorial rights. Within the last few days<br />

there has been a wonderful change effected in the talk <strong>and</strong> temperament of the people.<br />

Instead of the frequent expressions of disgust <strong>and</strong> dissatisfaction with the masterly inactivity of<br />

the imperial authorities, the people speak hopefully of a speedy settlement of a dispute which has<br />

seriously retarded the development of the mineral resources of the colony. <strong>The</strong>y point to the fact<br />

that, while there are vast stretches of territory with gold deposits to be developed the unsettled<br />

question as to boundaries <strong>and</strong> the probable recurrence of such incidents as that which took place at<br />

Uruan, the necessary capital for the developing of the gold industry has been withheld, <strong>and</strong> that for<br />

no other reason than the lack of security on the frontier. But now, by a sharp <strong>and</strong> decisive blow at<br />

what they term “<strong>Venezuela</strong>n arrogance,” they hope to change all this very shortly, <strong>and</strong> so hail the<br />

prospect of a speedy return of prosperity to the <strong>British</strong> colony.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re can be no doubt that the openly avowed dissatisfaction of the people, the freely expressed<br />

opposition by their representatives in the colonial Legislature to the dictates of the Colonial Office,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the positive refusal to sanction the expenditures of any moneys for Governmental schemes until<br />

the colony was assured whether the imperial Government was prepared to support them in asserting<br />

their rights on the frontier, <strong>and</strong> to obtain redress for the Uruan incident, has necessitated, if not<br />

forced, a public declaration from the imperial Government, through its local representative.<br />

Of course, international courtesies require that his Excellency, the administrator, in making the<br />

declaration, should only do so in the most guarded terms; but on the other b<strong>and</strong>, a dissatisfied<br />

people had to be appeased, <strong>and</strong> the readiness with which an open check was voted to the<br />

Government is sufficient proof of how admirably the administrator succeeded in satisfying the<br />

representative members of the Legislature.<br />

It may be confidently assumed <strong>and</strong> believed, said his Excellency, in the course of his speech, that<br />

steps are being taken to bring the long st<strong>and</strong>ing question as to the boundaries of the l<strong>and</strong> to a<br />

satisfactory point. With that question settled, he need not say how much brighter would be the<br />

outlook, how much more solid would be the foundations on which schemes will be put forward for<br />

the development of the interior <strong>and</strong> the opening up of the riches which exist there: <strong>The</strong> steps to<br />

which he had referred are being advanced in no half-hearted way. <strong>The</strong>re may be temporary delays, as<br />

there always must be in matters of such a nature <strong>and</strong> in international questions, but the subject will<br />

not be allowed to drag or be put aside until it is finally settled.<br />

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January - November 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong> mother country means that the rights <strong>and</strong> privileges <strong>and</strong> possessions of this one of her<br />

children—<strong>and</strong> by no means one of the least or least important of them—should be upheld <strong>and</strong><br />

secured, <strong>and</strong> it would be but poor policy on the part of the colony if they did not show to those who<br />

advise her Majesty that they (the colonists) do not mean to be lagging behind in assisting the<br />

attainment of this most desirable end. <strong>The</strong> proposal that would be put before them that day was<br />

simply this—that in case of necessity, they should empower the Government to add its quota<br />

toward the security of their great province, the upholding of its dignity, <strong>and</strong> the assertion of its<br />

territorial rights. That was all that would be asked from them that day.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government Secretary then submitted the following resolution:<br />

“Whereas, It may become necessary for the better security of the colony, in case of mergency, that increased<br />

expenditure should be incurred under defensive heads; be it<br />

“Resolved, That this court undertakes to provide such expenditure as may be necessary, to be appropriated as<br />

the Governor in council may determine.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> vote was passed unanimously, <strong>and</strong> the Attorney General, on behalf of the Government, said<br />

that the vote would be most gratifying to her Majesty’s Government, as it would show that, while<br />

they were prepared to act resolutely in this matter, the colony was also prepared to be equally<br />

resolute, <strong>and</strong> that they were prepared to st<strong>and</strong> by her Majesty’s Government to the fullest extent of<br />

their means. <strong>The</strong>y all joined in deprecating hostilities, but in the event of such a contingency<br />

expenditures would arise which would naturally fall upon the colony, such as the making of the<br />

preparations for the arrival of the troops, while her Majesty’s Government might, of course, wish<br />

the local forces to be employed, either alone or in conjunction with the imperial troops, in the<br />

settlement of this question.<br />

Within the past few days there has been a marked increased activity in the local official circles;<br />

the colonial forces are being regularly drilled, <strong>and</strong> the military police corps are at frequent rifle<br />

practice.<br />

His Excellency the acting Governor <strong>and</strong> other officials have made a visit to the Northwest<br />

district (the disputed territory,) <strong>and</strong> inspectors have been dispatched to Uruan on a visit of<br />

inspection.<br />

On every h<strong>and</strong> the indications are that, should force be resorted to, neither the Government nor<br />

the people will be unprepared for taking active military steps, <strong>and</strong> the general opinion entertained<br />

here is that the solution of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary problem will be speedy <strong>and</strong> effective.<br />

[24 November 1895]<br />

- 64 -<br />

COLONIAL OFFICE AND GUIANA ARDOR<br />

LONDON, Nov. 25.—<strong>The</strong> Post will to-morrow say that nothing is known at the Colonial<br />

Office regarding the statements reported to have been made by the officer administering the<br />

Government of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> to the effect that unless <strong>Venezuela</strong> withdraws her claims to the<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

greater part of territory in dispute the imperial Government was prepared to assert the rights of the<br />

colony by force of arms.<br />

[26 November 1895]<br />

- 65 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Affair Still Undecided<br />

LONDON, Nov. 26.—Prime Minister Salisbury has not yet replied to the memor<strong>and</strong>um of Mr.<br />

Olney, the American Secretary of State, on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affair. <strong>The</strong> Foreign Office declines to<br />

state whether the reply will be transmitted through Ambassador Bayard or Sir Julian Pauncefote, the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Ambassador in Washington.<br />

[27 November 1895]<br />

- 66 -<br />

CRESPO PREPARING FOR BATTLE<br />

He <strong>and</strong> the Governors Count Forces Available<br />

to Expel Settlers from <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n L<strong>and</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, Nov. 27.—President Crespo has been cautiously sounding the Governors of<br />

the different provinces of the republic as to the forces which they can put into the field in case of<br />

war.<br />

Assurances, it is said, were given to him that a well-equipped army of 100,000 men could be<br />

mobilized, in case the President determined upon a movement against the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>n settlers<br />

on what is claimed to be <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory.<br />

[28 November 1895]<br />

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January - November 1895<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- Part 3 -<br />

1-18 December 1895<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

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- 67 -<br />

Britain’s Reply Sent to Pauncefote<br />

LONDON, Nov. 30.—It was learned from the Foreign Office to-day that Lord Salisbury’s<br />

answer to the American note outlining the Monroe doctrine in connection with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

dispute, has just been mailed to Sir Julian Pauncefote, <strong>British</strong> Ambassador at Washington.<br />

[1 December 1895]<br />

- 68 -<br />

COMMENT ACROSS THE WATER<br />

Views of English <strong>News</strong>papers on the President’s Message<br />

LONDON, Dec. 3.—<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong>, commenting on President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message to<br />

Congress, will say to-morrow:<br />

A worse financial muddle than Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> stated it would be difficult to conceive. Such is the result of<br />

tampering with the currency for the supposed relief of powerful interests. It is worth the attention of our own<br />

currency doctors.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>News</strong> will refer to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> dispute as a matter in which the United States is not<br />

concerned directly. On this point it says:<br />

<strong>The</strong> principle of arbitration is invaluable, but its friends should beware of straining it unduly. <strong>The</strong><br />

comparative weakness of <strong>Venezuela</strong> does not give that country exceptional rights. Arbitration has<br />

nothing to do with the relative strength of the parties. <strong>The</strong> President’s message is silent regarding the<br />

outrage on the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> police. It is neither dignified nor politic for Washington to take up the<br />

quarrels of South American communities which do not observe the usages of civilized nations. <strong>The</strong><br />

United States will find out some day that this sort of patronage involves corresponding responsibility<br />

<strong>and</strong> will not like it at all. . .<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard will say:<br />

<strong>The</strong> maintenance of friendly relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States is of such supreme<br />

importance that we cannot but regret the tone in which President Clevel<strong>and</strong> alluded to the dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

If we may judge the tone <strong>and</strong> substance of the dispatch addressed to Ambassador Bayard in July from the<br />

paraphrase communicated to Congress we are not in the least surprised that no answer has yet been received. We<br />

undertake to predict that when the answer reached the White House it will furnish the President with much matter<br />

for serious reflection. We have far too much confidence in the strength <strong>and</strong> generosity of American character to<br />

believe for a moment that the President will be sustained in his position by the better order of transatlantic<br />

sentiment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard disavows any wish to treat the message with disrespect, but says that the whole<br />

passage relative to <strong>Venezuela</strong> is a tissue of unreal assumptions <strong>and</strong> unsupported deductions. It adds<br />

that it is obviously for the people of the United States to decide whether at any time they will<br />

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forcibly prevent a European power from forcibly increasing its possessions on the American<br />

continent. If they wish to carry out this view they will do so after due calculation of the cost, but this<br />

has nothing to do with Great Britain’s right to vindicate her title to territory which she holds to be<br />

her own without interference from the outside.<br />

Regarding the mode of enforcing the <strong>British</strong> claim, the paper asks:<br />

Does Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> seriously suggest that because a State is insignificant it is to be exempt from the ordinary<br />

consequences of aggression on a powerful neighbor? Has he ever adopted this singular principle where wrong has<br />

been done to the United States? Of course not, <strong>and</strong> he must not teach a virtue that he declines to practice. He insists<br />

that there must be arbitration; that <strong>Venezuela</strong> is to define the issues, <strong>and</strong> that Great Britain is to submit meekly to<br />

the award.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Morning Post will say:<br />

. . . <strong>The</strong> President appears to assume that Engl<strong>and</strong> must be wrong because she is stronger than <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle will say:<br />

. . . Few honest critics can say anything against the references to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. We agree that the matter is<br />

eminently suited for impartial arbitration. No doubt the <strong>British</strong> Government will take the same view when<br />

reparation for injuries due to us from <strong>Venezuela</strong> is made.<br />

Every Liberal will acquiesce in the doctrine enunciated by Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> that our h<strong>and</strong>s are full enough<br />

without increasing our burdens in America, especially at the risk of creating a serious strain with a great power,<br />

whose friendship is more valuable to us than of all others together, but if the United States assumes extra<br />

territorial authority, they render themselves answerable in some degree for the faithful discharge of obligations<br />

by the Central <strong>and</strong> South American republics. Apparently it is their intention to undertake this serious task. . .<br />

All the London papers will publish extensive abstracts of the message.<br />

[4 December 1895]<br />

- 69 -<br />

THE CLEVELAND DOCTRINE IN VENEZUELA<br />

In his statement of our relations to the boundary dispute between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has enunciated a doctrine that would become as famous in history as Mr.<br />

Monroe’s great declaration were it not for the fact that the interests <strong>and</strong> the designs of the European<br />

powers are diminishing factors in New World affairs. It is not the Monroe doctrine that Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> affirms. <strong>The</strong> hasty commentators on his message who assume that it is that doctrine miss<br />

the point entirely <strong>The</strong> positions taken by President Monroe were quite outside the domain of<br />

possible arbitration. But Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> declares that Great Britain’s boundary dispute with<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> “can be reasonably settled only by friendly <strong>and</strong> impartial arbitration.” <strong>The</strong> distinction is<br />

fundamental <strong>and</strong> as wide as the seas that separate these disputants.<br />

No part of the message will be more attentively scrutinized than the passage in which the<br />

President treats of this subject, nor will any other be more fruitful of discussion. It contains the<br />

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substance of the July dispatch to Ambassador Bayard <strong>and</strong> will awaken the liveliest public desire for<br />

the perusal of that document in its entirety. Our attitude was “fully <strong>and</strong> distinctly set forth,” says the<br />

President, being, in substance “that the traditional <strong>and</strong> established policy of this Government is<br />

firmly opposed to a forcible increase by any European power of its territorial possessions on this<br />

continent; that this policy is as well founded in principle as it is strongly supported by numerous<br />

precedents; that, as a consequence, the United States is bound to protest against the enlargement of<br />

the area of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> in derogation of the rights <strong>and</strong> against the will of <strong>Venezuela</strong>,” <strong>and</strong> that in<br />

the impartial arbitration which opens the only avenue to a reasonable settlement the “whole<br />

controversy” should be included, as it would not be satisfactory “if one of the powers concerned is<br />

permitted to draw an imaginary line through the territory in debate <strong>and</strong> to declare that it will submit<br />

to arbitration only the part lying on one side of it.” <strong>The</strong> dispatch, therefore, calls upon the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government to give a “definite answer to the question whether it would or would not submit the<br />

territorial controversy in its entirety to impartial arbitration.”<br />

Now, Mr. Monroe’s celebrated doctrine consisted of three leading affirmations:<br />

(1) That “the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future<br />

colonization by any European powers.” (2) That as we have on just principles announced the<br />

independence of the various American Republics, “we could not view any interposition for the<br />

purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European<br />

power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United<br />

States.” (3) “It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any<br />

portion of either continent without endangering our peace <strong>and</strong> happiness,” or “that we should<br />

behold such interposition in any form with indifference.”<br />

None of these positions furnishes matter for arbitration. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine is nowhere<br />

conditionally permissive. It prohibits on pain of our displeasure—that is, of giving us probable cause<br />

for war. Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s proposition is that Great Britain may have the disputed territory, <strong>and</strong> be<br />

welcome to it, if she can establish her title before an honest arbitrator. But she must not attempt “a<br />

forcible increase” of her possessions as against <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> she must let the whole belt go to<br />

arbitration, not merely that part west of the Schomburgk line.<br />

This is not the Monroe doctrine, it is the Clevel<strong>and</strong> doctrine; <strong>and</strong> it is a mighty stiff <strong>and</strong> firm<br />

utterance. Translated into action it means that Great Britain must not attempt to seize territory of<br />

which <strong>Venezuela</strong> contests the possession, <strong>and</strong> that she must ab<strong>and</strong>on the Schomburgk line <strong>and</strong> all<br />

other “lines”—Aberdeen, Granville, Rosebery, <strong>and</strong> what not—<strong>and</strong> retiring behind the Esequibo<br />

River, the original boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> under her rights of succession, must let the arbitrator<br />

judge between her <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> as to all territory west of that stream. This is a serious abatement<br />

of her pretensions. It she accepts this proposition, she <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> will enter the court of<br />

arbitration on even terms. Otherwise she will enjoy the advantages which, according to her<br />

notorious custom, she has from time to time obtained by encroachment perpetrated against<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s protests.<br />

Unlike Mr. Monroe’s doctrine, which, in some of its applications, would lead to war, Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s doctrine unmistakably tends to peace. He proposes to “have peace if he has to fight for<br />

it” by enforcing arbitration.<br />

This reaffirmation or American belief in the adequacy of arbitration for the adjustment of<br />

international differences is important to a degree not easily overestimated. It foreshadows the<br />

broadening of the principle, to which the message several times refers, <strong>and</strong> is a better guarantee of<br />

peace than are battleships <strong>and</strong> bayonets.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> counsel he gives in such firm tones is so plainly disinterested that no reasonable power, no<br />

nation not possessed of the instincts of a bully, would venture to disregard it.<br />

[4 December 1895]<br />

- 70 -<br />

What the President Said About <strong>Venezuela</strong> Last Year<br />

From President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Message, Dec. 3, 1894:<br />

<strong>The</strong> boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> still remains in dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. Believing that its early settlement on some just basis, alike honorable to both parties,<br />

is in the line of our established policy to remove from this hemisphere all causes of differences<br />

with powers beyond the sea, I shall renew the efforts heretofore made to bring about a<br />

restoration of diplomatic relations between the disputants <strong>and</strong> to induce a reference to<br />

arbitration, a resort which Great Britain so conspicuously favors in principle <strong>and</strong> respects in<br />

practice, <strong>and</strong> which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversary.<br />

[4 December 1895]<br />

- 71 -<br />

Salisbury’s Reply About <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

LONDON, Dec. 4.—<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette says that Lord Salisbury’s reply to the note of<br />

Secretary of State Olney in regard to the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute, which has been forwarded to<br />

Washington by mail, should be in the h<strong>and</strong>s of Sir Julian Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador to the<br />

United States, to-day or to-morrow.<br />

[5 December 1895]<br />

- 72 -<br />

SALISBURY’S NOTE ON VENEZUELA<br />

Great Britain Insists that the Schomburgk Boundary Line Should Mark<br />

the Minimum of Her Territory<br />

LONDON, Dec. 5.—<strong>The</strong> papers here will to-morrow say that it has been learned that the reply<br />

of Lord Salisbury to the recent note of Secretary of State Olney relative to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question,<br />

which reply is now en route to Washington, discusses at length the history of the question for forty<br />

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years, <strong>and</strong> intimates that Great Britain does not depart from the view that the Schomburgk boundary<br />

marks the minimum of the territory she possesses in that region.<br />

[6 December 1895]<br />

- 73 -<br />

LORD SALISBURY’S REPLY<br />

His Statement as to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Matter Is in Washington<br />

SAID TO AVOID THE REAL QUESTION<br />

<strong>British</strong> Foreign Office Desirous of Gaining Time—<strong>The</strong> Matter Likely to Come<br />

Before Congress at an Early Day<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 6.—Now that the text of Lord Salisbury’s reply to the Secretary of<br />

State’s note on the <strong>Venezuela</strong> dispute is in the h<strong>and</strong>s of Sir Julian Pauncefote, having arrived to-day,<br />

it is probable that the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador <strong>and</strong> the Secretary of State will have some personal<br />

consultations over its contents. <strong>The</strong>y will meet on even terms, so far as mere acquaintance with the<br />

text goes, for as Ambassador Bayard received a copy at it prior to its transmission <strong>and</strong> undoubtedly<br />

telegraphed a syllabus of it to Secretary Olney, it is assumed he lost no time in forwarding a copy of<br />

it to the State Department. <strong>The</strong> facts as reported to-day make it plain that the writers who<br />

represented Ambassador Bayard as having been overstepped or ignored were more anxious to give<br />

the impression that he was ill treated than they were to suppose that Great Britain was unfamiliar<br />

with diplomatic usage.<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message acquires additional significance in the light of the undoubted fact<br />

that he knew the <strong>British</strong> position as indicated in Lord Salisbury’s answer to Secretary Olney before<br />

he wrote his lines declaring that it would be unsatisfactory to this country to have a line drawn, upon<br />

one side of which the territory should be declared not subject to arbitration.<br />

It already estimated that Lord Salisbury’s letter is one that is artfully designed to protract<br />

negotiations, as it calls upon the United States for the first time to consider the boundary question<br />

on its merits. <strong>The</strong> idea of the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office is understood to be to engage the United States<br />

in a time-consuming examination of claims, proofs, arguments, etc., which must consume months or<br />

years, <strong>and</strong> meanwhile afford Great Britain an opportunity to escape from other controversies <strong>and</strong> be<br />

able to devote much attention to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no doubt that son after the holidays, probably not before, the President will send to<br />

Congress the message on <strong>Venezuela</strong> which he has promised, <strong>and</strong> with it the correspondence,<br />

including Lord Salisbury’s answer to Secretary Olney, <strong>and</strong> that the matter will be the cause of a great<br />

flood of oratory in the House <strong>and</strong> the Senate. <strong>The</strong>re are few members so hot <strong>and</strong> foolish as<br />

Representative Livingston of Georgia, who says that we want a war, were never in better fettle for it,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that we can whip Great Britain h<strong>and</strong>s down. Still, Mr. Livingston does not believe that Great<br />

Britain would fight us, for commercial reasons, <strong>and</strong> he therefore is bolder, perhaps, in his defiance<br />

of the <strong>British</strong> Empire.<br />

Representative Hitt, who it to be at the head of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, was a warm<br />

partisan <strong>and</strong> a watchful <strong>and</strong> habitual opponent of the Administration when he was one of the<br />

minority, but he is not likely to sacrifice his reputation by permitting anything to be done in the<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

House that would put the United States in the position exaggerating the wrong side of the<br />

controversy.<br />

He will be quite sure, before agreeing to an extreme resolution, that the United States will be<br />

justified in stopping Great Britain wholly from urging dem<strong>and</strong>s upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> he will see to it<br />

that the violation of the territory is the real object before advising action based upon that<br />

assumption. <strong>The</strong> applicability of the Monroe doctrine as it is understood by Congress is the first<br />

thing to be ascertained. If that is made clear, there can be no doubt what the course of the House<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Senate will be.<br />

[7 December 1895]<br />

- 74 -<br />

SALISBURY MAKES REPLY<br />

Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Olney Discuss the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Question<br />

NO OFFICIAL STATEMENT MADE PUBLIC<br />

Two Reports as to the Position Taken by the Government of Great Britain—<br />

<strong>The</strong> Attitude of the United States in the Matter<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec.7.—While there appears to be no doubt that the answer of Lord<br />

Salisbury to Secretary Olney in the <strong>Venezuela</strong> matter has been received here, <strong>and</strong> that it has been<br />

communicated by her Majesty’s Ambassador to the Secretary of State, the public learns those facts<br />

rather by conjecture than by any communication of the State Department for the general public.<br />

Intent watchfulness on the part of the person charged with the business was rewarded by the<br />

sight of Donelson, the messenger at the <strong>British</strong> Embassy, making a discreet <strong>and</strong> early call upon the<br />

Secretary of State, followed by a call of the Ambassador upon Mr. Olney. That was all that could be<br />

really seen.<br />

It was only the length of the Ambassador’s visit <strong>and</strong> the news sent fully from Engl<strong>and</strong> as to the<br />

nature of the <strong>British</strong> reply that gave color to the report that Sir Julia Pauncefote spent the time<br />

reading to Mr. Olney the language of the declination of Great Britain to submit to arbitration a<br />

dispute which she feels strong enough to settle in her own way by force.<br />

Sir Julian Pauncefote ought to be prepared to inform the Government that that the United States<br />

takes care of diplomatic secrets more religiously than does Great Britain. For while the Salisbury<br />

reply was outlined from London by telegraph before it arrived here, the State Department remained<br />

silent, refusing to-day to affirm the London reports. Until the President has returned from the<br />

Southern trip he began a few days ago <strong>and</strong> has prepared the message in which he promised the<br />

Congress to give it latest information about <strong>Venezuela</strong>, conjecture will continue to be indulged in as<br />

to the character of the <strong>British</strong> response to our request that Engl<strong>and</strong> should submit its <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

claims to arbitration.<br />

Two reports have gone out concerning the form of Lord Salisbury’s reply. Very much will<br />

depend on which one is true. One says that Great Britain refuses to submit to arbitration any of the<br />

claims made to territory within the Schomburgk line. Another report is that it will not assent to have<br />

its right discussed to hold any territory now in its possession. A willingness to permit the whole<br />

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question to go to arbitration would have contributed to the increase of confidence in the <strong>British</strong><br />

argument.<br />

<strong>The</strong> conditions imposed for admitting the territory outside the Schomburgk line are not yet<br />

suggested, but it is surmised by persons who have studied this question to be of such a character as<br />

to involve an expenditure of time <strong>and</strong> an exhaustion of patience that are bound to wear upon the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns <strong>and</strong> not convince Americans.<br />

Warlike utterances on this subject are apt to be expressed by persons whose declarations of war<br />

are not likely to control the Congress. <strong>The</strong> Administration does not talk arbitration for fear of war,<br />

but because it is believed that the best interests of the United States may be better served by a policy<br />

of peace by honorable arbitration than by war <strong>and</strong> the sacrifice of life <strong>and</strong> business to maintain an<br />

imperfectly understood controversy.<br />

Our interest in <strong>Venezuela</strong> is not so deep <strong>and</strong> binding as to oblige the United States to insist that<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns shall not get along as far as possible without cultivating war with European nations,<br />

nor is our fear of Great Britain so abject as to cause us to fear the consequences of our assertion of a<br />

policy that may be beneficial to <strong>Venezuela</strong> under the trying circumstances in which that republic<br />

finds itself.<br />

[8 December 1895]<br />

- 75 -<br />

BRITONS AGAINST ARBITRATION<br />

Opinion of the English Public on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Case<br />

LONDON. Dee. 7.—In accordance with unvarying precedent, the reply of Prime Minister<br />

Salisbury to the note of Richard Olney, the American Secretary of State, on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute,<br />

will not be issued by the Foreign Office until it is presented to Parliament. It will be a surprise to<br />

every one if Lord Salisbury, in his reply, has not firmly declined to admit the right of the United<br />

States to interfere in the dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, especially to insist that the<br />

whole case shall be submitted to arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> English public takes small interest in the dispute or the attitude of the United States on the<br />

matter. Not the remotest reference to the subject has been made on the political platform during the<br />

period that the Prime Minister has been wrestling with Mr. Olney’s note <strong>and</strong> the reply thereto. <strong>The</strong><br />

comments in the press alone indicate the line of <strong>British</strong> opinion, which, according to the<br />

newspapers, is unanimously against any arbitration concerning the territory within the Schomburgk<br />

line.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Statist says:<br />

Neither for its own sake nor ours is it expedient for the United States Government to put forward a claim as of<br />

right to dictate how we shall conduct a dispute with another country relative to territory that has long been held by<br />

the <strong>British</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States Government is entitled to offer its good offices, but there is a wide distinction between these<br />

<strong>and</strong> intervention, based on the round that the United States have the right to forbid any Government in the world<br />

to enlarge the area under its jurisdiction in any part of the American continent. Still, there is no occasion for heroics.<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong> bit of territory in dispute is of small value, while good relations with the United States are of the highest value<br />

to us <strong>and</strong> civilization.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Spectator says:<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> addresses Great Britain in the tone of a master in laying down principles so absolutely. His<br />

sentences read as if Great Britain had been ordered to choose arbitration or war. Negotiations will not be carried on<br />

in that tone unless the President arid the American people are seeking war, a crime or which we would net even<br />

mentally accuse them.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Economist, treating of the same subject, declares that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s words mean that Great<br />

Britain must not defend what she considers her own soil against any Spanish-American State, under<br />

the penalty of the United States declaring war. It is impossible for Lord Salisbury to yield to such<br />

pretensions, yet it is more difficult for him to deal with them so as to avoid exasperating American<br />

feelings. His only sensible course is to repudiate seeking for any extension of territory <strong>and</strong> do<br />

nothing, leaving on <strong>Venezuela</strong> or the United States the responsibility for aggression.<br />

All of these supposed leaders of high-class opinion in Engl<strong>and</strong> make the usual commonplace<br />

references to the American vote influencing the utterances of those in political life.<br />

[8 December 1895]<br />

- 76 -<br />

SURPRISED AT ENGLAND’S CLAIM<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister’s Views on the Dem<strong>and</strong> for $60,000—<br />

Says It Is Not an Ultimatum<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 8.—Dr. Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister at Washington, has not been<br />

informed that the reported dem<strong>and</strong> by Great Britain on his Government for $60,000 as indemnity<br />

for the arrest of <strong>British</strong> subjects within the disputed boundary has been received at Caracas. Minister<br />

Andrade, however, says he will undoubtedly be notified after the matter is placed in President<br />

Crespo’s h<strong>and</strong>s. He expressed surprise to-night at the report that Engl<strong>and</strong> should present such a<br />

claim, <strong>and</strong> stated that it could not be called an ultimatum, as it was an original dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> there<br />

would be much correspondence <strong>and</strong> investigation before it could reach that status.<br />

Diplomatic relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, he stated, have been suspended for<br />

some time, <strong>and</strong> for that reason the German Minister acts as representative of the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government at Caracas. He added that the President of <strong>Venezuela</strong> was against yielding to the <strong>British</strong><br />

in the present dispute, <strong>and</strong> would be very likely to object to paying an indemnity.<br />

<strong>The</strong> legation here has not been in receipt of news in regard to the revolution in the republic since<br />

the 1st inst., but the Minister says he does not attach much importance to it as the present<br />

dispatches state the fighting is entirely confined to the frontier. A mail is expected at the legation tomorrow,<br />

giving the latest developments in <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affairs.<br />

[9 December 1895]<br />

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- 77 -<br />

THE JINGOES ARE PUZZLED<br />

Unable to Find Out What Salisbury Said About <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

NOT TALKING MUCH OF WAR NOW<br />

Possibly <strong>The</strong>y Surmise that Engl<strong>and</strong> Has Not Assumed a Defiant<br />

Position After All—No <strong>News</strong> of the Ultimatum.<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 9.—It is not to be supposed that the jingoes of the Senate <strong>and</strong> the<br />

House have received inside information concerning the purport of the response of Lord Salisbury to<br />

the note of Secretary Olney in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n-<strong>Guiana</strong> boundary question, but for some reason they<br />

are disposed to pause before letting loose their eloquence upon the assumption that its character is<br />

such as to dem<strong>and</strong> an instant resort to hostilities between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain to<br />

settle the dispute.<br />

By intuition, perhaps, the idea has taken a lodgment that the answer is anything but defiant. That<br />

may account, in a measure, for the relaxation of impatience shown by some of his political<br />

opponents to the departure of the President for North Carolina, <strong>and</strong> to an abatement of their<br />

criticism of him for presuming at this time to go off on a duck-hunting trip.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Republicans are by no means agreed as to what they shall do if the Salisbury answer shall<br />

turn out to be couched in language tending to delay in making a definite answer to our renewed<br />

request for arbitration. <strong>The</strong> President would have had no power to do less than he did in calling for<br />

an answer to that question, instructed as he was by Congress. He plainly has no power to act in such<br />

a way as to provoke a collision, as Congress alone possesses that right. While it might be considered<br />

a good political stroke to bring on a war, a war with Great Britain would disturb business seriously,<br />

<strong>and</strong> business men are not likely to be more anxious for war as a disturber of business with our best<br />

foreign customer than they are to have domestic <strong>and</strong> foreign business deranged by a new tariff<br />

measure.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re may be calls upon the President for the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n correspondence, which he told<br />

Congress he expected to communicate to that body, but the resolutions have first to go through the<br />

two houses, <strong>and</strong> alter that the President is bound to pay regard to the consideration whether it is<br />

compatible with the public interest to communicate correspondence upon a question still under<br />

advisement.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no longer any doubt that the Administration knew, before the arrival of the Salisbury<br />

letter in the h<strong>and</strong>s of Ambassador Pauncefote, the nature of its contents, <strong>and</strong> was prepared to<br />

respond to it. <strong>The</strong> going away of the President would not necessarily make any difference in the<br />

disposition of the matter. Secretary Olney underst<strong>and</strong>s the President’s position thoroughly, <strong>and</strong><br />

doubtless will have prepared for him precisely the language of rejoinder to Lord Salisbury that the<br />

Government of the United States shall feel constrained to make to the last <strong>British</strong> communication.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister this evening received from the Director of Foreign Relations, a<br />

cablegram announcing that the country was perfectly peaceful. Minister Andrade says this is<br />

evidently an answer to a letter he sent to his Government ten days ago which probably has just<br />

reached Caracas.<br />

In that letter he called attention to the frequent reports published In this country of the unsettled<br />

state of affairs in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> recounting details of a widespread revolution against Gen. Crespo.<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

Minister Andrade considers to-day’s dispatch conclusive, <strong>and</strong> is confident that no revolutionary<br />

movement exists. <strong>The</strong> cablegram mentions no other matters, <strong>and</strong> the Minister is still unable to say<br />

whether any ultimatum from Great Britain has been presented or not.<br />

State Department officials are confident that some mistake has been made in the assertion that<br />

Great Britain has presented a peremptory dem<strong>and</strong> on <strong>Venezuela</strong> for £12,000 as ‘smart” money an<br />

account of the Yuruan incident. <strong>The</strong>y are disposed to doubt altogether that any so-called ultimatum<br />

such as that presented to Nicaragua has been sent to <strong>Venezuela</strong> at all, but they say if a note<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>ing redress for a supposed indignity has been addressed to President Crespo, it is incredible<br />

that it should ask for such an exorbitant amount as $60,000. <strong>The</strong> highest figure given at the time of<br />

the drafting of the so-called ultimatum last October was £1,000, <strong>and</strong> considering the nature of the<br />

incident, this was considered rather a fancy valuation for the character of the alleged insult to a<br />

colonial policeman.<br />

Police Inspector Barnes of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> Colonial Police, was in charge at the station on the<br />

Yuruan River, a considerable distance to the west of the Schomburgk line, which, according to Lord<br />

Salisbury’s retort to Secretary Olney, is claimed as the <strong>British</strong> western boundary. Some <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

soldiers in November, a year ago, crossed the river <strong>and</strong> arrested Barnes <strong>and</strong> two of his men as<br />

squatters <strong>and</strong> took them off toward Guacipati for trial. On the way they were met by <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

officials who promptly released the Englishmen with profuse apologies <strong>and</strong> took the soldiers into<br />

custody.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government immediately made a formal disavowal of the arrest <strong>and</strong> instituted<br />

military proceedings against all the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soldiers directly or indirectly responsible for the<br />

affair, including the Captain of the company in that district, Dominguez, who was degraded, but<br />

escaped front the country before trial.<br />

Barnes alleged that articles had been stole from his station at the time of his arrest worth about<br />

300 bolivars, equal to about $60, <strong>and</strong> this amount was promptly paid him, for which he gave a<br />

receipt as full compensation <strong>and</strong> expressed complete satisfaction.<br />

No more was thought of the matter until the announcement in October that Great Britain had<br />

determined to regard it as an international affront, requiring $5,000 smart money as an emollient for<br />

her injury. As it was alleged that the so-called ultimatum was sent to Berlin for transmission through<br />

German channels in October, officials in Washington are at a loss to account for the delay of two<br />

months in its arrival at Caracas.<br />

[10 December 1895]<br />

- 78 -<br />

CRESPO ON SALISBURY’S NOTE<br />

A Distinct Dem<strong>and</strong> for the Attack upon the <strong>British</strong> Police<br />

for Which Compensation Would Be Made<br />

LONDON, Dec. 10.—<strong>The</strong> Times will to-morrow publish a dispatch from Caracas saying that in<br />

an interview President Crespo declined to discuss the note sent to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government by<br />

Lord Salisbury.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> President did say, however, that he understood that the dem<strong>and</strong> made by Great Britain in<br />

connection with the attack made upon the <strong>British</strong> police was distinct from the boundary question.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n officer who was responsible for the attack would be punished for exceeding his<br />

duty <strong>and</strong> the Englishmen would be compensated. He could see no reason why Great Britain should<br />

intervene in a matter that concerned <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> alone.<br />

[11 December 1895]<br />

- 79 -<br />

A VENEZUELAN REPORT DENIED<br />

President Crespo Repudiates Statements Published in London<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12.—Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, to-night received a cable<br />

dispatch from his Government authorizing him to deny published statements to the effect that an<br />

interviewer for a London paper had obtained from President Crespo statements concerning the<br />

disposition of his Government on the subject of the <strong>British</strong> “smart money claim,” <strong>and</strong>, particularly,<br />

that part of the report indicating that the boundary question would be treated distinctly between<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>; that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n officer who arrested the <strong>British</strong> officers would be<br />

punished for exceeding his instructions, <strong>and</strong> that the Englishmen would be compensated.<br />

<strong>The</strong> cable message received by Mr. Andrade to-night quotes the substance of the foregoing, <strong>and</strong>,<br />

while denying it toto, particular stress is laid upon the fact that President Crespo is not to be quoted<br />

as making any statement regarding the intervention of this country in <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affairs.<br />

[13 December 1895]<br />

- 80 -<br />

VENEZUELAN MISSION DENIED<br />

Martinez Has No Official Connection With Crespo’s Government<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13.—Minister Andrade discredits the cabled report from London that<br />

Señor F. E. Martinez of Caracas is in Engl<strong>and</strong> on a secret mission from President Crespo to the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Government.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Minister says that no such person has any authority whatever from the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

President, <strong>and</strong> has no official connection with the Government. It is quite possible that a<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n named Martinez is in London, but that name is a very common one in South America.<br />

<strong>The</strong> legation here is fully informed of all <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affairs, <strong>and</strong> has authority to deny that any<br />

secret missions to London or elsewhere exist in fact or are remotely contemplated.<br />

[14 December 1895]<br />

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- 81 -<br />

CLEVELAND’S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17. – President Clevel<strong>and</strong> to-day sent the following message to<br />

Congress, relative to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary dispute:<br />

To the Congress:<br />

In my annual message addressed to the Congress on the 3rd instant I called attention to the<br />

pending boundary controversy between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> recited the<br />

substance of a representation made by the Government to Her Britannic Majesty's Government<br />

suggesting reasons why such dispute should be submitted to arbitration for settlement <strong>and</strong> inquiring<br />

whether it would be so submitted.<br />

<strong>The</strong> answer of the <strong>British</strong> Government, which was then awaited, has since been received, <strong>and</strong>,<br />

together with the despatch to which it is a reply, is hereto appended.<br />

Such reply is embodied in two communications addressed by the <strong>British</strong> Prime Minister to Sir<br />

Julian Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> ambassador at this capital. It will be seen that one of these<br />

communications is devoted exclusively to observations upon the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> claims that<br />

in the present instance a new <strong>and</strong> strange extension <strong>and</strong> development of this doctrine is insisted on<br />

by the United States; that the reasons justifying an appeal to the doctrine enunciated by President<br />

Monroe are generally inapplicable “to the state of things in which we live at the present day,” <strong>and</strong><br />

especially inapplicable to the controversy involving the boundary line between Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Without attempting extended argument in reply to these positions, it may not be amiss to<br />

suggest that the doctrine upon which we st<strong>and</strong> is strong <strong>and</strong> sound, because its enforcement is<br />

important to our peace <strong>and</strong> safety as a nation <strong>and</strong> is essential to the integrity of our free institutions<br />

<strong>and</strong> the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply to<br />

every stage of our national life <strong>and</strong> can not become obsolete while our republic endures. If the<br />

balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among the Governments of the Old World, <strong>and</strong><br />

a subject for our absolute noninterference, none the less is an observance of the Monroe doctrine of<br />

vital concern to our people <strong>and</strong> their Government.<br />

Assuming, therefore, that we may properly insist upon this doctrine without regard to “the state<br />

of things in which we live” or any changed conditions here or elsewhere, it is not apparent why its<br />

application may not be invoked in the present controversy.<br />

If a European power by an extension of its boundaries takes possession of the territory of one<br />

of our neighboring Republics against its will <strong>and</strong> in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why<br />

to that extent such European power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government to<br />

that portion of this continent which is thus taken. This is the precise action which President Monroe<br />

declared to be “dangerous to our peace <strong>and</strong> safety,” <strong>and</strong> it can make no difference whether the<br />

European system is extended by an advance of frontier or otherwise.<br />

It also suggested in the <strong>British</strong> reply that we should not seek to apply the Monroe doctrine to the<br />

pending dispute because it does not embody any principle of international law which “is founded on<br />

the general consent of nations,” <strong>and</strong> that “no statesman, however eminent, <strong>and</strong> no nation, however<br />

powerful, are competent to insert into the code of international law a novel principle which was<br />

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never recognized before <strong>and</strong> which has not since been accepted by the government of any other<br />

country.”<br />

Practically the principle for which we contend has peculiar, if not exclusive, relation to the<br />

United States. It may not have been admitted in so many words to the code of international law, but<br />

since in international councils every nation is entitled to the rights belonging to it, if the enforcement<br />

of the Monroe doctrine is something we may justly claim, it has its place in the code of international<br />

law as certainly <strong>and</strong> as securely as if it were specifically mentioned; <strong>and</strong> when the United States is a<br />

suitor before the high tribunal that administers international law the question to be determined is<br />

whether or not we present claims which the justice of that code of law can find to be right <strong>and</strong> valid.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are<br />

based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected <strong>and</strong> its just claims enforced.<br />

Of course this Government is entirely confident that under the section of this doctrine we have<br />

clear rights <strong>and</strong> undoubted claims. Nor is this ignored in the <strong>British</strong> reply. <strong>The</strong> Prime Minister, while<br />

not admitting that the Monroe doctrine is applicable to present conditions, states:<br />

In declaring that the United States would resist any such enterprise if it was contemplated, President Monroe<br />

adopted a policy which received the entire sympathy of the English Government at that date.<br />

He further declares:<br />

Though the language of President Monroe is directed to the attainment of objects which most Englishmen would<br />

agree to be salutary, it is impossible to admit that they have been inscribed by any adequate authority in the code of<br />

international law.<br />

Again he says:<br />

<strong>The</strong>y (Her Majesty's Government) fully concur with the view which President Monroe apparently entertained, that<br />

any disturbance of the existing territorial distribution in that hemisphere by any fresh acquisitions on the part of any<br />

European State would be a highly inexpedient change.<br />

In the belief that the doctrine for which we contend was clear <strong>and</strong> definite, that it was founded<br />

upon substantial considerations <strong>and</strong> involved our safety <strong>and</strong> welfare, that it was fully applicable to<br />

our present conditions <strong>and</strong> to the state of the world’s progress, <strong>and</strong> that it was directly related to the<br />

pending controversy, <strong>and</strong> without any conviction as to the final merits of the dispute, but anxious to<br />

learn in a satisfactory <strong>and</strong> conclusive manner whether Great Britain sought under a claim of<br />

boundary to extend her possessions on this continent without right, or whether she merely sought<br />

possession of territory fairly included within her lines of ownership, this Government proposed to<br />

the Government of Great Britain a resort to arbitration as a proper means of settling the question,<br />

to the end that a vexatious boundary dispute between the two contestants might be determined <strong>and</strong><br />

our exact st<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> relation in respect to the controversy might be made clear.<br />

It will be seen from the correspondence herewith submitted that this proposition has been<br />

declined by the <strong>British</strong> Government upon grounds which in the circumstances seem to me to be far<br />

from satisfactory. It is deeply disappointing that such an appeal, actuated by the most friendly<br />

feelings toward both nations directly concerned, addressed to the sense of justice <strong>and</strong> to the<br />

magnanimity of one of the great powers of the world, <strong>and</strong> touching its relations to one<br />

comparatively weak <strong>and</strong> small, should have produced no better results.<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong> course to be pursued by this Government in view of the present condition does not appear<br />

to admit of serious doubt. Having labored faithfully for many years to induce Great Britain to<br />

submit this dispute to impartial arbitration, <strong>and</strong> having been now finally apprised of her refusal to do<br />

so, nothing remains but to accept the situation, to recognize its plain requirements, <strong>and</strong> deal with it<br />

accordingly. Great Britain’s present proposition has never thus far been regarded as admissible by<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, though any adjustment to the boundary which that country may deem for her advantage<br />

<strong>and</strong> may enter into of her own free will can not of course be objected to by the United States.<br />

Assuming, however, that the attitude of <strong>Venezuela</strong> will remain unchanged, the dispute has<br />

reached such a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United States to take measures to<br />

determine with sufficient certainty for its justification what is the true divisional line between the<br />

Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> inquiry to that end should of course be conducted<br />

carefully <strong>and</strong> judicially, <strong>and</strong> due weight should be given to all available evidence, records, <strong>and</strong> facts in<br />

support of the claims of both parties.<br />

In order that such an examination should be prosecuted in a thorough <strong>and</strong> satisfactory manner, I<br />

suggest that the Congress make an adequate appropriation for the expense of a commission, to be<br />

appointed by the Executive, who shall make the necessary investigation <strong>and</strong> report on the matter<br />

with the least possible delay. When such report is made <strong>and</strong> accepted it will, in my opinion, be the<br />

duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights<br />

<strong>and</strong> interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any l<strong>and</strong>s or the exercise of governmental<br />

jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred <strong>and</strong> keenly<br />

realize all the consequences that may follow.<br />

I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two<br />

great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the<br />

onward march of civilization <strong>and</strong> strenuous <strong>and</strong> worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no<br />

calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to<br />

wrong <strong>and</strong> injustice <strong>and</strong> the consequent loss of national self-respect <strong>and</strong> honor, beneath which are<br />

shielded <strong>and</strong> defended a people’s safety <strong>and</strong> greatness.<br />

GROVER CLEVELAND<br />

Executive Mansion, December 17, 1895<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

- 82 -<br />

EXCITING SCENES IN WASHINGTON<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17.—A degree of excitement that has not been equaled in this city for<br />

many years was created by the appearance at noon to-day of the special message of the President to<br />

Congress on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. Although the message was expected, it was not looked for at<br />

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once, <strong>and</strong> its early appearance, together with its ringing reassertion of the position taken by the<br />

Administration that Engl<strong>and</strong> must not be allowed to occupy l<strong>and</strong> in this hemisphere that does not<br />

belong to her, were at once a surprise <strong>and</strong> a gratification.<br />

Prompt <strong>and</strong> Cordial Approval<br />

Never before, following a public utterance by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> or any other recent President,<br />

have the words of a message been received with such prompt <strong>and</strong> cordial approval. Men who have<br />

been seeking little occasions as a ground for criticism of the Administration forgot their<br />

dissatisfaction in commendation of the resolute opinions expressed by the President, <strong>and</strong><br />

unhesitatingly declare that every American citizen would st<strong>and</strong> to the last extremity in support of a<br />

policy so manfully <strong>and</strong> righteously asserted for the American people.<br />

Conclusions Carefully Matured<br />

<strong>The</strong> President <strong>and</strong> his Cabinet had kept the President’s intentions a profound secret. It must<br />

have been known to them that the message of to-day was contemplated, <strong>and</strong> there is reason to<br />

believe that it might have been sent in when the annual message was submitted. While the President<br />

was away, presumably enjoying a hunting trip, he was turning the matter over in his mind, <strong>and</strong> while<br />

he was not accompanied by any one with whom he could or would be likely to discuss it, there is no<br />

doubt that it was the chief topic of reflection, <strong>and</strong> that the conclusions he reached were those that<br />

had been matured carefully after the whole matter had been studied out thoroughly <strong>and</strong> full weight<br />

had been given in his mind to the consequences that would flow from a resolute challenge of Great<br />

Britain in the event that the <strong>British</strong> Empire should refuse to abide by our reiterated dem<strong>and</strong> that the<br />

boundary question must be submitted to arbitration.<br />

Its Tenor Known in Advance<br />

Long before the message was read in the Senate <strong>and</strong> hours before it became officially known to<br />

the House of Representatives its contents were familiar to the Senators <strong>and</strong> the members of the<br />

House, <strong>and</strong> by the time the Clerk of the Senate was ready to read it the Capitol was ringing with<br />

praises of the stirring last paragraph, <strong>and</strong> everybody who was worth quoting was giving his opinion<br />

of the document as a whole. <strong>The</strong> feeling was about the same on both sides of the Senate <strong>and</strong> the<br />

House.<br />

<strong>The</strong> suggestion for a commission to enable the Congress to learn the merits of the controversy<br />

was regarded as sure to cause a postponement of serious difficulty with Great Britain in case the<br />

<strong>British</strong> authorities should persist in pursuing a policy directly in opposition to what the President has<br />

declared will be our interest <strong>and</strong> adherence to our traditional policy, but nowhere was there the<br />

slightest reservation of approval of the President or of the possibility that support of him would lead<br />

to an immediate rupture of agreeable relations.<br />

No Serious Expectation of War<br />

It cannot be said that there was any strong belief that Engl<strong>and</strong> would force hostility as a result of<br />

this controversy. While it is known that there is a <strong>British</strong> desire to gain valuable gold fields in the<br />

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territory of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to which she has made claim, the value of these l<strong>and</strong>s, it gained, would be<br />

small compared with the direct <strong>and</strong> indirect loss that might be suffered by precipitating a conflict<br />

that might bring on an invasion of Canada <strong>and</strong> the loss of those colonies to the <strong>British</strong> Empire.<br />

May Lead to Salisbury’s Overthrow<br />

<strong>The</strong> persistence of the Salisbury Ministry in making the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary dispute a cause for<br />

war, <strong>and</strong> possibly the loss to Engl<strong>and</strong> for a protracted period of one of her best customers, it is<br />

believed will prove extremely unpopular with the <strong>British</strong> people, <strong>and</strong> possibly lead to the sudden <strong>and</strong><br />

complete overthrow of the Tory Party on an appeal to the people.<br />

<strong>The</strong> trade with <strong>Venezuela</strong> is of comparative inconsequence; that with the United States is<br />

constant <strong>and</strong> immense. If the <strong>British</strong> regard for commercial activity <strong>and</strong> business prosperity is not as<br />

influential as it has been in the past, <strong>and</strong> there is not full sympathy with Chamberlain in his ambition<br />

to carry out an aggressive colonial policy at whatever cost, <strong>British</strong> opinion will not, it is believed,<br />

support the position of Salisbury in this case.<br />

Waiting for the <strong>British</strong> Response<br />

Upon this <strong>British</strong> public response, <strong>and</strong> that at once, as it will be learned tomorrow, will the<br />

course of the United States Government be shaped in precautionary measures until the report is<br />

obtained from the commission asked for by the President <strong>and</strong> which will be at once prove an<br />

provided for.<br />

As the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n side is the one on which the United States authorities have been obliged to<br />

depend, it is admitted that there may be information to be derived from Great Britain or from<br />

<strong>British</strong> sources that may put a somewhat different aspect on some features of the controversy,<br />

without, however, removing our concern about the recognition of a doctrine that must come to be<br />

respected by European nations with possible designs of expansion on this continent.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Must Be Treated Decently<br />

But if the tone <strong>and</strong> temper of the <strong>British</strong> people is evil, <strong>and</strong> the effort to secure Information<br />

through a commission is not facilitated by the <strong>British</strong> in <strong>Guiana</strong>, there is no doubt that our<br />

Government will push to the utmost the preparations for supporting its dem<strong>and</strong> that <strong>Venezuela</strong> be<br />

treated with the decency that that weak <strong>and</strong> disorganized nation is entitled to receive, <strong>and</strong> dealt with<br />

in the same spirit of justice that would be exacted by a nation more capable of supporting emphatic<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Commerce at Stake<br />

While the United States lack readiness for war <strong>and</strong> is not strong in naval equipment, we have<br />

some good warships <strong>and</strong> a few merchant ships that would be able, if armed, seriously to embarrass<br />

<strong>and</strong> injure the great commercial marine of Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the direct loss that would follow the loss of<br />

ships would be insignificant as compared with the indirect loss suffered by her citizens in the<br />

interruption of a vast commerce, the loss of buyers of <strong>British</strong> goods, the advance of prices of food<br />

in Engl<strong>and</strong> incidental to an interrupted supply of American breadstuffs <strong>and</strong> provisions, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

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increased cost to the people of Engl<strong>and</strong> of maintaining in a distant sea the fleets that might be sent<br />

to attack American ports.<br />

To conduct an effective attack upon any one port of the United States would require much<br />

preparation by the <strong>British</strong>, <strong>and</strong> when all was ready there would be exposed to the danger of our<br />

flying cruisers the coal ships necessary to supply a fighting fleet, the troop ships under convoys with<br />

small coaling capacity <strong>and</strong> narrow steaming radius, while the vessels of the United States always<br />

would be able to keep near ports in which coal supplies could be had after short runs from seaward.<br />

People Will Support the President<br />

<strong>The</strong> cost of war wilt not now deter the American people from supporting the President, <strong>and</strong> if<br />

war shall result from the message of to-day, it is believed here that the country will contribute<br />

generously, if not cheerfully, its share of the cost of providing the men <strong>and</strong> arms necessary to make<br />

good all the pretensions that we shall decide to make.<br />

To declare that we are for right <strong>and</strong> justice <strong>and</strong> against wrong <strong>and</strong> injustice is not an unworthy<br />

declaration, <strong>and</strong> the American people will st<strong>and</strong> by the President in making good the assertion that<br />

their cause only can be upheld with honor <strong>and</strong> self-respect by a strict enforcement of the position<br />

the President bas taken.<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

- 83 -<br />

ENGLAND MUCH SURPRISED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Press of London Tries to Belittle the Message<br />

WAR CONSIDERED WHOLLY IMPROBABLE<br />

<strong>The</strong> Monroe Doctrine Not Regarded as Applicable to Present Conditions—<br />

Salisbury’s St<strong>and</strong> Generally Approved<br />

LONDON, Dec. 17.—All the newspapers of this city will comment upon President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

message in the morning.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Times will say:<br />

It is impossible to disguise the gravities of the difficulties that have arisen between this country <strong>and</strong> the United<br />

States. <strong>The</strong> message that President Clevel<strong>and</strong> transmitted to Congress <strong>and</strong> the reception it met from both sides in<br />

the Senate give additional importance to the dispatches that have passed between the State Department at<br />

Washington <strong>and</strong> the Foreign Office. <strong>The</strong> details of the boundary dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong> are insignificant in<br />

comparison with the far-reaching claim put forward in Mr. Olney’s dispatch <strong>and</strong> emphasized in Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

message.<br />

Convinced as we are that a rupture between the two great English-speaking communities would be a calamity,<br />

not only to themselves, but to the civilized world, we are, nevertheless, driven to the conclusion that the concessions<br />

that this country is imperiously summoned to make are such as no self-respecting nation, <strong>and</strong>, least of all, one ruling<br />

an empire that has roots in every quarter of the globe, could possibly submit to. <strong>The</strong> United States themselves<br />

would never for a moment dream of yielding to this kind of dictation. We are of the same blood, <strong>and</strong> shall not be<br />

less careful of our national honor. We can hardly believe that the course threatened by Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> will be<br />

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seriously adopted by the American Government, but, if so, it will be incumbent upon us, without entering upon any<br />

aggressive measures, to protect our imperial interests <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong> up for our rights under international law.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> will say:<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s communication is a remarkable document, though its consequences are not likely to be serious.<br />

Neither Mr. Olney nor the President seems to realize that the Monroe doctrine cannot be quoted as authoritative in<br />

negotiations with a foreign power. Both of them are certainly as far as possible from suspecting that the real author<br />

of the doctrine was Canning, not Monroe.<br />

<strong>The</strong> definition of the doctrine, however, is a matter for the Americans themselves. It binds nobody else. <strong>The</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n difficulty must be considered on its own merits. This is what Lord Salisbury has done in a masterly<br />

dispatch. As he has refused general unrestricted arbitration, upon which, by the way, the Monroe doctrine is silent, it<br />

must be assumed that he would not assent to the mode of ascertaining the rights or the parties that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

suggests. <strong>The</strong> President, in his account of the doctrine, surrenders the whole case. What Monroe meant was that the<br />

United States would resent any European attempt to establish monarchical systems in hostile communities on the<br />

American Continent.<br />

<strong>The</strong> concluding portions of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message are not expressed in the language usually employed by one<br />

friendly power to another. <strong>The</strong>y are aggressive, even menacing. Engl<strong>and</strong> is threatened with war unless she permits<br />

Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> to adjust the boundaries or <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Happily, there is some sense of humor in the American<br />

people. Regarded as a party move the message is not unskillful. It puts the Republicans in a hole. If they agree to the<br />

appointment of a commission they will give Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> such credit as belongs to it, <strong>and</strong> will enable him, or the<br />

Democratic c<strong>and</strong>idate, to pose as an accomplished twister or the lion’s tail. If, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, they refuse to<br />

agree to the commission, they will give the Democrats a chance of denouncing them as being servile friends of the<br />

<strong>British</strong>.<br />

But the great body of the American people will not be led by any such motives or considerations. <strong>The</strong> ordinary<br />

American citizen cares nothing for <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> has no feeling against this country. He might be very jealous for<br />

the Monroe doctrine when it really defended American interests, but the idea of making himself responsible for the<br />

concerns of every South American republic is too absurd for him to regard it seriously.<br />

It is not correct to say that Lord Salisbury has altogether rejected the idea of arbitration. On the contrary, he has<br />

partially accepted it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle will say to-morrow:<br />

<strong>The</strong> message will be read in this country with blank astonishment. An American commission to determine what<br />

territory a <strong>British</strong> colony can call its own, <strong>and</strong>, failing our compliance with its finding, war by l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> sea with<br />

Great Britain! Can these be serious words addressed to us by the descendants of the little shipload of English folks<br />

who sailed in the Mayflower? We will not take things too seriously. We will suppose that the President is engaged in<br />

the familiar work of twisting the lion’s tail.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is one answer to President Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America. If an enlarged application of a neglected doctrine is to<br />

be inforced with all the might of the United States, at least let us be assured of the correlative that the United States<br />

will make itself responsible for the foreign policy of all the petty, impetuous little States on the two continents of<br />

America. <strong>The</strong>re is no international right without corresponding duty.<br />

<strong>The</strong> paper concludes thus:<br />

We can only express genuine regret at the tone of the document, which meets no argument made by Lord<br />

Salisbury, <strong>and</strong> which applies a threat of force from a daughter State of the motherl<strong>and</strong> over an obscure, trumpery<br />

dispute in which the United States has no real interest. But the message cannot obscure or defeat the affection<br />

which subsists between the two countries, or break the ties of blood that must needs bind them in indissoluble<br />

union.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Morning Post will say:<br />

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President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has outdone the Republican Party in his efforts to show dislike for this country, yet he has<br />

not committed himself to anything. <strong>The</strong> message does not make the slightest attempt to grapple with Lord<br />

Salisbury’s arguments that the United States cannot find any excuse in the language of the Monroe doctrine for their<br />

appearance on the scene, or that, if they could give the old President’s words any such extension, his declaration has<br />

any authority. <strong>The</strong> international law tribunal that President Clevel<strong>and</strong> asks Congress to set up can have no more<br />

binding effect in this country than would a decision by the Supreme Court at Washington.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard will say:<br />

Most Englishmen will read the message with unfeigned astonishment. <strong>The</strong> position taken by Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> is<br />

preposterous. No citizen of the United States would for a moment dream of admitting its soundness in any<br />

analagous case in which the interest or honor of his own country was concerned. <strong>The</strong> most appropriate comment<br />

on the situation that would arise from a recognition of the Clevel<strong>and</strong> dogma is presented by the concluding words<br />

of the message [which the paper quotes, adding]:<br />

<strong>The</strong> message may be a trifle turgid, but the sentiment is wholesome. Yet it is to this act of self-abasement that<br />

the President imagines he is entitled to bring Great Britain. <strong>The</strong>re can be only one answer to such a dem<strong>and</strong>. We<br />

decline to humiliate ourselves, <strong>and</strong> refuse to accept the decision of the United States’s Executive in matters<br />

altogether outside of its jurisdiction.<br />

If it could reasonably be made out that the pretensions of the State Department to enforce arbitration<br />

throughout the American continent had any color in the Monroe doctrine, such an application of the principle<br />

would be a reductio ad absurdum of a cherished maxim. Happily, however, for the sobriety <strong>and</strong> endurance of the<br />

traditions at American diplomacy, Lord Salisbury has effectively disposed of the delusion that the Monroe doctrine<br />

is in any way pertinent to the question of the <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> frontier.<br />

As regards the precise cause of the difference with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, we believe we have a perfectly stainless record.<br />

Mr. Olney, to do him justice, refuses to take it for granted that <strong>Venezuela</strong> has substantiated her case against us,<br />

though Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, with a loss at perception, chooses to assume that our action is in derogation of the rights of<br />

the little republic. As <strong>British</strong> subjects have settled up to the Schomburgk line, we cannot possibly withdraw our<br />

protection <strong>and</strong> leave them to the risks of the revolutions <strong>and</strong> misrule of the republic, but, beyond the pale of<br />

settlement we are quite willing to accept arbitration. This however, would be of no avail. <strong>Venezuela</strong> sets up<br />

pretensions which, if found valid, would involve the absorption of half of our colony, if not the territory of our<br />

Dutch <strong>and</strong> French neighbors. By the same rule the United States might be asked to submit their title to Alaska to<br />

the judgment of impartial umpires. Congress would immediately reject such a dem<strong>and</strong>. So will the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government reject the present dem<strong>and</strong>.<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

- 84 -<br />

GREAT BRITAIN MUST HALT<br />

Further Aggressions Cannot Be Tolerated,<br />

SECRETARY OLNEY’S VIGOROUS WORDS<br />

<strong>The</strong> Contentions of Lord Salisbury Answered—Quibbles of Diplomacy Set Aside<br />

MONROE DOCTRINE HELD INAPPLICABLE<br />

<strong>The</strong> Proposition for Arbitration Contemptuously Ignored by the English Ministry<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17.—<strong>The</strong> correspondence between the State Department <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong><br />

Foreign Office touching the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute was sent to Congress to-day, along with<br />

the President’s message. <strong>The</strong> correspondence is voluminous. It is opened by a letter from Secretary<br />

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Olney to Ambassador Bayard, to which Salisbury replies in two notes addressed to Minister<br />

Pauncefote.<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

- 85 -<br />

GOVERNMENT POLICY OUTLINED<br />

Secretary Olney Tells Ambassador Bayard What Course to Pursue<br />

WASHINGTON. Dec. 17.—<strong>The</strong> first letter in relation to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question was dated<br />

July 20 last, when Secretary Olney wrote to Ambassador Bayard as follows:<br />

I am directed by the President to communicate to you his views upon a subject to which he has<br />

given much anxious thought <strong>and</strong> respecting which he has not reached a conclusion without a lively<br />

sense of its great importance as well as of the serious responsibility involved in any action now to be<br />

taken.<br />

It is not proposed, <strong>and</strong> for present purposes is not necessary, to enter into a detailed account of<br />

the controversy between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> respecting the western frontier of the colony<br />

of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> dispute is of ancient date <strong>and</strong> began at least as early as the time when Great<br />

Britain acquired by the treaty with the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s of 1814 “the establishments of Demerara,<br />

Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> Berbice.” From that time to the present the dividing line between these<br />

“establishments” (now called <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>) <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> has never ceased to be a subject of<br />

contention. <strong>The</strong> claims of both parties, it must be conceded, are of a somewhat indefinite nature.<br />

On the one h<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, in every constitution of government since she became an independent<br />

State, has declared her territorial limits to be those of the Captaincy General of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in 1810.<br />

Yet out of “moderation <strong>and</strong> prudence,” it is said, she has contented herself with claiming the<br />

Essequibo line—the line of the Essequibo River, that is—to be the true boundary between<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, at least an equal degree of indefiniteness<br />

distinguishes the claim of Great Britain. It does not seem to be asserted, for instance, that in 1814<br />

the “establishments” then acquired by Great Britain had any clearly defined western limits which can<br />

now be identified <strong>and</strong> which are either the limits insisted upon today, or, being the original limits,<br />

have been the basis of legitimate territorial extensions. On the contrary, having the actual possession<br />

of a district called the Pomaron district, she apparently remained indifferent as to the exact area of<br />

the colony until 1840, when she commissioned an engineer, Sir Robert Schomburgk, to examine <strong>and</strong><br />

lay down its boundaries. <strong>The</strong> result was the “Schomburgk line” which was fixed by metes <strong>and</strong><br />

bounds, was delineated on maps, <strong>and</strong> was at first indicated on the face of the country itself by posts,<br />

monograms, <strong>and</strong> other like symbols.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s Complaint<br />

If it was expected that <strong>Venezuela</strong> would acquiesce in this line, the expectation was doomed to<br />

speedy disappointment. <strong>Venezuela</strong> at once protested <strong>and</strong> with such vigor <strong>and</strong> to such purpose that<br />

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the line was explained to be only tentative—part of a general boundary scheme concerning Brazil<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s as well as <strong>Venezuela</strong>—<strong>and</strong> the monuments of the line set up by Schomburgk<br />

were removed by the express order of Lord Aberdeen. Under these circumstances, it seems<br />

impossible to treat the Schomburgk line as being the boundary claimed by Great Britain as matter of<br />

right, or as anything but a line originating in considerations of convenience <strong>and</strong> expediency. Since<br />

1840 various other boundary lines have from time to time been indicated by Great Britain, but all as<br />

conventional lines—lines to which <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s assent has been desired but which in no instance, it<br />

is believed, have been dem<strong>and</strong>ed as matter of right. Thus neither of the parties is today st<strong>and</strong>ing for<br />

the boundary line predicated upon strict legal right—Great Britain having formulated no such claim<br />

at all, while <strong>Venezuela</strong> insists upon the Essequibo line only as a liberal concession to her antagonist.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Early Protested<br />

Several other features of the situation remain to be briefly noticed—the continuous growth of<br />

the undefined <strong>British</strong> claim, the fate of various attempts at arbitration of the controversy, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

part in the matter heretofore taken by the United States. As already seen, the exploitation of the<br />

Schomburgk line in 1840 was at once followed by protest of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> by proceedings on the<br />

part of Great Britain which could fairly be interpreted only as a disavowal of that line. Indeed—in<br />

addition to the facts already noticed—Lord Aberdeen himself in 1844 proposed a line beginning at<br />

the River Moroco, a distinct ab<strong>and</strong>onment of the Schomburgk line. Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing this, however,<br />

every change in the <strong>British</strong> claim since that time has moved the frontier of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> farther<br />

<strong>and</strong> farther to the westward of the line thus proposed. <strong>The</strong> Granville line of 1881 placed the starting<br />

point at a distance of twenty-nine miles from the Moroco in the direction of Punta Barima. <strong>The</strong><br />

Rosebery line of 1886 placed it west of the Guaima River, <strong>and</strong> about that time, if the <strong>British</strong><br />

authority known as the “Statesman’s Year Book” is to be relied upon, the area of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> was<br />

suddenly enlarged by some 33,000 square miles—being stated as 76,000 square miles in 1885 <strong>and</strong><br />

109,000 square miles in 1887. <strong>The</strong> Salisbury line of 1890 fixed the starting point of the line in the<br />

mouth of the Amacuro west of the Punta Barima on the Orinoco. And finally, in 1893, a second<br />

Rosebery line carried the boundary from a point to the west of the Amacuro as far as the source of<br />

the Cumano River <strong>and</strong> the Sierra of Usupamo. Nor have the various claims thus enumerated been<br />

claims on paper merely.<br />

An exercise of jurisdiction corresponding more or less to such claims has accompanied or<br />

followed closely upon each <strong>and</strong> has been the more irritating <strong>and</strong> unjustifiable if, as is alleged, an<br />

agreement made in the year 1850 bound both parties to refrain from such occupation pending the<br />

settlement of the dispute.<br />

Development of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

While the <strong>British</strong> claim has been developing in the manner above described, <strong>Venezuela</strong> has made<br />

earnest <strong>and</strong> repeated efforts to have the question of boundary settled. Indeed, allowance being made<br />

for the distractions of a war of independence <strong>and</strong> for frequent internal revolutions, it may be fairly<br />

said that <strong>Venezuela</strong> has never ceased to strive for its adjustment. It could, of course, do so only<br />

through peaceful methods, any resort to force as against its powerful adversary being out of the<br />

question. Accordingly, shortly after the drawing of the Schomburgk line, an effort was made to settle<br />

the boundary by treaty, <strong>and</strong> was apparently progressing towards a successful issue when negotiations<br />

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were brought to an end in 1844 by the death of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Plenipotentiary. <strong>Venezuela</strong> in 1848<br />

entered upon a period of civil commotions which lasted for more than a quarter of a century, <strong>and</strong><br />

the negotiations thus interrupted in 1844 were not resumed until 1876. In that year <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

offered to close the dispute by accepting the Moroco line proposed by Aberdeen. But, without<br />

giving reasons for his refusal, Lord Granville rejected the proposal <strong>and</strong> suggested a new line<br />

comprehending a large tract of territory all pretension to which seemed to have been ab<strong>and</strong>oned by<br />

the previous action of Lord Aberdeen. <strong>Venezuela</strong> refused to assent to it, <strong>and</strong> negotiations dragged<br />

along without result until 1882, when <strong>Venezuela</strong> concluded that the only course open to her was<br />

arbitration of the controversy. Before she had made any definite proposition, however, Great Britain<br />

took the initiative by suggesting the making of a treaty which should determine various other<br />

questions as well as that of the disputed boundary.<br />

Arbitration Was Accepted<br />

<strong>The</strong> result was that a treaty was practically agreed upon with the Gladstone government in 1886<br />

containing a general arbitration clause under which the parties might have submitted the boundary<br />

dispute to the decision of a third power or of several powers in amity with both. Before the actual<br />

signing of the treaty, however, the administration of Mr. Gladstone was superseded by that of Lord<br />

Salisbury, which declined to accede to the arbitration clause of the treaty notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the<br />

reasonable expectations of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to the contrary based upon the Premier’s emphatic declaration<br />

in the House of Lords that no serious government would think of not respecting the engagements<br />

of its predecessor.<br />

Since then <strong>Venezuela</strong> on the one side has been offering <strong>and</strong> calling for arbitration, while Great<br />

Britain on the other has responded by insisting upon the condition that any arbitration should relate<br />

only to such of the disputed territory as lies west of a line designated by herself. As this condition<br />

seemed inadmissible to <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> as, while the negotiations were pending, new appropriations<br />

of what is claimed to be <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory continued to be made, <strong>Venezuela</strong> in 1887 suspended<br />

diplomatic relations with Great Britain, protesting “before Her Britannic Majesty’s Government, <strong>and</strong><br />

to all civilized nations <strong>and</strong> before the world in general, against the acts of spoliation committed to<br />

her detriment by the Government of Great Britain, which she at no time <strong>and</strong> on no account will<br />

recognize as capable of altering in the least the rights which she has inherited from Spain <strong>and</strong><br />

respecting which she will ever be willing to submit to the decision of a third power.”<br />

Why <strong>Venezuela</strong> Quit<br />

Diplomatic relations have not since been restored, though what is claimed to be new <strong>and</strong><br />

flagrant <strong>British</strong> aggressions forced <strong>Venezuela</strong> to resume negotiations on the boundary question in<br />

1890, through its Minister in Paris <strong>and</strong> a special envoy on that subject, <strong>and</strong> in 1893, through a<br />

confidential agent, Señor Michelena. <strong>The</strong>se negotiations, however, met with the fate of other like<br />

previous negotiations—Great Britain refusing to arbitrate except as to territory west of an arbitrary<br />

line drawn by herself. All attempts in that direction definitely terminated in October, 1893, when<br />

Señor Michelena filed with the Foreign Office the following declaration: “I perform a most strict<br />

duty in raising again in the name of the Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong> a most solemn protest against the<br />

proceedings of the Colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, constituting encroachments upon the territory of the<br />

Republic, <strong>and</strong> against the declaration contained in Your Excellency’s communication that Her<br />

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Britannic Majesty’s Government considers that part of the territory as pertaining to <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> admits no claim to it on the part of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. In support of this protest I reproduce all the<br />

arguments presented to Your Excellency in my note of 29 of last September <strong>and</strong> those which have<br />

been exhibited by the Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong> on the various occasions they have raised the same<br />

protest.<br />

Britain Held Responsible<br />

I lay on Her Britannic Majesty’s Government the entire responsibility of the incidents that may<br />

arise in the future from the necessity to which <strong>Venezuela</strong> has been driven to oppose by all possible<br />

means the dispossession of a part of her territory, for by disregarding her just representation to put<br />

an end to this violent state of affairs through the decision of arbiters, Her Majesty s Government<br />

ignores her rights, <strong>and</strong> imposes upon her the painful though peremptory duty of providing for her<br />

own legitimate defense.”<br />

To the territorial controversy between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, thus briefly<br />

outlined, the United States has not been <strong>and</strong>, indeed, in view of its traditional policy, could not be<br />

indifferent. <strong>The</strong> note to the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office by which <strong>Venezuela</strong> opened negotiations in 1876<br />

was at once communicated to this Government. In January, 1881, a letter of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Minister at Washington respecting certain alleged demonstrations at the mouth of the Orinoco was<br />

thus answered by Mr. Evarts, then Secretary of State:<br />

“In reply I have to inform you that in view of the deep interest which the Government of the United States<br />

takes in all transactions tending to attempted encroachments of foreign powers upon the territory of any of the<br />

Republics of this continent, this Government could not look with indifference to the forcible acquisition of territory<br />

by Engl<strong>and</strong> if the mission of the vessels now at the month of the Orinoco should be found to be for that end. This<br />

Government awaits, therefore, with natural concern the more particular statements promised by the Government of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, which it hopes will not be long delayed.”<br />

In the February following, Mr. Evarts wrote again on the same subject as follows:<br />

“Referring to your note of the 21st of December last, touching the operations of certain <strong>British</strong> war vessels in<br />

<strong>and</strong> near the mouth of the Orinoco River <strong>and</strong> to my reply thereto of the 31st ultimo as well as to the recent<br />

occasions in which the subject has been mentioned in our conferences concerning the business of your mission, I<br />

take it to be fitting now at the close of my incumbency of the office I hold to advert to the interest with which the<br />

Government of the United States cannot fail to regard any such purpose with respect to the control of American<br />

territory as is stated to be contemplated by the Government of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> to express my regret that the<br />

further information promised in your note with regard to such designs had not reached me in season to receive the<br />

attention which, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the severe pressure of public business at the end of an administrative term, I<br />

should have taken pleasure in bestowing upon it. I doubt not, however, that your representations in fulfillment of<br />

the awaited additional orders of your Government will have like earnest <strong>and</strong> solicitous consideration at the b<strong>and</strong>s of<br />

my successor.”<br />

Arbitration Suggested<br />

In November, 1882, the then state of negotiations with Great Britain together with a copy of an<br />

intended note suggesting recourse to arbitration was communicated to the Secretary of State by the<br />

President of <strong>Venezuela</strong> with the expression of the hope that the United States would give him its<br />

opinion <strong>and</strong> advice <strong>and</strong> such support as it deemed possible to offer <strong>Venezuela</strong> in order that justice<br />

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should be done her. Mr. Frelinghuysen replied in a dispatch to the United States Minister at Caracas<br />

as follows:<br />

This Government has already expressed its view that arbitration of such disputes is a convenient resort in the<br />

case of failure to come to a mutual underst<strong>and</strong>ing, <strong>and</strong> intimated its willingness, if <strong>Venezuela</strong> should so desire, to<br />

propose to Great Britain such a mode of settlement. It is felt that the tender of good offices would not be so<br />

profitable if the United States were to approach Great Britain as the advocate of prejudged solution in favor of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. So far as the United States can counsel <strong>and</strong> assist <strong>Venezuela</strong> it believes it best to confine its reply to the<br />

renewal of the suggestion of arbitration <strong>and</strong> the offer of all its good offices in that direction. This suggestion is the<br />

more easily made, since it appears, from the instruction sent by Señor Seijas to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister in London<br />

on the same 15th of July, 1882, that the President of <strong>Venezuela</strong> proposed to the <strong>British</strong> Government the<br />

submission of the dispute to arbitration by a third Power.<br />

You will take an early occasion to present the foregoing considerations to Señor Seijas, saying to him that,<br />

while trusting that the direct proposal for arbitration already made to Great Britain may bear good fruit (if, indeed, it<br />

has not already done so by its acceptance in principle), the Government of the United States will cheerfully lend any<br />

needful aid to press upon Great Britain in a friendly way the proposition so made, <strong>and</strong> at the same time you will say<br />

to Señor Seijas (in personal conference, <strong>and</strong> not with the formality of a written communication) that the United<br />

States, while advocating strongly the recourse of arbitration for the adjustment of international disputes affecting<br />

the states of America, does not seek to put itself forward as their arbiter; that, viewing all such questions impartially<br />

<strong>and</strong> with no intent or desire to prejudge their merits, the United States will not refuse its arbitration if asked by both<br />

parties, <strong>and</strong> that, regarding all such questions as essentially <strong>and</strong> distinctively American, the United States would<br />

always prefer to see such contentions adjusted through the arbitrament of an American rather than an European<br />

Power.<br />

Minister Guzman’s Plan<br />

General Guzman Blanco, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister to Engl<strong>and</strong> in 1884, appointed with special<br />

reference to pending negotiations for a general treaty with Great Britain, visited Washington on his<br />

way to London <strong>and</strong>, after several conferences with the Secretary of State respecting the objects of<br />

his mission, was thus commended to the good offices of Mr. Lowell, our Minister at St. James’s:<br />

“It will be necessarily be somewhat within your discretion how far your good offices may be profitably<br />

employed with Her Majesty s Government to these ends, <strong>and</strong> at any rate you may take proper occasion to let Lord<br />

Granville know that we are not without concern as to whatever may affect the interests of a sister Republic of the<br />

American continent <strong>and</strong> its position in the family of nations.<br />

“If General Guzman should apply to you for advice or assistance in realizing the purposes of his mission you<br />

will show him proper consideration, <strong>and</strong> without committing the United States to any determinate political solution<br />

you will endeavor to carry out the views of this instruction.”<br />

Arbitration Offered<br />

<strong>The</strong> progress of Gen. Guzman’s negotiations did not fail to be observed d by this Government<br />

<strong>and</strong> in December, 1886, with a view to preventing the rupture of diplomatic relations—which<br />

actually took place in February following—the then Secretary of State, Mr. Bayard, instructed our<br />

Minister to Great Britain to tender the arbitration of the United States, in the following terms:<br />

“It does not appear that at any time heretofore the good offices of this Government have been actually<br />

tendered to avert a rupture between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. As intimated in my No. 58, our inaction in this<br />

regard would seem to be due to the reluctance of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to have the Government of the United States take any<br />

steps having relation to the action of the <strong>British</strong> Government which might, in appearance even, prejudice the resort<br />

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to further arbitration or mediation which <strong>Venezuela</strong> desired. Nevertheless, the records abundantly testify our<br />

friendly concern in the adjustment of the dispute; <strong>and</strong> the intelligence now received warrants me in tendering<br />

through you to Her Majesty’s Government the good offices of the United States to promote an amicable settlement<br />

of the respective claims of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> in the premises.<br />

“As proof of the impartiality with which we view the question, we offer our arbitration, if acceptable to both<br />

countries. We do this with the less hesitancy as the dispute turns upon simple <strong>and</strong> readily ascertainable historical<br />

facts.<br />

“Her Majesty’s Government will readily underst<strong>and</strong> that this attitude of friendly neutrality <strong>and</strong> entire<br />

impartiality touching the merits of the controversy, consisting wholly in a difference of facts between our friends<br />

<strong>and</strong> neighbors, is entirely consistent <strong>and</strong> compatible with the sense of responsibility that rests upon the United<br />

States in relation to the South American republics.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> doctrines we announced two generations ago, at the instance <strong>and</strong> with the moral support <strong>and</strong> approval of<br />

the <strong>British</strong> Government, have lost none of their force or importance in the progress of time <strong>and</strong> the Governments<br />

of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States are equally in conserving a status, the wisdom of which has been<br />

demonstrated by the experience of more than half a century.<br />

“It is proper, therefore, that you should convey to Lord Iddesleigh, in such sufficiently guarded terms as your<br />

discretion may dictate, the satisfaction that would be felt by the Government of the United States in perceiving that<br />

its wishes in this regard were permitted to have influence with Her Majesty s Government.”<br />

Great Britain Declined<br />

This offer of mediation was declined by Great Britain, with the statement that a similar offer had<br />

already been received from another quarter, <strong>and</strong> that the Queen’s Government were still not without<br />

hope of a settlement by direct diplomatic negotiations.<br />

In February, 1888, having been informed that the Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> had by formal<br />

decree laid claim to the territory traversed by the route of a proposed railway from Ciudad Bolivar to<br />

Guacipati, Mr. Bayard addressed a note to our Minister to Engl<strong>and</strong>, from which the following<br />

extracts are taken:<br />

<strong>The</strong> claim now stated to have been put forth by the authorities of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> necessarily gives rise to grave<br />

disquietude, <strong>and</strong> creates an apprehension that the territorial claim does not follow historical traditions or evidence,<br />

but is apparently indefinite. At no time hitherto does it appear that the district, of which Guacipati is the center, has<br />

been claimed as <strong>British</strong> territory or that such jurisdiction has ever been asserted over its inhabitants, <strong>and</strong> if the<br />

reported decree of the Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> be indeed genuine it is not apparent how any line of railway<br />

from Ciudad Bolivar to Guacipati could enter or traverse territory within the control of Great Britain.<br />

It is true that the line claimed by Great Britain as the western boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> is uncertain <strong>and</strong><br />

vague. It is only necessary to examine the <strong>British</strong> Colonial Office List for a few years back to perceive this. In the<br />

issue for 1877, for instance, the line runs nearly southwardly from the mouth of the Amacuro to the junction of the<br />

Cotinga <strong>and</strong> Takutu rivers. In the issue of 1887, ten years later, it makes a wide detour to the westward, following<br />

the Yuruari. Guacipati lies considerably westward of the line officially claimed in 1887, <strong>and</strong> it may perhaps be<br />

instructive to compare with it the map which doubtless will be found in the Colonial Office List for the present<br />

year.<br />

It may be well for you to express anew to Lord Salisbury the great gratification it would afford this<br />

Government to see the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute amicably <strong>and</strong> honorably settled by arbitration or otherwise <strong>and</strong> our<br />

readiness to do anything we properly can to assist to that end.<br />

In the course of your conversation you may refer to the publication in <strong>The</strong> London Financier of Jan. 24 (a copy of<br />

which you can procure <strong>and</strong> exhibit to Lord Salisbury) <strong>and</strong> express apprehension lest the widening pretensions of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> to possess territory over which <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s jurisdiction has never heretofore been disputed may not<br />

diminish the chances for a practical settlement.<br />

If, indeed, it should appear that there is no fixed limit to the <strong>British</strong> boundary claim, our good disposition to aid<br />

in a settlement might not only be defeated, but be obliged to give place to a feeling of grave concern.<br />

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Blaine’s St<strong>and</strong> Reviewed<br />

Information having been received in 1889 that Barima, at the mouth of the Orinoco, had been<br />

declared a <strong>British</strong> port, Mr. Blaine, then Secretary of State, authorized Mr. White to confer with<br />

Lord Salisbury for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

on the basis of a temporary restoration of the status quo, <strong>and</strong> May 1 <strong>and</strong> May 6, 1890, sent the<br />

following telegrams to our Minister to Engl<strong>and</strong>, Mr. Lincoln:<br />

Mr. Lincoln is instructed to use his good offices with Lord Salisbury to bring about the resumption of<br />

diplomatic intercourse between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> as a preliminary step towards the settlement of the<br />

boundary dispute by arbitration. <strong>The</strong> joint proposals of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States towards Portugal which<br />

have just been brought about would seem to make the present time propitious for submitting this question to an<br />

international arbitration. He is requested to propose to Lord Salisbury, with a view to an accommodation, that an<br />

informal conference be had in Washington or in London of representatives of the three powers. In such conference<br />

the position of the United States is one solely of impartial toward both litigants. It is, nevertheless, desired that you<br />

shall do all you can consistently with our attitude of impartial friendship to induce some accord between the<br />

contestants by which the merits of the controversy may be fairly ascertained <strong>and</strong> the rights of each party justly<br />

confirmed. <strong>The</strong> neutral position of this Government does not comport with any expression of opinion on the part<br />

of this Department an to what these rights are, but it is confident that the shifting footing on which the <strong>British</strong><br />

boundary question has rested for several years past is an obstacle to such a correct appreciation of the nature <strong>and</strong><br />

grounds of her claim as would alone warrant the formation of any opinion.<br />

In the course of the same year, 1890, <strong>Venezuela</strong> sent to London a special envoy to bring about<br />

the resumption of diplomatic relations with Great Britain through the good offices of the United<br />

States Minister. But the mission failed because a condition of such resumption, steadily adhered to<br />

by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, was the reference of the boundary dispute to arbitration. Since the close of the<br />

negotiations initiated by Señor Michelena in 1893, <strong>Venezuela</strong> has repeatedly brought the controversy<br />

to the notice of the United States, has insisted upon its importance to the United States as well as to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, has represented it to have reached an acute stage—making definite action by the United<br />

States imperative—<strong>and</strong> has not ceased to solicit the services <strong>and</strong> support of the United States in aid<br />

of its final adjustment. <strong>The</strong>se appeals have not been received with indifference <strong>and</strong> our Ambassador<br />

to Great Britain has been uniformly instructed to exert all his influence in the direction of the reestablishment<br />

of diplomatic relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> in favor of<br />

arbitration of the boundary controversy. <strong>The</strong> Secretary of State in a communication to Mr. Bayard,<br />

bearing the date July 13, 1894, used the following language:<br />

A Peaceful Settlement Desired<br />

“<strong>The</strong> President is inspired by a desire for a peaceable <strong>and</strong> honorable settlement of existing difficulties between<br />

an American state <strong>and</strong> a powerful transatlantic nation, <strong>and</strong> would be glad to see the re-establishment of such<br />

diplomatic relations between them as would promote that end.<br />

“I can discern but two equitable solutions of the present controversy. One is the determination of the rights of<br />

the disputants as the respective successors to the historical rights of Holl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Spain over the region in question.<br />

<strong>The</strong> other is to create a new boundary line in accordance with the dictates of mutual expediency <strong>and</strong> consideration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> two Governments having so far been unable to agree on a conventional line, the consistent <strong>and</strong> conspicuous<br />

advocacy by the United States <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> of the principle of arbitration <strong>and</strong> their recourse thereto in settlement<br />

important questions arising between them, makes such a mode of adjustment equally appropriate in the present<br />

instance, <strong>and</strong> this Government will gladly do what it can to further a determination in that sense.”<br />

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<strong>The</strong> President’s Views<br />

Subsequent communications to Mr. Bayard direct him to ascertain whether a Minister from<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> would be received by Great Britain. In the annual Message to Congress of December 3rd<br />

last, the President used the following language:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> still remains in dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Believing that<br />

its early settlement on some just basis alike honorable to both parties is in the line of our established policy to<br />

remove from this hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the sea, I shall renew the efforts<br />

heretofore made to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations between the disputants <strong>and</strong> to induce a<br />

reference to arbitration—a resort which Great Britain so conspicuously favors in principle <strong>and</strong> respects in practice<br />

<strong>and</strong> which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversary.”<br />

And February 22, 1895, a joint resolution of Congress declared: “that the President’s suggestion .<br />

. . that Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> refer their dispute as to boundaries to friendly arbitration be<br />

earnestly recommended to the favorable consideration of both parties in interest.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> important features of the existing situation, as shown by the foregoing recital, may be briefly<br />

stated.<br />

1. <strong>The</strong> title to territory of indefinite but confessedly very large extent is in dispute between Great<br />

Britain on the one h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the South American Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> on the other.<br />

2. <strong>The</strong> disparity in the strength of the claimants is such that <strong>Venezuela</strong> can hope to establish her<br />

claim only through peaceful methods—through an agreement with her adversary either upon the<br />

subject itself or upon an arbitration.<br />

3. <strong>The</strong> controversy, with varying claims on the part of Great Britain has existed for more than<br />

half a century, during which period many earnest <strong>and</strong> persistent efforts of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to establish a<br />

boundary by agreement have proved unsuccessful.<br />

4. <strong>The</strong> futility of the endeavor to obtain a conventional line being recognized, <strong>Venezuela</strong> for a<br />

quarter of a century has asked <strong>and</strong> striven for arbitration.<br />

5. Great Britain, however, has always <strong>and</strong> continuously refused to arbitrate, except upon the<br />

condition of a renunciation of a large part of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claim <strong>and</strong> of a concession to herself of<br />

a large share of the territory in controversy.<br />

6. By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the instance of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, by constantly<br />

urging <strong>and</strong> promoting the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, by pressing<br />

for arbitration of the disputed boundary, by offering to act as arbitrator, by expressing its grave<br />

concern whenever new alleged instances of <strong>British</strong> aggression upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory have been<br />

brought to its notice, the Government of the United States has made it clear to Great Britain <strong>and</strong> to<br />

the world that the controversy is one in which both its honor <strong>and</strong> its interests are involved <strong>and</strong> the<br />

continuance of which it can not regard with indifference.<br />

This Country’s Position<br />

<strong>The</strong> accuracy of the foregoing analysis of the existing status cannot, it is believed, be challenged.<br />

It shows that status to be such that those charged with the interests of the United States are now<br />

forced to determine exactly what those interests are <strong>and</strong> what course of action they require. It<br />

compels them to decide to what extent, if any, the United States may <strong>and</strong> should intervene in a<br />

controversy between <strong>and</strong> primarily concerning only Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> to decide how<br />

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far it is bound to see that the integrity of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory is not impaired by the pretensions of<br />

its powerful antagonist. Are any such right <strong>and</strong> duty devolved upon the United States? If not, the<br />

United States has already done all, if not more than all, that a purely sentimental interest in the<br />

affairs of the two countries justifies, <strong>and</strong> to push its interposition further would be unbecoming <strong>and</strong><br />

undignified <strong>and</strong> might well subject it to the charge of impertinent intermeddling with affairs with<br />

which it has no rightful concern.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, if any such right <strong>and</strong> duty exist, their due exercise <strong>and</strong> discharge will not<br />

permit of any action that shall not be efficient <strong>and</strong> that, if the power of the United States is adequate,<br />

shall not result in the accomplishment of the end in view. <strong>The</strong> question thus presented, as matter of<br />

principle <strong>and</strong> regard being had to the settled national policy, does not seem difficult of solution. Yet<br />

the momentous practical consequences dependent upon its determination require that it should be<br />

carefully considered <strong>and</strong> that the grounds of the conclusion arrived at should be fully <strong>and</strong> frankly<br />

stated.<br />

That there are circumstances under which a nation may justly interpose in a controversy to<br />

which two or more other nations are the direct parties <strong>and</strong> immediate parties is an admitted canon<br />

of international law. <strong>The</strong> doctrine is ordinarily expressed in terms of the most general character <strong>and</strong><br />

is perhaps incapable of more specific statement. It is declared in substance that a nation may avail<br />

itself of this right whenever what is done or proposed by any of the parties primarily concerned is a<br />

serious <strong>and</strong> direct menace to its own integrity, tranquillity, or welfare. <strong>The</strong> propriety of the rule when<br />

applied in good faith will not be questioned in any quarter. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, it is an inevitable<br />

though unfortunate consequence of the wide scope of the rule that it has only too often been made<br />

a cloak for schemes of wanton spoliation <strong>and</strong> aggr<strong>and</strong>izement. We are concerned at this time,<br />

however, not so much with the general rule as with a form of it which is peculiarly <strong>and</strong> distinctively<br />

America. Washington, in the solemn admonition of the Farewell Address, explicitly warned his<br />

countrymen against entanglements with the politics or the controversies of European powers.<br />

“Europe,” he said, “has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation.<br />

Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to<br />

our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the<br />

ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations <strong>and</strong> collisions of her friendships or<br />

enmities. Our detached <strong>and</strong> distant situation invites <strong>and</strong> enables us to pursue a different course.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Monroe Doctrine<br />

During the administration of President Monroe this doctrine of the farewell address was first<br />

considered in all its aspects <strong>and</strong> with a view to all its practical consequences. <strong>The</strong> farewell address,<br />

while it took America out of the field of European politics, was silent as to the part Europe might be<br />

permitted to play in America. Doubtless it was thought the latest addition to the family of nations<br />

should not make haste to prescribe rules for the guidance of its older members, <strong>and</strong> the expediency<br />

<strong>and</strong> propriety of serving the powers of Europe with notice of a complete <strong>and</strong> distinctive American<br />

policy excluding them from interference with American political affairs might well seem dubious to<br />

a generation to whom the French alliance, with its manifold advantages to the cause of American<br />

independence, was fresh in mind. Twenty years later, however, the situation had changed. <strong>The</strong> lately<br />

born nation had greatly increased in power <strong>and</strong> resources, had demonstrated its strength on l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

sea <strong>and</strong> as well in the conflicts of arms as in the pursuits of peace, <strong>and</strong> had begun to realize the<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>ing position on this continent which the character of its people, their free institutions, <strong>and</strong><br />

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their remoteness from the chief scene of European contentions combined to give to it. <strong>The</strong> Monroe<br />

administration therefore did not hesitate to accept <strong>and</strong> apply the logic of the Farewell Address by<br />

declaring in effect that American non-intervention in European affairs necessarily implied <strong>and</strong> meant<br />

European non-intervention in American affairs.<br />

What Monroe Believed<br />

Conceiving unquestionably that complete European non-interference in American concerns<br />

would be cheaply purchased by complete American non-interference in European concerns,<br />

President Monroe, in the celebrated Message of December 2, 1823, used the following language:<br />

In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it<br />

comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries<br />

or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere, we are of necessity, more<br />

immediately connected, <strong>and</strong> by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened <strong>and</strong> impartial observers. <strong>The</strong><br />

political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference<br />

proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defense of our own which has been<br />

achieved by the loss of so much blood <strong>and</strong> treasure <strong>and</strong> matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens,<br />

<strong>and</strong> under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to c<strong>and</strong>or<br />

<strong>and</strong> to the amicable relations existing between the United States <strong>and</strong> those powers to declare that we should<br />

consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our<br />

peace <strong>and</strong> safety.<br />

With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered <strong>and</strong> shall not<br />

interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence <strong>and</strong> maintained it, <strong>and</strong> whose<br />

independence we have, on great consideration <strong>and</strong> on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any<br />

interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European<br />

power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. . .<br />

Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated<br />

that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of<br />

its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations<br />

with it, <strong>and</strong> to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, <strong>and</strong> manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of<br />

every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently <strong>and</strong><br />

conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of<br />

either continent without endangering our peace <strong>and</strong> happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren,<br />

if left to themselves would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold<br />

such interposition, in any form, with indifference.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Monroe administration, however, did not content itself with formulating a correct rule for<br />

the regulation of the relations between Europe <strong>and</strong> America. It aimed at also securing the practical<br />

benefits to result from the application of the rule. Hence the message just quoted declared that the<br />

American continents were fully occupied <strong>and</strong> were not the subjects for future colonization by<br />

European powers.<br />

To this spirit <strong>and</strong> this purpose, also, are to be attributed the passages of the same message which<br />

treat any infringement of the rule against interference in American affairs on the part of the powers<br />

of Europe as an act of unfriendliness to the United States. It was realized that it was futile to lay<br />

down such a rule unless its observance could be enforced. It was manifest that the United States was<br />

the only power inn this hemisphere capable of enforcing it. It was therefore courageously declared<br />

not merely that Europe ought not to interfere in American affairs, but that any European power<br />

doing so would be regarded as antagonizing the interests <strong>and</strong> inviting the opposition of the United<br />

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States.<br />

America Not Open to Colonization<br />

That America is in no part open to colonization, though the proposition was not universally<br />

admitted at the time of its first enunciation has long been universally conceded. We are now<br />

concerned, therefore, only with that other practical application of the Monroe doctrine, the<br />

disregard of which by an European power is to be deemed an act of unfriendliness towards the<br />

United States.<br />

What the United States Dem<strong>and</strong>s<br />

<strong>The</strong> precise scope <strong>and</strong> limitations of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not<br />

establish any general protectorate by the United American states over other American states. It does<br />

not relieve any American state from its obligations as fixed by international law nor prevent any<br />

European Power directly interested from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited<br />

punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs<br />

of any American state or in the relations between it <strong>and</strong> other American states. It does not justify<br />

any attempt on our part to change the established form of government of any American state or to<br />

prevent the people of such state from altering that form according to their own will <strong>and</strong> pleasure.<br />

<strong>The</strong> rule in question has but a single purpose <strong>and</strong> object. It is that no European power or<br />

combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American state of the right <strong>and</strong> power of<br />

self-government <strong>and</strong> of shaping for itself its own political fortunes <strong>and</strong> destinies.<br />

That the rule thus defined has been the accepted public law of this country ever since its<br />

promulgation cannot fairly be denied. Its pronouncement by the Monroe administration at that<br />

particular time was unquestionably due to the inspiration of Great Britain, who at once gave to it an<br />

open <strong>and</strong> unqualified adhesion which has never been withdrawn. But the rule was decided upon <strong>and</strong><br />

formulated by the administration as a distinctively American doctrine of great import to the safety<br />

<strong>and</strong> welfare of the United States after the most careful consideration by a Cabinet which numbered<br />

among its members John Quincy Adams, Calhoun, Crawford, <strong>and</strong> Wirt, <strong>and</strong> which before acting<br />

took both Jefferson <strong>and</strong> Madison into its counsels. Its promulgation was received with acclaim by<br />

the entire people of the country irrespective of party. Three years after, Webster declared that the<br />

doctrine involved the honor of the country. “I look upon it,” he said, “as part of its treasures of<br />

reputation, <strong>and</strong> for one I intend to guard it,” <strong>and</strong> he added, “I look on the message of December,<br />

1823, as forming a bright page in our history. I will help neither to erase it nor to tear it out; nor<br />

shall it be by any act of mine blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the Government, <strong>and</strong><br />

I will not diminish that honor.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Action on Congress<br />

Though the rule thus highly eulogized by Webster has never been formally affirmed by<br />

Congress, the House in 1864 declared against the Mexican monarchy sought to be set up by the<br />

French as not in accord with the policy of the United States, <strong>and</strong> in 1889 the Senate expressed its<br />

disapproval of the connection of any European power with a canal across the Isthmus of Darien or<br />

Central America. It is manifest that, if a rule has been openly <strong>and</strong> uniformly declared <strong>and</strong> acted upon<br />

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by the executive branch of the Government for more than seventy years without express<br />

repudiation by Congress, it must be conclusively presumed to have its sanction. Yet it is certainly no<br />

more than the exact truth to say that every administration since President Monroe’s has had<br />

occasion, <strong>and</strong> sometimes more occasions than one, to examine <strong>and</strong> consider the Monroe doctrine<br />

<strong>and</strong> has in each instance given it emphatic endorsement. Presidents have dwelt upon it in messages<br />

to Congress <strong>and</strong> Secretaries of State have time after time made it the theme of diplomatic<br />

representation.<br />

Nor, if the practical results of the rule be sought for, is the record either meager or obscure. Its<br />

first <strong>and</strong> immediate effect was indeed most momentous <strong>and</strong> far reaching. It was the controlling<br />

factor in the emancipation of South America <strong>and</strong> to it the independent states which now divide that<br />

region between them are largely indebted for their very existence. Since then the most striking single<br />

achievement to be credited to the rule is the evacuation of Mexico by the French upon the<br />

termination of the civil war. But we are also indebted to it for the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer<br />

treaty, which both neutralized any interoceanic canal across Central America <strong>and</strong> expressly excluded<br />

Great Britain from occupying or exercising any dominion over any part of Central America. It has<br />

been used in the case of Cuba as if justifying the position that, while the sovereignty of Spain will be<br />

respected, the isl<strong>and</strong> will not be permitted to become the possession of any other European power.<br />

It has been influential in bringing about the definite relinquishment of any supposed protectorate by<br />

Great Britain over the Mosquito Coast. President Polk, in the case of Yucatan <strong>and</strong> the proposed<br />

voluntary transfer of that country to Great Britain or Spain, relied upon the Monroe doctrine,<br />

though perhaps erroneously, when he declared in a special message to Congress on the subject that<br />

the United States could not consent to any such transfer. Yet, in somewhat the same spirit, Secretary<br />

Fish affirmed in 1870 that President Grant had but followed “the teachings of all our history” in<br />

declaring in his annual message of that year that existing dependencies were no longer regarded as<br />

subject to transfer from one European power to another, <strong>and</strong> that when the present relation of<br />

colonies ceases they are to become independent powers. Another development of the rule, though<br />

apparently not required by either its letter or its spirit, is found in the objection to arbitration of<br />

South American controversies by an European Power. American questions, it is said, are for<br />

American decision, <strong>and</strong> on that ground the United States went so far as to refuse to mediate in the<br />

war between Chile <strong>and</strong> Peru jointly with Great Britain <strong>and</strong> France. Finally, on the ground, among<br />

others, that the authority of the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> the prestige of the United States as its<br />

exponent <strong>and</strong> sponsor would be seriously impaired, Secretary Bayard strenuously resisted the<br />

enforcement of the Pelletier claim against Haiti.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Haitian Case<br />

“<strong>The</strong> United States,” [he said,] “has proclaimed herself the protector of this western world, in which she is by<br />

far the stronger power, <strong>and</strong> from the intrusion of European sovereignties. She can point with proud satisfaction to<br />

the fact that over <strong>and</strong> over again has she declared effectively, that serious indeed would be the consequences if<br />

European hostile foot should, without just cause, tread those states in the New World which have emancipated<br />

themselves from European control. She has announced that she would cherish, as it becomes her, the territorial<br />

rights of the feeblest of those states; regarding them not merely as the eye of the law equal to even the greatest of<br />

nationalities, but in view of her distinctive policy as entitled to be regarded by her as the objects of a peculiarly<br />

gracious care. I feel bound to say that if we should sanction by reprisals in Haiti the ruthless invasion of her territory<br />

<strong>and</strong> insult to her sovereignty which the facts now before us disclose, if we approve by solemn Executive action <strong>and</strong><br />

Congressional assent that invasion, it will be difficult for us hereafter to assert that in the New World, of whose<br />

rights we are the peculiar guardians, these rights have never been invaded by ourselves.”<br />

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<strong>The</strong> foregoing enumeration not only shows the main instances wherein the rule in question has<br />

been affirmed <strong>and</strong> applied, but also demonstrates that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary controversy is in<br />

any view far within the scope <strong>and</strong> spirit of the rule as uniformly accepted <strong>and</strong> acted upon. A doctrine<br />

of American public law thus long <strong>and</strong> firmly established <strong>and</strong> supported could not easily be ignored<br />

in a proper case for its application, even were the considerations upon which it is founded obscure<br />

or questionable. No such objection can be made, however, to the Monroe doctrine understood <strong>and</strong><br />

defined in the manner already stated. It rests, on the contrary, upon facts <strong>and</strong> principles that are<br />

both intelligible <strong>and</strong> incontrovertible.<br />

That distance <strong>and</strong> three thous<strong>and</strong> miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political<br />

union between an European <strong>and</strong> an American state unnatural an inexpedient will hardly be denied.<br />

But physical <strong>and</strong> geographical considerations are the least of the objections to such a union. Europe,<br />

as Washington observed, has a sot of primary interests which are peculiar to herself. America is not<br />

interested in them <strong>and</strong> ought not to be vexed or complicated with them. Each great European<br />

power, for instance, today maintains enormous armies <strong>and</strong> fleets in self-defense <strong>and</strong> for protection<br />

against any other European power or powers. What have the states of America to do with that<br />

condition of things, or why should they be impoverished by wars or preparations for wars with<br />

whose causes or results they can have no direct concern?<br />

If all Europe were to suddenly fly to arms over the fate of Turkey, would it not be preposterous<br />

that any American state should find itself inextricably involved in the miseries <strong>and</strong> burdens of the<br />

contest? If it were, it would prove to be a partnership in the cost <strong>and</strong> losses of the struggle but not in<br />

any ensuing benefits. What is true of the material is no less true of what may be termed the moral<br />

interests involved. Those pertaining to Europe are peculiar to her <strong>and</strong> are entirely diverse from those<br />

pertaining <strong>and</strong> peculiar to America.<br />

Nothing in Harmony<br />

Europe as a whole is monarchical, <strong>and</strong>, with the single exception of the Republic of France, is<br />

committed to the monarchial principle. America, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, is devoted to the exactly<br />

opposite principle—to the idea that every people has an inalienable right to self-government—<strong>and</strong>,<br />

in the United States of America, has furnished to the world the most conspicuous <strong>and</strong> conclusive<br />

example of proof of the excellence of free institutions, whether from the st<strong>and</strong>point of national<br />

greatness or of individual happiness. It can not be necessary, however, to enlarge upon this phase of<br />

the subject whether moral or material interests be considered, it can not but be universally conceded<br />

that those of Europe are irreconcilably diverse from those of America, <strong>and</strong> that any European<br />

control of the latter is necessarily both incongruous <strong>and</strong> injurious.<br />

If, however, for the reasons stated the forcible intrusion of European Powers into American<br />

politics is to be deprecated—if, as it is to be deprecated, it should be resisted <strong>and</strong> prevented—such<br />

resistance <strong>and</strong> prevention must come from the United States. <strong>The</strong>y would come from it, of course,<br />

were it made the point of attack. But, if they come at all, they must also come from it when any<br />

other American state is attacked, since only the United States has the strength adequate to the<br />

exigency.<br />

Is it true, then, that the safety <strong>and</strong> welfare of the United States are so concerned with the<br />

maintenance of the independence of every American state as against any European power as to<br />

justify <strong>and</strong> require the interposition of the United States whenever that independence is endangered?<br />

<strong>The</strong> question can be c<strong>and</strong>idly answered in but one way. <strong>The</strong> states of America, South as well as<br />

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North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental constitutions,<br />

are friends <strong>and</strong> allies, commercially <strong>and</strong> politically, of the United States. To allow the subjugation of<br />

any of them by an European Power is, of course, to completely reverse that situation <strong>and</strong> signifies<br />

the loss of all the advantages incident to their natural relations to us. But that is not all. <strong>The</strong> people<br />

of the United States have a vital interest in the cause of popular self-government. <strong>The</strong>y have secured<br />

the right for themselves <strong>and</strong> their posterity at the cost of infinite blood <strong>and</strong> treasure. <strong>The</strong>y have<br />

realized <strong>and</strong> exemplified its beneficent operation by a career unexampled in point of national<br />

greatness or individual felicity. <strong>The</strong>y believe it to be for the healing of all nations, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

civilization must either advance or retrograde accordingly as its supremacy is extended or curtailed.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Position of Americans<br />

Imbued with these sentiments, the people of the United States might not impossibly be wrought<br />

up to an active propag<strong>and</strong>a in favor of a cause so highly valued both for themselves <strong>and</strong> for<br />

mankind. But the age of the Crusades has passed, <strong>and</strong> they are content with such assertion <strong>and</strong><br />

defense of the right of popular self-government as their own security <strong>and</strong> welfare dem<strong>and</strong>. It is in<br />

that view more than any other that they believe it not to be tolerated that the political control of an<br />

American state shall be forcibly assumed by an European power. <strong>The</strong> mischiefs apprehended from<br />

such a source are none the less real because not immediately imminent in any specific case, <strong>and</strong> are<br />

none the less to be guarded against because the combination of circumstances that will bring them<br />

upon us cannot be predicted. <strong>The</strong> civilized states of Christendom deal with each other on<br />

substantially the same principles that regulate the conduct of individuals. <strong>The</strong> greater its<br />

enlightenment, the more surely every state perceives that its permanent interests require it to be<br />

governed by the immutable principles of right <strong>and</strong> justice. Each, nevertheless, is only too liable to<br />

succumb to the temptations offered by seeming special opportunities for its own aggr<strong>and</strong>izement,<br />

<strong>and</strong> each would rashly imperil its own safety were it not to remember that for the regard <strong>and</strong> respect<br />

of other states it must be largely dependent upon its own strength <strong>and</strong> power.<br />

Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, <strong>and</strong> its fiat is law upon the<br />

subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good<br />

will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom<br />

<strong>and</strong> justice <strong>and</strong> equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States.<br />

It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated<br />

position render it master of the situation <strong>and</strong> practically invulnerable as against any or all other<br />

powers. All the advantages of this superiority are at once imperiled if the principle be admitted that<br />

European powers may convert American states into colonies or provinces of their own. <strong>The</strong><br />

principle would be eagerly availed of, <strong>and</strong> every power doing so would immediately acquire a base of<br />

military operations against us. What one power was permitted to do could not be denied to another,<br />

<strong>and</strong> it is not inconceivable that the struggle now going on for the acquisition of Africa might be<br />

transferred to South America. If it were, the weaker countries would unquestionably be soon<br />

absorbed, while the ultimate result might be the partition of all South America between the various<br />

European powers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> disastrous consequences to the United States of such a condition of things are obvious. <strong>The</strong><br />

loss of prestige, of authority <strong>and</strong> of weight in the councils of the family of nations, would be among<br />

the least of them. Our only real rivals in peace as well as enemies in war would be found located at<br />

our very doors. Thus far in our history, we have been spared the burdens <strong>and</strong> evils of immense<br />

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st<strong>and</strong>ing armies <strong>and</strong> all the other accessories of huge warlike establishments, <strong>and</strong> the exemption has<br />

largely contributed to our national greatness <strong>and</strong> wealth as well as to the happiness of every citizen.<br />

What Would Be Meant<br />

But, with the Powers of Europe permanently encamped on American soil, the ideal conditions<br />

we have thus far enjoyed can not be expected to continue. We too must be armed to the teeth, we<br />

too must convert the flower of our male population into soldiers <strong>and</strong> sailors, <strong>and</strong> by withdrawing<br />

them from the various pursuits of peaceful industry we too must practically annihilate a large share<br />

of the productive energy of the nation. How a greater calamity than this could overtake us it is<br />

difficult to see. Nor are our just apprehensions to be allayed by suggestions of the friendliness of<br />

European powers—of their good will towards us—of their disposition, should they be our<br />

neighbors, to dwell with us in peace <strong>and</strong> harmony. <strong>The</strong> people of the United States have learned in<br />

the school of experience to what extent the relations of states to each other depend not upon<br />

sentiment nor principle, but upon selfish interest. <strong>The</strong>y will not soon forget that, in their hour of<br />

distress, all their anxieties <strong>and</strong> burdens were aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against<br />

their natural life on the part of powers with whom they had long maintained the most harmonious<br />

relations. <strong>The</strong>y have yet in mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our civil war<br />

to set up a monarchy in the adjoining state of Mexico. <strong>The</strong>y realize that had France <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain held important South American possessions to work from <strong>and</strong> to benefit, the temptation to<br />

destroy the predominance of the Great Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its<br />

dismemberment might have been irresistible. From that grave peril they have been saved in the past<br />

<strong>and</strong> may be saved again in the future through the operation of the sure but silent force of the<br />

doctrine proclaimed by President Monroe. To ab<strong>and</strong>on it, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, disregarding both the<br />

logic of the situation <strong>and</strong> the facts of our past experience, would be to renounce a policy which has<br />

proved, both an easy defense against foreign aggression <strong>and</strong> a prolific source of internal progress<br />

<strong>and</strong> prosperity.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is, then, a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle <strong>and</strong> abundantly<br />

sanctioned by precedent, which entitles <strong>and</strong> requires the United States to treat as an injury to itself<br />

the forcible assumption of an European power of political control over an American state. <strong>The</strong><br />

application of the doctrine to the boundary dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> remains to<br />

be made <strong>and</strong> presents no real difficulty. Though the dispute relates to a boundary line, yet, as it is<br />

between states, it necessarily imports political control to be lost by one party <strong>and</strong> gained by the<br />

other. <strong>The</strong> political control at stake, too, is of no mean importance, but concerns a domain of great<br />

extent—the <strong>British</strong> claim, it will be remembered, apparently exp<strong>and</strong>ed in two years some 33,000<br />

square miles—<strong>and</strong>, if it also directly involves the comm<strong>and</strong> of the mouth of the Orinoco, is of<br />

immense consequence in connection with the whole river navigation of the interior of South<br />

America.<br />

Great Britain False Claim<br />

It has been intimated, indeed, that in respect of these South American possessions Great Britain<br />

is herself an American state like any other, so that a controversy between her <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> is to be<br />

settled between themselves as if it were between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Brazil or between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

Colombia, <strong>and</strong> does not call for or justify United States intervention. If this view be tenable at all,<br />

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the logical sequence is plain. Great Britain as a South American state is to be entirely differentiated<br />

from Great Britain generally, <strong>and</strong> if the boundary question cannot be settled otherwise than by force,<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, with her own independent resources <strong>and</strong> not those of the <strong>British</strong> Empire, should be<br />

left to settle the matter with <strong>Venezuela</strong>—an arrangement which very possibly <strong>Venezuela</strong> might not<br />

object to. But the proposition that an European power with an American dependency is for the<br />

purposes of the Monroe doctrine to be classed not as an European but as an American state will not<br />

admit of serious discussion. If it were to be adopted, the Monroe doctrine would be too valueless to<br />

be worth asserting. Not only would every European Power now having a South American colony be<br />

enabled to extend its possessions on this continent indefinitely, but any other European power<br />

might also do the same by first taking pains to procure a fraction of South American soil by<br />

voluntary cession.<br />

<strong>The</strong> declaration of the Monroe message, that existing colonies or dependencies of an European<br />

power would not be interfered with by the United States, means colonies or dependencies then<br />

existing, with their limits as then existing. So it has been invariably construed, <strong>and</strong> so it must<br />

continue to be construed unless it is to be deprived of all vital force. Great Britain cannot be deemed<br />

a South American state within the purview of the Monroe doctrine, nor, if she is appropriating<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, is it material that she does so by advancing the frontier of an old colony<br />

instead of by the planting of a new colony. <strong>The</strong> difference is matter of form <strong>and</strong> not of substance<br />

<strong>and</strong> the doctrine if pertinent in the one case must be in the other also. It is not admitted, however,<br />

<strong>and</strong> therefore cannot be assumed, that Great Britain is in fact usurping dominion over <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

territory. While <strong>Venezuela</strong> charges such usurpation, Great Britain denies it, <strong>and</strong> the United States,<br />

until the merits are authoritatively ascertained, can take sides with neither. But while this is so—<br />

while the United States may not, under existing circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which<br />

of the two parties is right <strong>and</strong> which wrong—it is certainly within its right to dem<strong>and</strong> that the truth<br />

shall be ascertained. Being entitled to resent <strong>and</strong> resist any sequestration of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soil by Great<br />

Britain, it is necessarily entitled to know whether such sequestration has occurred or is now going<br />

on. Otherwise, if the United States is without the right to know <strong>and</strong> have it determined whether<br />

there is or is not <strong>British</strong> aggression upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, its right to protest <strong>and</strong> repel such<br />

aggression may be dismissed from consideration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States <strong>and</strong> the Boundary<br />

<strong>The</strong> right to act upon a fact the existence of which there is no right to have ascertained is simply<br />

illusory. It being clear, therefore, that the United States may legitimately insist upon the merits of the<br />

boundary question being determined, it is equally clear that there is but one feasible mode of<br />

determining them, viz., peaceful arbitration. <strong>The</strong> impracticability of any conventional adjustment has<br />

been often <strong>and</strong> thoroughly demonstrated. Even more impossible of consideration is an appeal to<br />

arms—a mode of settling national pretensions unhappily not yet wholly obsolete.<br />

If, however, it were not condemnable as a relic barbarism <strong>and</strong> a crime in itself, so one-sided a<br />

contest could not be invited nor even accepted by Great Britain without distinct disparagement to<br />

her character as a civilized state. Great Britain, however, assumes no such attitude. On the contrary,<br />

she both admits there is a controversy <strong>and</strong> that arbitration should be resorted to for its adjustment.<br />

But, while up to that point her attitude leaves nothing to be desired, its practical effect is completely<br />

nullified by her insistence that the submission shall cover but a part of the controversy—that as a<br />

condition of arbitrating her right to a part of the disputed territory, the remainder shall be turned<br />

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over to her. If it were possible to point to a boundary which both parties had ever agreed or<br />

assumed to be such either expressly or tacitly, the dem<strong>and</strong> that territory conceded by such line to<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> should be held not to be in dispute might rest upon a reasonable basis. But there is<br />

no such line.<br />

<strong>The</strong> territory which Great Britain insists shall be ceded to her as a condition of arbitrating her<br />

claim to other territory has never been admitted to belong to her. It has always <strong>and</strong> consistently been<br />

claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Upon what principle—except her feebleness as a nation—is she to be denied<br />

the right of having the claim heard <strong>and</strong> passed upon by an impartial tribunal? No reason nor shadow<br />

of reason appears in all the voluminous literature of the subject.<br />

“It is to be so because I will it to be so” seems to be the only justification Great Britain offers. It<br />

is, indeed, intimated that the <strong>British</strong> claim to this particular territory rests upon an occupation, which<br />

whether acquiesced in or not, has ripened into a perfect title by long continuance. But what<br />

prescription affecting territorial rights can be said to exist as between sovereign states? Or, if there is<br />

any, what is the legitimate consequence? If it is not that all arbitration should be denied, but only<br />

that the submission should embrace an additional topic, namely, the validity of the asserted<br />

prescriptive title either in point of law or in point of fact.<br />

Great Britain Is Inconsistent<br />

No different result follows from the contention that as matter of principle Great Britain cannot<br />

be asked to submit <strong>and</strong> ought not to submit to arbitration her political <strong>and</strong> sovereign rights over<br />

territory. This contention, if applied to the whole or to a vital part of the possessions of a sovereign<br />

state, need not be controverted. To hold otherwise might be equivalent to holding that a sovereign<br />

state was bound to arbitrate its very existence. But Great Britain has herself shown in various<br />

instances that the principle has no pertinency when either the interests or the territorial area<br />

involved are not of controlling magnitude <strong>and</strong> her loss of them as the result of arbitration cannot<br />

appreciably affect her honor or her power. Thus, she has arbitrated the extent of her colonial<br />

possessions twice with the United States, twice with Portugal, <strong>and</strong> once with Germany, <strong>and</strong> perhaps<br />

in other instances. <strong>The</strong> Northwest Water Boundary Arbitration of 1872 between her <strong>and</strong> this<br />

country is an example in point <strong>and</strong> well illustrates both the effect to be given to long-continued use<br />

<strong>and</strong> enjoyment <strong>and</strong> the fact that a truly great Power sacrifices neither prestige nor dignity by<br />

reconsidering the most emphatic rejection of a proposition when satisfied of the obvious <strong>and</strong><br />

intrinsic justice of the case. By the award of the Emperor of Germany, the arbitrator in that case, the<br />

United States acquired San Juan <strong>and</strong> a number of smaller isl<strong>and</strong>s near the coast of Vancouver as a<br />

consequence of the decision that the term “the channel which separates the continent from<br />

Vancouver’s Isl<strong>and</strong>”, as used in the treaty of Washington of 1846, meant the Haro channel <strong>and</strong> not<br />

the Rosario channel. Yet a leading contention of Great Britain before the arbitrator was that equity<br />

required a judgment in her favor because a decision in favor of the United States would deprive<br />

<strong>British</strong> subjects of rights of navigation of which they had the habitual enjoyment from the time<br />

when the Rosario Strait was first explored <strong>and</strong> surveyed in 1798. So, though in virtue of the award<br />

the United States acquired San Juan <strong>and</strong> the other isl<strong>and</strong>s of the group to which it belongs, the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Foreign Secretary had in 1859 instructed the <strong>British</strong> Minister at Washington as follows:<br />

Her Majesty’s Government must, therefore, under any circumstances, maintain the right of the <strong>British</strong> Crown<br />

to the Isl<strong>and</strong> of San Juan. <strong>The</strong> interests at stake in connection with the retention of that Isl<strong>and</strong> are too important to<br />

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admit of compromise <strong>and</strong> your Lordship will consequently bear in mind that, whatever arrangement as to the<br />

boundary line is finally arrived at, no settlement of the question will be accepted by Her Majesty’s Government<br />

which does not provide for the Isl<strong>and</strong> of San Juan being reserved to the <strong>British</strong> Crown.<br />

Thus as already intimated, the <strong>British</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> that her right to a portion of the disputed territory<br />

shall be acknowledged before she will consent to an arbitration as to the rest seems to st<strong>and</strong> upon<br />

nothing but her own ipse dixit [pronouncement]. She says to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, in substance: “You can get<br />

none of the debatable l<strong>and</strong> by force, because you are not strong enough; you can get none by treaty,<br />

because I will not agree; <strong>and</strong> you can take your chance of getting a portion by arbitration only if you<br />

first agree to ab<strong>and</strong>on to me such other portion as I may designate.”<br />

It is not perceived how such an attitude can be defended nor how it is reconcilable with that<br />

love of justice <strong>and</strong> fair play so eminently characteristic of the English race. It in effect deprives<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> of her free agency <strong>and</strong> puts her under virtual duress. Territory acquired by reason of it<br />

will be as much wrested from her by the strong h<strong>and</strong> as if occupied by <strong>British</strong> troops or covered by<br />

<strong>British</strong> fleets. It seems therefore quite impossible that this position of Great Britain should be<br />

assented to by the United States, or that, if such position be adhered to with the result of enlarging<br />

the bounds of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, it should not be regarded as amounting, in substance, to an invasion<br />

<strong>and</strong> conquest of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s Duty<br />

In these circumstances, the duty of the President appears to him unmistakable <strong>and</strong> imperative.<br />

Great Britain's assertion of title to the disputed territory combined with her refusal to have that title<br />

investigated being a substantial appropriation of the territory to her own use, not to protest <strong>and</strong> give<br />

warning that the transaction will be regarded as injurious to the interests of the people of the United<br />

States as well as oppressive in itself would be to ignore an established policy with which the honor<br />

<strong>and</strong> welfare of this country are closely identified. While the measures necessary or proper for the<br />

vindication of that policy are to be determined by another branch of the Government, it is clearly<br />

for the Executive to leave nothing undone which may tend to render such determination<br />

unnecessary.<br />

You are instructed, therefore, to present the foregoing views to Lord Salisbury by reading to him<br />

this communication (leaving with him a copy should he so desire), <strong>and</strong> to reinforce them by such<br />

pertinent considerations as will doubtless occur to you. <strong>The</strong>y call for a definite decision upon the<br />

point whether Great Britain will consent or will decline to submit the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary question<br />

in its entirety to impartial arbitration. It is the earnest hope of the President that the conclusion will<br />

be on the side of arbitration, <strong>and</strong> that Great Britain will add one more to the conspicuous<br />

precedents she has already furnished in favor of that wise <strong>and</strong> just mode of adjusting international<br />

disputes.<br />

If he is to be disappointed in that hope, however—a result not to be anticipated <strong>and</strong> in his<br />

judgment calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations between this country <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain—it is his wish to be made acquainted with the fact at such early date as will enable him to lay<br />

the whole subject before Congress in his next annual message.<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

- 86 -<br />

ENGLAND’S DIFFERENT CLAIMS TO VENEZUELAN TERRITORY<br />

<strong>The</strong> controversy between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> over territory is one of long st<strong>and</strong>ing.<br />

Claims made by Engl<strong>and</strong> have steadily increased <strong>and</strong> have always been resisted by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns.<br />

<strong>The</strong> territory in dispute is extremely valuable <strong>and</strong> fear of losing it is thought to be the reason for<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s declining arbitration.<br />

Great Britain acquired her title to the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> by treaty from Holl<strong>and</strong> in 1814,<br />

the provinces transferred being those of Esequibo, Demerara, <strong>and</strong> Berbice. From that time to the<br />

present day <strong>Venezuela</strong> has never recognized that Engl<strong>and</strong> enjoys legal right to a single foot of<br />

ground west of the Esequibo River.<br />

In 1841 Sir Robert Schomburgk, an engineer in the <strong>British</strong> service, entered the disputed territory<br />

without the concurrence of the <strong>British</strong> Government, <strong>and</strong> proceeded to run a line from the Brazilian<br />

frontier to the Boca Gr<strong>and</strong>e, which was intended to establish a definite boundary between <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Schomburgk line was not at first claimed by the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office<br />

as legal, <strong>and</strong> has not until recently been designated in <strong>British</strong> diplomatic correspondence as<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s primary base.<br />

When Schomburgk drew his “arbitrary line” of demarcation in 1841, he set up posts to indicate<br />

<strong>British</strong> dominion at Point Barima, Amacuro <strong>and</strong> other localities. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government made<br />

a vigorous protest, <strong>and</strong> Lord Aberdeen, then Foreign Secretary, promptly ordered the posts<br />

removed, thus showing that Engl<strong>and</strong> felt no certainty of the justice of her claims.<br />

Lord Aberdeen, in 1844, proposed to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns a boundary line which did not follow the<br />

Schombugk line. It conceded to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns a large part of the coast <strong>and</strong> the mouth of the<br />

Orinoco River, which Lord Salisbury now claims. Aberdeen’s proposed line began on the coast at<br />

the mouth of the River Morocco, run straight into the interior, crossing the Schomburgk line at right<br />

angles. This Aberdeen proposition was the first specific definition of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s pretended rights,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the sole foundation for it in international law was the shadowy allegation that Dutch settlements<br />

<strong>and</strong> Indian treaties justified Great Britain in instituting authority over a portion of the trans-<br />

Esequibo regions, the exact geographical limits of which had never been adjusted.<br />

It is seen that Lord Aberdeen, in undertaking to trace <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>’s extreme rightful<br />

bounds—thereby fixing a precedent for future <strong>British</strong> Foreign Secretaries—could find no excuse for<br />

carrying them further than the mouth of the Morocco. He made no pretense to ownership of the<br />

gr<strong>and</strong> mouth of the Orinoco. It is claimed to-day by Lord Salisbury, who not only declares that<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> owns the coast up to the terminus of the Schomburgk line at the mouth of the Amacuro,<br />

but claims l<strong>and</strong> in the interior considerably beyond the furthest westward bend of the Aberdeen line.<br />

Of course, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns declined to accept the Aberdeen line, <strong>and</strong> nothing further was done<br />

in the matter until 1850, when the celebrated status quo was established, whereby Great Britain<br />

agreed not to occupy or encroach upon the territory in dispute in consideration of a similar<br />

agreement on the part of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. What was meant by “territory in dispute” was not stated. <strong>The</strong><br />

status quo has never been abrogated. It is claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns that Engl<strong>and</strong> has repeatedly<br />

violated the status quo by invading the territory far beyond either the Schomburgk or Aberdeen line.<br />

Lord Granville in 1881 proposed to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns a new boundary line. It began far north of<br />

the Aberdeen line on the coast, but a short distance south of the Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong> did not<br />

116


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

include the Barima River or isl<strong>and</strong>, which are now claimed by Engl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Granville line in the<br />

interior followed the Aberdeen line, but gave <strong>Venezuela</strong> undisputed possession at the mouth of the<br />

Orinoco.<br />

This was equivalent to a formal disavowal of any design upon the Boca Gr<strong>and</strong>e of the Orinoco;<br />

in the most positive style the exclusive control was assigned to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

In 1883, (Lord Granville being still at the head of the Foreign Office.) overtures were made to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> to have an amicable settlement of the case. <strong>Venezuela</strong> was anxious for settlement, <strong>and</strong><br />

dispatched Gen. Guzman Blanco, one of the foremost diplomats of South America, to Engl<strong>and</strong> to<br />

act in the matter. Gen. Blanco did not waste his time in discussing maps <strong>and</strong> ancient lines, but bent<br />

all his energies to secure arbitration of the matter. He gained his point, for June 18, 1883. Lord<br />

Granville assented to a treaty between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, one clause of which provided that<br />

any differences not adjustable by the usual means should be submitted to “the arbitration of a third<br />

power, or of several powers, in amity with both countries, without resorting to war.”<br />

[Map: <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> claims]<br />

117


1 - 18 December 1895<br />

This great diplomatic stroke of Gen. Blanco, absolutely bringing Engl<strong>and</strong> to bay on the<br />

boundary question, was, however, immediately made of no avail by the overturn of the Gladstone<br />

Ministry. Lord Salisbury, who took office a few days later, promptly rescinded the arbitration clause<br />

of the proposed treaty. Since that time Engl<strong>and</strong> has persistently declined every proposal to arbitrate<br />

the matter.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> is not satisfied with repudiating the comparatively moderate boundary designations<br />

originated by Aberdeen <strong>and</strong> Granville, but has enlarged her territorial claim with the utmost<br />

recklessness. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government contends that the Essequibo-Pumeron-Cuyuni strip is<br />

the only l<strong>and</strong> fairly in dispute.<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

- 87 -<br />

THE MESSAGE IS INDORSED<br />

Congressmen in Hearty Accord with the President<br />

POLITICAL DIFFERENCES ARE IGNORED<br />

Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Utterances Approved by Republicans as Well as Democrats—<br />

<strong>The</strong> Commission Idea Favorably Received<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17—<strong>The</strong> President’s message was the topic of general discussion on the<br />

floor of the Senate long after adjournment. Mr. Voorhees said to a correspondent of <strong>The</strong> New-York<br />

Times that he agreed with every recommendation made by the President. “It is a strong message,”<br />

he said, “<strong>and</strong> one that will appeal to the American heart. While there may be some difference of<br />

opinion regarding the best plan to adopt in connection with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, I shall be<br />

surprised if the Senate does not follow the recommendation of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> authorize him to<br />

appoint a commission to examine the question in all its bearings. Such a commission should be able<br />

to report inside of sixty days. I applauded the message because I recognized the patriotic spirit which<br />

animates it. It will receive the indorsement of the people, beyond a doubt.”<br />

Senator Faulkner said the message was the strongest that had proceeded from the White House<br />

during the present Administration. “It is absolutely without a flaw.” He added:<br />

It puts the question outside of diplomatic shilly-shallying. <strong>The</strong>re may be conflicting views as to the best method<br />

to be adopted by this country in pursuing the subject to its end, whatever that may be. Personally, I should think<br />

that the State Department, which has a contingent fund at its disposal, could make the investigation asked for by the<br />

President <strong>and</strong> report to Congress with greater dispatch than a commission such as he suggested. <strong>The</strong> President has<br />

taken hold of this question in a way that appeals to the true American spirit, <strong>and</strong> he will be indorsed by all parties.<br />

This matter has gone beyond the stage of partisan polities. <strong>The</strong> people know no politics when a question affecting<br />

the whole country is at stake. It need not surprise you to see a rupture in the Salisbury Cabinet as the direct outcome<br />

of this message. <strong>The</strong> position of this country is solid enough. Great Britain has been asked to arbitrate the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary question. She has refused. Now the United States proposes to determine the question at issue<br />

to its own satisfaction. If it shall be found that Great Britain claims territory to which she is not entitled, she will be<br />

politely, but firmly, told to retreat beyond the lines marking her rightful possessions. If it shall be found that the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns are wrong, <strong>and</strong> that Great Britain is not a trespasser, it will be the manly, straightforward course for<br />

this Government to say so. Whatever will be the result of the investigation which assuredly will be set on foot, there<br />

can be no doubt, in view of the President’s message, that this Government will strike straight from the shoulder.<br />

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That message I regard as a boon to the Democratic Party. It adds immeasurably to the prospects of the Democrats<br />

in the coming campaign. <strong>The</strong> outlook for the party is much brighter now than it was yesterday.<br />

While the American people are opposed to war on general principles, it must not be forgotten that we have<br />

already had two wars with Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> there is deep <strong>and</strong> lasting rivalry between the two nations. One result of<br />

another contest would be the acquisition, by the United States, of Canada, a country which ought to be included in<br />

the American Union.<br />

While a war would be a calamity in one sense, it might eventually prove to be a blessing in disguise. I am<br />

inclined to think, however, that Great Britain will not go to war over this question.<br />

Several Senators whose views were requested said they doubted very much whether the<br />

President’s recommendation of the appointment of a commission would be adopted.<br />

“We want something livelier than a commission,” said one Senator, who did not care to be<br />

quoted. “<strong>The</strong> State Department is amply able to probe this matter, <strong>and</strong> the Secretary of State ought<br />

to be instructed to Investigate <strong>and</strong> report at the earliest possible moment.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> message came as a blow between the eyes to some of the Republican “jingoes,” who had<br />

expected to make political capital cult of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> question this Winter. <strong>The</strong>y began to look for<br />

a political trick as soon as the contents of the message were made known to them, <strong>and</strong> concluded<br />

that they had found it in the recommendation relative to the commission.<br />

Senator Cullom, who recently made a speech on the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> who is inclined to<br />

view matters from a partisan st<strong>and</strong>point, said this afternoon that he did not propose to sanction the<br />

plan for a Democratic commission to be helping the Democrats in the coming campaign. Mr.<br />

Cullom was careful to say that he indorsed the general sentiments of the message. Mr. Teller<br />

unhesitatingly said that he was in favor of upholding the Monroe doctrine against all comers, <strong>and</strong><br />

that the President might rely upon his support.<br />

Other Senators <strong>and</strong> Representatives were free to express their opinions, which follow:<br />

Mr. Brice (Dem., Ohio)—<strong>The</strong> idea of appointing a commission suggests a long continuance of<br />

the discussion. Commissions drawing a per diem do not conclude their labors speedily, <strong>and</strong> no one<br />

can tell when this commission would cease to draw its per diem.<br />

Mr. Gorman (Dem., Md.)—It is a very thorough, emphatic, <strong>and</strong> strong American message. It<br />

looks very much as if the President intended to enforce the Monroe doctrine.<br />

Mr. Caffery (Dem., La.)—I have not thoroughly digested the message, but so far as I was able to<br />

hear it, I am compelled to say that I look upon it as a most extraordinary message.<br />

Mr. Bacon (Dem., Ga.)—I agree with every word of it.<br />

Mr. Pugh (Dem., Ala.)—On this matter Democrats <strong>and</strong> Republicans come together with one<br />

accord. I am for war <strong>and</strong> free coinage. <strong>The</strong> message certainly indicates that there will be war unless<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> backs down.<br />

Mr. Call (Dem., Fla.)—It is excellent, splendid. <strong>The</strong> matter is still open to arbitration, <strong>and</strong> I am<br />

sure Engl<strong>and</strong> will finally consent.<br />

Mr. Vilas (Dem., Wis.)—I look upon it as a strong <strong>and</strong> able state paper, one that will rank with<br />

any state paper issued by any Administration.<br />

Mr. Gray (Dem., Del.)—I must decline to be interviewed on the subject.<br />

Mr. Chilton (Dem., Tex.)—It is an able a timely declaration of the true American principle.<br />

Mr. Faulkner (Dem., W. Va.)—This message may affect the Salisbury Ministry before the<br />

English Prime Minister gets through with it. He must st<strong>and</strong> up now or go under. <strong>The</strong>re can be no<br />

such thing as a backdown on the part of the United States. <strong>The</strong> Congress will indorse <strong>and</strong> support<br />

the President in the st<strong>and</strong> he has taken.<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

Representative Sherman (Rep., N. Y.)—If the utterances of the President contained in his<br />

message on <strong>Venezuela</strong> are in any manner the result of his recent ducking outing I very much regret<br />

that his Secretary of State did not accompany him on that trip. <strong>The</strong> message has in it an American<br />

ring that is as gratifying as it has been unusual during this Administration. I might almost use the<br />

word “jingo” in reference to it, did not that word grate on Democratic ears. I am glad to commend<br />

it without qualification.<br />

Representative Quigg, (Rep., N. Y.)—President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message is admirable in every<br />

respect. His statement of the grounds upon which the Monroe doctrine is made applicable to the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary question cannot be answered. His definition of our duty in the presence of<br />

Great Britain’s refusal to arbitrate is clear <strong>and</strong> true. I shall vote for the commission be proposes <strong>and</strong><br />

entertain the policy he outlines in every way I can. During a visit to Demerara <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> three<br />

years ago I examined this question very thoroughly <strong>and</strong> no doubt exists in my mind of the justice of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s contention. <strong>The</strong> President has met his duty in a manner which is at once dignified,<br />

equitable, <strong>and</strong> complete, <strong>and</strong> the sentiments of all parties <strong>and</strong> of the whole country will indorse his<br />

position heartily.<br />

M. Grosvenor, (Rep., Ohio)—<strong>The</strong> message is a strong, clean-cut dem<strong>and</strong> for the observance<br />

<strong>and</strong> defense of the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> in the light of the dispatches from the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government, it is only a little short of a declaration of war unless Engl<strong>and</strong> recedes or seeks farther<br />

diplomacy. <strong>The</strong> position taken by the President is, at first glance, a step in advance of the former<br />

official declarations of our country. If the attitude of Engl<strong>and</strong>, as announced, is the ultimatum, then<br />

the message is a menace of war. It may be said, in friendly criticism of the message, that it has<br />

possibly gone just a shade too far in this direction, <strong>and</strong> apparently the President does not feel much<br />

need of Congressional action To ascertain facts by a commission to be sent to a foreign country to<br />

decide <strong>and</strong> report upon a dispute between two other countries is novel, <strong>and</strong> will possibly lead to<br />

results which Congress will not be willing to contribute to.<br />

Mr. McCall, (Rep., Mass.)—<strong>The</strong> reply of Lord Salisbury attempts, in effect, to do away with the<br />

Monroe doctrine. Since Great Britain declines to submit the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary to arbitration, we<br />

must ascertain that boundary for ourselves, <strong>and</strong> then resist any encroachments upon it. <strong>The</strong> message<br />

of the President is a spirited <strong>and</strong> noble document, <strong>and</strong> should receive the united support of both<br />

parties.<br />

Mr. Russell, (Rep., Conn.)—<strong>The</strong> message is good. Anything less would be unpatriotic <strong>and</strong><br />

cowardly in the President of the United States. A commission will delay the settlement of the<br />

controversy <strong>and</strong> furnish information already known. Its suggestion is prudent, perhaps, <strong>and</strong> allows<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> a chance to retract. It is not necessary, <strong>and</strong> we don’t want to dally any in this controversy.<br />

What a pity Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> cannot apply his patriotic instincts to the benefit of our home industries<br />

as well as to the defense of our rights under the Monroe doctrine.<br />

Mr. McCreary, (Dem., Ky.)—It is vigorous, positive <strong>and</strong> able. As a reaffirmation of the Monroe<br />

doctrine it will attract wide attention, <strong>and</strong> I believe be generally indorsed by the people. <strong>The</strong><br />

President, having tried faithfully to induce Great Britain to submit the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute<br />

to impartial arbitration, <strong>and</strong> having been apprised of the refusal of Great Britain, he very properly<br />

suggests that Congress make an appropriation to pay the expenses of a commission, to be appointed<br />

by the Executive, to make the necessary investigation <strong>and</strong> report without delay an regards the<br />

boundary dispute. I admire the firm <strong>and</strong> positive course taken by the President <strong>and</strong> I believe the<br />

House of Representatives will support him in his efforts to uphold the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> prevent<br />

Great Britain from making illegal encroachments on the territory of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

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Mr. Cummings, (Dem., N. Y.)—<strong>The</strong> message breathes the spirit of Thomas Jefferson, James<br />

Monroe, <strong>and</strong> Andrew Jackson. President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s action st<strong>and</strong>s in strong contrast with the<br />

cowardly action of Lord Salisbury in Armenian affairs.. <strong>The</strong> President st<strong>and</strong>s by the Monroe<br />

doctrine, <strong>and</strong> he undoubtedly means every word he says.<br />

Mr. Bartlett (Dem., N. Y.)—I am glad to see that the President has decided in favor of resisting<br />

the aggressions of Great Britain in respect to the boundary dispute. I believe it is practically<br />

conceded that Engl<strong>and</strong>’s title to a large part of the disputed territory is a title which might alone<br />

gives. Engl<strong>and</strong>, in any event, will consent only to arbitrate a small portion of the territory, <strong>and</strong> will<br />

insist on maintaining her hold on nearly all of the l<strong>and</strong>. We should force Great Britain to recede<br />

from her position <strong>and</strong> relinquish the territory.<br />

Mr. Livingston, (Dem., Ga.)—Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message is clean-cut American. He distinctly<br />

recognizes the Monroe doctrine in all its length <strong>and</strong> breadth, <strong>and</strong> as specially applicable in the<br />

dispute pending between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. He declares emphatically for resistance<br />

against <strong>British</strong> oppression, <strong>and</strong>, like the man he is, against further delay <strong>and</strong> further appeals on our<br />

part for arbitration. He suggests the very method contained in my resolution now before Congress,<br />

for a commission to ascertain for ourselves the true boundary line <strong>and</strong> then enforce the findings of<br />

that commission, even if war shall be the result. His message will find a warm response in the hearts<br />

of all Americans. He recognizes the terrible conflict that would follow, if fight we must, between the<br />

two great English-speaking peoples; yet admits that there is no calamity which a great Nation can<br />

invite which equals supine submission <strong>and</strong> loss of National honor <strong>and</strong> self-respect.<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

- 88 -<br />

SOUTHERN DIPLOMATS OVERJOYED<br />

None of <strong>The</strong>m, However, Is Willing to Talk Publicly of the Measure<br />

WASHINGTON Dec. 17.—<strong>The</strong> diplomatic representatives of American republics in<br />

Washington were highly elated over the President’s message, <strong>and</strong> nearly all of them cabled copious<br />

extracts of the document to their respective Governments. Ever since the Corinto affair they had<br />

been somewhat despondent over the supposed indisposition of the United States to resist foreign<br />

aggression on the American Continent, but to-day they could not find language adequate to express<br />

their admiration for President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s forcible utterances, particularly in regard to the possible<br />

resort to other competitions than those “in the arts of peace.”<br />

None of the Ministers or Chargés d’Affaires, however, consented to speak authoritatively for<br />

their Governments in the absence of instructions, nor would any be led into a public interview on<br />

the subject. One who has had perhaps more experience in the international affairs of the United<br />

States than most of his colleagues in the Diplomatic Corps said that while he was gratified to see<br />

that the United States had finally taken a firm st<strong>and</strong> on the Monroe doctrine it would be unwise to<br />

consider it established in the code of nations, <strong>and</strong> although he believed European nations would be<br />

compelled to recognize its force hereafter, it was not by any means sure that its effect could be made<br />

retroactive, as its application to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter certainly would be. Aside from this, he hoped<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

(<strong>and</strong> in this he believed all American republics would support the United States) that Engl<strong>and</strong> would<br />

be forced by war if necessary, to give up the territory she had stolen from <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> he trusted<br />

that Congress would authorize the Executive to furnish arms <strong>and</strong> men to drive out the 40,000<br />

squatters referred to by Lord Salisbury.<br />

Another representative of a Government that has a dispute with Great Britain as to a matter of<br />

l<strong>and</strong> grabbing, differing only in degree from that of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, declared that if the United States was<br />

sincere in this matter <strong>and</strong> supported President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s suggestion for a boundary commission<br />

beyond Engl<strong>and</strong>’s influence, it would result in that greater desideratum, an alliance both for peace<br />

<strong>and</strong> war of the most progressive American republics. <strong>The</strong> boundary questions in Alaska, he said,<br />

could then be as quickly settled as that in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the rapid encroachments of Belize on both<br />

Mexico <strong>and</strong> Guatemala would be terminated <strong>and</strong> the title to the territory of Brazil now claimed by<br />

French <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> would be determined.<br />

With the bulldozing power of Great Britain nullified, he believed her commercial supremacy<br />

would disappear, <strong>and</strong> that trade would flow on north <strong>and</strong> south lines instead of east <strong>and</strong> west.<br />

Another of the South American representatives was disposed, in view of the attitude of the<br />

United States in past years, <strong>and</strong> the peculiar political conditions now existing in this country, to await<br />

the sober second thought of the people in regard to the message. He thought he should like to hear<br />

what Senator Sherman (the new Chairman of Foreign Relations) said about the readiness of the<br />

United States to go to war about <strong>Venezuela</strong>, where its interests were so small, compared with what<br />

they were presumed to be in Nicaragua <strong>and</strong> Cuba.. His opinion was that Great Britain would not<br />

recede behind the Schomburgk line in the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> claim, <strong>and</strong> that the United States would<br />

not resort to force in the attempt to compel her to do so. He thought, however, that Lord Salisbury<br />

would very promptly concede the remainder of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n contention, including control of the<br />

Orinoco mouth, <strong>and</strong> that the United States would secure <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s acquiescence in that boundary.<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

- 89 -<br />

RIGHT AND JUSTICE<br />

<strong>The</strong> President joins the courage of an American to a jurist’s respect for right <strong>and</strong> justice. <strong>The</strong><br />

position he takes is immeasurably strengthened by the fact that it is based upon a dem<strong>and</strong> for<br />

arbitration. Great Britain refusing to submit its pretensions to an impartial examination, the<br />

President declares that we must constitute a competent court of inquiry. If the court finds that Great<br />

Britain is right, we shall interpose no obstacle to her at acquiring all the territory as to which her title<br />

is proved. If she is wrong, the unwarranted seizure of the disputed territory by her would constitute<br />

<strong>and</strong> act of aggression which we will not permit. <strong>The</strong> American people will sustain that position,<br />

because it is honorable, just, <strong>and</strong> in accord with a principle to which we have uniformly adhered for<br />

three-quarters of a century.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Ministry cannot maintain <strong>and</strong> justify before the people of Great Britain, against the<br />

firm <strong>and</strong> united protest of the people of the United States, a cause they dare not or will not submit<br />

to impartial arbitration.<br />

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[18 December 1895]<br />

- 90 -<br />

LORD SALISBURY’S REPLY<br />

Declares the Monroe Doctrine Does Not Apply to <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s Case<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17.—Lord Salisbury’s answer to Mr. Olney’s note is addressed to Sir<br />

Julian Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador at Washington, <strong>and</strong> is in two installments, both under<br />

date of Nov. 20 last. <strong>The</strong> first note deals with the enunciation of principles laid down by Mr. Olney<br />

on the basis of the Monroe doctrine while the second merely discusses the boundary question<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> first note follows:<br />

FOREIGN OFFICE, Nov. 26, 1895.<br />

Sir: On the 7th August I transmitted to Lord Gough a copy of the despatch from Mr. Olney<br />

which Mr. Bayard had left with me that day, <strong>and</strong> of which he had read portions to me. I informed<br />

him at the time that it could not be answered until it had been carefully considered by the Law<br />

Officers of the Crown. I have therefore deferred replying to it till after the recess.<br />

I will not now deal with those portions of it which are concerned exclusively with the<br />

controversy that has for some time past existed between the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Her<br />

Majesty’s Government in regard to the boundary which separates their dominions. I take a different<br />

view from Mr. Olney of various matters upon which he touches in that part of the despatch; but I<br />

will defer for the present all observations upon it, as it concerns matters which are not in themselves<br />

of first-rate importance, <strong>and</strong> do not directly concern the relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the<br />

United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> latter part however of the despatch, turning from the question of the frontiers of <strong>Venezuela</strong>,<br />

proceeds to deal with principles of a far wider character, <strong>and</strong> to advance doctrines of international<br />

law which are of considerable interest to all the nations whose dominions include any portion of the<br />

western hemisphere.<br />

<strong>The</strong> contentions set forth by Mr. Olney in this part of his despatch are represented by him as<br />

being an application of the political maxims which are well known in American discussion under the<br />

name of the Monroe doctrine. As far as I am aware, this doctrine has never been before advanced<br />

on behalf of the United States in any written communication addressed to the Government of<br />

another nation; but it has been generally adopted <strong>and</strong> assumed as true by many eminent writers <strong>and</strong><br />

politicians in the United States. It is said to have largely influenced the Government of that country<br />

in the conduct of its foreign affairs; though Mr. Clayton, who was Secretary of State under President<br />

Taylor, expressly stated that that Administration had in no way adopted it.<br />

Development of the Doctrine<br />

But during the period that has elapsed since the Message of President Monroe was delivered in<br />

1823, the doctrine has undergone a very notable development, <strong>and</strong> the aspect which it now presents<br />

in the h<strong>and</strong>s of Mr. Olney differs widely from its character when it first issued from the pen of its<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

author. <strong>The</strong> two propositions which in effect President Monroe laid down were, first, that America<br />

was no longer to be looked upon as a field for European colonization; <strong>and</strong>, secondly, that Europe<br />

must not attempt to extend its political system to America, or to control the political condition of<br />

any of the American communities who had recently declared their independence.<br />

<strong>The</strong> dangers against which President Monroe thought it right to guard were not as imaginary as<br />

they would seem at the present day. <strong>The</strong> formation of the Holy Alliance; the Congresses of Laybach<br />

<strong>and</strong> Verona; the invasion of Spain by France for the purpose of forcing upon the Spanish people a<br />

form of government which seemed likely to disappear, unless it was sustained by external aid, were<br />

incidents fresh in the mind of President Monroe when he penned his celebrated Message. <strong>The</strong><br />

system of which he speaks, <strong>and</strong> of which he so resolutely deprecates the application to the American<br />

Continent, was the system then adopted by certain powerful States upon the Continent of Europe<br />

of combining to prevent by force of arms the adoption in other countries of political institutions<br />

which they disliked, <strong>and</strong> to uphold by external pressure those which they approved. Various<br />

portions of South America had recently declared their independence, <strong>and</strong> that independence had not<br />

been recognized by the Governments of Spain <strong>and</strong> Portugal, to which, with small exception, the<br />

whole of Central <strong>and</strong> South America were nominally subject.<br />

Danger Not Imaginary<br />

It was not an imaginary danger that he foresaw, if he feared that the same spirit which had<br />

dictated the French expedition into Spain might inspire the more powerful Governments of Europe<br />

with the idea of imposing, by the force of European arms, upon the South American communities<br />

the form of government <strong>and</strong> the political connection which they had thrown off. In declaring that<br />

the United States would resist such enterprise if it was contemplated, President Monroe adopted a<br />

policy which received the entire sympathy of the English Government of that date.<br />

<strong>The</strong> dangers which were apprehended by President Monroe have no relation to the state of<br />

things in which we live at the present day. <strong>The</strong>re is no danger of any Holy Alliance imposing its<br />

system upon any portion of the American Continent, <strong>and</strong> there is no danger of any European State<br />

treating any part of the American Continent as a fit object for European colonization. It is<br />

intelligible that Mr. Olney should invoke, in defence of the views on which he is now insisting, an<br />

authority which enjoys so high a popularity with his own fellow-countrymen.<br />

But the circumstances with which President Monroe was dealing, <strong>and</strong> those to which the present<br />

American Government is addressing itself have very few features in common. Great Britain is<br />

imposing no “system” upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> is not concerning herself in any way with the nature of<br />

the political institutions under which the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns may prefer to live. But the <strong>British</strong> Empire <strong>and</strong><br />

the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> are neighbours, <strong>and</strong> they have differed for some time past, <strong>and</strong> continue<br />

to differ, as to the line by which their dominions are separated.<br />

No Concern of Uncle Sam<br />

It is a controversy with which the United States have no apparent practical concern. It is<br />

difficult, indeed, to see how it can materially affect any State or community outside those primarily<br />

interested, except perhaps other parts of Her Majesty’s dominions, such as Trinidad. <strong>The</strong> disputed<br />

frontier of <strong>Venezuela</strong> has nothing to do with any of the questions dealt with by President Monroe. It<br />

is not a question of the colonization by a European Power of any portion of America. It is not a<br />

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question of the imposition upon the communities of South America of any system of government<br />

devised in Europe. It is simply the determination of the frontier of a <strong>British</strong> possession which<br />

belonged to the Throne of Engl<strong>and</strong> long before the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> came into existence. But<br />

even if the interests of <strong>Venezuela</strong> were so far linked to those of the United States as to give to the<br />

latter a locus st<strong>and</strong>i in this controversy, their Government apparently have not formed, <strong>and</strong> certainly<br />

do not express, any opinion upon the actual merits of the dispute.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government of the United States do not say that Great Britain, or that <strong>Venezuela</strong>, is in the<br />

right in the matters that are in issue. But they lay down that the doctrine of President Monroe, when<br />

he opposed the imposition of European systems, or the renewal of European colonization, confers<br />

upon them the right of dem<strong>and</strong>ing that when a European Power has a frontier difference with a<br />

South American community, the European Power shall consent to refer that controversy to<br />

arbitration; <strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney states that unless Her Majesty’s Government accede to this dem<strong>and</strong>, it<br />

will “greatly embarrass the future relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States.”<br />

Whatever may be the authority of the doctrine laid down by President Monroe, there is nothing<br />

in his language to show that he ever thought of claiming this novel prerogative for the United States.<br />

It is admitted that he did not seek to assert a Protectorate over Mexico, or the States of Central <strong>and</strong><br />

South America. Such a claim would have imposed upon the United States the duty of answering for<br />

the conduct of those States, <strong>and</strong> consequently the responsibility of controlling it. His sagacious<br />

foresight would have led him energetically to deprecate the addition of so serious a burden to those<br />

which the Rulers of the United States have to bear.<br />

Should Not Act as Protector<br />

It follows of necessity that if the Government of the United States will not control the conduct<br />

of these communities, neither can it undertake to protect them from the consequences attaching to<br />

any misconduct of which they may be guilty towards other nations. If they violate in any way the<br />

rights of another State, or of its subjects, it is not alleged that the Monroe doctrine will assure them<br />

the assistance of the United States in escaping from any reparation which they may be bound by<br />

international law to give. Mr. Olney expressly disclaims such an inference from the principles he lays<br />

down.<br />

But the claim which he founds upon them is that, if any independent American State advances a<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> for territory of which its neighbour claims to be the owner, <strong>and</strong> that neighbour is the colony<br />

of a Euro-State, the United States have a right to insist that the European State shall submit the<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> its own impugned rights to arbitration.<br />

I will not now enter into a discussion of the merits of this method of terminating international<br />

differences. It has proved itself valuable in many cases; but it is not free from defects, which often<br />

operate as a serious drawback on its value. It is not always easy to find an Arbitrator who is<br />

competent, <strong>and</strong> who, at the same time, is wholly free from bias; <strong>and</strong> the task of insuring compliance<br />

with the Award when it is made is not exempt from difficulty. It is a mode of settlement of which<br />

the value varies much according to the nature of the controversy to which it is applied, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

character of the litigants who appeal to it.<br />

Whether, in any particular case, it is a suitable method of procedure is generally a delicate <strong>and</strong><br />

difficult question. <strong>The</strong> only parties who are competent to decide that question are the two parties<br />

whose rival contentions are in issue. <strong>The</strong> claim of a third nation, which is unaffected by the<br />

controversy, to impose this particular procedure on either of the two others, cannot be reasonably<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

justified, <strong>and</strong> has no foundation in the law of nations.<br />

In the remarks which I have made, I have argued on the theory that the Monroe doctrine in<br />

itself is sound. I must not, however, be understood as expressing any acceptance of it on the part of<br />

Her Majesty’s Government. It must always be mentioned with respect, on account of the<br />

distinguished statesman to whom it is due, <strong>and</strong> the great nation who have generally adopted it. But<br />

international law is founded on the general consent of nations; <strong>and</strong> no statesman, however eminent,<br />

<strong>and</strong> no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into the code of international law a novel<br />

principle which was never recognized before, <strong>and</strong> which has not since been accepted by the<br />

Government of any other country.<br />

Rights of Nations Stated<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States have a right, like any other nation, to interpose in any controversy by which<br />

their own interests are affected; <strong>and</strong> they are the judge whether those interests are touched, <strong>and</strong> in<br />

what measure they should be sustained. But their rights are in no way strengthened or extended by<br />

the fact that the controversy affects some territory which is called American. Mr. Olney quotes the<br />

recent Chilean war, in which the United States declined to join with France <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> in an effort<br />

to bring hostilities to a close, on account of the Monroe doctrine. <strong>The</strong> limited States were entirely in<br />

their right in declining to join in an attempt at pacification if they thought fit; but Mr. Olney’s<br />

principle that “American questions are for American decision,” even if it receive any countenance<br />

from the language of President Monroe (which it does not), can not be sustained by any reasoning<br />

drawn from the law of nations.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government of the United States is not entitled to affirm as a universal proposition, with<br />

reference to a number of independent States for whose conduct it assumes no responsibility, that its<br />

interests are necessarily concerned in whatever may befall those States simply because they are<br />

situated in the Western Hemisphere. It may well be that the interests of the United States are<br />

affected by something that happens to Chile or to Peru, <strong>and</strong> that that circumstance may give them<br />

the right of interference; but such a contingency may equally happen in the case of China or Japan,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the right of interference is not more extensive or more assured in the one case than in the other.<br />

Though the language of President Monroe is directed to the attainment of objects which most<br />

Englishmen would agree to be salutary, it is impossible to admit that they have been inscribed by<br />

any adequate authority in the code of international law; <strong>and</strong> the danger which such admission would<br />

involve is sufficiently exhibited both by the strange development which the doctrine has received at<br />

Mr. Olney’s h<strong>and</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> the arguments by which it is supported, in the despatch under reply. In<br />

defence of it he says:<br />

“That distance <strong>and</strong> 3,000 miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union<br />

between a European <strong>and</strong> an American State unnatural <strong>and</strong> inexpedient will hardly be denied. But<br />

physical <strong>and</strong> geographical considerations are the least of the objections to such a union. Europe has<br />

a set of primary interests which are peculiar to herself; America is not interested in them, <strong>and</strong> ought<br />

not to be vexed or complicated with them.”<br />

And, again: “Thus far in our history we have been spared the burdens <strong>and</strong> evils of immense<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ing armies <strong>and</strong> all the other accessories of huge warlike establishment; <strong>and</strong> the exemption has<br />

highly contributed to our national greatness <strong>and</strong> wealth, as well as to the happiness of every citizen.<br />

But with the powers of Europe permanently encamped on American soil, the ideal conditions we<br />

have thus far enjoyed cannot be expected to continue.”<br />

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Meaning of Mr. Olney’s Words<br />

<strong>The</strong> necessary meaning of these words is that the union between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> Canada;<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> Jamaica <strong>and</strong> Trinidad; between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> Honduras or<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> are “inexpedient <strong>and</strong> unnatural.” President Monroe disclaims any such inference<br />

from his doctrine; but in this, as in other respects, Mr. Olney develops it. He lays down that the<br />

inexpedient <strong>and</strong> unnatural character of the union between a European <strong>and</strong> American State is so<br />

obvious that it “will hardly be denied.” Her Majesty’s Government are prepared emphatically to<br />

deny it on behalf of both the <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> American people who are subject to her Crown. <strong>The</strong>y<br />

maintain that the union between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> her territories in the Western Hemisphere is both<br />

natural <strong>and</strong> expedient.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y fully concur with the view which President Monroe apparently entertained, that any<br />

disturbance of the existing territorial distribution in that hemisphere by any fresh acquisitions on the<br />

part of any European State would be a highly inexpedient change. But they are not prepared to<br />

admit that the recognition of that expediency is clothed with the sanction which belongs to a<br />

doctrine of international law.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y are not prepared to admit that the interests of the United States are necessarily concerned<br />

in every frontier dispute which may arise between any two of the States who possess dominion in<br />

the Western Hemisphere; <strong>and</strong> still less can they accept the doctrine that the United States are<br />

entitled to claim that the process of arbitration shall be applied to any dem<strong>and</strong> for the surrender of<br />

territory which one of those States may make against another.<br />

I have commented in the above remarks only upon the general aspect of Mr. Olney’s doctrines,<br />

apart from the special considerations which attach to the controversy between the United Kingdom<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> in its present phase. This controversy has undoubtedly been made more difficult by<br />

the inconsiderate action of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government in breaking off relations with Her Majesty’s<br />

Government, <strong>and</strong> its settlement has been correspondingly delayed; but Her Majesty s Government<br />

have not surrendered the hope that it will be adjusted by a reasonable arrangement at an early date.<br />

I request that you will read the substance of the above despatch to Mr. Olney, <strong>and</strong> leave him a<br />

copy if he desires it.<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

- 91 -<br />

SAYS BRITAIN’S CLAIMS ARE JUST<br />

<strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory, Salisbury Declares, Was Acquired by Conquest<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17.—Lord Salisbury’s note of Nov. 26 concludes the correspondence.<br />

His object in writing it is, he says, because it seems desirable, in order to remove some evident<br />

misapprehensions as to the main features of the question, <strong>and</strong> that the statement of the boundary<br />

dispute contained in the earlier portion of Mr. Olney s dispatch should not be left without reply.<br />

“Such a course,” he says, “will be the more convenient, because, in consequence of the suspension<br />

of diplomatic relations, I shall not have the opportunity of setting right misconceptions of this kind<br />

in the ordinary way, in a dispatch addressed to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government itself.”<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

Great Britain, Lord Salisbury is careful to note, has heretofore refrained from presenting any<br />

detailed statement of its case either to the United States or any foreign Government, <strong>and</strong> he<br />

therefore thinks Mr. Olney’s argument must be founded mainly, if not entirely, on ex parte<br />

statements emanating from <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> giving au erroneous view of many material facts.<br />

Lord Salisbury denies that the boundary question, as stated by Mr. Olney, is of ancient origin. It<br />

did not commence, he says, until after 1840. Great Britain’s title, says his Lordship, to the territory in<br />

dispute, was derived by conquest from the Dutch <strong>and</strong> military occupation of Dutch settlements in<br />

1796.<br />

As to the claim that <strong>Venezuela</strong> acquired the territory she now claims by assumption of all the<br />

territory of Spain, Lord. Salisbury contends that this is an acknowledgment of her non-ownership of<br />

the territory now claimed by Great Britain, as Spain had not asserted ownership of it.<br />

Continuing, he says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> fundamental principle underlying the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n argument is, in fact, that, inasmuch as<br />

Spain was originally entitled of right to the whole of the American Continent, any territory on that<br />

continent which she cannot be shown to have acknowledged in positive <strong>and</strong> specific terms to have<br />

passed to another owner, can only have been acquired by wrong usurpation, an if situated to the<br />

north of the Amazon <strong>and</strong> west of the Atlantic, must necessarily belong to <strong>Venezuela</strong> as her selfconstituted<br />

inheritor in those regions. It may reasonably be asked whether Mr. Olney would consent<br />

to refer to the arbitration of another power pretentions raised by the Government of Mexico on<br />

such a foundation to large tracts of territory which had long been comprised in the federation.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> marking of the Schomburgk line is reviewed at length, <strong>and</strong> this line, Lord Salisbury states,<br />

instead of being an encroachment on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, was, in fact, “a great reduction of the<br />

boundary claimed by Great Britain as a matter or right, <strong>and</strong> its proposal originated in a desire to<br />

come to a speedy <strong>and</strong> friendly arrangement with a weaker power with whom Great Britain was at<br />

the time, <strong>and</strong> desired to remain, in cordial relations.”<br />

Lord Salisbury says that it will be seen that Great Britain has from the first held the same view as<br />

to the extent of the territory which they are entitled to claim as a matter of right. It comprised the<br />

coast line up to the River Amacura, <strong>and</strong> the whole basin at the Esequibo River <strong>and</strong> its tributaries. A<br />

portion of that claim, however, says Lord Salisbury, they have always been willing to waive<br />

altogether; in regard to another portion they have been <strong>and</strong> continue to be perfectly ready to submit<br />

the uestion of their title to arbitration.<br />

As regards the rest, that which lies within the so-called Schomburgk line, they do not consider<br />

that the rights of Great Britain are open to question. Even within that line they have, on various<br />

occasions, offered to <strong>Venezuela</strong> considerable concessions as a matter at friendship <strong>and</strong> conciliation,<br />

<strong>and</strong> for the purpose of securing an amicable settlement of the dispute.<br />

If, as time has gone on, the concessions thus offered diminished in extent, <strong>and</strong> have now been<br />

withdrawn, this has been the necessary consequence of the gradual spread over the country of<br />

<strong>British</strong> settlements, which her Majesty’s Government cannot, in justice to the inhabitants, offer to<br />

surrender to foreign rule, <strong>and</strong> the justice of such withdrawal is amply borne out by the researches in<br />

the national archives of Holl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Spain, which have furnished further <strong>and</strong> more convincing<br />

evidence in support of the <strong>British</strong> claims.<br />

Lord Salisbury intimates that when the internal politics of <strong>Venezuela</strong> are on a more durable basis<br />

the <strong>British</strong> Government may be enabled to adopt a more moderate <strong>and</strong> conciliatory course in regard<br />

to this question, <strong>and</strong> has not ab<strong>and</strong>oned the hope that the negotiations of 1890, 1891, <strong>and</strong> 1893 may<br />

be resumed with better success. He disclaims any intention of Great Britain to secure territory that<br />

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does not belong to her, <strong>and</strong> states her desire to be on friendly relations with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. In<br />

conclusion, he says, referring to the <strong>British</strong> Government:<br />

“<strong>The</strong>y have, on the contrary, repeatedly expressed their readiness to submit to arbitration the<br />

conflicting claims of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> to large tracts of territory, which, from their<br />

auriferous nature, are known to be of almost untold value. But they cannot consent to entertain, or<br />

to submit to arbitration of another power, or of foreign jurists, however eminent, claims based on<br />

the extravagant pretensions of Spanish officials in the last century, <strong>and</strong> involving the transfer of large<br />

numbers of <strong>British</strong> subjects who have for many years enjoyed the settled rule of a <strong>British</strong> colony, to<br />

a nation of different race <strong>and</strong> language, whose political system is subject to frequent disturbances,<br />

<strong>and</strong> whose institutions as yet too often afford very inadequate protection to life <strong>and</strong> property.<br />

“No issue of this description has ever been involved in the questions which Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

the United States have consented to submit to arbitration, <strong>and</strong> her Majesty’s Government is<br />

convinced that in similar circumstances the Government of the United States would be equally firm<br />

in declining to entertain proposals of such a nature.”<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

- 92 -<br />

THE PEOPLE WILL SUSTAIN THE PRESIDENT<br />

<strong>The</strong> declarations of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s special message on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affair are very serious.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y are more so than the American public had expected, though they are absolutely in harmony<br />

with the brief statement contained in the message of Dec. 3. <strong>The</strong> first impression made by the<br />

present message undoubtedly will be, coming from a President of such sober <strong>and</strong> independent<br />

judgment, with so deep a sense of his responsibility, <strong>and</strong> so free alike from the influence of popular<br />

passion or the bias of personal ambition, that it rests on a strong case. And this general, this<br />

practically universal confidence in the high character of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> is a very weighty element in<br />

the situation. <strong>The</strong> people of the United States have always been <strong>and</strong> always will be prompt <strong>and</strong> firm<br />

in sustaining their Government in the assertion of their rights. <strong>The</strong>ir feeling <strong>and</strong> their action are the<br />

more sure when they know that these rights are interpreted by a calm, clear, <strong>and</strong> just mind.<br />

<strong>The</strong> substance of the case as submitted by the President may be briefly stated. In the dispute<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, which has existed in various stages of acuteness for more than<br />

a half century, Great Britain, starting from the boundary of the unquestioned territory of her colony<br />

of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, had at successive periods claimed a different <strong>and</strong> gradually greater extent of<br />

territory. <strong>The</strong> dispute having reached a critical stage, the President communicated to the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government, in July last, a statement of what the United States regarded as their just <strong>and</strong> essential<br />

policy in the premises. This is in effect that no European power can be allowed, by the forcible<br />

extension of its territory on this continent or by other means, to extend its system over, or to<br />

oppress or control, the destiny of any independent American State. <strong>The</strong> question in the present case<br />

is, What is the boundary of <strong>British</strong> territory? Whatever it can fairly <strong>and</strong> fully be shown to be, the<br />

United States will respect it, but it should not be determined arbitrarily by Great Britain alone. It can<br />

only honorably <strong>and</strong> decisively be determined by arbitration, which the United States had urged on<br />

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Great Britain for many years. <strong>The</strong> President requested of the <strong>British</strong> Government to be informed<br />

whether arbitration will be adopted.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government has, with an elaborate statement of its case <strong>and</strong> with an extended<br />

discussion of the principles advanced <strong>and</strong> the policy avowed by the United States, declined to<br />

submit to arbitration, <strong>and</strong> equally, of course, denies the tight of the United States to require it.<br />

Assuming that <strong>Venezuela</strong> maintains the position thus far taken, the President says:<br />

<strong>The</strong> dispute has reached such a stage as to make it now incumbent upon the United States to take measures to<br />

determine, with sufficient certainty for its justification, what is the true divisional line between the Republic of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> inquiry to that end should, of course, be conducted carefully <strong>and</strong> judicially, <strong>and</strong><br />

due weight should be given to all available evidence, records, <strong>and</strong> facts in support of the claims of both parties.<br />

In order that such an examination should be prosecuted in a thorough <strong>and</strong> satisfactory manner, I suggest that<br />

the Congress make an adequate appropriation for the expenses of a commission to be appointed by the Executive,<br />

who shall make the necessary investigation <strong>and</strong> report upon the matter with the least possible delay. When such<br />

report is made <strong>and</strong> accepted it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its<br />

power, as a willful aggression upon its rights <strong>and</strong> interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any l<strong>and</strong>s or the<br />

exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which, after investigation, we have determined of right<br />

belong to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

This declaration, as we have said, is very serious. It is made still more so by the closing words of<br />

the message:<br />

In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the full responsibility incurred, <strong>and</strong> keenly realize all the<br />

consequences that may follow. I am nevertheless firm in my conviction that, while it is a grievous thing to<br />

contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in<br />

the onward march of civilization <strong>and</strong> strenuous <strong>and</strong> worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which<br />

a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong <strong>and</strong> injustice, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

consequent loss of national self respect <strong>and</strong> honor, beneath which is shielded <strong>and</strong> defended a people’s safety <strong>and</strong><br />

greatness.<br />

It does not, in our judgment, express the scope or the authority of the principle involved in this<br />

message to designate it as a “doctrine” or to attach to it the name of any President, whether that of<br />

Monroe or another. It includes, we believe, a rational <strong>and</strong> fair application of the essential part of the<br />

“Monroe doctrine” as it has repeatedly been declared by the Government of the United States under<br />

successive Administrations <strong>and</strong> in varied circumstances. But it is now submitted to the judgment of<br />

the American Nation as an American principle. As it st<strong>and</strong>s to-day in the message of the President, it<br />

is a clear, grave assertion that the United States will see justice done, neither asking more nor<br />

accepting less, to any Independent State on this continent. To that principle soon or late we believe<br />

Great Britain will assent. By that principle, in any event, the American Nation will st<strong>and</strong>.<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

- 93 -<br />

THE MONROE DOCTRINE<br />

How It Was Expressed by Its Author in Messages Regarding It<br />

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In a pamphlet entitled “<strong>The</strong> Monroe Doctrine: Its Origin <strong>and</strong> Meaning,” prepared by John<br />

Bassett Moore, Professor of International Law at Columbia College, may be found all the passages<br />

in President Monroe’s messages that have been cited as containing the expression of his doctrine. At<br />

the beginning of Mr. Moore’s pamphlet are the two following extracts, numbered respectively I <strong>and</strong><br />

II:<br />

I<br />

“At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the Minister of the<br />

Emperor residing here, a full power <strong>and</strong> instructions have been transmitted to the Minister of the<br />

United States at St. Petersburg to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights <strong>and</strong> interests<br />

of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by his<br />

imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has like wise been acceded to. . . In the<br />

discussions to which this interest has given rise, <strong>and</strong> in the arrangements by which they may<br />

terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights <strong>and</strong><br />

interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free <strong>and</strong><br />

independent condition which they have assumed <strong>and</strong> maintain, are henceforth not to be considered<br />

as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” —Paragraph 7, message of Dec. 2,<br />

1823.<br />

II<br />

“In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any<br />

part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously<br />

menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense.<br />

“With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, <strong>and</strong><br />

by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened <strong>and</strong> impartial observers. <strong>The</strong> political system of<br />

the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference<br />

proceeds tram that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense or our own,<br />

which has been achieved by the loss of much blood <strong>and</strong> treasure, <strong>and</strong> matured by the wisdom of<br />

their most enlightened citizens <strong>and</strong> under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole<br />

Nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to c<strong>and</strong>or <strong>and</strong> to the amicable relations existing between<br />

the United States <strong>and</strong> those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to<br />

extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace <strong>and</strong> safety. With<br />

the existing colonies or dependencies at any European power we have not interfered <strong>and</strong> shall not<br />

interfere.<br />

“But with the Governments who have declared their independence <strong>and</strong> maintained it, <strong>and</strong> whose<br />

independence we have, on great consideration <strong>and</strong> just principles, acknowledged, we could not view<br />

any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their<br />

destiny by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly<br />

disposition toward the United States. . .<br />

“Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so<br />

long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in<br />

the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the Government de facto as the legitimate<br />

Government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, <strong>and</strong> to preserve those relations by a frank,<br />

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1 - 18 December 1895<br />

firm, <strong>and</strong> manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries<br />

from none.<br />

“But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently <strong>and</strong> conspicuously different. It is<br />

impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either<br />

continent without endangering our peace <strong>and</strong> happiness, nor can any one believe that our southern<br />

brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it at their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore,<br />

that we should behold such interposition in any farm with indifference.”—Paragraphs 48 <strong>and</strong> 49,<br />

Message of Dec. 2, 1823.<br />

It will be observed that the above two passages, which are sometimes printed together as if they<br />

farmed one continuous passage <strong>and</strong> were intended to convey one idea, are widely separated in<br />

President Monroe’s message. In reality they relate to two different subjects.<br />

[18 December 1895]<br />

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- Part 4 -<br />

19 - 20 December 1895<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

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- 94 -<br />

ALTGELD DOES SOME JEERING<br />

Illinois Governor Has No Faith in the President<br />

SPRINGFIELD, Ill., Dec. 18.—Gov. Altgeld talked freely last night concerning the attitude of<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter as shown in his message. He said:<br />

“This message is a loud cry to Congress to help the Administration let go or a tiger’s tail, <strong>and</strong> it<br />

shows clearly that the Administration is looking around for a hole in the fence to creep through in<br />

order to get out of the field in which it has been doing some grunting <strong>and</strong> a little rooting. This<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary-line question is old. If there was any uncertain point connected with it, then the<br />

Administration should have gotten the necessary information before it made any protest to the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Government.<br />

“Now, suppose a commission is appointed <strong>and</strong> it gets through the form of an investigation <strong>and</strong><br />

then reports that the facts are in favor of Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> that we ought never to have interfered <strong>and</strong><br />

have no grounds for protesting, how will we then look in the sight of the other nations?<br />

“And you notice the President asks that he be permitted to name this commission. Of course, he<br />

will name friends of his, <strong>and</strong> they will not report until he asks them to.”<br />

CHICAGO, Dec. 18.—Merchants, Board of Trade members, Judges, lawyers, <strong>and</strong> prominent<br />

men of the Chicago business world generally who were asked to-day for an expression of opinion<br />

regarding the message of the President to Congress spoke approvingly of the position taken by the<br />

Government <strong>and</strong> in the majority of cases indulged in enthusiastic praise. <strong>The</strong>re were a few<br />

exceptions, but the criticism was actuated by partisan feeling. Among the leading Democrats<br />

identified with the party management in the State <strong>and</strong> county none could be found who would say<br />

for publication that they approved of the criticism of the message by Gov. Altgeld, <strong>and</strong> several wore<br />

outspoken in declaring that the Governor acted ill-advisedly from a party st<strong>and</strong>point.<br />

Es-Mayor Hopkins was credited with saying that the criticism would cost the Governor a<br />

renomination <strong>and</strong> retire him politically.<br />

P. D. Armour said: “I think it is a very good message. I do not think we will have any war with<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, as matters have not reached the point where they cannot be amicably settled, but if there is<br />

war I believe it would be thoroughly justifiable on the part of the United States. <strong>The</strong>re arc a great<br />

many of us Republicans who like Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>.”<br />

Marshall Field said; ‘Some one will have to back down in this international dispute. I need not<br />

say whether it will be the President or Lord Salisbury. Ex-Minister Lincoln says Lord Salisbury once<br />

offered to arbitrate the question. He may be willing to do so now.”<br />

Ex-United States Senator Charles B. Farwell said: “I believe Lord Salisbury should have acceded<br />

to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s request for arbitration. President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has the courage of his<br />

convictions <strong>and</strong> I believe the Monroe doctrine should be upheld strictly in the present dispute.”<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

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- 95 -<br />

A GLANCE AT VENEZUELA<br />

Something About the Country <strong>and</strong> Its Valuable Resources.<br />

HER RICH AND VALUED PRODUCTIONS<br />

Position of the Republic—<strong>The</strong> Cities, Lakes, Rivers <strong>and</strong> Form<br />

of Government—Natural Wealth <strong>and</strong> Character of the People<br />

Although the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> has been a somewhat settled <strong>and</strong> comparatively welldefined<br />

country for over 400 years, it was not until recently that the attention of the people of the<br />

United States became strongly attracted to this sister republic on the South American continent.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, indeed, has been practically left to the unaided resources of development of its own<br />

inhabitants, since the period when the ancient Spanish conquerors ab<strong>and</strong>oned the territory for those<br />

other regions on the slopes of the Andes, where the precious metals were seemingly much more<br />

abundant, <strong>and</strong> were to be had with the expenditure of infinitely less time <strong>and</strong> trouble. During these<br />

several centuries the country slumbered, <strong>and</strong> its wonderful natural resources lay undiscovered.<br />

This was in part due to the situation of the country, <strong>and</strong> in part the consequence of the easygoing<br />

disposition of the descendants of the original Spanish inhabitants. Immigration, however,<br />

added to the awakened spirit of the age, has astonishingly quickened the impulses of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns, as is attested by the rapid growth <strong>and</strong> quickly perfected character of their chief cities,<br />

notably Caracas, the capital of the nation <strong>and</strong> of its federal districts, which has been likened by<br />

travelers to Paris on a smaller scale.<br />

<strong>The</strong> chief knowledge of <strong>Venezuela</strong> gained from the school geographies of a quarter of a century<br />

ago was circumscribed by the fact that it was the first l<strong>and</strong> seen by Columbus on his third voyage to<br />

the west, <strong>and</strong> that it was traversed by the Orinoco, one of the greatest rivers of the world. It was<br />

pictured as a region of limitless tropic forests, immense plains, <strong>and</strong> vast mountain ranges.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> has frequently been styled in reference to its dispute with Engl<strong>and</strong> over its boundary<br />

line, a small country. It is so only in the comparative sense, when contrasted in the mind figuratively<br />

with the enormous development <strong>and</strong> compact civilization of Great Britain. <strong>Venezuela</strong> is a large<br />

country—larger than France, Germany, <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong> combined. It is equal in extent to the great<br />

States of Texas, Colorado, Idaho, <strong>and</strong> California joined together.<br />

Including the territory in dispute with Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>Venezuela</strong> has an area of almost 600,000 square<br />

miles.<br />

Visitors to the Chicago World’s Fair were astonished to see the variety of the productions of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> there displayed. <strong>The</strong>se included many kinds at maize, starch, sugar <strong>and</strong> sugar cane, honey,<br />

beans, coffee, cocoa, chocolate, tobacco, hemp, palm, leaves, cotton, silk-cotton, silk-wool,<br />

vegetable horsehair, vegetable sponges, mineral waters, alcoholic, <strong>and</strong> other beverages, castor beans,<br />

castor oil, cocoanut oil, crab oil, sassafras oil, vanilla, soaps, beeswax, ornamental woods, dyeing <strong>and</strong><br />

tanning woods, <strong>and</strong> barks, gums, resins, <strong>and</strong> caoutchoue, brooms, baskets, fibres, preserved fruits,<br />

coal, gold <strong>and</strong> silver, asbestos, copper, opal, talc, calcic spar, galena, tonka beans, lignite, petroleum,<br />

marble, paving stones, stalactites, kaolin, pipe-clay, magnesian limestone, sulphur, rubber, indigo,<br />

phosphate, guano, iron ore, mustard, sarsaparilla cinchona bark, cola nuts, tamarinds, <strong>and</strong> aloes.<br />

Of forest woods alone there were 145 varieties, including a fine specimen of the algarrabo, a<br />

beautiful wood of dark yellowish color, streaked with green veins. <strong>The</strong>re were besides many<br />

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specimens at prepared products, chemical <strong>and</strong> pharmaceutical, <strong>and</strong> of manufactures, not to speak of<br />

a collection of paintings by <strong>Venezuela</strong>n artists <strong>and</strong> of many books <strong>and</strong> newspapers.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> lies altogether within the torrid equatorial region, the great line passing through the<br />

southernmost territory of Alto-Amazonas. Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing this, the temperature of the country is<br />

much milder than that of the African equatorial coast l<strong>and</strong>s—for instance, Guinea <strong>and</strong> Zanzibar.<br />

Situated at the northern end of South America, with the Caribbean Sea to the north, the Atlantic<br />

Ocean on the east, <strong>and</strong> high mountains in the interior, <strong>Venezuela</strong> is peculiarly favored by the natural<br />

elements. Three mountain ranges rear snow-capped summits to the sky—the Andes, the Coast<br />

Range, <strong>and</strong> the Parima Mountains. <strong>The</strong> Andes cross the northwestern States from northeast to<br />

southwest. <strong>The</strong> Coast Range runs parallel with the Caribbean coast <strong>The</strong> Parima Mountains,<br />

beginning in the interior of the central western State of Bolivar, run east <strong>and</strong> west <strong>and</strong> mark the<br />

southern limit of the agricultural zone.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> has the shape or a three-leafed clover, with the stem on the Caribbean coast. Speaking<br />

generally, nearly every State in the country is mountainous to some degree. Among the mountains<br />

the country varies in temperature from moderate to very cold. <strong>The</strong> temperate l<strong>and</strong>s begin at the<br />

height of 7,000 feet above <strong>and</strong> descend until within 2,000 feet of the sea level. Below that level are<br />

the hot countries.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are but two seasons in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the wet <strong>and</strong> the dry. When the sun reaches the Tropic<br />

of Capricorn the rains begin, <strong>and</strong> they do not stop until the sun has entered the Tropic of Cancer.<br />

Thus it is rainy <strong>and</strong> hot from April to October, <strong>and</strong> the rest of the year it is dry <strong>and</strong> cooler. During<br />

the summer the prevailing winds are from the northeast. <strong>The</strong>re are heavy rainstorms called<br />

“northers” usually in November <strong>and</strong> December.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are over 1,000 rivers <strong>and</strong> brooks in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, of which over 400 are affluents of the<br />

Orinoco. <strong>The</strong> Orinoco is navigable 850 miles from the ocean, <strong>and</strong> taps the fertile regions in the<br />

interior of the Colombia Republic. Some of the navigable tributaries of the Orinoco run south <strong>and</strong><br />

join the Amazon or its tributaries, thus opening a double route to the sea. Besides this network of<br />

rivers, there are two large inl<strong>and</strong> lakes, one of which, Lake Maracaibo, is as large as the Great Salt<br />

Lake in Utah, with an area of 2,100 square miles. <strong>The</strong> other, Lake Valencia, is 1,700 feet above the<br />

sea level.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are three kinds of soil in <strong>Venezuela</strong>—agricultural, grazing, <strong>and</strong> wooded. <strong>The</strong>re are 13,600<br />

square miles of agricultural l<strong>and</strong>, of which only 300 square miles are under cultivation. <strong>The</strong> Orinoco<br />

sweeps over the arc of an immense circle, entering on the east coast, <strong>and</strong> emerging from the country<br />

on the southwest border. <strong>The</strong>re are over 70 isl<strong>and</strong>s on the coast, the largest, Margarita, being 441<br />

square miles in area. <strong>The</strong>re are over 1,500 miles of coast scattered along which are 32 harbors <strong>and</strong> 50<br />

bays. Like the great lakes of the United States, the two great inl<strong>and</strong> lakes of <strong>Venezuela</strong> have their<br />

own ports. <strong>The</strong>re are five gulfs on the ocean coast, the largest of which is the Gulf of Maracaibo,<br />

1,600 square miles in extent.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are many mines in operation throughout <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the more valuable being in the<br />

Yuruari region, which is in the disputed territory. <strong>The</strong>re is situated the famous Callao gold mine.<br />

Gold is also found in the mountainous districts of the Yaracui River, <strong>and</strong> near the cities of San<br />

Felipe <strong>and</strong> Nirgua. Several rich gold mines near Carupano are being worked with New York capital,<br />

<strong>and</strong> have assayed seven ounces to the ton. <strong>The</strong>re are silver, copper, <strong>and</strong> lead mines in <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Seventy miles east of Puerto Cabello are the valuable Aroa copper mines, from which comes the red<br />

copper. In the Cordillera region are red hematite <strong>and</strong> iron deposits. <strong>The</strong> largest deposits of these<br />

ores are near the Imataca River, which is one of the tributaries of the Lower Orinoco. A dozen miles<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

from Barcelona are extensive deposits of bituminous coal. <strong>The</strong> Pedernales asphalt is similar to the<br />

Egyptian refined product.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are rich salt beds in the Araya Peninsula which have been constantly worked since 1499,<br />

when they were discovered by Nino. In the last quarter of a century they have produced a<br />

Government revenue of $2,700,000.<br />

In Lagrenillas, near Merida, there is a lake the bottom of which is covered with sesqui carbonate<br />

of soda, which the natives call urao. <strong>The</strong>re are large deposits of sulphur in Barcelona, Cremona, <strong>and</strong><br />

Coro, <strong>and</strong> there are inexhaustible granite quarries in the Silla Mountain, near Caracas. Granite, chalk,<br />

slate, <strong>and</strong> marble abound on the coast <strong>and</strong> in the Parima Mountains. Over nine tons of solid gold<br />

were taken from the Yururi mines from 1886 to 1890. In Coro, at La Quiva, near the Pedregal road,<br />

there are forty springs which gush through beds as white as porcelain. Agriculture in <strong>Venezuela</strong> is<br />

mainly confined to the raising of coffee, cocoa <strong>and</strong> sugar cane. <strong>The</strong>re are mother-of-pearl deposits in<br />

Neuva Esparta.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> is a Federal republic. Its Constitution is modeled on those of the United States <strong>and</strong><br />

Switzerl<strong>and</strong>. It. gives autonomy to the States in the confederation. <strong>The</strong>re are open elections, free<br />

speech, free press, religious liberty, security of person <strong>and</strong> property, prohibition of slavery, <strong>and</strong> no<br />

imprisonment for debt.<br />

But in <strong>Venezuela</strong> there is no writ of habeas corpus <strong>and</strong> no trial by jury. <strong>The</strong> legislative power is<br />

lodged in a Senate <strong>and</strong> a House of Deputies <strong>The</strong>re are three Senators from each State, <strong>and</strong>, with<br />

their alternates, they serve four years. One Deputy is apportioned to each 35,000 inhabitants. <strong>The</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress consists of 27 Senators <strong>and</strong> 53 Deputies.<br />

<strong>The</strong> population of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is 2,400,000 by the latest census. On the peace footing the army<br />

numbers 7,000 men. In case of war the effective force can be raised to 60,000 men. <strong>The</strong> annual<br />

revenue of the country is $5,500,000, of which two-thirds is from customs duties. <strong>Venezuela</strong> imports<br />

annually $13,000,000 worth of merch<strong>and</strong>ise, <strong>and</strong> exports $16,000,000 worth. <strong>The</strong> principal export is<br />

coffee, equal to $15,000,000 per annum. <strong>Venezuela</strong> buys $1,000,000 worth of goods yearly from<br />

Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> sells John Bull only $500,000 worth annually. <strong>The</strong> United States bought<br />

$12,000,000 worth of goods from <strong>Venezuela</strong> in 1891. <strong>Venezuela</strong> has borrowed from Deputy from<br />

each State <strong>and</strong> a Deputy from French bankers $750,000. <strong>The</strong> internal debt amounts to $7,500,000.<br />

<strong>The</strong> executive power of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is vested in a president, who acts in conjunction with his<br />

Cabinet <strong>and</strong> the Federal Council. He holds office two years, <strong>and</strong> cannot be at once re-elected. <strong>The</strong><br />

Federal Council is composed of a Senator <strong>and</strong> deputy from each State <strong>and</strong> a deputy from the Federal<br />

District, chosen by Congress from among its own members, for the term of two years. <strong>The</strong> Federal<br />

Council chooses the President of <strong>Venezuela</strong> from its own ranks. <strong>The</strong> courts are organized much like<br />

those in the United States. <strong>The</strong>re is a system of free public schools. <strong>The</strong> Federal District<br />

corresponds to the District of Columbia.<br />

<strong>The</strong> chief city of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is the capital, Caracas. It has a population of 75,000 persons. <strong>The</strong><br />

other chief cities are Valencia, 40,000 population; Maracaibo, 35,000; Barquisimeto, 32,000, <strong>and</strong><br />

Ciudad Bolivar, 12,000.<br />

In one of the fine public squares in Caracas is a large statue of George Washington.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> remained under Spanish rule until 1811, when Simon Bolivar proclaimed her<br />

independent. <strong>The</strong> independence of <strong>Venezuela</strong> was recognized by Spain in 1845. In 1846 a series of<br />

civil wars began, <strong>and</strong> did not close until 1870. All slaves were emancipated in 1854. In 1864 a<br />

Federal Constitution was drawn up. Guzman Blanco became Dictator in 1870, when he was elected<br />

President.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> people of <strong>Venezuela</strong> are in the main descended from the Spaniards. A. good deal of Indian<br />

blood has been mingled with the Spanish strain. <strong>The</strong>y are a talented <strong>and</strong> courteous people, who bear<br />

the reputation of being fine fighters. A considerable part of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is still practically unexplored,<br />

<strong>and</strong> is inhabited by aborigines. <strong>The</strong> republic is divided into nine States, a Federal District, <strong>and</strong> five<br />

Federal Territories. <strong>The</strong>re are 3,900 miles of telegraph wire. Five steamship lines ply along the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n coasts <strong>and</strong> through the rivers. <strong>The</strong>re are 234 miles of railroads. <strong>The</strong> monetary unit of the<br />

country is the bolivar, equal to 19¼ cents American money.<br />

Caracas, the capital, is situated in the Valley of Chacao, seven miles distant from the Caribbean<br />

coast. <strong>The</strong> city is regularly laid out. <strong>The</strong>re are two main streets, which cross each other at right<br />

angles. <strong>The</strong>re are several fine parks. <strong>The</strong> city was almost totally destroyed by an earthquake in 1812.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 96 -<br />

THE RESULTS OF WAR<br />

Mr. Henderson Says the United States Would Suffer<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18.—John B. Henderson Jr., son of ex-Senator Henderson of Missouri,<br />

John W. Foster’s private secretary in the peace negotiations between China <strong>and</strong> Japan, has issued in<br />

pamphlet form an argument on the relations of the Monroe doctrine to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

After recounting the boundary question, showing the <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns were equally negligent<br />

in settling the boundaries of <strong>Guiana</strong>, “a country in which the statistics show that the deaths nearly<br />

double the number of births,” Mr. Henderson attributes to the discovery of gold the intensification<br />

of the dispute, just as a similar condition now threatens trouble in Alaska, <strong>and</strong> then proceeds to<br />

consider the interest the United States, as a nation, has in the controversy.<br />

He begins with the farewell address of Washington <strong>and</strong> goes through the history of the<br />

developments of the Monroe doctrine just as Secretary Olney did in his dispatch of July 20, but<br />

reaches conclusions precisely opposite to those adopted by the Secretary of State <strong>and</strong> President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>.<br />

He recalls “that Sir Walter Raleigh ascended the Orinoco River, as an English discoverer, twentyfive<br />

years before Plymouth Rock was ever pressed by Puritan foot; <strong>and</strong> it must be further<br />

remembered that for nearly 300 years the <strong>Guiana</strong> country was claimed <strong>and</strong> colonized alternately by<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, Holl<strong>and</strong>, France <strong>and</strong> Spain; but in 1803, twenty years before the Monroe declaration was<br />

proclaimed, all right <strong>and</strong> title to what is now known as <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> passed to the English<br />

Government, <strong>and</strong> since that date the English title has been undisputed.”<br />

After numerous quotations from American statesmen on the limitations of the Monroe doctrine<br />

to the attempt to restore Spanish dominion over American republics, Mr. Henderson declares that<br />

the doctrine received its authoritative exposition by a resolution adopted by the House of<br />

Representatives in 1825 in the following words:<br />

That the United States ought not to become a party with the Spanish-American republics, or either of them, to<br />

any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing interference by any of the European powers with their<br />

independence or form of government, or to any compact for the purpose of preventing colonization upon the<br />

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continent of America, but that the people of the United States should be left free to act in any crisis in such a<br />

manner as their feelings <strong>and</strong> friendship toward these republics, <strong>and</strong> as their own honor <strong>and</strong> policy may, at the time,<br />

dictate.<br />

Mr. Henderson concludes his paper as follows:<br />

If, in the progress of the negotiation between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain we shall discover in the conduct of<br />

the latter a disposition to use the question of unsettled boundaries as a mere pretext to extend her territorial limits at<br />

the expense of our sister republic, we are still free to denounce such act hostile <strong>and</strong> unfriendly, <strong>and</strong> even “dangerous<br />

to our peace <strong>and</strong> safety,” should the circumstances, when carefully considered, seem to justify such a declaration. At<br />

present the English Government claims to be the “innocent <strong>and</strong> injured party”; that <strong>Venezuela</strong> is the aggressor, not<br />

only in asserting a false boundary line, but in arresting <strong>British</strong> subjects on territory which has for an indefinite period<br />

been known <strong>and</strong> recognized by both Governments as the property of Engl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> truth or falsity of this claim is<br />

not yet developed.<br />

If true, Engl<strong>and</strong> is clearly justified. If false, it will be time enough for us to act.<br />

In a material point of view, a war with Engl<strong>and</strong>, whatever the result, can bring nothing to compensation for its<br />

losses. Over one-half of our exports now go to Engl<strong>and</strong>. While we annually sell to her nearly $500,000,000 worth of<br />

our products, we sell to <strong>Venezuela</strong> about $4,000,000 worth, <strong>and</strong> to all the Spanish South American republics less<br />

than $20,000,000 worth. Such a war means ruined commerce, increased National debt, a new pension list, <strong>and</strong><br />

taxation of the people to the very extreme of poverty <strong>and</strong> want.<br />

<strong>The</strong> pamphlet has attracted much attention from members of Congress <strong>and</strong> diplomats.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 97 -<br />

AWAITING OFFICIAL NEWS<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government Not Regularly Informed<br />

COMMISSION MAY HASTEN A CRISIS<br />

Its Arrival on the <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>Border</strong> Liable to be Regarded as a Menace<br />

European Views <strong>and</strong> Effects<br />

LONDON, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Marquis of Salisbury held the usual Wednesday reception at the<br />

Foreign Office to-day. <strong>The</strong> French, German, Italian, <strong>and</strong> Spanish Ambassadors, <strong>and</strong> the Austrian<br />

<strong>and</strong> Dutch Chargés d’Affaires were present. United States Ambassador Bayard was absent.<br />

It is understood that the <strong>British</strong> Government has not been informed officially of the proposed<br />

commission in connection with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute, <strong>and</strong> that Great Britain will follow<br />

the usual diplomatic course until overt action is taken by the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> action of the House of Representatives in voting an appropriation for the expenses of the<br />

commission may hasten a crisis, but it is not expected that there will be serious developments until<br />

the commission shall have arrived in <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Its presence on the <strong>Guiana</strong> border will constitute a<br />

grave menace, <strong>and</strong> the necessary instructions will be forwarded to the authorities to maintain the<br />

interests of Great Britain in <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

It is the opinion in financial circles here that President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message will render the<br />

placing of a new issue of United States bonds in London impossible.<br />

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A representative of <strong>The</strong> United Press interviewed a number of prominent Stock Exchange<br />

operators, from whom he elicited expressions of belief that the affair would not finally be serious,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that the fall of prices resultant from President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message would not be permanent.<br />

A number of politicians seen at the various Conservative clubs by <strong>The</strong> United Press representative<br />

maintained that diplomats, acting under the instructions of Lord Salisbury, had sounded the<br />

European powers during last Autumn, <strong>and</strong> prior to the dispatch of Great Britain’s reply to Secretary<br />

Olney’s note, with the result that the diplomats answered that all the powers having interests in<br />

America agreed with Lord Salisbury that the Monroe doctrine as stated by Mr. Olney, did not<br />

possess any international authority.<br />

All attempts to obtain from United States Ambassador Bayard an expression of his views in<br />

regard to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message or any other phase of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute have been<br />

fruitless. Mr. Bayard positively declines to say a word on the subject.<br />

<strong>The</strong> first announcement in London of the communication of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message to<br />

Congress was made in a United Press dispatch to <strong>The</strong> Central <strong>News</strong>, the leading features of which the<br />

Central <strong>News</strong> immediately sent to the Foreign Office, whence they were at once transmitted to Lord<br />

Salisbury at Hatfield House over the Premier’s private wires.<br />

This was the first intimation that Lord Salisbury had had of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s serious view of<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n situation. <strong>The</strong> Premier <strong>and</strong> his secretaries were greatly concerned over the critical<br />

turn which the affair had taken <strong>and</strong> asked for further information expressing their thanks to <strong>The</strong><br />

United Press for its promptness in cabling the important news <strong>and</strong> to <strong>The</strong> Central <strong>News</strong> for its courtesy<br />

in placing it at their disposal.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 98 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s Message as Viewed by Frenchmen<br />

PARIS, Dec. 18.—M. Lucien Millevoye, formerly a member of the Chamber of Deputies, has an<br />

article in La Patrie in which he says:<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message inflicts a harder blow on <strong>British</strong> pride than it has received in a<br />

century. It will diminish Engl<strong>and</strong>’s prestige in all parts of the world. Engl<strong>and</strong> must undertake <strong>and</strong><br />

ultra-formidable adventure or bow to the Americans’ haughty ultimatum. Since Napoleon<br />

threatened to invade Engl<strong>and</strong> no chief of State has dared to use toward the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office<br />

such firm language as that of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s.<br />

“Engl<strong>and</strong> is in a dilemma. Submission is equivalent to humiliation, <strong>and</strong> resistance is equivalent to<br />

war, an implacable duel with all the energy <strong>and</strong> the moral <strong>and</strong> material forces which America has at<br />

its disposal, including the Irish, whom Engl<strong>and</strong>’s iniquitous rule has exiled to the New World.<br />

Europe will not intervene. It would not dare to brave an American coalition roused to anger by an<br />

attack upon its dearest interests. <strong>The</strong> time is past when <strong>British</strong> diplomacy bribed half the world <strong>and</strong><br />

intimidated the remainder. It is only audacious now with weaklings like the Matabeles; it will now<br />

<strong>and</strong> warn her that she need not look for any help from France.”<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

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- 99 -<br />

AMERICAN NEWSPAPER COMMENT<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s Course Receives the Approval of the Press<br />

All the American newspapers, with one or two exceptions, heartily approve President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s attitude regarding Britain’s claims to <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory. North <strong>and</strong> South, East <strong>and</strong><br />

West the papers give unqualified approval. Below will be found the views of leading Journals:<br />

ALBANY, N.Y., Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Journal says:<br />

Albany<br />

“<strong>The</strong> message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> appeals to the people of this country at a time when conditions compare<br />

similarly in not a single respect with those existent in 1823, when President Monroe promulgated the Monroe<br />

doctrine. To-day there exists no fear that any Continental nation or alliance of nations will extend its system to any<br />

portion of this hemisphere, so that it will become dangerous to our peace <strong>and</strong> safety. We question the wisdom of<br />

the proposition advanced by President Clevel<strong>and</strong>. As the matter st<strong>and</strong>s to-day, however, there is but one course<br />

open to Congress, <strong>and</strong> that is to accept the advice of the President.”<br />

Atlanta<br />

ATLANTA, Ga., Dec. 18. —<strong>The</strong> Atlanta Constitution says the message is very strong throughout,<br />

<strong>and</strong> from first to last breathes the genuine American spirit. It strikes a note of patriotism that is not<br />

often heard in high places during these latter days, <strong>and</strong> for that reason it will fall on the ears of the<br />

people with a welcome sound.<br />

Baltimore.<br />

BALTIMORE, Dec. 18. —<strong>The</strong> American (Rep.) says:<br />

“It will receive the approval of the American people. It will warm their hearts <strong>and</strong> gratify their pride as no State<br />

paper has done during this Administration.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Herald (Ind.) says:<br />

“It is a peculiarly able <strong>and</strong> lucid statement of the American position. No more positive or emphatic defense of<br />

the Monroe doctrine could have been expected or desired. For once Engl<strong>and</strong> has met its match in the field of<br />

diplomacy.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Sun (Dem.) says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Republican howlers for a ‘vigorous policy’ <strong>and</strong> for war on any terms <strong>and</strong> against anybody cannot but be<br />

disappointed at the awful turn President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has given to their bombastic war cry. <strong>The</strong> only political stock in<br />

trade left to the Republicans was their Jingo cry, <strong>and</strong> they hoped to ‘whoop things up’ with this <strong>and</strong> put the<br />

Administration of the Democratic Party in general in an unpopular attitude. But the transparent scheme has failed,<br />

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<strong>and</strong> without committing himself or his part to anything further at present than the ascertainment of the facts, the<br />

President has completely turned the table on them.”<br />

BUFFALO, N.Y., Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Courier says:<br />

Buffalo<br />

“<strong>The</strong> President’s message is firm <strong>and</strong> vigorous, but it is also calm <strong>and</strong> deliberate. At such a time hot words <strong>and</strong><br />

intemperate harangues should be avoided.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Express characterizes it as bold <strong>and</strong> patriotic.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Evening Post says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> message promises to become the historic confirmation of the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> before the question is<br />

settled to establish once for all universal recognition of this American contribution of this American contribution of<br />

the law of nations.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Enquirer says the message is a splendid utterance, <strong>and</strong> that “the President will be sustained in<br />

the position he has taken at all hazards <strong>and</strong> at all costs.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Evening <strong>News</strong> says: “<strong>The</strong> President will be heartily supported by the American people of all<br />

ranks <strong>and</strong> persuasions.”<br />

Charleston<br />

CHARLESTON, S.C., Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>News</strong> <strong>and</strong> Courier to-day has a column editorial admiring<br />

the spirit, but criticising the lack of judgment of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message. <strong>The</strong> following opening<br />

sentences indicate the spirit of the editorial:<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s special message to Congress on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question must satisfy the most exacting<br />

<strong>and</strong> enthusiastic Jingoes. But it will make the judicious grieve. We have no criticism to make of the message itself,<br />

nor of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s statement of the case. He has expressed himself with even more than his usual clearness <strong>and</strong><br />

force, but it is to be hoped on every account that some satisfactory basis may yet be found for an honorable<br />

adjustment of the differences between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain without resort to the last dread appeal of<br />

nations.”<br />

Chicago<br />

CHICAGO, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> following are the comments of Chicago newspapers on the<br />

President’s special message:<br />

Inter Ocean, (Rep.):<br />

“<strong>The</strong> President’s special message relative to <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affairs is in a tone that will be pleasing to the country.”<br />

Record, (Ind.):<br />

“In substance the message is a dignified but peremptory declaration that the Monroe doctrine is sound<br />

international law, that the United States will abide by it, <strong>and</strong> that further aggressions in <strong>Venezuela</strong> will be met with<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

resistance by every means within this Nation’s power. If Congress remains steadfast in support of the President’s<br />

policy, the effect of this message will be the final establishment of the Monroe doctrine beyond any nation’s power<br />

to dispute.”<br />

Cincinnati<br />

CINCINNATI, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Commercial Gazette (Rep.) says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> message of yesterday will become one of the great historic papers at the Nation. Briefly it is an unreserved<br />

acceptance of the doctrine of President Monroe, <strong>and</strong> it expresses his willingness to go to the extreme lengths in<br />

support of the doctrine.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Tribune (Rep.) says:<br />

“It will st<strong>and</strong> so long as this Nation st<strong>and</strong>s as one of the greatest <strong>and</strong> most momentous utterances at an<br />

American president.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Enquirer (Dem.) says:<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question leaves no room for criticism. It is an exhibition of<br />

the American backbone which every true American will applaud.”<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

CLEVELAND, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> World (Rep.) says:<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has given the people of the United States a genuine <strong>and</strong> agreeable surprise. In a dignified,<br />

patriotic, conservative, yet courageous temper he has accepted the challenge which Great Britain has laid down in its<br />

contemptuous commentaries on the Monroe doctrine.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Press (Ind.) says:<br />

“Every patriotic American will have a higher opinion of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> now that he has thrown dawn the<br />

gauntlet.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Recorder (Ind.) says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> sent to Congress yesterday is forcible <strong>and</strong> exactly to the point.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Plain Dealer (Dem.) says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re ought to be no partisan differences in the response to this appeal to the patriotism <strong>and</strong> self-respect of<br />

the American people.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Leader (Rep.) says:<br />

“This means that John Bull must either fight or back down. Grover Clevel<strong>and</strong> is exactly right”<br />

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Detroit<br />

DETROIT, Mich., Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Journal (Rep.) says editorially:<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re can be no further misunderst<strong>and</strong>ing or doubt as to the position of this Government relative to the<br />

controversy between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine is clearly involved; it will be defended at all<br />

hazards.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Evening <strong>News</strong> (Ind.) says:<br />

“Our Government has declared in the most solemn manner how the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute can be settled, <strong>and</strong><br />

there can be no retreat. Engl<strong>and</strong> will not be permitted to hold even the Schomburgk line without arbitration.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Tribune (Rep.) says:<br />

“We st<strong>and</strong> pledged by President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message to investigate the merits of the dispute between Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, with the support of sword <strong>and</strong> bayonet, if they are needed.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Free Press (Dem.) says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> fact seems to be that the Marquis of Salisbury <strong>and</strong> his advisers have made up their minds to insist upon<br />

the boundary between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> which they, themselves, have marked out. If that is the case the<br />

consequences must, indeed, be momentous. <strong>The</strong>y may involve us in a war.”<br />

Philadelphia<br />

PHILADELPHIA, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Record (Dem.) says editorially:<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message is a strong <strong>and</strong> firm declaration. <strong>The</strong>re is no jingoism in it, but there is such a<br />

courageous assertion of the Monroe doctrine as might have been expected from a Democratic Administration<br />

carefully following Democratic precedents.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Ledger (Ind. Rep.) says:<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message is clear, emphatic, <strong>and</strong> dignified. It will be heartily indorsed by every genuine<br />

American.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Times (Dem.) says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> President speaks for the Nation.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Press (Rep.) says:<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has at last taken a st<strong>and</strong> upon a capital question of foreign relations in which he will carry<br />

the cordial <strong>and</strong> unanimous approval of the American people.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Inquirer (Rep.) says:<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

“No one can call the President to account for not taking a vigorous st<strong>and</strong> regarding the <strong>British</strong> encroachments<br />

upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>.”<br />

Pittsburg<br />

PITTSBURG. Penn., Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> following editorial comments from to-day’s Pittsburg<br />

papers illustrate the feeling here about the President’s message of yesterday on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

boundary dispute:<br />

Dispatch, (Ind.):<br />

“On the main question that the principle involved is fundamental to our own existence, <strong>and</strong> that it must be<br />

maintained at any cost, the President will have the necessary support of the Congress <strong>and</strong> the whole Nation.”<br />

Commercial Gazette, (Rep.):<br />

“<strong>The</strong> message defines the situation in terms not to be misunderstood. That these sentiments will be approved<br />

by the great majority of the American people is not to be doubted.”<br />

Post, (Dem.):<br />

“Great Britain refusing to arbitrate, we propose to arbitrate for ourselves, <strong>and</strong> .maintin the award made, no<br />

matter where it leads—to peace or to war.”<br />

Times, (Rep.):<br />

“Every loyal American must rejoice in President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s firmness <strong>and</strong> determination.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Leader (Ind.) commends the message as voicing the sentiment of the whole people.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Press, (Rep.):<br />

“It is not probable that the two greatest Christian powers of the world to-day are to be involved in actual<br />

hostilities. <strong>The</strong> firm <strong>and</strong> uncompromising attitude taken by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> is bound to give the Monroe<br />

doctrine that st<strong>and</strong>ing in international law which it dem<strong>and</strong>s.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle Telegraph, (Rep.):<br />

<strong>The</strong> firmly worded message to Congress sent yesterday by Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> cannot help being influential in<br />

settling a contention of long st<strong>and</strong>ing. <strong>The</strong> President’s recommendations in connection herewith are wise, far<br />

removed from the spirit of jingoism or desire to precipitate war.”<br />

St. Louis<br />

ST. LOUIS, Dec. 18.—Local papers comment as follows upon the President’s special message:<br />

Republic, (Dem.):<br />

“<strong>The</strong> message is the most virile assertion possible of the Monroe doctrine. <strong>The</strong>re is no jingoism in it, but pure<br />

Americanism.”<br />

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Globe-Democrat, (Rep.):<br />

“<strong>The</strong> President grasps the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n situation with commendable vigor <strong>and</strong> courage.”<br />

Richmond<br />

RICHMOND, Va., Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Dispatch says editorially this morning:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> special message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> sent to Congress yesterday leaves not a shadow of doubt as to his<br />

position on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. It seems to us that Congress is bound to vote the money that the President<br />

asks. If so, we hope <strong>and</strong> expect that he will appoint a commission of cool-headed <strong>and</strong> patriotic men, who will<br />

proceed cautiously <strong>and</strong> verify every statement that is made to them. <strong>The</strong>n if it is found that Great Britain is bent<br />

upon extending her domain upon this continent, <strong>and</strong> still persists in declining to submit the question to arbitration,<br />

this country will be committed to aid the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns, in defending their territory against <strong>British</strong> aggression. In<br />

other words, we shall then have war.<br />

“That war is a serious thing we need not tell the people of the South, the people of Richmond particularly.<br />

Nevertheless, whenever the country needs soldiers it will find that the South will not only furnish its share, but more<br />

than its share.”<br />

Rochester<br />

ROCHESTER, N.Y., Dec. 18—<strong>The</strong> Union <strong>and</strong> Advertiser says editorially:<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message meets the fullest expectations of the country <strong>and</strong> elicits the warmest approval of<br />

the patriotic people <strong>and</strong> press of all parties <strong>and</strong> of no party.”<br />

San Francisco<br />

SAN FRANCISCO, Dec. 18. – <strong>The</strong> San Francisco morning papers comment on President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s utterances as follows:<br />

Call, (Rep.):<br />

“By his message of yesterday, President Clevel<strong>and</strong> assumes the rightful position of a President of the United<br />

States. He asserts the principles of true Americanism. He speaks the popular will in language not to be mistaken.”<br />

Chronicle, (Rep.):<br />

“<strong>The</strong> argument of the President is unanswerable. Let it be understood that the Government will not recede.”<br />

Examiner, (Dem.):<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has taken precisely the st<strong>and</strong> in his <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message which Americans who are not<br />

jingoes but who are keenly alive to the honor, the interests, <strong>and</strong> the traditions of their country hoped he would<br />

take.”<br />

Savannah<br />

SAVANNAH, Ga., Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Savannah Morning <strong>News</strong> says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> President’s <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message meets the hearty approval of the people. <strong>The</strong>y believe the Monroe<br />

doctrine should be upheld, <strong>and</strong> that it must be upheld now or forever ab<strong>and</strong>oned. <strong>The</strong>y are not anxious for war with<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

Great Britain. <strong>The</strong>y want peace with all the world, <strong>and</strong> they would willingly do all that could be done with honor to<br />

maintain it, but they prefer war, knowing full well what it means, rather than have peace on terms that would not be<br />

creditable to the Nation.”<br />

Syracuse<br />

SYRACUSE, N.Y., Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Journal comments editorially on the President’s message:<br />

“<strong>Venezuela</strong> will secure her rights to the dispute, Engl<strong>and</strong> will suffer no wrong, <strong>and</strong> there will be an end to<br />

attempted encroachments by foreign powers upon territory which rightfully comes under the protection of the<br />

Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> the world will know once <strong>and</strong> for all time that the United States will maintain that doctrine at<br />

all hazards.”<br />

Utica<br />

UTICA. N. Y, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Utica Observer closes its editorial on the President’s message, <strong>and</strong><br />

the situation with these words:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> President’s firm dignity <strong>and</strong> fearlessness, which denote strength <strong>and</strong> determination, will go far toward a<br />

peaceful settlement of the matter.”<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 100 -<br />

CANADA GOES WITH ENGLAND<br />

Biased Comment on the President’s <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Message<br />

TORONTO, Ontario, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> World says: “If the President is acting from what he<br />

considers patriotic motives alone, then his message is to be dealt with in a serious aspect. But if he is<br />

simply trying to boom himself for a third term his conduct will be discounted by the Republican<br />

Party even more rapidly than by the <strong>British</strong> Government. Before, therefore, expressing an opinion<br />

on what the document really means the world at large will require to know what the President’s<br />

aspirations are in regard to his successor. That can be learned by watching the political development<br />

within the United States during the next few days, rather than by regarding what the people of<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> elsewhere may think of it.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Ottawa Citizen (Government organ) says: “President Clevel<strong>and</strong> is apparently willing to run the<br />

risk of war with Engl<strong>and</strong> in support of monstrous <strong>and</strong> unjustifiable claims for the purpose of<br />

appealing on the eve of an election contest to the baser elements of the population or the United<br />

States.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Gazette concludes as follows: “President Clevel<strong>and</strong> makes no serious attempt to answer Lord<br />

Salisbury’s argument, but exp<strong>and</strong>s himself in vague <strong>and</strong> general phrases, more or less referring to the<br />

subject of disagreement.<br />

He then suggests at commission, <strong>and</strong> hints that the United States will go to war with Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

unless the latter accepts the results of the commission, an astounding piece of impertinence. Of<br />

course, if the Americans want war with Engl<strong>and</strong>, then war it must be. A great crime for those who<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

promote it, the enormity of which is made absolutely clear by the flimsiness of their pretended<br />

claims in equity <strong>and</strong> justice.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Montreal Star, under the caption, “Why <strong>The</strong>re Will Be No War,” says: “If the cheap fustian of<br />

politicians should appear likely to entice the over-busy American people unthinkingly into war, it will<br />

only be necessary to shake in their laces the pension charges which are still increasing, though the<br />

local ‘unpleasantness’ of the sixties is now thirty years below the horizon. <strong>The</strong>y might feel equal to<br />

the task of getting together an army; they, especially the inl<strong>and</strong> cities, might be willing to endure a<br />

bombardment of the seacoast towns; they might even face the possibility of the creation of a new<br />

batch of colonies; but the firmest nerve would shake when they thought of the pension payments<br />

that would grow bigger <strong>and</strong> bigger as the war passed further <strong>and</strong> further into the past. Congress may<br />

be valiantly willing to send the whole nation to the front in this <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute, but will it dare<br />

face the pension rolls of the future?”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Montreal Gazette says: “Lord Salisbury’s firm statement of his case shows that Great Britain<br />

will not be move from the course she has marked out for herself in defense of her subjects’ rights.<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s position is a new one in the history of diplomacy. It is not warranted by<br />

international law. It is not backed by good sense. It is not even justified by that much-talked-of <strong>and</strong><br />

little understood thing, the Monroe doctrine.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Mail says: “To declare that the Monroe doctrine is an authority upon this continent is one<br />

thing; to exercise jurisdiction under it upon soil that is held to be <strong>British</strong> is another. Congress may<br />

well hesitate to take so serious a step. <strong>The</strong> commission, however, is a very good device, from Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s point of view, which is evidently that of the politician who is out for votes.”<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 101 -<br />

HARSH TALK IN ENGLAND<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Attitude Criticised by <strong>News</strong>papers<br />

SAY BRITAIN CANNOT BE SCARED<br />

Opinions on the Controversy of the Paris <strong>and</strong> Berlin Journals—Comments<br />

of the American Press<br />

LONDON, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> English newspapers all comment on President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message.<br />

<strong>The</strong> general tone is that Engl<strong>and</strong> should not recede. <strong>The</strong> Globe says:<br />

“Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney have strained the friendship of the two countries almost to the<br />

point of breaking.<br />

“It is difficult to write calmly of the amazing claims which these gentlemen advance in the name<br />

of the United States, but we trust that the proposed commission will be politely but firmly requested<br />

to pursue their inquiries on the far side of the Schomburgk line.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> claims set up by Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney are so exaggerated <strong>and</strong> their language is so<br />

offensive that it would cause no surprise if there should be a similar explosion of violence in Great<br />

Britain.”<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong> Manchester Guardian, commenting on President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message to the American<br />

Congress yesterday, says:<br />

“We deeply regret the tone of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message. A grave struggle will now begin between<br />

moderate <strong>and</strong> extreme public opinion in America, the issue of which will have the gravest effect<br />

upon the peace of the world. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government, who are the exponents of Great Britain, will<br />

only do their duty if they strengthen the h<strong>and</strong>s of the friends of peace in the United States by<br />

avoiding any expression of public animosity.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Sheffield Telegraph, the organ of the steel-plate manufacturing district, says:<br />

“Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s language is admirably calculated to induce Engl<strong>and</strong> to bid the Yankees to do<br />

their worst, which, as they would be the attacking power, seeing that they have neither army nor<br />

navy to speak of, would incline to the ridiculous. Still, if the United States really means fighting,<br />

Great Britain is not likely to evade the challenge. Certainly we wall not be turned from the plain path<br />

by threats.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette does not regard Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s communication to Congress as a serious<br />

message, but only an election address, which ought to bring him the solid vote of the concession<br />

mongers, who already see themselves washing out tons of gold on the Essequibo River. <strong>The</strong> Gazette<br />

advises Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> to go before the country immediately, before the people of America have time<br />

to study the Olney doctrine, an not give them a day to ask what he would think if Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

appointed a commission to delimit the frontiers of the United States <strong>and</strong> Mexico.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette speaks of the horrors of fratricide within the Anglo-Saxon race <strong>and</strong> says:<br />

“We do not believe that war is possible.”<br />

Most of the newspapers print articles summing up the war strength of the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette publishes a list of the <strong>British</strong> warships now in American waters, together<br />

with their dimensions, etc., which is followed by a list of the vessels composing the United States<br />

Navy, giving also their capacity, &c.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette has an article showing the numerical strength of the United States Army<br />

<strong>and</strong> the strength, character <strong>and</strong> location of the country’s defenses, <strong>and</strong> <strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette<br />

presents a map of the disputed frontiers, accompanied by an article thereon.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> to-morrow will say that it was hardly to be expected that Congress would do<br />

otherwise than grant an appropriation for the proposed <strong>Venezuela</strong>n commission.<br />

“Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s plot,” <strong>The</strong> <strong>News</strong> will say, “was well laid <strong>and</strong> has achieved his immediate object.<br />

Probably he sees in the vista a third term as his reward. But we cannot believe he will permanently<br />

gain. It is not to the advantage of the Republicans to prolong the excitement. Thus party feeling,<br />

combined with the words of the wise, will make common sense prevail. If the message had been<br />

communicated to the Foreign Office it must have led to a rupture of diplomatic relations. As it is, it<br />

does not call for a reply.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> in an editorial will review past disputes between the United States <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

which for the moment looked serious enough, but in which, with sense <strong>and</strong> good temper, both sides<br />

came to an arrangement on peaceful <strong>and</strong> friendly terms.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard to-morrow will say it is apparent that the war fever in the United States is among<br />

politicians, <strong>and</strong> instances Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler’s bill. It continues:<br />

“While the fit lasts we must expect to deal with gr<strong>and</strong>iose talk <strong>and</strong> must not be surprised at the<br />

promulgation of the most ridiculous plans, but we have an abiding faith in the good sense of the<br />

American people <strong>and</strong> feel sure that when they come to review the facts calmly they will be prepared<br />

to admit that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> has altogether overdone his part.”<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>The</strong> paper discusses Mr. Olney’s dispatch, reasserts the strength of the English position, <strong>and</strong><br />

concludes as follows:<br />

“We fail to find a shadow of excuse for an act of astounding <strong>and</strong> utterly unprovoked<br />

unfriendliness. Even if our case were less strong it would be startling, indeed shocking, to find the<br />

head of the American Republic plunging with so much levity into a position from which one side or<br />

the other must recede with some discredit <strong>and</strong> not without some humiliation; but that in the actual<br />

circumstances Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> should employ language recommending action that savors of a<br />

readiness to commit Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States to a fratricidal conflict seems to us little short of<br />

a grave crime.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle to-morrow will say:<br />

“Had the controversy arisen between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> a European power it would by now have<br />

had consequences of the most serious character. But we <strong>and</strong> the United States are brethren, <strong>and</strong><br />

family quarrels have often kindled a quick flame <strong>and</strong> ended in sudden tenderness. <strong>The</strong>refore we do<br />

not <strong>and</strong> will not assume that President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message has produced an impasse. Above all, we<br />

will not contemplate the iniquity of a war between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America. It is a thing that<br />

civilization would not envisage. It horrifies even cool or hostile observers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Morning Past to-morrow will say that if the utterance of Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> meant anything, the recall of Sir Julian Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador to the United<br />

States, would be justified. <strong>The</strong> paper agrees with Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> in deprecating an appeal to arms, but<br />

says that “language of this kind makes it necessary to consider the chances of war.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily Telegraph to-morrow will say:<br />

“Any serious discussion of the possibility of a war between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States<br />

arising is ridiculous. It is a mischievous political dodge that ought to be regarded as a sign of<br />

incipient dementia. We are perfectly satisfied to rely upon the straightforward, high-bred simplicity<br />

of Lord Salisbury’s diplomacy <strong>and</strong> the good sense, widespread honesty, intelligence, <strong>and</strong> kindliness<br />

of the American people.”<br />

“Engl<strong>and</strong> will begin to comprehend that America is no longer a field for English expansion. Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> appears to intend purposely to offend other powers, but it must be remembered that the<br />

elections in the United States are near.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Lokal-Anzeiger says that the President’s message is purposely aggressive <strong>and</strong> will make a<br />

friendly solution of the question harder than ever.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Journal des Debats says that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s language is somewhat immeasured, <strong>and</strong><br />

undoubtedly places before the United States the alternative of fighting Engl<strong>and</strong>, however monstrous<br />

that might be, or beating an inglorious retreat after yesterday’s bravery. <strong>The</strong> paper contests the right<br />

of the United States to intervene in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine, it says, cannot be<br />

considered by the rest of the world as an international act possessing any value as a law of nations. It<br />

is surprised at the proposal to send a commission to examine a disputed boundary in a foreign<br />

country.<br />

In conclusion <strong>The</strong> Debats says that, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the unfavorable character of American<br />

political customs it refuses to believe that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> would risk the fortune <strong>and</strong> honor of the<br />

Americans for mere political motives. It hopes <strong>and</strong> believes that the good sense of the Washington<br />

<strong>and</strong> London statesman will prevent an open rupture between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States.<br />

La Liberte says:<br />

“Peoples of the same race <strong>and</strong> origin are accustomed to using strong language without fighting.<br />

Doubtless the differences will be settled pacifically. If Lord Salisbury should pick up the glove so<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

arrogantly thrown down Engl<strong>and</strong> would be able to organize a military expedition in a few hours,<br />

while the United States is unprepared. <strong>The</strong> complication affords matter for reflection on the<br />

disadvantages of colonial expansion.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Temps has a two-column editorial on the message, which, it says is the gravest document<br />

signed by an American President since President Lincoln’s manifesto on the Trent Incident. <strong>The</strong><br />

question is whether Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> is merely twisting the <strong>British</strong> lion’s tail or is acting seriously. At<br />

any rate his action is without diplomatic precedent unless such can be found in the annals of the<br />

arrogant Roman Senate. Engl<strong>and</strong> refuses arbitration, while the United States Government declares<br />

that it will compel Engl<strong>and</strong> to accept its judgment without appeal. It is impossible far an<br />

autonomous State, let alone a great power, to submit to such humiliation. Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> has been<br />

accused of restricting the meaning of the Monroe doctrine, but in fact he now stretches it beyond<br />

measure.<br />

Monroe never imagined such action. Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s claim of supreme authority over the whole<br />

hemisphere is a claim that is harmful to the protéges of the United States, as Europe <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

will not bow to such a pretension. Arbitration has been greatly harmed in public opinion, yet war is<br />

impossible. <strong>The</strong> incident is one of the periodical outbursts that had a parallel in the Sackville-West<br />

affair. <strong>The</strong> paper says it wishes <strong>and</strong> expects that a pacific solution of the questions at issue will be<br />

found.<br />

In the Figaro to-morrow Jacques Saint-Cère will have an article under the caption “Monroe est<br />

Mon Rot” in which he will contend that the Monroe doctrine is not a principle of international law.<br />

If the Americans, he says, hold to a doctrine forbidding Europe to interfere in American affairs, why<br />

do they interfere in European questions?<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> may be wrong or right, but the principle involved is of world-wide interest. France has a<br />

similar difficulty with Brazil. It is impossible to admit a principle which would prevent settling<br />

directly with the latter.<br />

<strong>The</strong> République Française, the Presse, <strong>and</strong> the Soir, while they do not indorse President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

interpretation of the Monroe doctrine, gloat over Engl<strong>and</strong>’s dilemma. “Engl<strong>and</strong> cannot count on<br />

any support.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Freisinnige Zeitung says President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s aggressive tone is hardly credible. It seems to<br />

serious politicians like playing with fire <strong>and</strong> do not know how to be prudent. <strong>The</strong> Freisinnige Zeitung<br />

concludes by expressing the hope that such a trifle as the dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the<br />

United States in relation to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>-<strong>Guiana</strong> boundary will not lead to war between the<br />

countries.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Cologne Gazette, discussing President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message to the American Congress, says:<br />

“Against pretensions of this kind all of the European States will st<strong>and</strong> by Engl<strong>and</strong>, for it is a<br />

question to be decided once <strong>and</strong> for all, whether unbridled claims of the United States shall be<br />

recognized or European civilization subordinated to North American civilization on the American<br />

Continent. Great Britain has the fullest moral <strong>and</strong> material right to persist defiantly in a conflict so<br />

passionately initiated.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Gaulois says that the consequences of a war between the United States <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> are<br />

altogether too great to admit that they are possible. <strong>The</strong> writer contrasts the position of an American<br />

President empowered to invoke the country to war with that of the President of France, who is<br />

under the restraint of the Chambers.<br />

VIENNA, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Neue Freie Presse says that the indignation expressed in Engl<strong>and</strong> over<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message in regard to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy is abundantly justified.<br />

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[19 December 1895]<br />

- 102 -<br />

POLITICS AND PATRIOTISM<br />

It is not surprising that the London papers should attribute the course of the American<br />

Government in the <strong>Venezuela</strong> matter to partisan or personal ambition. <strong>The</strong>y do not know much<br />

about America <strong>and</strong> her public men at best. <strong>The</strong>y have had a few conspicuous instances in the past of<br />

idle threats used to excite popular passion. It is natural <strong>and</strong> pleasant to think that an opponent is<br />

playing a mean <strong>and</strong> ignoble part, <strong>and</strong> easy to say so, even when you do not wholly believe it. <strong>The</strong><br />

utterances of the Executive of the United States arouse less perturbation in English minds if they<br />

can be dismissed as the declamation of a “lion’s tail twister,” <strong>and</strong> it is tempting to dispose of them in<br />

that way even if they have to be considered with greater gravity later on. Moreover, the habit of the<br />

English journalist is to treat with more or less conscious sense of superiority any criticism of the<br />

English Government, which he usually believes is positively the only one in the world that tries to<br />

base its conduct on moral principles. He thinks that he knows that the English record in<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>—of which he probably learned for the first time in Lord Salisbury’s dispatch to Sir Julian<br />

Pauncefote—is “stainless,” <strong>and</strong> he is practically incapable, on short notice, of conceiving that any<br />

one should question it from good motives. When he says that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> is bidding for a third<br />

term he has found an explanation that for the time explains <strong>and</strong> that will be accepted with eagerness<br />

by his own readers. It is not worth while to blame him very harshly, for in the long run he is apt to<br />

show himself a reasonable person, <strong>and</strong> we can afford to wait.<br />

But it is surprising, <strong>and</strong>, to speak plainly, it is disgusting, to find Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> accused of<br />

abusing his great trust in order to secure his renomination to the Presidency when such accusation<br />

comes from an American journal, <strong>and</strong> especially when it comes from a journal that daily proclaims<br />

its unswerving adherence to a higher <strong>and</strong> purer st<strong>and</strong>ard than any other know in the daily press. To<br />

any one reasonably familiar with the history <strong>and</strong> present condition of the politics of this country it<br />

would be plain that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, were he guided by ambition, would not seek to attain its object<br />

by what his accusers are sure is pure bullying of a friendly <strong>and</strong> powerful Government. No man who<br />

has held the Presidential office twice <strong>and</strong> three times has been a c<strong>and</strong>idate for the Presidency would<br />

make so obvious a blunder as that. Particularly would such a blunder be impossible to a man who<br />

had on two successive occasions defeated before the people c<strong>and</strong>idates who expressly appealed to<br />

the sentiment he is now charged with flattering. If we concede, for the moment, that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

has suddenly become base enough to play such a part, he must also have become a rash,<br />

unreflecting, blind, <strong>and</strong> stupid fool. That may be the character in which he now appears to those<br />

who attribute to him a vile motive for a serious <strong>and</strong> even momentous act of public policy. But the<br />

man who believes that that is Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s real character compels us to think that for the time it<br />

is his own character.<br />

Surely, if ever there was a public man from the days of Washington to the President who has<br />

won <strong>and</strong> deserved the confidence of the Nation in his unselfish devotion to duty as he sees it, it is<br />

Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>. His record is one long proof of it. We need refer to but two instances. At the close of<br />

his first term he deliberately <strong>and</strong> consciously endangered his own re-election by his unqualified<br />

declaration of fidelity to tariff reform, believing at the time that the chances of securing then the<br />

153


19 – 20 December 1895<br />

approval which he was confident the Nation would ultimately give that reform were very slight.<br />

Again, on the eve of the canvass of 1892, against the judgment of many politicians of note in his<br />

party, he declared his opposition to free silver, before which the “leaders” of both parties were<br />

trembling. A man of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s experience who is capable of such decisive acts as these is not<br />

capable of prostituting his high office to curry favor with the unthinking. We cannot disregard all the<br />

evidence of a career known of the whole country, a career marked by unusual c<strong>and</strong>or <strong>and</strong><br />

fearlessness in the expression of opinion <strong>and</strong> motive, <strong>and</strong> one pursued in the fierce light of political<br />

contention as bitter <strong>and</strong> cruel as our history has ever known. But we must disregard this evidence<br />

before we can justify or excuse the contemptible aspersions cast upon the President.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 103 -<br />

PARTISANSHIP LAID ASIDE<br />

All Members of Congress Cordially Sustain the President<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> President has reason to be gratified with the spirit manifested<br />

by the Senate since his <strong>Venezuela</strong> message was received.<br />

Although there are a few Senators who regard his ringing declarations with partisan eyes, the<br />

majority indorses all that he said, <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>s ready to support his policy. <strong>The</strong> jingo” Senators, like<br />

Lodge, Frye, <strong>and</strong> Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, realize that the message completely overshadows their previous<br />

utterances, but they are “game,” <strong>and</strong> thus far have not uttered any discordant notes. Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler,<br />

on the contrary, has come forward with a proposition to put the country in possession of muchneeded<br />

large <strong>and</strong> small arms.<br />

He introduced in the Senate to-day a bill calling for the appropriation of $100,000,000 to be used<br />

for the betterment of our National defenses.<br />

Senator Ch<strong>and</strong>ler’s Plan<br />

Senator Ch<strong>and</strong>ler’s bill directs the President to strengthen the military force of the United States<br />

by adding 1,000,000 infantry rifles, 1,000 guns for field artillery, <strong>and</strong> not exceeding 5,000 heavy guns<br />

for fortifications. <strong>The</strong> sum of $100,000,000 is made immediately available far the purpose of the<br />

proposed armament. <strong>The</strong> same measure was introduced in the House.<br />

Senator Gallinger also introduced a bill instructing the Secretary of War to negotiate <strong>and</strong> contract<br />

for the purchase from Genevieve G. Kennon, widow of Beverly Kennon of the letters patent<br />

granted to him for the invention of a counterpoise battery for the protection of cannon in coast <strong>and</strong><br />

harbor defenses.<br />

Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler Expects No Opposition<br />

Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler said to a correspondent of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times this afternoon, that his bill would<br />

probably become a law.<br />

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We have devoted much of our time <strong>and</strong> money in the last few years to the upbuilding of the<br />

naval establishment,” he said, “<strong>and</strong> the army has been neglected. What we need in an emergency like<br />

that which now confronts us is plenty of modern guns for the soldiers who may be called into the<br />

field <strong>and</strong> heavy cannon for sea coast defenses. Our navy is able to take care of itself, <strong>and</strong> there is<br />

always the prospect of a foreign alliance which would offset our present deficiencies in the way of<br />

warships.<br />

“Our first duty is to put our seacoast in shape for adequate defense <strong>and</strong> to provide means for<br />

arming a million men. <strong>The</strong> moral effect upon Great Britain of the passage of this bill would be very<br />

salutary. <strong>The</strong>re unquestionably is a strong sentiment in favor of it.”<br />

Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler’s bill was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, at whose h<strong>and</strong>s it will<br />

receive early consideration. <strong>The</strong>re is little likelihood that it will be reported before the beginning of<br />

the holiday recess.<br />

Hitt’s Resolution Delayed<br />

<strong>The</strong>re was considerable disappointment expressed over the failure of the Senate to receive the<br />

resolution adopted by the House appropriating $100,000 to carry out the President’s<br />

recommendations regarding the appointment of a commission to inquire into the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

question. Under the law passed in the last session, such resolutions are required to be printed, <strong>and</strong> it<br />

was impossible for the printer to supply the printed copy before the Senate adjourned.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is some difference of opinion in the Senate as to the exact method of dealing with the<br />

proposition for a commission, but there is apparently no danger of a controversy as to the general<br />

proposition. Some Senators want to go through the form of consideration of the measure by a<br />

committee, with the view of making some provisions not included in the measure as passed by the<br />

House.<br />

<strong>The</strong> thing they particularly want is to provide a limit of time within which the commission must<br />

report. <strong>The</strong> objection made by a good many Senators to this is that the time taken for these<br />

formalities will defer the appointment of the commission <strong>and</strong> cause the delay which all profess to be<br />

anxious to avoid.<br />

Commission Will Report Promptly<br />

Persons who have talked with Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> on the subject are convinced that he desires a very<br />

early report from the commission, <strong>and</strong> will so indicate to members on their appointment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Senators who suggest deliberation would have the Committee on Foreign Relations<br />

completed at once <strong>and</strong> the matter referred to it for a report. This contemplates a possible delay of<br />

action by the Senate proper until after the holidays, <strong>and</strong> therefore it is not popular. A considerable<br />

number of Senators on both sides of the Chamber say that there can be no holiday adjournment<br />

until after the House resolution has been acted on by the Senate, <strong>and</strong> that if the matter shall go to<br />

the committee it must be with the underst<strong>and</strong>ing that the report be made in time for action before<br />

the holidays.<br />

Every suggestion of delay or hesitation on the part of any one appears to meet with general<br />

disfavor.<br />

Mr. Hitt explains that his failure to provide a time within which the report of the commission<br />

shall be made was because he deemed it unnecessary. He was satisfied that the report would be<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

made as soon as possible. <strong>The</strong>re does not appear to be any doubt that the resolution will receive the<br />

indorsement of the Senate.<br />

It is taken for granted that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> will lose no time in naming the members of the<br />

commission. <strong>The</strong> opinion was expressed at the Capitol to-day that a commission of active men<br />

could examine the necessary data <strong>and</strong> come to a conclusion in comparatively short time.<br />

Conservative members of the Senate say that the time occupied by the commission in its<br />

investigation ought to be employed in strengthening our naval <strong>and</strong> military departments.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> Must Retract or Fight<br />

Most of the Senators appreciate the gravity or the situation.<br />

“Unless Great Britain shall back down the only result of the attitude of this country can be war,<br />

unless the United States commission shall decide that Great Britain is right,” said a Democratic<br />

Senator this afternoon.<br />

“It is impossible to get around this fact. It must he conceded that this country is not in a fit<br />

condition to issue a manifesto to a first-class power like Great Britain. <strong>The</strong>re is much to be done to<br />

get the army <strong>and</strong> navy in fighting condition, <strong>and</strong> two or three months will hardly suffice to bring the<br />

work up to satisfactory proportions. Much may be done, however in that direction in that limited<br />

time.<br />

“I hope that the Ch<strong>and</strong>ler bill or one similar to it will become a law very soon, <strong>and</strong> that the gun<br />

factories of the country will be run to their fullest capacity. Engl<strong>and</strong> arrogates to herself all the<br />

patriotism in the world, <strong>and</strong> does not think it possible for Americans to turn their eyes from<br />

business long enough to consider the honor of their country.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> spectacle of gun factories <strong>and</strong> shipyards working overtime would be an object lesson which<br />

would open the eyes of John Bull to the seriousness of the controversy in which he is now engaged.<br />

I am glad to see that the sentiment of the country is with the President, <strong>and</strong> I am confident that the<br />

country will now take up the question of its defenses in a spirit that will be productive of much<br />

good.”<br />

Senator Pettigrew takes the view that Great Britain will not fight with the United States. He is<br />

the representative in the Senate of that inconsiderable element which deprecates any movement<br />

which savors of war. “<strong>The</strong>re is no danger of Engl<strong>and</strong> going to war with us over any question,” he<br />

said to a correspondent of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times.<br />

“She is the Shylock of the world, <strong>and</strong> for years has been living on the accumulations of the<br />

tolling masses of the world. Her exports in the last few years have fallen off $84,000,000, while her<br />

imports are constantly increasing. No country whose yearly imports exceed its exports by<br />

$600,000,000 may be expected to go to war with a powerful nation. It is Great Britain’s mission on<br />

earth to accumulate all she can <strong>and</strong> bullyrag weaker nations. She has everything to lose <strong>and</strong> nothing<br />

to gain by going to war with this country.<br />

“Despite her present aggressive attitude, she will find a loophole to retreat. In my opinion there<br />

is no necessity for any warlike preparations on the part of the United States, for Engl<strong>and</strong> will not<br />

fight us.”<br />

Revenue Will Be Voted<br />

This view is shared by only a few members of the upper chamber.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> question of revenue has arisen in connection with the proposed arming of the country, but<br />

it is dismissed with the assertion that long term, short interest bonds will be cheerfully voted.<br />

One gratifying sign to those who are jealous of their country’s honor is the practical<br />

disappearance in both houses of partisan spirit. <strong>The</strong>re are, of course, a few men in each branch who<br />

cannot rise above the level of partisan politics, but these are apt to be swept out of sight in the tide<br />

of patriotism which now is rising so rapidly.<br />

Representatives Act As One<br />

<strong>The</strong>re was a large audience in the gallery of the House this morning in expectation of a long <strong>and</strong><br />

interesting debate on the President’s special message on <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> visitors were not altogether disappointed but the debate was shorter <strong>and</strong> less spirited than<br />

had been hoped for. Mr. Crisp <strong>and</strong> Mr. Hitt both attempted to obtain recognition from the Speaker<br />

at the same time. Speaker Reed naturally <strong>and</strong> perhaps properly, from a party st<strong>and</strong>point, saw Mr.<br />

Hitt <strong>and</strong> gave him recognition.<br />

<strong>The</strong> veteran from Illinois, who had undoubtedly consulted with the Speaker before the House<br />

met, sent up for immediate consideration a bill providing for the appointment of a commission to<br />

investigate the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary question <strong>and</strong> make a report, <strong>and</strong> appropriating $100,000 to<br />

defray the expenses of the commission authorized by the bill.<br />

If the Speaker had been a Democrat instead of a Republican, it is probable that Capt. Boutelle<br />

would have insisted upon being called to order <strong>and</strong> disciplined by being ordered into his seat. He<br />

was disposed to be captious, but did not go so far in his manifestation of uneasiness <strong>and</strong><br />

dissatisfaction as to object, although he was invited to do so by Mr. Reed.<br />

Mr. Crisp did not oppose the prompt disposition of the immature <strong>and</strong> hastily constructed Hitt<br />

bill, which was more useful as a test of the feeling toward the Administration than it was as<br />

promising a conclusion to the boundary dispute.<br />

Mr. Hitt’s Bill Presented<br />

Immediately after the reading of the journal, Mr. Hitt (Rep. Ill.) asked unanimous consent for the<br />

present consideration of a bill which he sent to the desk <strong>and</strong> had read. It appropriated $100,000 for<br />

the payment of the expenses of the commission suggested by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> in his message<br />

yesterday for the purpose of determining the true divisional line between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> reading of the bill was followed by applause.<br />

Mr. Boutelle (Rep., Me.) asked if it were the intention to pass the bill without debate.<br />

Mr. Hitt stated that that was his desire.<br />

Mr. Boutelle said that he hoped that in view of the vast importance <strong>and</strong> serious gravity of the<br />

consequences that might grow out of the passage the bill, the House would proceed in a decorous<br />

<strong>and</strong> deliberate manner in the consideration of this matter.<br />

Mr. Boutelle said that he had been charged with being a jingo, whatever that might be, <strong>and</strong> he<br />

did not think it was necessary for him to state wherever he was known that, should Congress <strong>and</strong><br />

the President find themselves in a position where they felt it necessary to call the country to arms, he<br />

would not be found lagging behind. <strong>The</strong> press this morning, he said, brought to the House notice<br />

that in the consideration of this affair the members should take counsel of their calmness <strong>and</strong><br />

deliberation.<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong> eyes of all the people, he said, were upon the House <strong>and</strong> Senate this day, <strong>and</strong> to this matter<br />

the members ought to give as much consideration as would be devoted to an appropriation of a few<br />

thous<strong>and</strong> dollars. He hoped that the bill would be sent to a committee in the regular way to be<br />

thoroughly digested there <strong>and</strong> then reported to the House.<br />

Speaker Reed—Does the gentleman object?<br />

Mr. Boutelle—I have not objected. I simply suggested the hope that the bill might be sent to the<br />

committee.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Speaker—Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the bill? [A pause.] <strong>The</strong> Chair<br />

hears none.<br />

Speaks for the Measure<br />

Mr. Hitt followed in a speech in support of the bill. He said:<br />

Mr. Speaker, appreciating all that was said by the gentleman who has just taken his seat <strong>and</strong><br />

the patriotic impulse that led him to make his remarks, I desire to say only a word in explanation<br />

of the bill <strong>and</strong> its purpose, which. I trust, will satisfy everyone in this House – <strong>and</strong> I say it<br />

without mentioning this side of the House or that side. I hope we have not two sides when it<br />

comes to a question of this kind.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President of the United States yesterday sent a message to this House. After a general<br />

discussion in that message of doctrines, policies <strong>and</strong> National interests there is a request made<br />

directly by the executive of this House for action to aid in the exercise of his executive functions.<br />

It is purely an executive function to ascertain all the facts relating to any question of negotiation<br />

with a foreign country.<br />

<strong>The</strong> gravity of the case is such that the President suggests a mode of determining a cardinal<br />

question in the controversy, <strong>and</strong> he asks us to co-operate with him by enabling him to appoint<br />

three men to examine the records <strong>and</strong> evidences of the facts involved. In this contention<br />

between the two great Governments the first fact for us to remember as patriotic Americans is<br />

that the success of our country in its contention depends above all upon our presenting a united<br />

front, so that all Americans shall appear to be one, <strong>and</strong> that our Government shall speak for all<br />

the people of the United States.<br />

And the prompt response of the people’s representatives here in according this small sum of<br />

money to pay the expenses of an investigation which the President says shall be carefully <strong>and</strong><br />

judicially made <strong>and</strong> with the least delay possible—a suggestion which I am sure was made in<br />

good faith <strong>and</strong> will be so carried out by an American President—we answering in that spirit<br />

which becomes Americans, <strong>and</strong> promptly granting the appropriation, the spectacle will be<br />

presented of Republic that is one man.<br />

In negotiations of this character any officer charged with the duty or representing this<br />

Government is hampered <strong>and</strong> his opponent is encouraged by every word of dissent that comes<br />

from his home. Every criticism behind the officer’s back puts him at a disadvantage, <strong>and</strong><br />

hesitation by this Congress, the postponing of this simple question of an appropriation to aid the<br />

President in performing an executive function, would be construed by the <strong>British</strong> press <strong>and</strong> the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Government as evidence that the people of the United States were not behind the<br />

President; that his action in the matter had some relation to party tactics, <strong>and</strong> that he did not<br />

speak the voice of the American people.<br />

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Let us answer <strong>and</strong> do our duty, all of us, now. We shall have long days in which to discuss<br />

the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> the exact words in which it should be formulated, if we do no agree<br />

with the precise terms in which in which Mr. Olney or the President has put it. But on this<br />

matter discussion only confuses, <strong>and</strong> gives aid <strong>and</strong> comfort to those across the sea. Any<br />

disclosure of dissent here—<strong>and</strong> at bottom there really is none—any appearance of dissent would<br />

not aid, but would hamper those who are clothed by the Constitution with this great duty. I<br />

hope, therefore, that the House will proceed to pass the bill without delay. I have made these<br />

few remarks, not from any desire for debate, but merely as a suggestion by way of guidance to<br />

the action which I believe we ought to take <strong>and</strong> in which I hope all will concur. And now, Mr.<br />

Speaker, unless there is some considerable body of gentlemen here who desire discussion I will<br />

move the previous question.<br />

Mr. Crisp, the ex-Speaker, said:<br />

Indorsed by Mr. Crisp<br />

Together with all on this side of the House, I rejoice that the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.<br />

Hitt) has been recognized to ask consideration of the bill which has just been read at the Clerk’s<br />

desk. It does seem to me that there can be no division in this House as to the propriety of the<br />

immediate passage of that bill. For a great many years there has been a controversy as to the<br />

divisional line between the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. We respectfully invited<br />

Great Britain to submit the controversy between that Government <strong>and</strong> the Republic of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> to arbitration. Great Britain has declined arbitration. Now what are we to do? If the<br />

American people have a fixed opinion upon any question, it is the opinion that no European<br />

country shall be permitted to acquire territory on the American Continent by force. Now, the<br />

question is, what are we to do?<br />

Inasmuch as Great Britain has declined arbitration of this controversy, we are bound to<br />

ascertain, <strong>and</strong> to ascertain speedily, on which side lies the right, <strong>and</strong> that is the object of the<br />

President’s message <strong>and</strong> of this bill. If we to have the assistance of Great Britain in ascertaining<br />

the facts by means of arbitration, then we must ascertain them for ourselves, <strong>and</strong> we ought to do<br />

it at once. <strong>The</strong> suggestion of my friend from Maine (Mr. Boutelle) to wait until a committee is<br />

appointed means to wait three weeks, while we should at once authorize the appointment of this<br />

commission <strong>and</strong> the payment of its expenses, so that it may proceed, as I have just said, to<br />

ascertain where the right is; <strong>and</strong> every one may rest assured that when we ascertain where the<br />

right is, we have the courage <strong>and</strong> the manhood to maintain it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> previous question was then ordered without a dissenting vote <strong>and</strong> the bill read a third time<br />

<strong>and</strong> passed unanimously.<br />

Mr. Dingley offered a concurrent resolution providing a holiday recess extending from Friday,<br />

Dec. 20, to Friday, Jan. 3, 1896.<br />

Mr. Meredith (Dem., Va.)—Before that resolution is passed I would like to have some<br />

gentleman on the other side introduce a bill to repeal the law forbidding old Confederates from<br />

serving in the army or navy. I think this would be a good time.<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolution was passed, <strong>and</strong> then at 12:40, on motion from Mr. Dingley, the House<br />

adjourned until Friday.<br />

159


19 – 20 December 1895<br />

Senator Morgan is Pleased<br />

Senator Morgan, (Dem., Ala.)—<strong>The</strong> present Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations,<br />

expresses his views on the President’s message as follows:<br />

“I look upon the President’s message as a thoughtful, able, carefully prepared, <strong>and</strong> vigorous<br />

document. It is time that we should have an utterance of this character, <strong>and</strong> Americans, who always<br />

like a straightforward declaration, will support all that the President has said on this subject so<br />

fraught with vital consequences for the people of this country.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> message will meet with the approval of Congress, <strong>and</strong> will teach Engl<strong>and</strong> that she has gone<br />

as far as she dare in this matter. <strong>The</strong> whole subject will be up soon for discussion in the Senate, <strong>and</strong><br />

I predict there will be nothing uncertain about the sentiments that will be expressed on the floors of<br />

the two houses of Congress. That I deem the situation one of the most vital importance is suggested<br />

by my motion yesterday granting the Committee on Foreign Relations the authority to sit during the<br />

recess of Congress.”<br />

John W. Foster’s Views<br />

John W. Foster, ex-Secretary of State, an acknowledged authority upon the subject of<br />

international law, cordially approves <strong>and</strong> supports the position taken by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

Secretary Olney upon the meaning <strong>and</strong> scope of the Monroe doctrine, as laid down in he President’s<br />

message delivered to Congress yesterday, <strong>and</strong> in the dispatch to Lord Salisbury written by the<br />

Secretary last Summer. He was asked for an expression of opinion upon the situation, <strong>and</strong> in<br />

response said:<br />

“I recognize the President’s exposition of the Monroe doctrine as a correct statement in its<br />

application to the present controversy with Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> I deem it the duty of every citizen of<br />

the United States to support him in his attitude. I do not, however, regard his course as necessarily<br />

leading to war.<br />

“I have confidence that the two English-speaking people of the world will be able to find a<br />

peaceful method of adjusting the question honorable alike to both.”<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 104 -<br />

JULES SIMON EXPECTS NO WAR<br />

Holds that the Monroe Doctrine Is Not Applicable<br />

PARIS, Dec. 18.—In an interview to-day M. Jules Simon* said that, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing his<br />

sympathies with a sister republic of France, he could not see how the Monroe doctrine was<br />

applicable in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy.<br />

Replying to a suggestion that President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s action was a political manoeuvre, he said that<br />

be thought that such a motive for the course followed by Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> would be unworthy of the<br />

President <strong>and</strong> degrading to the Nation.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

He was convinced, he added, that a peaceful solution of the question would he found that would<br />

be honorable to both countries.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

* French statesman <strong>and</strong> philosopher<br />

- 105 -<br />

IT WAS MR. CLEVELAND’S WORK<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Message Was Written by the President Himself<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong>re has been an absurd story it circulation in connection with<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message, to the effect that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> was not the author of that document, <strong>and</strong><br />

that his signature was the only thing contributed by the Chief Executive <strong>The</strong> reputed author was<br />

Secretary Olney.<br />

As a matter of fact Mr. Olney did not write the message. It was entirely the work of the<br />

President, <strong>and</strong> appears as originally written, with the exception of a few changes in expression. <strong>The</strong><br />

message was written on unruled, common, white paper, of note size, apparently torn from a<br />

convenient block. Each page is finely written in the running <strong>and</strong> familiar chirography of the<br />

President. <strong>The</strong>re are fifteen pages in all. <strong>The</strong> President made few alterations, the composition being<br />

almost without interlineations.<br />

It is understood that Secretary Olney did prepare a form of message, as is usual in such instances<br />

for it is customary for the Secretary of State to outline, as a sort of brief, the documents which<br />

appear as part of such a message as the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n document. Often the Secretary’s contribution<br />

serves as the basis of the Executive communication, <strong>and</strong> it did so in the present instance, but the<br />

message which was published this morning, <strong>and</strong> which has aroused so much patriotic indorsement,<br />

is the work of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> every word was written by him personally.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 106 -<br />

SURPRISING INCREASE IN TERRITORY<br />

<strong>British</strong> Claims in <strong>Guiana</strong> Nearly Doubled In One Year<br />

One phase of the history of Great Britain’s contested claims in <strong>Venezuela</strong> may be traced in<br />

interesting fashion in the pages of the “Statesman’s Year Book,” a publication whose authority is<br />

recognized the world over. It has for many years been edited by J. Scott Keltie, Librarian of the<br />

Royal Geographical Society, <strong>and</strong> it is revised after official returns. From 1869 to 1885 inclusive the<br />

“Statesman’s Year Book” gives the area of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> at 76,000 square miles. In the issue of 1886<br />

this area in the most surprising fashion jumped up to 109,000 square miles.<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong> Hon. William Ewart Gladstone was at that time Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Earl of<br />

Rosebery was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, <strong>and</strong> Earl Granville Secretary of State for the<br />

Colonies. <strong>The</strong> Gladstone Government came into power after the general election of 1880, <strong>and</strong> was<br />

restored to office as a result of the election in 1886. <strong>The</strong>re was a short interregnum from June 24,<br />

1885, until Feb. 6, 1886, during which period the Marquis of Salisbury assumed the reins of<br />

government, but it was during the first of these Gladstone administrations that the Granville<br />

boundary line between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> was promulgated, whereby the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government increased its possessions in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> from 76,000 square miles to 109,000 square<br />

miles by alleged encroachments on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 107 -<br />

THINKS ENGLAND IS RIGHT<br />

Prof. Moore, ex-Assistant Secretary of State, Talks of the Message<br />

FLUSHING, L. I., Dec. 18.—Prof. John Bassett Moore of Columbia College, who was Assistant<br />

Secretary of State under James G. Blaine, who is a recognized authority on international law, <strong>and</strong><br />

who has issued recently several pamphlets on the Monroe doctrine, said to-day that he believed<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s position in regard to the boundary of <strong>Venezuela</strong> was the right one.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, he said, seized the territory in dispute under the right by which unoccupied l<strong>and</strong> may<br />

be claimed, <strong>and</strong> made it valuable. <strong>The</strong>re is an unclaimed strip of l<strong>and</strong> on the other side of <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

in every respect as valuable as that in dispute. Engl<strong>and</strong>. Prof. Moore said, has twice established a<br />

boundary line, <strong>and</strong> in every way attempted to act fairly.<br />

<strong>The</strong> sentiment aroused in America, he declared, is an almost insane one. <strong>The</strong>re seems to be no<br />

reason on the part of Engl<strong>and</strong> to war with America, he said, yet to maintain her self-respect she may<br />

be forced to it. Our naval men, he stated, all agree that we are in no position to cope with Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

upon the waters. Why America should forsake alliance with the Anglo-Saxons, her own kindred, <strong>and</strong><br />

take up with those of Spanish descent seems to him incomprehensible. <strong>The</strong> Spanish are a<br />

treacherous race, unsettled <strong>and</strong> wavering, he said. <strong>The</strong> South American republics are continually<br />

changing their position, <strong>and</strong> if the United States intends to become their champion it will keep the<br />

country continually involved in diplomatic controversy with European countries. Prof. Moore says<br />

he is preparing a paper on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s vigorous utterances are approved by men of all political factions.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 108 -<br />

THE PRESIDENT’S COURSE UPHELD<br />

Members of Congress Indorse the Message In Regard to<br />

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<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s Boundary <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

REVENUES FORTHCOMING IN THE EVENT OF WAR<br />

Senator Ch<strong>and</strong>ler Proposes to at Once Expend One Hundred Millions of Dollars to Defend<br />

the Coast—<strong>The</strong> House Adopts it Resolution to Provide for the Commission Suggested by<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>—Partisanship for Once Forgotten<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> President did not have to go to the Capitol to-day to ascertain<br />

how his message of yesterday had impressed the members of Congress, <strong>and</strong> the general public.<br />

Dispatches poured into the White House from every part of the l<strong>and</strong> weighted with the approval of<br />

men in public <strong>and</strong> private life. Senators <strong>and</strong> Representatives called upon him in great numbers to<br />

commend in person the st<strong>and</strong> he had taken in asserting anew the traditional policy of this<br />

Government. Every one of these official visitors offered at once, <strong>and</strong> in the most cordial manner,<br />

support of any effort to maintain the American position taken.<br />

Almost without exception the metropolitan newspapers were in accord with the general feeling<br />

expressed by the White House visitors. <strong>The</strong> bellicose spirit manifested by the fragments of London<br />

editorials had been read <strong>and</strong> their tone was understood, but the knowledge that Engl<strong>and</strong> was<br />

substantially a unit in denouncing our contention did not dash the enthusiasm of those who<br />

regarded the President as right <strong>and</strong> as having expressed the feeling of the people he was chosen to<br />

represent at the head of the Government.<br />

<strong>The</strong> approval of the President is not partisan. <strong>The</strong> words of indorsement uttered by Republicans<br />

are as straightforward <strong>and</strong> as unmistakable as those expressed by Democrats. In only a few<br />

instances, notably those of Senators Gray <strong>and</strong> Hill, have there been Democratic declinations to<br />

comment upon the President’s message. Senator Gray’s silence is construed to indicate disapproval<br />

of the President’s position, <strong>and</strong> it must be stated in fairness to Senator Hill that the declination of<br />

the New-York Senator to speak is not a reluctance to aggravate the <strong>British</strong> authorities, but a feeling<br />

that there is something in the message that may be in time construed to qualify its ringing reiteration<br />

of the Monroe doctrine. He intends to speak to the public when he has anything to say.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President Heartily Indorsed<br />

Some comments upon the message <strong>and</strong> the effect it has had upon the relations of the President<br />

with the leading men of his party in Washington have been sent out from this city to-day, <strong>and</strong> if read<br />

by any considerable number of persons they are apt to have a misleading influence. <strong>The</strong>se comments<br />

give the idea that the message has severed from him the men who have been his friends, <strong>and</strong> has not<br />

increased the confidence of his former admirers.<br />

It would be difficult, it not impossible, to prove this. In the effort to find critics of the President<br />

in the ranks of the Republicans, reports are made of covert sneers at him, <strong>and</strong> references are made<br />

to alleged comparisons of his courage in asserting the Monroe doctrine with the indifference<br />

manifested toward slaughtered Armenians. <strong>The</strong> comparisons are as absurd at they are forced <strong>and</strong><br />

inadmissible. This talk is palpably an effort to find what is regarded by a select few as a “jingo”<br />

character in the message of the President. If such comments as those suggested have been made<br />

they have been so “covert” that they have been heard only by the man who wrote them, <strong>and</strong>, at all<br />

events, they were so carefully expressed that but one correspondent has enjoyed the privilege of<br />

hearing them, <strong>and</strong> he has made the most of an opportunity to enjoy what he imagined, perhaps, was<br />

a monopoly.<br />

163


19 – 20 December 1895<br />

No One Attacks the President<br />

It ought to be observed that the comments are entirely impersonal; that not one of the men who<br />

are referred to as thinking that the President’s course has “thrown him into the h<strong>and</strong>s of his<br />

enemies” has been considered of sufficient importance to permit the use of his name in the<br />

repetition of his criticisms, <strong>and</strong> there is anonymous authority only for the intimation that the<br />

President has taken the st<strong>and</strong> that meets with almost unanimous approval merely in pursuance of a<br />

campaign policy.<br />

That this feeling did not exist in the House at noon to-day will be apparent to any one who will<br />

take the trouble to read the report of the proceedings in that body, which at once took up the bill<br />

offered by Mr. Hitt to enable the President to appoint a boundary commission, with the liberty to<br />

use $100,000 to pay its expenses. This sudden action on the part of the man who is to be the<br />

Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee cut out Mr. Crisp, who had in contemplation the offer<br />

of a similar proposition.<br />

An Imperfect Bill<br />

With Mr. Reed to watch out for Mr. Hitt, <strong>and</strong> with the power to overlook Mr. Crisp, even if the<br />

Democratic leader were really entitled first to the floor, the opportunity was assured to the<br />

Republicans. <strong>The</strong> bill went through after a slight interruption by Capt. Boutelle, whom the Speaker<br />

unsuccessfully endeavored to put in the position of objecting to its immediate consideration, which<br />

the doughty warrior did not desire to do. <strong>The</strong> bill went through without so much as one opposing<br />

voice.<br />

Now that the bill has been approved by the House, it in seen to be imperfect. That may have<br />

been the intention of the introducer, who neglected to say whether the commission should consist<br />

of one man or fifteen men. <strong>The</strong> size <strong>and</strong> character of the appointments are left entirely to the<br />

discretion of the President, <strong>and</strong> there is no limit of time in which the report of the commission is to<br />

be made to the President <strong>and</strong> the Congress. <strong>The</strong> Senate will undoubtedly amend the bill in these<br />

particulars, <strong>and</strong> having prescribed the number of commissioners to serve for the investigation, will<br />

also fix a limit of time in which they shall be called upon to complete their work. However amended,<br />

the bill must go back to the House for its consideration as amended, so that it looks as if the<br />

commission might not be authorized until after the holiday recess.<br />

English Opinion Disregarded<br />

<strong>The</strong> expressions quoted from the <strong>British</strong> papers this morning are not weighing very heavily<br />

against the American argument. Most at them are taken as the official <strong>and</strong> organic utterances of<br />

Tory sheets, <strong>and</strong> all of them seem to reveal an ignorance of the dispute that is common with the<br />

<strong>British</strong> people. <strong>The</strong> later dispatches from London confirm this opinion, for it is reported that the<br />

people in London do not know what the newspaper dispute is all about. But it is assumed that even<br />

the densest of Britons will be able to comprehend the fact that the managers of the Tory<br />

Administration have refused to submit to arbitration a case that the parties on one side are willing<br />

shall go to an arbitrator, while the other side is manifesting a preference for war rather than a<br />

settlement of the controversy by peaceable means. Arbitration could be accepted without cost to the<br />

people or loss of self-respect. War must impose upon Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States heavy<br />

164


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burdens of taxation, <strong>and</strong> possibly great loss of life <strong>and</strong> material. When that is accomplished it is not<br />

at all certain that Great Britain will have anything to show for its bluster, loss of life, <strong>and</strong> refusal to<br />

resort to the inexpensive <strong>and</strong> reasonable proposition to arbitrate.<br />

A party that undertakes to carry out a policy of resistance to so reasonable a proposition as that<br />

made by Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> insisted upon by the President would not long remain popular in the<br />

United States, <strong>and</strong> it is believed that the people of Great Britain are likely to be convinced of the<br />

correctness of our position if they devote any time to investigation of the subject.<br />

Bloodshed Not Expected<br />

With all the vigorously defiant talk there is an undercurrent of opinion that the trouble will come<br />

to an end without bloodshed. Everybody cannot take just the view that is entertained by the younger<br />

men of the army <strong>and</strong> the navy. To these trained men of war the prospect of a collision between<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States offers so many chances of achievement in their profession that they<br />

will, no doubt, see with regret the diplomatic settlement of the controversy. Men who consider the<br />

prospects of war lightly, <strong>and</strong> talk about its opportunities for fame <strong>and</strong> glory cheerfully, are apt to be<br />

impatient of the arguments that represent the superior importance of maintaining amicable relations<br />

with the whole world <strong>and</strong> preventing the interruption of our business with other nations.<br />

But, with some of those who are most averse to war, the prospect of sounding the willingness of<br />

the country to test its readiness for self-defense <strong>and</strong> even aggressive operations is considered a<br />

wholesome one.<br />

<strong>The</strong> freedom from partisanship of the approval of the President was expressed by a Republican,<br />

who said of the leading editorial in <strong>The</strong> Times of to-day that it expressed his opinion of the message<br />

better than he had held it himself.<br />

Partisanship Ab<strong>and</strong>oned<br />

“<strong>The</strong> President,” he said, “has made a declaration which is entitled to <strong>and</strong> which will receive the<br />

support of every American, of whatever party.”<br />

It is understood that the Hitt bill will be amended in the Senate so as to provide for the<br />

appointment of two members of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> commission by the Senate, two by the House, <strong>and</strong><br />

two by the President. <strong>The</strong> expectation is that it will consist of three Democrats <strong>and</strong> three<br />

Republicans, <strong>and</strong> that the men selected will be of such character as to commend them to the support<br />

of both parties.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 109 -<br />

THE FINANCIAL MARKETS<br />

An Advancing Market Checked by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Incident<br />

INTERNATIONAL STOCKS FREELY SOLD<br />

Other Issues Decline in Sympathy— Industrials Also Lower—Exchange<br />

165


19 – 20 December 1895<br />

Rates Firm—Call Money Higher<br />

Tuesday—P. M.<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message to Congress on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter reached Wall Street when<br />

the market was showing considerable strength, operators having been liberal buyers throughout the<br />

morning. It was several minutes before the full import of the matter impressed itself, during which<br />

there was a temporary lull in business. <strong>The</strong>n fractions began to fall with rapidity from stocks having<br />

an international market, <strong>and</strong> it was not long before the whole list was moving downward. Business<br />

was over for the day in London when the news came, so there was really no selling for the foreign<br />

account. But it was evident that local operators believed that American stocks would be thrown over<br />

by the foreigners at the first opportunity, <strong>and</strong> it was equally evident that they did not intend to make<br />

the market attractive for the expected liquidation. Louisville <strong>and</strong> Nashville dropped 2 points; Denver<br />

preferred 1¾; Baltimore <strong>and</strong> Ohio, 1½; Southern preferred 1⅜; St. Paul, Kansas <strong>and</strong> Texas<br />

preferred, <strong>and</strong> Wabash preferred, each 1¼; Reading, 1, <strong>and</strong> Atchison ⅞. <strong>The</strong>se declines were from<br />

the high prices prevailing about noon, the net losses for the day being somewhat less.<br />

Interest in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter overshadowed everything else, <strong>and</strong>, pending further<br />

developments, the disposition was to close up accounts <strong>and</strong> wait events. This resulted in liquidation<br />

in all the leading industrials, as well as in the local railway list. <strong>The</strong> large increase in Wabash earnings<br />

for the second week in December did not check the decline in the preferred stock, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

ratification of the Pacific Mail-Panama Railway agreement was marked by a decline of more than 2<br />

points in Pacific Mail. <strong>The</strong> foreign exchange market was strong <strong>and</strong> rates were verging on the point<br />

where gold may be shipped to London on Saturday. <strong>The</strong>re was a slight flurry in the call money<br />

market. Loans on the exchange ran up to 3 per cent, <strong>and</strong> many banks dem<strong>and</strong>ed 4 per cent. . .<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 110 -<br />

THE COUNTRY’S RESPONSE<br />

<strong>The</strong> unanimous passage of Mr. Hitt’s resolution appropriating $100,000 to defray the expense of<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Commission furnishes the best possible evidence of the disposition of<br />

Congress toward the recommendations of the President’s message. It is apparent that the resolution<br />

st<strong>and</strong>s in need of amendment since it fails to indicate the number of Commissioners to be appointed<br />

<strong>and</strong> does not clearly prescribe the duties they are to perform. Those details can be attended to later.<br />

<strong>The</strong> main thing was that the House should at once <strong>and</strong> with unanimity support the President in the<br />

firm position he has taken. That has been done, <strong>and</strong> in doing it the House responds to the spirit of<br />

the country.<br />

We are informed by cable dispatches that the President’s application of the Monroe doctrine to<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong> controversy is unsatisfactory to the great powers of Europe. This is interesting, but<br />

not specially important, since we already knew the temper of the European powers <strong>and</strong> could easily<br />

have foreseen the nature of the replies they would make to the inquiries said to have been addressed<br />

to them by Lord Salisbury before he drew up his answer to Secretary Olney’s letter of July 20. <strong>The</strong><br />

166


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Monroe doctrine in its modern applications, through which it broadens to a set of principles that it<br />

seems to us it would be much better to call the American doctrine, was not formulated for the<br />

interest <strong>and</strong> behoof of the great European powers. It works for our interest, for our defense, <strong>and</strong> to<br />

the entire satisfaction of the American people, who have given it their unfailing support for threequarters<br />

of a century. We have no more occasion to inquire how it suits Europe than Europe has to<br />

inquire if we are content with its balance of power arrangements, about which we have never given<br />

ourselves the slightest concern. But chief among the fools who have favored us with their valuable<br />

opinions upon the unsubstantial character of the Monroe doctrine are the Paris journalists, who will<br />

be singing a very different tune in the not distant future.<br />

Anybody could foresee that stocks would fall upon the publication of the President’s message. In<br />

particular it could be foreseen that American securities would be thrown over in the London market<br />

with the natural <strong>and</strong> inevitable effect of advancing interest rates in New-York <strong>and</strong> of creating a<br />

condition favorable to a considerable outflow of gold. This state of things would call for serious<br />

revision of any arrangements hitherto contemplated for maintaining the Treasury reserve. But the<br />

cause of the trouble provides also the remedy. It has always seemed plain to us that in ordinary<br />

conditions no popular loan would appreciably add to the stock of gold in the Treasury, <strong>and</strong> we have<br />

often given our reasons for holding that opinion. But when once the patriotism of the American<br />

people is appealed to, as it is most powerfully appealed to by the President’s message, when it is<br />

understood that English holders of our securities are throwing them upon the market, partly, of<br />

course, through motives of speculative prudence, but partly also through a sentiment of awakening<br />

hostility, the American people will take the bonds of a popular loan at any moment in amounts<br />

sufficient to replenish the reserve. Such an appeal from the Treasury would call forth accumulations<br />

of gold from all their hiding places, petty in the individual sums, but in the aggregate sufficient for<br />

any Government need.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 111 -<br />

VENEZUELAN MINISTER PLEASED<br />

Gratified at the St<strong>and</strong> Taken by President Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18—Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, expressed himself as<br />

thoroughly gratified with the recommendations of the President, <strong>and</strong> is confident that the<br />

enthusiasm in <strong>Venezuela</strong> when the main points of the message are received where will be very great.<br />

He considers as remarkable the deep insight into the question shown by the President, <strong>and</strong> can<br />

find no words strong enough to commend the masterly presentation of the facts of the controversy<br />

by Secretary Olney.<br />

In regard to the commission Señor Andrade believes it would be most welcome to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, a<br />

similar commission having been recommended by the representative of that country in London in<br />

1893 to Lord Rosebery.<br />

That proposition provided for eight or ten men of the highest technical attainments, including<br />

lawyers, to examine the legal portion of the controversy, <strong>and</strong> in case of failure of this commission to<br />

agree, the points it left disputed would be referred to arbitration.<br />

167


19 – 20 December 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong> Minister thinks the commission suggested by the President could complete its labors<br />

without going to <strong>Venezuela</strong> in a few months, from material available in this country.<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 112 -<br />

VIEWS ON THE MESSAGE<br />

Further Opinion Regarding President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Action<br />

EX-SECRETARY EVARTS SATISFIED<br />

Abram S. Hewitt Opposed to War—Criticism by the Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbott<br />

—Mayor Schieren’s Views<br />

Reporters for <strong>The</strong> New-York Times obtained further interviews yesterday on the President’s<br />

message regarding the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary question.<br />

Ex-Secretary William W. Evarts said: “I am satisfied with the course the President has taken.”<br />

Ex-Mayor Abram S. Hewitt, after expressing a disinclination to discuss the President’s message,<br />

said: “So far as I underst<strong>and</strong> it, this is not the Monroe doctrine at all. If war is declared, it will be<br />

declared on some other basis than that. But I think the horse sense of the country at large is<br />

thoroughly opposed to war. Our people do not want to fight about the exact location or a boundary<br />

line away down in <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It seems to me that the Monroe doctrine is not the issue here <strong>and</strong><br />

does not cover the case. <strong>The</strong> thorough student of international law must be well aware of this. <strong>The</strong><br />

message is the statement of a good politician.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, it seems to me, must be decided on some other issue than this elastic<br />

Monroe doctrine. I recall in this connection the setting up of the empire in Mexico, at the close of<br />

the war, which was extremely offensive to us. But Secretary Seward practically told France she must<br />

get out, <strong>and</strong> France promptly did get out.”<br />

Gen. Russell A. Alger of Michigan was at the Fifth Avenue Hotel last night. He is a Republican<br />

who has often been mentioned as a possible c<strong>and</strong>idate for President. Speaking of President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message, he said: “It was a bold, manly message, <strong>and</strong> it was timely. <strong>The</strong> American people<br />

will always support their President when he is right, <strong>and</strong> they will always support the Monroe<br />

doctrine.”<br />

Gen. Alger also said that the action of the House of Representatives yesterday in unanimously<br />

voting the one-hundred-thous<strong>and</strong>-dollar appropriation for the expenses of a commission to be<br />

appointed by the President to investigate the boundary question was right <strong>and</strong> worthy of all<br />

commendation. He deprecated the suggestion that has been made by some that the message was<br />

written for partisan reasons. He did not believe that such a criticism should be made, <strong>and</strong> he was<br />

emphatically of the opinion that on an issue like this all patriotic Americans should st<strong>and</strong> together.<br />

Gen. Anson G. McCook, now City Chamberlain <strong>and</strong> formerly Secretary of the United States<br />

Senate, <strong>and</strong> always a Republican of high st<strong>and</strong>ing, said: “President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message is a dignified,<br />

patriotic document well worthy of an American President.”<br />

Mr. McCook also said that he was disgusted with the idea that when a President of the United<br />

States made such a declaration he should be charged with doing it for partisan purposes.<br />

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Tax Commissioner Wells, a Republican <strong>and</strong> a strong partisan, said that the people would sustain<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> in this matter as they had sustained President Lincoln years ago.<br />

Gen. Felix Agnus of Baltimore, a stanch Republican, who arrived at the Fifth Avenue Hotel last<br />

night, said that he believed in proceeding carefully in the matter. He did not want to underestimate<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> as a foe. But if it should come to war then all <strong>British</strong> control should be banished from this<br />

continent.<br />

All the South American republics would be with the United States in the conflict, <strong>and</strong> Canada<br />

<strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> possessions in North America should be wiped out <strong>and</strong> made a part of the United<br />

States.<br />

Simon Sterne said: “This is far too important a matter for me to discuss in an offh<strong>and</strong> way <strong>and</strong><br />

without due reflection.”<br />

James C. Carter said: “I have read the message, but I cannot enter into any discussion of it. I<br />

cannot express an opinion on it.”<br />

Francis L. Eames, President of the Stock Exchange, said: “While I do not think that the time had<br />

come for such a message, it is a good thing for a nation to st<strong>and</strong> firmly for its rights. Not being a<br />

prophet or a son of a prophet, I cannot foresee the outcome.”<br />

Collis P; Huntington said: “I think Engl<strong>and</strong> made a mistake in declining arbitration. Out people<br />

are thoroughly committed to the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> will st<strong>and</strong> by it.”<br />

Washington E. Connor said: “No doubt the President will have the support of loyal citizens<br />

throughout the country in whatever action he may take to maintain the Monroe doctrine. His<br />

argument against the forcible extension of <strong>British</strong> boundary lines is unanswerable. It is time for the<br />

people of this country to give more attention to patriotism than to politics. For some time each of<br />

the great parties has made the mistake of trying to gain some advantage at the expense of the other.<br />

In a situation like the present one, with a question affecting the general welfare, partisanship should<br />

be put aside. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question must be settled on its merits. That is our position, <strong>and</strong> it is<br />

sound. We can well afford to st<strong>and</strong> by it.”<br />

John F. James of Brooklyn said: “I think the President has done a gr<strong>and</strong> thing. I have always had<br />

a high regard for Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, but the course he takes in this matter increases my admiration of<br />

him greatly. His views are marked with the greatest propriety, <strong>and</strong> should not only be acquiesced in<br />

by every true American citizen, but given the most unqualified indorsement as well.”<br />

A. Abraham of the firm of Abraham & Straus of Brooklyn said: “I believe the President to be a<br />

very wise <strong>and</strong> conservative man, <strong>and</strong> do not believe he has taken the present step without exercising<br />

the greatest judgment <strong>and</strong> being thoroughly advised. If Engl<strong>and</strong> is encroaching on our territory, or<br />

infringing on the Monroe doctrine, we should not hesitate about showing our true colors. Still, I<br />

think that when the only thing at issue is the question of boundary, the matter is one which can be<br />

settled by arbitration.<br />

“We are not so well prepared to go to war as Engl<strong>and</strong>, with her enormous fleet. We are trying<br />

hard to equal Engl<strong>and</strong> in that respect. Engl<strong>and</strong> should be content with her possessions on the<br />

American continent, which cover, I believe, a larger area than the United States does. Why she<br />

should assume her present attitude on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question I find it difficult to underst<strong>and</strong>.”<br />

Thomas E. Pearson of Brooklyn said: “I think the President’s message is a gr<strong>and</strong> doctrine. <strong>The</strong>re<br />

is a democratic tone about it which everybody will admire. <strong>The</strong> President takes a very proper view of<br />

the matter, <strong>and</strong> his position will certainly commend itself to every citizen. He very wisely suggests<br />

arbitration, <strong>and</strong> I think Engl<strong>and</strong>, in due course of time, will see the justice of the position, <strong>and</strong> act<br />

accordingly.”<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

Public Administrator William B. Davenport of Brooklyn said: “I heartily approve of the<br />

President’s sentiments. I trust that no warlike results will follow. <strong>The</strong> President only performed a<br />

duty which could not have been avoided.”<br />

Mayor Schieren of Brooklyn said: “I am glad to see the President take the st<strong>and</strong> that he has<br />

taken. I believe in the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> its enforcement. <strong>The</strong>re is a line drawn, <strong>and</strong> when foreign<br />

powers propose to go beyond it I believe the President should st<strong>and</strong> firm in opposing them. I do<br />

not think that the president has any political motives in this matter, as has been suggested in some<br />

quarters. Every public official is open to the criticism that his every public act is for a selfish<br />

purpose. I have seen nothing to indicate that President Clevel<strong>and</strong> desires another term.”<br />

Justice William E. Osborne of the Brooklyn City Court said: “I heartily approve of the<br />

President’s action, <strong>and</strong> of the doctrine it so ably sets forth. I believe it will meet with universal<br />

approval as soon as it is fully understood.”<br />

Ex-Park Commissioner George V. Brown of Brooklyn said: “President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has always<br />

shown himself honest <strong>and</strong> faithful to the interest of the American people in every emergency, <strong>and</strong><br />

he has not failed <strong>and</strong> will tot fail us in the present instance.”<br />

Bernard J. York of Brooklyn said: “I think it one of the finest <strong>and</strong> strongest documents that ever<br />

emanated from the Executive Mansion. It is certainly time that we asserted ourselves in defense of<br />

the Monroe doctrine as against the encroachments of European powers. <strong>The</strong> message of the<br />

President is higher than mere politics,”<br />

I. Augustus Stanwood, Chief Accountant of the Brooklyn Police Department, a cousin of the<br />

late James G. Blaine, said: “I think Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> has taken a very good st<strong>and</strong>, indeed. <strong>The</strong> United<br />

States has never interfered with European matters, <strong>and</strong> has always kept its h<strong>and</strong>s off in questions<br />

directly affecting European countries. But our country has a direct interest in all that appertains to<br />

foreign influence with matters affecting this hemisphere. I do not think we will have wait. <strong>The</strong><br />

<strong>British</strong> Government can scarcely afford it at present, but I am glad that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> has taken<br />

such a decided st<strong>and</strong>. I speak as a Republican <strong>and</strong> as an American citizen.”<br />

Police Superintendent McKelvey of Brooklyn said: “I like the note of Americanism in President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message.”<br />

Brig. Gen. Jarnes McLeer said: “It seems to me that there is but one opinion of the position<br />

taken by the President in respect to the question. All party lines are obliterated. It is possible that the<br />

wise men of this country, after careful consideration, may determine that the question is not one that<br />

comes within the provisions of the Monroe doctrine, but until that decision is made it is the duty at<br />

the American people to st<strong>and</strong> by their President <strong>and</strong> adopt his patriotic utterances as their own.”<br />

Prof. Franklin W. Hooper of Brooklyn said: “My impression is that the President knows what he<br />

is about. I have not had time to read his message carefully. I do not at this moment recall that he has<br />

made during his Administration any serious mistakes in his foreign policy. I am of the opinion that<br />

the people of the United States ‘will st<strong>and</strong> solidly behind the President in this matter.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbott, pastor of Plymouth Church, Brooklyn, said: “I hesitate to criticise<br />

the foreign policy of the President of the United States, because I cannot but assume that he<br />

possesses a knowledge respecting the question at issue greater than that of most private citizens. But<br />

assuming the facts to be all as stated in his message, I should dissent earnestly from the conclusion<br />

to which he would lead the country.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine was legitimate <strong>and</strong> necessary at the time it was propounded. Its wisdom,<br />

even as Monroe propounded it, is more doubtful now, <strong>and</strong> there appears to me to be no reason for<br />

extending it, while it is certain that the President’s policy would be a very great extension of it.<br />

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“We have offered our friendly offices to Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> she has declined them. Now the<br />

President practically proposes that we shall say to Great Britain, ‘You must do in South America<br />

what we think is right, or we will go to war with you.’ If she refuses, <strong>and</strong> we do go to war with her,<br />

this means danger all along our Northern border from Maine to Vancouver. It means also a possible<br />

peril to all our seaports from <strong>British</strong> fleets, <strong>and</strong> this double peril the President proposes that we shall<br />

invite.<br />

“At some remote future day Engl<strong>and</strong> may come into conflict with us if we allow her to extend<br />

her South American colony; therefore, we are to challenge her to a conflict now. In truth, our<br />

interests would be promoted rather than imperiled by English immigration to South America <strong>and</strong><br />

the increase of English colonists on that continent. <strong>The</strong> spirit of the Monroe doctrine is hostility to<br />

the introduction at monarchical institutions on this hemisphere. An English colony is more really<br />

republican than a Spanish-American republic. If every one of those republics could be converted<br />

into an English colony the United States might well felicitate herself upon the change. Every<br />

increase of Anglo-Saxon civilization in the world is a gain to the world. Every increase of that<br />

civilization in America is a gain to our own nation. Canada is a far better neighbor than Mexico.<br />

“As our own interests do not call for intervention, so neither does justice. In case of a great<br />

palpable wrong in South America like the massacre of the Armenians in Turkey, for example, or like<br />

the invasion of Mexico by France, our intervention might justly be defended on humanitarian <strong>and</strong><br />

philanthropic grounds.<br />

“But there is no such palpable <strong>and</strong> monstrous wrong in the present case. <strong>The</strong>re is a dispute<br />

concerning boundary lines, which to all but a limited number of Americans is very obscure <strong>and</strong><br />

uncertain.<br />

“If we are to interfere in every such case, it can only be on the ground that we assume a<br />

protectorate over the whole of South America, an assumption which neither our interests, our<br />

duties, nor our abilities warrant.<br />

“I very much hope that the Republican House of Representatives will refuse to grant the<br />

President the appropriation which he asks for a commission to investigate the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary<br />

question, <strong>and</strong> will adopt so far as in it lies, a policy for minding our own business.”<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 113 -<br />

VIEWS OF GERMAN JOURNALS<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Question Regarded as a Serious One<br />

BERLIN, Dec. 18.—<strong>The</strong> message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> to the United States Congress in<br />

regard to <strong>Venezuela</strong> is heartily indorsed by the United States Embassy here. <strong>The</strong> authorities of the<br />

embassy applaud Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s firmness, but will not talk any further on the subject.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Vossische Zeitung, in commenting on President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

question, says that the President’s sharp tone against Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> his emphasizing the Monroe<br />

doctrine will attract the attention of other powers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> National Zeitung says:<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

“Rudeness toward unliked countries is the rule when Presidents reseek office. As the<br />

Washington Government claims exclusive rights in the matter of arbitrating American affairs, the<br />

whole arbitration claim becomes a pure farce.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Boersen Courier says that Engl<strong>and</strong> first haughtily treated the Alabama claims, but was<br />

afterward obliged to accept arbitration on the question, <strong>and</strong> that established a precedent.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Boersen Zeitung says:<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s answer leaves nothing to be desired in its outspokenness.”<br />

[19 December 1895]<br />

- 114 -<br />

DISAGREES WITH THE PRESIDENT<br />

A Yale Professor Criticises Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Message<br />

NEW-HAVEN, Conn., Dec. 19.—Prof. William G. Sumner of Yale writes to a local newspaper<br />

that he has been incorrectly reported on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. He says:<br />

“I dissent from every statement of the history or law contained in it, (the President’s message,)<br />

<strong>and</strong> I regard all the proceedings in the matter as unjustifiable. <strong>The</strong> suggestions of the message<br />

seemed to me undiplomatic <strong>and</strong> mischievous.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re will be a sober second thought to this matter. War with Engl<strong>and</strong> would be grave business<br />

for our sons <strong>and</strong> for our property. If we are only playing with the nation or war, believing ourselves<br />

secure, we shall not cut a good figure in our own eyes when we come to realize how we are acting.<br />

Let us wait for the second thought. Possibly it may also prove a boomerang in its political effects.”<br />

WHAT WOULD RESULT FROM WAR?<br />

Ulysses D. Eddy’s Views Regarding a Conflict with Great Britain<br />

Ulysses D. Eddy said yesterday, in speaking of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affair:<br />

“War would be a misfortune, especially between two such nations as the United States <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain. We see already the effects of war talk in the sale of our securities abroad <strong>and</strong> in dem<strong>and</strong>s for<br />

our gold for them. A rupture of relations would threaten us with serious financial confusion. But in<br />

an affair involving the country’s welfare or a National principle or policy, the people must be willing<br />

to make sacrifices.<br />

“If we were to go to war with Engl<strong>and</strong> we must expect at first heavy losses by attacks on our<br />

seaboard, but we would come out of the conflict not with 3,000,000 square miles of territory but<br />

with 6,000,000.<br />

E. F. Beddall of 50 Wall Street said: “<strong>The</strong> general belief is that the President is right <strong>and</strong> the<br />

people will uphold him. In view of all that would be involved in war, however, it would seen that the<br />

question must be settled without resort to hostilities<br />

FORMER MINISTER PERAZA’S VIEWS<br />

What He Says of Territory in <strong>Dispute</strong> in South America<br />

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N. Blolet Peraza of Brooklyn, who was Minister Plenipotentiary from <strong>Venezuela</strong> to the United<br />

States for a number of years up to 1892, gave out yesterday this brief explanation of the <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

controversy.<br />

“Two centuries ago Holl<strong>and</strong> invaded Spanish <strong>Guiana</strong>. At that period all of <strong>Venezuela</strong> was a<br />

Spanish possession under that name. <strong>The</strong> war ended in 1791, <strong>and</strong> according to the treaty of peace<br />

signed then, Spain ceded the colonies to Holl<strong>and</strong>—Esequibo, Demerara, <strong>and</strong> Surinam—<strong>and</strong> the<br />

Esequibo was agreed upon <strong>and</strong> recorded as a dividing line between the two possessions. This treaty<br />

was signed at Aranjuez, in Spain, in 1791. Spain <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong>, in this treaty, had an extradition clause<br />

which permitted the extradition of criminals, <strong>and</strong> the Esequibo River was clearly defined as the<br />

dividing line between the possessions.<br />

“Spain owned what the treaty described as hers by right of discovery, <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong> was described<br />

as owning up to the Esequibo River by right of conquest over Spain. This line still st<strong>and</strong>s. When<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> first drew the Schomburgk line, <strong>Venezuela</strong> protested but Engl<strong>and</strong> stated that it was drawn<br />

for the purpose of exploration. <strong>Venezuela</strong> thought the explanation in good faith, <strong>and</strong> was further<br />

deceived when Engl<strong>and</strong> asked <strong>Venezuela</strong> to build a lighthouse at the mouth of the Orinoco on the<br />

English side of the Schomburgk line. When Engl<strong>and</strong> claimed the mouth of the Orinoco, I presented<br />

the protest of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to Secretary Blaine—I was <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister at the time—<strong>and</strong> this was<br />

just four years after <strong>Venezuela</strong> had been requested by Engl<strong>and</strong> to erect the lighthouse at the mouth<br />

of the Orinoco.<br />

“During the period 1791 to the date of the independence of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Spain had exercised full<br />

power <strong>and</strong> full jurisdiction in <strong>Guiana</strong>, as far as the Esequibo River, <strong>and</strong> there is not a single record of<br />

a protest from Holl<strong>and</strong>, but, to the contrary, there are many records which show that she recognized<br />

the jurisdiction of Spain over that territory. Engl<strong>and</strong> would have avoided all this trouble if she could<br />

have shown even in confidence to any American Minister in London any proof of her right to a<br />

claim over the disputed territory.<br />

VENZUELANS ARE ENTHUSIASTIC<br />

President Crespo Says <strong>The</strong>y Are Most Grateful to the “Great Republic”<br />

Col. George W. Turner, editor of <strong>The</strong> New-York Recorder, sent the following telegram to President<br />

Crespo Tuesday night:<br />

“Will your Excellency voice to the citizens of the United States the opinion of your countrymen<br />

on President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message?”<br />

This reply was received last night:<br />

“I answer your telegram with satisfaction. Popular enthusiasm here is indescribable. All<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns pronounce to-day with profound respect <strong>and</strong> gratitude the name of the Great<br />

Republic.”<br />

What Henry Clews Suggests<br />

Henry Clews sent the following telegram yesterday to Washington addressed to Senator Wolcott<br />

of Colorado <strong>and</strong> to Representative Sereno Payne of New-York:<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s proposition to Congress to appoint a commission to determine the<br />

boundary line in the dispute between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> can be made available for an amicable<br />

settlement of the vexed question, provided Marquis Salisbury will also appoint a commission for the<br />

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same purpose, <strong>and</strong> then leave the settlement of the question to the two commissions, whose<br />

decision will be final without appeal. This will end the business <strong>and</strong> cannot fail to be satisfactory to<br />

all concerned. Congress should pass a resolution requiring the President to invite Engl<strong>and</strong> to<br />

appoint a commission to co-operate with our commission in effecting a settlement of the boundaryline<br />

as above proposed.”<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

- 115 -<br />

COMMISSION BILL GOES OVER<br />

A Populist Senator Insists upon the Observance of the Rule<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19.—As soon as the Journal of yesterday was read in the Senate to-day,<br />

a clerk from the House delivered to the Senate the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission bill, <strong>and</strong> the Vice<br />

President laid it before the Senate. Practically the entire session was devoted to consideration of this<br />

bill.<br />

Mr. Sherman (Rep., Ohio), moved that the bill be referred to the Committee on Foreign<br />

Relations; but, as his attention was called to the fact that the present Chairman of that committee<br />

(Mr. Morgan, Dem, Ala.) was not in the Chamber, he withdrew the motion temporarily.<br />

Mr. Cockrell. (Dem, Mo.), Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, reported back<br />

favorably the concurrent resolution for the holiday recess, from Friday, Dec. 20, until Friday, Jan. 3,<br />

but Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler (Rep., N.H.), objected to the present consideration of the concurrent resolution,<br />

holding that the <strong>Venezuela</strong> business should be disposed of first. <strong>The</strong> resolution went over until tomorrow.<br />

Mr. Allen (Pop., Neb.), offered a resolution instructing the Finance Committee to inquire<br />

whether it would not be expedient <strong>and</strong> proper for the Government of the United States at this time,<br />

“when the contingency of war between the <strong>British</strong> Empire <strong>and</strong> the United States of America may<br />

suddenly arise,” to open its mints to the free <strong>and</strong> unlimited coinage of gold <strong>and</strong> silver at the ratio of<br />

18 to 1; also to issue an adequate volume of greenbacks, <strong>and</strong> to withdraw the National bank power<br />

of currency issue.<br />

M. Platt (Rep., Conn.) moved to strike out the “whereases” in reference to war; <strong>and</strong> then both<br />

he <strong>and</strong> Mr. Gorman (Dem., Md.) objected to its consideration to-day.<br />

Mr. Morgan on the Commission<br />

<strong>The</strong> House bill appropriating $100,000 for the expenses of the proposed commission to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> was laid before the Senate, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Morgan (Dem., Ala.), Chairman of the Committee of<br />

Foreign Relations, addressed the Senate on the subject. <strong>The</strong> Senate, he said, in considering a<br />

question of such gravity, ought to deliberate as long as was proper <strong>and</strong> necessary in order to come to<br />

an absolutely correct judgment; <strong>and</strong> he therefore favored the reference of the bill to the Committee<br />

on Foreign Relations. But he should object to any such reference unless the Senate agreed that it<br />

would take no recess until the committee should make its report. For, while he would hasten slowly<br />

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in the matter, he would still make all necessary speed. It was a question that was agitating the people<br />

of the United States, <strong>and</strong> of the whole world; <strong>and</strong> delay would give an opportunity for the formation<br />

of incorrect opinions that might become very unfortunate. He preferred to have appropriate <strong>and</strong><br />

necessary deliberation. He had doubts as to whether Congress intended to intervene in that which<br />

was a diplomatic question, or whether it intended to leave to the President of the United States the<br />

full <strong>and</strong> unembarrassed exercise of his Constitutional power in framing <strong>and</strong> shaping the diplomatic<br />

question for the future consideration of Congress.<br />

<strong>The</strong> division line between the functions of Congress <strong>and</strong> of the President was a clear one, <strong>and</strong><br />

was one which he did not care to cross by anticipation. As an illustration of his meaning, he<br />

instanced the case of Mr. Blount, who was sent by the President as a special Commissioner to<br />

Hawaii without nomination to or confirmation by the Senate. That question was again involved in<br />

this matter, <strong>and</strong> ought to be duly considered <strong>and</strong> acted on. It was for the Senate to determine<br />

whether it would interfere in the matter legislatively, now, or whether it would leave it where the<br />

President desired (as indicated in his message) it to be left, in the h<strong>and</strong>s of the Executive. <strong>The</strong>re was<br />

no difference of opinion, he believed, between the President <strong>and</strong> Congress as to the promptitude<br />

with which the question ought to be settled. He believed that the President <strong>and</strong> Congress were in<br />

entire accord.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s Act Conclusive<br />

So far as the Monroe doctrine was concerned, that was settled by the action of the Executive, at<br />

least; <strong>and</strong> the conclusions reached by the Executive on it could be absolutely <strong>and</strong> unequivocally<br />

confirmed. He did not at all, he thought, mistake the sense of Congress or of the people of the<br />

United States on that subject. <strong>The</strong> question of the application of the doctrine to the present ease was<br />

one which was settled by the President’s message quite as conclusively. But it was not settled<br />

absolutely. <strong>The</strong> Government has passed now to an attitude on the Monroe doctrine that would<br />

gratify, he thought, the present generation of men <strong>and</strong> all generations of Americans who might live<br />

hereafter. It was an assertion of the right of the United States, as the controlling nationality on this<br />

continent. It has been made <strong>and</strong> would st<strong>and</strong> as the law of the United States. He was incapable of<br />

expressing the ratification he felt that a question which had been so long debated had at last received<br />

such a clear-cut definition. He could never express his gratitude that a conclusion had been arrived<br />

at so entirely comporting with the dignity <strong>and</strong> honor of the Government of the United States, with<br />

its prestige among the nations of the world, <strong>and</strong> with the sentiment of all the people of the country.<br />

Mr. Sherman Commends the Message<br />

Mr. Sherman, (Rep. Ohio), who is to be Mr. Morgan’s successor as Chairman of the Committee<br />

on Foreign Relations, was then next speaker. He expressed his general assent to Mr. Morgan’s views,<br />

<strong>and</strong> commended the President’s message, but favored a reference of the House bill to the<br />

Committee on Foreign Relations, <strong>and</strong> its deliberate consideration by that committee <strong>and</strong> by the<br />

Senate. <strong>The</strong> bill, as passed by the House, he said, should be amended, defined, <strong>and</strong> limited. He<br />

indorsed the Monroe doctrine, but argued that its application to a specific case was a matter of the<br />

gravest importance to the United States <strong>and</strong> to the world. <strong>The</strong> controversy was a serious one, but he<br />

had no doubt that the question would bet settled peaceably. An assertion should be made of the<br />

right of the United States to prevent European powers from invading the American continent <strong>and</strong><br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

treating it as they treated Africa <strong>and</strong> Asia. America was now settled in every part by people of<br />

European origin, Engl<strong>and</strong> having the greatest interest. Mr. Sherman declared:<br />

Under the circumstances, I do not expect that a war will ensue. I do not contemplate or wish to contemplate<br />

the possibility of such an event. I have seen enough of war in my time to dread its principles <strong>and</strong> its consequences. I<br />

do not wish, in the slightest degree, to say a word that would indicate that a war was likely to ensue about this small<br />

matter. At the same time I think that the President of the United States did right in taking the ground that it is our<br />

duty, as the most powerful of American nations, to say to the countries of Europe: “<strong>The</strong>se two continents are<br />

already occupied by Christian people, <strong>and</strong> we are willing to see that their rights shall not be trampled upon by<br />

European powers.” As a matter of course, we cannot interfere in any agreement made between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

Great Britain as to the boundary between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, but I have a map here [pointing to it]<br />

which shows repeated encroachments made by Great Britain. This is a serious controversy, <strong>and</strong> Great Britain has<br />

taken the ground that she will not even submit it to arbitration.<br />

Now, I think that the <strong>British</strong> people, when they underst<strong>and</strong> this matter, when they see that it has attracted the<br />

attention of the civilized world, will not insist upon that refusal, especially when it is recollected that the Monroe<br />

doctrine was not, perhaps, as much the doctrine of Monroe as it was the doctrine of Mr. Canning, the English<br />

Prime Minister.<br />

While we are in no hurry, I do not wish this matter to pend beyond the present session. But I do think that the<br />

bill ought to be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, <strong>and</strong> that it should be acted upon promptly. Let that<br />

committee hear suggestions of amendment to the House bill. If all amendments be voted down by the committee<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Senate, <strong>and</strong> if they choose to take the House bill, well <strong>and</strong> good. We will pass it. But I dem<strong>and</strong> the right of<br />

the Senate to consider so grave a proposition as this, <strong>and</strong> not to be hurried in its consideration. It is supposed that<br />

we are a slow-moving body. Well, we ought to be. This bill ought to be referred to the Committee on Foreign<br />

Relations, <strong>and</strong> the committee should be instructed to report it back – say to-morrow, or at any other time necessary<br />

– <strong>and</strong> let it then be discussed in the Senate. If the committee reports that amendments are necessary, <strong>and</strong> if the<br />

Senate adopts those amendments, I have no doubt that the House will also agree to them, <strong>and</strong> if the committee<br />

does not report any amendments, the Senate will pass the bill as it came from the House. That will show no haste,<br />

no excitement.<br />

Mr. Lodge Asks a Reference<br />

Mr. Lodge (Rep., Mass.), said that it would be difficult to exaggerate the gravity of the question<br />

involved in the bill. It seemed to him that the proper course for the Senate to take with such an<br />

important matter was the usual course—to send the bill to the Committee on Foreign Relations <strong>and</strong><br />

to instruct that committee to report at once—to-morrow if the Senate so pleased. He did not think<br />

that Congress ought to adjourn for the holidays until the bill was disposed of. He had not the least<br />

desire to delay action. On the contrary, he wished to expedite it in every possible way. But he<br />

thought that action taken by the Senate in its ordinary <strong>and</strong> usual way, after the report of a<br />

committee, would have far more weight <strong>and</strong> would meet much more certainly with the approbation<br />

of the whole American people than if the bill was passed now without having consideration from<br />

the appropriate committee. If it were referred to-day it could be reported back to-morrow <strong>and</strong><br />

passed by the Senate. He added:<br />

Let Congress remain in session until the bill is disposed of. Surely, at this time, Senators are not going to set the<br />

question of a holiday against dealing with a matter which involves a principle on which are staked the interests <strong>and</strong><br />

safety of the United States, <strong>and</strong> which may bring hostilities between the two great English-speaking nations of the<br />

world. It is of the utmost importance that we shall show to the world that we are united, without distinction of party<br />

or of section, in support of the policy which the President’s message outlines. We shall be able to say, as Webster<br />

said, that our politics stop at the water’s edge, <strong>and</strong> that when we have to deal with a foreign question we are all<br />

simply Americans. It has been freely charged in the English press published in London <strong>and</strong> in that small edition of it<br />

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published in the City of New-York, that this whole thing is a matter of politics, <strong>and</strong> that it is being used by the<br />

President for electioneering purposes.<br />

This is the most mistaken view ever uttered. I believe that the American people, without distinction of party,<br />

believe in the Monroe doctrine.<br />

Mr. Voorhees Ready to Act<br />

Mr. Voorhees (Dem., Ind.) said that he could see no reason why action on the House bill should<br />

not be taken at once. He was not contemplating war or peace. He was contemplating what was right<br />

in the case. He was not in haste, <strong>and</strong> the English Government had not been in haste when it took<br />

five months to make up its mind what answer to give to Mr. Olney’s dispatch, or whether it would<br />

answer it at all. He had no fear of war. He looked upon war as a horror, <strong>and</strong> hoped that every<br />

Christian man did so. But there would be no war over this matter. He declared:<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is a hostage on this continent, north of us; <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> will not fight on an issue of this kind. She does<br />

not dare to do so. <strong>The</strong> commerce of the world is in English bottoms. No! <strong>The</strong>re will be an adjustment <strong>and</strong> a<br />

settlement. Let us have that understood, <strong>and</strong> we will go along peaceably. Let us now go forward <strong>and</strong> settle the<br />

question for ourselves, so far as our responsibilities are involved. Let Engl<strong>and</strong> have what belongs to her <strong>and</strong> no<br />

more.<br />

I trust that we will waste no further time on this great question, but dispose of it, pass the bill, <strong>and</strong> let the<br />

President appoint his commission.<br />

Mr. Allen (Pop., Neb.,) objected to the second reading of the bill to-day—so that the motion to<br />

refer could not be entertained. <strong>The</strong>re was no doubt, he said, that there was unanimous agreement in<br />

the Senate on the subject of the Monroe doctrine. Nobody misapprehended the force of that<br />

doctrine or what it was. But there might be a grave question as to its application to this particular<br />

case. He looked upon it, not as a rule of international law except so far as it was a rule of National<br />

self-defense.<br />

Mr. Hawley Would Go Slow<br />

Mr. Hawley (Rep., Conn.), expressed regret at the tone at Mr. Voorhees’s remarks. It was not<br />

wise, he said, to assume that either the great <strong>British</strong> nation or the great American people would<br />

refuse to fight in any imaginable contingency. He would not discuss the question of war at all. What<br />

was desired under the provisions of the House bill was information. <strong>The</strong>re was not a Senator or a<br />

citizen who would not be very glad indeed to receive the careful report of five leading jurists on the<br />

merits of the question. Nobody knew what the facts were. <strong>The</strong> English Government itself did not<br />

know—as was shown by a map in which there were six different boundaries. If that was not a case<br />

for a commission, he did not know what would be. If the Senate should act upon the bill without its<br />

having received the mature consideration of the Committee on Foreign Relations, it would be<br />

reproached with having departed from its usual course. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, if the bill were sent to<br />

the committee, various amendments would be offered to it; for instance, that the Commissioners<br />

should be nominated <strong>and</strong> approved by the Senate, <strong>and</strong> that a time for final report should be fixed in<br />

the bill.<br />

Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler (Rep., N.H.), obtained the floor but his contribution to the discussion consisted in<br />

having read from the Clerk’s desk the memorial submitted to Congress <strong>and</strong> the President last<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

February on the part of English gentlemen to have a system of international arbitration established<br />

to prevent war.<br />

An American Doctrine<br />

Mr. Teller (Rep., Col.), contended that in ordinary decency the Senate ought to wait until the bill<br />

was reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations. <strong>The</strong> President, he said, had the power to<br />

appoint a commission without the consent of Congress; but if he wanted the assistance of Congress<br />

he was entitled to it. <strong>The</strong> President’s message, as a whole, met with his hearty approval, but he had<br />

expected it. No President <strong>and</strong> no Secretary of State, he said, had reached a point where he would<br />

retire before the assertion of the Monroe doctrine. It was, however, not merely the Monroe<br />

doctrine; it was the American doctrine. It was a doctrine which grew out of the right of self-defense.<br />

Continuing, he said:<br />

If we believe that the establishment of colonies on the western hemisphere is contrary to our interests <strong>and</strong><br />

threatening to our institutions, it is our right to say that they shall not be established. We do not resort to<br />

international law for our defense; we resort to the right of every nation to say that no other nation shall arrogate to<br />

itself so much power as to threaten its stability. Let the bill go to the committee, <strong>and</strong>, if the committee wants two<br />

weeks to consider it, or a month, let the committee take that time. Nothing will be lost by delay. Great Britain will<br />

not misunderst<strong>and</strong> our attitude, <strong>and</strong> does not misunderst<strong>and</strong> it now. We know that we are not willing to ab<strong>and</strong>on<br />

the Monroe doctrine, or to permit European Governments to interfere improperly in American affairs.<br />

If war should break out, it would be a universal war. We would not be without European allies. <strong>The</strong> interest of<br />

certain European countries would be that we should destroy the prestige of treat Britain, not only on sea, but on<br />

l<strong>and</strong>. Great Britain knows that, we know it, <strong>and</strong> the world knows it. <strong>The</strong> great Russian Government, patiently<br />

waiting to get its advent to the sea, would find an opportunity which it has never yet had. Do you think it would be<br />

slow to take it? Russia is waiting to crowd her domination on the line of <strong>British</strong> India. Do you suppose she would<br />

fall to do it? She is waiting to complete her commenced domination over China. Do you suppose she would fail to<br />

take the opportunity?<br />

In my judgment there is no danger of war over a trivial question like this. <strong>The</strong> consequences would be more<br />

serious to Great Britain than to us. But I do not wish to say that in the way of threat. I do not believe that that is the<br />

way to discuss this question. Neither Great Britain nor we can afford to go to war unless there is a great principle at<br />

stake <strong>and</strong> a great necessity for war. It would be the most inhuman thing in the world for these two great Englishspeaking<br />

people to go to war. <strong>The</strong>re in no haste in this matter. It is a question involving the friendship, peace, <strong>and</strong><br />

prosperity of the two greatest nations of the world. Let us approach it as statesmen <strong>and</strong> Senators ought. Let us not<br />

be impatient. And, above all, let us not be anxious only to get political advantage one side of the other. It is too big a<br />

question for party purposes <strong>and</strong> party gain. Let the question be settled in such a way that when Great Britain sees<br />

what you have done she will know that there is a united nation back of it, <strong>and</strong> that we have, as we ought to have, the<br />

approval of the civilized world. We cannot afford to go to war until we have that, <strong>and</strong> that cannot be had until the<br />

facts are judicially determined. When that determination is made I am for acting in accordance with the honor <strong>and</strong><br />

dignity of the Government of the United States without reference to what way be the result.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Bill Goes over for a Day<br />

This closed the discussion, which was carried on throughout with much spirit, but with no show<br />

of passion or excitement As Mr. Allen (Pop., Neb.), persisted in his objection to the second reading<br />

of the bill, it had to lie upon the table till to-morrow, when it will have its second reading, <strong>and</strong> when<br />

the motion to refer it to the Committee on Foreign Relations will be in order.<br />

In the meantime, Mr. Morgan, Chairman or the committee, asked members of it to meet in<br />

committee at 10 A.M. to-morrow, saying that there were other resolutions before it, embodying the<br />

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same question, <strong>and</strong> that he believed the committee would be prepared to report to the Senate tomorrow<br />

with such suggestions as it might deem proper to make, when the Senate could take action<br />

on the bill.<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

- 116 -<br />

ENGLAND SLOW OF ACTION<br />

No Developments Expected Till After the Holidays<br />

A SEMI-OFFICIAL STATEMENT MADE<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chancellor of the, Exchequer Thinks the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Difficulty Will Be Adjusted<br />

Without a Resort to Arms<br />

LONDON, Dec. 19.—Lord Salisbury did not come to London to-day. Business at the<br />

Government offices went along as usual, <strong>and</strong> there was no bustle or excitement. It is the opinion in<br />

official quarters that there will be no developments in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter until the Christmas<br />

holidays are over. It is also thought that the Government will not act in any way until it receives a<br />

formal intimation of the appointment of the American commission.<br />

In a speech delivered at Bristol to-day Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer,<br />

made a passing reference to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message. Some people, he said, appeared to<br />

regard a war between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain as impossible owing to their ties of<br />

kinship.<br />

Nothing, however, was impossible. War had already happened between them. If kinsmen<br />

unhappily differed they became sometimes very bitter enemies. But he did not believe that many<br />

persons, if any, on either side of the Atlantic thought that the people of the United States or Great<br />

Britain wanted war. He was confident that when a true statement of Great Britain’s case was ably<br />

<strong>and</strong> fully presented <strong>and</strong> Lord Salisbury’s dispatches were laid before both peoples the result would<br />

be peaceful <strong>and</strong> honorable to both countries.<br />

Gen. Lord Wolseley, Comm<strong>and</strong>er in Chief of the <strong>British</strong> forces, in the course of an address to<br />

the inmates of the Soldiers’ Home at Norwich to-day, mentioned the difference between the United<br />

States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain over the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question <strong>and</strong> exclaimed: “God forbid that there should<br />

be war.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Joseph Parker, in the course of a sermon in the City Temple to-day, told his hearers<br />

that there would be no war between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America. <strong>The</strong> Christians of both countries, he<br />

said, would keep the peace of the world. . .<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

- 117 -<br />

FRENCHMEN APPROVE THE MESSAGE<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

Rejoice at the Stumbling Block to Further <strong>British</strong> Aggression<br />

PARIS, Dec. 19.—M. Delcasse, formerly French Minister of the Colonies, said in an interview<br />

with a United Press reporter to-day:<br />

“Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> is a man of sound sense <strong>and</strong> reflection <strong>and</strong> it is not likely that he sent his<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n message to Congress without having duly weighed the consequences <strong>and</strong> being<br />

practically certain of achieving his aim.”<br />

M. Delcasse declined to say whether he approved the message or not, <strong>and</strong> added that if it were<br />

true that Engl<strong>and</strong> meditated taking action in Asia Minor it would cause modifications in the policy<br />

of Turkey.<br />

M. Deloncle, the French Colonial expert <strong>and</strong> Deputy, spoke in warm approval of the message,<br />

which, he said, vigorously affirms an indestructible national tradition <strong>and</strong> promulgates a new public<br />

right against which <strong>British</strong> rage is powerless.<br />

“It is useless,” he declared, “for Engl<strong>and</strong> to hope to obtain the support of Europe in this matter.<br />

Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> has turned the tables by employing toward Great Britain the methods that she herself<br />

has hitherto used against her enemies. France, which has long been dem<strong>and</strong>ing the arbitration at her<br />

dispute with Brazil, is bound to support Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, who reassures France of at the impossibility<br />

of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s encroaching upon French territory recognized by the Utrecht treaty. <strong>The</strong> appointment<br />

of an American boundary commission will accomplish a work of justice <strong>and</strong> establish an excellent<br />

precedent. <strong>The</strong> eventual consequences of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s attitude will be the autonomy of Canada<br />

<strong>and</strong> the end of <strong>British</strong> intrigues in Central <strong>and</strong> South America. Europe now realizes that a force<br />

exists which is capable of imposing respect for a right which it has hitherto been accustomed to<br />

ignore.”<br />

M. Joseph Reinach, journalist <strong>and</strong> member of the Chamber of Deputies, said: “Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

interpretation of the Monroe doctrine is quite inadmissible. His message is either an election<br />

manoeuvre or an aggressive expression of a fixed resolve to provoke a conflict with Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Nothing in the Monroe doctrine warrants American interference in the demarcation of a frontier.”<br />

M. Houanet, member of the Chamber of Deputies, said: “Engl<strong>and</strong>’s attitude in <strong>Venezuela</strong> amply<br />

justifies the United States in intervening in behalf of a weaker republic. President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

message will cause Engl<strong>and</strong> to reconsider, <strong>and</strong> not rush into a conflict over a few square miles of<br />

waste l<strong>and</strong>.”<br />

M. Hanotaux, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet of Premier Dupuy, <strong>and</strong><br />

retained that portfolio in the succeeding Ministry formed by M. Ribot, when asked to give his views<br />

upon the tension between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain over the latter’s claim in <strong>Venezuela</strong>,<br />

said that no serious French politician would venture to express an opinion in a case upon which two<br />

powers friendly to France were at variance. He had, he said, the most implicit confidence that Lord<br />

Salisbury’s judgment, firmness, <strong>and</strong> fairness would attain a satisfactory solution of the difficulty<br />

without resort to force. M. Hanotaux declined to discuss the Monroe doctrine. Each case, he said,<br />

ought to be judged upon its merits. If the boundary dispute between France <strong>and</strong> Brazil became acute<br />

it ought to be submitted to arbitration. In the small dispute between France <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, which<br />

was not a territorial question, the United States sought to interfere. He (Hanotaux) resisted such<br />

interference <strong>and</strong> simply dem<strong>and</strong>ed that France be left to settle the matter without the intervention of<br />

a third party.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Temps says that the possibility or a war between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States<br />

controverts the proverb that “Blood is thicker than water,” <strong>and</strong> pricks the bubble of a gigantic<br />

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Anglo-Saxon federation. It adds that the violence of American politicians is laughable, although the<br />

matter becomes grave when it is remembered that the excitement is echoed in Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

- 118 -<br />

PROF. WESTLAKE’S OPINION<br />

He Discusses the Monroe Doctrine in <strong>The</strong> London Times<br />

London, Dec. 19.—<strong>The</strong> Times will to-morrow publish a letter anent the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute from<br />

Prof. John Westlake, Professor of International Law in the University of Cambridge. Prof. Westlake<br />

says:<br />

“How far the Monroe doctrine is consistent with international law depends upon the<br />

circumstances of each case to which it is applied.<br />

“If the United States can show that the dispute affects any real interest of theirs they are as free<br />

to intervene as Engl<strong>and</strong> would be under similar conditions, but they cannot maintain their right to<br />

intervene merely because the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute falls, if it does, within the general terms of a rule of<br />

their policy, which, in other cases, may concern real interests of theirs.<br />

“If President Clevel<strong>and</strong> considers that the United States have real concern in the question, we<br />

may be sure that all experienced diplomats, of whom the United States have many, will agree that his<br />

right course is to take the best advice he can get <strong>and</strong> act upon it, but not to clothe the means by<br />

which he seeks advice with even the semblance of an assertion of jurisdiction.”<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

- 119 -<br />

THE COUNTRY IS AROUSED<br />

It St<strong>and</strong>s Firmly by the President in the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Matter<br />

CONGRESS WILL DO ITS FULL DUTY<br />

<strong>The</strong> Senate as Determined as the House to Maintain the Nation’s Honor<br />

DISPOSED TO PROCEED CAREFULLY<br />

Probable that the Bill Providing for a Commission Will Become a Law This Week<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19.—<strong>The</strong> delay caused in the Senate in the passage of the Hitt bill, to<br />

authorize the President to appoint a commission to investigate the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary question for<br />

the information of the Administration <strong>and</strong> the Congress, should not be taken as an indication of<br />

flagging interest in the dispute between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain. But the first flush of<br />

excitement had passed, the parties had had some chance to cultivate rivalries, <strong>and</strong> reasons not<br />

altogether free from partisanship helped to make it easier to let the bill go to the Committee on<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

Foreign Relations than to force it through by a vote not altogether unanimous. <strong>The</strong> Senate<br />

Committees are to be changed soon.<br />

Willing to Trust the President<br />

Mr. Morgan, who is Chairman to-day, in a few days may be succeeded by Mr. Sherman, <strong>and</strong> it is<br />

evident that, while the Republicans are not unwilling to co-operate with the President, they are not<br />

indifferent to securing such commendation for their party as may be obtained by prompt <strong>and</strong><br />

patriotic action in which they may lead.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are more plans for amending the bill in the newspapers <strong>and</strong> in the corridors of the Senate<br />

than can be traced to any sponsors. One hears that a proposition will be made to make the<br />

commission one of six or nine members, the members to be named by the President, the House,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Senate, each naming a third of them.<br />

Mr. Morgan was more than usually friendly <strong>and</strong> trustful to-day when he declared that, for his<br />

part, he was willing to leave the investigation entirely to the President; <strong>and</strong> as the Hitt bill imposed<br />

no limitations upon the President, according him freedom as to the number <strong>and</strong> character of the<br />

commission, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Morgan was frank in declaring that he would not amend it, it may be the bill<br />

will come back from the committee unchanged in that respect.<br />

Against Making a Time Limit<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is little acceptation of the proposition of Mr. Lodge to prescribe the time in which the<br />

commission must report. If the President shall be permitted to control the commission, <strong>and</strong> he shall<br />

discharge his duty with as much acceptability as he so far has shown in this matter, it is assumed he<br />

will not permit any time to be wasted.<br />

One purpose in the minds of some at the Senators is the amendment of the Hitt bill to reassert<br />

the Monroe doctrine as a part of the expression of the will of the Congress in giving the President<br />

the power to investigate, in order to be guided in future recommendations. <strong>The</strong> fact that the<br />

doctrine never has been expressed in a law is urged as the best reason for this amendment of this<br />

bill. This suggestion may meet with better acceptation than any which shall propose a limitation<br />

upon the President.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is a patriotic desire to give the impression, in anything that may be done, that the<br />

President is acting for the Nation, <strong>and</strong> not for a party or parts of all parties. No better way of<br />

conveying the National feeling can be devised than that of throwing upon the President the<br />

opportunity <strong>and</strong> the responsibility of securing in his own way the report that is desired.<br />

No One Questions His Patriotism<br />

<strong>The</strong>re admittedly is no doubt of his patriotism. It is conceded cordially by all men here that he<br />

has met fully every expectation that American citizens have formed of what the President should be<br />

in such an emergency. It will be hurtful to the United States <strong>and</strong> its cause if at this time any<br />

indiscreet or embarrassing limitations, conceived in a mere party spirit, be imposed upon President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States should be heard through the law the Senate is about to pass, <strong>and</strong> no mistake<br />

should be made in having the will of the people expressed in such a way that the impression made in<br />

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Engl<strong>and</strong> shall be doubtful or carry an intimation of reluctance on our part to trust fully the Chief<br />

Magistrate.<br />

Studying the Map<br />

Everybody who has not studied already the map of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute has taken<br />

up the subject as one to which he is bound to give careful attention. Maps of the half dozen <strong>British</strong><br />

lines, advancing further <strong>and</strong> further into <strong>Venezuela</strong> from <strong>Guiana</strong>, are to be found in offices <strong>and</strong><br />

shops, some in plain black <strong>and</strong> white <strong>and</strong> others in colors. If similar maps are to be found in<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> citizen stops to examine them, it must become apparent to him, as it is<br />

plain to the dullest American, that there is something wrong with Engl<strong>and</strong>’s case, <strong>and</strong> that Great<br />

Britain has been a great many years in making up the present claim against <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> map of<br />

the controversy is a quicker <strong>and</strong> deeper convincer than the long letter of Salisbury.<br />

When the proposed American commission shall have investigated for the President, <strong>and</strong> shall<br />

have reported with a line which it has found to be a reasonable <strong>and</strong> just limit of the English claims,<br />

it may be west of the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> far to the east of the sweeping line enclosing the newly<br />

discovered gold fields <strong>and</strong> reaching well toward the Orinoco River.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Case of Alaska<br />

Some of the students of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary dispute at the State Department <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Capitol are wondering whether we are to have a similar dispute with Great Britain about the Alaska<br />

boundary line. <strong>The</strong> United States Government has neglected its possessions on the Yukon.<br />

Assuming that the English adventurers <strong>and</strong> prospectors who have gone there to seek gold <strong>and</strong> other<br />

things follow the plan of the English adventurers in <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, if Great Britain is to<br />

sanction that method of procedure, all the subjects of the empire in Alaska will have to do will be to<br />

establish themselves boldly upon territory they desire to hold, set up the flag <strong>and</strong> an outpost, claim<br />

the l<strong>and</strong> by virtue of occupation, <strong>and</strong> then be insulted <strong>and</strong> belligerent if the assertion is made by the<br />

United States that the l<strong>and</strong> belongs to us by treaty cession <strong>and</strong> by lines described at the time of the<br />

purchase from Russia.<br />

Would Do It if She Dare<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is not the slightest doubt if Great Britain believed that we were no stronger than<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> the Alaska l<strong>and</strong> would be claimed.<br />

Following further the <strong>British</strong> plan in <strong>Venezuela</strong> the Salisbury Ministry might be expected to<br />

refuse to submit their claims to arbitration except, perhaps, as to territory which they had not yet<br />

occupied, but which they hoped to get into <strong>and</strong> hold by outrageous assertion <strong>and</strong> bluster.<br />

If there is any widespread impression in Engl<strong>and</strong> that the feeling here is one of resentment, the<br />

speeches of several Senators to-day ought to remove that impression. In the War <strong>and</strong> Navy<br />

Departments where there are many officers who believe a war would be helpful to them, giving the<br />

two branches of the service a chance to justify the legislation, appropriation, <strong>and</strong> care invested in<br />

their behalf for many years, during which we have avoided wars, the talk is naturally about<br />

preparations <strong>and</strong> resources.<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

Men Who Hope for Peaceful Settlement<br />

Men who have seen war <strong>and</strong> remember some of its miseries <strong>and</strong> the train of expenses <strong>and</strong><br />

excesses following war conditions, deplore the fighting talk <strong>and</strong> counsel the wise discretion that will<br />

enable us to dispense with it.<br />

Among the politicians <strong>and</strong> in the diplomatic circles there is, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the admission that<br />

the situation is a serious one, the genera opinion that the extremity of war will be avoided <strong>and</strong> that<br />

possibly Engl<strong>and</strong> will suggest the way to <strong>Venezuela</strong> by which that country <strong>and</strong> the United States may<br />

escape the conflict that would be disastrous to business <strong>and</strong> revive the unfriendliness between the<br />

United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain that existed a hundred years ago, immediately after the War of the<br />

Revolution <strong>and</strong> until after the war of 1812.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Administration Is Watchful<br />

<strong>The</strong> concern of the Administration about the future is indicated by the report from the Navy<br />

Department to-day, that the North Atlantic squadron, with which Admiral Bunce was about to go to<br />

the southward for a practice cruise, will be held at Hampton Roads for further orders.<br />

If it shall sail Dec. 21, it may be assumed that the outlook is considered free from immediate<br />

danger. <strong>The</strong> Hitt bill will have been passed, it is believed, before that date, <strong>and</strong> the reception given to<br />

it in Engl<strong>and</strong> may control the department in letting the fleet depart, or in holding it for such<br />

defensive purposes as it may seem likely to be useful for.<br />

Work for the Engineers<br />

Meanwhile, the services of the engineers of the army, who have direction of the submarine<br />

defenses of our harbors, which to some extent must be relied upon until more adequate defenses<br />

can be provided, will be brought into employment. <strong>The</strong>ir preparations will be in the nature of things<br />

kept from the public. <strong>The</strong>re is an impression in the army <strong>and</strong> navy that this Government has not<br />

kept pace with other nations in the sort of work performed in France <strong>and</strong> Germany by the general<br />

staff, <strong>and</strong> that every nation that might become our foe is better prepared by the study of<br />

hypothetical attacks <strong>and</strong> defensive operations than is the Government of the United States.<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

- 120 -<br />

SENATE ACTION DELAYED<br />

Populist Allen Obstructs the Passage of the Hitt Bill<br />

THE PRESIDENT’S VIEWS SUSTAINED<br />

Members of the Upper Mouse Approve the Administration’s Attitude<br />

with Relation to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19.—<strong>The</strong> “calm, deliberate second thought” of the Senate, coupled with<br />

the desire of Mr. Allen, the Nebraska Populist, for a little cheap notoriety, operated to-day to delay<br />

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action upon the House bill to appropriate $100,000 for carrying out the President’s suggestion with<br />

regard to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary.<br />

It was shown in these dispatches last night that there was a disposition in the Senate to delay<br />

action on the bill. This disposition was made manifest this morning when the bill came up for<br />

consideration. Much to the surprise of the Democrats, who had favored its immediate consideration,<br />

Mr. Morgan, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, moved that the bill be referred to<br />

his committee. <strong>The</strong> reasons he advanced for this course appeared to the Senate to be in line with the<br />

traditions of that body. Mr. Morgan took the ground that the dignity which should surround an<br />

important action like that proposed by the President would be intensified by close observance of the<br />

usual Senate forms. His declaration that he would not support a motion to adjourn over the holidays<br />

until this bill had been acted upon was a source of some comfort to those who desired immediate<br />

action.<br />

Mr. Sherman, Mr. Lodge, Mr. Teller, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Hawley of the Republicans advocated the<br />

reference of the bill to the Committee on Foreign Relations, while Mr. Voorhees made a vigorous<br />

appeal for quick consideration. Mr. Lodge offered an amendment making it necessary for the<br />

proposed commission to report not later than April 1.<br />

Mr. Allen destroyed all hope of action upon the bill to-day by objecting to its second reading.<br />

His performance left the bill upon the table.<br />

Much to the gratification of the Senate, Mr. Morgan suggested a way around the Allen obstacle.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Committee on Foreign Relations has had the general subject of the Monroe doctrine under<br />

consideration in connection with resolutions bearing upon it. This committee will meet to-morrow,<br />

before the Senate convenes, <strong>and</strong> arrange to accept the proposed amendments, so that it will be ready<br />

to act as soon as the bill is read the second time <strong>and</strong> referred to it. Its report will be submitted,<br />

according to the arrangement, before the Senate is ready to adjourn, so that final action may be had<br />

before the holiday adjournment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> attitude of Mr. Allen is explicable only on the ground that he was in a humor to make<br />

trouble <strong>and</strong> took advantage of the opportunity afforded by the rules. According to Senate Rule 14,<br />

“Whenever a bill or joint resolution shall be offered, its introduction shall, if objected to, be<br />

postponed for one day,” there must be three readings of every bill <strong>and</strong> joint resolution previous to<br />

its passage, which readings shall be on three different days unless the Senate shall otherwise<br />

unanimously direct.<br />

Mr. Allen may pursue his obstructive tactics to-morrow, but it is assumed that be will subside. At<br />

the most he could only delay consideration of the bill one day longer, unless he should decide to<br />

filibuster. His explanation today of his action was extremely puerile. He said he wanted the Senate to<br />

control the commission.<br />

In addition to the Lodge amendment, another will probably be inserted to the effect that the<br />

Senate shall confirm the appointment of the Commissioners. <strong>The</strong>re is a disposition on the part of<br />

some members of the Committee on Foreign Relations to insert the Monroe doctrine in the bill, it<br />

being their opinion that a more opportune time was never presented for renewing this declaration<br />

<strong>and</strong> making it essentially an American doctrine. From statements made by members of the House it<br />

is believed that the bill, as thus amended, will be acceptable to that body <strong>and</strong> will be passed before<br />

the holiday adjournment.<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

- 121 -<br />

SIGNATURES HARD TO GET<br />

Charles Stewart Smith Wants President Clevel<strong>and</strong> Criticised<br />

SEEKS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AID<br />

A Petition for a Special Meeting Circulated with Slight Success—Only Ten Names Needed<br />

Charles Stewart Smith, whose appetite for merchants’ movements in public affairs has been<br />

growing since he got some glory of the Committee of Seventy’s work, made a flat failure down town<br />

yesterday in an effort to get up a demonstration on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter in the Chamber of<br />

Commerce. He talked about a meeting to members whom he met, <strong>and</strong> finding no dissent down<br />

town from his expressions of regret over the decline in the security market <strong>and</strong> the threatened<br />

exports of gold, he concluded that there would probably be something in it for Mr. Smith, in the<br />

way of fresh fame, if be would take the lead in trying to commit the Chamber to a criticism of<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message.<br />

A. petition addressed to Alex<strong>and</strong>er E. Orr, President of the Chamber, was accordingly drafted<br />

by Mr. Smith. It read as follows:<br />

“Dear Sir: <strong>The</strong> undersigned members of the Chamber respectfully request that you call a special<br />

meeting of the Chamber at an early date for the purpose of considering the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question,<br />

brought into prominence by the message of the President of the United States.”<br />

Ordinarily Mr. Smith has had no trouble in getting signatures in numbers to suit to any paper<br />

designed to bring about a special meeting of the Chamber. Ten names are sufficient for the purpose.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y could usually be had in any block down town, or in almost any of the large office buildings. It<br />

was different yesterday. Mr. Smith worked hard with the paper. He found sympathetic ears for<br />

regretful talk of business disturbance, but unwilling pens. After hard sledding, he carried his petition<br />

home with him, declaring that he would not yet ab<strong>and</strong>on the attempt to get signatures,<br />

Out of 1,000 members of the Chamber, with the majority of whom Mr. Smith considers himself<br />

personally friendly, he could not prevail on a meagre nine to join him in this movement.<br />

Mr. Smith showed the petition to President Alex<strong>and</strong>re Orr. He got little comfort from Mr. Orr,<br />

who said he would be bound by the rules of the Chamber to call a meeting on the petition of ten<br />

members, but that since the number of signatures was insufficient, he could not think of issuing a<br />

call. That settled the matter for the day down town, although Mr. Smith, in chagrin over the fizzle of<br />

his scheme, said he would get the signatures if he had to work at night for them.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Smith movement excited general comment down town. Much of it was severely critical of<br />

its originator. Business there has been much disturbed over the <strong>Venezuela</strong> affair. Investors have<br />

found their plans spoiled far a contented holiday season. <strong>The</strong> effect of the message has been to<br />

touch nearly every pocket.<br />

If there were any choice of seasons for losses <strong>and</strong> financial distractions, it would fall on almost<br />

any other time than this. But in matters affecting the general welfare, the financial district is not<br />

behind in loyal interest, <strong>and</strong> the bare suggestion of not st<strong>and</strong>ing behind the President in a<br />

controversy with another Government was not to be tolerated.<br />

If the financial community is not in a mood to ignore its losses for the week, talk of setting itself<br />

in opposition to the Government provoked so much resentment yesterday that a call for a special<br />

meeting of the Chamber of Commerce to indorse the President would doubtless have been eagerly<br />

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signed. <strong>The</strong>re is probably no likelihood of such a call, because sacrifices have been confined within<br />

too narrow compass so far to insure unanimity at expression, but the opinion of members of the<br />

Chamber was that while substantial indorsement might not now be feasible, the usefulness of the<br />

Chamber would be injured beyond hope at repair if anything were to be done by it at this time<br />

except in cordial <strong>and</strong> unqualified support of the Government’s position.<br />

Bankers who refused to sign the Smith paper felt that the financial community could afford a<br />

much more serious shrinkage than has yet occurred, with losses of gold, wholesale return of<br />

securities from Europe, <strong>and</strong> all the entailed evils rather than to expose the Chamber of Commerce<br />

to the adverse criticism of the country. Much as they deplored strained relations with any country, as<br />

a disturber of business <strong>and</strong> finance, they agreed that jealousy <strong>and</strong> distrust of New-York could in no<br />

way be so greatly aggravated as by the first sign of a lack of entire concurrence with the<br />

Government’s course <strong>and</strong> with feeling in other sections.<br />

<strong>The</strong> sentiment of members of the Chamber was well expressed by John A. Stewart, President of<br />

the United States Trust Company, who said:<br />

“I have heard that Charles Stewart Smith is agitating a meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, to<br />

be called for the purpose of considering President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s attitude on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

“I don’t want to criticise Mr. Smith, but I say,” <strong>and</strong> Mr. Stewart brought his fist down<br />

emphatically—“I say it is the duty of every American citizen to sustain the President.”<br />

Other remarks on Mr. Smith were less considerate of his feelings. His propensity for thrusting<br />

himself forward on all possible occasions seemed to exhaust the patience of some of his critics, who<br />

said that this performance ought to drive him into the retirement of the cemetery company of which<br />

he is Treasurer.<br />

<strong>The</strong> business of selling burial lots was thought to be the only one likely to save him from<br />

discredit hereafter. It was generally agreed that the memory of his Presidency of the Chamber of<br />

Commerce could no longer serve him in any public capacity.<br />

General feeling in the down-town district, shared by members of the Chamber, was that nothing<br />

should be permitted to indicate a division of sentiment in this country. Such expression could only<br />

please the English, while enthusiastic support of our Government was the surest way to comm<strong>and</strong><br />

proper respect for it abroad. <strong>The</strong> English strength, it was pointed out, was reinforced by the<br />

strongest possible public approval.<br />

A similar spirit of loyalty here would do more to prevent further differences than any other<br />

agency. Comment in this line was so vigorous that many thought that the Smith fiasco might result<br />

in a demonstration to show the country that New-York intends to be in the front for the<br />

Government in whatever may occur.<br />

Charles Stewart Smith was seen late last night, <strong>and</strong> when asked about the petition said:<br />

“I have not been down town since noon, <strong>and</strong> do not know whether the petition has received the<br />

signatures necessary for such a call. I have no doubt that many more signatures than were needed<br />

were secured.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> first suggestion for such a meeting came from John H. Inman, not from me. Among the<br />

other signers when I left, besides Mr. Inman <strong>and</strong> myself, were Cornelius V<strong>and</strong>erbilt. Chauncey M.<br />

Depew, <strong>and</strong> J. Edward Simmons.<br />

I think the meeting will probably be held next week, but just when or what action will be taken,<br />

of course I cannot say.”<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

- 122 -<br />

THE “THUNDERER” ALARMED<br />

Hopes for Peace, but Advises Preparation for War<br />

LONDON, Dec. 19.—<strong>The</strong> newspapers in the morning will comment on the action of the<br />

United States Senate with relation to the bill for a commission to examine the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary<br />

question. <strong>The</strong> Times will say of the situation:<br />

Despite some severe criticism in America, evidence accumulates that President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message was framed<br />

in accord with <strong>and</strong> to play upon a popular sentiment. <strong>The</strong>re is no reason to doubt that the Senate will pass the<br />

Commission bill, although it is obvious that the commission is not likely to be granted on Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s own<br />

terms. A most remarkable incident of the discussion was Senator Lodge’s unconscious humor in moving that the<br />

Commissioners report on April 1.<br />

We are afraid that the Americans will not be moved by arguments drawn from precedents <strong>and</strong> established<br />

principles of international law. <strong>The</strong>y have always shown themselves a sentimental, excitable Nation. <strong>The</strong>y have the<br />

haziest idea of what the Monroe doctrine really is, but nevertheless they are quite willing to enter upon a holy war to<br />

defend it. We must reckon on this feeling <strong>and</strong> be prepared for the wildest aberrations it may cause.<br />

This does not lessen the gravity of the situation; indeed, it rather increases our sense of the peril to which<br />

immense international interests are subjected by combined sentiment <strong>and</strong> ignorance. We earnestly hope that the<br />

opinion of the sagacious, far-seeing men of the United States, which has already begun to assert itself, will prevail<br />

over the reckless policy of the President.<br />

<strong>The</strong> fact cannot be ignored, however, that the latter is supported by a majority of both houses <strong>and</strong> the great<br />

body of the public opinion of the country. As we cannot yield to Mr. Olney’s dem<strong>and</strong>s, whether they are supported<br />

by the people or not, without surrendering the title to almost the whole of our empire, we must hold ourselves<br />

prepared to defend our rights in any quarter where they may be threatened.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard:<br />

It is no small advantage that time for reflection has been gained. Englishmen have far too high respect for the<br />

better order of American opinion than to doubt that in the end the voice of reason will be listened to. Great Britain<br />

does a look to continental powers for material support. We can afford to be fairly cheerful in our isolation, for, to<br />

tell the whole truth at once, we do not believe that the people of the United States will ever be so unfaithful to<br />

reason <strong>and</strong> right as to give logical effect to the plain sense of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s menace.<br />

Great Britain may safely leave the two amateurs, Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Olney, to face the censure that the educated<br />

opinion of the world will pronounce on their efforts.<br />

In the meanwhile the cordial good will <strong>and</strong> respect that Great Britain entertains for transatlantic genius outside<br />

of election politics will not be impaired.<br />

<strong>The</strong> “isolation of Engl<strong>and</strong>” will furnish a topic for discussion in several other newspapers.<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

- 123 -<br />

THE ENGLISH PRESS<br />

Comment on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Incident Generally Temperate in Tone<br />

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LONDON, Dec. 19.—<strong>The</strong> press continues to discuss the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n incident. Among to-day’s<br />

comments are the following:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Morning Post—<strong>The</strong>re seems little doubt that the commission will hold an inquiry, in which<br />

event an unexpected way of escape may be provided for President Clevel<strong>and</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette—<strong>The</strong> Americans would fight with all the fierce energy of the race for a<br />

principle or an idea, <strong>and</strong> sacrifice a million men <strong>and</strong> spend a thous<strong>and</strong> million dollars to punish what<br />

they conceived to be an invasion of their tights or an attempt to work an injustice upon them. We<br />

know that, <strong>and</strong> respect them for it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong>—<strong>The</strong> whole political prospect in the United States has changed, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

common sense of the American people has reasserted itself. <strong>The</strong> Senate discussed the matter of a<br />

grant for the commission with the dignity <strong>and</strong> gravity becoming the first assembly of the Union. <strong>The</strong><br />

jingoes were evidently overawed not by what passed in the Senate, but by what was passing outside.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y already had had a taste of plain speaking from many quarters of the Union. It is not Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

but Europe which threatens them with confusion, <strong>and</strong> proclaims the message an outrage on right<br />

<strong>and</strong> injustice that has not been paralleled since the time of Napoleon.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette—Lord Salisbury made a mistake in going beyond necessity in the case,<br />

<strong>and</strong> arguing against the Monroe doctrine as being obsolete. He ought to have confined himself to<br />

showing that it did not apply to the present case.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette—We are not infuriated, nor are we excited, but we are partly astonished,<br />

partly amused, <strong>and</strong> also somewhat embarrassed, as when somebody else has committed a bad breach<br />

of decorum in public. We know it is not our fault, yet we feel awkward, <strong>and</strong> are disposed to blush.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Globe—Whether election exigencies lie behind the message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> or not, it<br />

does not matter. A much more serious matter is the fact that the Chief Magistrate of the United<br />

States has distinctly pledged himself that if Engl<strong>and</strong> refuses to abide by the award of a commission<br />

of arbitration, he will resort to warlike measures to enforce obedience to his will.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Liverpool Post says that when Secretary Olney’s letter in regard to Great Britain’s position in<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> reached Lord Salisbury last August the Premier saw the gravity of the situation. His first<br />

idea was to obtain the withdrawal or the letter by the American Secretary, but he did not make a<br />

formal request for its withdrawal, finding that it would be fruitless.<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

- 124 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN CORRESPONDENCE<br />

<strong>The</strong> correspondence accompanying the message of the President on the 17th inst. is printed in<br />

full in <strong>The</strong> Congressional Record, pages 204 to 212. It embraces a letter of Secretary of State Olney<br />

to Ambassador Bayard, July 20, 1895; a brief note to the Ambassador from the Acting Secretary of<br />

State. Mr. A. A. Adee, July 24; a letter of Lord Salisbury to Sir Julian Pauncefote, Nov. 26, 1895, <strong>and</strong><br />

a second letter of the same date.<br />

Mr. Olney’s letter begins by the statement that “the President has given much anxious thought”<br />

to the subject treated, <strong>and</strong> “has not reached a conclusion without a lively sense of its great<br />

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19 – 20 December 1895<br />

importance, as well as of the serious responsibility involved in any action now to be taken.” He then<br />

reviews briefly the history of the dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> touching the<br />

boundary between the latter <strong>and</strong> the colony of the former known as <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. From the outset<br />

“the claims of both parties, it must be conceded, are of a somewhat indefinite nature.” On the one<br />

h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>Venezuela</strong>, though declaring her territorial limits to be those of “the Captaincy General of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> in 1810,” contented herself with claiming the line of the Essequibo River. On the other<br />

b<strong>and</strong>, Great Britain, claiming from Holl<strong>and</strong>, “apparently remained indifferent as to the exact area<br />

of” her “colony until 1840,” when she commissioned Sir R. Schomburgk “to examine <strong>and</strong> lay down<br />

its boundaries.” To this line <strong>Venezuela</strong> declined to accede. “Since 1840 various other boundary lines<br />

have from time to time been indicated by Great Britain, but all as conventional lines – lines to which<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s assent has been desired, but which in no instance, it is believed, have been dem<strong>and</strong>ed as<br />

a matter of right. Thus neither of the parties is to-day st<strong>and</strong>ing for the boundary line predicated<br />

upon strict legal right—Great Britain having formulated no such claim at all, while <strong>Venezuela</strong> insists<br />

upon the Essequibo line only as a liberal concession to her antagonist.”<br />

Mr. Olney then traces the successive propositions made by Great Britain as to a boundary—the<br />

Aberdeen line of 1844 ab<strong>and</strong>oning the coast from the mouth at the Moroco to the mouth of the<br />

Orinoco, where the Schomburgk line had ended, but including territory west of that line <strong>and</strong> further<br />

south; the Granville line of 1881, which struck the coast, about half way between the Moroco <strong>and</strong><br />

the Orinoco; the Rosbery line of 1886, which swept in some 33,000 square miles west of the<br />

Granville line, including gold mines, <strong>and</strong>, finally, the Salisbury line of 1890 <strong>and</strong> the second Rosebery<br />

line of 1893, embracing the valleys of the Yurnan <strong>and</strong> the Yuruari <strong>and</strong> the mountains of Imataca <strong>and</strong><br />

extensive auriferous regions. On the expansion of the <strong>British</strong> claims the letter of Mr. Adee cites the<br />

“<strong>British</strong> Colonial Office List, a Government publication”, which in 1885 stated of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>:<br />

“It is impossible to specify the exact area of the colony, as its precise boundaries between <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> Brazil respectively are undetermined, but it has been computed to be 76,000 square miles.” In<br />

1886 the same statement occurs, with the change of area to “about 109,000 square miles.” <strong>The</strong> maps<br />

in the two volumes are identical, but later maps “show a varying sweep of the boundary westward<br />

into what previously figured as <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory.” <strong>The</strong> point of international importance in the<br />

comparison of these varying lines is not the inclusion of gold mines, but the insistence by Great<br />

Britain, after 1886, of the inclusion of the Isl<strong>and</strong> of Barima <strong>and</strong> the right bank of the great mouth of<br />

the Orinoco to the mouth of the Amacura, which in 1844, <strong>and</strong> even in 1881, she had been ready to<br />

ab<strong>and</strong>on.<br />

Mr. Olney, after further tracing the stages of the controversy, sums up “the important features of<br />

the existing situation” as follows:<br />

1. <strong>The</strong> title to territory of indefinite but confessedly very large extent is in dispute between Great Britain on the<br />

one h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the South American Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> on the other.<br />

2. <strong>The</strong> disparity in strength of the claimants is such that <strong>Venezuela</strong> can hope to establish her claim only through<br />

peaceful methods—through an agreement with her adversary either upon the subject itself or upon an arbitration.<br />

3. <strong>The</strong> controversy, with varying claims on the part of Great Britain, has existed for more than half a century,<br />

during which period many earnest <strong>and</strong> persistent efforts of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to establish a boundary by agreement have<br />

proved unsuccessful.<br />

4. <strong>The</strong> futility of the endeavor to obtain a conventional line being recognized, <strong>Venezuela</strong> for a quarter of a<br />

century has asked <strong>and</strong> striven for arbitration.<br />

5. Great Britain, however, has always <strong>and</strong> continuously refused to arbitrate, except upon the condition of a<br />

renunciation of a large part of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claim <strong>and</strong> of a concession to herself of a large share of the territory in<br />

controversy.<br />

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6. By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the instance of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, by constantly urging <strong>and</strong><br />

promoting the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, by pressing for arbitration of the<br />

disputed boundary, by offering to act as arbitrator, by expressing its grave concern whenever new alleged instances<br />

of <strong>British</strong> aggression upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory have been brought to its notice, the Government of the United<br />

States has made it clear to Great Britain <strong>and</strong> to the world that the controversy is one in which both its honor <strong>and</strong> its<br />

interests are involved, <strong>and</strong> the continuance of which it cannot regard with indifference.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> remainder of Mr. Olney’s letter is devoted to the consideration of the rights <strong>and</strong> duties of<br />

the United States, <strong>and</strong> with this portion our readers are already so far familiar that it does not now<br />

require extensive analysis. <strong>The</strong> following passage shows most clearly the decision of the<br />

Government of the United States as to what is not <strong>and</strong> what is involved in the American principle<br />

generally designated as the Monroe doctrine:<br />

“That America is in no part open to colonization, though the proposition was not universally admitted at the<br />

time of its first enunciation, has long been universally conceded. We are now concerned, therefore, only with that<br />

other practical application of the Monroe doctrine, the disregard of which by a European power is to be deemed an<br />

act of unfriendliness toward the United States. <strong>The</strong> precise scope <strong>and</strong> limitations of this rule cannot be too clearly<br />

apprehended. It does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over other American States. It does<br />

not relieve any American State from its obligations as fixed by international law, nor prevent any European power<br />

directly interested from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them. It<br />

does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American State, or in the relations between it<br />

<strong>and</strong> other American States. It does not justify any attempt .on our part to change the established form or<br />

government of any American State or to prevent the people of such State from altering that form according to their<br />

own will <strong>and</strong> pleasure. <strong>The</strong> rule in question has but a single purpose <strong>and</strong> object. It is that no European power or<br />

combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American State of the right <strong>and</strong> power or selfgovernment<br />

<strong>and</strong> of shaping for itself its own political fortunes <strong>and</strong> destinies.”<br />

Mr. Olney reviews at some length the utterances of the American Government on various<br />

occasions with reference to this principle. He points out the consequences of adhering to it in the<br />

case of Mexico, in excluding Great Britain by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty “from occupying or<br />

exercising any dominion over any part of Central America,” <strong>and</strong> in justifying the position of the<br />

United States that “Cuba will not be permitted to become the possession of any other European<br />

country.” He indicates certain developments of the rule “apparently not necessarily required by<br />

either its letter or its spirit,” such as “the objection to arbitration of South American controversies<br />

by an European power.” And he submits that his enumeration demonstrates that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

boundary controversy is in any view far within the scope <strong>and</strong> spirit of the rule as uniformly accepted<br />

<strong>and</strong> acted upon.<br />

After developing the argument as to the consequences of failing to apply this rule, Mr. Olney<br />

explains that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute may involve “the forcible assumption by an European power<br />

of political control over an American State,” which the United States is entitled <strong>and</strong> required to treat<br />

as an injury to itself.”<br />

“<strong>The</strong> political control at stake, too, is of no mean importance, but concerns a domain of great<br />

extent—the <strong>British</strong> claim, it will be remembered, apparently exp<strong>and</strong>ed in two years some 33,000<br />

square miles—<strong>and</strong>, if it also directly involves the comm<strong>and</strong> of the mouth of the Orinoco, is of<br />

immense consequence in connection with the whole river navigation of the interior of South<br />

America.”<br />

And Mr. Olney then states the logical necessity under which our Government asks for an<br />

arbitration of this dispute:<br />

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“It is not admitted, however, <strong>and</strong> therefore cannot be assumed, that Great Britain is in fact usurping dominion<br />

over <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory. While <strong>Venezuela</strong> charges such usurpation. Great Britain denies it, <strong>and</strong> the United States,<br />

until the merits are authoritatively ascertained, can take sides with neither. But while this is so—while the United<br />

States may not, under existing circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which of the two parties is right <strong>and</strong><br />

which is wrong—it is certainly within its right to dem<strong>and</strong> that the truth shall be ascertained. Being entitled to resent<br />

<strong>and</strong> resist any sequestration of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soil by Great Britain, it is necessarily entitled to know whether such<br />

sequestration has occurred, or is now going on. Otherwise, if the United States is without the right to know <strong>and</strong><br />

have it determined whether there is or is not <strong>British</strong> aggression upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, its right to protest against<br />

or repel such aggression may be dismissed from consideration.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> substance, then of the declaration of our Government is that the United States claims the<br />

right <strong>and</strong>, acknowledges the duty to see that justice is done to <strong>Venezuela</strong> in any controversy<br />

involving the political control of that State, <strong>and</strong> that in order that it may be fairly <strong>and</strong> fully<br />

determined what justice requires, it asks the Government of Great Britain to submit the boundary<br />

dispute to impartial arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> reply of Lord Salisbury to Mr. Olney’s letter consists of two letters, each bearing date Nov.<br />

26, nearly four months after a copy was left with him by Mr. Bayard (Aug. 7). <strong>The</strong> longer of the two<br />

letters gives the <strong>British</strong> history of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute. He asserts that the title of Great Britain is<br />

derived from conquest <strong>and</strong> military occupation of the Dutch settlements in 1796, <strong>and</strong> that on this<br />

occasion <strong>and</strong> at the time of a previous occupation, in 1781, the “<strong>British</strong> authorities marked the<br />

western boundary of their possessions as beginning some distance up the Orinoco beyond Point<br />

Barima, in accordance with the limits claimed <strong>and</strong> actually held by the Dutch, <strong>and</strong> this has always<br />

since remained the frontier claimed by Great Britain.”<br />

He further declares that the “Government of Great Britain have from the first held the same<br />

view as to the extent of territory which they are entitled to claim as a matter of right. It comprised<br />

the coast line up to the River Amacura <strong>and</strong> the whole basin of the Essequibo River <strong>and</strong> its<br />

tributaries.” He states that any propositions to vary this boundary that have been made have been<br />

“concessions as a matter of friendship <strong>and</strong> conciliation” only. And he sums up the present position<br />

of the <strong>British</strong> Government as follows:<br />

“A portion of that claim [to the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> its tributaries] they have always been willing to<br />

waive altogether; in regard to another portion they have been <strong>and</strong> continue to be perfectly ready to<br />

submit the question of their title to arbitration. As regards the rest, that which lies within the socalled<br />

Schomburgk line, they do not consider that the rights of Great Britain are open to question.”<br />

He explains that concessions have lessened in extent because of the gradual spread of English<br />

settlements which her Majesty’s Government cannot surrender to foreign rule.<br />

<strong>The</strong> other <strong>and</strong> more direct answer to Mr. Olney’s letter by Lord Salisbury relates to the principle<br />

laid down by the Government of the United States <strong>and</strong> its application to the present question. He<br />

declares that the original Monroe doctrine cannot be made to cover the case; that, if it could, it is<br />

not accepted as a part of international law; he traverses the arguments by analogy used by Mr. Olney,<br />

<strong>and</strong> he states the actual position of the Government of Great Britain as follows:<br />

“<strong>The</strong>y fully concur with the view which President Monroe apparently entertained, that any disturbance of the<br />

existing territorial distribution in that hemisphere by any fresh acquisitions on the part of any European State would<br />

be a highly inexpedient change. But they are not prepared to admit that the recognition of that expediency is clothed<br />

with the sanction which belongs to a doctrine of international law. <strong>The</strong>y are not prepared to admit that the interests<br />

of the United States are necessarily concerned in every frontier dispute which may arise between any two of the<br />

States, who possess dominion in the Western Hemisphere, <strong>and</strong> still less can they accept the doctrine that the United<br />

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States are entitled to claim that the process of arbitration shall be applied to any dem<strong>and</strong> for the surrender of<br />

territory which one at those States may make against another.”<br />

We have here placed before our readers in as succinct manner as possible the essential points in<br />

the correspondence on which the message of the President on Dec. 17 was based. Practically the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Government, in denying to the United States the only means adequate to ascertain the full<br />

rights of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, which (<strong>and</strong> no more) the United States Government feels bound to protect,<br />

imposes upon that Government the duty of ascertaining those rights in the most thorough, careful,<br />

<strong>and</strong> impartial way remaining open. That is what the President has asked <strong>and</strong> received authority to<br />

do. It is a step which he was bound to propose, <strong>and</strong> which Congress, truly representing the Nation,<br />

has promptly empowered him to take.<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

- 125 -<br />

TO STAND BY THE GOVERNMENT<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Revolutionary Junta Advised to Stop Hostilities<br />

A cablegram was received last night by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Revolutionary Junta advising that further<br />

hostilities against the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government cease. Charles C. Bolot, Secretary of the Junta in this<br />

city, has authorized the following statement:<br />

“This step has been precipitated by the vigorous message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> in the <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

controversy. I expected that such a course would be advised by Gen. Monagas <strong>and</strong> his friends just as<br />

soon as he learned what had happened. I cabled the facts to him the afternoon that the message was<br />

h<strong>and</strong>ed to Congress <strong>and</strong> the information reached him last night. He sent us instructions at once. He<br />

has not had time to instruct us in detail, <strong>and</strong> only directed us to stop all further operations. This step<br />

stops the revolution. We don’t care to say anything further beyond what has been said. We will aid<br />

the Government.<br />

Gen. Monagas <strong>and</strong> all his officers <strong>and</strong> men, arms, ammunition, dynamite, Hotchkiss gun, <strong>and</strong><br />

other materials in the h<strong>and</strong>s of the insurgents will be offered to the Crespo Government just as soon<br />

as Engl<strong>and</strong> invades <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory <strong>and</strong> fires upon the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n flag. If there is no war, <strong>and</strong><br />

our National honor is not assailed, we reserve the right to settle our internal troubles, our local<br />

political differences, in any way we see fit.<br />

“In the event of war we will work in perfect harmony with the Government, <strong>and</strong> prove that the<br />

l<strong>and</strong> of Bolivar is still in a position to duplicate its victory over another European monarchy.<br />

“In my opinion Engl<strong>and</strong> has only three courses open to her: First, Lord Salisbury must resign or<br />

his Cabinet must go out. This would give Engl<strong>and</strong> time to form a new Cabinet, which would have to<br />

go over the archives <strong>and</strong> study the question anew—this is an old <strong>British</strong> trick. Second, she can recall<br />

her Ambassador <strong>and</strong> meditate war. Third, <strong>and</strong> the most probable course, she may accept the studied<br />

lesson of justice which the United States has taught her.”<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

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- 126 -<br />

THE NEW VENEZUELAN MINISTRY<br />

Señor Andrade Announces Its Appointment to Secretary Olney<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19.—Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, was among Secretary<br />

Olney’s callers, this morning. While there was no special significance in the visit to-day, it being<br />

diplomatic reception day at the State Department, the Minister seized the opportunity to pay his<br />

respects <strong>and</strong> to thank Secretary Olney for the interest he had officially taken in the boundary<br />

dispute. Señor Andrade had received his weekly official mail just before going to the State<br />

Department, <strong>and</strong> was enabled to announce the formation of the new <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Cabinet which was<br />

formed by President Crespo Dec. 9. Its personnel is as follows:<br />

Foreign Relations—Dr. Pedro Ezequiel Rojas.<br />

War—Gen. Ramon Guerra.<br />

Treasury—Gen. Henrique Perez.<br />

Public Works—Dr. Claudio Brazual Serra.<br />

Interior—Dr. S. Francisco Castillo.<br />

Fomento—Gen. Francisco Tosta Garcia.<br />

Public Instruction—Dr. Frederico R. Chirinos.<br />

Of these Gen. Guerra. <strong>and</strong> Dr. Castlllo have continued in office during the Summer <strong>and</strong> are<br />

now reappointed. Gen. Garcia is transferred to the Department of Fomento from Governor of the<br />

Federal District, in which office he is succeeded by Gen. Estchan Ibarra Hervera. Dr. Rojas was<br />

Minister of Foreign Relations a year ago. He has had official charge of the boundary dispute for<br />

many years, <strong>and</strong> is considered one of the ablest diplomats in South America.<br />

Among other callers at the State Department this morning were Minister Lazo de Arriago of<br />

Honduras <strong>and</strong> Señor Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister. Senators Lodge, Call, <strong>and</strong> Morgan also<br />

saw Secretary Olney.<br />

[20 December 1895]<br />

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- Part 5 -<br />

21 - 23 December 1895<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

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COMMENT IN RUSSIA<br />

A Suggestion of European Intervention in Case of War<br />

ST. PETERSBURG, Dec. 20.—Several of the St. Petersburg newspapers discuss the dispute<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States, <strong>and</strong> profess to believe that the issue will be pacific. <strong>The</strong><br />

Novosti says the present conflict interests the whole of Europe, <strong>and</strong> therefore the mediation of<br />

certain European powers, with a view of bringing about a peaceful settlement, would be opportune.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Novoe Vremya says:<br />

If it should come to a war between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, the latter would have to encounter<br />

internal as well as foreign foes, for the Irish would scarcely look passively on such a conflict. In that event,<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s affairs in Turkey <strong>and</strong> the far East would not wear so favorable an aspect as she might desire, <strong>and</strong> there<br />

would come an hour of bitter retribution for a past on which Englishmen pride themselves, forgetting successes<br />

gained by guile <strong>and</strong> force are never enduring.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 128 -<br />

COMMON SENSE IN ENGLAND<br />

A Judicious View of the Case in a London <strong>News</strong>paper<br />

WASHINGTON Dec. 20.—<strong>The</strong> State <strong>and</strong> Navy Departments have just received the latest<br />

issues one of the most important London marine journals, <strong>The</strong> Shipping World, in which several pages<br />

are devoted to adverse criticism of the English politicians who have denied to <strong>Venezuela</strong> the justice<br />

of arbitrating the boundary dispute. An appeal is made to the Government to consent to an<br />

honorable settlement of the controversy, with the interests of <strong>British</strong> politicians made subservient to<br />

those of <strong>British</strong> traders. <strong>The</strong> disastrous effects upon <strong>British</strong> commercial prosperity of a possible war<br />

with the United States are strongly emphasized.<br />

This influential English journal says:<br />

We have reached a crisis in our quarrel with the little republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> collision between the outposts<br />

on the Yuruan River has served to bring to a head a controversy over boundaries which has lasted for a hundred<br />

years. Lord Salisbury has dem<strong>and</strong>ed apology <strong>and</strong> reparation, which will probably be made, not, perhaps, with<br />

heartiness <strong>and</strong> sincerity, but because President Crespo has neither army nor navy worth talking about, <strong>and</strong> must<br />

needs yield to superior force. <strong>The</strong> larger question of determining the boundaries between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> will remain; <strong>and</strong> while we hope <strong>and</strong> believe it will be settled amicably, the controversy undoubtedly<br />

contains the elements of a possible war with the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> merits of the case have been practically ab<strong>and</strong>oned on both sides of the Atlantic. <strong>The</strong> press of Engl<strong>and</strong> is<br />

well nigh unanimous in supporting the contentions of Downing Street, <strong>and</strong> even <strong>The</strong> Times refers to the scene on<br />

the Yuruan as “<strong>British</strong> soil” while the press of the United States are equally unanimous in supporting the case of the<br />

republic. <strong>The</strong> man who invented the cry “My country, right or wrong,” did a poor turn for humanity but that mad<br />

principle is already supreme in this dispute. Day after day we read of “the line” of demarkation. This shows that few<br />

of those who discuss the question have taken the trouble to inform themselves concerning it. <strong>The</strong> official maps<br />

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serve to show that there are many lines. And the President of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is in this peculiar position: When he retires<br />

at night, he does not know what the boundaries of his country may be when he wakes up in the morning.<br />

<strong>The</strong> editor of <strong>The</strong> Shipping World proceeds to recount the successive encroachments, which he<br />

calls “stealing,” <strong>and</strong> concludes as follows:<br />

We believe that this question will be settled without bloodshed, but we repeat that it contains elements that may<br />

lead to war with the United States. That, at all events, every jingo will admit, will be no child’s play. <strong>The</strong> policy<br />

foreshadowed by Washington, <strong>and</strong> formulated by James Monroe, from whom the doctrine has taken its name, is<br />

directed against the interposition of foreign powers in the affairs or the Spanish-American republics. <strong>The</strong> United<br />

States professes to believe in this doctrine in a still wider sense. To what extent they believe in it, we cannot say; nor<br />

are European powers compelled to accept the American version of the policy in government which should prevail<br />

in South America. But, from very shame, Congress will be obliged to st<strong>and</strong> by its resolution, <strong>and</strong> Senator Morgan,<br />

Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate, must maintain a show of consistency. A few weeks<br />

ago he said that the United States should not permit this aggression. He stated it as his belief that it is the purpose of<br />

Downing Street to push forward her frontier sufficiently far into the interior to encompass the rich gold fields of<br />

that section. And against this policy he would put the Monroe doctrine into operation. We have heard a great deal—<br />

too much for our taste—about this Monroe doctrine. It is something like the funds of a man whom we once saw<br />

playing cards for a stake, his part of which was supposed to be in a five-dollar bill in his pocket. When it as his turn<br />

to “put up” his money, he referred to the invisible note. And when he had lost all of the reputed value of the note,<br />

be walked away.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine is referred to, but we never see it in operation. We care nothing in this crisis about<br />

political pretensions, even those of the first magnitude, involved in the American policy: but we care everything for<br />

the principle of international disputes. We have escaped a conflict of arms until now, because <strong>Venezuela</strong> is too small<br />

to fight. If our cause is a fair one, we have nothing to fear from arbitration. If we have behaved in a grasping <strong>and</strong> an<br />

arbitrary way, <strong>and</strong> have presumed upon our strength to set justice aside, we ought to be stopped in our unrighteous<br />

career.<br />

We scarce know where to turn—in Parliament or out of it—excepting to the ranks of a gallant b<strong>and</strong> of Quakers<br />

in this country, for a man who is prepared to fight for peace. And we cannot help singing, “Oh, for one solid hour<br />

of John Bright.”<br />

<strong>The</strong>se words come with extra force now that this country has taken action on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 129 -<br />

BISHOP DOANE IS EXCITED<br />

He Thinks the Talk About War with Engl<strong>and</strong> Is Preposterous<br />

ALBANY, Dec. 20.—<strong>The</strong> Rev. William Crosswell Doane, Bishop of Albany, has prepared a<br />

long communication to the press in relation to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

He says:<br />

<strong>The</strong> time is soon coming when an appeal to the sober judgment of men who have settled down from a wild<br />

excitement will be heard <strong>and</strong> heeded; <strong>and</strong>, perhaps, it will do no harm to make the appeal now. Does anybody<br />

believe that the enlargement of <strong>British</strong> possessions in South America is likely to affect a republican form of<br />

government in the United States? <strong>The</strong> question is too preposterous to be considered at all. <strong>The</strong> name of any man<br />

would be consigned to immortal infamy who succeeded in breaking the peace between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America, either<br />

by refusing arbitration instead of war or in enforcing arbitration by means of war.<br />

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As an American, I am especially concerned with the American condition, <strong>and</strong> the pain of it lies in the zest with<br />

which demagogues <strong>and</strong> half-Americanized foreigners, <strong>and</strong>, to a large extent, the press, hail the possibility of war<br />

with an unholy haste, before a commission had been even granted or appointed to ascertain whether the claim of<br />

Great Britain was right or wrong, <strong>and</strong> an enormous amount of money is proposed to be appropriated for war<br />

preparations.. It is time to protest against the haste, the appeal to prejudice, the recklessness <strong>and</strong> bravado of the<br />

whole American attitude, as well as against the hard <strong>and</strong> haughty assumption of the English view. I believe that<br />

neither of these conditions represents the thought, the purpose, or the feeling of either people. I venture to<br />

prophesy that somehow these empty vaporings will vanish into thin air, <strong>and</strong> no serious consequences will result,<br />

except the substitution of confidence <strong>and</strong> comity to the present feeling.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

To the Editor of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times:<br />

- 130 -<br />

A Proper Subject for Arbitration<br />

It seems to me that Great Britain’s answer to the overtures of this Government for an<br />

arbitration of the differences between the claims of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> is singularly<br />

inconsistent.<br />

When the principle of arbitration is approved it appears to be very illogical to say that such a<br />

method of settling international disputes does not apply to the present case, because Great Britain<br />

does not recognize the present aspect of the question as a dispute, though many years have elapsed<br />

since there was in fact a claim to certain territory by Great Britain, which the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Government has disputed.<br />

Such an arbitration, or the propriety thereof, is not dependent upon an indisputable fact, but,<br />

upon a disputed fact, much less is it dependent upon the assumption that the claim of the stronger<br />

Government settles the question of right, however hostile to the claim of the weaker. If such were<br />

the test of arbitration, no case could ever arise for such a peaceable adjustment of international<br />

differences.<br />

It is not the purpose of this communication to review the action of the President or the<br />

propriety of his suggestions in the emergency, first, because it is not necessary, <strong>and</strong>, second, because<br />

the facts are not sufficiently known to me to justify any such attempt. Besides, upon Congress<br />

devolves the responsibility of acting in the premises.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is one concession in the President’s message from which I must dissent. Without<br />

considering whether the “Monroe doctrine” has been incorporated in or recognized as a part of<br />

international law, it certainly has become the settled policy of this Government, <strong>and</strong> I am inclined to<br />

go further than the President, <strong>and</strong> to hold, as has been well said, that “it was a notification to all<br />

European Governments that the United States would resent <strong>and</strong> resist any attempt they might make<br />

to extend the monarchical system to any part of this hemisphere not then subject to it.” This<br />

position, I think, we are bound to maintain, even against the consent of those Governments sought<br />

to be acquired.<br />

To illustrate my position: Suppose Turkey should by negotiation undertake to acquire Mexico,<br />

<strong>and</strong> to establish its inhuman, brutal, <strong>and</strong> despotic Government over that country, would Mexico’s<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

consent justify our acquiescence in such a dangerous <strong>and</strong> hateful menace at our very doors? I think<br />

not.<br />

D. C. Calvin.<br />

New-York, Dec. 20, 1895.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 131 -<br />

DILKE INDORSES SALISBURY<br />

<strong>The</strong> American Claim Untenable—Effect of War on Trade<br />

PARIS, Dec. 20.—Sir Charles Dilke, M. P., who is in Paris, in an interview heartily approved the<br />

attitude assumed by Lord Salisbury, which, he said, was the only position he could adopt.<br />

Arbitration, he thought, was impossible, but between that <strong>and</strong> serious talk of war there was a long<br />

distance. <strong>The</strong> conquest of Canada by the United States was possible, but the cost <strong>and</strong> sacrifices<br />

would be similar to those incurred in the war of the rebellion, while the <strong>British</strong> fleet could destroy<br />

the commerce of America.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> would be the first to suffer in the event of war. Her towns would quickly be destroyed<br />

by the <strong>British</strong> fleet before aid could arrive from the United States.<br />

As regarded the Monroe doctrine, Sir Charles thought it was a very legitimate expression of the<br />

feelings of the American people. He had no doubt the various American republics would unite to<br />

prevent the introduction of European militarism or European intervention in their affairs, but it was<br />

clearly understood that France, Holl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, having territory in America, would not<br />

agree with the United States on this point.<br />

Gil Blas publishes a report at an interview with H. Vignaud, First Secretary of the United States<br />

Embassy. Mr. Vignaud expressed regret that the French press should have made the error of<br />

deducing fantastic conclusions from the message. He did not think that France, whose interests were<br />

opposed to those of Engl<strong>and</strong> everywhere, would favor Great Britain, especially as France had not<br />

opposed the aims of the United States anywhere. Mr. Vignaud said he felt certain that the United<br />

States would not yield, but that Great Britain, which had everything to lose in a war, would give way.<br />

War, be said, would mean that Canada would become part of the United States <strong>and</strong> that English<br />

trade would be destroyed within a month following the outbreak of hostilities. A few shells thrown<br />

into an open port would cost Engl<strong>and</strong> dear. <strong>The</strong>re was no doubt in his mind, he said, that in the<br />

event of war France would take advantage of the occasion to settle the question in regard to Egypt<br />

<strong>and</strong> Siam, while Russia would advance her interests in India.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Gaulois publishes an interview with Count Chaudordy, in which he expresses the opinion<br />

that Engl<strong>and</strong> has found her master in arrogance. He thought that the Monroe doctrine applied to<br />

North America, not to South America.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

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- 132 -<br />

LONDON’S WEEKLY PRESS AROUSED<br />

Seriousness of the Situation Recognized, but Danger Not Feared<br />

LOBNON, Dec. 20.—<strong>The</strong> weekly press of London devotes much space to a discussion of the<br />

situation between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States. Among the comments are the following:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Spectator—<strong>The</strong> event <strong>and</strong> the document are of grave importance. It is difficult for<br />

Englishmen to conceive circumstances under which they would willingly go to war with the United<br />

States. At the present moment such a war would seem to Englishmen peculiarly horrible, owing to<br />

the permanent complications in Europe <strong>and</strong> the desire, in which the statesmen of the American<br />

Union share, to rescue the people of Armenia from bloodthirsty tyranny. It is clear, however, that<br />

the dominant party in the Untied States puts forward pretensions to which no self-respecting power<br />

could possibly submit. As Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> puts the matter, in language, the stateliness <strong>and</strong> force of<br />

which we fully acknowledge:<br />

“While it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world<br />

as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march to civilization <strong>and</strong> strenuous <strong>and</strong><br />

worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals<br />

that which follows a supine submission to wrong <strong>and</strong> injustice <strong>and</strong> the consequent loss of national<br />

self-respect <strong>and</strong> honor, beneath which is shielded <strong>and</strong> defended a people’s safety <strong>and</strong> greatness.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> message is an extraordinary expansion of the Monroe doctrine. To submit to it is to confess<br />

that we regard our American possessions as no longer independent. Nobody here dreams of<br />

menacing the United States; nobody here has the faintest idea of conquering, colonizing, or claiming<br />

any fresh portion of either of the two Americas, <strong>and</strong> nobody disputes the right of the United States<br />

to defend any State in America which she may it think proper, in her interests, to defend. All we<br />

maintain is that we are entitled to protect against Spanish aggression frontiers which we believe are<br />

unquestionably ours, <strong>and</strong> which the people of the United States, if <strong>Guiana</strong> were theirs, would<br />

similarly defend.<br />

We are not even defending them against the United States, whose nearest territory is 1,200 miles<br />

distant, but against a turbulent little Spanish State, which was born after we made our settlement in<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong>, therefore, is in no way assailed, menaced, or injured by our action.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Tablet—<strong>The</strong>re is danger lest, in the natural resentment caused by the manner of President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message, we may overlook the sentiment <strong>and</strong> line of reasoning beneath, which so<br />

warmly commends it to the hearts of the American people. <strong>The</strong> Americans have seen how another<br />

continent has been parceled out, how the doctrine of the hinterl<strong>and</strong> has been pressed, <strong>and</strong> how<br />

certain it is that all of the Old World quarrels, rivalries, <strong>and</strong> frontier disputes will soon be reproduced<br />

upon the soil of Africa.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine may not be a part of any code of international law, but it is a part of the<br />

settled policy of the United States, <strong>and</strong> that is within the knowledge of all the world.<br />

It is irrelevant to contend that our right to the territory within the Schomburgk line is too clear<br />

for dispute, since the fact remains that it is disputed <strong>and</strong> has been disputed for years.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Saturday Review—Sensible people on both sides of the water recognize that President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> has played Dogberry to no purpose. He has written himself down an ass, <strong>and</strong> that is about<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

all he has accomplished. Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message shows how far a man who in the main is able <strong>and</strong><br />

upright, is compelled to stoop to-day in order to reach the prize of political popularity in the United<br />

States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Speaker (Gladstonian)—We have no reason to thank Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> that the peace of the<br />

world is not disturbed by the incredible crime of war between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States. He<br />

has brought the two countries into a position of such extreme danger <strong>and</strong> difficulty that only the<br />

good sense <strong>and</strong> the good feeling that are at the root of the character of the two peoples can be<br />

trusted to avert a fatal collision. Who is responsible for bringing the two countries to the point of<br />

contemplating a struggle which would ruin both for a generation? Not Engl<strong>and</strong>. Has she shown any<br />

disposition to trespass upon the rights of the people of the United States? Has she failed in the<br />

usages of diplomatic courtesy? No fair-minded American dare answer in the affirmative. If Lord<br />

Salisbury had willfuly provoked public feeling in America, it would not have been left to the<br />

Americans to rebuke <strong>and</strong> punish him.<br />

We are not among the adherents or Lord Salisbury, but we must affirm that we fail to find in his<br />

dispatches a single line to which reasonable Americans can object. <strong>The</strong> trumpery question of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> which is made the excuse for Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s shrill challenge, is in itself the merest<br />

subterfuge. <strong>The</strong> manoeuvre may succeed as a party stratagem for securing Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s election<br />

for himself or his nominee, but be will .have bought his triumph at a price which few men would<br />

care to pay. <strong>The</strong>re is no need to discuss the monstrous pretensions contained in President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message <strong>and</strong> Secretary Olney’s dispatch. If they mean anything, they mean that notice to<br />

quit the New World is served in the rudest manner upon Great Britain. Surely, Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> must<br />

know that a great power will not accept such a notice until she has exhausted all of the resources at<br />

her comm<strong>and</strong> for resisting aggression, which, if successful, would destroy her status before the<br />

world.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Economist—<strong>The</strong>re is no excuse for a panic. Ample time will be occupied in negotiations,<br />

during which public opinion in both countries will grow cool. In the meantime, there is nothing to<br />

be gained by discussing, as the daily newspapers do, President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s action, party politics, <strong>and</strong><br />

wish for popularity. <strong>The</strong> influences of all Governments are dependent upon the mass of the vote,<br />

<strong>and</strong> there is no satisfaction in hearing that the American masses are so hostile to Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

that all the parties are trying each to outstrip the others in the race of Jingoism. We see really no<br />

evidence that the American people are so penetrated with Jingoism as to desire to absorb unwilling<br />

Canada, much less to fight for the West Indies, with its addition to the colored population of the<br />

United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government, with its usual disregard of diplomatic forms, has said a little more than it<br />

means; that it is vexed by our refusal to arbitrate, <strong>and</strong> that its governing idea rather is to compel us<br />

to arbitrate than to make itself the sole in America. President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message was written like a<br />

dispatch preceding war, but it isn’t addressed to the world, or to Engl<strong>and</strong>, but only to the people of<br />

the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> other weekly prints treat the subject in much the same vein.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

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- 133 -<br />

FREE TRADERS HESITATE<br />

<strong>The</strong> New-Engl<strong>and</strong> Club Dem<strong>and</strong>s Time to Consider the Message<br />

BOSTON, Dec. 20.—<strong>The</strong> New-Engl<strong>and</strong> Free Trade League, at a banquet to-night, adopted<br />

resolutions relative to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy. President Lamb of the league indorsed<br />

Ambassador Bayard’s recent Edinburgh speech. His remarks were applauded, as was his reference to<br />

“the present hysterical craze for war.” <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n resolutions adopted were as follows:<br />

<strong>The</strong> recent message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has proposed to Congress that unless Great Britain shall surrender<br />

her claim to all l<strong>and</strong>s which we may find, upon inquiry, belong to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, we shall resist her aggression by every<br />

means in our power.<br />

Before our people are required to sacrifice their lives <strong>and</strong> their property in this war, we hope they will be given<br />

time to reflect upon certain material facts.<br />

1. We have no treaty, offensive or defensive with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. We have assumed no protectorate over her. We<br />

are under no obligations, express or implied, to fight her battles for her. <strong>The</strong>re can be no valid ground for our<br />

interference in the present dispute unless the alleged encroachments of Great Britain upon <strong>Venezuela</strong> are, in the<br />

words of President Monroe, “dangerous to our peace <strong>and</strong> safety.”<br />

2. <strong>The</strong> disputed territory could not be used by Great Britain as a base of military operations against this country.<br />

It has no good harbors. It is a thous<strong>and</strong> miles away from our nearest coast. Without this, Great Britain has St. Lucia,<br />

Bermuda, Halifax, Vancouver.<br />

3. Annexation of the disputed territory to a <strong>British</strong> colony would not be an assault on our political system. Next<br />

to ourselves, Great Britain <strong>and</strong> her colonies best exemplify the working of free institutions. <strong>The</strong> most potent<br />

argument against such institutions is furnished by the turbulent republics of Central <strong>and</strong> South America.<br />

Fourth – <strong>The</strong> controversy between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> does not threaten our foreign trade. Under the<br />

so-called “reciprocity” clause of the McKinley tariff, we had no difficulty in making a satisfactory commercial<br />

agreement with Great Britain as to her West India colonies, including <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, but <strong>Venezuela</strong> refused to<br />

make those concessions which our Government dem<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong>, in consequence, President Harrison exercised the<br />

power of retaliation conferred upon him by that act.<br />

Fifth – We have told Great Britain that she must submit her boundary dispute to arbitration. But we have not<br />

offered to submit to arbitration the question whether we have any interest in that dispute which can by any<br />

possibility justify an armed intervention.<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolutions were adopted by a vote of 39 to 15.<br />

Other resolutions were adopted indorsing the sentiments of Ambassador Bayard, as expressed in<br />

his Edinburgh speech.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 134 -<br />

ENGLAND STILL STUBBORN<br />

London <strong>News</strong>papers Continue to Put on Bold Fronts<br />

JEER AT THE MONROE DOCTRINE<br />

Profess to Have Information that <strong>The</strong>re Has Been a Revulsion in<br />

Feeling in This Country<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

LONDON, Dec. 20.—All of the morning newspapers to-morrow will continue their discussions<br />

of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> matter.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Morning Post will contend that events have shown that dislike <strong>and</strong> envy of Engl<strong>and</strong> are<br />

imbedded deeply in popular feeling in the United States, <strong>and</strong> suggests that it would be worth while<br />

to reflect whether a position that is regarded with such jealousy by a proud <strong>and</strong> successful nation is<br />

not worth making same sacrifices to maintain. <strong>The</strong> paper says that, whatever the purpose for which<br />

Mr. Olney has written, it has aroused feelings which cannot be dispersed by any mere calculation of<br />

electioneering chances. Public passions may force Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> to maintain his hostile attitude<br />

toward Engl<strong>and</strong>. All sober people see that perseverance in the line adopted must lead to war.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Graphic will suggest that it is possible to honorably settle the dispute by arbitration solely on<br />

the question as to whether the Monroe doctrine is applicable to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong>, basing its statement on its own reports from New-York will insist that there has<br />

been an entire revulsion of feeling there, owing to the panic in Wall Street. It contends that<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has inflicted a heavier injury on his own country than upon Great Britain by<br />

striking a blow at the public credit just as it was recovering from the effects of the collapse caused by<br />

the Sherman act. Continuing its argument, it says:<br />

Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> will find no bond issues or withdrawal of notes so effectual as the assurance of peace. He must<br />

now be conscious of his mistake. He will be able to some extent to repair it by replying to Lord Salisbury in a tone<br />

more befitting the head of a great Nation, than that adopted in his unhappy message. He will find the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government <strong>and</strong> people entirely disposed to forget his hot words, <strong>and</strong> to help him repair the damage they have<br />

done.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard predicts that before many days there will be a striking revulsion of popular<br />

sentiment in the United States. <strong>The</strong> American mind, it says, is clear <strong>and</strong> logical, <strong>and</strong> Americans fully<br />

share with the <strong>British</strong> in what they both call love of fair play. It adds:<br />

We feel confident that a vast majority of the Americans will soon be profoundly sorry for what Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

has done. He has travestied <strong>and</strong> damaged a principle that they hold dear, <strong>and</strong> has made the Republic which we have<br />

all honored on account of its supposed attachment to peace <strong>and</strong> non-intervention, figure in the eyes of Europe as a<br />

gratuitously aggressive <strong>and</strong> reckless champion of war. Englishmen are well aware of the difficulty many Americans<br />

must feel in reconciling patriotism with a frank disavowal of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s attitude, but we can join in all sincerity<br />

in the prayer offered by the Chaplain of the Senate.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Times will say:<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s second message is almost as remarkable in its own way as his first. With an air of the utmost<br />

innocence he takes note of a panic that he himself originated in precisely the tone that would be appropriate to the<br />

discussion of a calamity due to causes beyond human control.<br />

We see, he says in effect, how urgent is the necessity for the financial reforms he has vainly advocated, when<br />

such a trifle as a threat of war against Great Britain suffices to have disorganized Wall Street.<br />

It is doubtful from the terms of the message whether he now wishes it to be understood that his <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

policy was designed simply to give an object lesson to finance, or whether he merely turns to account a catastrophe<br />

that be did not foresee.<br />

Business men in the United States will not derive much consolation from this anxious appeal for a way to<br />

escape the natural consequences of the president’s action, nor will the numerous opponents of his financial policy<br />

regard with anything but distrust <strong>and</strong> resentment the attempt to rush it under the cover of an artificial foreign<br />

complication.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> Chronicle will say:<br />

Yesterday’s message must induce the American people to think deeply over the needlessness of Tuesday’s bolt<br />

from the blue. It must appear to the most alert American patriot that the sudden apprehension <strong>and</strong> timidity of<br />

business circles was due to the inevitable alarm into which the whole commercial world was suddenly thrown by the<br />

new foreign policy of the United States. <strong>The</strong> second message is virtually a counterblast, for it appeals to facts, not<br />

prejudices, <strong>and</strong> presents real, not imaginary, perils.<br />

In its issue to-morrow <strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard will mention a rumor that the Rothschilds will immediately<br />

withdraw £5,000,000 from the United States.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 135 -<br />

PASSAGE OF THE BILL<br />

<strong>The</strong> Senate Unanimous for the Appointment of a Commission<br />

WASHINGTON. Dec. 20.—<strong>The</strong> first words on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question in the Senate to-day<br />

were spoken by Mr. Milburn, the blind Chaplain who prayed:<br />

As the time draws near the period of Christmas, inaugurated by the angels singing “Glory to God in the highest;<br />

on earth peace to men of good will,” we pray that the spirit of the season may enter in our hearts <strong>and</strong> minds <strong>and</strong><br />

may keep us in the knowledge <strong>and</strong> love of God <strong>and</strong> of His son. Jesus Christ, our Saviour.<br />

Forbid that the two foremost nations of the world which bear the name of Christian, with one language, one<br />

faith, one baptism, one Lord, shall be embroiled in war with all its horrors <strong>and</strong> barbarianisms.<br />

Grant, we beseech <strong>The</strong>e, that we mar be saved from imbruing our h<strong>and</strong>s in each others blood. Let the spirit of<br />

justice <strong>and</strong> magnanimity prevail among the rulers of both nations <strong>and</strong> among the people, the kindred people, of the<br />

two l<strong>and</strong>s, so that all differences <strong>and</strong> difficulties may be amicably <strong>and</strong> righteously settled, <strong>and</strong> that God’s name may<br />

be glorified in the establishment of concord, amity <strong>and</strong> brotherly kindness.<br />

May this become an august <strong>and</strong> memorable Christmas in the history of the English-speaking world <strong>and</strong> of the<br />

whole earth.<br />

Let health, brotherly kindness, <strong>and</strong> charity pervade all our l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> our motherl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

And may God be glorified <strong>and</strong> the reign of Jesus Christ, our Saviour, be established, we humbly pray <strong>The</strong>e, in<br />

His sacred name. Amen.<br />

Ordered the Prayer Printed<br />

At the suggestion of Mr. Mitchell, (Rep., Oregon,) unanimous consent was given to the printing<br />

in <strong>The</strong> Record of this invocation by the Chaplain.<br />

After the introduction <strong>and</strong> reference of numerous bills, Mr. Mitchell (Rep., Oregon,) offered a<br />

resolution instructing the Finance Committee to incorporate into any revenue bill that may come to<br />

that committee from the House of Representatives, a provision imposing duties on wool – in three<br />

several classes. <strong>The</strong> resolution was laid on the table, as Mr. Mitchell gave notice of his desire to<br />

address the Senate on the subject.<br />

Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler (Rep., N.H.,) offered a resolution, which was agreed, calling on the Secretary of the<br />

Treasury for a statement showing, during each of the last five years <strong>and</strong> for the whole period, the<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

gross amount of imports from <strong>and</strong> exports to, ports of Great Britain, her colonies, <strong>and</strong><br />

dependencies, with the number of entries of <strong>British</strong> vessels into American ports <strong>and</strong> their gross<br />

tonnage.<br />

Allen Harangues the Senate<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolution offered yesterday by Mr. Allen (Pop., Neb.,) directing the Finance Committee to<br />

inquire into the advisability of opening our mints to the free coinage of silver <strong>and</strong> the issue of<br />

Treasury notes to provide for the contingency of war between the <strong>British</strong> Empire <strong>and</strong> the United<br />

States of America, was taken up, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Allen proceeded to deliver what he evidently considered<br />

some very caustic remarks at the expense of the President <strong>and</strong> his supporters on both sides of the<br />

Chamber. He said that he could conceive of no sufficient cause for the delivery of the President’s<br />

message. <strong>The</strong>re did not seem to be any dem<strong>and</strong> for it.<br />

It occurred to him that the President, having lost the confidence of the people, to some extent,<br />

during the administration of the last two years <strong>and</strong> nine months, was seeking to restore himself <strong>and</strong><br />

his party to that confidence, <strong>and</strong> thus induce the people to forget the business conditions of the<br />

country.<br />

Mr. Allen referred to the bill recently introduced by Mr. Hill, (Dem., N.Y.,) to enable ex-<br />

Confederate officers to be commissioned as officers in the army or navy of the United States; the<br />

one introduced by Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler (Rep., N.H.,) far an appropriation of $100,000,000 for rifles <strong>and</strong><br />

cannon, <strong>and</strong> the two introduced by Mr. Hale, (Rep., Me.,) for an increase of the navy <strong>and</strong> for a<br />

reconstruction of the United States ship Constitution, as so many proofs of the war spirit in the<br />

Senate.<br />

He suggested that, on the Democratic side, there was an attempt to sustain the President for the<br />

splendid services of himself <strong>and</strong> his Secretary of the Treasury in the late political campaigns in New-<br />

York, Maryl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Kentucky.<br />

Populists Must Take a St<strong>and</strong><br />

It was necessary, Mr. Allen thought, for the Populist Party to take a st<strong>and</strong> in the matter. It would<br />

not do, he said, to permit the President of the United States <strong>and</strong> his distinguished associates in the<br />

Senate to carry off all the glory <strong>and</strong> honor. It would not do to permit the Democratic Party <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Republican Party in the Senate to take off all the glory <strong>and</strong> honor incident to the Monroe doctrine. It<br />

was necessary that the Populist Party should have a st<strong>and</strong>ing in the matter. Realizing that fact, the<br />

resolution had been prepared, as money was essential to war.<br />

Mr. Platt (Rep., Conn.,) moved to refer the resolution to the Committee on Finance, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

motion was defeated – yeas 24, nays 36, as follows:<br />

Yeas—Messrs. Allison, Brice, Burrows, Caffery, Cameron, Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, Gallinger, Gorman, Hale,<br />

Hawley, Lodge, McMillan, Martin, Mills, Mitchell (Wis.,) Morrill. Platt, Proctor. Quay, Sewell,<br />

Sherman, Smith, Thurston, <strong>and</strong> Wetmore – 24.<br />

Nays—Messrs. Allen, Bacon, Baker, Bate, Berry, Blackburn, Butler, Call, Carter, Chilton, Clark,<br />

Cockrell, Dubois, Gibson, Harris, Jones (Ark.), Jones (Nev.), Kyle, Mantle, Mitchell (Oregon),<br />

Morgan, Nelson, Pasco, Peffer, Perkins, Pettigrew, Pritchard, Roach, Stewart, Tuller, Tillman, Vest,<br />

Voorhees, Walthall, Warren, <strong>and</strong> Wilson – 36.<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolution was agreed to, Mr. Allen having withdrawn the preamble. It now reads:<br />

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Resolved, That the Committee on Finance do, <strong>and</strong> they are hereby directed <strong>and</strong> instructed to inquire, <strong>and</strong><br />

report, by bill or otherwise, whether it would not be expedient <strong>and</strong> proper for the Government of the United States<br />

of America, at this time, to open its mints to the free <strong>and</strong> unlimited coinage of gold <strong>and</strong> silver at the ratio of 1 to 16,<br />

<strong>and</strong>, in addition thereto, issue an adequate volume of full legal tender Treasury notes in the same manner such notes<br />

have heretofore been issued, <strong>and</strong> in the interest of National safety withdraw the issue power of National banks, <strong>and</strong><br />

retire all bank currency.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Commission Bill Taken Up<br />

<strong>The</strong> Vice President laid before the Senate the House bill appropriating $100,000 for the expenses<br />

of the commission to inquire <strong>and</strong> report on the true divisional line between the Republic of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> it was read a second time.<br />

Mr. Morgan, (Dem., Ala.), Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, asked <strong>and</strong><br />

obtained unanimous consent to have the bill considered in the Senate immediately. <strong>The</strong> committee<br />

he said had had the matter under consideration, <strong>and</strong> had instructed him to report it back with<br />

amendments in the nature of a substitute.<br />

<strong>The</strong> substitute was read, its principal difference from the House bill being that it fixed the<br />

number of Commissioners at three, <strong>and</strong> required that they should be appointed by <strong>and</strong> with the<br />

consent of the Senate.<br />

Mr. Platt (Rep., Conn.,) said he differed from the conclusions of the committee with great<br />

diffidence, <strong>and</strong> he rose to speak upon the subject with a good deal of embarrassment. His opinion<br />

was very decided that the Senate had better not amend the House bill, but pass it as it came over;<br />

<strong>and</strong> in that view he understood that the Chairman of the committee concurred.<br />

Better Not to Talk War<br />

It was useless, he said, to deny that this was a very grave <strong>and</strong> important subject; but in its<br />

consideration Senators ought not to talk about war. Senators did not invite war. <strong>The</strong>y deprecated it.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re was no reason, at present, to suppose that war was to be precipitated. <strong>The</strong> American people<br />

would not shun it, however, if it became inevitable.<br />

All Senators, he thought, concurred with the President. <strong>The</strong>re might be something in the<br />

message which he would have preferred to have otherwise; but as far as it was a statement of the<br />

position <strong>and</strong> determination of the American people on the great subject, there was no difference of<br />

opinion. No matter whether the Monroe doctrine were called a doctrine or a canon of international<br />

law, the American people were determined to sustain it.<br />

It was admitted, Mr. Platt continued, that Senators were not in possession of the facts involved<br />

in the controversy. <strong>The</strong>refore the proposed commission was to be appointed. Any amendment of<br />

the House bill would be considered in Engl<strong>and</strong> as a hesitation on the part of the Senate to sustain<br />

the President in his position. And, therefore, unless it became absolutely necessary to amend the bill,<br />

the Senate should refrain from doing so in order that the attitude of the Senate might not be<br />

misunderstood in Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re seemed to be an opinion on the other side of the water that this assertion of American<br />

rights <strong>and</strong> of the American determination to sustain those rights, was a campaign idea, <strong>and</strong> that it<br />

was put forth at this time for political effect.<br />

“Engl<strong>and</strong>,” said Mr. Platt, emphatically, “must be disabused of any such opinion or belief as that.<br />

<strong>The</strong> American people were never more in earnest, from the breaking out of the Revolution to this<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

day than in the determination to assert <strong>and</strong> maintain what they believe to be essential to the safety of<br />

the Republic. <strong>The</strong> Senate must be careful, then, to do nothing here that would give plausibility to the<br />

already prevalent idea in Engl<strong>and</strong> that the United States was not united <strong>and</strong> in earnest about this<br />

matter.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Money Consideration<br />

Mr. Mills (Dem., Texas) said that it appeared to him that the most important consideration<br />

connected with the whole subject had been utterly overlooked in both houses <strong>and</strong> that was the<br />

money consideration. Where were the revenues to be obtained?<br />

How was the Government to get money enough to carry on the war <strong>and</strong> to carry it on<br />

successfully? A conflict with Great Britain would be no child’s play, <strong>and</strong> the mistake of underrating<br />

it should not be committed. It might be, as the Senator from Ohio, Mr. Sherman, thought, there<br />

would be no war. Mr. Mills’s own voice was for peace, but for peace honorable <strong>and</strong> consistent with<br />

the safety <strong>and</strong> dignity of the people of the United States.<br />

“But,” Mr. Mills continued, “the American Government <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> Government have<br />

arrived at a point, after a long discussion, where both say that they will not yield, <strong>and</strong> the President<br />

says that we ought to resist with all the means in our power.<br />

“Certainly, then, we are st<strong>and</strong>ing face to face on the very edge of battle, <strong>and</strong> prudence <strong>and</strong> safety<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> that we should look to our treasure box <strong>and</strong> see where we are to obtain the money to carry<br />

on this great struggle.”<br />

In developing this idea Mr. Mills argued that the first course to be taken was an amendment of<br />

the Constitution legalizing an income tax, <strong>and</strong> he suggested that a joint resolution proposing such an<br />

amendment should be passed <strong>and</strong> sent to the State Legislatures.<br />

Not an Electioneering Dodge<br />

Mr. Lodge (Rep., Mass.,) said that yesterday he had given notice of amendments, but he should<br />

not offer them to-day, because he thought it of the utmost importance that there should be<br />

absolutely no division whatever in the Senate on any question involving the support of the President<br />

in the position he had taken. As to the English idea that the whole thing was an electioneering<br />

business, he wanted to see that idea done away with. He wanted to make it understood that there<br />

was no division of sentiment among the American people.<br />

And he wanted, by the action of the Senate to-day, to say plainly to those people in London who<br />

were undertaking to make a scare in this country by selling stocks <strong>and</strong> calling loans in the American<br />

market, that the American people were united on this question, that they purposed to st<strong>and</strong> by it,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that the attempt to create a panic in Wall Street by calling loans <strong>and</strong> draining gold was not the<br />

road to honorable <strong>and</strong> peaceful settlement. [Applause in the galleries.]<br />

Mr. Stewart (Pop., Nev.) said the sentiment in the United States in favor of the Monroe doctrine<br />

was practically unanimous.<br />

He accused Engl<strong>and</strong> of various attempts to irritate the United States in the matter of Alaska, of<br />

slaughtering seals, <strong>and</strong> of the seizure of Corinto, in Nicaragua. And he declared that it was this<br />

English arrogance which had aroused the feelings of the American people.<br />

“Great Britain,” be exclaimed, vehemently, “can put an end to it by being honest <strong>and</strong><br />

reasonable.” [Renewed applause in the galleries which was promptly suppressed by the Vice President.]<br />

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Not a Very Large War Cloud<br />

Mr. White (Dem.. Cal.,) said he could not bring himself to believe that there was the serious<br />

menace to peace which Senators supposed. He concurred in everything that had been said as to the<br />

necessity of firmly <strong>and</strong> rigidly <strong>and</strong> at all times enforcing the Monroe doctrine. But he was persuaded<br />

that if on a careful <strong>and</strong> judicial investigation the facts were made patent to the world there would be<br />

no difficulty as to an honorable solution. He could not underst<strong>and</strong> that there was reason to<br />

apprehend immediate difficulty. <strong>The</strong> war cloud did not seem to him to be very large.<br />

Mr. Mitchell (Rep., Oregon,) asked Mr. White to give his construction at the Monroe doctrine;<br />

<strong>and</strong> he put the case of <strong>Venezuela</strong> ceding the disputed territory to Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> asked whether<br />

such cession would be in conflict with the Monroe doctrine.<br />

Mr. White declined to discuss that point as not being involved in the controversy.<br />

Mr. Mitchell answered his own question by stating that the true construction of the Monroe<br />

doctrine to be that no European power shall be permitted either by force or treaty to acquire one<br />

foot of soil which it does not now own on the Western hemisphere.<br />

Caffery Urges Caution<br />

Mr. Caftery (Dem., La.,) said that he heartily concurred in Senator Sherman’s opinion that the<br />

Senate should pursue a conservative course of action. If war should ensue between the United States<br />

<strong>and</strong> Great Britain out of this controversy, the responsibility for it would rest on the Senate <strong>and</strong><br />

House of Representatives. <strong>The</strong> President might precipitate War, but Congress was the war-making<br />

power, <strong>and</strong>, therefore, he argued that the Senate should supervise the appointment of the<br />

commission. Continuing, he said:<br />

What need is there of haste? Is our honor suffering? Is our frontier invaded? Are not our ships permitted to<br />

plow the ocean unmolested? Wherein are we assailed? <strong>The</strong> very appointment of this commission is a warlike step. It<br />

is a very extreme application of the Monroe doctrine. But even that step—which, in my opinion, is a forecast of<br />

war—may not lead to the dire conclusion of war, if temperate <strong>and</strong> wise counsels are followed afterward.<br />

I know something of the horrors <strong>and</strong> devastation of war; but if the occasion dem<strong>and</strong>s war, if the honor or the<br />

interests or the United States are so insulted or infringed upon as to make a call to arms necessary, I would not<br />

hesitate, on account of the financial condition of the United States, to enter into war, <strong>and</strong> I believe that the people<br />

would respond to the call of patriotism.<br />

It occurs to me, however, knowing the terrors of war, knowing the upheaval that will follow from a conflict<br />

between these two vast powers, that we ought not to be precipitate or hasty. Let us give a breathing time. <strong>The</strong><br />

people of the United States are excited, <strong>and</strong> members of Congress are excited on this question. Taking counsel of<br />

my prudence, I consider it wise <strong>and</strong> just that the House bill shall be amended as suggested by the Senator from<br />

Ohio.<br />

Ch<strong>and</strong>ler Wants Prompt Action<br />

Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler (Rep., N.H.) said that he had yesterday thought it wise to have the bill amended,<br />

but to-day he did not think so. He believed that it was of the highest National importance that the<br />

bill should pass the Senate to-day exactly as it came from the House of Representatives. <strong>The</strong><br />

President of the United States had risen above party <strong>and</strong> had shown himself to be patriotic <strong>and</strong> an<br />

American. Inspired by the genius of Massachusetts which pervaded the State Department, the<br />

President had taken American ground, from which America would never recede. He was in favor of<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

meeting the President on that ground, <strong>and</strong> he asked whether there was a Democratic Senator or a<br />

Republican Senator in favor of doing anything in this matter in order to promote party interests. He<br />

did not believe there was.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President had done his best to remove the question from the domain of American politics,<br />

<strong>and</strong> should not the people of the country, he asked, without distinction of party, respond to the<br />

President’s effort <strong>and</strong> sustain his h<strong>and</strong> in every particular.<br />

He understood that Wall Street <strong>and</strong> State Street were greatly agitated because a Democratic<br />

President, sustained by a Republican Congress, proposed to defend the National honor. It struck<br />

him, however, that if stocks had gone down they were stocks that ought to go down, irrespective of<br />

National complications.<br />

And he undertook to say that no valuable American stock would be seriously affected because<br />

American honor had been preserved in this crisis of its affairs. He did not propose to be intimidated<br />

by any conspiracy of foreign capitalists to destroy American credit.<br />

In this connection Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler read from a London dispatch giving the facts of a meeting of<br />

English capitalists in London called for the purpose of considering the advisability of united action<br />

(“united action,” he repeated, with emphasis), in calling off their American credits. He also repeated<br />

from the dispatch the sentence: “<strong>The</strong>re were no defenders of the President present.”<br />

A Characteristic Fling<br />

“Alas,” said Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, “has it come to this? I ask the other side of the chamber to consider<br />

the fact that their President, who has done more for English interests than any President who ever<br />

sat in the White House, has now fallen so low that there are none to do him reverence.<br />

“On the contrary,” continued Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, quoting still further from the dispatch, “he was<br />

denounced unsparingly, <strong>and</strong> his conduct was described by several as insane.”<br />

Mr. Allen (Pop., Neb.,) wanted to know whether any of the Rothschilds were present at that<br />

meeting.<br />

Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler replied that there were no names mentioned.<br />

“Does the Senator believe,” Mr. Allen asked, “that If the application of the Monroe doctrine<br />

were not only to keep Great Britain out of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, but were also to result in the<br />

withdrawal of the <strong>British</strong> capital invested in the United States in the form of stocks <strong>and</strong> bonds, he<br />

would still sustain the Monroe doctrine?”<br />

“I am willing,” Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler replied, laughingly, “with the Senator from Nebraska, to arrange<br />

American finances independently of Engl<strong>and</strong>; but, one thing at a time.”<br />

Tillman Asks a Question<br />

“If the Senate passes this bill,” Mr. Tillman (Dem., S.C.,) asked, “<strong>and</strong> if the result shall be that<br />

the gold reserve shall disappear, <strong>and</strong> that the country gets on the silver basis, as is threatened, would<br />

you still vote for the bill?”<br />

“It is the tendency of our Populistic friends,” Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler replied, “to mix up questions.”<br />

[Laughter.]<br />

“I beg your pardon,” Mr. Tillman said, “I want it understood that I am not a Populist. If I am<br />

not a Democrat, there is no Democrat here. [Laughter.] Will you answer my question?”<br />

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“I will vote,” Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler exclaimed, “for any sacrifice, even for the resolution of the Senator<br />

from Nebraska [Mr. Allen]—which is a concrete absurdity—if necessary to protect the National<br />

honor.”<br />

“Well. Sir, we join h<strong>and</strong>s,” was Mr. Tillman’s rejoinder.<br />

Mr. Turple (Dem., Ind.,) made an impassioned speech in favor of the assertion of the Monroe<br />

doctrine, <strong>and</strong> exclaimed, in a remark as to the river Esequibo being one of the boundary lines of the<br />

disputed territory: “We now pass the Rubicon, <strong>and</strong> can never recede without dishonor.” He also<br />

said:<br />

We did not assume guardianship over the South American republics. <strong>The</strong> guardianship has been cast on us by<br />

the force of political gravitation. Our primacy among the republics or the American hemisphere <strong>and</strong> among the<br />

Governments of the world has thrown upon us the guardianship of those republics. We cannot avoid it. We<br />

cannot evade it. It belongs to that class or duties comprised in the maxim “Noblesse oblige.”<br />

Mr. Call (Dem, Fla.) gave it as his opinion that there was no possibility of war as the enlightened<br />

sentiment of nations of the world forbade war on the question.<br />

What if the Stocks Go Down?<br />

Mr. Teller (Rep., Col.) expressed his regret that the President had not settled the question of a<br />

commission, as he might have done, without sending it to Congress. He (Mr. Teller) was not<br />

frightened by the little financial disturbances in London <strong>and</strong> New York. Suppose stocks did fall.<br />

That was a matter which the American people did not care much about. He understood that railroad<br />

stocks had fallen 4 percent to-day. He did not care if they fell 50 percent. That would not effect the<br />

country generally—only a few speculators. But the English would not sell American stocks. That<br />

was a bluff on their part. Mr. Teller also read from the dispatch already quoted by Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, <strong>and</strong><br />

paused the phrase “Its deluded Chief Magistrate.” He also read this question: “<strong>The</strong> meeting finally<br />

resolved to postpone any action until it became clear to what extent the President’s course<br />

represents the will of the American people.”<br />

“And,” added Mr. Teller, “when they have gone through the files of the American press <strong>and</strong><br />

listened to the voice of the American people, if sending back our securities depends upon the<br />

support we shall give to the President, they will send back these securities in a mass.”<br />

Passage of the Bill<br />

This closed the debate. On motion of Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, (Rep., N.H.,) the proposed amendments to<br />

the House bill were laid on the table; <strong>and</strong> the bill was read a third time <strong>and</strong> progressed to the point<br />

where the question was on its passage.<br />

An offer of amendment was made by Mr. Caffery, (Dem., La.,) who was informed by the<br />

presiding officer (Mr. Harris. Dem., Tenn.) that the bill had gone beyond the point where any<br />

amendments could be offered.<br />

<strong>The</strong> presiding officer then put the question, “Shall the bill pass?” <strong>and</strong>, as the votes (viva voce)<br />

were all “Aye,” <strong>and</strong> not one “No.” he declared that the House bill was passed, without amendment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Senate then, at 3:45, proceeded to executive business: <strong>and</strong> when the doors were opened, at<br />

4:30, the presiding officer laid before the Senate the President’s message, asking that no recess be<br />

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taken until after financial legislation necessary to preserve the credit of the Government had been<br />

enacted.<br />

“I move that the Senate do now adjourn.” said Mr. Cockrell, (Dem., Mo.,) as soon as the reading<br />

of the message was concluded.<br />

“Why,” said Mr. Hawley, (Rep., Conn.,) with real or affected surprise, “I expected that some<br />

serious consideration would be given to this most important message of the President by our<br />

Democratic friends.”<br />

“We want time to consider it,” Mr. Cockrell bluntly rejoined.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Senate adjourned until to-morrow.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 136 -<br />

ENGLAND WARNED BEFORE<br />

Her Attitude Toward <strong>Venezuela</strong> Was Changed Seven Years Ago.<br />

THE ACTION THEN OF MR. CLEVELAND<br />

Called Forth a Letter of Praise from Fr. Antonio Silva—<br />

President Would Not Permit Its Being Used In Campaign<br />

In an article printed in <strong>The</strong> New-York Times Oct. 21 last, it was demonstrated, from an<br />

examination of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s previous record on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n issue <strong>and</strong> also from an<br />

analysis of the merits of the controversy between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>, that the country was<br />

probably on the eve of diplomatic developments which would easily prove “the most embarrassing<br />

that the State Department had had to deal with since the war.” Among the observations made by the<br />

writer, W. W. Spooner, was the following:<br />

“As an instance of the President’s earnest <strong>and</strong> recognized sentiments in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter, it<br />

is known to some of his friends that there is in the possession of a gentleman in this city a letter of<br />

great significance written by the Chargé d’Affaires of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in the United States, in 1888, highly<br />

lauding him as the forceful <strong>and</strong> never yielding friend of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in her difficulty with Great<br />

Britain. At the time of the Sackville-West incident <strong>and</strong> the Presidential message of 1888, this letter<br />

was placed at the disposal of the Democratic National Committee, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Brice anxiously desired<br />

to publish it as a counter-active of the ferocious Anglophobic accusations against the tariff-reform<br />

hero. But Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, when his consent was sought, took a lofty <strong>and</strong> conscientious attitude, <strong>and</strong><br />

refused to be a party to such electioneering claptrap, even if his success at the polls depended on it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> publication of the letter, with the connecting circumstances, would present one of the most<br />

characteristic chapters in Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s personal political history.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> document thus alluded to was a personal letter dated New-York, Sept. 18, 1888, from Señor<br />

Fr. Antonio Silva, In charge of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Legation at Washington, to Col. George W.<br />

Gibbons, who was at that time a diplomatic agent of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Republic <strong>and</strong> is now a legal<br />

practitioner, with an office in the Stewart Building. <strong>The</strong> following is a copy of it:<br />

Legation de <strong>Venezuela</strong> en Washington:<br />

NEW-YORK, Sept. 18, 1888.<br />

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Col. George W. Gibbons [Diplomatic agent of the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong>]<br />

My Dear Sir: In reply to your inquiry of this date permit me to say that as the representative of the Government<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in the United States, I thank you for your manly <strong>and</strong> patriotic efforts in behalf of my country. To the<br />

President of the United States, Grover Clevel<strong>and</strong>, my country is largely indebted for his sympathy <strong>and</strong> the notion<br />

taken by him toward the Government of Great Britain, in showing that Government that the United States of<br />

America was not indifferent to the unwarranted acts of encroachment by Great Britain on the territory of the<br />

Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

This timely interference on the part of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has for the present stopped the English<br />

Government in her attempted acts of spoliation, encroachment, <strong>and</strong> appropriation to herself of very nearly onethird<br />

of our whole republic, <strong>and</strong> besides taking possession of the Orinoco River, which connects with the River<br />

Amazon <strong>and</strong> the Plate, the possession of which would have given to Great Britain the absolute control of the trade<br />

of the whole of South America. My Government <strong>and</strong> people feel that in President Clevel<strong>and</strong> they have a friend <strong>and</strong><br />

protector, <strong>and</strong> that the power of Great Britain over this trade is at an end, <strong>and</strong> that closer commercial <strong>and</strong> friendly<br />

relations between the United States <strong>and</strong> my country are firmly established in the wishes of my countrymen <strong>and</strong> will<br />

be carried out by my Government.<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s bold <strong>and</strong> manly course on the South American question will, no doubt, give your country<br />

the control of the trade of that portion of the continent, amounting to about $900,000,000 a year, a result which, I<br />

trust, will come to pass. It is my opinion that the safety of republican institutions in South America depends largely<br />

on the establishment of closer commercial relations, on a basis that will prove very advantageous to the United<br />

States, <strong>and</strong> of such a character that it will be impossible for Europe to compete or interfere. <strong>The</strong> natural position of<br />

both sections of this continent makes it imperative that such should be the case, <strong>and</strong> I am satisfied that such will be<br />

the result of the deliberations of the representatives of all the South American countries at the proposed conference<br />

to be held in Washington in January 1889, <strong>and</strong> which was approved by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> on the 24th day of May,<br />

1888.<br />

With the assurance of my high consideration, I remain,<br />

Yours truly,<br />

FR. ANTONIO SILVA<br />

For a suitable underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the Silva letter in its enthusiastic tribute to President Clevel<strong>and</strong> as<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s friend, a remembrance of certain historical facts is necessary. Previous to 1888 there<br />

really existed no <strong>Venezuela</strong> question of which our State Department could take serious cognizance<br />

on the grounds of the Monroe doctrine. Up to that time Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> had been uniformly<br />

passing a course of diplomatic negotiations with a view to compromise of some kind. That course<br />

showed astonishing irregularities <strong>and</strong> frequent changes of base; but on the whole, it was a course<br />

manifesting a decided willingness for concessions on both sides.<br />

Sir Robert Schomburgk, a <strong>British</strong> engineer in 1841 traced the arbitrary “Schomburgk line”<br />

beginning at the mouth of the Orinoco River, <strong>and</strong> intended to indicate the westward extent of<br />

<strong>British</strong> territorial claims. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government made a vigorous protest, <strong>and</strong> accordingly<br />

Lord Aberdeen ordered the Schomburgk line obliterated <strong>and</strong> disavowed any design of peremptory<br />

conduct concerning the boundary question. In 1850 the <strong>British</strong> Government went even further,<br />

agreeing to a status quo whereby Engl<strong>and</strong> pledged herself not to occupy or encroach upon any foot<br />

of the debated territory in consideration of a like pledge from <strong>Venezuela</strong>. In 1881 Señor Rojas,<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s diplomatic representative in London, endeavored to come to an underst<strong>and</strong>ing with<br />

Lord Granville, <strong>British</strong> Foreign Secretary, about the long-st<strong>and</strong>ing difficulty. Señor Rojas <strong>and</strong> Earl<br />

Granville each proposed a summary compromise line, <strong>and</strong> it is worthy of particular recollection that<br />

the line suggested by Granville placed the extreme limit of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s claim very far to the east from<br />

the old repudiated Schomburgk line—leaving, in fact, the whole of the Orinoco mouth exclusively<br />

to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Rojas <strong>and</strong> Granville could not agree, <strong>and</strong> matters dragged on for a while. Meantime<br />

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President Guzman Blanco, as a means of bringing Engl<strong>and</strong> to terms, persuaded the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Congress to place a discriminating duty of 30 percent on all merch<strong>and</strong>ise from the <strong>British</strong><br />

colonies—which was a direct blow at <strong>British</strong> West Indian trade. In consequence of this the English<br />

Government invited <strong>Venezuela</strong> to appoint a diplomatic agent accredited with full powers to settle all<br />

pending issues. Guzman Blanco thereupon proceeded to London, <strong>and</strong> entered into negotiations<br />

with the Gladstone Cabinet—the upshot of which was that Lord Granville, on June 18, 1885,<br />

consented to a treaty whereby every matter of difference between the two countries which could not<br />

be adjusted in the ordinary diplomatic way should be submitted to the arbitration of a power or<br />

powers in amity with both nations.<br />

This arbitration treaty was promptly repudiated by Lord Salisbury when he came into power<br />

soon afterward. <strong>The</strong>n, <strong>and</strong> not until then, the English Government began to develop its programme<br />

of not only claiming, but seizing, fortifying, <strong>and</strong> holding <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory in utter defiance of<br />

every suggestion of arbitration or compromise.<br />

<strong>The</strong> attention of the Clevel<strong>and</strong> Administration, early in January, 1888, was drawn by the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister to extraordinary <strong>British</strong> aggressions. At that period diplomatic claims of a<br />

serious character were pending on the part of American citizens against the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Government, <strong>and</strong> President Clevel<strong>and</strong> had taken occasion to use pretty strong language in urging<br />

their settlement. This should be remembered in forming a proper estimate of the significance of our<br />

Government’s response to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister’s appeal. That response was contained in a note<br />

communicated Feb. 17, 1888, by Secretary of State Bayard to Edward J. Phelps, United States<br />

Minister to Engl<strong>and</strong>, in which he said:<br />

I transmit herewith translation of a note received by me on the 15th inst., wherein the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister sets<br />

forth the information lately supplied to him to the effect that the Legislature of Demerara has recently asserted a<br />

claim of <strong>British</strong> jurisdiction over the gold- mining districts of Caratal, on the headwaters of the Yuruari River, <strong>and</strong><br />

that, by a decree of the Government of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, dated Dec. 31, 1887, formal denial is made of the validity of<br />

a grant by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government for the construction of a railway frown Ciudad Bolivar to Guacipati, a city<br />

in the Caratal district, on the ground that it passes in <strong>and</strong> over certain territories <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong>s within <strong>and</strong> forming part<br />

of the Colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. . .<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government of the United States has hitherto taken an earnest <strong>and</strong> friendly interest in the question of<br />

boundaries so long in dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> so far as its disinterested counsels were<br />

admissible, has advocated an amicable, final <strong>and</strong> honorable settlement of the dispute. We have followed this course<br />

on the assumption that the issue was one of historical fact, eminently adaptable for admitting arbitration <strong>and</strong> that<br />

the territorial claims of each party had a fixed limit, the right of which would without difficulty be determined<br />

according to the evidence.<br />

<strong>The</strong> claim now stated to have been put forth by the authority of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> necessarily gives rise to grave<br />

disquietude, anti creates an apprehension that the territorial claim does not follow historical traditions or evidence,<br />

but is apparently indefinite. At no time hitherto does it appear that the district of which Guacipati is the centre has<br />

been claimed as <strong>British</strong> territory or that such jurisdiction has ever been asserted over its inhabitants, <strong>and</strong> if the<br />

reported decree of the Government of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> be indeed genuine it is not apparent how any line of railway<br />

from Ciudad Bolivar to Guacipati could enter or traverse territory within the control of Great Britain.<br />

If, indeed, it should appear that there is no fixed limit to the <strong>British</strong> boundary claim, our good disposition to aid<br />

in a settlement might not only be defeated, but be obliged to give place to a feeling of grave concern. . .<br />

It was this firm action of Secretary Bayard’s, taken without hesitation immediately after the<br />

intervention of our Government was formally requested by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the<br />

diplomatic differences at that period existing between the United States <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> which caused<br />

Señor Silva to write in such emphatic terms to Mr. Gibbons at a critical emergency of the campaign<br />

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of 1888. Recalling the circumstance in an interview had with him by a reporter for <strong>The</strong> New-York<br />

Times, Mr. Gibbons said:<br />

“As a diplomatic agent of <strong>Venezuela</strong> I was much interested in everything affecting the trade <strong>and</strong><br />

political relations of the United States with South American countries in general, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> in<br />

particular. I was a Democrat in American politics, <strong>and</strong> a great admirer of Grover Clevel<strong>and</strong>, as I still.<br />

I regard his tariff-reform <strong>and</strong> free-ships ideas as of vital importance to the development of our<br />

South American trade. It was estimated by <strong>The</strong> Dry Goods Chronicle that the foreign commerce of the<br />

South American republics amounted to $1,000,000,000 annually, of which the United States had<br />

only 14 percent. Laws providing for free trade on a comprehensive scale <strong>and</strong> lower rates of duty in<br />

general, <strong>and</strong>, at the same time, for American registry of foreign-built ships, would have been<br />

immediately followed by a practical mastery of South American trade.<br />

“Señor Silva perfectly well understood my views on these points, <strong>and</strong>, as a patriotic <strong>Venezuela</strong>n,<br />

he felt very grateful to Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> for the st<strong>and</strong> taken by the Administration early in 1888 against<br />

<strong>British</strong> territorial aggression. In the course of my correspondence with him during the Presidential<br />

campaign of 1888, I wrote to him respecting the general topic of the community of interests of the<br />

South American republics, <strong>and</strong> their common dependence upon the United States as their natural<br />

friend <strong>and</strong> protector. I wish you to underst<strong>and</strong> that his reply, so highly complimenting Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>, was perfectly spontaneous—not at all the consequence of any prearranged underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

for campaign purposes. Señor Silva, who is now in Havana looking out for the interests of the estate<br />

of his son (who recent1y was the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Consul General in that city, <strong>and</strong> was killed in the<br />

memorable explosion there about two years ago) is a very bright <strong>and</strong> high-minded man, <strong>and</strong> his<br />

letter to me was an entirely voluntary <strong>and</strong> disinterested tribute to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>.<br />

“Feeling very strongly about the unjust Republican accusations against Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, based on<br />

the Sackville matter, I took Señor Silva’s letter to C. S. Brice, Chairman of the Democratic National<br />

Committee. This was with Señor Silva’s full consent. Mr. Brice recognized its importance, <strong>and</strong> felt<br />

that its publication would not only put an end to the Sackvllle business, but throw new light upon<br />

the merits of the President’s tariff-reform programme. But he told me that, as it was a confidential<br />

communication from a diplomatic representative of a foreign Government, he was unwilling to take<br />

the responsibility for making it public without the President’s consent.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>reupon, at Mr. Brice’s suggestion, I went to Washington to have an interview with the<br />

President, <strong>and</strong>, if possible, persuade him to agree to the publication of the letter. A telegram,<br />

announcing my corning, was sent from the National Democratic headquarters to the White House. I<br />

found Private Secretary Lamont waiting for me at the foot of the White House stairs, <strong>and</strong> I was<br />

ushered immediately into Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s presence. He read the document over attentively, reflected<br />

just a moment, <strong>and</strong> said:<br />

“‘Mr. Gibbons, I agree with you that it would have a good political effect to print this at the<br />

present time. I know full well that my re-election is involved in much doubt, <strong>and</strong> that if the public<br />

could read the letter I hold in my h<strong>and</strong> our party would be helped materially. But since I am<br />

consulted, I tell you frankly that I cannot be a party to the matter; <strong>and</strong>, more than that, I forbid any<br />

use of the document, which I think I have a perfect right to do, as President. It is a letter from a<br />

member of the Diplomatic Corps, who is required by all considerations to have nothing to do in the<br />

home political concerns of this country; <strong>and</strong> while Señor Silva carefully avoids allusions to our party<br />

politics, the proposed publication for campaign ends would be tantamount to a breach of proprieties<br />

<strong>and</strong> I would have to take cognizance of it officially as such. In that event I should be obliged to<br />

immediately give Mr. Silva notice to go home’.<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

“In consequence of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s conscientious <strong>and</strong> dignified attitude,” said Mr.<br />

Gibbons,” the Silva letter could not be used for the campaign of 1888. Its appearance in <strong>The</strong> New-<br />

York Times now, in view of the recent developments of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, is very opportune,<br />

<strong>and</strong> will help to show the people that the momentous issue which their noble President now makes<br />

with Engl<strong>and</strong> is no new one suddenly brought forward by him for effect or from any motives which<br />

small politicians <strong>and</strong> critics insultingly ascribe to him. On the contrary, the vigorous utterances in the<br />

Olney letter, <strong>and</strong> again in the President’s annual message, <strong>and</strong> finally in the special message of last<br />

Tuesday, are but the logical sequences, coming in the fullness of time, of the courageous <strong>and</strong><br />

unqualified <strong>Venezuela</strong>n policy that was inaugurated nearly eight years ago—inaugurated deliberately,<br />

but without any blast of trumpets.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> public will give President Clevel<strong>and</strong> all the more credit, both as a man <strong>and</strong> as the dignified<br />

head of the Nation, because he refused to consent to the publication of the Silva letter in the 1888<br />

campaign. That refusal was no slight illustration of one of the most admirable characteristics of the<br />

man <strong>and</strong> the President as he is known to those who know him best <strong>and</strong> honor him most. A bitter<br />

clamor had been raised against him by his enemies upon the representation that Engl<strong>and</strong> desired his<br />

re-election. That was done to prejudice Irish voters <strong>and</strong> also to distract attention from the results of<br />

the tariff-reform discussion. He had it in his power to thoroughly discomfit his accusers, <strong>and</strong>,<br />

besides, to introduce a new issue into the campaign—the issue of trade expansion with South<br />

American countries, whose commerce aggregated fully $800,000,000; to say nothing of the issue of<br />

the Monroe doctrine. But in his mind, to take advantage or that opportunity would have involved a<br />

compromise of dignity of the Presidential office. He recognized no other consideration, <strong>and</strong> he<br />

preferred to sacrifice the temporary advantage.”<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 137 -<br />

UPHELD BY THE CONGRESS<br />

<strong>The</strong> President Given Full Power in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Matter<br />

NO DESIRE FOR PARTISAN ADVANTAGE<br />

Amendments to the Hitt Bill Withheld for Patriotic Reasons<br />

—<strong>The</strong> Appropriation Unanimously Voted<br />

AMERICA’S POSITION WELL FORTIFIED<br />

Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Attitude Heartily Approved in Every Quarter<br />

—<strong>The</strong> Country United in Its Sentiment<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 20.—<strong>The</strong> Senate acted patriotically <strong>and</strong> wisely to-day. With absolute<br />

unanimity, when it came to a vote, <strong>The</strong> Hitt bill providing for the appointment of a <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Boundary Commission was passed just as it came from the House.<br />

<strong>The</strong> purpose in so passing the bill was precisely the one indicated in these dispatches last night as<br />

the one that should control, that any amendment which might be construed into an expression of<br />

doubt about the wisdom or the patriotism of the President, or as indicating a division of sentiment<br />

in the Congress or the country about the justice <strong>and</strong> soundness of the position he had taken in his<br />

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message, would weaken the impression which it was important to convey of National agreement<br />

with the President.<br />

If the question had been one in which our relations with another country were not involved this<br />

would not have happened. That there was some question about the wisdom of leaving the whole<br />

matter in the President’s discretion was apparent in the decision of the Foreign Relations Committee<br />

to amend the bill so as to provide that the three Commissioners to be named should be confirmed<br />

by the Senate. If the Senate had insisted upon that, its object would have been to assure our own<br />

people that the Senate agreed with the President <strong>and</strong> wished to sustain him by approving of the men<br />

he might select to report on the boundary question.<br />

But, lest this limitation of the powers of the President should be misunderstood <strong>and</strong> unfavorably<br />

commented upon in Engl<strong>and</strong>, as showing that the President <strong>and</strong> the Senate were pulling apart on<br />

the assertion of the Monroe doctrine, the bill was allowed to go through just as it was introduced<br />

<strong>and</strong> passed by the House.<br />

Some House Members Disappointed<br />

This prompt disposition of the bill will cause deep disappointment among a very few members<br />

of the House. From New Engl<strong>and</strong> have come protests against the sudden action of the House in<br />

passing the bill upon its introduction, <strong>and</strong> Capt. Boutelle, in a little way, has been justified for his<br />

inclination to stop the bill without objecting to it.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re was an opinion in the House, amounting almost to a conviction, that the Senate would<br />

not take the bill just as it received it, but that it would amend it in several particulars, naming the<br />

limit of time in which the commission must report, giving two or three members of the commission<br />

to the Senate <strong>and</strong> to the House <strong>and</strong> an equal number to the President, <strong>and</strong> thus constituting the<br />

commission with a majority of Republican members, who would see that no party advantage should<br />

be obtained for the Democrats.<br />

All the waiting partisans who contemplated a deliberative session over the amended bill have<br />

missed their opportunity. <strong>The</strong> bill now only needs to be printed, as approved by the by the Speaker<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Vice President, <strong>and</strong> sent to the President for his approval.<br />

A Strong Position<br />

As the study of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question is pursued here the strength of the position of the<br />

President <strong>and</strong> Secretary Olney is found to be greater than was supposed by those who have had only<br />

imperfect information about our acquaintance, officially, with the subject.<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States is simply adhering to a continuous policy in resisting <strong>British</strong> aggression in<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> subject was brought to the attention of the Government in 1886 by Señor Colcano,<br />

then <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister of Foreign Affairs, <strong>and</strong> was fully discussed by Secretary Bayard in<br />

communications to Minister Phelps. Mr. Bayard, in spite of the dislike felt for him by the extreme<br />

jingo element, was only a shade less emphatic in his expressions of 1887 <strong>and</strong> 1888 than Mr. Olney<br />

has been this year.<br />

Mr. Bayard declared in a letter to Mr. Phelps dated Feb. 17, 1888, after reviewing the situation,<br />

that “if, indeed, it should appear that there is no fixed limit to the <strong>British</strong> boundary claim, our good<br />

disposition to aid in a settlement might not only be defeated, but be obliged to give place to a feeling<br />

of great concern.”<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

English Claims Refuted<br />

<strong>The</strong> claim now put forward by hasty English magazine writers that Great Britain has never<br />

admitted that se was making encroachments or that her claims were not well founded receives a<br />

curious commentary from the undisputed statement of facts submitted by Minister Colcano in 1886.<br />

He then said:<br />

As early as 1841, the nation was alarmed by the arrival of an English Commissioner, who advanced as far as the<br />

mouths of the Orinoco, invading localities, setting outposts, <strong>and</strong> raising crowns <strong>and</strong> flats at Barima. It is but fair to<br />

admit that, in consequence of the complaints then made, Her Britannic Majesty ordered the removal of these marks.<br />

She also entered into negotiations at the instance of our representative for the conclusion of a treaty for the<br />

settlement of the boundary question. <strong>The</strong> discussion was commenced <strong>and</strong> proposals were made, but matters did not<br />

advance in consequence of certain unacceptable conditions which were added, <strong>and</strong> subsequently, in consequence of<br />

the death of our plenipotentiary.<br />

<strong>The</strong> maps submitted at this time <strong>and</strong> subsequently, show the wide variance between the territory<br />

originally claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the line now admitted to limit her possessions by Great Britain.<br />

<strong>The</strong> original contention, according to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claims, was over a mass of territory around the<br />

upper courses of the Esequibo.<br />

<strong>The</strong>n appeared in 1841 the <strong>British</strong> Commissioner who drew the Schomburgk line—a line drawn<br />

without the consent of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> including the territory around the upper courses of the<br />

Esequibo within its <strong>British</strong> possessions.<br />

Gold Territory Involved<br />

<strong>The</strong> line was also so drawn as to take in an important piece of territory west of the Esequibo,<br />

which includes important gold mines. This line includes within <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> the territory which<br />

the <strong>British</strong> Government now refuses to submit to arbitration. It includes great stretches of territory,<br />

extending over from one to two degrees of west longitude <strong>and</strong> many degrees of latitude which<br />

previously prepared official <strong>British</strong> papers had never claimed to be within the <strong>British</strong> possessions.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Governor of Demerara, in a dispatch on Sept. 1, 1836, said that the River Pomaron, just<br />

west of the mouths of the Esequibo, <strong>and</strong> an entire degree of longitude east of the Schomburgk line,<br />

might be taken as the limit of the English colony. An Englishman who had killed an Indian was<br />

arraigned in Demerara in September, 1840, <strong>and</strong>, the defendant having proved that the act was<br />

committed on the River Moroco, the tribunal of the colony declared itself without jurisdiction,<br />

because the crime was consummated in foreign territory. This river was away without the<br />

Schgmburgk line.<br />

Lord Aberdeen offered a boundary beginning at this River Moroco <strong>and</strong> leaving within the limits<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, much of the territory which Sir Robert Schomburgk had coolly endeavored to bring<br />

within <strong>British</strong> jurisdiction by drawing arbitrary lines on a map. <strong>The</strong> offer was rejected, because it was<br />

put in the terms of a cession by Great Britain, did not include the territory claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>,<br />

<strong>and</strong> was coupled with the conditions that the Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong> should not alienate any part<br />

of the territory to a foreign power.<br />

Thus matters lay, with only brief discussion in 1876 <strong>and</strong> 1877, until 1881, when Señor Rojas,<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister at London, offered to make a settlement upon the basis of the Moroco. He was<br />

answered, after a long delay, that the <strong>British</strong> Government could not accept the mouth of the<br />

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Moroco as the limit on the coast. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government now talked of the mouths of the<br />

Orinoco, several hundred miles west of the Moroco, as the line up to which they had a right to make<br />

claims, apparently basing these claims upon the fact that <strong>British</strong> subjects had settled within the<br />

territory. During all these years, while a settlement was delayed, <strong>British</strong> subjects <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> missions<br />

were making their way further an further to the west, establishing every year a stronger <strong>British</strong> claim,<br />

if such a claim can be based upon the occupation of foreign territory by <strong>British</strong> subjects. <strong>The</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government has repeatedly challenged Great Britain to a comparison of evidence as to<br />

the historic rights to the territory in dispute, but has been answered by a constant advance of the<br />

<strong>British</strong> claims, <strong>and</strong> without that specific evidence which the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns have expressed themselves<br />

ready, on their side, to submit.<br />

<strong>The</strong> mouths of the Barima, voluntarily relinquished in 1841, now constitute a part of the<br />

territory claimed by Great Britain <strong>and</strong> invaded by persons claiming allegiance to her <strong>and</strong> disputing<br />

the sovereignty of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

No Sudden Inspiration<br />

<strong>The</strong> position taken by Secretary Olney is no sudden inspiration of jingoism, but has become a<br />

part of the settled foreign of the United States under successive Administrations. If the two<br />

Administrations of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> made the matter more prominent than did those of Mr.<br />

Arthur <strong>and</strong> Mr. Harrison, it is because other subjects of discussion with Great Britain, especially the<br />

Bering Sea matter, under President Harrison, have absorbed their time. But there was no disavowal<br />

under the Republican Administration of the position which Secretary Bayard assumed as the<br />

successor of Secretary Fish <strong>and</strong> Secretary Frelinghuysen. Secretary Olney has felt from the beginning<br />

that it was a matter dem<strong>and</strong>ing the most serious consideration of the United States, <strong>and</strong> that it could<br />

no longer play into the h<strong>and</strong>s of Great Britain by permitting the gradual occupation of the territory<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong> as the basis of new <strong>British</strong> claims.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Schomburgk Line<br />

<strong>The</strong> Schomburgk line, when it was adopted, according to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n view, was an assertion<br />

of the extreme limit of <strong>British</strong> claims at that time. It was then assumed as a starting point for fresh<br />

aggressions, which have again been made the basis of new claims.<br />

Those who attribute to President Clevel<strong>and</strong> a different policy from that which he pursued in the<br />

Corinto affair <strong>and</strong> a sudden disposition to court cheap applause by catering to the jingo element do<br />

not do justice, his friends declare, to the sober spirit in which he views the boundary controversy.<br />

He has said to those who have called upon him that he did not wish to court the applause of the<br />

noisy element which is eager for foreign war, <strong>and</strong> that he had been reluctant to take a position which<br />

seemed to invite an armed conflict.<br />

He feels, however, that the United States cannot look with indifference upon the gradual<br />

destruction of <strong>Venezuela</strong> by the eating away of her territorial limits <strong>and</strong> their transfer to a foreign<br />

power. He believes he is right in this position, both as the Chief Executive of the United States,<br />

bound by its historic policy to arrest the extension of European power on this continent, <strong>and</strong> as an<br />

American, interested in preventing injustice to a comparatively weak American power. He is little<br />

likely to be swerved from his position, or to accept European interpretations of the Monroe<br />

doctrine, <strong>and</strong> its application to American affairs.<br />

219


21 – 23 December 1895<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 138 -<br />

THE SENATE DOES ITS DUTY<br />

Passes the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Commission Bill by Unanimous Vote<br />

TRUSTS ALL TO THE PRESIDENT<br />

A Debate That Was Marked by Great Patriotism—An Earnest <strong>and</strong> Deliberate Discussion<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 20.—<strong>The</strong> spirit of patriotism was too deep in the Senate to-day to admit<br />

of quick action on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission bill. It seethed <strong>and</strong> bubbled, <strong>and</strong> fairly ran aver at<br />

times. Three hours were consumed in the consideration of the measure. <strong>The</strong> time was well spent.<br />

It has been the assertion by the <strong>British</strong> press since the President’s message was sent to Congress<br />

that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> was actuated by political motives only, <strong>and</strong> that the American public would not<br />

sustain him in his course toward Great Britain. By this time it is known in Engl<strong>and</strong> that the<br />

Congress, which speaks for the American people, has given the President the assurance of its hearty<br />

support. It ought to be doubly significant to the <strong>British</strong> Government that the Senate, which prides<br />

itself on its decorum <strong>and</strong> deliberate methods, has displayed infinitely more earnestness <strong>and</strong><br />

enthusiasm in its consideration of the House measure than did the House itself.<br />

All the authority he asked for has been given to the President. <strong>The</strong> bill when it left the Senate<br />

late this afternoon was exactly in the form in which it passed the House two days ago.<br />

Scenes That Will Not Be Forgotten<br />

<strong>The</strong> scenes in the Senate Chamber to-day will not soon be forgotten. If war with Great Britain<br />

already had been declared the speakers could not have been more determined in their declarations<br />

that the Monroe doctrine should be upheld at all hazards.<br />

In anticipation of an exciting time hundreds of persons occupied the galleries before 12 o’clock.<br />

By the time the bill was reported every seat was taken, <strong>and</strong> the corridors outside contained an<br />

anxious throng waiting for an opportunity to witness the proceedings. <strong>The</strong>re were not more than a<br />

dozen vacant seats on the floor of the Senate when the excitement began, <strong>and</strong> these were occupied<br />

speedily by members of the House who were interested in the fate of the Commission bill. Less<br />

fortunate Representatives had to st<strong>and</strong>. At one time in the course of the debate the space behind the<br />

rear row of seats was crowded with members <strong>and</strong> others having the privileges of the floor.<br />

Great Interest Manifested<br />

<strong>The</strong> report was circulated some time before the session opened that the Senate would not<br />

modify the House bill. It had become known that Mr. Lodge, who yesterday offered an amendment<br />

limiting the time in which the committee might report to April 1, had decided to withdraw it. Mr.<br />

Lodge said in explanation of his action that he had become convinced over-night that the position<br />

of this Government would be strengthened if the Senate should indorse the House bill in its<br />

entirety.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> news of his change of base intensified interest in the prospective report of the Committee<br />

on Foreign Relations. That committee, true to the promise made yesterday by Mr. Morgan, its<br />

Chairman, met early this morning <strong>and</strong> agreed upon a substitute bill, the principal change being that<br />

the commission should be limited to three members, to be appointed “by <strong>and</strong> with the advice <strong>and</strong><br />

consent of the Senate.” That these proposed amendments would not be permitted to st<strong>and</strong> in the<br />

way of the sentiment of a majority of the Senate was made known by Mr. Morgan when the<br />

Commission bill came up for consideration. He acknowledged there was a difference of opinion in<br />

the committee regarding the propriety of amending the House bill in any way. Personally, he would<br />

prefer to see the bill passed in its original form.<br />

All this was exceedingly gratifying to the advocates of prompt <strong>and</strong> decisive action in support of<br />

the President’s position.<br />

A Wave of Discontent<br />

A wave of discontent rolled over the Chamber when Mr. Allen, the Nebraska Populist, tried to<br />

divert the Senate from the main issue by entering upon a rambling discourse, in which the present<br />

condition of the Treasury was declared to be so perilous that nothing short of the free <strong>and</strong> unlimited<br />

coinage of silver would avert disaster. He took up in succession the bills recently introduced<br />

providing for increasing the naval <strong>and</strong> military arms of the public service, <strong>and</strong> asserted that nothing<br />

could be done unless the populistic theory of supplying the Treasury with funds should be adopted.<br />

His effort to be funny was painful <strong>and</strong> shallow, <strong>and</strong> everybody was glad when he took his seat.<br />

<strong>The</strong> flow of oratory which followed was interesting, because, as it proceeded, the conviction<br />

became stronger that the Senate was disposed to take affirmative action before adjournment.<br />

A Few Discordant Notes<br />

<strong>The</strong>re were a few discordant notes. John Sherman was conservative. He counseled further delay.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Senate would not accept his advice to “hang up” the bill until after the holidays.<br />

Mr. Platt struck the keynote of the matter when he declared that further delay or any<br />

amendments made by the Senate would be regarded in Engl<strong>and</strong> as hesitancy on the part of the body<br />

to sustain the President. Mr. Platt recognized the necessity of disabusing the mind of Great Britain<br />

of the idea that the President’s message to Congress was written purely for political effect.<br />

In succession Mr. Lodge, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Teller declared in favor of prompt<br />

action <strong>and</strong> no amendments. Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler’s speech was the brightest of the day. <strong>The</strong>re was keen<br />

appreciation of his statement that the threat of <strong>British</strong> financiers to unload their American securities<br />

was a gigantic “bluff.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Amendment Tabled<br />

Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler’s motion that the committee amendment be laid upon the table was indorsed by<br />

Mr. Morgan as a reflection of his own views, <strong>and</strong> the Senate subscribed to the proposition with<br />

alacrity. On the final vote the bill went through without a dissenting voice.<br />

Interest was added to the debate by the speech of Mr. Mills, who assumed that the country was<br />

on the verge of war <strong>and</strong> declared that the Constitutional m<strong>and</strong>ate against taxation of real estate<br />

should be done away with in order that the Treasury might immediately be filled. Not the least<br />

221


21 – 23 December 1895<br />

interesting feature of the debate was the appearance of the white-haired Mr. Stewart making a<br />

speech in which “the crime of 1873” was not once referred to.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 139 -<br />

THE THING THAT MAKES FOR PEACE<br />

It would be very foolish to draw conclusions as the outcome of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute from the<br />

events of the few days following the message of the President in the excitement of the moment<br />

things are said on both sides that will conveniently be forgotten. <strong>The</strong> men who frankly confess or<br />

loudly profess that they are spoiling for a fight, <strong>and</strong> that a lively war with Great Britain would delight<br />

the American people, who are at heart lovers of justice <strong>and</strong> of peace, <strong>and</strong>, who, though they will<br />

accept without flinching the duty that is presented to, will do so soberly <strong>and</strong> with a profound<br />

conception of the horrors of war. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the men who are representing Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

as a jingo <strong>and</strong> his policy as a party “coup,” who are railing at the Secretary of State, <strong>and</strong> exhausting<br />

the vocabulary of abuse to discredit the honesty <strong>and</strong> fidelity of the responsible officers of the<br />

Government, are in their turn wholly unrepresentative of the American people. We are often<br />

inclined, in purely domestic matters, to think poorly enough of our rulers. It is a habit bred of our<br />

bitter partisan contests, but as a people we do not respect those who follow that habit when the eyes<br />

of the world are on our rulers.<br />

But while the manifestations of the moment are some of them misleading <strong>and</strong> confusing, the<br />

essential features of the situation are, we think, clear <strong>and</strong> will be recognized. <strong>The</strong> most important of<br />

these is not the fact—though it clearly is the fact—that the great body of the American people back<br />

their Government, right or wrong, but that in this case the position of the Government is one that<br />

the world must ultimately acknowledge is unselfish <strong>and</strong> just. Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> seeks for his country not<br />

the slightest advantage at the expense of any other. He is not trying to extend our territorial limits.<br />

He does not claim to encroach upon the rights of any other nation. He does not pretend to decide<br />

what are the rights of either Great Britain or <strong>Venezuela</strong>. He simply asserts the duty of the United<br />

States to see that no essential wrong is done to any independent nation on this continent <strong>and</strong> invites<br />

Great Britain to consent to the only possible adequate method of determining what the rights of the<br />

two parties to the controversy are. And the American people, the longer they study his attitude, the<br />

more completely they underst<strong>and</strong> it, are bound to be more <strong>and</strong> more firm in their support of their<br />

Government.<br />

That, we believe, is the surest augury of peace. It is the best <strong>and</strong> only way to impress upon the<br />

Government <strong>and</strong> upon the people of Great Britain the real nature of the issue between the two<br />

Governments. Even so strong-willed <strong>and</strong> so self-confident a statesman as Lord Salisbury cannot<br />

face that issue with a light heart <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> people, with all their absorption in trade <strong>and</strong> their<br />

stubborn energy in pursuit of their interests, have a substratum of love of equity. When they are<br />

convinced that the choice is between submitting their claim to South American territory to<br />

arbitration, or else arriving at a peaceful settlement with <strong>Venezuela</strong> on the one h<strong>and</strong>, or, on the<br />

other, an aggressive war on <strong>Venezuela</strong> supported by the United States, we have no doubt what<br />

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choice they will insist upon. In the strictest <strong>and</strong> simplest sense, the way to secure peace is to make<br />

ready for war, <strong>and</strong> the chief element of readiness is the strong, calm, unflagging support of the<br />

sentiment of the people.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 140 -<br />

SOUTH AMERICA WILL APPROVE<br />

Charles R. Flint Is Absolutely Certain of This Fact<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 20.—Charles R. Flint of New-York, who is in this city, expresses great<br />

confidence in the unanimous approval by the South American republics of the President’s message<br />

on <strong>Venezuela</strong>. “<strong>The</strong> reassertion, in so explicit <strong>and</strong> vigorous a manner, of the Monroe doctrine,<br />

cannot fail,” he says, “to increase with these countries respect for the United States, <strong>and</strong> deeper<br />

sympathy with our institutions <strong>and</strong> interests.”<br />

Mr. Flint’s business acquaintance with the South American republics, which is also a very large<br />

personal acquaintance, justifies him in making the prediction, with the greatest confidence, that<br />

when the South American republics speak, they will have but one opinion, <strong>and</strong> that will be favorable<br />

to the utterances of the President.<br />

When they have had opportunity to speak officially, he has not the slightest doubt that they will<br />

approve our position, first, because we have asserted it, <strong>and</strong> next, for the reason that the assurance it<br />

gives to <strong>Venezuela</strong> of fraternal interest will appeal to all republics that might be subjected to<br />

aggressions like that suffered by <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

- 141 -<br />

“WE SHALL NOT YIELD AN INCH”<br />

Mr. V<strong>and</strong>erbilt Says the President Was Ready to Face Any Situation<br />

BRUSSELS, Dec. 20.—<strong>The</strong> Soir publishes an interview with Mr. V<strong>and</strong>erbilt*, who, according to<br />

that paper, said:<br />

“We shall not yield an inch. We shall begin by closing our ports against Engl<strong>and</strong>. I have private<br />

telegrams announcing the convocation of a congress of delegates from all the American republics.<br />

This congress will effect the late Mr. Blaine’s project for a customs union.”<br />

Referring to Engl<strong>and</strong>’s navy, Mr. V<strong>and</strong>erbilt exposed the palm of his h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> said:<br />

“In a month from the declaration of war the entire ocean will be as clean as this of <strong>British</strong><br />

ships.”<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, he added, would never have thrown the gauntlet down unless he had been<br />

prepared for every eventuality.<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

“H<strong>and</strong>s off” he concluded “is America’s cry to Great Britain.”<br />

[21 December 1895]<br />

*<strong>The</strong> American multi-millionaire, Cornelius V<strong>and</strong>erbilt<br />

- 142 -<br />

HAS NO FAITH IN UNITED STATES<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns Will Never Rely on the Americans<br />

TORONTO, Ontario. Dec. 21.—Mr. B. Lawrence, the only accredited representative of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> in Canada, is a resident of this city. In an interview with <strong>The</strong> United Press respecting the<br />

boundary difficulty, Mr. Lawrence said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re is only one way in which the real frontier can possibly be found, <strong>and</strong> that is by searching<br />

the archives of Madrid <strong>and</strong> <strong>The</strong> Hague. <strong>The</strong>re is nothing in <strong>Venezuela</strong> that will throw any light upon<br />

the subject. <strong>The</strong>y have nothing down there but a few antiquated maps, which may be interesting<br />

enough as relics, but which, as helps in ascertaining boundary lines, would be almost valueless. If<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> really wants to get the facts of the case, a friendly request to the Government at<br />

Madrid for permission to search the archives would do more toward getting at the information<br />

required than anything else he can possibly do.”<br />

“What do you think will be the outcome of the present entanglement?”<br />

“One thing is very certain—the interference of the United States Government will not result in<br />

any good to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns will never rely on the Americans. <strong>The</strong>y look upon them us<br />

a people who would maintain the bluff until they (the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns) got into the lurch, <strong>and</strong> would<br />

then desert them <strong>and</strong> leave them more defenseless than ever. <strong>The</strong> people themselves have no quarrel<br />

with Engl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong>y like the English people, <strong>and</strong> the word of an Englishman is the most solemn<br />

asseveration you will hear even among the natives. <strong>The</strong>y have no very exalted idea of the hospitality<br />

of the people of the United States, <strong>and</strong> have not much confidence in their promises.”<br />

Mr. Lawrence says <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soldiers are brave <strong>and</strong> wiry, <strong>and</strong> will fight like wildcats. <strong>The</strong>ir<br />

whole boundary line is defenseless. <strong>The</strong> disputed territory covers 25,000 square miles, <strong>and</strong> is rich in<br />

gold <strong>and</strong> mines.<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

- 143 -<br />

GERMANY AGAINST THE PRESIDENT<br />

His Message Denounced by an Organ of the Government<br />

BERLIN, Dec. 21.—When President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message to the United States<br />

Congress burst upon Europe, the semi-official press of Berlin <strong>and</strong> the other German centres<br />

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generally touched upon the subject with extreme caution. <strong>The</strong> Cologne Gazette certainly did bristle up<br />

a little against Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, but the Berlin newspapers, which were awaiting instructions from the<br />

Ministers as to their treatment of the document, refrained from committing themselves to an<br />

expression of opinion absolutely adverse to the United States Government.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Ministerial inspiration seems to have been finally given, <strong>and</strong> in pursuance of instructions the<br />

North German Gazette makes a vicious attack upon the message. <strong>The</strong> article which the Gazette<br />

devotes to the message declares that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> has arrogated for the United States the supreme<br />

judgeship of all questions affecting the other States in the western hemisphere. “No European<br />

Government,” the article says, “disputes the high position or the form of Government of the United<br />

States, but this new phase of spread-eagleism requires the attention of the European nations. <strong>The</strong><br />

new <strong>and</strong> strained interpretation of international law necessary to support the so-called Monroe<br />

doctrine dem<strong>and</strong>s the serious consideration of other Governments besides Engl<strong>and</strong>.”<br />

Since this article appeared, the report has been circulated in the Ministerial circle that the Kaiser<br />

had told Prince Hohenlohe that he was determined to throw the influence of Germany upon the<br />

side of Engl<strong>and</strong>. No authentic information in regard to the Emperor’s opinion can be obtained, of<br />

course, but the tone of the North German Gazette’s article, combined with the official resentment of<br />

the threatened commercial retaliations, clearly indicates the probable attitude of the German<br />

Government.<br />

<strong>The</strong> American colony here receive the adverse German opinion with equanimity, <strong>and</strong> are<br />

confident that it will not in any way affect the issues between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States, as<br />

Germany cannot risk any form of active intervention, not do the utterances of the semi-official press<br />

represent the unanimous German sentiment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Freisinnige newspapers take an impartial line, regretting chiefly the possibility of a conflict<br />

between sister peoples having free institutions <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ing in the forefront of the civilized world.<br />

Some of the Bismarckian organs, notably the Hamburger Nachrichten, while condemning the message<br />

or Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> as an arbitrary assertion of supremacy on the part of the United States, express<br />

satisfaction at seeing a strong power administer a severe check to the world-wide arrogance of<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Lokal Anzeiger publishes a report of an interview with Sir Frank Lascelles, <strong>British</strong><br />

Ambassador to Germany, in which that diplomat says that he does not expect any grave<br />

complications as a sequel to the message in regard to <strong>Venezuela</strong> sent to the American Congress by<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Lord Salisbury, he said, had the confidence of the <strong>British</strong> Parliament <strong>and</strong> the friendly powers,<br />

<strong>and</strong> a speedy return of good relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States ought to be<br />

looked forward to.<br />

Mr. Hahn Echenagucia, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Consul here, said to a United Press reporter to-day that<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> would offer resistance to Engl<strong>and</strong> to the bitter end. A pacific settlement of the dispute<br />

between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, he said, was out of the question, <strong>and</strong> the appointment of an<br />

American Boundary Commission would increase the breach.<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

225


21 – 23 December 1895<br />

- 144 -<br />

ITALY OFFERS HER SERVICES<br />

Willing to Act as Arbitrator Between This Country <strong>and</strong> Great Britain<br />

PARIS, Dec. 21.—<strong>The</strong> Temps publishes a dispatch from Rome saying that Italy has offered to act<br />

as arbitrator of the difficulty between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States. Great Britain, the dispatch<br />

adds, has not replied to the offer.<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

LONDON, Dec. 21.—<strong>The</strong> Globe says:<br />

- 145 -<br />

“FINANCIAL KINGS” DON’T WANT WAR<br />

“<strong>The</strong> financial kings of the Old World are firmly resolved that such a horror as war between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />

United States shall not occur, <strong>and</strong> they will not hesitate to employ any means to prevent it. Our great banks are<br />

insisting upon the immediate repayment of advances made to American houses, at the same time intimating that<br />

they will suspend financial accommodation so long as the menace of an American commission to locate the<br />

boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> hangs in the air.”<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

- 146 -<br />

ENGLAND IS NOT EXCITED<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Affairs Receive But Little Public Attention<br />

NO CABINET MEETING TILL JANUARY<br />

<strong>The</strong> Queen Much Interested in the Subject—President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Second<br />

Message Favorably Received<br />

LONDON, Dec. 21.—No one in the thick of events here <strong>and</strong> in a position to judge of public<br />

feeling can honestly affirm that the country is in the state of excitement over the difficulties which<br />

have arisen in connection with the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute that some of the newspapers<br />

represent. Official <strong>and</strong> diplomatic circles have never shared in the extreme alarmist views that have<br />

found expression in the press.<br />

It is expected that no Cabinet meeting will be held until the views of the American Government,<br />

embodied in a dispatch that Mr. Olney, the American Secretary of State, is understood to be about<br />

to send in reply to Lord Salisbury’s note, have reached the Foreign Office. Upon making inquiries as<br />

to when this reply was likely to be received, the representative of <strong>The</strong> United Press learned that it was<br />

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expected to reach here early in January. It depends upon the nature <strong>and</strong> tone of Mr. Olney’s<br />

communication whether the situation will become really critical.<br />

<strong>The</strong> ignorance of the English masses in regard to the real issue between the Governments must<br />

ere long operate to restrain Lord Salisbury from following an active policy of sheer defiance of<br />

America. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine breaks upon the bulk of the populace like the enigma of the Sphinx.<br />

<strong>The</strong> locality of the dispute is to them a geographical mystery. Even <strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette, which is<br />

an organ of the educated classes, thinks it necessary to inform its readers that neither <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

nor Demerara is an isl<strong>and</strong>, as is generally supposed in Engl<strong>and</strong>. Before the Government dares to<br />

commit the country, the people will want to know what the trouble is about.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Queen is showing the keenest anxiety in the matter. Lord Salisbury was closeted yesterday at<br />

the Foreign Office, not seeing even the diplomats. In the evening he sent a long dispatch to her<br />

Majesty at Osborne House, on the Isle of Wight, where she is at present sojourning. <strong>The</strong> Queen’s<br />

remembrance of the fact that the last official act of the Prince Consort was the preparing of a<br />

memor<strong>and</strong>um counseling a peaceful settlement of the Trent affair will incline her to interfere to<br />

prevent a rupture between the two countries.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette says that President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s second special message to the Congress of<br />

the United States greatly improves the situation. “<strong>The</strong> President’s enemies,” <strong>The</strong> Gazette says,<br />

“though stalwart for the application of the Monroe doctrine, will not scruple to attack his currency<br />

policy. We hope that our Government will seize this occasion to make it clear that we do not intend<br />

to challenge the Monroe doctrine or to raise that issue.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette says: “Even if <strong>Venezuela</strong> were ten thous<strong>and</strong> times right it would be<br />

impossible for Great Britain to recognize her rights or even make the slightest concessions to her<br />

until President Clevel<strong>and</strong> withdraws from his menacing attitude. <strong>The</strong> sole service which his message<br />

has done to the Monroe doctrine is to call forth a chorus of disavowal <strong>and</strong> ridicule from the whole<br />

of Europe.”<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

- 147 -<br />

THE AMERICAN PLAN CONDEMNED<br />

A Paris Journal’s Opinion of the President’s Message<br />

PARIS, Dec. 21.—<strong>The</strong> Journal des Débats, discussing the <strong>British</strong>-American situation, says:<br />

Perhaps Great Britain might have accepted the proposal to submit the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question to arbitration, but<br />

what it most significant is the fact that in the face of the refusal of Great Britain to entertain the suggestion of<br />

arbitration, the United States declared themselves arbitrators <strong>and</strong> decided to send a commission of inquiry in regard<br />

to the disputed boundary line, whose conclusion should be binding upon all concerned.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Débats describes Secretary Olney’s dispatch to Lord Salisbury as a mixture of practical spirit<br />

<strong>and</strong> prejudice which must produce the very worst effect in London. <strong>The</strong> paper commends the reply<br />

of Lord Salisbury to Secretary Olney’s note, which, it says, does not contest the principle of the<br />

Monroe doctrine, but declares that that idea does not apply to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter.<br />

227


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[22 December 1895]<br />

- 148 -<br />

SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> Commission Bill Has Become a Law<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21.—<strong>The</strong> President this afternoon approved the bill authorizing the<br />

appointment of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission <strong>and</strong> appropriating $100,000 for the expenses of the<br />

commission while it shall be engaged in inquiring into the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary matter.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Executive approval was given to the measure as soon as the official copy reached the<br />

President.<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

- 149 -<br />

PROF. McVANE ON THE MESSAGE<br />

He Says that This Government Is Doing a Very Rash Thing<br />

BOSTON, Dec. 21—Prof. McVane of the government <strong>and</strong> law department of Harvard<br />

University gave out his opinions on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n trouble this morning in his course, government<br />

<strong>and</strong> law. He said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Government of the United States is doing a very rash thing in taking its present action. <strong>The</strong> people of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> are as much entitled to the United States’ consideration as are the people of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong><br />

inhabitants of <strong>Guiana</strong> are at all American born, which is not at all true of the people of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. As to the<br />

settlement of the question of boundary in 1791, there was none. All that Great Britain claimed was that all the<br />

unsettled territory the ownership of which was undecided should belong to her is it was settled by her people. <strong>The</strong><br />

question is not a fit one for arbitration. Engl<strong>and</strong>’s position is a tenable one. She has adopted the policy which the<br />

United States adopted during the first part of its life, <strong>and</strong> her policy is exactly that which the United Stares would<br />

have adopted if she had been in Great Britain’s place under like circumstances.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> United States had better consider what she is doing. In case of war, the conflict would be a hospital one.<br />

<strong>The</strong> climate or <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> is such that the hospital service would become the most important part of the army.<br />

As to the threats to shoot at the Canadians on account of trouble between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, that would be<br />

infamous.”<br />

An article in <strong>The</strong> Harvard Crimson this morning, signed by Profs. A. B. Hart, J. B. Ames, W. E.<br />

Hutton, Fletcher Dobbins, <strong>and</strong> others, says that war between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States would<br />

be a calamity especially felt at the university, <strong>and</strong> urges the student to write to the Senators of their<br />

respective States urging them to use every Influence in their power to prevent a declaration of<br />

hostilities.<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

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- 150 -<br />

THE TALK ABOUT WAR<br />

Editorial - <strong>The</strong> New-York Times<br />

Those who are making haste to sell American stocks <strong>and</strong> bonds from fear that there will be a<br />

war between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain would do well to examine carefully the grounds of<br />

that fear. As we have sustained the Government of the United States in the action it has taken, <strong>and</strong><br />

as the great body of the people have done the same, we are, perhaps, in a better situation to aid in<br />

such an examination than are the few who have declared that the course of the Government has<br />

made war inevitable, <strong>and</strong> have denounced it accordingly.<br />

What, then, are the conditions which must necessarily precede any hostilities? In the first place,<br />

there must fail to be “any adjustment of the boundary which <strong>Venezuela</strong> may deem for her<br />

advantage, <strong>and</strong> may enter into of her own free will.” This, our Government has expressly declared,<br />

“cannot, of course, be objected to by the United States.”<br />

On this point Lord Salisbury declares that “Her Majesty’s Government are sincerely desirous of<br />

being on friendly relations width <strong>Venezuela</strong>” <strong>and</strong> “have not ab<strong>and</strong>oned the hope that an<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing may be reached. This declaration is made in the conclusion of Lord Salisbury’s reply<br />

to Mr. Olney, <strong>and</strong> is accompanied by the assurance that “Her Majesty’s Government have no design<br />

to seize territory that properly belongs to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, or forcibly to extend sovereignty over any<br />

portion of her population.”<br />

It is not at all impossible, or even improbable, that <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain may reach a<br />

settlement that will relieve the United States of all responsibility <strong>and</strong> deprive it of any interest in the<br />

controversy.<br />

In the second place, the commission to be appointed by the President may find that the<br />

respective rights of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> are such as do not call for the intervention of the<br />

United States. Our Government has not been, <strong>and</strong> is not now, definitely informed on that point.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission is to be created to secure that information. Judgment on the merits of the case is<br />

frankly <strong>and</strong> c<strong>and</strong>idly suspended until such information is obtained. When it shall have been<br />

obtained, but not before, a decision will be made. Our Government has been scrupulously careful to<br />

avoid any prejudgment. Its desire was not to be forced to any judgment whatever, but to leave the<br />

matter wholly to impartial arbitrators. It remains, <strong>and</strong> must remain, anxious that any judgment it<br />

shall reach, with the confessedly imperfect means now open to it, shall be as impartial as it can<br />

possibly be made. It is entirely premature to infer that the decision will be unfavorable to the claims<br />

of Great Britain.<br />

In the third place, if we assume that <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain shall not agree, <strong>and</strong> that the<br />

commission shall find that Great Britain is in the wrong, it does not follow that war must ensue. We<br />

shall then have, in the language of the President, a case “of willful aggression,” which it will “be the<br />

duty of the United States to resist, by every means in its power.” But even this does not necessarily<br />

involve war. It presents to the Governments of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States a difference,<br />

which, if not adjusted, must lead to war, but the very certainty of that possible termination makes<br />

adjustment the more desirable <strong>and</strong> imperative, <strong>and</strong> the calm opinion of both peoples will be directed<br />

to securing it.<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

We have defined the conditions that must precede war. It is possible that they may all be<br />

fulfilled. It is extremely improbable. And before they can be determined a long time will elapse,<br />

which can more profitably be employed than in panicky discussions.<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

- 151 -<br />

LONDON AND VENEZUELA<br />

Downing Street, Britons Think, Needed Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Rousing Protest<br />

By Commercial Cable from Our Own Correspondent<br />

LONDON, Dec. 21.—It would need a big took adequately to depict the state of mind of<br />

London <strong>and</strong> of Engl<strong>and</strong> at large since Wednesday morning. It would begin by the description of a<br />

moral earthquake, followed immediately by the blackest <strong>and</strong> densest sort of mental fog. <strong>The</strong> shock<br />

of the former is still rocking these isl<strong>and</strong>s, but the latter, by slow degrees, is clearing off. Englishmen<br />

still find their perturbed nerves quivering automatically, but their minds are coming under better<br />

control <strong>and</strong> they are already revising or trying to forget some of the hasty things which they said in<br />

the first stages of their confusion. To give merely one illustration, I hear men who Thursday were all<br />

for shelling New-York within a fortnight saying to-night that, after all, Engl<strong>and</strong> has undeniably got<br />

into bad habits in dealing with smaller peoples, <strong>and</strong> perhaps some such vigorous rousing protest as<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s was needed to waken Downing Street to the consciousness of the fact. From<br />

this attitude it will be a short step to a general popular request for a statement of how Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

without undue loss of dignity, can meet America’s wishes on this <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter, which nobody<br />

here cares a button about. This, I believe unreservedly, will be Englishmen’s real feeling a week<br />

hence, although hot words on both sides may obscure its expression or even silence it altogether.<br />

Unfortunately, all Engl<strong>and</strong> started Wednesday morning with a profound misapprehension of<br />

what was really involved, <strong>and</strong>, for once, special correspondents in New-York helped to strengthen<br />

this delusion. Englishmen have formed the rather contemptuous habit of supposing that everything<br />

in America displeasing to them originates in the desire of our politicians to p<strong>and</strong>er to the Irish vote,<br />

<strong>and</strong> they would have naturally jumped to this explanation of the President’s message had the<br />

President been anybody but Clevel<strong>and</strong>. In the present case their respect for his character would have<br />

made them hesitate; but, unhappily, they were told from all sides in New-York that this must not be<br />

taken into account <strong>and</strong> that the whole episode was strictly referable to the exigencies of American<br />

politics. Upon this point there is a quaint thing to record. Somehow the City men got the idea that<br />

the Presidential election came next March, <strong>and</strong> the theory based on this that the whole flurry would<br />

be over within three months was so general Wednesday that the markets were scarcely affected that<br />

day. <strong>The</strong> change on Thursday came when the word was passed round that the elections were not to<br />

occur till November.<br />

As Englishmen in general have had to unlearn things <strong>and</strong> to comprehend that their easy-going,<br />

half-informed notion about American politicians twisting the lion’s tall did not fit this particular case<br />

at all, it has dawned on them here that the matter is one in which the American people are so<br />

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profoundly in earnest that everybody, if necessary, will shoulder a musket to defend it. <strong>The</strong>y have<br />

come to consider the issue respectfully <strong>and</strong> ask to be shown an honorable way out of the<br />

complication. <strong>The</strong>re is no element of cowardice in this attitude, bear in mind. <strong>The</strong>y would fight any<br />

European nation without any searchings of conscience at all, whether they were right or wrong, but<br />

they do recognize that if the whole American people st<strong>and</strong> out on a matter of principle Englishmen<br />

must act on an equally high level.<br />

Curiously enough, the news from the Continent that the foreign press is pretty generally<br />

denouncing the Monroe doctrine has an actual tendency to dispose Englishmen to think that it must<br />

be a better doctrine than they had supposed. This seeming paradox is very illustrative of the Briton’s<br />

general state of mind. <strong>The</strong> very idea that Frenchmen or Germans applaud <strong>and</strong> egg him on in a<br />

quarrel with Americans suggests to him that he is an ass to be engaged in any such quarrel.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se Continental press opinions may not express in the least the attitude of the Continental<br />

Foreign Offices. Perhaps in Paris journalism is closest in contact with diplomacy, or, rather, exerts<br />

the largest influence on it, but there, as elsewhere, they do not mind saying contradictory things for<br />

the sake or fun <strong>and</strong> to disclose sportive enjoyment at an Anglo-American squabble rather than for a<br />

serious policy. It is said here that the Marquis of Salisbury has secured general European assent to<br />

the repudiation of the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong>, as theoretical expressions of opinion, there is nothing<br />

improbable in this, but in practice it is of little value. If the Continental powers saw a profit to<br />

themselves in any emergency of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s, they would not be restrained for a moment by any such<br />

consideration, <strong>and</strong>, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, the knowledge that Salisbury had committed Engl<strong>and</strong> to a<br />

European league against the charter of immunity to the New World from the militarism of the Old,<br />

which Canning helped Adams <strong>and</strong> Monroe to formulate, would raise an overwhelming popular<br />

demonstration of wrath all over Engl<strong>and</strong>. Nothing can be gathered from the Russian papers as to<br />

Russia’s intentions, but the French politicians assume with certainty that she will act in entire accord<br />

with France.<br />

I spent yesterday in the City among the bankers <strong>and</strong> brokers, who were getting bulletins minute<br />

by minute of the slaughter in American prices. I verified the fact that the mischief began by cabled<br />

selling orders from the New-York bears, but the heaviest share of the decline is ascribed to the<br />

throwing over of long stock. Ordinarily calm investors piled in their securities amid the general<br />

fright until no buyers could be round for anything. <strong>The</strong> talk among these men was not of a physical<br />

war, which everybody scouted as impossible, but of a financial war, which nothing now, in one way<br />

or the other, would check for weeks to come. Everybody repeated the rumor for a fact that people<br />

were betting that gold would be at a premium in New-York before the new year, but no one knew<br />

of a particular instance in which the wager was made here or there. Long-sighted men held the<br />

opinion that the ultimate result would be to put American finance on a better footing <strong>and</strong> so benefit<br />

everybody, but the popular view was that America would be drained of gold at once, forced into the<br />

h<strong>and</strong>s of the silver crowd, <strong>and</strong> would lapse into a financial disorder which, even at best, it would<br />

take years to recover from. On all sides there was a general indignation at Moreton Frewen’s<br />

suggestion in <strong>The</strong> Times that America would begin hostilities, if the worst came to the worst, by<br />

confiscating five billions of <strong>British</strong> capital invested in America. . .<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

- 152 -<br />

WHAT ENGLAND MIGHT LOSE BY WAR<br />

Ex-Gov. Campbell Says Only Scotl<strong>and</strong> Would Be Left to Her<br />

Ex-Gov. James E. Campbell of Ohio was in the city yesterday. He was enthusiastic over<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message.<br />

“I have talked with some men since I came to New-York who say they do not like the message,<br />

but let them get off Manhattan Isl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> hear how the people are talking. <strong>The</strong> men I talked with at<br />

home were all in favor of it, <strong>and</strong> I believe that 90 percent of the people of this city are in favor of it,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that only those who think more or the dollar than they do of patriotism are not in favor of it. I<br />

am heartily in favor of everything President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has said in this matter!”<br />

Ex-Gov. Campbell was of the opinion, if Engl<strong>and</strong> should go to war with the United States, an<br />

event which he sincerely hoped would be averted with honor, that after the war was over the <strong>British</strong><br />

possessions would consist of Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Scotl<strong>and</strong>. He left Irel<strong>and</strong> out.<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

- 153 -<br />

VIEWS OF ENGLISH CLUBMEN<br />

Salisbury’s St<strong>and</strong> Meets the Approval of Most of His Countrymen<br />

LONDON, Dec. 21.—In seeking to gauge the currents of public opinion, the representative of<br />

<strong>The</strong> United Press tried to ascertain what ideas prevailed at the leading clubs. <strong>The</strong> clubhouses are now<br />

comparatively empty, it being the recess time of Parliament <strong>and</strong> the eve of the Christmas holidays,<br />

but quite a number of town members were found. Getting in touch with several members of the<br />

Carlton, the great Conservative club, it was not surprising to find them concurring in the hope that<br />

Lord Salisbury would maintain his policy of no compromise, whatever might be the risk of war. <strong>The</strong><br />

Tory l<strong>and</strong> owners, inheriting the traditions of the party <strong>and</strong> personally interested in enhanced values<br />

for home-grown grain, are naturally the war party. <strong>The</strong>ir dislike of the democratic institutions of the<br />

United States adds to the equanimity with which they regard a breach between the <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

American peoples.<br />

At the Constitution club, a less exclusive organization than the Carlton, the opinions expressed<br />

were much the same.<br />

It was from the Reform Club, where Whigism still lingers with some strength, that <strong>The</strong> Speaker,<br />

whose comment was cabled yesterday to <strong>The</strong> United Press, got its inspiration. Sir I. W. Reid, the editor<br />

of that paper, is the centre of a clique belonging to this club which meets almost daily. <strong>The</strong> clique<br />

includes among its number some members of old Liberal Ministries, who still think themselves able<br />

to judge <strong>and</strong> guide public tendencies <strong>and</strong> who are still aiming to keep the party strings in their own<br />

h<strong>and</strong>s. Within this circle President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message is resented as a diverting blow. <strong>The</strong> Liberals<br />

hoped to deal with Lord Salisbury’s policy in Turkey, while the message is certain to unite the nation<br />

in support of the Government in a moderate policy of resistance to the American claims. Chagrin<br />

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over their lost game has helped to make the Reform Club members Jingoish. <strong>The</strong>ir respect for the<br />

Earl of Kimberley, Secretary of Stale for Foreign Affairs in Lord Rosebery’s Cabinet, guides their<br />

approval of Lord Salisbury’s adherence to the Earl of Kimberleys line of action.<br />

At the National Liberal Club the dominant tone was one of regret that the quarrel would tend to<br />

alienate the peoples of the two countries, <strong>and</strong> lessen the influence of the United States here, <strong>and</strong> so<br />

lessen democratic progress in Great Britain. <strong>The</strong> National Liberal Club has more than 6,000<br />

members, <strong>and</strong> among them radicalism, merging with republicanism, prevails. <strong>The</strong> closest affiliation<br />

with the American people <strong>and</strong> with American ideas is their sincerest aspiration. <strong>The</strong>re is no wonder,<br />

therefore, that intense disappointment has been caused by the message, which has occasioned an<br />

outburst of national antipathies that were supposed to have been long ago assuaged.<br />

<strong>The</strong> editorials published by <strong>The</strong> Chronicle which have been cabled day by day to <strong>The</strong> United Press,<br />

fairly represent the opinion prevailing at the National Liberal Club that a war between the two<br />

nations is impossible. <strong>The</strong> Radicals, despite the statement contained in <strong>The</strong> Speaker, credit Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> with being conscientious <strong>and</strong> honest, <strong>and</strong> believe that he is not influenced by party<br />

motives. <strong>The</strong>y, however, consider his message as showing aberration of judgment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> representative of <strong>The</strong> United Press has essayed to ascertain the feeling in the workingmen’s<br />

political clubs, on which feeling the politicians here rely when organizing popular demonstrations.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se clubs, though numbering their members by the tens if thous<strong>and</strong>s, remain concealed from<br />

public view until there are periods of agitation, when party wire-pullers, finding it advisable to<br />

foment excitement, supply funds to call out the masses. Funds alone, however, would not evoke<br />

processions in Hyde Park, nor enthusiastic crowds in the great halls. <strong>The</strong> workingmen’s clubs can<br />

only be manipulated on the lines of their own tendencies.<br />

Selecting four of the most notable of these clubs, the inquiries of <strong>The</strong> United Press representative<br />

revealed the fact that there was an entire absence of excitement, <strong>and</strong> only a mild interest in the<br />

situation. While keenly alive to home politics, the average intelligence of the workingmen who are<br />

members of these clubs does not extend to Great Britain’s foreign relations. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine,<br />

especially, is a hieroglyph to them, but they are sympathizers with America, <strong>and</strong> their belief in the<br />

justice of the American Government is profound.<br />

To sum up the result of the conversations had with several of the best-informed members of the<br />

clubs, it may be said that the opinion is that the men must learn more about the causes of the quarrel<br />

before there will be the smallest chance of their responding to party appeals for a demonstration for<br />

or against the Government.<br />

<strong>The</strong> recognition of the primary necessity for the spread of information on the subject has led the<br />

London weekly papers, which have a purely popular circulation, to set themselves in their issues of<br />

to-day to enlighten their readers. One of these papers, having a weekly issue of 700,000 copies,<br />

preludes its article with the admission that many Englishmen will learn for the first time through<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message that Great Britain has a boundary dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, which it<br />

then proceeds to explain. <strong>The</strong> article concludes with an attack on Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s action as<br />

calculated to bring the principle of arbitration into contempt.<br />

Another of these papers, which has an enormous circle of readers in the operative <strong>and</strong><br />

manufacturing centres, likewise expounds the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> then upholds President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> as being in the right in insisting upon arbitration. It, however, denounces the “arrogant<br />

pretensions of the United States that in no part of America shall any one set foot except with the<br />

permission of the curious gang of corrupt politicians in Washington.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> paper adds: “Grant Irel<strong>and</strong> home rule, <strong>and</strong> we shall hear little of the Monroe doctrine.”<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

Another Radical workingmen’s paper holds that it is impossible for the public to support a war<br />

on the question of the boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> or of teaching Uncle Sam better manners. It<br />

recalls how Lord Palmerston played the “Civis Romanus Sum” doctrine to get well with the crowd.<br />

Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, it says, is using the Monroe doctrine in a similar manner as the last dodge of the<br />

beaten party.<br />

<strong>The</strong> most notable feature of the articles in these <strong>and</strong> other papers of the same class—<br />

Conservative, Liberal, <strong>and</strong> Radical alike—is the consensus of opinion that Great Britain cannot<br />

submit to the humiliation of accepting President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s dem<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

[22 December 1895]<br />

- 154 -<br />

AID THE SMALL REPUBLICS<br />

Duty of the United States in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

BRITAIN’S ACTION A MENACE TO US<br />

No Place for Monarchical Aggression on the Western Hemisphere—<br />

A Suggestion to the English<br />

To the Editor of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times:<br />

It would be a pity if the Chamber of Commerce should be able to see nothing more in President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message than an injury to trade, a disturbance of the finances, or a senseless quarrel with<br />

a friendly nation <strong>and</strong> people of the same race <strong>and</strong> language. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine had relation to<br />

two different systems of government as wide as the poles assunder in their effect on the security,<br />

happiness, <strong>and</strong> progress a mankind—the Republican or Democratic, system on the one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />

the monarchical, or aristocratical, on the other. No greater boon (unless it be the advent of our<br />

Saviour) was ever conferred upon the human race than the successful establishment <strong>and</strong> working of<br />

the American Republic, for its service is not confined to the inhabitants <strong>and</strong> their descendants<br />

within its boundaries, but its example <strong>and</strong> power make thrones <strong>and</strong> tyrants tremble in the uttermost<br />

parts of the earth, <strong>and</strong> give hope <strong>and</strong> encouragement to the enslaved <strong>and</strong> downcast the wide world<br />

over..<br />

<strong>The</strong> men who established this Government took no thought of their own merely selfish interests<br />

in entering upon <strong>and</strong> carrying through the struggle. If they had had regard only for these, the<br />

English monarchical system were good enough for purposes of mere personal ease <strong>and</strong> profit. So,<br />

with those who in Mexico <strong>and</strong> Central <strong>and</strong> South America have thrown off the yoke of Spain <strong>and</strong><br />

Portugal <strong>and</strong> established republics in imitation at our own. In this work of removing the shackles<br />

from the minds <strong>and</strong> limbs of men, they are our brothers—our cause (the cause of mankind)—is a<br />

common one, <strong>and</strong> any menace or wrong to them is as well a menace <strong>and</strong> wrong to us. That in<br />

establishing these institutions of self-government, freedom, security, <strong>and</strong> progress on a solid<br />

foundation they have met with greater obstacles than we; that the proportion of the ignorant <strong>and</strong><br />

grovelling of those seeking only their own ease <strong>and</strong> profit, <strong>and</strong> who have no care for their posterity<br />

or the advancement of civilization in the world, has been greater than with us, <strong>and</strong>, consequently,<br />

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their progress, slower <strong>and</strong> sometimes halting, is no cause for surrender by them or by us of the<br />

principles for which we <strong>and</strong> they have nobly <strong>and</strong> cheerfully suffered <strong>and</strong> died, but rather a greater<br />

reason why we, the stronger, should succor them, the weaker, in any time of trial <strong>and</strong> trouble—on<br />

any occasion when the monarchical system shall be attempted to be extended or reimposed upon<br />

them accompanied with injustice <strong>and</strong> wrong, by a European Government whose greed <strong>and</strong><br />

oppression of weaker peoples for its commercial <strong>and</strong> national gain, we, ourselves, have had an<br />

experience of, <strong>and</strong> which has in more recent years made itself hated <strong>and</strong> feared by every weak <strong>and</strong><br />

struggling people In the world.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s message <strong>and</strong> the action of Congress thereon is, as it were, the service of notice<br />

on all European monarchical powers that their systems of government, so far as they exist on this<br />

continent, are barely tolerated, <strong>and</strong> that the peoples who have thrown off their yoke do not intend<br />

that a false, worn-out <strong>and</strong> wicked theory <strong>and</strong> system of government shall in this age of progress have<br />

any, the very least, toleration <strong>and</strong> encouragement from them, <strong>and</strong> that foreign Governments desiring<br />

to possess American soil can have no subjects here but free citizens only. With this condition an<br />

English, French, Spanish, or German European republic may have as many colonies, <strong>and</strong> rule as<br />

many people in the Western Hemisphere as they choose, with, of course, the consent of the people<br />

they govern, <strong>and</strong> the United States would have only congratulations to offer.<br />

As for Engl<strong>and</strong>, let her make of Scotl<strong>and</strong> two States, of Irel<strong>and</strong> two States, of Wales one State,<br />

of Engl<strong>and</strong> two States, <strong>and</strong> locate the capital of this Republic, formed on the lines of the United<br />

States Constitution, in a portion of the interior of Engl<strong>and</strong> set apart for this purpose in analogy to<br />

our District of Columbia, <strong>and</strong> then with a President, (perhaps the Prince of Wales) elected once in<br />

four or six years, it could keep forever its colonies on this side of the water <strong>and</strong> in perpetual<br />

friendship with the United States. <strong>The</strong> whole world, by these two great Republics, could, in a<br />

reasonable time, by their example, influence, <strong>and</strong> aid, be so completely transformed, compared with<br />

what it is to-day, as to be a heaven upon earth.<br />

SIGMA.<br />

New-York, Dec. 21, 1895.<br />

[23 December 1895]<br />

- 155 -<br />

CESSATION OF WAR TALK<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Question to be Settled Without Resort to Arms<br />

COMMISSIONERS NOT YET CHOSEN<br />

President Will Not Act Hastily, but Is Determined to Carry Out His Policy<br />

MORE TROUBLE MAY COME OVER ALASKA<br />

Firm Action Now Will Have a Good Effect on Great Britain in<br />

Any Future Controversy<br />

WASHINGTON. Dec. 22.—Sunday has brought to the people in Washington who a day or two<br />

ago were talking excitedly <strong>and</strong> prematurely of war an opportunity for rest <strong>and</strong> a lack of material<br />

upon which to feed their appetites. Assuming that matters growing out of the message of the<br />

235


21 – 23 December 1895<br />

President an the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question were to be hurried to immediate conclusions, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

Executive approval of the Commission bill meant the prompt selection of the Commissioners <strong>and</strong><br />

speedy consideration of the boundary dispute, there has been some curiosity concerning the choice<br />

of men to be made by the President.<br />

Lists of prominent persons have been published as having been preferred by the President. It is<br />

learned that there is no basis for announcing these names, except perhaps, the prominence of the<br />

men in public or political life. A man well qualified to speak of the matter said this afternoon that<br />

the President had not yet decided upon the Commissioners. He did not even have a list of those<br />

men from whom he would eventually select the Commissioners. It was not his intention to<br />

announce the commission to-morrow, <strong>and</strong> it might be several days before it will be announced.<br />

While the matter would be disposed of with promptness, it would not be hurried. <strong>The</strong> determination<br />

of the people <strong>and</strong> the Congress to resist aggressions by foreign nations upon the territory of<br />

American republics having been made known by the quick <strong>and</strong> unanimous action of the Congress,<br />

the Administration had been assured or public approval of its course, <strong>and</strong> that course would be<br />

pursued with due regard for justice <strong>and</strong> right.<br />

Republicans Not So Eager<br />

<strong>The</strong> Republicans, now that they have committed themselves to the Presidents support, <strong>and</strong> have<br />

since been confronted with the necessity of doing something to check the tide of speculation against<br />

American securities that has arisen abroad, are qualifying the patriotism that inspired them on<br />

Wednesday. <strong>The</strong>n they were all on fire for war. <strong>The</strong>y could not say too much in approval of the<br />

entire message. Something of regret was discovered when it was predicted that the Senate would so<br />

provide for the selection on the boundary commission that it would be kept within the control of<br />

the dominant party in the House. <strong>The</strong> Senate was not so willing as had been expected to humor the<br />

Republican notion.<br />

Since the passage or the House bill in the Senate without a change flaws have been found in the<br />

President’s communication. New-Engl<strong>and</strong>, oddly enough, suggests that it was too jingoish. Mr.<br />

Dingley, who is a discerning man, but who did not earlier discover that there was anything in the<br />

message that he disliked, now finds that there was.<br />

“It would have been disagreeable <strong>and</strong> would have created a bad impression,” he says, “to have<br />

objected to it at first. Our friends abroad might have obtained the impression that we were divided<br />

as a Nation on the Monroe doctrine if criticism had led to opposition to granting the request of the<br />

President for a commission of inquiry. Our patriotism would have been challenged. But the last two<br />

paragraphs of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message, talking of war, were bound to make trouble; they were not<br />

necessary; they have caused all the panicky feelings, <strong>and</strong> they have not added to the strength of our<br />

argument.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Last Paragraphs Important<br />

Without the last paragraphs—the lines which at once aroused the patriotism of the country—the<br />

ultimate possible outcome at the controversy, in case Great Britain has determined to force it to a<br />

breach, would have been left to inference, <strong>and</strong> the men who are now beginning to remonstrate<br />

against too vigorous language from the President would have been prompt to accuse him of<br />

hesitation or with averting his face from a contingency that all would have been compelled to admit<br />

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might arise. <strong>The</strong> result would undoubtedly have been a partisan dem<strong>and</strong> that the President should<br />

speak out more plainly <strong>and</strong> say precisely what everybody felt.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no expectation on the part of the Administration that the voice of the Americans who<br />

support Lord Salisbury rather than the President in this emergency will be so loud or impressive in<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> as to lead to the belief that it will justify the assumption that the English side will be taken<br />

by this Government, or that the American doctrine of self-preservation will be ab<strong>and</strong>oned. Lord<br />

Salisbury, in his answer to Secretary Olney, has indicated the Ministerial belief that Engl<strong>and</strong> might<br />

pursue a course which would not be obnoxious to that doctrine.<br />

Without regard to the war talk that has been an incident of the week, there is no doubt among<br />

the supporters of the President who accept his message as good in whole, as well as those who arc<br />

now beginning to peep their criticisms, that the effect produced upon the people by his strongest<br />

utterances, certainly will not lead the English Ministers to consider our traditional policy as less<br />

lightly held than they did when it was not expected that a reassertion of it with spirit would convulse<br />

the Nation.<br />

Good Reasons for Strong Words<br />

Those friends or the President who are more anxious to find justification for him than for Lord<br />

Salisbury, are confident that there will be abundant reason shown for the strongest words of his<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n message. <strong>The</strong>y believe that, with a less vigorous answer to Lord Salisbury, the <strong>British</strong><br />

aggressions in <strong>Venezuela</strong>—extended against <strong>Venezuela</strong>n protest <strong>and</strong> our suggestions for<br />

arbitration—would have been insisted upon, <strong>and</strong> advanced in consequence of our complaisance <strong>and</strong><br />

the opportunity for encroachment offered by diplomatic delicacy <strong>and</strong> delay, <strong>and</strong> that eventually we<br />

should have been compelled to assert the determination expressed by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> when the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns would have been deprived, by “occupation,” of more acres, which they may yet be able<br />

to hold because the <strong>British</strong> flag has not been unfurled over them.<br />

Several references have been made to the question of our Alaskan boundary, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong><br />

occupation of l<strong>and</strong>s supposed to be within the lines ceded to us when the Territory was purchased<br />

from Russia. <strong>The</strong> Government of the United States has been disposed to regard too lightly, it is now<br />

felt, the offers of Canadian authorities to perform police duty in the absence from our Alaskan<br />

property of American police prepared to protect the settlers who have gone into the Territory to<br />

seek gold. <strong>The</strong>re are few Americans there. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> flag is there supported by armed Britons.<br />

<strong>The</strong> assumption has been, evidently, that when we care to ask the <strong>British</strong> to move out they will<br />

go, thankful for our kindness in having permitted them to work our gold mines so long. But if we<br />

acknowledge that occupation of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory by the <strong>British</strong> without the consent of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> creates a title to the l<strong>and</strong>, we shall have no case against Great Britain when we conclude<br />

that we want the Alaska territory the citizens of the Empire are now occupying.<br />

<strong>The</strong> dispute about the correct boundary line may not be in shape yet, but that is a mere matter of<br />

detail, about which the <strong>British</strong> will not concern themselves until they come to consider it. <strong>The</strong>n the<br />

delays of diplomacy will be invoked to enable the <strong>British</strong> still further to strengthen their claim, <strong>and</strong><br />

the task or ousting the invaders will be indefinitely postponed. At all events the degree of respect to<br />

be looked for from Great Britain in treating upon that question will be to a greater on less extent<br />

affected by the manner in which we deal with the <strong>Venezuela</strong> question.<br />

[23 December 1895]<br />

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- 156 -<br />

A WARNING TO ENGLAND<br />

One of Her Sons Discusses the Monroe Doctrine in a Distinctly<br />

Reasonable Sort of Way<br />

Godwin Smith in <strong>The</strong> Saturday Review<br />

<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine seems to have been of late the theme of active discussion in the <strong>British</strong><br />

press, <strong>and</strong> to have been treated by different journals in different ways. Same journals seem to have<br />

treated it as an aggression, others as a fanfaronade, <strong>and</strong> others again as a hypothesis which they<br />

might safely concede in dealing with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. By this time Englishmen must all<br />

know pretty well what the Monroe doctrine really is. <strong>The</strong>y must be aware that there are, in fact, two<br />

doctrines comprised in the same message of President Monroe, cognate, yet distinct from each<br />

other, <strong>and</strong> directed as warnings to different powers.<br />

To Russia is directed the warning that the American continent is no longer to be regarded as a<br />

field for European colonization. To the Holy Alliance, which was inclined to meddle with the newborn<br />

republicanism of South America, is directed the warning that no European power can be<br />

allowed to interfere with the political self-development of American communities. In intimating that<br />

interference with the political freedom of the South American Republics will be regarded as an<br />

unfriendly act by the United States, Monroe manifestly claimed for his Republic a tutelary power.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, there is nothing in the massage that can be construed as a pretension to<br />

territorial aggr<strong>and</strong>izement on the part of the United States.<br />

Whether the Monroe doctrine thus stated is a part of international law seems not a very practical<br />

question. International law is a law without a legislature, without a policeman, <strong>and</strong> without a Judge.<br />

Its highest court of appeal is the cannon. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine will be law if America is strong<br />

enough to enforce it. Louis Napoleon did not regard it as law, but he nevertheless had to accept it<br />

<strong>and</strong> retire from Mexico. In this respect it seems to st<strong>and</strong> on much the same footing as the European<br />

protectorate of Turkey, the guaranteed independence of Belgium, <strong>and</strong> other underst<strong>and</strong>ings<br />

respected in diplomacy, which rest, not on universal law, but on the readiness of the parties<br />

interested to fight for their enforcement.<br />

It is, however, not with the Monroe doctrine as formulated in the famous message that<br />

Englishmen are now in contact, <strong>and</strong>, if Mr. Chamberlain pursues his dream of imperial<br />

confederation, may be one day brought into collision, so much as with the Monroe sentiment. <strong>The</strong><br />

Monroe sentiment imports that the New World shall be free from interference on the part of the<br />

Old World; that it shall be allowed to follow its own destinies, <strong>and</strong> to work out its own civilization;<br />

that it shall not be made the field or the highway of European war; but shall be left without<br />

molestation to dedicate itself to peaceful industry <strong>and</strong> the improvement of the human lot. <strong>The</strong>re is in<br />

this, at all events, nothing of vulgar ambition or rapacity.<br />

Of mere territorial aggr<strong>and</strong>izement I have never in thirty years of intercourse detected the<br />

slightest desire in the American breast. <strong>The</strong> Americans refused San Domingo, they refused St.<br />

Thomas, <strong>and</strong> they would very likely have refused Alaska, it they could have done it without<br />

offending Russia, who had been their friend in the civil war. <strong>The</strong> l<strong>and</strong> hunger, economical or<br />

political, fled with slavery. But the Monroe sentiment as to the independence of the continent has<br />

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always seemed to me to be strong, <strong>and</strong> strong I believe it would be found by any one who should<br />

venture to defy it.<br />

It showed its force in the fixed resolution to eject Louis Napoleon <strong>and</strong> his Latin Empire from<br />

Mexico, while the Americans have never betrayed any disposition to annex Mexico themselves, easy<br />

as the acquisition would probably be. Nothing seems to be more certain than that Canada, if she<br />

were independent <strong>and</strong> chose so to remain, might rest in perfect security by the side of her mighty<br />

neighbor. Opinion in the United States is even divided as to the expediency of admitting her to the<br />

Union. If she is the object of any hostile feeling on the part of the Americans, it is not as an<br />

independent territory, but as the outpost <strong>and</strong> the entering wedge of European interference with the<br />

American continent. In that aspect she is always being presented to the Americans by the strongly<br />

<strong>British</strong> party here.<br />

Your military roads <strong>and</strong> the military harbor which Englishmen are constructing at Esquimault<br />

threaten the territory of the United States, though they are not constructed with that object.<br />

Esquimault threatens the whole Pacific coast, which at present is defenseless. <strong>The</strong> bombardment of<br />

the seaboard cities of the United States by English ironclads is a familiar subject of speculation.<br />

Hence naturally arises a desire on the part of the Americans to create a war navy; <strong>and</strong> that navy is, of<br />

course, directed against the only power from which they have anything to fear. People in Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

do not realize all this, nor do they hear the language which Canadian loyalty holds, or see the<br />

demonstrations to which it indulges on their behalf.<br />

Whether in case of war a sea power could well avail itself of a l<strong>and</strong> route, <strong>and</strong>, in particular,<br />

whether the Canadian Pacific Railway, with the accidents to which a mountainous <strong>and</strong> sub-arctic line<br />

is exposed, could be trusted for the sure <strong>and</strong> rapid transmission of troops, are questions for the War<br />

Office to decide.<br />

What seems to me certain is that any attempt on the part of Great Britain to use the American<br />

Continent as a base or highway of war against a nation with which the United Sates were at peace<br />

would be apt to call the Monroe sentiment into active play. Englishmen have to consider, then, what<br />

would be the safety <strong>and</strong> value of a military road, exposed as the Canada Pacific Railway is, through a<br />

great part of its course, to the emissaries of any hostile power, against whose machinations it could<br />

be protected only by the most zealous vigilance on the part of the adjoining States.<br />

Some sidelights have recently been thrown upon these questions. <strong>The</strong> Canadian Commissioner<br />

says that the English is the only nation that treats its colonies commercially as foreign countries. Are<br />

not the English the only colonies which treat their mother country as a commercial enemy, laying<br />

protective duties on her goods? Englishmen have been given by a Canadian Minister to underst<strong>and</strong>,<br />

in effect, that the imperial veto on colonial legislation is a practical nullity, however injurious to<br />

imperial interests that legislation may be, <strong>and</strong> that Canada will legislate for herself in commercial<br />

matters, with little regard to <strong>British</strong> expostulations.<br />

Even on such a question as copyright it is found that imperial unity does not exist. <strong>The</strong> refusal of<br />

the colonies to contribute to imperial armaments appears to be definitive. According to the colonial<br />

theories which have been broached in connection with the copyright question, the <strong>British</strong><br />

Parliament is, in fact, only one of a number of local legislatures, all independent of each other,<br />

nothing being imperial except the nominal power of the Crown, the only prerogative of Great<br />

Britain being her sole responsibility for the general defense. If Mr. Chamberlain’s “dream” is, as he<br />

says, tending to become a reality, its approach is masked with great skill.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se opinions, I fear, are not popular; but I know that they are those of an Englishman loyal to<br />

the interests <strong>and</strong> honor of his country.<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

[23 December 1895]<br />

- 157 -<br />

SERMONS ON VENEZUELA<br />

Ministers Deprecate the Talk About Prospective War<br />

ENGLISH CLOSER THAN SPANISH<br />

It Would Be Civil War, Dr. Huntington Says—Dr. Parkhurst’s Position<br />

—A Horrible Crime, Dr. Eaton Declares<br />

WAR NOT A TEST OF PATIOTISM<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> Declared to be In Favor of Peace—Commended by<br />

Dr. Chadwick <strong>and</strong> Others<br />

<strong>The</strong> leading preachers of this city <strong>and</strong> Brooklyn, as a rule, alluded to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question<br />

yesterday. Several took the question as a theme for their sermons.<br />

While some dwelt upon the horrors that must result from a war between the United States <strong>and</strong><br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, none appeared to regard a resort to arms as among the probabilities.<br />

<strong>The</strong> duty of good citizens during the prevailing excitement was clearly pointed out <strong>and</strong> advice<br />

was volunteered by the clergymen, with a view to preventing disastrous financial results from the illconsidered<br />

war talk.<br />

IT WOULD BE A WAR OF BRETHEREN<br />

Dr. Huntington Says the English Are Closer to Us Than the Spanish<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. W. R. Huntington, rector of Grace Church, took for his text yesterday morning,<br />

Acts vii, 26: “Sirs, ye are brethren; why do ye wrong to one another?”<br />

“<strong>The</strong>se are the words,” he said, “of an acknowledged leader of men—no weakling, no<br />

sentimentalist, no timid peace-at-any-price-time-server, but a duly authenticated hero, monarch, if<br />

ever there was one—Moses, Adam’s son.<br />

And what is this that we hear Moses singing? It is nothing else than a solemn <strong>and</strong> pathetic<br />

protest against civil war. He has come down into Egypt fired with the zeal of a deliverer. His whole<br />

soul is bent upon the high task of breaking Pharaoh’s rod <strong>and</strong> leading his burdened countrymen out<br />

of their house of bondage.<br />

“To his dismay, to his disgust, he finds the people whom it has been his dream <strong>and</strong> prayer that<br />

he may help hopelessly at strife among themselves, ready for battle, not against the common foe, the<br />

task-master, but against each other.<br />

“He would have sanctioned, yes, patriot that he was, he would have led a war of Israel against<br />

Egypt—but war of Israel against Israel, war of brother against brother, that broke his heart. ‘<strong>The</strong>n<br />

fled Moses at this saying, <strong>and</strong> was a stranger in the l<strong>and</strong> of Madian.’<br />

“We, to-day, are threatened, vaguely indeed, but really threatened by the spectre of civil war, of<br />

all the calamities that can befall mankind the worst. If ever the Church of Christ had clearly laid<br />

upon her the duty of sounding out in her most persuasive tones, words of protest <strong>and</strong> remonstrance,<br />

it is to-day.<br />

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“<strong>The</strong>re is no time for half-hearted smoothnesses or non-committal common-place. Let the<br />

preacher speak his honest thought or hold his tongue. Let the world know where the Church st<strong>and</strong>s,<br />

in so far as the pulpit has the power to state the fact.<br />

“‘Sirs, Ye are brethren.’ I have called this menace that is in the air a menace of civil war. I have<br />

done so from the conviction that any war waged between the two great branches of the Englishspeaking<br />

race would deserve that name, <strong>and</strong> could be correctly characterized by none other.<br />

“Brethren we are by blood, by language, by tradition, <strong>and</strong> any quarrel into which we suffer<br />

ourselves to be either enticed or dragged as mutual antagonists is, <strong>and</strong> from the the necessity of<br />

things must be, family quarrel.<br />

“I am quite aware that language of this sort is apt to call forth earnest protest from those who<br />

like to think that we have a civilization wholly of our own making, a civilization which dates from<br />

Bunker Hill <strong>and</strong> Yorktown, <strong>and</strong> in which Europe has neither lot nor part.<br />

“But we cannot thus airily snip the threads of continuity. Say what we will, do what we may, the<br />

history of America is a continuation of the history of Europe, <strong>and</strong> the history of the United States is<br />

especially a continuation of the history of Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

“On Old World Battlefields New World issues were decided, <strong>and</strong> our National civilization is<br />

what it is, has the tone <strong>and</strong> color that it has, because in her eighteenth century wars against the great<br />

powers of the Continent, Engl<strong>and</strong> came out victorious.<br />

“In those conflicts our fathers of the Colonies played their honorable part, <strong>and</strong> when it came to<br />

be a question of the un-English overriding of their own liberties, they were able to show that they<br />

had not been taught the arts of war in vain.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> National life of which we are so justly proud owes its being to the expansion of ideas<br />

which, in the closer atmosphere of the Old World, could not exp<strong>and</strong> without explosion. Here there<br />

was more space, <strong>and</strong> what were only dreams in Europe found freedom to become facts in America.<br />

“Nevertheless, as concerns Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> ourselves, the family heirlooms are the same. Law,<br />

language, <strong>and</strong> religion—where men have these in common they are of kin, <strong>and</strong> can no more get rid<br />

of their relationship by quarreling than brothers can shake off brotherhood by blows.<br />

“What have the Latin races in common with ourselves that can compare for a moment with the<br />

treasure in which the United States <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> possess an undivided <strong>and</strong> indivisible inheritance?<br />

“Do you ask, How is it possible that monarchy <strong>and</strong> republic should be so close of kin? <strong>The</strong><br />

answer lies in that appeal to fact which always overrides appeal to theory.<br />

“Is it not true that Tennyson <strong>and</strong> Lowell in their patriotic lyrics strike precisely the same note,<br />

<strong>and</strong> expect the same response? Is it a note which any French or Spanish poet could strike if he tried,<br />

or to which Frenchmen or Spaniards would respond were they to hear it struck? This is not said in<br />

disparagement of the ideals of the Latin races. Those ideals have a dignity <strong>and</strong> a sacredness of their<br />

own.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>y may conceivably be better, even, than the ideals of the English-speaking peoples, but they<br />

are not the same. With the United Stairs <strong>and</strong> Great Britain the ideals are the same. Our political<br />

estimates, our ethical st<strong>and</strong>ards, our legal maxims correspond; the thoughts of Washington are as the<br />

thoughts of Alfred; the judgments of Marshall are as the judgments of Mansfield; Prescott <strong>and</strong><br />

Motley, Irving <strong>and</strong> Parkman, speak as do Hallam <strong>and</strong> Freeman, Gardiner <strong>and</strong> Froude; <strong>and</strong> although<br />

our national hymns have each a wording of its own, we sing them to the same air.<br />

“Yes, strife between the United States <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> must of necessity be fratricidal strife; war<br />

must be civil war. Is it worth while? Ought such a contest to be seriously thought of for a moment?<br />

Ought it to be even so much as named among us, or counted among possible contingencies?”<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

Dr. Huntington said it would be inappropriate to enter upon a discussion of the merits of the<br />

political question at issue. He said, however, that where a “doctrine” was involved, nothing was<br />

more important than that we should distinguish the shell <strong>and</strong> the substance of the doctrine. We<br />

should endeavor to determine what the framers or the doctrine meant.<br />

NO WAR, DR. PARKHURST SAYS<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States Should Rescue the Armenians<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst, in his sermon at the Madison Square Presbyterian Church<br />

yesterday, alluded to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> question, <strong>and</strong> denounced the idea of war between the United<br />

States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain.<br />

Dr. Parkhurst dealt with the nativity of Christ, which, he said, came with great abruptness on the<br />

world. <strong>The</strong> pages of history showed that great events came sometimes very suddenly, <strong>and</strong> that we<br />

are liable at any moment to be on the edge of a great surprise.<br />

“And it always seems as though there were a Providence,” he continued, “in the way in which<br />

the Christmas days synchronize this year with events that are just now filling our hearts with<br />

disturbance <strong>and</strong> throwing an uncomfortable shadow around the track of the near future.<br />

“We do not care to beat about the bush in this matter, but prefer to go straight to the mark by<br />

saying that, if Christendom wants to make the religion of Jesus, with its Bethlehem, its angelic choir,<br />

<strong>and</strong> its anthem of peace on earth, a laughing stock to the ungodly <strong>and</strong> a contempt to the heathen,<br />

the best thing it can do will be to set the two foremost Christian nations of the earth to work<br />

blowing up one another’s cities <strong>and</strong> blowing out one another’s brains.<br />

“Unless we utterly misconceive the sentiment of the Christianized masses, both here <strong>and</strong> on the<br />

other side of the water—I say unless we utterly misconceive that sentiment as it seems to be<br />

asserting itself in soberer second thought, such an issue will be morally impossible. But the Church<br />

must now move to the front.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re will be no conflict that will go beyond the point of messages <strong>and</strong> pronunciamentos on<br />

either side it the Church of the Bethlehem Christ comes <strong>and</strong> record its veto. Christianity, both here<br />

<strong>and</strong> in Engl<strong>and</strong>, is too thoroughly a part of the national life for armies <strong>and</strong> navies to clash in warfare<br />

at the same moment that the churches of the two countries are thundering for peace.<br />

“We are not here to discuss the international technicalities of the case. This is not the place to<br />

enter into a philosophical or historic exposition of the Monroe doctrine: only it is safe to say that<br />

this Nation is not going to be drawn into an international conflict of arms, to the dishonor of<br />

Christianity, the discouragement of civilization, the destruction of life <strong>and</strong> treasure, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

demoralization of our entire organic life, in behalf of a doctrine such as probably 90 percent of a<br />

congregations well-informed as this would not be able to state intelligibly, <strong>and</strong> the other 10 percent,<br />

who can state it, disagreeing among themselves as to whether the doctrine is applicable to the<br />

present situation.<br />

“We are not speaking in disparagement of loyalty to country or of patriotic regard for our<br />

country’s rights.<br />

“Patriotic passions are intense, <strong>and</strong> can easily be fired to the point where righteousness is<br />

ignored <strong>and</strong> reason <strong>and</strong> balanced consideration tabooed, <strong>and</strong> that Is the mischief of inflammatory<br />

sheets, that make a paying newspaper business of fanning the flames of international animosity. I<br />

wish, for two weeks, that it could be a State offense to print newspaper headlines with anything<br />

larger than small caps.<br />

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“If the nations would take up first the business that belongs to them, <strong>and</strong> if Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />

United States join h<strong>and</strong>s in the rather more Gospel enterprise of rescuing pillaged <strong>and</strong> outraged<br />

Armenia from the dirty, bloody grip of the Turk, these two brothered nations would then find<br />

themselves in good Christian condition of spirit, probably to settle that little question of civil<br />

engineering down in <strong>Venezuela</strong> in a way that would save both parties not only their pride <strong>and</strong> their<br />

heads, but their Christian repute.<br />

“It two Christian men were to commence punching one another’s heads <strong>and</strong> tearing one<br />

another’s eyes with no clearer idea of what it was all about than the American people would have in<br />

plunging into war over the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary, unless with a better underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the matter in<br />

dispute <strong>and</strong> with further efforts at adjustment, we should call it an ignominious row, a disgrace both<br />

to intellect <strong>and</strong> decency, let alone professions of Christianity.<br />

“We have not in this discussed the international merits of the question, but the point is where<br />

the question is between two Christian peoples—that fact will itself, if passion is ruled out, determine<br />

the quality of h<strong>and</strong>ling that will be given to the question, <strong>and</strong> will either show the point in<br />

disagreement to be so small as not to be worth fighting about or so two-sided as to admit of a<br />

settlement that will be reasonably satisfactory to both parties.<br />

“May, then, these Christian days <strong>and</strong> all their holy memories <strong>and</strong> suggestions be blessed to the<br />

President of the United States <strong>and</strong> those associated with him in authority, <strong>and</strong> to the Premier of<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> those associated with him in authority, <strong>and</strong> the solid sense <strong>and</strong> Christian<br />

consideration of the two peoples, respectively, that are back of them rise to dignity of the occasion,<br />

shape themselves to the world-wide situation <strong>and</strong> the eternal spirit of peace on earth <strong>and</strong> good will<br />

toward men, achieve its own sweet <strong>and</strong> bloodless victory to the promotion of national prosperity, to<br />

the strengthening of international bonds of amity, <strong>and</strong> to the honor <strong>and</strong> glory of Christ, who was<br />

born once in Bethlehem, that He might make the whole earth His own forever.”<br />

CONSIDERS WAR A HORRIBLE CRIME<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. Eaton Says It Should Be the Last Resort<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. Charles Eaton of the Church of the Divine Paternity preached yesterday on<br />

‘Christianity <strong>and</strong> War.” “Peace an earth <strong>and</strong> good-will to men,’ he said, would be the inspiration for<br />

his sermon.<br />

“As the birthday of the Prince of men approaches,” he said, “there is great activity among our<br />

statesmen, <strong>and</strong> the mutterings of war are heard throughout the l<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong>re is talk of increasing the<br />

size of our army <strong>and</strong> strengthening our fortification; <strong>and</strong> it is threatened that, unless there is a<br />

satisfactory answer to our contention, a serious breach in the peace of the world will ensue. <strong>The</strong><br />

breach is all the more significant because of the two great nations involved.<br />

“Attempts have been made to substitute arbitration for war as a means of settling disputes<br />

between nations. Our own Chief Magistrate was requested to participate in the peaceful scheme of<br />

adjudicating momentous questions between different countries, <strong>and</strong> gave his consent at the time the<br />

matter was brought up.<br />

“It is not for me to decide whether the underlying principles on which our Government rests<br />

have been assailed. Whether the present attitude of Great Britain is to violate the principles of our<br />

Government is for our statesmen to answer, not only to their constituents, but to God. But a<br />

minister has a duty to perform. He has duties as a teacher of the Gospel, <strong>and</strong> may say there is no<br />

higher authority than the principles of Christianity.<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

“It is contended that a minister may only deal with the academic phase of the matter; it is then<br />

time to relegate Christianity to the shelf. <strong>The</strong> Church is in a measure responsible for the principles of<br />

men.<br />

“As a minister of the Gospel, I desire to enter my earnest protest against war being the way of<br />

settling the momentous question now being discussed, <strong>and</strong> I speak according to the gr<strong>and</strong> principles<br />

that govern alike the American <strong>and</strong> English peoples.<br />

“I believe there have been certain wars in the history of this country that were inevitable <strong>and</strong><br />

unavoidable. I hold that the War of the Revolution <strong>and</strong> the civil war were justified.<br />

“Every act by which a nation is precipitated into a fratricidal slaughter, where a declaration of<br />

war is made without exhausting every other possible measure of adjusting the difficulty, is contrary<br />

to the teaching of Christianity.<br />

“I beg you to remember that war, despite every refinement of the nineteenth century, is horribly<br />

cruel. Our noble Washington said that so many atrocities were committed on both sides during the<br />

Revolution that he could not <strong>and</strong> would not write the history. Cannot the destruction of so many<br />

lives <strong>and</strong> so much property be avoided?<br />

“Let us not forget that the Revolutionary War was not declared until every possible way was<br />

tried to avoid paying the iniquitous taxation imposed by Great Britain. Let us remember the evil<br />

following a call to arms. You <strong>and</strong> I can remember how long the Nation waited before striking the<br />

blow to preserve the Union. Not until Sumter was fired on <strong>and</strong> the Stars <strong>and</strong> Stripes were trampled<br />

upon, did the Government go to war.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> American people will never support their representatives in measures of war until every<br />

possible way of adjusting the dispute has been utilized. <strong>The</strong>re is a terrible waste, a terrible<br />

degradation in war. Did you ever calculate the loss caused by war in this century?<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re have been 4,250,000 lives sacrificed by war during the nineteenth century. That is more<br />

than eight times the population of <strong>Venezuela</strong> blotted out by war. It cost our Nation $40,000,000 to<br />

fight Indians in Florida, <strong>and</strong> it cost us $50,000,000 for the war of 1812.<br />

“It cost $3,471,000,000 for our civil war, <strong>and</strong> more hundreds of millions for interest on the debt<br />

<strong>and</strong> in pensions for the war. That money would have bought all the l<strong>and</strong>s in the world, <strong>and</strong> would<br />

have built schools <strong>and</strong> churches to educate <strong>and</strong> Christianize all the people of the world. We do not<br />

take prudential action unless we heed the advice of Christian doctrine.<br />

“I heed with interest the statement of Benjamin Franklin, when he said that, if statesmen were<br />

more inclined to calculate the results of warfare they would hesitate before declaring war against<br />

another country. I believe that war is a most horrible crime, <strong>and</strong> I would cry from the housetops:<br />

‘Peace! Peace! Peace!’<br />

“Had you conceived what war means when you cried out that we should not tolerate the<br />

pretensions or claims of Engl<strong>and</strong>? Have you forgotten the information furnished by our penal<br />

institutions that, since our last war, there has been an immense increase of crime in consequence,<br />

<strong>and</strong> crime of a violent kind?<br />

“Have you forgotten the increase of sin accompanying the increase of luxury, extravagance, <strong>and</strong><br />

disorder n the industrial world, which the war was largely responsible for? To make war is to open<br />

the gates of hell <strong>and</strong> our on us a storm of iniquity <strong>and</strong> wrath.<br />

“Oh, men! I hear you in public places cry out: ‘Let us be patriotic!’ but true patriotism does not<br />

consist in plunging a country into an inconsiderate war.<br />

“God forbid that we should sacrifice our character through pusillanimity; that we should<br />

sacrifice love of country for gain of stocks <strong>and</strong> bonds; but God forbid that we should try war until<br />

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we have exhausted every honorable means of settling the difficulty! We are not willing to sacrifice<br />

our commerce, our sons, <strong>and</strong> daughters to maintain a point in controversy. War is a cruelty against<br />

the mind, soul, <strong>and</strong> body of humanity.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> speaker said it was unjustifiable for a man meeting another on the street to knock him<br />

down, <strong>and</strong> when the fallen man has arisen to take him by the h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> express a willingness to argue<br />

the matter in dispute.<br />

“It is our duty,” he continued, “to cry to every statesman never to make a menace to a foreign<br />

nation, until he knows what war is, <strong>and</strong> has made every argument to avoid it, <strong>and</strong> he can say, ‘I am<br />

sorry for this, but I believe war is necessary for the country’s honor.’<br />

“<strong>The</strong> supposed haughtiness <strong>and</strong> arrogance of Engl<strong>and</strong> should not be pretexts for war. When the<br />

merits of the dispute have not been clearly explained, <strong>and</strong> approved by just men, a warlike attitude is<br />

not justifiable. <strong>The</strong> sword is not the final <strong>and</strong> most effective argument of international disputes, but<br />

the love of brotherhood <strong>and</strong> humanity should be the predominating influence.”<br />

WAR NOT A TEST OF PATRIOTISM<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. Ramsay Pleads for Peace <strong>and</strong> Prosperity<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. James S. Ramsay, pastor of the Harlem Presbyterian Church, One Hundred <strong>and</strong><br />

Twenty-fifth Street <strong>and</strong> Madison Avenue, in the course of his sermon yesterday morning, said,<br />

concerning the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute:<br />

“It is needless to say that the message of our worthy President has startled this country <strong>and</strong><br />

stirred it as nothing else has done since the firing on Fort Sumter. It has evoked a burst of patriotism<br />

from every quarter of our l<strong>and</strong>, patriotism glorious in its universality, its spontaneity, its promptness,<br />

its marvelous unifying force.<br />

“But is this magnificent torrent of National enthusiasm only to be used to sweep us on to an<br />

awful war? Must we forget whether the cause be great or trivial, merely to show our patriotism <strong>and</strong><br />

courage?<br />

“Patriotism is love of country, <strong>and</strong> should not that love, true to its nature, seek to gain the best<br />

for its l<strong>and</strong>? And if the best can be gained by peaceful diplomacy, without the death <strong>and</strong> desolation<br />

produced by war is not that the proper course, as well as the wisest policy? <strong>The</strong> most costly price<br />

any country can pay for any desired object is war, <strong>and</strong> it should see to it that the object is worthy of<br />

the outlay, since even victory gained in the interest of an ignoble cause is clouded for all time.<br />

“Our country has had four great wars, excluding those with Indians, <strong>and</strong>, measured by the<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ard that the object <strong>and</strong> gains must be worthy the sacrifice, <strong>and</strong> that no peaceful method could<br />

accomplish the desired result, only two of them st<strong>and</strong> the test, the war of the Revolution <strong>and</strong> the late<br />

civil war; the first for our country’s creation, the second for its preservation. But posterity has<br />

stubbornly refused to indorse fully the Mexican war, while in the second conflict with Great Britain<br />

we gained some glory, but more graves; <strong>and</strong> after all peaceful methods were used to gain the few<br />

results after the war in the appointment of Commissioners to adjust the claims.<br />

“In the light of past history we must now ask, Have all justifiable measures for peace been used<br />

in this issue? Is the object that looms before us as the prize worth the collision <strong>and</strong> bloody battle of<br />

the two foremost Christian nations of the earth, which may lead to the convulsion of the civilized<br />

world?<br />

“We venture to assert that even with the seeming rebuff of Engl<strong>and</strong>, diplomacy might have<br />

continued its efforts rather than give up at once <strong>and</strong> force a crisis with unseemly haste. And, then,<br />

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again, is the definite object one that should of itself make us willing <strong>and</strong> eager to appeal to arms? Are<br />

we ready to sacrifice the best blood <strong>and</strong> treasure of this country to secure a strip of l<strong>and</strong> to a petty<br />

Spanish republic of little better than mediaeval civilization <strong>and</strong> subject to periodical revolutions?<br />

“Admitting the importance of the political doctrine supposed to be involved, may we not<br />

concede that there may be honest doubts on both sides of the Atlantic regarding its scope <strong>and</strong><br />

applicability, <strong>and</strong> continue peaceful negotiations? If it took us more than fifteen yean to settle our<br />

own boundary question, by persistent negotiations, why rush at once to the edge of war to adjust the<br />

boundary line of another country 1,200 miles from our nearest point?<br />

“Let us be ready for the direst necessities <strong>and</strong> true to our country’s highest interest, but let us, at<br />

the same time, pray <strong>and</strong> hope <strong>and</strong> believe that American statesmanship may be equal to American<br />

patriotism, <strong>and</strong> that Providence will guide it to a peaceful settlement on these questions that now<br />

perplex our country <strong>and</strong> presage the shedding of costly blood.”<br />

PRESIDENT CLEVELAND COMMENDED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Lyman Ward Says He Has Asked for Peace, Not War<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Lyman Ward, pastor of the Second Universalist Society of Harlem, which meets at 82<br />

West One Hundred <strong>and</strong> Twenty-sixth Street, preached yesterday from the theme, “Ring in the<br />

Valiant Man <strong>and</strong> Free.” In the course of his sermon he said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re will be no war with Engl<strong>and</strong>. Mark that. <strong>The</strong> United States does not want war. Great<br />

Britain does not want war, least of all with us. <strong>The</strong> memory of 1776 <strong>and</strong> 1812 is still with those two<br />

great nations.<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has not asked for war. He has asked for peace. In the dignified yet<br />

courteous message to Congress by the President he asks for the privilege of appointing a<br />

commission to inquire into the difficulty existing between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. That is what he<br />

asks for. Who can object to it?<br />

“<strong>The</strong> ‘Monroe doctrine’ must be upheld. Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> has simply demonstrated to the world<br />

that, as Chief Executive of our Republic, he desires to see justice done to a sister republic.<br />

“Our President has taken a noble st<strong>and</strong>. He will be supported by every loyal citizen of every<br />

party. Congress, with conspicuous unanimity, approves the message <strong>and</strong> makes a generous<br />

appropriation for the use of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n commission.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> disputed territory is rich in minerals. It is a strategic point in South America <strong>and</strong> has been<br />

long in dispute. Were <strong>Venezuela</strong> to pay the indemnity that Great Britain dem<strong>and</strong>s it would be a tacit<br />

affirmation of Britain’s boundary line. She therefore, refuses. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine of seventy years’<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ing is attacked. We defend it—that is all.<br />

“We want peace to ourselves <strong>and</strong> to our neighbors. We st<strong>and</strong> by the Monroe doctrine. If it can<br />

be had by peace Commissioners well <strong>and</strong> good; if not—well, we st<strong>and</strong> by the President <strong>and</strong><br />

Congress <strong>and</strong> the Monroe doctrine. <strong>The</strong> greatest Christian Republic that the world has ever known<br />

believes in the Golden Rule.”<br />

DR. ABBOT PRAISES ENGLAND<br />

A congregation that entirely filled Plymouth Church assembled last evening to hear what the<br />

Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbott would say in connection with the excitement incidental to the President’s<br />

message on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

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In his prayer Dr. Abbott asked that all might be led to seek that which is just <strong>and</strong> right <strong>and</strong> that,<br />

if it is possible, this people live at peace with all men—it a peace with honor, with purity, <strong>and</strong> with<br />

righteousness—<strong>and</strong> that self-control <strong>and</strong> moderation be given to all in the present crisis.<br />

He then announced that Plymouth Church will consider the situation, <strong>and</strong>, after a public hearing<br />

on it on Friday evening, will pass such resolutions as the church members may favor.<br />

Dr. Abbot expects to speak tonight in Cooper Union on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

Dr. Abbott, in his sermon last night, spoke of the commercial depression from which the<br />

country is recovering, <strong>and</strong> mentioned the excitement that the message produced last week. After<br />

telling how deeply <strong>and</strong> strongly he felt on the subject of war, he said: “We need more light, but not<br />

with a combative spirit.”<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, he said, had never been a republic in more than name. It is ruled, he declared, by a<br />

Church of old-time barbarism <strong>and</strong> of a reactionary character. Engl<strong>and</strong> is a republic in everything but<br />

name that spread enlightenment wherever it went, even though it often ruthlessly took possession of<br />

foreign l<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

<strong>The</strong> l<strong>and</strong> in dispute, he said, was for the most part a barren wilderness, <strong>and</strong> the probability of<br />

war was but a shadow of a shadow.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, he declared, should arbitrate, <strong>and</strong> does wrong in refusing—even though she consents<br />

to arbitrate up to a certain point.<br />

Dr. Abbott read from the President’s message, <strong>and</strong> by way of comment said: “This country<br />

proposes to say hereafter: ‘We will assume the functions or an international court in regard to South<br />

American affairs’.”<br />

He read from Secretary Olney’s message, <strong>and</strong> said it was “a bugaboo to frighten children with.”<br />

He made light of it, spoke of the country’s unprotected condition, <strong>and</strong> said: “In another hundred<br />

years we will make the American people the greatest, most potent empire in the world.”<br />

He expressed a wish that Engl<strong>and</strong> might absorb all the Spanish-American republics except<br />

Brazil, as it would be a means of advancing civilization if it were to do so,<br />

He said he did not believe our National peace, prosperity, or honor depended upon the course<br />

that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> has pursued, <strong>and</strong> that it is not probable that Engl<strong>and</strong> is entirely right or wholly<br />

wrong.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> question is,” he said, “Are we appointed to make her do what is right? Should we police<br />

the whole of South America?”<br />

He read from Webster <strong>and</strong> others on the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> declared that although it was<br />

suggested by Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Minister, Mr. Canning, it had no legal or Constitutional binding power, had<br />

drifted into the past, <strong>and</strong> had no bearing on a question between a republic only in name <strong>and</strong> a nation<br />

that is a republic in all but name. <strong>The</strong>n he said that if a great wrong was being done it would be the<br />

duty of this country to intervene.<br />

<strong>The</strong> hostility toward Engl<strong>and</strong>, the mother country, he said, was not entirely without reason. He<br />

instanced the war between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> this country, <strong>and</strong> said that all this country is Engl<strong>and</strong> made<br />

it. Supporting this statement he mentioned Magna Charta <strong>and</strong> the House of Commons, after which<br />

<strong>and</strong> upon which this country’s great institutions are founded. He eulogized Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> said:<br />

“Together Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America may wrap the world round with liberty <strong>and</strong> fill it with peace.”<br />

He pictured the horrors of war, <strong>and</strong> said:<br />

“Our glory is a glory of peace, <strong>and</strong> our prosperity is due to almost 100 years of peace, <strong>and</strong> we<br />

will not sacrifice peace if peace can be maintained with honor.”<br />

Dr. Abbott was frequently applauded, <strong>and</strong> received much applause when he ceased speaking.<br />

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DOES THE MONROE DOCTRINE APPLY<br />

Mr. Cadman Says South America May Resent an Interference<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. S. Parks Cadman, in the Central Metropolitan Methodist Church, Seventh Avenue<br />

between Thirteenth <strong>and</strong> Fourteenth Streets, last evening spoke on “Peace or War with Engl<strong>and</strong>.”<br />

“I wish it were possible,” he said, “to admit that this question of peace or war is lifted above the<br />

contending factions, national <strong>and</strong> international. All ambitions for ascendancy, sobriety, <strong>and</strong><br />

soundness of judgment are largely absent from the discussion of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. Some of<br />

the hysterical shriekings of the daily press are an outrage upon decency <strong>and</strong> a disgrace to our boasted<br />

civilization.<br />

“Concerning the Monroe doctrine, legalists <strong>and</strong> statesmen dispute widely as to its significance<br />

<strong>and</strong> application to the boundary question between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It was created by<br />

our fears for the future of the whole continent when threatened by the Holy Alliance. Great Britain<br />

aided in its inception when we were a people only 9,000,000 strong.<br />

“If it means we are the practical sovereigns of the two continents of North <strong>and</strong> South America<br />

then war with Engl<strong>and</strong> will be the first incident in <strong>and</strong> bloody struggle to enforce a claim that many<br />

other nations, including the South American republics, will resent.<br />

“I do not believe we are prepared to purchase supremacy, either nominal or actual, over the<br />

South American republics at the cost of our felicitous existence, whose high level is the glory of<br />

modern civilization. If by peaceful means the two continents may be brought in touch with our<br />

influence, the destiny of our Republic <strong>and</strong> the race at large will gain, <strong>and</strong> with the passage of time<br />

Canada will be one with us, beneath one flag. But, rather than that this should come upon the<br />

reeking edge of sword, let us remain as we are, <strong>and</strong> move on in our providential path as a people,<br />

non-destroying <strong>and</strong> indestructible.<br />

WAR NOT EVEN A POSSIBILITY<br />

But the Rev. Dr. Virgin Thinks Examination Will Do No Harm<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. Samuel H. Virgin, pastor of the Pilgrim Congregational Church, Madison Avenue<br />

<strong>and</strong> One Hundred <strong>and</strong> Twenty-first Street, spoke on the possibilities of war with Great Britain at the<br />

services yesterday morning.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> President, in his strong feeling about the boundary line of the South American republic,”<br />

he said, “or in his devotion to the Monroe doctrine, or for some other reason to himself sufficient,<br />

may seem to threaten war, but the people will smother this sentiment under their rich <strong>and</strong><br />

abounding declarations of affection for our kindred across the sea.<br />

“A commission may examine facts <strong>and</strong> deliberate upon measures, <strong>and</strong> the ripe fruit of nineteen<br />

hundred years of Christian teaching will appear in the righteous <strong>and</strong> peaceful issue of their<br />

deliberations. If the Monroe doctrine has nothing to do with this country, it should be known <strong>and</strong><br />

declared. Examination will do no harm. <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> her rights are dear to us, so are the rights of<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the mother country itself. With interests of every character interlocked <strong>and</strong> with<br />

the noblest possessions of a common Christianity held equally dear to both, war is not for a moment<br />

to be dreamed of as a possibility.<br />

“Misunderst<strong>and</strong>ing may arise for a season <strong>and</strong> lead to a debate <strong>and</strong> Presidential proclamations<br />

<strong>and</strong> a disturbed money market <strong>and</strong> immeasurable evils, but war between these nations would be the<br />

giant crime of the centuries.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> intervention of this Christmas celebration must touch with healing charm the roused<br />

antagonisms, <strong>and</strong> blend all hearts in one common prayer for wisdom <strong>and</strong> one common purpose for<br />

instant <strong>and</strong> peaceful adjustment of this question of international concern.<br />

“A nation’s honor must be maintained, but this is consonant with peace in the light of the<br />

Christian principles by which nations are guided. We want no cries of jingoism.<br />

“We want no wholesale denunciations of our Chief Magistrate in endeavoring to uphold the<br />

principles that have governed us for many years. It was pertinent for him to speak after lengthened<br />

<strong>and</strong> unsuccessful correspondence. We need prudent councils, a calm <strong>and</strong> deliberate temper, <strong>and</strong> a<br />

statesmanship solid with true patriotism <strong>and</strong> heavenly wisdom. We need a broad generosity that will<br />

check the excitement that speculators will increase, <strong>and</strong> a financial skill alert <strong>and</strong> effective to stay<br />

further monetary evils.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> American people are opposed to war with Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> send her to-day salutations of<br />

Christian affection from sixty-six millions of hearts, <strong>and</strong> sing “God Save the Queen,’ while they<br />

make the welkin ring with their song of:<br />

‘My country, ‘tis of thee,<br />

Sweet l<strong>and</strong> of liberty,<br />

Of thee I sing.’<br />

“Let Lord Salisbury find some answer to the message of our President that shall shine with a<br />

loftier Christianity, that will show the path of honorable agreement, <strong>and</strong> the people or both realms<br />

will acknowledge his master spirit.<br />

“Let Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> rise above himself <strong>and</strong> issue another message higher, wiser, free from the<br />

suggestion of the possibility of armed conflict, discarding all hostile intent.<br />

“Ere this Christmas celebration pass, let the united voices sing in unison for the nations of the<br />

world to hear the angels’ song” ‘Peace on earth, good will to men’.”<br />

NO CONCERN OF OURS ANYWAY<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. Stimson Denounces the Action Regarding <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> sermon of the Rev. Dr. Henry A. Stimson at the Broadway Tabernacle Church yesterday<br />

was devoted almost entirely to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

“It seems like a travesty on Christmas,” he said, “that we should find ourselves in the Lord’s<br />

house to-day, with our minds <strong>and</strong> the minds of the people filled with the talk of war. That a<br />

Christian nation should be assembled to worship the Prince of Peace in the same breath with which<br />

it is uttering braggart bluster which, if it means anything, is threat of war; that it should be assembled<br />

to worship one Wonderful, a Counselor, in the very hour in which we are giving place to a folly so<br />

supreme that the world st<strong>and</strong>s amazed at it; at a time of extreme National strain, when anxiety has<br />

sat in the homes of our people for more than two years, <strong>and</strong> business has been paralyzed <strong>and</strong><br />

industries have stood still, <strong>and</strong> the fields of the farmer are loaded with crops for which there is no<br />

market, <strong>and</strong> when our whole financial system is built upon a basis so unstable that it has not been<br />

changed only because of the tremendous peril attending such a task; that at such a time this Nation<br />

should be suddenly diverted from its anxious but peaceful labors by public action that involves, even<br />

as a remote possibility, the horrors of war, is a situation so amazing, so preposterous, that one finds<br />

it difficult to get speech that will do it justice.<br />

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“<strong>The</strong> $100,000 precipitately voted for an investigation in which we have no concern, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

outcome of which has no visible value, except possibly to get us out of a difficulty which we have<br />

created for ourselves, <strong>and</strong> the $100,000,000 lost as a consequence in the panic of a single day, arrest<br />

our careful attention. Would that it were but a ‘midsummer madness!’<br />

“And what is it all about? A boundary dispute in which we have not the remotest concern, a<br />

question of fifty years’ st<strong>and</strong>ing, to be precipitated upon the country in a form which, whether it was<br />

intended or not, brings the alarm of war <strong>and</strong> not only the business interests of our own country, but<br />

the business interests of the world, into confusion, carrying loss <strong>and</strong> ruin into innumerable homes.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re have been sad hours in the history of the United States in the past—hours of irreparable<br />

loss, hours that brought the horrors of civil war in their train, hours that entailed commercial distress<br />

<strong>and</strong> widespread ruin from which the l<strong>and</strong> did not recover for years, but there have been few hours<br />

of panic so needless <strong>and</strong> of shame so mortifying.<br />

“Of course, we are not going to fight! War among great nations is fast becoming obsolete.<br />

Would to God that its very dialect should disappear from English speech. But when all Europe<br />

st<strong>and</strong>s like hounds strained in the leash, <strong>and</strong> the industries of the civilized world are consumed in<br />

maintaining st<strong>and</strong>ing armies so large as to almost neutralize man’s labors, who shall fitly characterize<br />

the reckless folly that would hurl even an apple of discord into the arena of the world’s debate, or<br />

utter bitter <strong>and</strong> braggart speech that would precipitate strife?”<br />

DEMAGOGUES SHOUTING FOR WAR<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Madison C. Peters Says No Fighting Is Necessary<br />

At the Bloomingdale Reformed Church yesterday morning, the Rev. Madison C. Peters preached<br />

on “Civilization’s Debt to Christianity.” In the course of his sermon, which was mainly devoted to<br />

an exposition of the lessons of the Christmas season, he referred to the possibilities of a conflict<br />

with Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

“War is cruel, hateful wrong,” he said. ““War is hell. <strong>The</strong> political demagogues who at this<br />

Christmastide are shouting for war, will be br<strong>and</strong>ed by the second sober thought of the American<br />

people as the criminals of the nineteenth century.<br />

“A war between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America could never be terminated until one or the other went<br />

into bankruptcy or had no more men to fill the ranks. When the time comes that there is a necessity<br />

for war, when we are encroached upon or attacked, then there will be a prompt response from the<br />

American people to defend the flag.<br />

“What sane man believes that such a necessity exists at the present time? If we are to have war,<br />

let it be on one condition—that the men who are now shouting for it be the first ones compelled to<br />

go to the front.<br />

“As a preacher of the Gospel of peace <strong>and</strong> universal brotherhood, I call for arbitration. ‘Blessed<br />

are the peacemakers.’ I pray that Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America may look across the centuries <strong>and</strong> hear the<br />

angels’ proclamation—‘On Earth Peace; Good Will Toward Men’.”<br />

BELIEVES IN THE PRESIDENT<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. J. W. Chadwick, However, Counsels Avoidance of War<br />

“Peace or War?” was the subject of the sermon of the Rev. J. W. Chadwick yesterday morning in<br />

the Second Unitarian Church, Brooklyn. He said, in part:<br />

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“‘Peace on earth, good will to men’,” said Mr. Chadwick. “That is a sentiment so pure <strong>and</strong> high<br />

that it would have preserved any legend. Who shall say it did not preserve the legend of the birth<br />

<strong>and</strong> was preserved by that legend?<br />

“It may not be a controlling factor in international law now. But I believe there has been more<br />

peace in the world than there would have been if that rebuke to war had not stared nations in the<br />

face for over eighteen centuries.<br />

“First in peace seems to be unsatisfactory at present. Some people think war, though, shows<br />

evolution of the race; another factor that makes warlike spirit is the growing strength of the Nation.<br />

Still another is the hope or gain nurtured by those who would feed on the distress of the Nation.<br />

“But the greatest factor of all is the passionate idealization of war—our belief in our own<br />

glorious victory. <strong>The</strong>re are some who can see only one side of war— the killing of men by their<br />

fellows. But these are in small numbers, perhaps. <strong>The</strong> literature of war is fascinating, because of the<br />

splendid courage portrayed. <strong>The</strong> terrible beauty of war lies in this. But is there anything in the<br />

history of our late memorable war that would not make us hate it <strong>and</strong> shun it?<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re is an old German proverb—‘Every war leaves behind it an army of heroes, an army of<br />

cripples, <strong>and</strong> an army of thieves.’ We had all these after our war. Besides, it left legacies that are<br />

hurtful even now. Our financial system represents the result of the country’s endeavors to help itself<br />

in a time of sore need.<br />

“War is to be avoided if possible, as one would avoid the gate of hell. Between supine<br />

submission to wrong <strong>and</strong> war’s dread alternative, there are stations which will admit to settlement<br />

with honor to both nations, <strong>and</strong> I hope we shall stop at one of these.<br />

“I deprecate ascribing unworthy motive to the President. I have known him too long to believe<br />

the charges which are coming now even from the house of his friends. I dismiss, without a<br />

moment’s consideration, such attacks upon Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s honesty of purpose”<br />

[23 December 1895]<br />

- 158 -<br />

THE SERVICE PATRIOTIC<br />

Ex-Minister Straus’s View of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Message<br />

PRESIDENT CLEVELAND COMMENDED<br />

Monroe Doctrine Must Be Upheld—Lord Salisbury Accused of<br />

Overstepping the Bounds of Ordinary Propriety<br />

Oscar S. Straus, formerly United States Minister to Turkey, has for many years devoted much<br />

time to the study of international questions which figure in the diplomatic business of this country.<br />

With considerable emphasis he indorses the position of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

question.<br />

He maintains that the restatement of the Monroe doctrine as being the American doctrine was a<br />

necessary <strong>and</strong> wise thing.<br />

To a reporter for the <strong>The</strong> New-York Times, ex-Minister Straus yesterday pointed out some<br />

important facts in connection with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute.<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine was neither inspired by the stock market nor stimulated by the price of<br />

cotton,” said Mr. Straus. “It was the ultimatum of a patriotic people, in times at peace, to preserve<br />

the integrity of our institutions in safety <strong>and</strong> honor.<br />

“President Monroe said, ‘We owe it to c<strong>and</strong>or <strong>and</strong> to amicable relations between the United<br />

States <strong>and</strong> the powers, that we would consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to<br />

any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace <strong>and</strong> safety.’ This declaration was hailed<br />

with approval <strong>and</strong> satisfaction by the Government <strong>and</strong> people of Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> served to confirm<br />

the establishment of free Governments on this continent, no less than it served as a harbinger of<br />

peace for the nations of Europe.<br />

“Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message, which clearly defines the scope, meaning, <strong>and</strong> continuing vitality of<br />

our American policy, was not only dem<strong>and</strong>ed at this time, but a sense of c<strong>and</strong>or <strong>and</strong> in order to<br />

avoid causes for conflict between us <strong>and</strong> Great Britain made it a duty that we should not leave her in<br />

doubt as to our policy.<br />

“When President Monroe, in 1823, submitted to Jefferson the correspondence relating to the<br />

designs of the Holy Alliance to intervene in South America, he answered: ‘<strong>The</strong> question presented is<br />

the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence<br />

Our first <strong>and</strong> fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our<br />

second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.’<br />

“<strong>The</strong> dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> involves territory two-thirds as large as the<br />

State of New-York, <strong>and</strong> the control of the mouth <strong>and</strong> 400 miles of the Orinoco River, which is the<br />

Mississippi of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

“Whatever may be the respective rights of the two countries, it is sufficient to say that while the<br />

claims of Great Britain have been from the beginning steadfastly resisted by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, they have<br />

been growing larger <strong>and</strong> larger until they have doubled in area in the past fifty years. <strong>Venezuela</strong> has<br />

constantly pressed for arbitration, while Great Britain has constantly shifted her boundary line<br />

westward, so that it resulted in 1887 in the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two<br />

countries.<br />

“Our Government has not been an indifferent spectator during all these years. On the contrary,<br />

our good offices have been liberally tendered. Again, in 1891, President Harrison, in his message,<br />

alluded to the subject in the following terms: “I should have been glad to announce some favorable<br />

disposition of the boundary dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> touching the western<br />

frontier of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, but the friendly efforts of the United States in that direction have thus far<br />

been unavailing. This Government will continue to express its concern at any appearance of foreign<br />

encroachment on territories long under the administrative control of American States. <strong>The</strong><br />

determination of a disputed boundary is easily attainable by amicable arbitration when the rights of<br />

the respective parties rest, as here, on historic facts readily ascertainable.<br />

“<strong>Venezuela</strong> has, time <strong>and</strong> again, pending these negotiations between her <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, asked<br />

for our friendly offices to aid in bringing about arbitration, <strong>and</strong> promptly advised our Government<br />

of <strong>British</strong> encroachments. In 1888 Secretary Bayard instructed Mr. Phelps to say to Lord Salisbury,<br />

in view of the widening <strong>British</strong> pretensions, ‘If, indeed, it should appear that there is no fixed limit<br />

to the <strong>British</strong> boundary claim, our good disposition to aid in a settlement might not only be<br />

defeated, but be obliged to give place to a feeling of grave concern.’<br />

“<strong>The</strong> forcible possession by Great Britain of this territory is not measured by its area, though as<br />

large as above stated, but by the fact that the control of Barima comm<strong>and</strong>s the mouth of the<br />

Orinoco River <strong>and</strong> its tributaries. <strong>The</strong> naval power in possession of this river could control the trade<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

as well as the destinies of Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, the Argentine Republic, <strong>and</strong> in fact the whole of<br />

South America.<br />

“Secretary Olney, under the direction of the President, in his dispatch to Mr. Bayard of the 20th<br />

of July, (a copy of which, as is usual, was left with the <strong>British</strong> Prime Minister,) went exhaustively into<br />

the entire subject, pointing out with painstaking fullness the importance of the subject to this<br />

country, <strong>and</strong> in what respect it conflicted with our policy <strong>and</strong> interest. It was nowhere claimed that<br />

the Monroe doctrine was a principle of international law, but stress was laid upon the fact that it was<br />

the calm <strong>and</strong> deliberate policy adopted by us more than seventy years ago as a continental policy. It<br />

impressed upon the Prime Minister the importance of submitting the question to impartial<br />

arbitration.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Prime Minister devotes the greater part of his reply to an endeavor to show that we do not<br />

underst<strong>and</strong> the significance <strong>and</strong> scope of the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> at any rate says that it is ‘played<br />

out’, or, as he puts it. ‘<strong>The</strong> dangers which were apprehended by President Monroe have no relation<br />

to the state of things in which we live at the present day.’ He further answers our urgent request for<br />

a peaceful arbitration that it is a controversy with which the United States have no apparent practical<br />

concern.<br />

“It will appear to any one reading the Prime Ministers communications that he has overstepped<br />

the bounds, not only of diplomatic etiquette, but of ordinary propriety, in assuming to dictate to our<br />

Government what is the meaning of the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> what we have a right to hold as our<br />

policy on this hemisphere. That the Monroe doctrine, which, when proclaimed in 1823, was hailed<br />

with satisfaction <strong>and</strong> approval by Engl<strong>and</strong>, is not ab<strong>and</strong>oned by us, should now be quite evident to<br />

Lord Salisbury, even if he should fail to recognize it as a principle of international law.<br />

“Lord Salisbury could more profitably employ his time in discovering that boundary lines are not<br />

the branches of compasses, which can be extended without regard to the rights of a contiguous<br />

Government, even though that Government be not able to adequately defend itself against forcible<br />

encroachment.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> President has performed a most patriotic service in his clear <strong>and</strong> forcible statement of our<br />

American policy. It was due to c<strong>and</strong>or <strong>and</strong> to the preservation of peaceable relations with the<br />

nations of the world that they should not be left in doubt.”<br />

[23 December 1895]<br />

- 159 -<br />

THE PRESIDENT’S CRITICS<br />

<strong>The</strong> President message did not create our vicious financial system. It is well to remember that.<br />

<strong>The</strong> evils <strong>and</strong> the weakness of the system were brought sharply into the public view by his<br />

utterances—they were even for the time intensified. But they were there before, they were known,<br />

<strong>and</strong> they would sooner or later have got us into serious trouble.<br />

It is complained that the message was inopportune, that the President might easily have deferred<br />

its issue, that there was surely nothing in the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary situation to call for precipitate<br />

utterance or action, <strong>and</strong> that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> should have strengthened the Treasury before he put on<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

high airs with Great Britain. Even those who told that the President is right protest that he was<br />

premature.<br />

For any critic of the Administration who is not in its confidence to make this protest is to take<br />

all the risks of speaking in ignorance of the facts. Here is a National policy formulated by President<br />

Monroe, in consultation with Jefferson, Madison <strong>and</strong> the younger Adams, accepted <strong>and</strong> restated<br />

with emphasis during the Administrations of Polk, Lincoln, Grant, Garfield, Arthur, <strong>and</strong> Harrison,<br />

specially applied to <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s boundary dispute with Great Britain by Secretaries of State Evarts,<br />

Frelinghuysen, Bayard, Blaine, Gresham, <strong>and</strong> Olney. It will be granted, perhaps, that such a policy<br />

must be put in force when the occasion arises or else ab<strong>and</strong>oned altogether. So far as the public<br />

knows the occasion chosen by the President was the receipt of Lord Salisbury’s letter declining<br />

arbitration. Do the critics of the President know, or merely assume, that there were no<br />

circumstances of the case that dem<strong>and</strong>ed immediate action? Sometimes the under officers <strong>and</strong><br />

privates hold the General’s dispositions to be senseless <strong>and</strong> perilous until they come to know his<br />

reasons. It is well to have some confidence in the General. He usually has superior facilities for<br />

getting information.<br />

It seems to us, also, that the young college professors who are so sure that the President is<br />

wrong would do well to remember that his action was taken only after prolonged consultation with<br />

gentlemen who are fully their equal in ability <strong>and</strong> of very much greater experience, <strong>and</strong> that it is<br />

sustained by precedence in the declarations <strong>and</strong> policies of many eminent persons who have filled<br />

the offices of President <strong>and</strong> of Secretary of State. <strong>The</strong> clergy who think the President wrong would<br />

think any President wrong who took almost any step that involved war as even a remote<br />

consequence. Ministers of the Gospel are men of peace. It would be a deplorable thing if they were<br />

not.<br />

But for that very reason they are probably not the best counselors in foreign affairs. If they were<br />

always consulted by Presidents <strong>and</strong> Secretaries of States, our foreign policy would be patterned<br />

closely on that of James I, who “shunned hostilities with a caution which was proof against the<br />

insults of his neighbors <strong>and</strong> the clamors of his subjects.”<br />

[23 December 1895]<br />

- 160 -<br />

PEACE TALK IN ENGLAND<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong>ers No Longer Fear <strong>The</strong>re Will Be a War<br />

SOME UTTERANCES FROM THE PULPIT<br />

Prominent English Clergymen Protest Against the Prevalence of a<br />

War Spirit—Urge Magnanimity <strong>and</strong> Concession<br />

LONDON. Dec. 22.—London had a good deal to say to-day, in one way <strong>and</strong> another, on the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter. <strong>The</strong> general view now is that there is not the slightest danger of war between<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> most notable utterances to-day were those from the pulpit.<br />

Speaking at the City Temple to-day, the Rev. Dr. Joseph Parker said:<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

Do not trouble yourselves with the thought of war. <strong>The</strong>re will be no war. Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America cannot do<br />

without each other. War would be suicide. We send to-day messages from our hearts to our fellow-Christians in<br />

America. We must act in a spirit of magnanimity <strong>and</strong> concession. We miss Henry Ward Beecher. He could <strong>and</strong><br />

would have spoken the word of reconciliation. I call upon <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> American Christians to unite in prayerful<br />

counsel in the interests of peace.<br />

Mr. Parker prayed in a similar strain, the congregation giving a hearty “Amen! to his supplication.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Mr. Waller, President or the Wesleyan Conference, preaching at Liverpool to-day, said<br />

that every lover of his kindred would strive to avert a war which would be unnatural, monstrous,<br />

<strong>and</strong> wicked.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Archdeacon of London, preaching at Canonbury, said that for the branches of the Anglo-<br />

Saxon race to plunge into a war for such a cause would seem to be a disaster whose magnitude,<br />

compared with the slightness of the occasion, removed it from the region of possibility. A give-<strong>and</strong>take<br />

policy, he added, would soon settle the difficulty.<br />

Canon Newbolt, preaching at St. Paul’s to-day, deplored the fact that the peace <strong>and</strong> good-will of<br />

kindred nations had been disturbed in the Christmas season, but he thanked God that the spirit of<br />

truth <strong>and</strong> honor animated both. This was the best pledge of a just <strong>and</strong> amicable settlement.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Hugh Price Hughes, in the course of his sermon at St. James’s Hall, said that the two<br />

most distressing spectacles for any lover of peace were the Sultan of Turkey <strong>and</strong> Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong><br />

latter bullied Great Britain <strong>and</strong> rudely threatened her with war, but, awful as a conflict was to<br />

contemplate, he hoped that those answerable for the conduct of the nation’s affairs would not allow<br />

him to dictate where the frontiers of the <strong>British</strong> Empire ended <strong>and</strong> began.<br />

At the Tabernacle, the Rev. Thomas Spurgeon prayed fervently that the Almighty’s h<strong>and</strong> would<br />

guide the statesmen of both countries, <strong>and</strong> that He would endow them with wisdom <strong>and</strong> patience to<br />

bring the trouble to a happy issue. <strong>The</strong> prayer was greeted with fervent Amens.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Men’s Sunday Union, which is composed of workers in the east end of London, has<br />

adopted a resolution sending “a hearty Christmas greeting to their brother nation” as an expression<br />

of their opinion that a war would be unnatural <strong>and</strong> un-Christian, <strong>and</strong> should be forever impossible.<br />

[23 December 1895]<br />

- 161 -<br />

SCHOMBURGK LIVED IN AMERICA<br />

A Botanist Drew the Alleged <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Line<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 22—An interesting fact in connection with the famous Schomburgk<br />

Line which has escaped observation is that the man who provided the <strong>British</strong> Government with that<br />

boundary came to this country from Germany when he was twenty-two years old, <strong>and</strong> after working<br />

for some time as a clerk in Boston <strong>and</strong> Philadelphia became a partner in a Richmond (Va.) tobacco<br />

manufactory in 1828.<br />

<strong>The</strong> factory was burned, <strong>and</strong> Schomburgk drifted to the West Indies, where, after unsuccessful<br />

ventures, his botanical work attracted the attention of the London Geographical Society, <strong>and</strong> he<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

secured means to explore the unknown region of the Orinoco where he traveled from 1823 to 1839,<br />

<strong>and</strong> discovered the Victoria Regina lily <strong>and</strong> numerous other plants.<br />

This work led the <strong>British</strong> Government to commission him to suggest a boundary between<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> to make further explorations. <strong>The</strong> line was drawn, <strong>and</strong> he was knighted<br />

by the Queen for his services. Schomburgk, until his death in 1865, continued in the <strong>British</strong><br />

Consular Service, but devoted himself chiefly to geographical studies, being a member of the<br />

principal American <strong>and</strong> European learned societies.<br />

[23 December 1895]<br />

- 162 -<br />

MINISTERS FOR PEACE<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Question Before the Baptist Conference<br />

PRAISE FOR PRESIDENT CLEVELAND<br />

A Resolution Reflecting upon His Action Laid on the Table<br />

Another to be Discussed Next Week<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question was brought up at the regular meeting of the Baptist Ministers’<br />

Conference, at 149 Fifth Avenue, yesterday, <strong>and</strong> there was much excitement before it was disposed<br />

of.<br />

<strong>The</strong> sentiment of the meeting was in favor of peace, but a resolution to that effect was defeated,<br />

because of its preamble, which was regarded as reflecting upon President Clevel<strong>and</strong>. Peace<br />

resolutions will be presented at the meeting of the conference next week, <strong>and</strong> will probably be<br />

adopted.<br />

When the meeting was called to order yesterday, the Moderator, the Rev. Dr. J. H. Dudley, said:<br />

“As we are not politicians, I presume we can take some action in regard to the probable or<br />

improbable war.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. B. F. Morse, assistant to the Rev. Dr. R. S. MacArthur of the Calvary Baptist<br />

Church, said: “As there has been action taken recently looking toward a disruption between America<br />

<strong>and</strong> Britain, I believe that we should take some action deprecating any proposal of war.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. S. W. Brinkerhoff, a venerable man, said that the President’s message did not<br />

contemplate war.<br />

“It certainly does contemplate war,’ said the Moderator, “<strong>and</strong> there is a suggestion of blood<br />

‘bridle deep’.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. George Tompkins then jumped up in an excited manner <strong>and</strong> said he was an<br />

Englishman, <strong>and</strong> had lived in the same house with John Bright. He quoted some of the latter’s<br />

writings in support of peace <strong>and</strong> union between the two great English- speaking nations.<br />

A motion was then made to appoint a committee to prepare a peace resolution. Before the<br />

motion was voted upon, the Rev. Dr. E. Crowell, a retired minister, said, amid much excitement:<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> has insulted the United States. I am an old man, but I remember very well when France undertook to<br />

trample on the Monroe doctrine, but she got left. She sent a sprig of royalty to Mexico, but we said to France, “No,<br />

Sir.” Maximilian died, justly or otherwise, an ignominious death.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

I never was an admirer of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, but I compliment him <strong>and</strong> rejoice that he has enough good<br />

American backbone in him to st<strong>and</strong> up for American rights.<br />

When the American commission determines the true boundary line between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>,<br />

then it will be time to pass such resolutions as are proposed here. [Applause.]<br />

“This subject, I maintain.” said Dr. Morse, “has no application to the Monroe doctrine.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> motion to prepare the resolution opposing war with Engl<strong>and</strong> was adopted, but it met with<br />

considerable opposition. Dr. Morse was named as a committee to prepare the resolution.<br />

Dr. Morse then presented the following:<br />

Whereas, A war between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America, with the horrors <strong>and</strong> suffering it would entail, would be a<br />

stigma upon Christianity <strong>and</strong> a travesty upon civilization; <strong>and</strong><br />

Whereas, <strong>The</strong> question of disagreement made by the President <strong>and</strong> accepted by Congress is unworthy of the<br />

thought of a great Republic like the United States, or a great empire like Great Britain;<br />

Resolved, That we as members of this conference composed of pastors of New-York City <strong>and</strong> vicinity, do<br />

protest against any hasty action looking toward disruption in the relations between the United States <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that we strongly deprecate anything advanced by private citizens or public officials, to the effect that war is the<br />

only question in dispute.<br />

Mr. Brinkerhoff opposed the resolution, saying:<br />

I do not want this to pass, because the President wants peace, not war. He wants arbitration, but Salisbury says<br />

“No.” If Salisbury refuses arbitration, then it is time to talk war.<br />

I have a son, <strong>and</strong> if it comes to defending the rights of my country I’ll give my son to its defense, <strong>and</strong> I’ll go<br />

myself it they will take me. [Applause.] I will st<strong>and</strong> by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> my country.<br />

A motion was then made to lay the resolution on the table. Several of the ministers objected to<br />

the preamble to the resolution, as being an uncalled-for reflection on the President.<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolution was finally laid on the table by a vote of 22 to 12.<br />

A committee of five was then appointed to present to the meeting of the conference next<br />

Monday resolutions embodying the views of the conference against war, but which will not be<br />

offensive to any at the members. . .<br />

[23 December 1895]<br />

- 163 -<br />

VERY PEACEFUL TALK THIS!<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s “Sober Second Thought”<br />

Approves the Commission <strong>and</strong> Is Very Reasonable Indeed<br />

LONDON, Dec 22.—<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> to-morrow, under the caption “Sober Second Thought,”<br />

will discuss the situation in that light. It will say:<br />

It would be improper <strong>and</strong> ungenerous to attribute the change of opinion to the chilling influence of a financial<br />

panic on a people so self-reliant <strong>and</strong> courageous as those of the United States. <strong>The</strong>y never would be turned from<br />

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21 – 23 December 1895<br />

any supreme object of patriotic effort by misgivings respecting their own power. No American can have stronger<br />

belief than we in the potency of the great country <strong>and</strong> its people. It is because we so strongly believe in the power<br />

<strong>and</strong> will of the American people that we rejoice in their rapid change of opinion.<br />

<strong>The</strong> paper then proceeds to blame Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> says that the sooner his language is<br />

forgotten the better it will be for all parties, including himself. It then adds:<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission will be regarded, not as an international tribunal, but as a form of domestic inquiry, designed<br />

for the better information of the American people <strong>and</strong> their rulers. It may be positively useful. Its very appointment<br />

is in one sense an admission that the State Department believes that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claims are exaggerated, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

no further action could wisely be taken until Washington discovered some firmer basis for negotiations than the<br />

shifty statements of the little military despot at Caracas.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>News</strong> professes to believe there is reason to expect that three Americans of credit <strong>and</strong><br />

st<strong>and</strong>ing would propose a very different line of demarkation from that insisted on by <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Times will say to-morrow:<br />

Although the reaction may not yet be triumphant, it is satisfactory to find that the Americans, whether they<br />

dislike us or not, are hesitating to incur the guilt of breaking the peace of the civilized world for such a contemptible<br />

cause, <strong>and</strong> in vindication of claims repudiated by all the nations of the Old World. President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s manifest<br />

incapacity to underst<strong>and</strong> the effect of what he was doing when he sent such a warlike message to the Congress, has<br />

shattered the confidence felt in him as a pillar of sound finance <strong>and</strong> a mainstay of the public credit.<br />

<strong>The</strong> renewal, therefore, of his proposals of currency reform, after he himself has made them impossible, has<br />

dashed the hopes of his friends <strong>and</strong> set his opponents to work to turn his errors to account. It is now clear that Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s financial proposals have no chance at all of passing.<br />

Deeply as we must regret that the controversy has arisen, we can, at all events, rejoice in the demonstration it<br />

has afforded of the unity of our national sentiment, especially the attachment of our Canadian fellow-subjects of the<br />

Crown. Good may come out of the evil if the incident should lead the Canadians to strengthen their organization<br />

for defense <strong>and</strong> admonish us at home to strain every nerve to retain that indisputable comm<strong>and</strong> of the sea on which<br />

the empire depends.<br />

[23 December 1895]<br />

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- Part 6 -<br />

24 - 25 December 1895<br />

259


24 – 25 December 1895<br />

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- 164 -<br />

An Appeal for Arbitration<br />

LONDON, Dec. 23.—<strong>The</strong> International Arbitration Society has adopted a resolution recalling<br />

its own efforts since 1892 to procure arbitration of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute <strong>and</strong> reasserting its<br />

position, while regretting President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s attitude. <strong>The</strong> resolution adds that, while the society<br />

does not recognize the right of the United States to decide the question, it hopes that the matter will<br />

yet be arbitrated.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 165 -<br />

AMERICA NOT THE AGGRESSOR<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> Raised the Quarrel <strong>and</strong> Persists In Keeping It Alive<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Chicago Tribune, (Rep.)<br />

Two courses were open for the President when this insulting reply of Lord Salisbury’s was<br />

received. He could have laid it before Congress <strong>and</strong> recommended that the subject be allowed to<br />

drop; that the Monroe doctrine, not being acceptable to Engl<strong>and</strong>, be ab<strong>and</strong>oned, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

be left to her fate.<br />

But President Clevel<strong>and</strong> did not do that. He did not believe the people would give up the<br />

Monroe doctrine because it was not recognized by Engl<strong>and</strong>. So he adopted the other course. He<br />

said: “Since Engl<strong>and</strong> will not arbitrate, <strong>and</strong> will not appear before an impartial tribunal, to show<br />

exactly what her rights are, let us do the investigating. We will find out how much of the territory in<br />

dispute really belongs to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.”<br />

It was not necessary to do that as long as there was hope that Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> would<br />

settle the matter peacefully. But when Engl<strong>and</strong> refused to arbitrate, then before this country went<br />

further it be-came necessary to see just how far <strong>Venezuela</strong> was being robbed.<br />

No American citizen should protest against that moderate, conservative course. <strong>The</strong>re have been<br />

protests, but they come from persons certainly not American in sentiment, <strong>and</strong> generally not<br />

Americans by nationality. If Engl<strong>and</strong> can regulate boundaries to suit herself in South America <strong>and</strong><br />

steal territory there, what is to hinder her trumping up other pretexts <strong>and</strong> regulating boundaries to<br />

suit herself in North America? She is doing it now in Alaska at the expense of the United States.<br />

It is not aggression on the part of the United States when it resists the attempted aggressions of<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> on other American countries. It is not aggression on the part of the United States to defend<br />

the Monroe doctrine enunciated in 1823 for the protection of this continent against European<br />

aggressions. It was not a part of international law then, but Americans are resolved that it shall be,<br />

even if it comes to a fight.<br />

<strong>The</strong> quarrel is not one which the United States has forced on Engl<strong>and</strong>, but which Engl<strong>and</strong> is<br />

forcing on this country <strong>and</strong> on all America. Engl<strong>and</strong> is seeking to annex American territory,<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

repudiates the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> says she has as much to say about affairs on this side of the<br />

ocean as Americans have. Eng l<strong>and</strong> is the quarrelsome one, not the United States.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 166 -<br />

Canada in Case of War<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Montreal Gazette (Quebec), Dec. 21<br />

<strong>The</strong> Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> message has led in Canada to considerable discussion as to what would<br />

be likely to follow in case the United States carried its contentions to the length of fighting for them.<br />

All the authorities agree that Canadians would come in for a good share of the hard knocks, <strong>and</strong> all<br />

seem to be perfectly satisfied that such a state of affairs would be regular, <strong>and</strong> be regarded as part of<br />

the price to be paid for membership in the empire, the proportions of which the United States<br />

Government has several times tried to curtail. If there is not as much federation of government in<br />

the empire as there might be there is plenty of federation of sentiment.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 167-<br />

GOOD FEELING IN ENGLAND<br />

No Fear <strong>The</strong>re Now that <strong>The</strong>re Will Be War with This Country<br />

A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT EXPECTED<br />

Impression Prevails that the Political Strain Between Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> America is Diminishing<br />

LIBERALS WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS<br />

While Not Dissenting from Salisbury’s Position, <strong>The</strong>y Hope to<br />

Force Him to at Conciliatory Policy<br />

By Commercial Cable from Our Own Correspondent<br />

LONDON, Dec. 23.—Everything to-night relating to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question is colored by the<br />

impression prevailing here that the political strain between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States is<br />

diminishing sensibly.<br />

Such remaining signs of demoralization as the security market showed in the middle of the day<br />

were due to the offerings of investors whom last week’s scare seemed just to have reached, <strong>and</strong> to<br />

effects of Saturday’s weakness of American securities in Vienna.<br />

Elsewhere on the Continent there was a rally Saturday, which came on speculative buying.<br />

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It is believed, if no fresh discouragement shall come from New-York bears, there will be a more<br />

decided rally in Americans after Christmas.<br />

Great attention has been given to-day to the pulpit utterances of yesterday in both countries, <strong>and</strong><br />

the opinion that the situation has improved is based principally on them.<br />

Liberal politicians are watching developments with the closest scrutiny; but no disposition is<br />

shown by them yet to dissent from Salisbury’s position, though they privately confess to the hope<br />

that America may offer a compromise which they can insist on making the Salisbury Government<br />

accept.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are no signs yet of any official tendency on the Continent to fish in the troubled<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n waters, though papers that are coming in now show that the tone of Continental<br />

comment, while against the Monroe doctrine, has been much more hostile to Engl<strong>and</strong> than<br />

summaries telegraphed here have represented it to be.<br />

<strong>The</strong> holiday season will begin to-morrow, <strong>and</strong> not even <strong>Venezuela</strong> will avail to disturb the<br />

national lethargy here till the close of the week.<br />

H. F.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 168 -<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> Divided; America United<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Utica Observer, (Dem.)<br />

It is apparent that Lord Salisbury’s blunt refusa1 to submit the matter in dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

to arbitration is not likely to be sustained in Engl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> London Times supports Salisbury staunchly,<br />

but the consciousness of right does not comm<strong>and</strong> for him the general support of the press. It is in<br />

striking contrast with the practical unanimity with which the American press sustains the President.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 169 -<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> Cannot Afford War<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Fitchburg Mail (Mass.), (Rep.)<br />

As a leading power upon this continent the United States ought, for its own interest, to<br />

determine which party is right in this dispute over boundary lines. Any encroachment by European<br />

powers beyond their just rights is likely to affect adversely, sooner or later, our own National<br />

interests. Hence, we are justified in calling a halt at the beginning, whenever there is any danger of<br />

one of the smaller American nations being imposed upon by unjust claims of a more powerful<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

nation. <strong>The</strong> st<strong>and</strong> taken by our National Administration at Washington is a very moderate one, <strong>and</strong><br />

asks only that the matter at issue be taken up by an impartial tribunal <strong>and</strong> decided upon its merits.<br />

This is all that the United States is asking of Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> she cannot refuse in the end to accede to<br />

this very reasonab1e request. <strong>The</strong> longer she delays the fewer sympathizers she will have. War is out<br />

of the question. With her diverse, world-wide interests, Engl<strong>and</strong> cannot afford to go to war with a<br />

powerful nation like the United States, <strong>and</strong> she is not likely to do so when once the reasonable<br />

attitude of this country has been realized.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 170 -<br />

His Position Impregnable<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Kansas City Times, (Ind. Dem.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> House has done its duty with admirable sense <strong>and</strong> temper in promptly <strong>and</strong> unanimously<br />

passing the bill suggested by the President providing for a commission to examine into the question<br />

of the proper boundary line between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. This step is eminently proper<br />

<strong>and</strong> necessary.<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s st<strong>and</strong> is impregnably taken. <strong>The</strong> country has perfect confidence in<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s wisdom <strong>and</strong> non-partisanship, <strong>and</strong>, as Congressman Hitt said in the House, in<br />

urging the passage of his bill, “in such a. time the Executive is hampered by every criticism that<br />

comes from our own country. <strong>The</strong> success of our country depends upon our maintaining a united<br />

front.” Would that both parties had more men like him.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 171 -<br />

COMMISSION NOT CHOSEN<br />

<strong>The</strong> President Has Not Selected His Representatives<br />

MR. HARRISON AN IMPOSSIBILITY<br />

Every Man Who Goes to the White House Slated by the Reporters<br />

for an Appointment—War Officer May Be Named<br />

WASHINGTON. Dec. 23.—Men of prominence go to the White House now at imminent rink<br />

of immediate appointment on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n commission.<br />

Chief Justice Fuller called at the Executive Mansion to-day, <strong>and</strong> he has straightway been named<br />

as one of the commission—not by the President, for Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> had not this afternoon so much<br />

as fixed his mind upon one member of that body. He has not yet decided whether the commission<br />

shall be made up of three or five members. <strong>The</strong> nominations of ex-Senator Edmunds, ex-Minister<br />

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Phelps, <strong>and</strong> ex-Minister Andrew D. White were public nominations, <strong>and</strong> none of those gentlemen<br />

has been consulted on the subject.<br />

A Senator, who referred jocularly to the excellence of the public nominations to the commission,<br />

said that the newspapers had misunderstood the intention of the Senate, which was not to ab<strong>and</strong>on<br />

the privilege of advising <strong>and</strong> consenting to the appointments in order that they might be made by<br />

eager newspapermen, but that the President might choose his own men to the number he thought<br />

fit, without concern as to the manner of their reception by the Senate when they had been named.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Administration will be in no haste about the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. It has been under<br />

consideration now no long that it was not seriously expected that it would be disposed of in one<br />

week after the President had indicated the position the United States ought to occupy in the matter.<br />

<strong>The</strong> army <strong>and</strong> navy men have about concluded that speculation about what we could do in case<br />

of war does not make a war, <strong>and</strong> have settled down calmly to the discharge of their usual duties,<br />

which are more useful than bellicose.<br />

Ex-President Harrison is reported from Indianapolis as saying that the report of an offer to him<br />

of the Presidency of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n commission was purely imaginative, <strong>and</strong> that no offer whatever<br />

had been made to him.<br />

Senator Turpie of Indiana said that there was no truth in the report that he <strong>and</strong> others of the<br />

Indiana delegation had been requested to transmit to ex-President Harrison Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s desire<br />

to appoint him as a member of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n commission. Mr. Turpie said he never heard of such<br />

a thing, <strong>and</strong> did not expect to hear from the President on the subject. Mr. Voorhees corroborated<br />

what his colleague said, <strong>and</strong> added that if Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> wished Mr. Harrison to serve on that<br />

commission, the President would doubtless do as he had in other matters, <strong>and</strong> communicate with<br />

the person concerned directly.<br />

A rumor has gained currency that the commission will consist of one Democrat, one Republican<br />

<strong>and</strong> a distinguished military or naval officer. Lieut. Gen. Schofield <strong>and</strong> Rear Admiral Walker have<br />

been mentioned in connection with this rumor, but Admiral Walker could not well serve if a salary<br />

were attached to the appointment, in view of the recent law of Congress, which prevents officers of<br />

the Government from drawing two Federal salaries synchronously. This provision would not debar<br />

Gen. Schofield, as it expressly exempts retired officers. Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Harlan, who<br />

have also been mentioned as possible members of the commission, would likewise come within the<br />

limits of the law.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 172 -<br />

Must Show that We Mean Business<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Chicago Journal <strong>and</strong> Press, (Rep.)<br />

What has become of the truculent war spirit that has marked every step of the stormy career of<br />

our own John M. Palmer? In a special dispatch to this paper the venerable Senator is quoted way<br />

down below zero on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. He says that the country in dispute was forsaken by<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

God from the foundation of the world, <strong>and</strong> that it is not worth the life of a single American citizen.<br />

He adds a protest against a protectorate on our part, but says: “We may insist that right shall be<br />

done that weak republic.”<br />

And just here is the weak part of the Senator’s argument, <strong>and</strong> in those of all the pretended<br />

upholders of the Monroe doctrine who are in a panic over the dim prospect of war. <strong>The</strong>re is only<br />

one way of insisting that right shall be done <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> that is by showing Engl<strong>and</strong> that we<br />

mean business. It has come to that delicate point in the negotiations where it is put up or shut up.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re will never be a better time for defining the Monroe doctrine so that its meaning cannot be<br />

misunderstood.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 173 -<br />

INDORSE THE PRESIDENT’S ACTION<br />

Five Republican Aldermen Vote Against Mr. Oakley’s Resolution<br />

<strong>The</strong> Board of Aldermen indorsed the action of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter<br />

yesterday, but not before a h<strong>and</strong>ful of Republican members had put themselves on record against it.<br />

Alderman Oakley brought up the matter by introducing the following resolution on behalf or the<br />

Tammany members:<br />

Whereas, Circumstances have arisen which involve the right <strong>and</strong> justice of one of the recognized principles of<br />

this Government; <strong>and</strong><br />

Whereas, the Hon. Grover Clevel<strong>and</strong>, President of the United States, realizing the importance of maintaining<br />

the autonomy or the American republics, has, in defense of this principle, upheld the dignity <strong>and</strong> honor of the<br />

United States; therefore, be it<br />

Resolved, That the Board of Aldermen of the city of New-York heartily indorse his act.<br />

Alderman Oakley asked that the board agree to his resolution. Alderman Olcott, the Republican<br />

leader, opposed the resolution. He said he did not believe that the Monroe doctrine applied to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> in this case, <strong>and</strong> that in his opinion the President had made a grievous mistake.<br />

Mr. Olcott argued that the question was simply one of territorial boundary, involving a question<br />

of fact yet to be determined. His opinion was that the President <strong>and</strong> Congress had erred in being so<br />

precipitate. Mr. Olcott moved to lay the resolution on the table. This was seconded by Mr. Ware,<br />

(Rep.)<br />

“This resolution,” said Mr. Oakley, “was made brief in order that it could be seen that there is no<br />

politics or no jingoism in it. I do not propose at this time to enter into a controversy with Mr. Olcott<br />

as to the scope of the Monroe doctrine, but I do maintain, however, that the President’s action is<br />

American <strong>and</strong> patriotic, <strong>and</strong> should be indorsed by this board. It has been approved by the<br />

Republican Congress, <strong>and</strong> why should Republicans oppose it here now. I hope that this motion to<br />

table will not prevail.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> motion to table was then lost by a vote of 16 to 11, all Democrats voting against it.<br />

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Mr. Olcott said that the people who were supporting Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> were doing so not because<br />

they loved Clevel<strong>and</strong> more, but Engl<strong>and</strong> less. He wondered whether Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> would have<br />

taken the same st<strong>and</strong> had the country been other than Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Alderman Goodman, (Rep.,) who had voted with Mr. Olcott to table the resolution, said that as<br />

the Congress of the United States had indorsed the course of the President there was no reason why<br />

the Board of Aldermen should not do so. Alderman Ware, who had seconded the resolution to<br />

table, was excused from voting. .<br />

Mr. Oakley’s resolution was finally adopted by a vote of 20 to 5. <strong>The</strong> five Aldermen who voted<br />

against it are Republicans. <strong>The</strong>y are Olcott, R<strong>and</strong>all, Parker, Robinson, <strong>and</strong> School.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 174 -<br />

MEETING LACKED “PEACE”<br />

Called to Protest Against President’s <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Message<br />

HALL CLEARED TO AVOID A RIOT<br />

Majority Cheered the Chief Executive <strong>and</strong> Was In Favor of Upholding Action of Congress<br />

CRIES OF TREASON; VOLLEYS OF HISSES<br />

<strong>The</strong>se Were Directed Against Speakers Such as Henry George <strong>and</strong> Charles Fred Adams<br />

<strong>The</strong> Single Tax League’s so-called “peace” demonstration last night at Cooper Union was worse<br />

than a fiasco; it was almost a riot. Ostensibly called calmly to discuss <strong>and</strong> protest against President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message, the denunciations of the Government by the speakers became<br />

more <strong>and</strong> more violent as the evening proceeded, until finally they reached a climax in the hotheaded<br />

utterances of Charles Fred Adams, who, losing control of himself, piled one epithet on<br />

another in characterizing the President, the Congress <strong>and</strong> the Monroe doctrine. His speech<br />

provoked loud cries of “Traitor!” “Treason!” in all parts of the hall.<br />

<strong>The</strong> audience, three-fourths of which were vociferously in favor of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

position, at the last became so worked up that it needed only the action of the Chairman in choking<br />

off a resolution supporting the Administration to produce a general movement toward the stage.<br />

<strong>The</strong> lights were hastily turned out. Fifty excited Americans jumped on the stage <strong>and</strong> surrounded<br />

Chairman Crosby <strong>and</strong> Henry George.<br />

<strong>The</strong> police cleared the hail. Two hustled out Mr. Crosby. Had it not been for their prompt action<br />

on the stage <strong>and</strong> all over the great subterranean chamber, there is no telling what might have<br />

happened.<br />

<strong>The</strong> following resolution, offered by Chauncey L Dutton, <strong>and</strong> carried by a mighty yell, as the<br />

lights began to go out, expressed the real <strong>and</strong> overwhelming sentiment of the mass meeting.<br />

Resolved, That we, the people of New-York City, hereby declare it to be our profound conviction that the<br />

Monroe doctrine is the only guarantee of permanent peace on this continent <strong>and</strong> to our Nation.<br />

Resolved, That we thank our President <strong>and</strong> Congress for their unanimous support of the Monroe doctrine.<br />

Resolved, That we pledge our lives, our fortune, <strong>and</strong> our sacred honor in support or such measures as the<br />

Congress shall adopt to maintain the Monroe doctrine in its broadest sense against any <strong>and</strong> all attacks.<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

If Mr. Crosby <strong>and</strong> Henry George, <strong>and</strong> the Single Tax leaders had expected to fill Cooper Union<br />

last evening with persons who were in opposition to the application of the Monroe doctrine, or who<br />

would listen silently to denunciation of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, they made the worst calculation of their<br />

lives. <strong>The</strong> hall was at first full to overflowing, but it was evident at the outset that there were three<br />

distinct elements in the evidence. First, there were the Single Taxers, who were angry with the<br />

Government, <strong>and</strong> they composed, certainly, not over one-third of the crowd. Second, there were the<br />

Americans, who were stoutly in sympathy with Congress <strong>and</strong> the Administration. <strong>The</strong>y were at all<br />

times greatly in the majority. <strong>The</strong>n, also, there were those who had come mainly out of curiosity to<br />

hear speeches from such men as Henry George <strong>and</strong> the Rev. Lyman Abbott of Plymouth Church.<br />

Among those on the stage were the Rev. Dr. Abbott, Horace White, Henry George <strong>and</strong> Mrs.<br />

George, Louis F. Post <strong>and</strong> Mrs. Post, Ernest Howard Crosby, Charles Fred Adams, Edward Lawson<br />

Purdy, ex-Assemblyman Edgar L. Ryder, Byron Holt, the Rev. Dr. J. H. Rylance of St. Mark’s<br />

Protestant Episcopal Church, August Lewis, the Rev. Mr. Bliss, a Christian Socialist Minister of<br />

Boston, <strong>and</strong> Robert Baker, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Single Tax<br />

League.<br />

Conspicuous in the audience was George Francis Train. He was armed with a large pair of field<br />

glasses, <strong>and</strong> he wore a big bunch of roses on the lapel of his coat.<br />

“Where Is the American flag?” called out a man in the audience, as Henry George came on the<br />

platform. It was nowhere to be seen. Nowhere on the platform was there a flag or a sign of a<br />

National emblem of any kind.<br />

<strong>The</strong> temper of the meeting was shown at the very beginning, in the short speech made by E. L.<br />

Purdy, in introducing ex- Assemblyman E. H. Crosby as the Chairman.<br />

When Mr. Purdy, in referring to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message, called it “an unfortunate<br />

utterance,” there was a storm of hisses. Mr. Purdy appeared to be astonished. “This meeting,” be<br />

said, reprovingly, “was not called for unruly persons.” <strong>The</strong>re was an outburst of hisses, mingled with<br />

slight h<strong>and</strong>clapping.<br />

Chairman Crosby did not improve the temper of the audience by his remarks. He characterized<br />

the war talk in <strong>and</strong> out of Congress as “an epidemic of froth <strong>and</strong> hysteria.” He was hissed.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chairman denounced the Monroe doctrine. “It is like a European doctrine with which I<br />

became acquainted when I was In Egypt,” he said. “<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine means that we Americans<br />

don’t allow anybody to steal but us.” His voice was drowned in a chorus of hisses <strong>and</strong> hoots.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine,” cried the Chairman, seeking to make himself heard above the storm,<br />

“did not prevent us from taking Texas.”<br />

“Yes, <strong>and</strong> we’ll take Mexico next,” came a loud cry from the audience.<br />

“Am I telling you the truth or not?” shouted Mr. Crosby, red in the face, shaking his finger at his<br />

hearers.<br />

“No! No!” yelled a hundred voices.<br />

“Yes! Yes!” came fainter cries.<br />

An elderly man of respectable appearance arose in the audience to ask a question. He was forced<br />

down by the police, who threatened to eject him.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> beam in our own eye,” continued the Chairman, “prevents from saying that Engl<strong>and</strong> shall<br />

not steal. We –” ; the rest was drowned out by hisses.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy,” said Mr. Crosby, “is merely an ignoble controversy of<br />

speculators over gold mines.”<br />

“Sit down! Sit down!” came from all parts of the building.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> Chairman sought to soothe the now excited audience by dwelling on the near approach of<br />

Christmas <strong>and</strong> the good feeling that should everywhere prevail.<br />

“No religion; leave that to the ministers!” was hurled at the platform by several voices in unison.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chairman referred to Gen. Miles, <strong>and</strong> his suggestion to spend $80,000,000 in defenses. This<br />

brought forth a round of cheers.<br />

“Let us take our places with the heavenly hosts to bring about peace <strong>and</strong> good will to all men,”<br />

said Mr. Crosby, in conclusion.<br />

“Amen!” was shouted at him in derisive voices.<br />

Mr. Purdy read a telegram from the Rev. Dr. R. S. Storrs of Brooklyn, <strong>and</strong> a letter from Bishop<br />

H. C. Potter, expressing sympathy with the purpose of the callers of the meeting. <strong>The</strong>y were<br />

received in silence.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbott was the first speaker. <strong>The</strong>re was some disposition on the part of the<br />

audience to express the prevailing sentiment in the first part of the reverend doctor’s speech, but his<br />

temperate language <strong>and</strong> kind <strong>and</strong> gentle manners, <strong>and</strong> the evident universal respect in which he was<br />

held, soon prevented any further interruptions.<br />

Dr. Abbott did not indulge in any denunciations of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> or Congress or the<br />

Monroe doctrine. He said there was no danger that <strong>Venezuela</strong> could ever menace the United States<br />

by being made the basis of <strong>British</strong> military operations. He cited the fact that Canada, a <strong>British</strong><br />

dependency, was much closer than <strong>Venezuela</strong>. He depreciated the character of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns, said<br />

they had never had a staple government in the last fifty years, whereas <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> had always had<br />

a “staple, reputable, <strong>and</strong> honorable government.” “No man,” he said, “will think the interests of<br />

humanity seriously imperiled if <strong>Venezuela</strong> loses some of her territory to <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.”<br />

<strong>The</strong>re were some hisses at this point.<br />

I am glad to hear these hisses,” said Dr. Abbott, smilingly. “Now I have some one to argue<br />

with.”<br />

During the rest of his speech he was listened to quietly, <strong>and</strong> when near the close he stopped,<br />

smiled, <strong>and</strong> said: “Well, I seem to have converted all of you.”<br />

Dr. Abbott said it was the workingmen’s hearts that would be ploughed by bullets in case of war.<br />

A foundry, he said, was more glorious than an armory. As he closed, a man shouted:<br />

“Down with bloody Engl<strong>and</strong>, the robber of the world!”<br />

A fat man in the second row from the platform snatched his spectacles from his face, turned<br />

around, <strong>and</strong> cried, “You shut your mouth!”<br />

Henry George was greeted with cheers, but he quickly chilled the cheers into an almost<br />

continuous hurricane of hisses. Ho did not refer to the single tax idea, but confined himself to an<br />

arraignment of the President <strong>and</strong> Congress.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> thing of things I have been most afraid of,” he said, “was this war cry. You <strong>and</strong> I know the<br />

last trump of the ruling classes has always been to get up a war.”<br />

He intimated that the ultimate use of the army <strong>and</strong> navy raised in a war in the United States<br />

would be to coerce labor by capital.<br />

“What is this <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question?” he asked. “Is it the boundary line between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> – . . .”<br />

“Honor!” cried dozens of voices.<br />

“How does the King come?” asked Mr. George. “Is it always by enlisting the prejudices of the<br />

people? Let Engl<strong>and</strong> go ahead.”<br />

“No! No!” were the cries.<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

“Let Engl<strong>and</strong> go ahead,” repeated Mr. George.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re was a brief tumult of angrily protesting voices.<br />

“You’re wrong there,” shouted Mr. George.<br />

“We’re right,” was the answering yell.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chairman tried to pacify the audience, but did not succeed.<br />

After the excitement had subsided, Mr. George said: “Is it our business to follow Engl<strong>and</strong> all<br />

around the world undoing her wrong doing?”<br />

“It is in America,” cried a dozen.<br />

“America for Americans!” went up the cry, followed by cheers.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> people who got up this war scare are playing at polities,” shouted Mr. George, now<br />

thoroughly exasperated, stamping his foot on the platform.<br />

“This is treason,” said a hoarse voice.<br />

Instantly some one proposed “Three cheers for Grover Clevel<strong>and</strong>!” <strong>The</strong> cheers came from<br />

hundreds of throats.<br />

Three cheers were next given for Secretary Olney. <strong>The</strong>re were also some hisses.<br />

Mr. George appeared to lose his bearings for a moment. He shook his finger at the audience.<br />

“Were those cheers for Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> I heard a little while ago?” he asked.<br />

“Yes,” was the mighty chorus.<br />

“I cheered for Grover Clevel<strong>and</strong> once,” said Mr. George.<br />

“You’ll do it again.”<br />

“Again?” said Mr. George.<br />

“Yes, again,” came the vociferous answer.<br />

“No, never,” shouted the speaker.<br />

He was hissed.<br />

“War,” said Mr. George, “always means the subjection of the many by the few.”<br />

“How about the American Revolution?” asked a listener.<br />

Mr. George stopped. He was angry clear through. So was most of the audience. Hoots <strong>and</strong> hisses<br />

filled in the interval before he made answer which was, in effect, that Benjamin Franklin had<br />

publicly doubted the advisability of the Revolutionary war.<br />

“This war cry,” said Mr. George, in closing, “is all for the purpose of carrying a Presidential<br />

election.”<br />

Hisses against the speaker <strong>and</strong> cries of “No!” were mingled with cheers for the President.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Mr. Bliss spoke for fifteen minutes on Christian Socialism. He was temperate, <strong>and</strong> he<br />

gave the audience a breathing spell.<br />

Franklin Pierce, gr<strong>and</strong>son of President Pierce, made a fiery speech, which served to arouse the<br />

audience once more into emphatic signs of anger <strong>and</strong> resentment.<br />

A diversion was furnished by Antonia Molina, an excited Cuban. He had not been asked to<br />

speak, but he rushed to the front of the stage, <strong>and</strong> shouted: “Why not help the Cubans?”<br />

Chairman Crosby, Henry George, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Purdy vainly sought to pull back Mr. Molina into a<br />

seat. This only made his excitement more vehement, <strong>and</strong> when finally Mr. Crosby advised that he be<br />

allowed to speak, he was not able to talk coherently, but could only gesticulate.<br />

A letter of sympathy with the object of the callers of the meeting was read from the Rev. N.<br />

Herber Newton.<br />

Charles Fred Adams was the last speaker. His talk was a violent harangue against President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>, Congress <strong>and</strong> the Monroe doctrine. At first the audience, impressed perhaps by his<br />

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prodigious gestures <strong>and</strong> his incessant hopping about, were inclined to make fun. For instance, when<br />

he said he was descended from “Sam” Adams, whom everybody has heard about, there were cries of<br />

“three cheers for Sam Adams,” which were given. But when he began to accuse the President <strong>and</strong><br />

Congress of treason, <strong>and</strong> it was seen he was very much in earnest, he was interrupted every minute<br />

by cries of “treason,” “traitor,” “scoundrel.” Men jumped up all over the ball <strong>and</strong> denounced him.<br />

<strong>The</strong> greatest tumult came when Mr. Adams said: “If the Monroe doctrine gives ground for the<br />

present attitude of the President <strong>and</strong> Congress, then I say (here he uplifted his arm) d– President<br />

Monroe <strong>and</strong> his doctrine.”<br />

<strong>The</strong>n there was, indeed, a great hubbub.<br />

“Put him out!” “Sit down!” “Traitor!” “Treason!” came from every part of the hall. <strong>The</strong> police<br />

rushed into the aisles to anticipate a movement of the angry people toward the stage.<br />

<strong>The</strong> audience gave three cheers for the Monroe doctrine.<br />

As Mr. Adams retired, amid hisses, there were calls for George Francis Train. He refused to<br />

respond.<br />

Chairman Crosby, through the Secretary, put a motion to appoint the speakers a committee to<br />

get the widest possible expression of opinion against President Clevel<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Before the motion could be put Shauncey M. Dutton sprang up from the first row of seats, <strong>and</strong>,<br />

waving a paper, he cried: “Mr. Chairman. I desire to otter a resolution that will express the sense of<br />

this meeting.”<br />

Several men who had been prowling round the rear of the platform, on the watch for such a<br />

proceeding, ran clown the steps into the hole, crying, “Put him out!” <strong>The</strong> audience was now<br />

altogether on its feet, some shouting, some cheering. <strong>The</strong>re was a general movement toward the<br />

platform. Trouble seemed imminent. <strong>The</strong> police grabbed Mr. Dutton <strong>and</strong> rushed him into the anteroom.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chairman put his own resolution. It was lost by a tremendous majority.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> meeting is adjourned,” said the Chairman.<br />

Instantly all but the lights on the stage was extinguished, <strong>and</strong> the police began to clear the hall.<br />

Fifty men jumped on the platform, <strong>and</strong> hard words were inter-changed, <strong>and</strong> fists were thrust under<br />

the noses of Henry George, Mr. Crosby, Robert Barker, Mr. Adams, <strong>and</strong> others identified with the<br />

meeting. Half a dozen police cleared the stage.<br />

Hostilities were renewed on the sidewalk, but a squad of police drove everybody away. <strong>The</strong><br />

people separated hissing, shouting, <strong>and</strong> cheering.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

To the Editor of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times:<br />

- 175 -<br />

Lord Salisbury, the Mischief Maker<br />

One may approve of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message without being a jingo. Nor, in disagreeing<br />

with it, does he need to be a jingo. Jingoes are men who so fiercely pant for war, whose patriotism is<br />

so thoroughly emotional, that they are all aflame on the slightest provocation. <strong>The</strong> fire in their hearts<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

consumes whatever little judgment they may have in their heads. Jingoes are those who so intensely<br />

admire their own opinions, whose dislike of dissent is so bitter, that they sling the mud of nasty<br />

insinuation against every man who does not meekly accept their conclusions. <strong>The</strong>ir gall <strong>and</strong> venom<br />

destroy what little of charity may lurk in the obscure recesses of what they call their hearts.<br />

<strong>The</strong> jingoes are now engaged in the congenial occupation of misrepresenting the President’s<br />

motives, because as a patriotic ruler he has dared in the face of a great crisis to uphold our traditions,<br />

that the Monroe doctrine means that while the powers of Europe, the world’s l<strong>and</strong> thieves, may, so<br />

far as we are concerned, steal <strong>and</strong> carve up for themselves Africa, Asia, <strong>and</strong> the isl<strong>and</strong>s of foreign<br />

seas, may use their hypocritical pretense of sympathy for suffering Armenians as a pretext for<br />

dividing the Sultan’s dominions, they shall when casting their greedy eyes upon <strong>and</strong> turning their<br />

predatory footsteps to the American continent be met by the fiat of the United States: Thus far <strong>and</strong><br />

no further. “It is to the interest of this Nation, as the original <strong>and</strong> foremost champion of republican<br />

forms of government, to defend all American republics in their rights, but not in their wrongs.” By<br />

that principle we have lived, for that principle we will fight.<br />

We have seen English troops occupying the port of Corinto in order to exact just retribution for<br />

a wrong committed by an American republic, <strong>and</strong> we have properly remained silent. We have seen<br />

Spanish troops trying to quell a rebellion in an isl<strong>and</strong> lying almost within our own coast line, <strong>and</strong><br />

although it was to our interests to have that rebellion succeed, we have honorably refrained from<br />

giving it the succor which would have insured success. But whet we behold the English Government<br />

charged with a fraudulent attempt to crowd a weak American republic out of territory it has long<br />

claimed, our President speaks in no uncertain tones: Thus far <strong>and</strong> no further, until we examine into<br />

the facts, to the end that if the weaker nation is in the right we may defend it, <strong>and</strong> if in the wrong,<br />

we may leave it to shift for itself.<br />

With an amusing obtuseness—or is it by intentional misrepresentation?—the jingoes <strong>and</strong> the<br />

slingoes have missed the point of the controversy. It was that English jingo, Lord Salisbury, not Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>, who shot “the bolt from the blue” By a special letter, so written that his position might<br />

have the greater emphasis from st<strong>and</strong>ing by itself, thus brought out in bold relief, which it would not<br />

be if hidden away in another document, he presented to our astonished gaze in a most cynical,<br />

contemptuous way the alternative of ab<strong>and</strong>oning the Monroe doctrine or undergoing Engl<strong>and</strong>’s illwill.<br />

He had the jaunty arrogance to notify Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> directly that while Engl<strong>and</strong> had once<br />

approved the Monroe doctrine, she now withdrew that approval. Times had changed; it had become<br />

obsolete; she would no longer recognize it. It was he, not in an address to his own country, but in a<br />

message to our Government, who in the silken language of a wily diplomacy, tendered us the issue<br />

of war. He, this English jingo, virtually said to be a ruler who in the Hawaiian difficulty as well as in<br />

those above mentioned, had shown his love of justice <strong>and</strong> of peace: If you wish to maintain your<br />

vaunted Monroe doctrine you must fight.<br />

Now, it may well be a fair question for argument whether the Monroe doctrine has become<br />

obsolete, or whether it is for all time. But I fancy we will not give it up until that matter has been<br />

fairly argued among us. Certainly we will not tamely surrender upon Engl<strong>and</strong>’s dictation. When it<br />

was put forth, an English Minister, Canning, claimed to have begot it. If after seventy years, we now<br />

withdraw it, another English Minister will boast that he strangled it!<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, instead of answering this haughty defiance, quietly transmits it to Congress,<br />

with a message, which is temperate in tone, dignified n manner, guarded in matter, entirely impartial,<br />

<strong>and</strong> asks Congress to take measures to ascertain the facts out of which the dispute between the<br />

strong <strong>and</strong> the weak nation has arisen, so that we may see what final st<strong>and</strong> an enlightened self-<br />

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interest requires us to take. Engl<strong>and</strong> responds as the bully always does, by saying we are doing the<br />

pushing!<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is not one word in the message from first to last, which takes sides with <strong>Venezuela</strong> against<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, nothing which prejudges the merits of their dispute. Lord Salisbury assails the Monroe<br />

doctrine <strong>and</strong> Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> declines to ab<strong>and</strong>on it. It were well, after the hubbub of last week, if the<br />

jingoes <strong>and</strong> the slingoes would read that message again. It might quiet their heated souls.<br />

JOHN BROOKS LEAVITT<br />

New-York, Forefathers’ Day, Dee. 22. 1895<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 176 -<br />

LORD SALISBURY ASSENTS TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE<br />

<strong>The</strong> London <strong>News</strong>, on “sober second thought,” concludes that the American <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

commission “may be positively useful” in supplying us better information about the <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

boundary.<br />

Quite likely. It is to be appointed for that purpose. But what will be the course of her Majesty’s<br />

Ministers if the commission shall report, on evidence submitted, that the territory in dispute is<br />

wholly or in large part <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s?<br />

We do not think they will venture to disregard the finding. In his letter in reply to Secretary<br />

Olney’s dispatch of July 20, Lord Salisbury wrote:<br />

“Her Majesty’s Government . . . fully concur with the view which President Monroe apparently<br />

entertained, that any disturbance of the existing territorial distribution in that hemisphere by any<br />

fresh acquisitions on the part of any European State would be a highly inexpedient change.”<br />

That is an admission of great importance. It will long be remembered that an English Prime<br />

Minister has declared that a violation of the Monroe doctrine by a European State would be “highly<br />

inexpedient.”<br />

We think so, too.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 177 -<br />

No War Expected—or Feared<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Raleigh <strong>News</strong> <strong>and</strong> Observer (N.C.) (Dem.)<br />

Serious as is the situation, we do not believe these two great peoples, common in origin,<br />

language, laws, <strong>and</strong> customs—foremost in the march of civilization <strong>and</strong> mightiest of all nations—<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

will in the broad light of the nineteenth century, fight over a beggarly plot of l<strong>and</strong> in which, it has<br />

been said, there is not room enough to bury the slain.<br />

<strong>The</strong> masses of the people do not want war, <strong>and</strong> most reluctantly will support a war waged over<br />

interests so remote from our own. <strong>The</strong>y will support their Government, but they will dem<strong>and</strong> that it<br />

proceed slowly, <strong>and</strong> make ever sacrifice for peace consistent with an enlightened sense of national<br />

dignity.<br />

But let it be understood, once for all, that this Government has firmly set up the time-honored<br />

contention that the extension of European sovereignty in the two Americas cannot be tolerated by<br />

the United States, <strong>and</strong> that, therefore, claims to territory in this hemisphere, advanced by any<br />

European nation, which are disputed, must be submitted to arbitration. If Great Britain continues to<br />

scoff at this doctrine <strong>and</strong> still firmly refuses to submit her claims to arbitration, then there will<br />

undoubtedly be war.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 178 -<br />

No Occasion for War<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Sioux City Tribune, (Iowa), (Dem.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> world has come to accept the refusal to arbitrate as evidence that the nation so refusing is in<br />

the wrong, <strong>and</strong> hence, should Great Britain conclude to defy the United States <strong>and</strong> undertake<br />

arbitrarily to establish a new boundary line between <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, she would outrage the<br />

sense of justice of every nation. <strong>The</strong>re will be no war, because there is no occasion for war.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 179 -<br />

NO SURRENDER OF PRINCIPLE<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s Position Will Be Courageously Sustained<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Salt Lake City Herald (Dem.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> New-York World declares the message to be a blunder because it is not sustained by<br />

international law; because it puts the United States in a false position; because its assumption is<br />

absurd. That tone might do for the English press, but it by no means reflects the spirit of the<br />

American people, nor is it justified by anything that appears either in the message of the Chief<br />

Executive or the correspondence of Secretary Olney.<br />

This country is confronted with the question as to whether it will maintain or surrender the<br />

Monroe doctrine—a doctrine which is supposed to have shaped the foreign policy of our<br />

Government for seventy years of our National life. To yield to the bluster of Engl<strong>and</strong> in this<br />

controversy means to surrender the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> that the people of America are not<br />

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prepared to do. <strong>The</strong>y would repudiate the Administration that would recommend it; <strong>and</strong> that man or<br />

paper that counsels it the people will set down as more English than American.<br />

We have asked for nothing but what is right, we will submit to nothing wrong, is the spirit of<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message to Congress on the subject of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

people of the United States, without regard to party affiliation, will sustain the President in the st<strong>and</strong><br />

he has taken.<br />

It has only dem<strong>and</strong>ed that the boundary-line dispute be submitted to arbitration, a proposition<br />

which Engl<strong>and</strong> rejects. Very well, then the United States Government, if it follows the courageous<br />

recommendations of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>—<strong>and</strong> we are of opinion it will—will take steps to ascertain<br />

for itself where the boundary line should run. It may be that the commission of examination asked<br />

for by the President would find that all the territory claimed by Engl<strong>and</strong> rightfully belongs to her; if<br />

so it would be for Engl<strong>and</strong> to enforce her rights. But if the commission should find that Engl<strong>and</strong> is<br />

seeking to extend her frontiers <strong>and</strong> thus enlarge her possessions in America in violation of the<br />

Monroe doctrine, the duty of the United States would be perfectly clear—it would be to maintain<br />

the Monroe doctrine.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 180 -<br />

No Politics in This Controversy<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Butte Inter-Mountain (Mon.) (Rep.)<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no politics in this controversy between this country <strong>and</strong> Great Britain over the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> imbroglio. It is a matter in which all true Americans, regardless of political affiliations,<br />

st<strong>and</strong> shoulder to shoulder in defense of their country’s rights, their country’s integrity, <strong>and</strong> their<br />

country’s honor. It is a matter in which every American forgets or ignores politics <strong>and</strong> remembers<br />

only that he is an American, not only in name but in all the name implies. <strong>The</strong> President’s message<br />

appeals directly to the sympathies, the sense of justice, <strong>and</strong> the patriotism of the whole American<br />

people. It is couched in unmistakably direct <strong>and</strong> firm, yet dignified, language. It is not possible for<br />

Great Britain to misunderst<strong>and</strong> or misinterpret its meaning. <strong>The</strong> message is in the nature of an<br />

ultimatum from this Government. It emphasizes the determination of the Administration to adhere<br />

to the principle embodied in the Monroe doctrine. It is hardly with the range of possibilities that<br />

Great Britain will try conclusions with this country at the point of the sword over this matter. She<br />

has too much at stake in Irel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Canada, to enter into war with the United States. Great Britain<br />

can afford to make a stalwart bluff; this Government cannot afford to set aside the Monroe<br />

doctrine. It is vital to its existence. For once Clevel<strong>and</strong> is right. Congress is all right, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

American people are always eminently right. For these reasons <strong>and</strong> others given we cannot believe a<br />

war with Great Britain is possible.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

- 181 -<br />

Opposition to the United States in the United States<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Brooklyn Eagle of Yesterday<br />

For eighty years Engl<strong>and</strong> has refused to <strong>Venezuela</strong> an arbitration of the boundary dispute<br />

between them. For nearly half that time Engl<strong>and</strong> has refused such arbitration, on the suggestion of<br />

the United States. In that time the boundary claim, or encroachment of Great Britain upon<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, has advanced from a strip about the size of Rhode Isl<strong>and</strong>, to a section as large as five of<br />

the six New-Engl<strong>and</strong> States. If this has been right, arbitration would show it. If it has been wrong,<br />

arbitration would show that. A refusal of arbitration creates the presumption that recourse to<br />

arbitration would not show the rightfulness of progressive encroachment.<br />

Arbitration refused, the facts still remain to be ascertained. If there is any other way to ascertain<br />

them than by investigation that other way has not been disclosed. <strong>The</strong> President has asked for<br />

authority to order such an investigation. Every member of the House at Representatives <strong>and</strong> every<br />

member of the United States Senate has voted for a bill appropriating $100,000 for the expenses of<br />

such an investigation by men to be appointed by the President. <strong>The</strong> appointment of these men is<br />

under consideration. This action is the action of the Government, if any action in this world ever<br />

was. It must be held to be the action of the people, <strong>and</strong> the unanimous action of the people, for they<br />

ad through their representatives, <strong>and</strong> their representatives have unanimously taken this action.<br />

Investigation has been ordered by law. Opposition to it is opposition to law. It has been ordered by<br />

the law of the United States. Opposition to it is opposition to the United States. In our civil strife<br />

that was called disloyalty. Possibly the definition was incorrect. If, however, the definition was true<br />

then, it has not become false now, because now the men who practice it were then the men who<br />

stigmatized it.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 182 -<br />

STAND BY THE PRESIDENT<br />

This Is the Imperative Duty Which Confronts the American People<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Boston Journal, (Rep.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Boston Stock Exchange, on consideration, has determined to proceed deliberately, <strong>and</strong> to<br />

take no action calculated to embarrass the President, <strong>and</strong> the meeting which a few members of the<br />

New-York Chamber of Commerce desired to call to obstruct his course has been indefinitely<br />

ab<strong>and</strong>oned. After the first flurry, it is being recognized on all h<strong>and</strong>s that it is the imperative duty of<br />

the entire Nation to st<strong>and</strong> by the President <strong>and</strong> Congress. That is the wisest <strong>and</strong> safest policy so far<br />

as the country’s great financial interests are concerned, <strong>and</strong> it is the wisest <strong>and</strong> safest policy, too, as<br />

regards the present controversy with Great Britain. Anything which is calculated to weaken our own<br />

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Government in this case inevitably tends to make a peaceful <strong>and</strong> satisfactory outcome more<br />

doubtful.<br />

In the meantime President Clevel<strong>and</strong> appeals to Congress for definite authority to make another<br />

issue of bonds. <strong>The</strong> pestilent Populists, who are the only declared opponents of his <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

message in Washington, are disposed to fight this other proposition also. Anything which weakens<br />

the President strengthens them <strong>and</strong> indirectly promotes all their financial <strong>and</strong> economic lunacies.<br />

<strong>The</strong> sagacious business men of the North <strong>and</strong> East have come to see this, <strong>and</strong> that is one reason<br />

why the President has met, <strong>and</strong> will meet, with no important opposition from New-York or New-<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 183 -<br />

Support the President—No Back Down<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Evening Sun of Yesterday<br />

President Roosevelt of the Police Board said, regarding the President’s message on the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n question:<br />

“I cannot too heartily praise the admirable message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>. He <strong>and</strong> Secretary<br />

Olney deserve the utmost credit. I am delighted that the House <strong>and</strong> Senate rose to the level of the<br />

occasion <strong>and</strong> acted in a spirit of broadminded patriotism.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> essence of the Monroe doctrine is that the European powers shall not be permitted to<br />

increase their territories on American soil at the expense of independent American States. Great<br />

Britain is now seeking to do this very thing at the expense of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> we could not submit to<br />

it without loss of National self respect.<br />

“People talk of relying upon Engl<strong>and</strong>’s honor <strong>and</strong> fairmindedness as a sufficient guarantee that<br />

she will not wrong <strong>Venezuela</strong>. I have never shared the popular dislike of Engl<strong>and</strong> but I have also<br />

never shared in those delusions about her which, though not popular, are in some quarters<br />

fashionable. Engl<strong>and</strong> never lets a consideration of abstract right or morality interfere with the<br />

chance for her national aggr<strong>and</strong>izement or mercantile gain.<br />

“I earnestly hope that neither the Chamber of Commerce nor any other body of reputable<br />

citizens will do anything that can even be construed into a failure to support to the fullest extent the<br />

American side of the pending question. And I would like to say right here that the talk of <strong>British</strong><br />

fleets ransoming American cities is too foolish to me for serious consideration. American cities may<br />

possibly be bombarded, but no ransom will be paid for them.<br />

“I hope there will be no backdown. We should st<strong>and</strong> right up to the position we have taken. No<br />

consideration, personal, political, or financial, should influence any of our people. We should st<strong>and</strong><br />

right behind the President <strong>and</strong> Congress, <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> that the position we have assumed shall be<br />

kept at all hazards. We earnestly hope that there will be no war, but far worse than any war would be<br />

a peace purchased at the cost of any loss of National self-respect.”<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

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- 184 -<br />

PRAISE FOR THE MESSAGE<br />

Tammany Hall Committee Indorses the President’s Action<br />

SUPPORT FOR THE NATION’S CHIEF<br />

Speeches by County Clerk Purroy, Senator-elect Grady, <strong>and</strong> Others<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message to Congress on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question was indorsed last night<br />

by the Tammany Committee on Organization at its meeting, held in the Wigwam. <strong>The</strong> attendance<br />

was large, <strong>and</strong> the meeting, which was called to adopt the call for the primaries, was given over for<br />

the most part to patriotic speeches.<br />

County Clerk Henry D. Purroy presided <strong>and</strong> John B. McGoldrick <strong>and</strong> William H. McDonough<br />

acted as Secretaries After the minutes were read, Mr. Purroy said that as he had a resolution to<br />

offer, he would ask Vice Chairman George W. Plunkitt to take the chair, Mr. Plunkitt did so, <strong>and</strong><br />

Mr. Purroy, taking the floor, said that, although it might be out of order, he desired consideration of<br />

a matter that was now deeply agitating the public—President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s recent message—<strong>and</strong> he<br />

asked that a special committee of five be at once appointed to prepare a resolution upon it. This was<br />

carried unanimously, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Purroy, ex-City Chamberlain T. C. T. Crain, William E. Stillings,<br />

Charles F. Allen, <strong>and</strong> William Sohmer were named on the committee.<br />

This committee lost no time in reporting the following resolution:<br />

Resolved, That the Democratic-Republican organization of the City <strong>and</strong> County of New-York hereby expresses<br />

its full approval of the well-considered, statesmanlike, <strong>and</strong> patriotic message of the President of the United States on<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary question, <strong>and</strong>, speaking on behalf of the majority of the citizens of this metropolis, it<br />

pledges to him, as the trusted chief of a united nation, a most loyal <strong>and</strong> unwavering support.<br />

This resolution was read by Mr. Purroy, <strong>and</strong> was received with great enthusiasm. Mr. Purroy, in<br />

moving the adoption of the resolution, said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> fearless maintenance of the great principle which more than seventy years ago was first<br />

proclaimed by President Monroe, <strong>and</strong> which last week was again enunciated by President Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

with a force which has since echoed <strong>and</strong> re-echoed throughout the world, must necessarily be of the<br />

most absorbing interest to every American citizen who is worthy of the name.<br />

“Stripped or all unnecessary verbiage, <strong>and</strong> apart from all quibbling distinctions, the Monroe<br />

doctrine, in the minds of a vast majority of our people, has for years assumed the full meaning of a<br />

National declaration that no European power shall ever be permitted to increase, by force or<br />

usurpation, its present possessions in America.<br />

“I know full well that some newspapers <strong>and</strong> certain distinguished representatives of trade, have<br />

warmly disputed this interpretation; but, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, our President <strong>and</strong> our Secretary of State,<br />

our House of Representatives, <strong>and</strong> our Senate, have deliberately proclaimed that such is its true<br />

meaning, <strong>and</strong> in doing so, their action has struck a responsive chord in the great heart of the<br />

American people, <strong>and</strong> has evoked a spontaneous, <strong>and</strong> almost unanimous, approval.<br />

“If the true meaning of the Monroe doctrine be as heretofore stated, then there never was a case<br />

which came more clearly <strong>and</strong> fairly within its purview than does the English-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

controversy, <strong>and</strong> if this doctrine be as important as we have often declared it, <strong>and</strong> if, therefore, our<br />

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National honor dem<strong>and</strong> that we uphold it at any cost, would it not be most pusillanimous on our<br />

part, while enforcing it unhesitatingly against a feeble neighbor, to shift <strong>and</strong> falter the first time it<br />

brings us face to face with a great power, our supposed equal in strength <strong>and</strong> influence?<br />

“This <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question has for me personally a peculiar interest, because, more than forty<br />

years ago, my father represented in this city a number of the South American republics, <strong>and</strong> largely<br />

influenced, perhaps, by this fact, I have always given to the affairs of Spanish America <strong>and</strong> their<br />

relation to the affairs of the United States more than ordinary attention, <strong>and</strong> latterly have tried, by all<br />

means at my comm<strong>and</strong>, to fully learn the merits of this boundary quarrel.<br />

“I shall not attempt, to-night, to discuss at any length the facts bearing upon it, because to my<br />

mind they have been set forth most clearly in the very able <strong>and</strong> logical letter of our Secretary of<br />

State, but I do desire to summarize my own opinion in the brief statement that the record<br />

conclusively shows that Engl<strong>and</strong>’s conduct in this whole matter especially in refusing to submit her<br />

claims to just arbitration, is only one more example of that rapacious greed of power which,<br />

throughout her whole history, has repeatedly led her to unscrupulously encroach upon <strong>and</strong> usurp the<br />

possessions of weaker States, <strong>and</strong> which has justly won for her the title of ‘the robber nation of the<br />

world.’<br />

“Apart from the protecting presence of the United States, South America presents to European<br />

avarice a most tempting field for invasion—an immense territory, nearly one-fourth of the whole<br />

globe in size, already occupied in part by European colonies, poorly guarded, comparatively sparsely<br />

populated, <strong>and</strong> richer, perhaps, in unexplored mineral wealth than any other similarly situated<br />

section of the world. Do we wish to see repeated on American soil the shameful duplicities <strong>and</strong><br />

atrocities which disgraced humanity during the progress of the English thefts of India <strong>and</strong> Africa? If<br />

we do not, then let us not st<strong>and</strong> by now, idly <strong>and</strong> silently, while the first step in that direction is<br />

being deliberately taken, but let us speak out so plainly <strong>and</strong> so forcibly that our heartfelt <strong>and</strong><br />

indignant protest shall suffice for all future time.<br />

“Mr. Chairman, some critics assert that President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, by his recent message, has made<br />

fearfully imminent what may be a most shocking <strong>and</strong> disastrous war. I do not agree with them. I am<br />

no worshipper of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, but I sincerely believe that by his well-considered <strong>and</strong> patriotic<br />

declaration he has for the first time opened full wide the eyes of Europe to our unalterable<br />

determination to protect, at any cost, American soil from European usurpation, <strong>and</strong> I am convinced<br />

that in so doing he has, by one well-directed stroke, accomplished far more toward averting war with<br />

Great Britain than could ever be attained by all the silly talk about mere imaginary kinship <strong>and</strong><br />

brotherly love.<br />

“Mr. Chairman, the prospects of war growing out of the President’s message are not at all<br />

alarming. Every sensible man deprecates <strong>and</strong> dreads war, for he well knows the desolation <strong>and</strong><br />

horrors which follow in its wake. But if, to preserve the Nation’s life <strong>and</strong> honor, it become necessary<br />

to arm her loyal sons, it may not be amiss for us at this time, when so much Is being said about<br />

Anglo-Saxon unity, to let it be proclaimed that, ready to respond to the first call of duty, there are<br />

hundreds of thous<strong>and</strong>s of sturdy American citizens who will not be hampered ever so little by any<br />

kinship with Engl<strong>and</strong>; but who, on the contrary, while gladly serving the country which they love<br />

better than their lives, will also see before them a golden opportunity to help to wipe out a debt<br />

which they owe their forefathers—a debt involving centuries of spoliation, misgovernment, <strong>and</strong><br />

cruelty—a debt which Lally <strong>and</strong> Dillon only partly paid upon the field of Fontenoy.”<br />

Mr. Purroy’s address was frequently interrupted by cheering <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong> clapping, <strong>and</strong> when he had<br />

concluded half a dozen men were on the floor dem<strong>and</strong>ing the recognition of the Chair. Mr. Plunkitt<br />

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recognized Senator-elect Thomas F. Grady, who spoke on the resolutions in a way that set the<br />

braves of the wigwam cheering <strong>and</strong> yelling with enthusiasm.<br />

At the outset Mr. Grady got a shot at the so-called peace meeting at the Cooper Union by saying<br />

that it “is eminently fitting that, while in another hall an audience made up of the peace-at-any-cost<br />

class of citizens is repudiating the patriotic action of the President, here, in the oldest Democratic<br />

institution in the county—in the temple where the fire has been kept burning upon the altar of<br />

liberty for 106 years—we should indorse his patriotic message.”<br />

Mr. Grady then eulogized American citizenship <strong>and</strong> wound up this portion of his address with<br />

the declaration that “we should not claim to be American citizens unless we are ready to take such<br />

action as may be necessary to preserve our National honor.” At this the committee was aroused to<br />

high pitch of enthusiasm. This was also the case when Mr. Grady spoke of this country as a Nation<br />

of almost 70,000,000 people, “peaceable <strong>and</strong> at peace with all the world until our National honor is<br />

affronted.”<br />

Lord Salisbury, he said, had declared that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question was no concern of ours.<br />

“Lord Salisbury’s predecessors many years ago held a similar opinion as to certain other things<br />

relating to this country,” he said.<br />

“That eminent humorist who mixes railroad management with political ambition can see nothing<br />

in this great message but an electioneering dodge,” said Mr. Grady.<br />

“Yet the Congress of the United States, as one man, has sustained it. <strong>The</strong> people of this splendid<br />

federation of States have sustained it. I am not one bit afraid of its being an electioneering dodge. It<br />

was time to awaken the American spirit. Salisbury’s letter was nothing but a challenge to Americans<br />

to defend the doctrine that was first enunciated by President Monroe, <strong>and</strong> as such it will be accepted<br />

by this great Nation. <strong>The</strong> President’s message, for the first time, has notified Engl<strong>and</strong> of the rights<br />

of this country, <strong>and</strong> of the firm intention of the people to maintain them in this generation.”<br />

Congressman William Sulzer got the floor next, <strong>and</strong> declared that the people who were meeting<br />

in Cooper Institute were Tories.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re were Tories in 1776; there were Tories in 1812, <strong>and</strong> of course there must be Tories in<br />

this country now.”<br />

Mr. Sulzer proceeded to tell of the enthusiastic manner in which the President’s message was<br />

received in Congress, <strong>and</strong> made a long speech on the various features of the dispute. He was<br />

frequently interrupted by applause.<br />

Ex-City Chamberlain Crain moved that a committee of five be appointed to report a resolution<br />

indorsing the President to the meeting of the General Committee on Friday night.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chair held that this was out of order for the time being, <strong>and</strong> Augustus W. Peters then<br />

moved the adoption of the resolution, <strong>and</strong> it was carried with a great chorus of “ayes.” <strong>The</strong>re was<br />

not a single “no.”<br />

Mr. Crain then renewed his motion <strong>and</strong> it was carried. Ex-Police Commissioner James J. Martin<br />

moved that the committee be the same as that which reported the resolution last night. This was<br />

agreed to.<br />

<strong>The</strong> action taken at last night’s meeting of the Committee on Organization was arranged for at<br />

yesterday afternoon’s meeting of the Tammany Executive Committee. . .<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

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- 185 -<br />

Peace, but St<strong>and</strong> by the Monroe Doctrine<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Independent<br />

We have peace with Engl<strong>and</strong>; we expect to maintain it. We are not beyond the province of<br />

diplomacy. Engl<strong>and</strong> has given us no ultimatum, nor has she given <strong>Venezuela</strong> an ultimatum. It is not<br />

cowardly on our part to refuse to precipitate a conflict. It is moral cowardice not to persist in<br />

peaceful negotiations.<br />

We do not propose abject surrender. We propose to st<strong>and</strong> by the Monroe doctrine. Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

gave her cordial assent to it once; why not again?<br />

Lord Salisbury, in his last note, intimates a possible way out of the present dilemma. He says that<br />

when <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s internal politics become more settled, the <strong>British</strong> Government may be able to<br />

adopt a more conciliatory course toward her. Here is an opportunity for Engl<strong>and</strong> to come out of the<br />

affair with honor. She has said she would not agree to our proposition for arbitration; she has not<br />

said she will not try to arrange the difficulty amicably with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Let us have faith that<br />

honorable peace will be secured, <strong>and</strong> let the hotheads on both sides of the Atlantic, who are<br />

conjuring up the spectre of war be treated as chattering magpies.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 186 -<br />

SENSIBLE ENGLISH COMMENT<br />

London <strong>News</strong>papers Show Fairness in Discussing the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Matter<br />

LONDON, Dec. 23.—<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette to-day prints an article in reference to the relations<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States, in which it says:<br />

We are still friends or the Americans, <strong>and</strong> as the excitement ebbs the tide of sense returns. It is for every<br />

English influence to spread calmer thoughts <strong>and</strong> build a golden bridge by which the former kindness may return.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette, under the caption, “Thank Goodness for the Holidays,” protests against<br />

the inflammatory opinions published by the press, which, it says, “are breeding bad blood between<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America, <strong>and</strong> making thoughts of war familiar to the peaceably inclined.”<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re is plenty of room” declares <strong>The</strong> Gazette, “for common sense to be exercised in Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

as well as in the United States. It ought to be recognized that Americans have a warm attachment for<br />

the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> that there is a good deal of reason on their side.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle will say to-morrow:<br />

If the commission is composed of men like Messrs. Phelps, White, <strong>and</strong> Edmunds, it must comm<strong>and</strong> respect,<br />

apart from its irregular origin. It would, in that case, occur to Lord Salisbury that some further proposal from him<br />

would be expedient, indeed necessary. This is not an instance where the diplomatic door can be closed with a bang.<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

In its issue to-morrow <strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard will reargue the <strong>British</strong> position on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

It predicts that American common-sense eventually will adopt its view, <strong>and</strong> says it may be presumed<br />

that the President will appoint as members of the commission men whose opinions are entitled to<br />

the respect of Englishmen, even though it may be impossible to admit their competence to<br />

pronounce a binding judgment on contested facts.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> will discuss to-morrow the prospective labors of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n High<br />

Commission. It will say:<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission, of course, will not invite communications from Great Britain, but should Ambassador Bayard<br />

require further information tending to elucidate our case, we feel sure that it will not be withheld. This country has<br />

never for a moment thought of pleading before the commission, but it cannot conduce either to our dignity or<br />

interests to leave the commission in the dark respecting the facts on which we base our dem<strong>and</strong>. It probably will be<br />

found that the <strong>British</strong> dispatches to Washington will furnish all the information required. Should they fail to present<br />

our case completely, Mr. Bayard may very probably ask for further information on his own account. This will<br />

probably be freely <strong>and</strong> courteously supplied.<br />

<strong>The</strong> paper again dilates upon the return of moderation in America, <strong>and</strong> says: “<strong>The</strong> community<br />

has righted itself from unwisdom in a day <strong>and</strong> a night. We may all be proud of this. Assuredly no<br />

other race in the world would or could have performed the feat in the same time. We must be<br />

careful to guard against all language calculated to provoke reaction.”<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 187 -<br />

THERE WILL BE NO WAR<br />

But the Country Will Prepare Itself to Meet One When It Comes<br />

CONCORD, N. H., Dec. 23.—Senator Gallinger returned from Washington this morning, <strong>and</strong><br />

will spend the holidays at his home in this city. When questioned about the probable outcome of the<br />

present difficulty between this country <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> over the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary line, he said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re will be no war between this country <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>, because the people of neither country<br />

would sanction such an extreme measure, <strong>and</strong> I am confident that when Engl<strong>and</strong> has played her<br />

game of bluff to the limit, an amicable underst<strong>and</strong>ing will be reached between that country <strong>and</strong> the<br />

South American republic. Congress is behind President Clevel<strong>and</strong> in this matter, <strong>and</strong> I believe the<br />

American people will sustain the position he has taken to a man.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> effect of the President’s message is bound to work good for the country. <strong>The</strong> true<br />

American spirit has been aroused to such an extent that the military defense of the country will, I am<br />

sure, now be placed in such condition that when such dem<strong>and</strong>s are made on foreign countries, we<br />

shall have the guns <strong>and</strong> men to back them up. We have gone on the theory that we can whip<br />

anything in sight too long. <strong>The</strong> present crisis has brought us to a full realization of our needs in this<br />

direction. Should war come, incalculable damage could be done before we could get ready to meet<br />

an enemy on an equal footing. In the present temper I think Congress will be very liberal in the<br />

matter of appropriations for military purposes. Further, I think it will awaken the American people<br />

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to the necessity of securing various strategic points both in the Atlantic <strong>and</strong> Pacific, in order to make<br />

the country absolutely safe from foreign attack.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> gist of the whole matter in a nutshell is this: Neither Congress nor the American people<br />

desire war with Engl<strong>and</strong> or any other country, but the time has come for them to assert their<br />

position <strong>and</strong> to maintain it against all odds. If peace can be maintained with honor, all right; if it<br />

cannot, war is the only alternative.”<br />

In regard to the currency question, the Senator said that Congress would pass bills increasing<br />

tariff on various articles in order to obtain more money for the Treasury, but beyond that nothing<br />

could be done, as the free-silver element in the Senate would prevent any action looking to the<br />

issuance of short-term bonds or bonds of any other character.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 188 -<br />

THERE IS NO “PANIC” HERE<br />

Wall Street Is Not America, <strong>and</strong> the People Are with the President<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Washington Post, (Ind.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> people in the country at large are not likely to be affected by the lamentations of Wall Street<br />

or to recognize in a panic on the stock market any real disaster to our domestic industries. <strong>The</strong><br />

country will not be frightened into submission to Engl<strong>and</strong>’s arrogant pretensions because a few<br />

speculators are forced to the wall by a flurry in gambling circles. If foreigners choose to get alarmed<br />

over the situation, <strong>and</strong> to send their stocks <strong>and</strong> bonds to New-York for sale at a loss, that is no<br />

concern of the American people. <strong>The</strong> fact does not mean that the railroads, mines, <strong>and</strong><br />

manufactories upon which these stocks <strong>and</strong> bonds are based have lost their earning powers, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

is the only question with which we need concern ourselves. <strong>The</strong> whole aim <strong>and</strong> purpose of this<br />

unloading of American securities by foreign holders is to frighten or dissuade us from the course we<br />

have marked out for ourselves.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President has touched a patriotic chord, <strong>and</strong> the American people have responded with<br />

instant <strong>and</strong> harmonious enthusiasm. <strong>The</strong> whole Nation is behind him. What is needed, <strong>and</strong> what the<br />

President, no doubt, wants, is a retirement of the Treasury dem<strong>and</strong> notes <strong>and</strong> the substitution for<br />

them of a currency equal in volume <strong>and</strong> in value, but divested of that prerogative which at present<br />

constitutes our greatest peril <strong>and</strong> embarrassment. This is not beyond the reach of immediate<br />

achievement.<br />

Unquestionably some legislation of this kind is imperative. Unquestionably it is the solemn duty<br />

of Congress to address itself to that task in a spirit of patriotic statesmanship. It is evident that<br />

Europe is now endeavoring to divert the United States from its present purpose, <strong>and</strong> that Europe<br />

has her allies in all the great American markets. <strong>The</strong> usurer <strong>and</strong> the money changer know neither<br />

creed nor nationality.<br />

At all times <strong>and</strong> in all places either is a man without a country, who knows only the god or<br />

avarice. It behooves us, therefore, as a people, to protect ourselves, to place our Treasury beyond<br />

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the reach of any foe, to erect financial bulwarks against which neither the avowed foe nor the<br />

disguised traitor may prevail. This we can do. This the President asks us to do.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 189 -<br />

THE RESPONSE OF THE PEOPLE<br />

It Was Prompt, General, <strong>and</strong> Enthusiastic<br />

From <strong>The</strong> St. Louis Globe-Democrat (Rep.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> response to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s vigorous <strong>and</strong> straightforward assertion of the Monroe<br />

doctrine in the <strong>Venezuela</strong> case was prompt, general, <strong>and</strong> enthusiastic. In a certain sense, the message<br />

was a surprise, but it was not that form of the unexpected which confuses the public mind <strong>and</strong><br />

provokes discord <strong>and</strong> controversy. <strong>The</strong> people were prepared for it, <strong>and</strong> it suited their mood of<br />

thought <strong>and</strong> feeling upon the subject. It aroused their spirit as American citizens like a match<br />

touched to gunpowder. In an instant all divisions in the way of political opinion <strong>and</strong> association<br />

were suspended <strong>and</strong> forgotten, <strong>and</strong> the sentiment of patriotism took possession of the situation.<br />

Republicans <strong>and</strong> Democrats alike discarded their party badges <strong>and</strong> ceased to recognize any emblem<br />

but the flag of the country. Congress did not stop to discuss the matter or to observe unnecessary<br />

parliamentary formalities, but brushed aside all minor circumstances <strong>and</strong> went directly to the main<br />

point of indorsing the message <strong>and</strong> giving notice of unanimous resolution to st<strong>and</strong> by it without<br />

compromise or equivocation. <strong>The</strong>re were those, to be sure, who suggested the propriety of a little<br />

more deliberation in an affair of so much importance, but they did not press that view very strongly,<br />

<strong>and</strong> it readily passed out of sight in obedience to the prevailing idea that nothing should be done that<br />

could be construed as implying the least doubt about the determination to resist the claims of<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> at all hazards.<br />

It has seldom, it ever, before happened in our history that a proposition involving the possibility<br />

of war has been so quickly accepted <strong>and</strong> applauded by all parties <strong>and</strong> all classes. <strong>The</strong>re is something<br />

very inspiring in such a demonstration, <strong>and</strong> the significance of it is not to be mistaken. It means that<br />

the spirit of the people, which is the strength of republican government, can be depended upon to<br />

manifest itself in a spontaneous <strong>and</strong> decisive way when any vital principle or interest of our political<br />

system is menaced by another nation. This potent force is not strikingly in evidence when the<br />

conditions are pacific <strong>and</strong> things are moving smoothly; but the moment that a threat is made against<br />

the institutions or the rights of the country as a country, it becomes a vivid <strong>and</strong> tremendous fact.<br />

<strong>The</strong> people are not simply given over to a passing influence of excitement. <strong>The</strong>y are moved by<br />

an impulse of patriotism that is fundamental <strong>and</strong> invincible; <strong>and</strong> if Engl<strong>and</strong> is wise, she will not fail<br />

to see that her best policy is to avoid rather than to invite the test of military collision.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

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- 190 -<br />

THE PRESIDENT’S COURSE WISE<br />

We Should Ascertain the Right <strong>and</strong> <strong>The</strong>n Maintain it<br />

From the Seattle (Washington) Post-Intelligencer, (Rep.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> course suggested by the President is wise. <strong>The</strong> first step is to assure ourselves that we are in<br />

the right. Knowing out rights, we must maintain them. <strong>The</strong> selection of the members of the<br />

proposed commission calls for extreme care. <strong>The</strong>ir duty will be of a judicial nature, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

consequences of their decision involve such vast interests that no suspicion of partiality should taint<br />

their conclusions. <strong>The</strong>y will be placed in a most delicate <strong>and</strong> trying position. A decision in favor of<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, just as it may be, would subject them to a momentary unpopularity which they should be<br />

strong enough <strong>and</strong> great enough to bear. Already, <strong>and</strong> not without cause, the policy of Engl<strong>and</strong> in<br />

the matter of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary has aroused the untrusting watchfulness of the United States,<br />

<strong>and</strong> it will be no easy matter for Americans with the most immaculate integrity to entirely divest<br />

themselves of a predisposition against <strong>British</strong> claims.<br />

<strong>The</strong> difficulty is the greater as the English side of the case will not be presented as will that of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> republic will no doubt be represented before the inquisitorial body by fervidly<br />

patriotic advocates. Engl<strong>and</strong> will be represented only by such documents <strong>and</strong> maps as the<br />

commission can have ready access to, unless Engl<strong>and</strong> becomes impressed with the grim earnestness<br />

of the American people, <strong>and</strong> finds diplomatic means of furnishing to the commission testimony now<br />

confined in the archives of the Foreign Office.<br />

We hope, <strong>and</strong> we believe, that the question will be settled without bloodshed, but it must be<br />

settled with a full recognition of the great American doctrine which Great Britain, when it suited her,<br />

so heartily commended.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 191 -<br />

THE PEOPLE ARE A UNIT<br />

Not on European Consent, but on Our Will, Rests the Monroe Doctrine<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Denver <strong>News</strong>, (Ind.)<br />

Since Engl<strong>and</strong> has declined to settle the question by arbitration, President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, that this<br />

country may have a safe basis to act from, asks Congress to make an appropriation for the expenses<br />

of a commission which shall make the necessary investigation to determine the true divisional line<br />

between the two countries. This he holds to be necessary, as a justification for saying to Great<br />

Britain that it must not set a hostile foot upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, <strong>and</strong> that it must confine its<br />

operations to its own country, with the line thus determined as the boundary. It was necessary to an<br />

effective enforcement of the rights of this country under the Monroe doctrine that some such<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

course be pursued, <strong>and</strong> it seems that the one proposed is, under all the conditions, the safest <strong>and</strong><br />

most just that could be devised.<br />

<strong>The</strong> effort of Lord Salisbury to show that the Monroe doctrine has never been recognized as a<br />

part of the international code is not pertinent to the controversy. Neither the President nor Secretary<br />

Olney seriously maintains that it has. <strong>The</strong>y place their right to insist upon its observance upon a<br />

broader <strong>and</strong> safer foundation than the acquiescence of a congress of European Governments in its<br />

justice. It is that its enforcement is important to the peace <strong>and</strong> safety of this Nation, <strong>and</strong> is essential<br />

to the integrity of our free institutions.<br />

Whether Europe wishes to recognize it as binding upon it or not, the United States says it must<br />

recognize it. Let Europe underst<strong>and</strong> that in excluding it <strong>and</strong> its institutions from encroachments<br />

upon the Western Hemisphere the people of the United States are a unit.<br />

[24 December 1895]<br />

- 192 -<br />

VENEZUELA AND ARMENIA<br />

Poet Watson Issues an Appeal to the Americans<br />

LONDON, Dec. 23.—William Watson, who, many persons imagine, will be appointed Poet<br />

Laureate as Lord Tennyson’s successor, has published the following poetic appeal to the United<br />

States in reference to the situation arising from the message to Congress of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> in<br />

regard to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affair:<br />

O, towering daughter. Titan of the West!<br />

Behind a thous<strong>and</strong> leagues of foam secure;<br />

Thou toward whom our inmost heart is pure<br />

Of ill intent, although thou threatenest<br />

With most unfilial h<strong>and</strong> thy mother’s breast:<br />

Not far one breathing space may earth endure<br />

<strong>The</strong> thought of wars intolerable cure<br />

For such vague pains as vex to-day thy breast.<br />

But if thou hast more strength than thou canst spend<br />

In tasks of peace, <strong>and</strong> findst her yoke too tame,<br />

Help us to smite the cruel, to befriend<br />

<strong>The</strong> succorless <strong>and</strong> put the false to shame.<br />

So shall the ages laud thee, <strong>and</strong> thy name<br />

Be lovely among nations to the end.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette says, this afternoon, it fears the poet’s appeal to America comes too late.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re was a time” says the Gazette, “when Cobden’s dream of America’s effective help for the<br />

Armenians might have been fulfilled, but now President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has created just that diversion<br />

upon which the Sultan has been counting all along.”<br />

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[24 December 1895]<br />

- 193 -<br />

CONDEMN “PEACE” MEETING<br />

What Citizens Say of the Cooper Union Gathering<br />

ALL SUSTAIN PRESIDENT CLEVLAND<br />

Opinions of Frederic R. Coudert, Gen. B. F. Tracy,<br />

Gen. Martin T. McMahon, <strong>and</strong> Others<br />

MUST MAINTAIN OUR SELF-RESPECT<br />

<strong>The</strong> Monroe Doctrine for the Protection of the United States,<br />

Not of South America<br />

<strong>The</strong>, so-called peace demonstration of the Single Tax League in Cooper Union Monday evening<br />

to protest against the President’s <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message, which resulted, contrary to the expectation of<br />

Henry George, Charles Frederic Adams, <strong>and</strong> other speakers, in an unrestrainable outburst of<br />

enthusiasm for the Chief Executive, was severely criticised by leading business <strong>and</strong> professional men<br />

of the city yesterday.<br />

Reporters for <strong>The</strong> New-York Times who interviewed a number of citizens secured ample proof<br />

that such a meeting is considered to have been unpatriotic <strong>and</strong> unfortunate. Some of the opinions<br />

are herewith given.<br />

What Frederic R. Coudert Said<br />

Frederic R. Coudert replied vigorously when asked what he thought of the matter. He said:<br />

“I consider it most unfortunate that such a thing happened. It was ill advised <strong>and</strong> unwise as well as unpatriotic.<br />

No matter what the views of these men may be with regard to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message, they should not have<br />

forgotten that just now the eyes of Europe <strong>and</strong> of all the world are upon us.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>y might have known, one would think, that, with the great majority in the city against them, the result of<br />

the meeting could only have been what it was.<br />

It there is any result to such a meeting, what is it to be? Why, simply to encourage Great Britain not to yield to<br />

any reasonable concession that she might otherwise consider right. <strong>The</strong>se ‘peace’ meetings can have no other effect.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y cannot move the great body of New-York opinion.<br />

“Do they consider what it is that we desire? It is not war that we desire, but simply that the question of a<br />

boundary line should be settled by arbitration.<br />

“Of all questions requiring careful settlement by arbitration, this surely is one of the first. It is right in line with<br />

the spirit of civilization of this nineteenth century.<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s war talk – threatening war talk, if you like—was only used after eight or ten years’<br />

earnest endeavor to have the matter peaceably settled.”<br />

Gen. Martin T. McMahon<br />

Gen. Martin T. McMahon, who was United States Consul to Paraguay during the Administration<br />

of Andrew Johnson, denounced the so-called “peace”, meeting, which, he said should have been<br />

named a “war” meeting. He said:<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

“If anything is likely to bring about hostilities it is just such demonstrations, which, though childish enough in<br />

themselves, might be responsible for dire results.<br />

‘It was evidently the aim of those people to give out the impression that the United States is not a unit in<br />

support of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s action in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter, whereas we know here in this country at least that<br />

every American citizen, irrespective of politics or creed, is only too glad to be numbered with the vast majority who<br />

think Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> did just right.<br />

“Mainly through the utterances of Chauncey Depew <strong>and</strong> a few other persons the <strong>British</strong> have got the idea into<br />

their heads that we are fooling over here, <strong>and</strong> that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> is playing to the galleries for political following.<br />

<strong>The</strong> English, however, have misinterpreted Mr. Depew’s language. When he said Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> had done an<br />

excellent thing for himself <strong>and</strong> his party he was not disparaging his action any, but simply making a remark which<br />

would apply to a just <strong>and</strong> patriotic step made by any politician.<br />

No One Impugns the President’s Motive<br />

“It certainly was a good thing for the Democratic Party, but few persons will be so foolish or ignorant as to<br />

impute to Grover Clevel<strong>and</strong> what we might call the crime of creating popularity at the expense of his country. He is<br />

not that kind of a man.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> demonstration last night fell flat. Every one of these vapid protests meet a similar fate. I am sure. Some<br />

gentlemen who are unpatriotic enough to denounce the Monroe doctrine, I perceive, are trying to make capital on<br />

the score that <strong>Venezuela</strong> will concede the disputed l<strong>and</strong> to Great Britain, in which case we will be left high <strong>and</strong> dry,<br />

a laughing stock for the world. Well, they are greatly mistaken.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine was originated for our protection. That of the South American States is secondary.<br />

“As a matter of self-defense, we are to regard the encroachments of any foreign power on this hemisphere as an<br />

‘unfriendly act’ If <strong>Venezuela</strong> says that the claim of the <strong>British</strong> is right <strong>and</strong> that the boundary line is the correct one,<br />

we have nothing more to do.<br />

“But if Engl<strong>and</strong> coddles her into ceding over the l<strong>and</strong> in question the United States will step in <strong>and</strong> say ‘H<strong>and</strong>s<br />

off!’ It is a question of sell-defense <strong>and</strong> nothing else.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine was promulgated in order that we, like the European nations, would not be compelled<br />

to have a balance of power; to maintain great navies <strong>and</strong> armies, <strong>and</strong> to engage in wars several times a century. It<br />

does not come to us by natural right probably, <strong>and</strong> it might not st<strong>and</strong> before an international tribunal, but it suits us.<br />

It is our simple method of keeping out of trouble <strong>and</strong> defending ourselves, <strong>and</strong> we will support it with the sword it<br />

necessary. We would not allow Spain to sell Cuba to Engl<strong>and</strong> or Russia <strong>and</strong> we will not allow <strong>Venezuela</strong> to cede<br />

territory to Engl<strong>and</strong>, even if she wants to. This is a phase of the question which seems to have received little<br />

consideration.<br />

Will Be Settled Peacefully<br />

“That the matter will be settled peacefully I have little doubt. Engl<strong>and</strong> will fix it up some way. <strong>The</strong> tone of her<br />

press is already changing, <strong>and</strong> she realizes that war would be fatal to her. <strong>The</strong> fact that a commission is to be<br />

appointed does not mean war.<br />

Even should the commission decide that Engl<strong>and</strong> is in the wrong about her boundary line, war will not follow.<br />

In this event, I think it probable that she will submit to the opinion of the Commissioners, who will be the most<br />

capable men to be found<br />

“Whatever else comes out of the affair, it will result in giving an impetus to American commerce such as she<br />

has never received before.<br />

“I spent a long time in South America, <strong>and</strong> while Consul in Paraguay, had many talks with Mr. Seward, who was<br />

one of the first to recognize the advantage of commerce with South America. Heretofore, most of the trading has<br />

been conducted by Europe. This is all wrong.<br />

“South America is the richest country in natural resources on the globe. It is the coming country. With it we<br />

could do without the Old World entirely. We are the great producers of the world, <strong>and</strong> it is now given to us to start<br />

up a commerce with South America that will make us the most powerful nation on the globe. This is what the States<br />

in South America want to see.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>y would not be jealous of us, for they know that we would not encroach one hair’s breadth on their<br />

territory, <strong>and</strong> would protect then.<br />

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“This war scare has opened up the whole country to us. <strong>The</strong>y now look upon us as their natural protector, <strong>and</strong><br />

to us they will look for all future arbitration, <strong>and</strong> be content with our decision. This, to me, is the real meaning of<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question <strong>and</strong> the war scare.”<br />

Eugene G. Blackford said:<br />

Eugene G. Blackford<br />

“It was a very unwise thing indeed to hold meetings of this description or to give any expression of opposition<br />

to the sentiments expressed by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> in that message. It only encourages the feeling existing in<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> that it is all a sort of political bluff. I consider such a meeting must unpatriotic.<br />

Whether the Monroe doctrine applies or not in this case, there is one thing on which we all feel alike, namely,<br />

that it is the duty of the President to take every step possible for the enforcement of what we underst<strong>and</strong> as the<br />

Monroe doctrine.<br />

“While I do not want war any more than these gentlemen who proclaimed themselves the other night as the<br />

apostles of peace, yet there are other things which are of worse – much worse – than war, <strong>and</strong> one of these is lack of<br />

self-respect on the part of the people.<br />

“Mr. Adams used some strong language, I see. Intemperate language does no good in any case.”<br />

Gen. Benjamin P. Tracy<br />

Ex-Secretary of the Navy Gen. Benjamin F. Tracy said: “I see no necessity for peace meetings.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re will be no war, <strong>and</strong> therefore anti-war sentiment has no place. <strong>The</strong> outcome of the present<br />

excitement will be one of peace with dignity.”<br />

Corporation Counsel Stott<br />

Corporation Counsel Francis M. Scott said: “Whatever might have been any one’s opinion of the<br />

President’s message on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, it is now the plain duty of all good Americans to<br />

back up the attitude in which the message has placed the country, <strong>and</strong> to st<strong>and</strong> behind the President<br />

firmly <strong>and</strong> loyally.”<br />

Gustav H. Schwab said:<br />

Gustav H. Schwab<br />

“I do not believe in approaching the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n subject in the way in which Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> has done it. I am<br />

opposed to jingoism <strong>and</strong> everything that savors of it, but I see no use in peace meetings. <strong>The</strong>re is not a shadow of a<br />

prospect of war, <strong>and</strong> the sooner all cease to talk of war the better it will be. ‘War’ has already been expensive<br />

enough, <strong>and</strong> there is no need to continue its discussion longer. Those who talk war have nothing else to do. <strong>The</strong> ill<br />

success of last night’s meeting should convince all that such meetings are not needed.”<br />

George L. Putnam<br />

George L. Putnam, of Sweetser, Pembrook & Co., said:<br />

“I am not inclined to take that meeting seriously. In my opinion very little attention should be paid to it or the<br />

utterances of the men who made themselves conspicuous there.<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

“It is really not worth discussing, <strong>and</strong> ought not be dignified by considering it seriously. <strong>The</strong>re are always a lot<br />

of cranks seeking notoriety. Like the east-side Socialists Anarchists, they always have on h<strong>and</strong> a large amount of gas<br />

bottled up, <strong>and</strong> they must have a meeting as an outlet for this harmless effervescence.<br />

“Who is this man, Charles Fred Adams, anyhow? Whom does he represent, <strong>and</strong> who is behind him I never<br />

heard of the man, <strong>and</strong> if he was at all prominent or known in business circles. It is probable that I should have heard<br />

of him. <strong>The</strong> meeting will have no effect on the situation at all, <strong>and</strong> should not receive any consideration.”<br />

Approves the President’s View<br />

“What is your opinion of the Presidents course in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affair?” the reporter asked.<br />

“I am fully in accord with the action of the President,” [Mr. Putnam replied.] “I do not believe there will be any<br />

war, as the outcome of the President’s message, <strong>and</strong> I am confident there will be found an honorable means of<br />

settling the dispute. All this war talk is foolish exaggeration.”<br />

“If we consider calmly <strong>and</strong> dispassionately what the President has done we find he has simply asked Congress<br />

to give him the authority to appoint a commission to investigate the situation in <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> report its findings.<br />

Of course, the message was couched in firm 1anguage, but that was necessary, under the circumstances.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> situation in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, to my mind, can be summed up in a few words. Down there are <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>,<br />

French <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> Dutch <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> territory is nearest to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> line. Great Britain wants, as<br />

usual, to extend her territory. She dare not attempt to extend her lines into the French territory or the Dutch<br />

territory, because she would not be permitted to do so by the European powers.<br />

“<strong>Venezuela</strong> being weak, the <strong>British</strong> Government takes advantage of this weakness to seize territory to which it<br />

has no right. It is simply might against right.<br />

Came at an Unfortunate Time<br />

“It was unfortunate, perhaps, that the message came at a time when our financial condition was not as<br />

promising as it might be. <strong>The</strong> war talk has been taken advantage at by the Wall Street speculators to make a raid on<br />

stocks, <strong>and</strong>, aided by London speculators, they created a short-lived panic, but that is now over.<br />

“President Clevel<strong>and</strong> holds the key of the financial situation by the power which is vested in him to issue bonds<br />

without reference to Congress, <strong>and</strong> in this he has the whip h<strong>and</strong> of Congress. If Congress passes a financial scheme<br />

that the President does not approve he will certainly veto it, <strong>and</strong> then fall back upon his power to issue bonds to<br />

relieve the situation.<br />

“When a business concern is in need of ready money <strong>and</strong> has good credit, it raises the needful cash by issuing<br />

promissory notes. This is exactly what the Government must do. I have the utmost confidence that President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>s the situation, that be has the courage of his convictions, <strong>and</strong> will do what he deems best for<br />

the interests at the country.<br />

“I am sure the President will appoint on the commission men of prudence <strong>and</strong> wisdom, in which the country<br />

will have confidence. Let us await in patience the report of this commission, <strong>and</strong> not lost our heads over the<br />

prospect of a war. I am sure that those who are now shouting for the conflict have not the welfare of the nation at<br />

hart. <strong>The</strong>y will be disappointed if they think war will grow out of the present disagreement between the two most<br />

civilized nations of the world.”<br />

James Mitchel, ex-Fire Marshal, said:<br />

James Mitchel<br />

“<strong>The</strong> men who are responsible for the Cooper Union meeting are simply idiots, if not worse. It was utterly in<br />

bad taste, to put it mildly, that such a meeting should have been held at this time.<br />

“While there may be an honest diversity of opinion as to the expediency of the President’s message, it is the<br />

duty at every patriotic citizen to uphold the President, <strong>and</strong> it is simply outrageous that the men should have been<br />

permitted to denounce the Chief Executive of the country in the manner they did at the meeting.<br />

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“<strong>The</strong> American people must bear in mind that they are dealing with the most grasping, unscrupulous, <strong>and</strong><br />

deceitful nation on the face of the earth.”<br />

A. B. Boardman said:<br />

A. B. Boardman<br />

“<strong>The</strong> duty of the hour is to keep coal <strong>and</strong> do nothing to weaken the h<strong>and</strong>s at the Government. Peace meetings<br />

are unwise, as are war meetings. Even casual excited talk about the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n situation should be avoided for the<br />

present.<br />

“When the commission reports, everyone will have a chance to make his influence felt. In the meantime we<br />

should each in his own sphere try to allay the existing excitement.”<br />

Major William Plimley<br />

Major William Plimley, Commissioner of Jurors, said:<br />

“I deprecate very much any such meeting as that held at Cooper Institute last night. This is no time for loud<br />

talking on either side of the question. It is a time for sober, serious consideration. Taken all in all, I believe, that the<br />

President was right in the position he took upon the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

“Our statesmen at Washington ought to be the best judges of this. It is unreasonable to say that these statesmen<br />

would unanimously indorse the President’s views simply on account of the popular clamor. I don’t believe that they<br />

would do anything of the sort, <strong>and</strong>, in view of their action, I cannot see the necessity for any such meeting as that of<br />

last night. It is no time for these mass meetings.<br />

“Engl<strong>and</strong> has been grasping everything it can get, <strong>and</strong> it is time it was stopped. Lord Salisbury declared in his<br />

letter practically that we didn’t know what the Monroe doctrine was. Lord Salisbury cannot tell Americans that. We<br />

know what it is <strong>and</strong> what it means, <strong>and</strong> he cannot change our views.”<br />

George W. Miller<br />

George W. Miller, a prominent man in Good Government Club circles, said:<br />

“It seems to me that the meeting at Cooper Institute last night was a disgrace to American civilization. I have<br />

lived in Guatemala <strong>and</strong> I know about the eagerness of the <strong>British</strong> to seize every inch of ground they can with safety.<br />

“I believe all good Americans should back the President up in this matter, irrespective of their polities, <strong>and</strong> I<br />

don’t see why men calling themselves Americans should gather in public meeting to oppose the President. It was<br />

astonishing <strong>and</strong> painful to learn that one of the speakers at this remarkable meeting should have said that if the<br />

Monroe doctrine gives ground for the attitude of the President <strong>and</strong> Congress, then—the Monroe doctrine. That sort<br />

of talk is extremely ridiculous.”<br />

Alderman Goodman<br />

Alderman Elias Goodwin (Rep.) said: “Well, that peace meeting was an extremely warlike affair,<br />

wasn’t it? Some one said—the Monroe doctrine, eh? Well, in some places <strong>and</strong> on some occasions tar<br />

<strong>and</strong> feathers might be applied to the maker of such a comment.”<br />

Ex-Assemblyman John E. Brodsky said:<br />

John E. Brodsky<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

“I have had but little time to read the reports of that Cooper Institute meeting, but from what I have heard of<br />

it, I should say it was decidedly un-American all the way through.<br />

“This is no time for such meetings. It is a time for every American to st<strong>and</strong> by his guns, shoulder to shoulder,<br />

like men. It is no time for whining or whimpering. Every good American will st<strong>and</strong> firmly behind the President. He<br />

is right in this matter. It is inconceivable to me that any man calling himself an American should use the language in<br />

reference to the Monroe doctrine that is credited to Charles Fred Adams.”<br />

John Simpson<br />

Superintendent of Streets <strong>and</strong> Roads John Simpson of the Department of Public Works said:<br />

“In a matter like this, I don’t care which of the parties may be in power: I believe in backing up the President of<br />

the United States. He is right. Engl<strong>and</strong> is trying to secure all it can from the weaker powers, <strong>and</strong> I would like to<br />

know when it whipped a first-class power in war.<br />

“You asked what is my opinion of that meeting at Cooper Institute last night. I will tell you. I believe it was<br />

absolutely un-American. It was unpatriotic. It was indecent. Why, I read that a man named Adams said: ‘<strong>The</strong><br />

Monroe doctrine be —.’ Now, I’ll bet you 100 to 1 that that fellow was either an Englishman, or has English<br />

connections.<br />

“I guess most of those fellows at that meeting had some English blood in them. Do you think any genuine<br />

Americans would participate in such a meeting? I don’t, <strong>and</strong>, as a Republican, I say that this is the time for<br />

Americans to st<strong>and</strong> by their President.”<br />

Alex<strong>and</strong>er Meakim<br />

Ex-Excise Commissioner Alex<strong>and</strong>er Meakim said:<br />

“Such a meeting as the one at Cooper Institute could not possibly have any effect. It was out of place <strong>and</strong> out<br />

of time. <strong>The</strong> President should be sustained by all good, honest Americans, whatever their politics. Certainly no<br />

American should seek at this time to side with Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong>, in my opinion, no true American will do so. I firmly<br />

believe this whole matter will be adjusted entirely to the satisfaction of the people of the United States.”<br />

Col. E. T. Taliaferro said:<br />

Col. E. T. Taliaferro<br />

“I have not read the accounts of this meeting at Cooper Institute. I have heard that a speaker at it used language<br />

about the Monroe doctrine that no American can have the slightest sympathy with. If such language was used, then<br />

I want to say that the speaker was wholly out of touch with American sentiment<br />

“I am heartily, sincerely, <strong>and</strong> absolutely in favor of every line <strong>and</strong> every word of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message of<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, from the first word in it to the last. He is right <strong>and</strong> the people are with him.”<br />

John B. McGoldrick<br />

John B. McGoldrick, Reading Secretary of Tammany Hall, said:<br />

“Why should people who claim that they are American citizens hold such a meeting at such a time as this, when<br />

every true citizen should be upholding the h<strong>and</strong>s of the President? In talking with people whom I have met since<br />

the President’s message was sent to Congress, I have found the universal opinion that the President is right.<br />

“I read that a man named Charles Fred Adams said: ‘– the Munroe doctrine.’ If that is so this man is a disgrace<br />

to the name of Adams.<br />

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“It was John Adams, Representative from Massachusetts Bay in the Continental Congress who said, in his<br />

speech in defense of the Declaration of Independence: ‘It may be that it may ask the poor sacrifice of my life. Well,<br />

let it come. <strong>The</strong> victim will be ready at the hour of sacrifice, come when that hour may!’<br />

“Is not this a time for Americans to st<strong>and</strong> up straight <strong>and</strong> assert their National Manhood? I believe it is, <strong>and</strong> I<br />

don’t believe this meeting at Cooper Institute will be regarded as anything more than a laughing matter.<br />

“To what strange usage do these people put their so-called talents? It is interesting to notice that they did not<br />

even contro1 their own meeting. Most of the people there were opposed to the doctrines they heard preached from<br />

the platform.<br />

“I believe these speakers are sadly in need of light. If they want to find it let them go among the people of the<br />

great masses of the common, everyday citizens, I mean, <strong>and</strong> hear how they talk. By so doing, they can not only gain<br />

information, but they can gain what they evidently need very much, <strong>and</strong> that is a lesson in honest patriotism.”<br />

John S. Melcher said:<br />

John S. Melcher<br />

“I think peace meetings at present are unnecessary <strong>and</strong> ill advised. It is well <strong>and</strong> eminently proper for the<br />

ministers to preach upon the horrors of war <strong>and</strong> inform those who are thoughtless of what might be precipitated in<br />

the event of war, <strong>and</strong> so set them thinking, but I can see no prospect of war. While I am not in accord with Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s final sentences in his message <strong>and</strong> his diplomatic methods, I think it will be well to have a complete<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> matter, <strong>and</strong> it think a commission may be able to give it to us. I do not expect that<br />

it will every reach war, <strong>and</strong> favor dropping its consideration.”<br />

Levi Burgess said:<br />

Levi Burgess<br />

“We veterans do not fear war so much as some others do, but we do not go out of our way to search for it. We<br />

know what it is, <strong>and</strong> consequently dread to see a country plunged into it, but no thoughtful man considers war<br />

imminent. <strong>The</strong> sooner the agitation is dropped the better, <strong>and</strong> the fewer peace meetings we have the sooner it will<br />

be ended. Peace meetings are foolish. <strong>The</strong> war is already over, <strong>and</strong> the stock jobbers have reaped all they can get<br />

from it.”<br />

Moses Hirshfield said:<br />

Moses Hirshfield<br />

“It is possible that peace meetings will tend to allay the little that is left of the war scare—if it can now be found<br />

to be allayed. Such meetings are all nonsense; they amount to nothing, <strong>and</strong>, if anything, only serve to bait a few<br />

thoughtless persons, who, intent on having fun, attend them.<br />

“Those who first started the war scare did it through criminal ignorance or worse. <strong>The</strong>y did not properly<br />

consider the message or purposely misconstrued it; the latter seems to be the fact, because no loss was occasioned<br />

until after the big bears had a chance to lay their heads together <strong>and</strong> use ‘war’ as a means for shaking out stocks held<br />

on margin. I have not noticed any losses except those made in purely speculative businesses, <strong>and</strong> although it matters<br />

little to me personally which way the stock market goes, the sooner the agitation is allowed to cease the better.<br />

“It certainly will not cease while unnecessary peace meetings are being held.”<br />

John J. Hickling said:<br />

John J. Hickling<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

“In the event of war—which I do not regard as a probable outcome of the present agitation—we will have<br />

plenty of time to consider it. I attended the peace meeting last night, but with all the talk of war, I cannot perceive<br />

that we will have it inside of two years, if then.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> greatest agitation is by the ‘bears,’ who always seize every opportunity to demoralize the community <strong>and</strong><br />

make what profits they can from the fears <strong>and</strong> misfortunes of others.<br />

“I see no occasion to fear war, but it is always well to consider everything in connection with it at such a time as<br />

this.”<br />

Samuel L. Finlay<br />

Samuel L. Finlay said:<br />

“It requires a great stretch of imagination for any one to see why peace meetings should be held.<br />

“A careful reading of the ‘war’ message would have convinced any one that war is one of the most remote of all<br />

international possibilities. My business is largely foreign, but I had no fear that it would be interfered with, as I have<br />

confidence in the diplomacy of the President <strong>and</strong> his Cabinet.<br />

“After the Government finds out the exact situation of affairs in South America, those who are confident of<br />

war will see how easily such matters can be adjusted.”<br />

Capt J. F. Nickles, a naval veteran said:<br />

Capt. J. F. Nickles<br />

“Old as I am, I would fight again if it were necessary. So far as Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message is concerned, I heartily<br />

agree with the st<strong>and</strong> that he has taken. But as I read it, there is no prospect or necessity for war in it. Peace meetings<br />

are entirely uncalled for.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> trouble with those who are calling peace meetings is that they have no appreciation of the situation, <strong>and</strong><br />

are afraid they may have to fight some day. <strong>The</strong>y spend their time talking of the horrors of war when there is no war<br />

in sight. I fought for four years, <strong>and</strong> over, <strong>and</strong> have no fear of all, they picture.<br />

“I do not believe in war or expect war, but every true American should support the Government when it is<br />

right, as it is now, even before there is a remote possibility of war, <strong>and</strong>, after war is declared, if it ever is declared, he<br />

who does not fight is no American.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Government is competent to h<strong>and</strong>le this whole matter, <strong>and</strong> peace meetings will only serve to irritate the<br />

people.”<br />

James D. Bell of Brooklyn said:<br />

James D. Bell<br />

“I am personally opposed to calling these so-called peace meetings. At the present time, it would be unwise to<br />

create a feeling of distrust by denouncing the existence of distrust, as it would by any blatant jingoism or cry for war.<br />

“In other words, persons by holding peace meetings may imply that there is war in the air, <strong>and</strong> this would create<br />

a bear feeling in the financial centres. I need not say that I am in favor of free speech. I repudiate those who<br />

endeavor, whether by police clubs, or stones or cat-calls, to interfere with it. <strong>The</strong> question here is as to the<br />

advisability at these so-called peace meetings. I think they are inadvisable. While I concede the right of citizens to<br />

meet, I would be earnestly opposed to holding any such meeting in Brooklyn. Anyway, there is no danger at war.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no good to be got out of such meetings. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine, by the way, has never been formally ratified<br />

even by the American Congress. It has always been in the air. <strong>The</strong> present action of Congress is a more advanced<br />

step toward ratification at the doctrine than any action ever before taken.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re were two parts of the Monroe doctrine – the one declaring against further colonization of the l<strong>and</strong> on<br />

the North American <strong>and</strong> South American continents, the other declaring against forcible occupancy of territory on<br />

either continent by a European power.<br />

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“It seems to me the part relating to colonization is the one that really applies to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy.”<br />

Ex-Congressman Magner<br />

Ex-Congressman Thomas F. Magner of Brooklyn said:<br />

“I believe in the old saying: ‘My country, right or wrong, always my country.’ I am personally opposed to the<br />

calling of any of the so-called peace meetings in New-York or Brooklyn or anywhere else.<br />

“I am pained <strong>and</strong> ashamed that any citizens of the United States wish to take a position opposed to the<br />

unanimously expressed wish of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Congress.<br />

“It is a little short of treasonable to utter such sentiments as were expressed last night by some of the speakers<br />

at the meeting in Cooper Union.<br />

“All patriotic American citizens should denounce such a meeting <strong>and</strong> those in charge of it. <strong>The</strong>se howlers are<br />

mere diletanti—the broth of our National life. <strong>The</strong>y are always opposed to anything American. <strong>The</strong>ir rantings are<br />

the result of ignorance <strong>and</strong> arrogance. Fortunately, there are not many of them.<br />

“I was surprised the other day at the peace meeting in Plymouth Church. Henry Ward Beecher was intensely<br />

patriotic, <strong>and</strong> I do not think such a meeting would have been held had he been alive.<br />

“But these shouters against the President <strong>and</strong> Congress <strong>and</strong> the Monroe doctrine are in such a small minority<br />

that we can afford to laugh at them.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re has been no time in the history of the United States when a public document has been received with<br />

more unanimity than President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message.<br />

“I do not think that any war was ever so popular as would be the war that might grow out of this message. <strong>The</strong><br />

people are behind the President.”<br />

Charles J. Patterson of Brooklyn said<br />

Charles J. Patterson<br />

“I do not see that public meetings to agitate the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter, like the one held last night at Cooper<br />

Union, are productive of any good.<br />

“At the same time, I am not in favor of going to war with Engl<strong>and</strong> on the mere report of any commission<br />

which may be sent to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. I do not believe that any commission is so certain to be right in their view of this<br />

controversy at to justify us in disturbing the whole civilized world with war.<br />

“I do not believe public demonstrations or mass meetings at this time can accomplish anything. <strong>The</strong>y are far<br />

more likely to keep alive the heat than to allay it. <strong>The</strong> sooner we get down to a calm consideration of this whole<br />

subject, the more likely are we to arrive at correct conclusions. Public meetings, just now, are decidedly unfavorable<br />

to calmness.”<br />

Josiah T. Mareau<br />

Joseph T. Mareau of Brooklyn, late regular Democratic c<strong>and</strong>idate for the Supreme Court, said:<br />

“I think this whole <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy is somewhat of a tempest in a teapot. All that is to be done is to<br />

appoint a commission, the duty of which will be to inquire into the merits of a quarrel between a weak South<br />

American State <strong>and</strong> the most powerful Government of Europe.<br />

“When, that inquiry shall have been completed, <strong>and</strong> we are then able to form a just opinion of the merits of the<br />

controversy, the question will be presented to us as follows: What action, in view of the determination of the<br />

commission, ought this country, the United States, to take?<br />

“To my mind, that is all that has been done up to this time, <strong>and</strong> it seems to me it ought to be approved by every<br />

true American.<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

“I do not say we should go to war with Engl<strong>and</strong>. We do not yet know positively enough of the merits of the<br />

dispute to say what ought to be done in respect to the controversy between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain.<br />

“But we cannot st<strong>and</strong> calmly by <strong>and</strong> see a weak South American State bullied by this powerful European<br />

country without taking some interest in the matter.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>se public meetings to discuss the controversy <strong>and</strong> the prospects of war do no good whatever. <strong>The</strong>y disturb<br />

the public mind, <strong>and</strong> the financial flurry that has already been produced is aggravated by such meetings.<br />

“Meetings like the one held last night in Cooper Union are not patriotic. Nothing has been so far done by the<br />

President <strong>and</strong> Congress which is not precisely right. I should certainly be earnestly opposed to calling a meeting of<br />

this character in Brooklyn. I sympathize entirely with the action of the President <strong>and</strong> Congress. <strong>The</strong> action of<br />

Congress does not at all indicate that we want to go to war with Engl<strong>and</strong>.”<br />

Edward M. Grout, last regular Democratic c<strong>and</strong>idate for Mayor of Brooklyn, said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> incidents attendant on last night’s so-called peace demonstration at Cooper Union, in New-York, clearly<br />

demonstrate to any mind that there is no wisdom in holding or in attempting to hold meetings of this sort pending<br />

the result of the inquiry.<br />

“Of course there is going to be no war between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States. All danger of that is past. Public<br />

meetings will only arouse the passions of the people, will inflame men’s minds, <strong>and</strong> will do more harm than good.<br />

Such meetings are unpatriotic, unwise, inopportune. <strong>The</strong>y keep up the excitement <strong>and</strong> the injury to business, instead<br />

of allowing sentiment to cool down.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> people should wait until the commission to be appointed by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> makes its report. This, I<br />

take it, will be months in the future, because the commission will first have to go through the original Dutch <strong>and</strong><br />

Spanish documents in order to get at the facts as to the boundary which underlie the controversy.<br />

“No matter what are men’s individual opinions respecting the wisdom of the course of the President <strong>and</strong> the<br />

action of Congress they should act patriotically, <strong>and</strong> should st<strong>and</strong> by what has been already done, <strong>and</strong> await the<br />

result of the inquiry of the commission.”<br />

Frederick W. Hinrichs<br />

Frederick W. Hinrichs, Registrar or Arrears of Brooklyn, said:<br />

“It will be the part of patriotism to await quietly the result of the inquiry to be undertaken by the commission to<br />

be appointed by the President.<br />

“I do not think, with my present light, that I would be in favor of calling a ‘peace’ demonstration in Brooklyn,<br />

<strong>and</strong> rather deprecate these ‘peace’ meetings. On the whole, I think they do more harm than good. <strong>The</strong>y serve to<br />

arouse the smoldering fires of feeling which lie in every man’s breast. A great many people are speaking without due<br />

reflection on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy.<br />

“I think very few of us really underst<strong>and</strong> what the Monroe doctrine is. I do not think any one can claim the<br />

Monroe doctrine has ever been recognized as part of international law.<br />

“But what have Americans themselves hitherto claimed were the limits of the Monroe doctrine? Even that<br />

question has not been clearly settled. But, as I have said, I am in favor of quietly awaiting the result of the inquiry set<br />

on foot by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Congress.”<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 194 -<br />

COMMISSION NOT CHOSEN<br />

<strong>The</strong> President Silent Regarding His Selection of Representatives<br />

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MAY BE ANNOUNCED ON THURSDAY<br />

It Is Now Expected that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Difficulty Wilt Be Adjusted<br />

in the Ordinary Way by the Diplomats<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 24.—<strong>The</strong> gossips have selected many distinguished citizens for members<br />

of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n commission, <strong>and</strong> an evening paper announces that the President has completed<br />

his list. In the absence or any information whatever from the White House bearing on this<br />

important question, the public will be obliged to wait until the President is ready to announce his<br />

decision. <strong>The</strong> statement is made on good authority that he is still undetermined regarding the<br />

composition of the commission. He has communicated with men of high st<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> necessarily<br />

will have to wait some time to hear from them.<br />

It is not probable that the announcements will be made before Thursday, at the earliest.<br />

It is the President’s desire to have this commission composed of men whose names will be a<br />

guarantee of the highest probity <strong>and</strong> intellectual force in connection with the proposed investigation.<br />

It s not known whether the commission will have three or five members, but the opinion prevails<br />

here that the smaller number will be decided upon.<br />

Much satisfaction is expressed in diplomatic circles with the tone of the latest London dispatches<br />

regarding the proposed commission. <strong>The</strong> statement of <strong>The</strong> London Chronicle that if the commission is<br />

made up of men like Messrs. Phelps, White, <strong>and</strong> Edmunds “it must comm<strong>and</strong> respect, apart from its<br />

irregular origin,” <strong>and</strong> that “it would in that case occur to Lord Salisbury that some further proposal<br />

from him would be expedient, indeed necessary,” is regarded as a strong indication that diplomacy<br />

will yet be resorted to in the settlement of the boundary question.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 195 -<br />

By Peaceful Methods<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Manchester Union (N. H.), (Dem.)<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are in any event ninety-nine out of a hundred chances that the controversy can be settled<br />

by peaceful methods without the humiliation of either nation. It is, moreover, a firm assurance that<br />

there has been undue dilatory action in the matter, <strong>and</strong>, if the merits of the dispute shall make plain<br />

that this country has rights <strong>and</strong> interests to be defended, that National self-respect <strong>and</strong> honor will be<br />

maintained if every means in her power shall prove sufficient therefor.<br />

Both countries realize the terrible cost to all their interests in actual warfare, <strong>and</strong> there is no<br />

disposition shown on the part of either to incur it unnecessarily. Among people of such intelligence<br />

the necessity will not arise. This country, however, st<strong>and</strong>s firmly upon its dignity, <strong>and</strong> that dignity<br />

will be respected <strong>and</strong> admired by fair-minded justice-loving people the world over.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

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- 196 -<br />

A Vital Principle<br />

From <strong>The</strong> St. Paul Pioneer Press (Minn.), (Rep.)<br />

It is of no earthly consequence to the United States whether Great Britain or <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

possesses the strip of territory, about 30,000 square miles in area, which is in controversy between<br />

the two powers But it is of vital consequence to maintain the principle that no European power shall<br />

be permitted to extend its rule on this continent. For on the maintenance of that doctrine depends<br />

the momentous question whether some European power or powers shall take possession of Central<br />

America <strong>and</strong> control the Nicaraguan or any other canal which may be built through it at across the<br />

isthmus between the two oceans. To surrender that principle in <strong>Venezuela</strong> would be to surrender it<br />

everywhere else on the continent, including the vital points on which the security of our commerce<br />

<strong>and</strong> of our Pacific possessions depends. When Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Russia <strong>and</strong> France <strong>and</strong> Germany have<br />

parceled out Asia <strong>and</strong> Africa among themselves, what is to hinder them in their contest for<br />

commercial supremacy <strong>and</strong> military <strong>and</strong> naval power from extending their rival projects of<br />

colonization to South America? What is to hinder them if the Monroe doctrine is dead? <strong>The</strong>y have<br />

been gradually dividing the Eastern world among them for the last sixty years. But they have kept<br />

h<strong>and</strong>s off South America, although with its weak Governments <strong>and</strong> its enormously rich resources, it<br />

presented a far more tempting field for their rapacity than Africa or Asia or the isl<strong>and</strong>s of the sea.<br />

But they have not attempted to meddle with the republics which the Monroe doctrine called into<br />

being, because the Monroe doctrine stood guard over them like the flaming sword at the gates of<br />

Paradise. No, . . . it is not dead. It is the vital, the supreme principle of American public law, as<br />

bearing upon the international politics of the American continent.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 197 -<br />

It Is the American Doctrine.<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Savannah <strong>News</strong>, (Ga.), (Dem.)<br />

Nearly the whole of the press of the country heartily supports the President in the position he<br />

has taken in respect to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary dispute. Both houses of Congress have practically<br />

declared that his position is the right one, by authorizing him to appoint a commission to inquire<br />

into the merits of the dispute. It is fair to assume, therefore, that the President has the approval of<br />

the people in what he has done.<br />

If the facts, as stated by Secretary Olney, are correct, Great Britain has been for many years, <strong>and</strong><br />

is now, acquiring <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory against <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s consent, <strong>and</strong> extending her system of<br />

government over it. We regard that as a violation of the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> we must either take a<br />

positive <strong>and</strong> determined st<strong>and</strong> against such a violation of the doctrine or ab<strong>and</strong>on the doctrine for<br />

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all time to come. If we draw back now the Monroe doctrine will cease to be a living principle. It will<br />

be as dead as if it had never existed.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 198 -<br />

NO DANGER OF WAR.<br />

Judge Lawson of Missouri Tells Why Hostilities Are Improbable<br />

COLUMBIA, Mo., Dec. 24.—Judge John Lawson, Professor of Law in the State University, is<br />

the author of numerous legal books. His work on “contracts” is used in nearly all of the leading law<br />

schools of America. Speaking of the threatened war with Engl<strong>and</strong>, Judge Lawson said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re will be no war, for the simple reason that Engl<strong>and</strong> has given too many hostages to<br />

fortune in the shape of American investments. Every American citizen would be released for the<br />

time from any debt obligation to Great Britain, <strong>and</strong>, if it became necessary, the United States<br />

Government could, as a war measure, wholly annul obligations.<br />

“Even without Governmental action all business relations would cease. Take the suspension of<br />

English insurance companies doing business in America; all the obligations incurred under these<br />

would be canceled. It would be a long time before a commercial country like Engl<strong>and</strong> involves itself<br />

in war with the United States.”<br />

Judge Lawson does not agree with the law professors of Yale <strong>and</strong> Harvard in their published<br />

utterances of international law. “International law,” said Judge Lawson, “is not a code of principles<br />

reckoned from all that pertains to justice. It is simply certain important principles which each nation<br />

has been able to get other nations to acquiesce in through force. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine will become<br />

international law as soon as the United States, holding firm to its position, compels its recognition<br />

by another country.”<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

Dec. 23, 1895.<br />

To the Editor of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times:<br />

- 199 -<br />

LETTER TO THE EDITOR<br />

As at last night’s Cooper Union meeting I, at least, left the impression (on some minds) that I<br />

was wantonly, <strong>and</strong> deliberately indulging in offensive personalities against the President. I hope you<br />

will allow me to offer to the public, through your columns, this expression of sincere regret, <strong>and</strong> my<br />

most profound apologies, for having apparently allowed myself to be betrayed, in the excitement<br />

<strong>and</strong> confusion of the wrangle precipitated by the noisy <strong>and</strong> insulting shouts <strong>and</strong> interruptions of the<br />

Jingo contingent in the hall, into anything which was even susceptible of being so construed.<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

Realizing, as I do, the utter impropriety, mischievousness, <strong>and</strong> bad taste of injecting offensive<br />

personalities into the public discussions of questions of policy, I wish publicly to withdraw any<br />

expression I may have really used, which even tended in that direction. In justice to myself I must<br />

say that, whatever may have been the actual result, the only intention I was definitely conscious of,<br />

the only attitude I supposed myself to be assuming, was simply that of indignantly protesting against<br />

the Jingoe’s preposterous dem<strong>and</strong> that we accept as practically infallible <strong>and</strong> absolutely binding on<br />

all, the personal, dangerous, <strong>and</strong> suddenly announced polity of the very man whom they (the<br />

Jingoes) have, through their favorite organ, constantly ridiculed <strong>and</strong> jeered at with the very<br />

“personalities” which I quoted.<br />

As to “President Monroe <strong>and</strong> his doctrine,” what I said, was that, if the Monroe doctrine was to<br />

be distorted <strong>and</strong> perverted into a pretext far ab<strong>and</strong>oning Washington’s policy of minding our own<br />

business, <strong>and</strong> for plunging the country into wars about the disputes of other nations, the people<br />

would “sooner or later be driven to exclaim ‘— both President Monroe <strong>and</strong> his doctrine’.” This I<br />

uttered purposely in extravagant burlesque, to cause, (as it did.), a laugh, which somewhat relieved<br />

the tension of feeling in the audience.<br />

CHARLES FREDERIC ADAMS<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 200 -<br />

LETTER BY LORD PLAYFAIR<br />

He Does Not Believe Peace Will Be Broken Between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America<br />

LONDON, Dec. 24.—<strong>The</strong> Times to-morrow will publish a letter written by Lord Playfair<br />

recalling instances of mutual expressions of brotherly sympathy by Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United<br />

States. He reproduces President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s “noble” words in reply to him when he introduced the<br />

arbitration deputation to the President in 1887.<br />

Lord Playfair dwells upon the celebration of the centenary of American independence in<br />

Philadelphia, <strong>and</strong> the enthusiasm displayed at a banquet there to the toast “<strong>The</strong> Mother Country,” to<br />

which he had the privilege of replying. He says he refuses, after what he has witnessed, to believe<br />

that the best people in the United States do not entertain an affection for Englishmen equal to that<br />

which Englishmen entertain for them.<br />

He refers to his spending eighteen successive Autumns in the United States, thereby gaining<br />

knowledge of many of the leading men there. He adds that the late James G. Elaine once assured<br />

him that nothing would induce the United. States to war with Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> authorized him to<br />

express this opinion to Lord Salisbury, who was then, as now, Prime Minister. <strong>The</strong> message was<br />

delivered. Lord Playfair concludes by urging the adoption of Mr. Gladstone’s “commonsense”<br />

advice, <strong>and</strong> declaring that the two nations admire <strong>and</strong> love each other.<br />

All the papers to-morrow will publish editorial articles, which are virtually long sermons from<br />

the text, “Peace on earth, good-will to men.” with special reference to the United States <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain. <strong>The</strong>y reaffirm their relief that peace will not be broken.<br />

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[25 December 1895]<br />

- 201 -<br />

Our Right <strong>and</strong> Our Duty<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Cincinnati Tribune, (Rep.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> nations of this continent are civilized republics <strong>and</strong> our near neighbors, with whose political<br />

<strong>and</strong> commercial prosperity we are indissolubly associated. We have, therefore, a right <strong>and</strong> an interest<br />

to claim <strong>and</strong> maintain for them immunity from the uncalled-for <strong>and</strong> ambitious confiscation of their<br />

territory by European States, whose political <strong>and</strong> commercial interests are forever antagonistic to our<br />

own.<br />

This is a guiding principle of the American people, <strong>and</strong> whether or not it be the Monroe<br />

doctrine, or, if it be, whether that doctrine has ever been specifically admitted to the international<br />

code, we need not care.<br />

We may, without deserving the sarcasm <strong>and</strong> ridicule of the European world, declare that if there<br />

is a serious question whether or not Great Britain be not attempting unjustly to confiscate a portion<br />

of the territory of our neighbor <strong>and</strong> friend, <strong>Venezuela</strong>, we will investigate that question, <strong>and</strong> if we<br />

find <strong>and</strong> believe the right to be with our sister republic, we will by all legitimate means aid <strong>and</strong> assist<br />

her in maintaining that right.<br />

This, we take it, is the true position of the Administration. It was not a theory so much as a<br />

condition that confronted the President, <strong>and</strong> that condition he has fairly met. <strong>The</strong> theory is of purely<br />

academic interest; the political situation presents a question for National action.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 202 -<br />

KIND WORDS FOR AMERICA<br />

Literary Men of Engl<strong>and</strong> to <strong>The</strong>ir Brethren in This Country<br />

MESSAGE OF PEACE AND GOOD WILL<br />

Men of Letters in the United States Urged to Use <strong>The</strong>ir Influence to Avert War<br />

over the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Matter<br />

LONDON, Dec. 24.—An address from <strong>British</strong> to American literary men relative to the Anglo-<br />

American crisis has been compiled by an author of distinction, whose name, however, is not made<br />

public, <strong>and</strong> already has a good many signatures.<br />

Among those whose names undoubtedly will appear on it are John Ruskin, William Lecky,<br />

Walter Besant, Richard Blackmore, Thomas Hardy, William Black, Rider Haggard, John Morley, <strong>and</strong><br />

others equally prominent.<br />

After prefatory remarks, the address says:<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are two paths before us. One leads we know not whither, but in the end, through war with all its<br />

accompaniments of carnage, unspeakable suffering, limitless destruction, <strong>and</strong> hideous desolation, to its inevitable<br />

sequel, hatred, bitterness, <strong>and</strong> the disruption of our race. It is this path that we ask you to join us in an effort to<br />

make impossible.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re follow expressions of the pride felt by the <strong>British</strong> in American achievements, in the course<br />

of which it is said:<br />

Nothing in history has earned us more glory than the conquest of a vast continent by the Anglo-Saxon race.<br />

When our pride is humbled by the report of things that you do better than ourselves it is also lifted up by the<br />

consciousness that you are our kindred. <strong>The</strong>re is no anti-American feeling among Englishmen; it is impossible that<br />

there can be any anti-English feeling among Americans.<br />

<strong>The</strong> address then dwells on the strength of the tie of literature, which, it says, will continue to<br />

live after the fever of any political strife shall have passed away. It is argued that if war should occur,<br />

English literature would be dishonored <strong>and</strong> disfigured for a century to come by patriotic songs,<br />

histories of victories <strong>and</strong> defeats, records of humiliation <strong>and</strong> disgrace, <strong>and</strong> stories of burning wrong<br />

<strong>and</strong> unavenged insult. “<strong>The</strong>se,” it is said, “would be br<strong>and</strong>ed deep in the hearts of our peoples, who<br />

would so express themselves in poems <strong>and</strong> novels as to make it impossible for any of those who had<br />

lived through such a fratricidal war to resume their former love <strong>and</strong> friendship.”<br />

In conclusion the address says: “Poets <strong>and</strong> creators, scholars <strong>and</strong> philosophers, men <strong>and</strong> women<br />

of imagination <strong>and</strong> vision, we call upon you in the exercise of your far-reaching influence to save our<br />

literature from dishonor, <strong>and</strong> our race from lasting injury.”<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 203 -<br />

THE COUNTRY STANDS BY THE PRESIDENT<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States now holds the position it has held for twenty-five years—that if Great Britain<br />

has a lawful claim upon the territory also claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, she can easily <strong>and</strong> surely prove her<br />

title before impartial arbiters; that as a strong power disputing with a weak one she ought to be<br />

willing to arbitrate if fair dealing is her purpose. If fair dealing is not her purpose, if her claim is not<br />

well founded, then, refusing arbitration, she clearly contemplates an act of aggression upon<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. About that we have something to say.<br />

President Monroe declared our policy in 1823 in these words:<br />

But with the Governments who have declared their independence <strong>and</strong> maintained it, <strong>and</strong> whose independence<br />

we have on great consideration <strong>and</strong> on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the<br />

purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other<br />

light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has declared that the action Engl<strong>and</strong> apparently contemplates is plainly that<br />

which Monroe said was dangerous to our peace <strong>and</strong> safety.<br />

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“If a European power,” he says in his message, “by an extension of its boundaries, takes<br />

possession of the territory of one of our neighboring republics against its will <strong>and</strong> in derogation at its<br />

rights, it is difficult to see why, to that extent, such European power does not thereby attempt to<br />

extend its system of Government to that portion of the continent which is thus taken.” That is the<br />

American doctrine. It anybody doubts that it is the spirit of the American people let him read the<br />

array of testimony marshaled in our columns yesterday <strong>and</strong> to-day.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President declares our hearty assent to any lawful claims of Great Britain. We should accept<br />

as final the finding of an impartial tribunal before which Great Britain should succeed in proving her<br />

case. Against her assertion of claims not lawful, against intended acts of aggression on American<br />

soil, we set up the policy we have asserted <strong>and</strong> maintained for seventy-seven years. We have taken<br />

our position in the present dispute after mature consideration, deliberately, justly, firmly.<br />

Shall we recede? Shall we ab<strong>and</strong>on the Monroe doctrine? Not because there has been a<br />

stockbroker’s panic. Not because men whose vision is bounded by the tall buildings of down-town<br />

New-York denounce the President for an act that, while it has caused them loss <strong>and</strong> pain, has<br />

thrilled the country with an awakened sense of our National dignity <strong>and</strong> responsibility. We needed<br />

some such appeal to emotions nobler than those aroused by the contemplation of interest, tables<br />

<strong>and</strong> prices current.<br />

If American citizenship is to be rated as a mere huckster’s license, then it is time to remove<br />

Washington’s statue from it pedestal on the Sub-Treasury steps, to make a market of Independence<br />

Hall, <strong>and</strong> to sink the Liberty Bell in the deep sea. Not a man of all the crazy throng in the Stock<br />

Exchange believed we were to have a war with Engl<strong>and</strong>. Three-quarters of them, were plunged into<br />

genuine fright by the crafty tactics of the other fourth, who swept in dirty gains from their halftreasonable<br />

assaults upon the Nation’s credit <strong>and</strong> position. But strong <strong>and</strong> patriotic h<strong>and</strong>s put a stop<br />

to their work before serious harm was done, <strong>and</strong> the banks of New-York, always conservative <strong>and</strong><br />

patriotic, have helped to stamp out the panic. Assuredly the National policy is not to be reversed at<br />

the begging of any such patriots for profit only.<br />

But must the appeals of the pulpit for Christian forbearance <strong>and</strong> peace pass unheeded? No, they<br />

will evoke hearty amens from every patriotic heart in the l<strong>and</strong>. We have striven for peace in this<br />

matter for twenty-five years. We have been most Christian in our forbearance. We have exhausted<br />

the arts of diplomatic persuasion in the effort to induce Great Britain to send the controversy to<br />

arbitration. It is amazing that the Christian pulpit of New-York <strong>and</strong> Brooklyn should have wasted in<br />

vain criticism of the President <strong>and</strong> in ill-informed strictures upon the Monroe doctrine that prayerful<br />

emotion which it ought to have employed in the effort to incline the obdurate heart of her Majesty’s<br />

Prime Minister to an honorable settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute before a court or impartial<br />

arbitrators.<br />

Those who set themselves up as the censors of the American President, the American Congress,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the American people have chosen the easy role. It costs nothing to declare that the Monroe<br />

doctrine has expired by limitation, that even if it existed it would be inapplicable to this dispute, <strong>and</strong><br />

that the matter is not worth making a fuss about, at least not in opposition to Great Britain, for the<br />

English are our good friends <strong>and</strong> kinsmen, while the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns are, as Prof. McVane of the<br />

Government <strong>and</strong> Law Department of Harvard University has it, “not American born,” or are<br />

Roman Catholics, as the Rev. Lyman Abbott avers. This line of argument requires no expenditure of<br />

time or tissue in research, nor do Mr. Chauncey Depew’s unworthy political jests about the<br />

President <strong>and</strong> erroneous statements about our relations to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> case cost him more than<br />

the simple effort of talking to a stenographer.<br />

303


24 – 25 December 1895<br />

Now that the “war scare,” which was altogether the creation of those who have assailed the<br />

President <strong>and</strong> his message, has passed away <strong>and</strong> the firm convictions of the American people have<br />

made themselves known <strong>and</strong> felt, it is evident that the position taken by the President to prove by its<br />

practical use that the Monroe doctrine “was intended to apply to every stage of our National life,”<br />

will not be ab<strong>and</strong>oned. We shall not desert that advanced position because of schemes for<br />

speculative or party profit. It is the American position. It is held by the Government <strong>and</strong> by the<br />

masses of both parties alike, by all citizens who have taken the trouble to think rightly upon the<br />

question. It is the peaceful position. Firmly maintained by us, it will never he assailed by foes from<br />

across the sea.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 204 -<br />

THE POSITION OF SPAIN<br />

Understood that She Will Give Access to Her <strong>Venezuela</strong> Records<br />

LONDON, Dec. 24.—<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard to-morrow will publish a dispatch from Madrid saying It is<br />

understood that the Government will not object to the United States sending a commission to<br />

Madrid to seek information from the Spanish archives regarding the boundaries of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> Brazil <strong>and</strong> French <strong>Guiana</strong>, but previously will intimate that allowing access to the<br />

archives is an act of courtesy, <strong>and</strong> does not imply in the slightest degree that Spain admits the<br />

soundness of the Monroe doctrine.<br />

It is an open secret in diplomatic <strong>and</strong> political circles, the dispatch says, that the Spanish<br />

Government will adopt the attitude of all the European countries whose opinions on the subject<br />

Spanish diplomats recently have ascertained are adverse to the Monroe doctrine.<br />

<strong>The</strong> dispatch adds that, in view of the unanimous protests against President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message<br />

in the press <strong>and</strong> by the public, Señor Canovas del Castillo, the Prime Minister, cannot afford to play<br />

into the h<strong>and</strong>s of the United States, however much he may desire to avert fresh developments<br />

concerning Cuba.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 205 -<br />

War a Long Way Off<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Chicago Times-Herald, (Ind.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> recent deliverance of the President <strong>and</strong> of the Secretary of State, backed as they are by the<br />

prompt adoption of a resolution authorizing, at the President’s request, the appointment of a<br />

commission to investigate the boundary line between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, will be accepted<br />

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the world over as assurance that the people of the United States are dead in earnest in their purpose<br />

to resist foreign aggression on this continent.<br />

To assume, however, that we are ready to go to war on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question without<br />

exhausting every means known to go to war on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question without exhausting every<br />

means known to diplomacy <strong>and</strong> ways of peace to bring Engl<strong>and</strong> to accept our view of the case is a<br />

mistake. <strong>The</strong> action of the President <strong>and</strong> Congress is not properly so interpreted by the <strong>British</strong> press<br />

<strong>and</strong> people.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 206 -<br />

SCHOMBURGK ON ALIEN SOIL<br />

Recognized that He Was Passing Beyond the English Line<br />

LANCASTER. Penn., Dec. 24.—F. R. Diffenderfer yesterday forwarded to Secretary of State<br />

Olney a little volume, discovered among books in his possession, which will doubtless prove of<br />

value in the present difficulty with Engl<strong>and</strong>. This book is Vol. XXXIX. of “Jardine’s Naturalist’s<br />

Library,’ published in Edinburgh, Scotl<strong>and</strong>, in 1843. It is a treatise on the fishes of <strong>Guiana</strong>, written<br />

by Robert Hermann Schomburgk, who surveyed the boundary line on which Great Britain now<br />

founds her claim to such a large share of territory belonging to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Prefixed to the book is a memoir of nearly one hundred pages, including a lengthy account of his<br />

operations in <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> between the years 1835 <strong>and</strong> 1839. It is this part of the volume<br />

which may prove important to the Boundary Commission authorized by Congress.<br />

Schomburgk <strong>and</strong> a party of explorers, on Sept. 20, 1838, sailed up the Takutu River <strong>and</strong> entered<br />

the Mahu village, where they remained several days, the guests of the Indians.<br />

Schomburgk says: “At length the column was put in marching order, the coxswain at the head,<br />

carrying the <strong>British</strong> union flag, under which they had been marching for the last three years through<br />

hitherto unknown parts of <strong>Guiana</strong>. Now it was to lead them beyond the <strong>British</strong> boundaries, into<br />

regions known only to the copper colored Indian; but they were animated with the hope of reaching,<br />

for the first time, from this side of the continent, the point which Baron Humboldt had in 1800,<br />

after many difficulties, arrived at from the westward—namely, Esmeraldo on the Orinoco.”<br />

This would indicate that whatever surveys or lines Schomburgk may have made afterward, in<br />

1838 <strong>and</strong> 1839, he then admitted that that territory was alien to the <strong>British</strong>.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 207 -<br />

RUSSIAN EDITORS HOPE FOR WAR<br />

<strong>The</strong>y Sympathize with America, <strong>and</strong> Do Not Hesitate to Say So<br />

305


24 – 25 December 1895<br />

Moscow, Dec. 24.—<strong>The</strong> entire Russian press is discussing the Anglo-American crisis with an<br />

ardor approaching enthusiasm.<br />

<strong>The</strong> papers daily calculate hopefully the chances of a conflict. <strong>The</strong>y wholly sympathize with the<br />

United States, <strong>and</strong> are hostile to Great Britain.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y do not conceal their delight that Great Britain possibly may be paralyzed in the East by her<br />

troubles in the West.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 208 -<br />

WILLIAMSBURG CITIZENS PATRIOTIC<br />

Condemn the Peace Meeting <strong>and</strong> Uphold the President<br />

In the Eastern District of Brooklyn, yesterday, one of the most pronounced sympathizers with<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> in his support of the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> one who was equally emphatic in<br />

denouncing “peace at any price” meetings, was the Rev. Sylvester Malone; one of the Regents of the<br />

State University.<br />

“Who speaks of war at this momentous hour?” asked the venerable pastor, recalling Southey’s<br />

lines on the eve of Waterloo. “We have no burning desire to see the two civilizations clash, but we<br />

do not want to see one civilization, <strong>and</strong> a representative monarchy at that, ride roughshod over us.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> question at issue, it seems to me, is likely to lead to a decisive struggle, sooner or later,<br />

between the rival systems of republicanism <strong>and</strong> of monarchy upon this continent. We, as a people,<br />

have forever separated ourselves from Europe <strong>and</strong> its traditions, but Europe, however, seems<br />

resolved not to permit us to remain in republican isolation, <strong>and</strong> besides hemming us in along the<br />

4,000 miles of our Northern border, has also erected strong fortifications in the West Indies.<br />

“America st<strong>and</strong>s for nothing if not for a new <strong>and</strong> a greater civilization than the world had ever<br />

seen. Our ethnological <strong>and</strong> racial diversifies, our geographical position, situated as we are n the<br />

midway of the world of the future, having 300,000,000 of Europeans on one side of us, <strong>and</strong><br />

600,000,000 Asiatics on the other; with, our magnificent domain kissing the bosoms of two oceans,<br />

render it necessary that this mighty republic, with its vast wealth <strong>and</strong> resources shall not tip its hat to<br />

any other nation beneath the sun.<br />

“At the same time, we are not courting war <strong>and</strong> I don’t believe there will be any war or that the<br />

President has given any justification for the belligerent tone attributed to his message. I am a<br />

Republican, but I heartily <strong>and</strong> cordially support the President in his action. This is not only our duty<br />

to ourselves, but the President deserves such support.<br />

“It is eminently wise on his part to send commissioners to examine all the facts. If there is<br />

justification for our interference then we ought to st<strong>and</strong> together once assured that we are right as<br />

one man, <strong>and</strong> cheerfully take up arms to vindicate the Monroe doctrine for all time.<br />

“No power in. the world to-day dare face America. Even in her present comparative state of<br />

unpreparedness, it is obvious that the powers of Europe fear the weight of her influence since two<br />

paragraphs in the message of her Chief Magistrate have awakened a terror unparalleled since the<br />

days when the word of Napoleon sent a cold shiver through the Cabinets of Europe.<br />

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“<strong>The</strong> miracle of the nineteenth century is that within the short period of a generation the North<br />

is willing to take the Southern Confederates into her army <strong>and</strong> navy, <strong>and</strong> the latter are glad <strong>and</strong><br />

anxious to demonstrate their participation <strong>and</strong> identity with the prosperity of their victors <strong>and</strong> to<br />

share alike in the fortunes <strong>and</strong> the patriotism of their common country.<br />

“This is a significant state of things <strong>and</strong> one that doubtless does not escape the eyes of our rivals<br />

for the commerce of the world <strong>and</strong> for the supremacy of the seas.<br />

“I think those peace meetings are apt to indicate an apparent division in our ranks <strong>and</strong> so create<br />

a false impression. It ought to go forth as something incapable of contradiction that we on this<br />

question are a united people. <strong>The</strong> President has spoken. A Congress overwhelmingly Republican has<br />

nobly sunk all party differences, <strong>and</strong> given to the President’s action its heartiest co-operation.<br />

“That is one of the gr<strong>and</strong> features of this <strong>Venezuela</strong>n incident. It shows that as a people we can<br />

lay aside party pride <strong>and</strong>, confronted by any National danger, make a holocaust of ourselves <strong>and</strong> of<br />

our political feelings upon the altar of patriotism.<br />

“This sacrifice is a lesson <strong>and</strong> a bright example for the older civilizations <strong>and</strong> has tended in no<br />

small degree to make America a model for other nations, which was the ideal intended by our<br />

Revolutionary fathers.<br />

“One of the gratifying evidences of this unity is the tribute paid to America recently by Mgr.<br />

Satolli, who, carried away by the electric thrill of our institutions, recognized their magnificent<br />

character in a unity of purpose when the nation’s future is at stake.<br />

It speaks well for the foreign population that it is thoroughly American, <strong>and</strong> that all classes,<br />

however divided in politics, are with the President<br />

“Speaking for myself. I can say that I have always strongly advised my Catholic <strong>and</strong> Irish fellowcitizens<br />

that they must not dream of ever going into a fight in the United States under any other flag<br />

than that of the Stars <strong>and</strong> Stripes, <strong>and</strong> with the single object of seeing that this great Republic of the<br />

West would, in any military contingency, triumph over all its enemies, come from what source they<br />

may.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. N. W. Wells<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Newell Woolsey Wells, the pastor of the South Third Street Presbyterian Church, said:<br />

“I think those peace meetings are making altogether too much of the matter. Americans are<br />

eminently a common-sense people, <strong>and</strong> common sense will enable them to see that the President’s<br />

message is pacific in tone. <strong>The</strong> President could not do anything else in view of the circumstances.<br />

We have not yet begun to think seriously of war, <strong>and</strong> I take issue with, the Rev. Lyman Abbott’s<br />

view of the situation. We are not affected much in a financial sense by the message. It is probable<br />

some railroad securities <strong>and</strong> certain inflated stocks may have been hurt, but the general property of<br />

the country is secure. A business man told me yesterday that no solid houses are likely to suffer in<br />

consequence of the message, <strong>and</strong> that the atmosphere was sure to be so cleared that in the long run<br />

we will be gainers by the belief in the permanence of our institutions <strong>and</strong> the impossibility of an<br />

attack by any foreign State.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Frederick T. Koerner<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Frederick T. Koerner, pastor of the German Lutheran Church, in Driggs Avenue, said:<br />

‘I st<strong>and</strong> by the President in the position he has taken, <strong>and</strong> I hope Congress will sustain him to the<br />

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24 – 25 December 1895<br />

end. Peace meetings are uncalled for, although I believe that their promoters are honest, <strong>and</strong><br />

inspired by patriotism in the course they are adopting. <strong>The</strong>re is not the least danger of a war,<br />

however, <strong>and</strong> if one should come, my knowledge of foreign-born residents leads me to believe that<br />

they would st<strong>and</strong> for the rights of the United States quite as firmly as the native-born.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Samuel K. Spahr<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Samuel K. Spahr, pastor of Trinity Methodist Episcopal Church, at Roebling <strong>and</strong><br />

South Fourth Streets said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> reading of the President’s message stirred up my blood into such a refreshing condition as<br />

I have not experienced for a long time. I regret anything in the shape of public meetings that would<br />

indicate any division or lack of unanimity among our people, <strong>and</strong> our representatives in both<br />

branches of Congress have shown us a magnificent example of loyalty <strong>and</strong> discipline, <strong>and</strong> the people<br />

should also on their part see that all party lines <strong>and</strong> prejudices are ignored.”<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

Editor’s note: Despite the headline, Williamsburg is not mentioned in this lengthy article.<br />

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- Part 7 -<br />

26 - 31 December 1895<br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

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- 209 -<br />

Editorial<br />

From a Letter of Secretary of State Frelinghuysen to<br />

Our Minister to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, November, 1882<br />

“You will take an early occasion to present the foregoing considerations to Señor Seijas, saying<br />

to him that, while trusting that the direct proposal for arbitration already made to Great Britain may<br />

bear good fruit (if, indeed, it has not already done so by its acceptance in principle,) the Government<br />

of the United States will cheerfully lend any needful aid to press upon Great Britain in a friendly way<br />

the proposition so made.”<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 210 -<br />

Editorial<br />

Secretary Bayard to Minister Phelps, February, 1887<br />

“. . .Nevertheless, the records abundantly testify our friendly concern in the adjustment of the<br />

dispute, <strong>and</strong> the intelligence now received warrants me in tendering, through you, to her Majesty’s<br />

Government the good offices of the United States to promote an amicable settlement of the<br />

respective claims of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> in the premises.<br />

“As proof of the impartiality with which we view the question, we offer our arbitration, if<br />

acceptable to both countries. We do this with the less hesitancy as the dispute turns upon simple <strong>and</strong><br />

readily ascertainable historical facts.<br />

“Her Majesty’s Government will readily underst<strong>and</strong> that this attitude of friendly neutrality <strong>and</strong><br />

entire impartiality touching the merits of the controversy, consisting wholly in a difference of facts<br />

between our friends <strong>and</strong> neighbors, is entirely consistent <strong>and</strong> compatible with the sense of<br />

responsibility that rests upon the United States in relation to the South American republics. <strong>The</strong><br />

doctrines we announced two generations ago, at the instance <strong>and</strong> with the moral support <strong>and</strong><br />

approval of the <strong>British</strong> Government, have lost none of their force or importance in the progress of<br />

time, <strong>and</strong> the Governments of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States are equally interested in<br />

conserving a status the wisdom of which has been demonstrated by the experience of more than<br />

half a century.<br />

“It is proper, therefore, that you should convey to Lord Iddesleigh, in such sufficiently guarded<br />

terms as your discretion may dictate, the satisfaction that would be felt by the Government of the<br />

United States in perceiving that its wishes in this regard were permitted to have influence with her<br />

Majesty’s Government.”<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

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- 211 -<br />

Editorial<br />

Secretary Blaine to Mr. Lincoln, Minister at London, May 1, 1890<br />

“Mr. Lincoln is instructed to use his good offices with Lord Salisbury to bring about the<br />

resumption of diplomatic intercourse between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> as a preliminary step<br />

toward the settlement of the boundary dispute by arbitration.”<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 212 -<br />

Editorial<br />

Mr. Lincoln’s Reply to Mr. Blaine, May 5, 1890<br />

“In reference to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary question, I have the honor to acquaint you that, having<br />

received on the 2d inst. your telegraphic instruction, I had to-day by appointment an interview with<br />

the Marquis of Salisbury, as I have informed you by a cablegram. . . In the course of the<br />

conversation he spoke of arbitration in a general way, saying that he thought there was more chance<br />

of a satisfactory result <strong>and</strong> more freedom from complication in the submission of an international<br />

question to a jurisconsult than to a sovereign power, adding that he had found it so in questions<br />

with Germany. If the matter had been entirely new <strong>and</strong> dissociated from its previous history, I<br />

should have felt from his tone that the idea of arbitration in some form to put an end to the<br />

boundary dispute was quite agreeable to him.”<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 213 -<br />

Editorial<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister to Secretary Gresham, March 31, 1894<br />

“Vainly have the Government of the United States, on different occasions <strong>and</strong> under various<br />

forms, expressed their wish to see the difficulty settled by award of arbitrators, <strong>and</strong> vainly, also, have<br />

the Governments of Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Argentine Republic, Guatemala, Salvador,<br />

Nicaragua, Costa Rica, <strong>and</strong> Haiti interposed in that direction their friendly recommendations to the<br />

Foreign Office. Her Britannic Majesty’s Government have insisted on their refusal.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> precedents established by Great Britain herself in various cases of similar differences with<br />

other nations have proved equally powerless to influence her mind <strong>and</strong> to persuade her to adjust in<br />

the same way her conflict with <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

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“In 1829 she consented to submit to the decision of the King of Holl<strong>and</strong> a boundary question<br />

with the United States; a similar one with Portugal, in 1872, to the judgment of the President of the<br />

French Republic, Marshal MacMahon, <strong>and</strong> recently, in 1893, to the Court of Arbitration of Paris the<br />

difference concerning the sphere of action <strong>and</strong> jurisdiction in the Bering Sea, which can properly be<br />

called a boundary question.<br />

“If Her Britannic Majesty’s Government believes that in the cause, nature, <strong>and</strong> object of their<br />

dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong> there is something to make it differ from the disputes just mentioned, <strong>and</strong> to<br />

sufficiently legitimate her obstinate resistance; if they consider their titles to be so unquestionable<br />

that it is useless to ascertain on whose part justice is; if they are afraid to ab<strong>and</strong>on a right which, in<br />

their opinion, is certain <strong>and</strong> perfect, <strong>and</strong> to expose the dignity <strong>and</strong> independence of their country by<br />

allowing an authorized <strong>and</strong> impartial court to tell them whether or not their pretensions are fully<br />

justified, then those motives themselves could be submitted, to the judgment of arbiters, under this<br />

form: Is Great Britain right in refusing to surrender to arbitration her boundary controversy with<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>? If what she seeks is truth, why does she object to its being established <strong>and</strong> proved by the<br />

arbiter or arbiters?”<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 214 -<br />

AGREEMENT OF SPAIN ADVISED<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Is Contending for the Same Rights Against Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

That the Spanish Colonists Claimed<br />

LONDON, Dec. 25.—<strong>The</strong> Nacional of Madrid advocates an entente between Spain <strong>and</strong> the<br />

United States regarding <strong>Venezuela</strong>, on the ground that <strong>Venezuela</strong> is merely contending for the same<br />

rights against Engl<strong>and</strong> that Spain used to claim when all the Spanish-American Republics were her<br />

colonies.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard to-morrow will print a dispatch from its Madrid correspondent saying that the<br />

article in the Nacional was evidently inspired, <strong>and</strong> that it has caused a sensation.<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 215 -<br />

Must Be Sure of Our Ground<br />

From the San Francisco Examiner, (Dem.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> proposed commission is not to be a tribunal at all. It is simply an agency to aid our own<br />

Government in reaching a conclusion. When the information collected by the commission is studied<br />

by the President, his conclusions will be presented to Lord Salisbury, not as the findings of an<br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

arbitration board, but as the views of the Government of the United States, <strong>and</strong> the question before<br />

the <strong>British</strong> Premier then will be simply whether he is willing to make an arrangement satisfactory to<br />

the United States or not. We have an idea that by that time he will.<br />

In the selection of the members of the commission President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, of course, will act under<br />

the fullest sense of his responsibilities. He will choose men of judicial minds, men who have been<br />

accustomed to sift evidence <strong>and</strong> who have never made themselves conspicuous by extreme opinion<br />

upon foreign affairs. He will carefully avoid the choice of mere politicians. We should like to see him<br />

include in the body some of the authorities on international law from the great universities, <strong>and</strong><br />

perhaps a member or two of the Supreme Court. In whatever action we may take we must be sure<br />

of our ground. <strong>The</strong> report of this commission must be so c<strong>and</strong>id, exhaustive, <strong>and</strong> convincing as to<br />

make the justice of our position apparent to the honest judgment of the world, even in Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

itself.<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 216 -<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Aim<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Buffalo Courier, (Dem.)<br />

<strong>The</strong>re appears to be very little doubt that Great Britain’s chief aim is to obtain control of the<br />

mouth of the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> undisputed control of the mouth of this mighty stream would be an<br />

immense acquisition, immeasurable in value. It would be far more important to her than the<br />

possession of the additional timber l<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> gold mines in the disputed territory. To say that the<br />

<strong>British</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> of the mouth of the Orinoco would not materially shape the destiny of <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

is absurd, <strong>and</strong> to assert that the United States should view the matter with indifference is not<br />

defensible. Happily all the facts in the case <strong>and</strong> the far-reaching issues involved will be put before<br />

the world in the report of the coming <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission.<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 217 -<br />

ENGLAND AND AMERICA<br />

<strong>The</strong> address of the <strong>British</strong> authors to the American authors must enlist the sympathy of every<br />

reader of the English language, not only in the <strong>British</strong> Isl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> the American hemisphere, but in<br />

all countries in which that language is read. It is as true of this country as it can be of Engl<strong>and</strong> that<br />

she rejoices in the achievements that are first addressed to the “other public” of English-writing<br />

authors. Every one of these the American as well as the English reader counts among his<br />

possessions. It was said by Dr. Johnson: “<strong>The</strong> chief glory of every nation arises from its authors.”<br />

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But these two nations are in the case, exceptional in human history, where the glories of a great<br />

literature are equally cherished by two nations.<br />

Indeed, nothing has been more noteworthy in the discussions that have been aroused by the<br />

special message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> than the absence of what may be called personal feeling. A<br />

question has arisen for international lawyers <strong>and</strong> for publicists which it is felt on all sides it would be<br />

not only inhuman but absurd to submit to the arbitrament of arms. It concerns the historical policy<br />

of this Nation, a policy adopted beyond the memory of any American now living. <strong>The</strong>re are fears<br />

that the action of Great Britain may infringe upon this policy, originally adopted, as Lard Salisbury<br />

has reminded us, with her entire approval. Those fears will not be allayed if Great Britain insists<br />

upon being the judge in her own cause, the other party being immeasurably weaker than herself <strong>and</strong><br />

unable of herself to resist the enforcement of an unjust judgment.<br />

In all this there is nothing that ought to excite any personal animosities or at all to change the<br />

friendly relations of individual Americans <strong>and</strong> individual Englishmen. In fact, those relations have<br />

not been disturbed or imperiled by the President’s emphatic notification that, as to the larger<br />

question involved in a dispute in itself trifling, his countrymen are very deeply in earnest. Individual<br />

Englishmen <strong>and</strong> individual Americans find it possible to maintain their friendships, <strong>and</strong> this not by<br />

avoiding the subject, but while discussing it fully <strong>and</strong> in all its bearings, <strong>and</strong> even while bantering<br />

each other upon it. Full <strong>and</strong> free discussion, under only such restraints as impose themselves upon<br />

the disputes of gentlemen <strong>and</strong> of friends, is all that is needed to assure a speedy, a peaceable, <strong>and</strong> a<br />

satisfactory solution of the international question. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> authors have contributed nothing<br />

directly to such a discussion, for they have abstained from entering at all upon the merits of the<br />

controversy. But indirectly they have made a contribution to it of the utmost possible value by<br />

giving an example, equally wholesome on both sides of the ocean, of the tone <strong>and</strong> temper, of the<br />

respect <strong>and</strong> good will, with which such a discussion should be conducted. A controversy conducted<br />

in such a spirit cannot but come to a just <strong>and</strong> a peaceful conclusion.<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 218 -<br />

No Need of Hysterics<br />

From <strong>The</strong> San Francisco Chronicle, (Rep.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> argument of the President in support of the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> in reply to the position<br />

assumed by the <strong>British</strong> Government in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter is unanswerable. Americans of all<br />

shades of political opinion will indorse the special message of the President in that regard.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no occasion for Congress or the country to go into hysterics over the situation. <strong>The</strong>re is<br />

nothing in the aspect of the affair to warrant any talk about a war between the United States <strong>and</strong><br />

Great Britain over the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n imbroglio. Neither country desires war, that is to say, an armed<br />

conflict.<br />

<strong>The</strong> situation dem<strong>and</strong>s that the United States should remain absolutely firm in the st<strong>and</strong> which<br />

has been taken. Let it be understood that the Government will not recede. <strong>The</strong> United States has<br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

now assumed <strong>and</strong> will maintain its position among the first nations of the world. As it is, the<br />

American people are content that the sphere of American influence shall be confined to the<br />

American Continent, but if the Republic is to have such controversies as the one concerning<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> on its h<strong>and</strong>s, it may become necessary to enter a wider diplomatic <strong>and</strong> international field.<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 219 -<br />

WAR NOT DEEMED TO BE POSSIBLE<br />

English Preachers Regard the War Talk in This Country Uncalled For—<br />

Army Officials Warned as to <strong>The</strong>ir Expressions<br />

LONDON, Dec. 25.—<strong>The</strong> Archbishop of Canterbury, the Dean of St. Paul’s, the Dean of<br />

Westminster, <strong>and</strong> preachers at Christmas services generally to-day touched upon the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

crisis. <strong>The</strong>y all deplored the idea of a war, expressed the belief that such an outcome of the<br />

controversy was impossible, <strong>and</strong> enlarged upon “peace <strong>and</strong> good will.” References to sympathetic<br />

feeling with the Armenians were also general.<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 25.—Certain army officers who have in recent interviews in the<br />

newspapers been quoted in discussion of the possibilities of war with Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> as outlining their<br />

ideas of what should be done in such event, are said to have received personal letters from Secretary<br />

of War Lamont severely deprecating such talk.<br />

Expressions from such sources, he says, are not only given undue significance, but they are also<br />

injurious to the good reputation of the discipline of the army <strong>and</strong> harmful to the country in<br />

contributing to an unwarranted apprehension.<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 220 -<br />

THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE<br />

It Continues Cordially to Support the President’s St<strong>and</strong><br />

NO ABATEMENT IN THE LOYAL ACCLAIM<br />

<strong>The</strong> Feeling Still Widespread that the Administration’s Course<br />

Is the Only Proper One for to Pursue<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Christian Intelligencer<br />

We have not the opportunity to-day to present more fully highly probable facts <strong>and</strong> some<br />

considerations concerning the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affairs which are the subject of discussion between our<br />

Government <strong>and</strong> that of Great Britain. However, the position firmly taken by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> in<br />

his message <strong>and</strong> Secretary Olney in his dispatches deserves, as it has received, the hearty support of<br />

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the Nation. <strong>The</strong> evils or war, as some of us distinctly remember, are unspeakably grievous <strong>and</strong><br />

afflictive. All honorable means should be used to the utmost to prevent war. <strong>The</strong> people of the<br />

United States love peace, as is evident from the smallness of our army, the comparative fewness of<br />

our ships of war, <strong>and</strong> the unfortified condition at our coasts. <strong>The</strong> proposition of the President to<br />

appoint a commission to ascertain whether <strong>Venezuela</strong> has a clear title to the territory which Great<br />

Britain not only claims, but has already occupied, in other words, to ascertain whether the Monroe<br />

doctrine applies to this case, is eminently wise <strong>and</strong> just.<br />

That a competent commission <strong>and</strong> one which will receive the confidence of the Nation will be<br />

selected is certain. Until the report of such a body is made it becomes us to avoid altogether all<br />

irritating or offensive words <strong>and</strong> deeds. Nothing should be allowed to carry us into precipitate or<br />

intemperate action. Let us wait patiently to learn the right, <strong>and</strong> than perform it courageously <strong>and</strong><br />

with steadfastness. <strong>The</strong> spirit of our National Administration in this serious business deserves our<br />

confidence. <strong>The</strong>re need be no fear that the firm maintenance of its position will result in war. Let us<br />

go about our ordinary avocations in our ordinary temper, <strong>and</strong> give no heed to the irritating <strong>and</strong><br />

abusive terms poured upon us by the journals of Great Britain. Above all let us entreat our God <strong>and</strong><br />

the God of our fathers to endow us with the wisdom, righteousness, <strong>and</strong> mercy we need in this<br />

hour.<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 221 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> Country Not Panic-Stricken<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Chicago Inter Ocean (Rep.)<br />

Possibly the time is near at b<strong>and</strong> to realize the dream of “a parliament of nations <strong>and</strong> federation<br />

of the world.” But however that all may be, the duty of the American people is to rally to the<br />

defense of the great doctrine that no European power shall encroach upon the territorial rights of<br />

any American power, however strong may be the aggressor <strong>and</strong> weak the victim. Engl<strong>and</strong> will be<br />

more likely to arbitrate of convinced that the United States is in downright earnest. Indeed, the<br />

English people need more than anything else just now to be convinced that our Government is in<br />

earnest.<br />

<strong>The</strong>ir first impression seemed to have been that the President was playing politics. <strong>The</strong>y did not<br />

think mach of it When a Republican Congress sustained him, they took it as an affront, a sacrificed a<br />

good many of our bonds in the fatuous hope to cause a revolution of public opinion. That ruse—for<br />

ruse it was—succeeded in frightening the speculative market, but the country, as a whole, is<br />

unmoved. <strong>The</strong>re is reason to call the creation of a boundary commission a step toward war. It is<br />

rather a long step toward what ought to prove a peaceable solution of the whole problem.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

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- 222 -<br />

Not Against the English People<br />

From <strong>The</strong> San Francisco Post, (Ind. Rep.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> burst of patriotism which has followed the transmission of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n message to Congress is not difficult of analysis. Nor does the fact that political lines<br />

seem for the moment to have been obliterated complicate the problem.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no feeling in the United States against the English people. On the contrary, we are<br />

bound to them by ties of relationship which cannot be easily broken. But that Americans generally<br />

think it is about time to put an end to Great Britain’s aggressions on this side of the ocean is<br />

sufficiently apparent from the support President Clevel<strong>and</strong> is now receiving.<br />

[25 December 1895]<br />

- 223 -<br />

WHY DOES SHE REFUSE ARBITRATION?<br />

Interesting Extracts from Public Documents Pertinent to<br />

Great Britain’s Present Attitude<br />

Resolution of the House of Commons, July 16, 1893<br />

Resolved, That this Rouse has learnt with satisfaction that both Houses of the United States<br />

Congress have, by resolution, requested the President to invite, from time to time, as fit occasions<br />

may arise, negotiations with any Government with which the United States have, or may have,<br />

diplomatic relations, to the end that any differences or disputes arising between the two<br />

Governments which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency may be referred to arbitration <strong>and</strong><br />

peaceably adjusted by such means, <strong>and</strong> that this House, cordially sympathizing with the purpose in<br />

view, expresses the hope that Her Majesty’s Government will lend their ready co-operation to the<br />

Government of the United States upon the basis of the foregoing resolution.<br />

[26 December 1895]<br />

- 224 -<br />

ATTITUDE OF LOYAL MEN<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s Firm Position Sustained by All Patriots<br />

No Other Course than His Would Comport with the Honor<br />

<strong>and</strong> Self-respect of the American People<br />

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From <strong>The</strong> Washington Post, (Ind.)<br />

It is difficult to underst<strong>and</strong> the blind persistency with which <strong>British</strong> newspapers <strong>and</strong> public men<br />

keep their eyes closed to the true condition of public sentiment in this country. Because a few alien<br />

editors have condemned the President’s course, a few school teachers have argued against his<br />

interpretation of the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> a few clergymen have protested in the name of peace,<br />

English opinion has suddenly taken up the hypothesis of a great popular revulsion of feeling, <strong>and</strong><br />

looks with confidence to an immediate change of attitude on the part of this Government.<br />

Nothing could be more fatuous <strong>and</strong> foolish. Nothing is further from the thoughts of the<br />

President or the plans of Congress than the very slightest modification of the position that has been<br />

assumed by Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> American people have hailed the announcement of that position<br />

with an approval so fervent, so enthusiastic, <strong>and</strong> so harmonious that for the moment party<br />

differences have been forgotten <strong>and</strong> party lines obliterated.<br />

Only the most infinitesimal <strong>and</strong> insignificant fraction of our population so much as dreams of<br />

receding one single step, of changing or retracting anything. <strong>The</strong> first wild clamor has subsided. <strong>The</strong><br />

country no longer seethes <strong>and</strong> froths. But instead there has come to us a quiet, earnest, deep-seated<br />

purpose, against which it will behoove no nation on thin globe to strike.<br />

Let no one delude himself with the vain <strong>and</strong> foolish thought that we have wavered. What the<br />

President has said upon the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, ninety-nine-hundredths of the able-bodied men<br />

over whom he rules have echoed from the bottom of their patriot hearts.<br />

[27 December 1895]<br />

- 225 -<br />

AN ALLEGED PRIVATE DISPATCH<br />

Reported in London that Mr. Olney Has Sent a Message to Salisbury<br />

LONDON, Dec. 26.—<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> to-morrow, commenting on the report that Secretary of<br />

State Olney has forwarded a private dispatch to Lord Salisbury, will say:<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is nothing incredible or surprising in such an announcement On the contrary, it would he highly<br />

honorable to him. <strong>The</strong>re is no reason to believe that, in pushing the Monroe doctrine, Secretary Olney had any<br />

design of insulting or annoying Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> paper discredits the various far-fetched explanations of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s policy, <strong>and</strong><br />

says be meant no harm by his message to Congress. Whatever mischief he did, he has endeavored<br />

conscientiously <strong>and</strong> laboriously to undo.<br />

Ex-Senator Warner Miller, in speaking of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n incident yesterday, said that war was<br />

out of the question. “<strong>The</strong> House <strong>and</strong> the Senate have the prerogative alone to declare war, <strong>and</strong> no<br />

President can rob them of it. President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has tried to do so. Of course, the House <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Senate passed the commission bill, not desiring to appear unpatriotic. But as these two branches of<br />

Congress have to vote to furnish the sinews of war in the shape of appropriations, it is nothing but<br />

right that they should have the power to declare war. President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s administration has<br />

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placed the country in a deep financial hole, <strong>and</strong> it only remains for a Republican Congress to try to<br />

get it out.”<br />

Hopes for Peaceful Relations<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chamber of Commerce yesterday received the following cablegram from the Edinburgh<br />

Chamber of Commerce:<br />

EDINGBURGH, Dec. 26, 1895.<br />

To Chamber of Commerce, New-York:<br />

Edinburgh Chamber express earnest desire that present difficulty may end in continuance of peaceful relations<br />

between both countries so closely allied by kindred language <strong>and</strong> mutual interests.<br />

THOMAS CLARK, Baronet, President.<br />

[27 December 1895]<br />

- 226 -<br />

A CANADIAN ALARMIST<br />

Editor of a Toronto Paper Fears an Invasion of the Dominion<br />

TORONTO, Dec. 26.—A local paper this morning printed the following:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> United States Jingoes are in retreat, but any day may see a panic followed by great social<br />

disturbances, <strong>and</strong> then an irrepressible rabble of adventurers take the road to invade Canada. <strong>The</strong>y<br />

have done it before. <strong>The</strong>re is, so a good authority says, 1,000,000 men without work, desperate as to<br />

the future, <strong>and</strong> with nothing to lose, who could easily be got to join in such an invasion. <strong>The</strong>re are<br />

also a host of ‘Generals’ <strong>and</strong> ‘Colonels’ of more or less war experience, <strong>and</strong>, well versed in the<br />

vocabulary of brag, to take the comm<strong>and</strong>. We say in all seriousness, that we are liable to such an<br />

invasion any day. It is therefore the duty of our Government to take some measure of defense, <strong>and</strong><br />

to quietly, but vigorously, see what shape we are in for resisting such attack.”<br />

OTTAWA. Ontario, Dec. 26.—<strong>The</strong> Government has decided to establish at once a school of<br />

military instruction in Montreal. Several influential delegations waited upon the authorities <strong>and</strong> urged<br />

this course.<br />

[27 December 1895]<br />

- 227 -<br />

AMERICAN REPUBLICS SYMPATHIZE<br />

Spanish Southern Governments Would Assist the United States<br />

in the Event of War with Great Britain<br />

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VIENNA, Dec.26.—<strong>The</strong> Paris correspondent of the Neues Journal sends to his paper a report of<br />

an interview with General Guzman Blanco of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, who is now In Paris, in which that<br />

gentleman says that the integrity of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is a vital question to all America. If Engl<strong>and</strong> is<br />

allowed to dominate the Orinoco region, Gen. Blanco declares, she will shortly assume control of<br />

the regions of the Amazon <strong>and</strong> La Plata. If she should begin war against <strong>Venezuela</strong>, by the<br />

establishment of a blockade of the latter’s ports, all of the American republics would respond by<br />

closing their ports against English commerce. Gen. Blanco expressed the belief that in the event of<br />

war between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States an entente would be established between the latter<br />

country <strong>and</strong> Russia, <strong>and</strong> that Russia would attack Great Britain’s Indian possessions at the moment<br />

that Engl<strong>and</strong> attacked the United States.<br />

[27 December 1895]<br />

- 228 -<br />

COMMISSION NOT SELECTED<br />

<strong>The</strong> President In No Haste to Appoint the Investigators of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary<br />

WASHINGTON. Dec. 26.—Despite the may rumors concerning the composition of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, the president has not yet decided whom he will appoint. He, of course,<br />

considered some of the names which have been mentioned in the last few days, but his mind is not<br />

made up. He dispatched a letter to ex-Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont two days ago,<br />

asking, it is assumed, whether Mr. Edmunds would accept an appointment as a member of the<br />

commission. Mr. Edmunds’s reply has not been indicated by the President. It is the policy of Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> to ascertain beforeh<strong>and</strong> whether any of the men he deems eligible for appointment would<br />

be willing to serve, <strong>and</strong> it is possible that some of the men with whom he has communicated may be<br />

disappointed if they have signified their willingness to accept.<br />

It is taken for granted, in the absence of definite information concerning the President’s plans,<br />

that he will not care to have a large commission. It follows that he is anxious to secure the very best<br />

material obtainable. It is not probable that the Commissioners will be named before Saturday.<br />

<strong>The</strong> improvement in the tone of English opinion is regarded at the White House as due in large<br />

measure to the President’s delay. If this delay is supplemented by the appointment of a commission<br />

composed of men with more than a National reputation, the <strong>British</strong> view, it is believed, will be<br />

further revised.<br />

Edward J. Phelps of Vermont, ex-Minister to Engl<strong>and</strong>, one of the gentlemen who may serve on<br />

the commission to report on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, was visited by a reporter for <strong>The</strong> New-York<br />

Times last evening at the Clarendon Hotel.<br />

Mr. Phelps said he had received no communication, official or other, that he was to be asked to<br />

serve on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission. He declined to discuss the matter.<br />

CHICAGO, Dec. 26.—At the offices of Isham, Lincoln & Beale this morning little credence<br />

was given to the report that Robert Todd Lincoln would be appointed a member of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Commission. Mr. Lincoln’s partners said there probably was no truth in the report. Mr. Lincoln has<br />

been in Philadelphia since Tuesday.<br />

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[27 December 1895]<br />

- 229 -<br />

REPORT OF A QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE<br />

Salisbury Said to be Negotiating for Support on the Continent<br />

LONDON. Dec. 26.—<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> will publish to-morrow a dispatch from Vienna stating<br />

that Lord Salisbury, the <strong>British</strong> Prime Minister, is negotiating with France <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong> with view to<br />

adopting common action against the policy of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Spain, the dispatch states, already has indicated her agreement with Great Britain on the<br />

question.<br />

It is believed, the correspondent states, that Great Britain, France, Holl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Spain will form<br />

a quadruple alliance to protect their American possessions against the United States.<br />

[27 December 1895]<br />

- 230 -<br />

PRESIDENT’S COURSE WAS RIGHT<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> Will Now Learn About Monroe Doctrine, Rev. Mr. Darlinton Says<br />

<strong>The</strong> Rev. Dr. J. H. Darlinton, rector of Christ Episcopal Church, Bedford Avenue <strong>and</strong> Clymer<br />

Street, Brooklyn, has not made any reference to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n trouble from his pulpit, but<br />

yesterday, in an interview, he said:<br />

Such topics are not to be brought into the pulpit on Sunday. <strong>The</strong> Sunday services of the Church<br />

should not be secularized. <strong>The</strong>y are for the preaching of the Gospel. <strong>The</strong> less secular topics of any<br />

kind brought into the pulpit the better. But I am very glad to give a reporter, or any one else, my<br />

views on this subject on a week day.<br />

My idea is that things have happened just right. I am very glad indeed that the President spoke as<br />

he did, <strong>and</strong> that the two houses of Congress acted as they did. <strong>The</strong> mind of the masses of the people<br />

in Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> on the Continent of Europe is in a misty condition about America <strong>and</strong> American<br />

affairs anyway. Probably, while the statesmen knew there was such a man as President Monroe, the<br />

majority of the people, not reading the newspapers to the extent that they do in this country, where<br />

even the laboring man buys his newspaper on his way to work, <strong>and</strong> when the best papers in Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

devote almost no space whatever to American news, giving, in fact, larger accounts of doings in<br />

Australia than in the United States <strong>and</strong> three times as much to the affairs of Canada as to this<br />

country, it is well they should learn that there is a Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> just what it is.<br />

<strong>The</strong> pronounced st<strong>and</strong> taken by the President <strong>and</strong> houses of Congress will make the Monroe<br />

doctrine a subject of discussion in every country <strong>and</strong> city chophouse, on the street corners <strong>and</strong> by<br />

the firesides; <strong>and</strong>, while there will be some Englishmen who will be crazy for war <strong>and</strong> who believe<br />

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that one Englishman is as good as from ten to twenty men of any other nation in battle, the majority<br />

of the thinking people of Engl<strong>and</strong> will readily determine that there must to no war for such a trifling<br />

cause, <strong>and</strong> mercantile Engl<strong>and</strong> will see that her immense money interests in this country are not to<br />

be put in peril by any such war.<br />

<strong>The</strong> shipping interests of Engl<strong>and</strong> alone, which to-day are greater than all the rest of the world,<br />

probably, would be utterly ruined should such a war occur. Now, as Gladstone says, all that needs to<br />

be applied to the situation is common sense—to go slow <strong>and</strong> not irritate Great Britain by any<br />

unnecessary warlike demonstration. We have taken the right st<strong>and</strong> in dem<strong>and</strong>ing arbitration. If we<br />

simply st<strong>and</strong> firm, in a few months the whole matter will be settled peaceably <strong>and</strong> without a thought<br />

of war.<br />

<strong>The</strong> only danger lies in the possibility that the hot-headed <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns may commit some<br />

untoward act <strong>and</strong> so force retaliation by the <strong>British</strong> fleet. But, even if that occurs, it is not necessary<br />

for the United States immediately to step in. <strong>The</strong> two greatest Christian nations of the world will<br />

look long at the dispute before they engage in a war which will cost hundreds of thous<strong>and</strong>s of lives<br />

<strong>and</strong> hundreds at millions of property.<br />

[27 December 1895]<br />

- 231 -<br />

IS A MESSAGE OF PEACE<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Utterance Not a Signal for War<br />

MR. CLEVELAND’S POSITION APPROVED<br />

Ex-Congressman Williams of the Opinion that the Dignity of<br />

the Country Has Been Fully Maintained<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 26.—Ex-Representative George Fred Williams of Boston, who is<br />

spending the holiday season in Washington, heartily approves of the President’s course in relation to<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary question. Mr. Williams, like all true Americans, takes the ground that the<br />

Monroe doctrine should be rigidly inforced. While applauding the President’s st<strong>and</strong> in behalf at this<br />

doctrine Mr. Williams does not believe that there will be a war between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain.<br />

“I agree that this <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question should be settled from the st<strong>and</strong>point of peace,” said Mr.<br />

Williams to a correspondent of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times, “<strong>and</strong> that if the American public has any<br />

distinctive function to perform in modern civilization it is to prevent war <strong>and</strong> maintain peace <strong>and</strong> a<br />

brotherhood of men so far as the American continents are concerned.”<br />

He continued:<br />

I underst<strong>and</strong> this to be the entire spirit <strong>and</strong> purpose of the Monroe doctrine, as announced<br />

by President Monroe in his annual message of Dec. 2, 1823. <strong>The</strong> primary declaration of that<br />

message is that America should not become involved in the policy which European nations may<br />

choose to adopt in maintaining their balance of power among themselves. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine,<br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

therefore, in the first instance, pledges the United States Government to the policy of declining<br />

any intervention by force of any countries beyond the American continents.<br />

Since the declaration of the Monroe doctrine the United States have fulfilled their pledges in<br />

this regard <strong>and</strong> their purpose has been the maintenance of peace upon the American continents.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong> they attempt to secure the domestic peace of the American States by<br />

forbidding the European nations from “any attempt on their part to extend their system to any<br />

portion of the hemisphere” <strong>and</strong> treating such an attempt “as dangerous to our peace <strong>and</strong> safety.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> attempt to extend European systems is further defined by the declaration that ‘we could not<br />

view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, (namely, any of the American States,)<br />

or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than<br />

as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> purpose of this doctrine was, I believe, fully foreshadowed in the letter of Thomas<br />

Jefferson, written in 1820, in which, referring to the Minister to Brazil, he says:<br />

I hope he sees <strong>and</strong> will promote in his new situation the advantages of a cordial fraternization among all the<br />

American nations <strong>and</strong> the importance of their coalescing in an American system <strong>and</strong> policy totally independent<br />

of <strong>and</strong> unconnected with that of Europe. <strong>The</strong> day is not distant when we may formally acquire a meridian of<br />

partition through the ocean which separates the two hemispheres, on the hither side of which no European gun<br />

shall ever be heard or an American on the other. . . I hope no American will ever lose sight of the essential<br />

policy of interdicting in the seas <strong>and</strong> territories of both Americas the ferocious <strong>and</strong> sanguinary contests of<br />

Europe. I wish to see this coalition begun.<br />

I think the words of Jefferson are even more fundamental <strong>and</strong> important to the peace of our<br />

continent than when they were uttered. Every true American must regard, as Jefferson did, that<br />

the sound of a European gun on our side of the ocean as a menace to our peace, <strong>and</strong> that, on the<br />

other h<strong>and</strong>, our intervention in the affairs of Europe, Asia, <strong>and</strong> Africa, would be an equally<br />

unfitting solution of the problem which interests our continents. It seems to me that the whole<br />

subject should be viewed from this st<strong>and</strong>point, <strong>and</strong> that war in nowise should be considered<br />

except for the great purpose of maintaining the peace of our continents. This doctrine, called the<br />

Monroe doctrine, has never been ab<strong>and</strong>oned by this Government, <strong>and</strong>, in my judgment, never<br />

should be. It deserves a place in international law because it absolutely prevents the interference<br />

of America with Europe in consideration of Europe’s consent to abstain from intervention in<br />

American affairs.<br />

Whatever may be the views of our citizens as to the caution or temperance of President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message, it is clear that his purpose has been to defend the peace of the American<br />

continents against the threat of Engl<strong>and</strong> to by force insist upon its own claims to take possession<br />

of American soil. If the Monroe doctrine is still the true American doctrine, it was President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s duty to insist upon it, <strong>and</strong> had he not done so, according to his judgment, the whole<br />

policy would have been placed in danger of invasion. We must judge the language of diplomacy<br />

according to its real purport, <strong>and</strong> not according to its well-chosen phrases, <strong>and</strong> it becomes every<br />

true American citizen who ventures to speak upon this subject to inquire who has used the<br />

actual language of war.<br />

It seems to me that it is not President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, but Lord Salisbury, who at first declared<br />

that force <strong>and</strong> not justice shall decide the points in dispute in this case. To those who deprecate<br />

war it should be suggested that Lord Salisbury was the first to decline a peaceful solution. Lord<br />

Salisbury’s position to expressed in the following words:<br />

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If, as time has gone on, the concessions thus offered diminish in extent <strong>and</strong> have now been withdrawn, this<br />

has been a necessary consequence of a gradual spread over the country of <strong>British</strong> settlements which her<br />

Majesty’s Government cannot, in justice to the inhabitants, offer to surrender to foreign rule.<br />

In other words, Lord Salisbury declares that wherever Englishmen choose to settle on<br />

American soil, Engl<strong>and</strong> will forcibly maintain their rights to English possession <strong>and</strong> English rule,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that the peaceful methods of arbitration shall not interfere. In other words, wherever<br />

Englishmen choose to settle disputed territory. Engl<strong>and</strong> will defend her claim to title, just or<br />

unjust. Now, it seems to me that the st<strong>and</strong> point from which every patriotic American should<br />

view the Presidents message is this: That upon the diplomatic correspondence <strong>and</strong> such<br />

information as has so far come to the Department of State, the President does not view the<br />

English claim as a legitimate boundary dispute, but as a case at theft of territory by Engl<strong>and</strong> from<br />

an independent American State.<br />

“While I would not maintain that the American people should sustain their President in any<br />

claim he may make, right or wrong, I do think that he should assume until further evidence is<br />

offered, that Engl<strong>and</strong>’s claim to the territory in question is so unfounded that it practically<br />

amounts to what President Monroe defined as “interposition by a European power for the<br />

purpose of oppressing an American republic.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> mere claim of title to territory will not change robbery into right, <strong>and</strong> from the attitude<br />

<strong>and</strong> vigorous words of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> the American citizen should assume that the<br />

President considers the English dem<strong>and</strong> for territory as baseless <strong>and</strong> unjust. In his message he<br />

says:<br />

If a European power, by the extension of its boundaries, takes possession or the territory of one of our<br />

neighboring republics against its will <strong>and</strong> in derogation of its rights, it is difficult to see why, to that extent, such<br />

European power does not thereby attempt to extend its system of government to that portion of this continent<br />

which is thus taken.<br />

As I underst<strong>and</strong> it, President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s attitude is this: He regards Lord Salisbury’s refusal<br />

to arbitrate as a declaration of purpose on the part of Engl<strong>and</strong> to occupy by force as much of the<br />

disputed territory as it chooses to claim, <strong>and</strong> to deny the dem<strong>and</strong> of this Government that the<br />

dispute be settled by peaceful arbitration, <strong>and</strong> in calling for a commission to fairly investigate the<br />

dispute. President Clevel<strong>and</strong> proposes to satisfy the people or this country <strong>and</strong> the whole world,<br />

winch makes <strong>and</strong> unmakes international law, whether Engl<strong>and</strong> is attempting to rob an American<br />

Government of its territory, or is merely asserting just <strong>and</strong> well-founded claims. It does not lie<br />

with patriotic Americans at this time to criticise of the President of the United States for<br />

attempting, through a just <strong>and</strong> impartial tribunal, to settle peacefully a question which Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

proposes to decide by force. It is not President Clevel<strong>and</strong> who is appealing to force, but<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, which declines the tribunal of peace.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission proposed by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> does not mean war, but peace. It is an<br />

assertion of peaceful methods against the defiant claim of Great Britain that it will forcibly<br />

occupy American territory without impartial judgment, <strong>and</strong> merely because English settlers have<br />

chosen to take possession of the l<strong>and</strong>. We may purchase peace at too high a price. Once allow<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> to occupy by force whatever American l<strong>and</strong> it chooses to claim, <strong>and</strong> the Monroe<br />

doctrine no longer exists. Any claim of title, whether by disputed boundaries, original grants, or<br />

conquest, must be submitted to by the United States against any European power merely<br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

because we ab<strong>and</strong>on the doctrine that American territory shall be independent of European<br />

control, except so far as it was colonized when President Monroe declared his doctrine.<br />

It seems to me that Lord Salisbury’s argument that the conditions which existed in 1823 are<br />

no longer effective is wrong, for the Monroe doctrine applies with much greater force than it did<br />

seventy years ago. <strong>The</strong> purposes, policy, <strong>and</strong> interests of the European States have been very<br />

dearly illustrated in recent years. <strong>The</strong>y have undertaken to control the Government of Egypt <strong>and</strong><br />

of Turkey, <strong>and</strong> have even divided up the African continent by virtue simply at their power over<br />

helpless countries. <strong>The</strong> question here involved is whether they may, by a like exercise of arbitrary<br />

power, possess themselves of American territory. Every year brings distant countries nearer<br />

together, <strong>and</strong> no one knows how soon railroads between the American continents may make<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Brazil our neighbors, <strong>and</strong> furnish facilities for European States to transport arms<br />

from those sections to our southern borders If, as is alleged by some, Engl<strong>and</strong>’s purpose is to<br />

control the commerce of North <strong>and</strong> South America by obtaining possession <strong>and</strong> control of the<br />

mouth of the Orinoco River, it is of fundamental importance to our peace that this shall not be<br />

done unjustly or by force.<br />

If Engl<strong>and</strong> would arbitrate its claim, then the methods of peace would be vindicated. If the<br />

United States allows Engl<strong>and</strong> to defy the tribunal of peace <strong>and</strong> take possession of American<br />

territory by force, it cannot later regain its position as the defender of the autonomy of the<br />

existing States of the American continents. I cannot underst<strong>and</strong> how President Clevel<strong>and</strong> can be<br />

charged with precipitating war when he proposes to appoint a just tribunal to satisfy the people<br />

of the United States <strong>and</strong> of the world as to the justice of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s dem<strong>and</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> thus insist<br />

upon a peaceful solution where Lord Salisbury insists upon the savage tribunal of force. While<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> might have chosen less forcible words with which to enforce the American<br />

doctrine of the peaceful solution of questions affecting the American continents, I should rather<br />

treat any excess in statement as an indignant protest against the policy of Engl<strong>and</strong> to acquire<br />

territory by force that the expression or a purpose on the part of the United States to use force<br />

in the defense of this territory.<br />

<strong>The</strong> appointment of the commission is a distinct repudiation of the doctrine of force. It is an<br />

appeal to the sense of justice of the world; it is a vigorous insistence that armed Europe shall not<br />

introduce warlike methods to disturb American peace. Instead of declaring war, the President<br />

treats Lord Salisbury’s refusal to arbitrate as an insistence upon forcible measures <strong>and</strong> proposes<br />

to have the case tried peaceably whether Engl<strong>and</strong> wishes it or not, <strong>and</strong> to ask the support of the<br />

peace-loving <strong>and</strong> war-hating world in resisting what he deems to be the oppression of a feeble<br />

American State by a powerfully armed European invader. This is the American doctrine that was<br />

good in 1823, is better now, in 1895, <strong>and</strong> will be a boon to mankind in the next century.<br />

I am second to no man in deprecating force in the settlement of international disputes. It is<br />

barbarous, unchristian, <strong>and</strong> to be hated by every just <strong>and</strong> merciful man, but the nation which<br />

defies the tribunal of peace is the nation which must bear the guilt of bloodshed, <strong>and</strong> not the<br />

nation that insists upon arbitration as the civilized, Christian; <strong>and</strong> lawful method of settling<br />

disputed international questions. <strong>The</strong>re is no fear of war between the United States, <strong>and</strong>, in my<br />

judgment, if the people of this country will st<strong>and</strong> by the President in this emergency, Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> all other nations will be taught a lesson which may well close this century that the American<br />

continent must be governed by law <strong>and</strong> not by the will of the strongest.<br />

[27 December 1895]<br />

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- 232 -<br />

COMMISSION NOT YET SELECTED<br />

<strong>The</strong> President Probably Will Not Name the Men to Investigate<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary <strong>Dispute</strong> Until Monday<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 27.—<strong>The</strong>re have been no developments to-day in connection with the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission appointments. <strong>The</strong> President still is engaged in the task at selecting a body<br />

of men whose names will be a guaranty to the world that the boundary question is to be examined<br />

with due regard to the responsibility attaching to the decision that is to be reached.<br />

It is probable all the names which have been suggested in the last week have occurred to the<br />

President, <strong>and</strong> equally is it certain that some of the men whose qualifications have been urged do not<br />

approach the high st<strong>and</strong>ard the President has set.<br />

<strong>The</strong> necessary delay involved in the creation of the commission in having a wholesome effect,<br />

not only in the United States, but in Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> no harm will be done to American interests if the<br />

commission be not named before next week. It requires time to fix upon a dozen or more men who<br />

would make acceptable Commissioners, to ascertain whether they would accept appointment, <strong>and</strong><br />

finally to decide upon the three or five, as the case may be, to whom the delicate task shall be<br />

committed.<br />

It comes from high authority to-night that the Commissioners may not be named before<br />

Monday. <strong>The</strong> President has not yet decided whether the commission shall have more or fewer than<br />

three members.<br />

He may be governed in determining the matter by a desire to appoint men regarded as desirable,<br />

after three persons have been chosen, but it is intimated that he relies upon more rapid work by a<br />

small commission than would be obtained from a larger one.<br />

[28 December 1895]<br />

- 233 -<br />

GREAT BRITAIN TO WAIT<br />

Will Give Away No More Property of <strong>Venezuela</strong> at Present<br />

DELAY CAUSED BY THE UNITED STATES<br />

St. James’s Gazette Story Denied—Excitement Over War Talk<br />

Dying Out—People Did Not Grasp the Question<br />

By <strong>The</strong> United Press<br />

LONDON, Dec. 28.—<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette, which was the first newspaper to print the<br />

ultimatum of Great Britain to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Oct. 19, published to-day a statement that initial steps have<br />

been taken in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> to form a chartered company, whose operations shall lie between the<br />

Essequibo <strong>and</strong> the Schomburgk line. <strong>The</strong> Gazette proceeds to say that the origin of this important<br />

political development is to be found in a dispatch which Mr. Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, wrote<br />

in September, sketching the new policy of the Imperial Government as regarded interior affairs, <strong>and</strong><br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

inquiring if local capitalists were prepared to take up a large concession in the Northwest <strong>and</strong><br />

develop its mineral <strong>and</strong> other resources, at the same time hinting that, if not, there were people in<br />

the United Kingdom who were willing to do so.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Gazette then goes on to print a report of an alleged meeting held in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> for the<br />

purpose of forming a chartered company to take up Mr. Chamberlain’s offer. <strong>The</strong> paper, which<br />

claims to know the policy of the Colonial Office, says it is certain that Great Britain will not consent<br />

to leave to arbitration the entire territory claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

With reference to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n situation it can be said that the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> Chartered<br />

Company, over which <strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette is trying to get up a sensation, has not been chartered,<br />

nor is a charter likely to be given until everything is amicably arranged between London <strong>and</strong><br />

Washington.<br />

<strong>The</strong> dispatch of Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, offering to make<br />

concessions within the Schomburgk line, was written obviously to strengthen the <strong>British</strong> case against<br />

the contentions advanced by Mr. Olney, the American Secretary of State.<br />

An English syndicate, relying on Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestions, made proposals to the <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

Government, asking for the grant of huge tracts of l<strong>and</strong> between the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Schomburgk frontier. <strong>The</strong> syndicate asked too much <strong>and</strong> met with a refusal. A meeting of colonial<br />

residents held in Georgetown, chiefly representative of the planter interest, formed a board which<br />

was authorized to petition the Government for a limited concession. All this happened prior to the<br />

sending to Congress of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message anent the boundary dispute. <strong>The</strong> St. James’s<br />

Gazette admits that, though there is no reason why Mr. Chamberlain should delay his decision in the<br />

matter of the concession out of consideration for the feelings of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, he will probably hold<br />

the matter in abeyance, in view of the tension between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States.<br />

No Excitement Over <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

Notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the condition of excitement under which the country was alleged to be laboring<br />

owing to the attitude of the United Status on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute, which excitement, by the way,<br />

was only manifested by the newspapers <strong>and</strong> not by the people, Prime Minister Salisbury spent the<br />

whole week quietly at his residence, Hatfield House with his family <strong>and</strong> a few guests. Two<br />

messengers went daily between Hatfield House <strong>and</strong> the Foreign Office carrying dispatches. Those<br />

whose business, even during the holiday period, obliged them to visit the Foreign Office, found the<br />

atmosphere motionless <strong>and</strong> not a trace or the recent supposed excitement.<br />

Few communications have been received during the week from any quarter, <strong>and</strong> most of those<br />

that were received were from Constantinople. No communication of importance was received from<br />

Washington. If the statement cabled here is correct that Secretary or State Olney has informed Sir<br />

Julian Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, that the members of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n commission have<br />

been nominated by President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, the fact has not yet been officially communicated to the<br />

Foreign Office.<br />

It is understood here that no difficulty will be placed in the way of the commission getting at all<br />

the sources of inquiry at the disposal of the Foreign Office. If the documents in its possession are<br />

desired, duly certified copies of the same will be transmitted to Washington. If the commissioners<br />

carry their inquiries into <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, they will obtain all facilities for the pursuit of their<br />

investigations, though it is the opinion of the authorities here that the work of an actual frontier<br />

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inspection will be too difficult a task for any Commissioners that President Clevel<strong>and</strong> is likely to<br />

appoint, a task that neither Mr. Phelps nor Mr. Lincoln would undertake.<br />

Lord Salisbury, in appointing Sir Augustus Hemming to the Governorship of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> in<br />

succession to Sir Charles Cameron Lees, had in view Sir Augustus’s services in delimiting <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

French territories in West Africa. <strong>The</strong> nomination at Sir Augustus was due to Joseph Chamberlain,<br />

Secretary of State for the Colonies, who persuaded Lord Salisbury to make an unprecedented<br />

departure from official custom in raising Sir Augustus from a chief clerkship in the Colonial Office<br />

to a Colonial Governorship. Sir Augustus has studied the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n frontier question. He coached<br />

Mr. Chamberlain on the subject, <strong>and</strong> probably supplied Lord Salisbury with material information.<br />

War Talk Dying Out<br />

Now that the question of the crisis has relaxed, people are wondering what all the furor was<br />

about. Papers like <strong>The</strong> Speaker, which last week breathed a warlike defiance to the United States,<br />

indulge this week in queer self-congratulations on the good sense <strong>and</strong> good feeling shown by the<br />

English under most unexpected <strong>and</strong> extraordinary provocation in “keeping their temper <strong>and</strong><br />

studiously refraining from anything like retaliation upon the American jingoes.” <strong>The</strong> truth of the<br />

matter is that the jingo papers here, notably the Liberal press, tried to fan popular feeling into<br />

flames. <strong>The</strong>y failed chiefly because the mass of the people could not underst<strong>and</strong> what the cause of<br />

offense was that had been offered or was to be received from Washington. <strong>The</strong> war talk on the part<br />

of some of the newspapers is not quite over. <strong>The</strong> agricultural papers discuss the probable effects of<br />

a war between the two countries.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Mark Lane Express holds that, should a war occur, <strong>and</strong> should it be a brief one, the only<br />

effect on the grain trade would be increased prices, <strong>and</strong> not a shortness of the supply. Russia <strong>and</strong><br />

India, it says, are now effective sources for the supply at any home deficiency.<br />

Vanity Fair publishes a wild article, in which it says that a war would be an excellent thing. If<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> should make the United States climb down, it would put Engl<strong>and</strong> on a pinnacle that she<br />

has never yet attained, <strong>and</strong> much other matter of the same calibre. This paper is a harmless society<br />

organ, <strong>and</strong> reflects the prejudice of only a small circle which is in no way noted for its grasp of<br />

current events outside of gossip <strong>and</strong> society functions.<br />

[29 December 1895]<br />

- 234 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> Commission a Peace Measure<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Philadelphia Telegraph, (Rep.)<br />

<strong>The</strong> proposition to appoint a United States Commission to ascertain, if possible, precisely what<br />

the relative rights of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain in the disputed boundary matter are, was not only<br />

not a declaration of war but it was really a peace proposition. <strong>The</strong> commission will ascertain, if<br />

possible, which country is right in its contention; <strong>and</strong> while it is doing that diplomacy will be<br />

employing its best offices to secure an amicable settlement of the of the matter in dispute. <strong>The</strong><br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

commissions may possibly discover that the <strong>British</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> is valid; for if there were no doubt with<br />

reference to the boundary line there would be no commission <strong>and</strong> no inquiry. It is the reasonable<br />

uncertainty of the situation that makes an investigation desirable.<br />

[29 December 1895]<br />

- 235 -<br />

STRONG ANTI-BRITISH SENTIMENT<br />

Arrivals from <strong>Venezuela</strong> Tell How the Message Was Received<br />

Arturo L. Mola <strong>and</strong> Roberto Mola, Cubans on their way from the United States of Colombia to<br />

Cuba arrived here yesterday from La Guayra, on the steamship Caracas. <strong>The</strong>y were in <strong>Venezuela</strong> at<br />

the time President Clevel<strong>and</strong> sent his message to Congress.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y said yesterday that as soon as the full text of the message became known in <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

everything put on a holiday appearance, <strong>and</strong> America <strong>and</strong> Americans were cheered upon all<br />

occasions. Bonfires were built, fireworks were discharged, <strong>and</strong> the American flag was flown from<br />

hundreds of houses.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y said that the American Consuls were serenaded in all of the cities, <strong>and</strong> it was generally said<br />

that all Englishmen would be asked to leave <strong>Venezuela</strong>, unless their country consented to arbitrate<br />

the boundary question. <strong>The</strong> feeling in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, they stated, was strongly anti-<strong>British</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

entire sentiment was for this country.<br />

William L. Russell, Secretary of the American Legation, went from Curaçao to La Guayra on the<br />

steamship Caracas while she was en route for this port. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Custom House boat went<br />

out to meet the Caracas flying the American <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n flags. When her officers discovered<br />

Mr. Russell on the Caracas they gave him an enthusiastic reception, fired guns in his honor, <strong>and</strong> took<br />

him ashore, where he met the officials <strong>and</strong> soldiers at a reception given in his honor.<br />

[29 December 1895]<br />

- 236 -<br />

OPPOSED BRITAIN’S GREED<br />

Mr. Gresham’s Attitude on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Question<br />

WOULD HAVE RESISTED AGGRESSION<br />

Mr. Olney Doing Practically What His Predecessor Would Have Done<br />

—Claims of the Anglo-Americans Denied<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 28.—Some of the ladylike objectors to the message of the President on<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question are attempting to support their arguments for the <strong>British</strong> attitude toward<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States by insisting that it Secretary Gresham had lived the management of<br />

the matter would have been much more careful of <strong>British</strong> prejudices, <strong>and</strong> that he never would have<br />

permitted American feeling to be aroused as Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> President Clevel<strong>and</strong> have stirred it.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> theory of these apologists for Engl<strong>and</strong> is that Secretary Gresham approved of the <strong>British</strong><br />

aggressions in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> would have advised President Clevel<strong>and</strong> to pursue a course that<br />

virtually would have justified the retention by Great Britain of its most advanced boundary line in<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. It might as well be stated now, as it will appear later, that Secretary Olney has followed<br />

directly in the lines marked out by his predecessor, that there has been not the slightest departure<br />

from them, <strong>and</strong> that if Secretary Gresham had lived until now it is highly probable that it would be<br />

Secretary Gresham, <strong>and</strong> not Secretary Olney, who would be exasperating all the pro-<strong>British</strong> persons<br />

living in the United States <strong>and</strong> exciting numbers of ignorant clergymen <strong>and</strong> laymen to criticism of<br />

their own Government <strong>and</strong> praise of the Government with which we have brought an old<br />

controversy to something like a head.<br />

As a matter of fact, the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary question is one that has engaged the attention of<br />

changing Administrations for several years, <strong>and</strong> the conclusions <strong>and</strong> arguments of Secretary Olney,<br />

upon which the President based his message, are founded upon the correspondence in the<br />

Department of State. <strong>Venezuela</strong> has been too much occupied with revolutions to calmly dwell upon<br />

the preservation of her eastern boundary line, <strong>and</strong> Great Britain has apparently benefited by the preoccupation<br />

or the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n mind <strong>and</strong> the complacency of the United States about the Monroe<br />

doctrine.<br />

Until <strong>Venezuela</strong> was aroused by the discovery that the Schomburgk line had been left to the<br />

eastward, <strong>and</strong> that Great Britain had set up a new <strong>and</strong> more advanced claim, the intent of Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

to defy the Monroe doctrine was not accepted as a reason additional to the one of justice to warrant<br />

the United States in objecting to further assertion of control over <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory. Out of the<br />

correspondence in the matter, it is probable that Secretary Gresham reached the conclusion that it<br />

was not so much the desire to hold the swamp that Mr. Depew says is not worth $25,000 as it was<br />

the intention of Engl<strong>and</strong> to show its contempt for the American doctrine at non-extension of<br />

European system or control. This naturally led the Government to decide that if a stop was to be<br />

put to the absorption of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, it must begin before that republic was half appropriated by the<br />

<strong>British</strong> in <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

Secretary Gresham h<strong>and</strong>ed dawn to Secretary Olney the correspondence of the State<br />

Department <strong>and</strong> the programme of the Administration just as t had been made out prior to his<br />

death. <strong>The</strong> present Secretary will show, when he comes to publish the correspondence for the year<br />

1895, that in dem<strong>and</strong>ing from Spain the prompt settlement at the Mora indemnity he simply carried<br />

out the plan arranged by Secretary Gresham, who had adhered to the policy of Blaine,<br />

Frelinghuysen, Fish, <strong>and</strong> the Presidents under whom those Secretaries of State served, in Insisting<br />

that Spain should do all that she had offered <strong>and</strong> agreed to do, but which she had evaded doing<br />

until, with a Cuban war on her h<strong>and</strong>s, she feared that the United States might insist upon collecting<br />

the indemnity in Havana while the insurrection was going on at the east end of the isl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re has been until recently a hope in the Department of State that Engl<strong>and</strong> would<br />

demonstrate its entire reliance upon the possibility of sustaining its <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claims by ample<br />

proofs, <strong>and</strong> that it would resort to arbitration as an opportunity by which it could lose nothing in the<br />

h<strong>and</strong>s of impartial judges. Whether the l<strong>and</strong> be worthless, as it is said to be by Mr. Depew’s <strong>British</strong><br />

friends, or valuable, as the effort of the <strong>British</strong> to hold it leads the public to believe, the decision as<br />

to the boundary line, if adverse, would not greatly impair the prestige of the <strong>British</strong> Empire <strong>and</strong> a<br />

decision restoring to <strong>Venezuela</strong> a portion of territory claimed by Great Britain would unquestionably<br />

do much to modify the world’s opinion that Engl<strong>and</strong> is not governed by considerations of justice<br />

when she is dealing with nations regarded as easier to crush than to conciliate.<br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

<strong>British</strong>-Americans will not derive any real comfort from the attempt to prove that the cause of<br />

Great Britain would have been in more sympathetic h<strong>and</strong>s if Gresham had lived than it has been<br />

since his death. He had a strong conviction that the <strong>British</strong> aggressions in <strong>Venezuela</strong> were not only a<br />

glaring injustice to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, but also gave an occasion, possibly sought, of intimidating the United<br />

States.<br />

Secretary Olney has apparently considered Mr. Gresham’s views as sound <strong>and</strong> worthy of<br />

adoption as correctly maintaining the traditional policy of the United States since Monroe. <strong>The</strong><br />

intent, more than the extent of the appropriation of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is the thing by which Great Britain<br />

must be judged. <strong>The</strong> advancement of the boundary line from the east toward the west at different<br />

times during the last half century has had some pretended property <strong>and</strong> commercial justifications.<br />

<strong>The</strong> concern of the United States has not been about the loss to <strong>Venezuela</strong>—it has been a<br />

reasonable jealousy lest the real purpose of the successive seizures of territory were the assertion of a<br />

policy antagonistic to our own <strong>and</strong> intended to illustrate our disposition to allow the Monroe<br />

doctrine to lapse.<br />

[29 December 1895]<br />

- 237 -<br />

THE PRESIDENT UPHELD<br />

Washington Unanimously Sustains the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Message<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 28.—Never since the times of the war of the rebellion has there been<br />

manifested so great a feeling of unanimity about any National question as has been displayed here<br />

on the President’s assertion of the American doctrine regarding the extension by Great Britain of its<br />

boundaries or its power, or both, in <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Old newspaper correspondents have made this<br />

comparison, <strong>and</strong> they admit that there was greater division of opinion about the rebellion than there<br />

has been about the correctness of the President’s position. For, when the rebellion began, there<br />

lingered about the city many writers for the Southern press who desired to stay as long in the<br />

National capital as possible to send news across the lines, <strong>and</strong> occasionally to be of service to the<br />

States, whose cause they believed was right.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re were at first no critics of the President for his <strong>Venezuela</strong> message. <strong>The</strong> few newspaper<br />

exceptions to the general voice of approval encouraged other critics, <strong>and</strong> gave some of the men who<br />

had voted for the bill to authorize a commission of inquiry, time <strong>and</strong> strength to find fault, not<br />

loudly, but by ingenious qualification <strong>and</strong> political analysis, But if the thing were to be all done over<br />

again, <strong>and</strong> the men who are now criticising the President for having added the two paragraphs at the<br />

end of his message which have been alluded to as “a menace of war” were to be heard, there are not<br />

many here who would ask to have those paragraphs omitted. <strong>The</strong> effect of those lines upon the<br />

popular mind has been made. Possibly some of those who have discussed the message <strong>and</strong> the<br />

papers that accompanied it did not really know just what the controversy was all about. But<br />

everybody who is at all conversant with the talk of the street <strong>and</strong> the crowds is sure that the country<br />

has obtained the impression that there was an inclination on the part of Great Britain to crowd us,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that the President had given our <strong>British</strong> uncle a nudge that could be taken to mean nothing less<br />

than a warning to “keep off.”<br />

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<strong>The</strong>re will he some speech making on the Monroe doctrine before the Winter is ended, <strong>and</strong> one<br />

Senator, in whose utterances the public always finds much of interest, will contribute his opinion,<br />

which will not conflict at all with that of the President, but may put the doctrine in new words. He<br />

thinks that the investigating commission will sustain his notion that the only interpretation to be put<br />

upon the doctrine in such a case as that of the <strong>British</strong> aggression in <strong>Venezuela</strong> is the one of intent.<br />

“We cannot,’ says this Senator, “listen to such puerile arguments as that of Dr. Depew, when he says<br />

that the territory in dispute is a swamp worth less than $25,000. Great Britain would be justified by<br />

that argument, if it could buy up its stolen territory. Further than that, it might absorb several other<br />

sections of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> other South American States entire, <strong>and</strong> by <strong>and</strong> by snap its fingers at the<br />

United States <strong>and</strong> ask, ‘Where is your Monroe doctrine?’ <strong>The</strong> danger is that there is a well-formed<br />

determination to overturn the doctrine, make it to be a subject for ridicule, <strong>and</strong> demonstrate, if<br />

possible, that we did not under st<strong>and</strong> what we were proposing to do when we enunciated it. By an<br />

honest <strong>and</strong> earnest examination into the matter we shall undoubtedly show that the changes of the<br />

boundary have been made for the purpose of extending the <strong>British</strong> Empire in spite of our doctrine<br />

of ‘h<strong>and</strong>s off,’ <strong>and</strong> that American unwillingness to make a fuss could be depended upon an<br />

undertaking to carry out a policy so menacing to our traditional policy, if not to our interests.”<br />

[29 December 1895]<br />

- 238 -<br />

GUIANA AND NEW-YORK<br />

<strong>The</strong> dispute about the boundaries of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> has a particular though indirect interest for<br />

the inhabitants of this isl<strong>and</strong>, since it formed a part of the territory for which New-York was traded<br />

more than two centuries ago. It is curious that what is now undisputedly <strong>Venezuela</strong> should have<br />

been the only part of the mainl<strong>and</strong> of America which was ever seen by Christopher Columbus, a<br />

little less than four hundred years ago. His conviction that by steering west from the Pillars of<br />

Hercules he would find the Continent of Asia was part of a geographical notion correct only in its<br />

basis <strong>and</strong> its outline <strong>and</strong> almost necessarily wildly wrong in its detail. He had been so often deceived,<br />

from his first sight of Watling’s Isl<strong>and</strong>, in what he had taken to be indications of a continent that,<br />

after having rightly conceived Trinidad to be an isl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> given it the name it carries to this day, he<br />

assumed the l<strong>and</strong> at the mouth of the Orinoco to be an isl<strong>and</strong> also, <strong>and</strong> named it accordingly. It was<br />

only after it had been made clear to him that the great river was a river <strong>and</strong> not an estuary that he<br />

concluded, from its great volume, that it could flow only from the heart of same body of l<strong>and</strong> far<br />

too great to be a mere isl<strong>and</strong>, even such an isl<strong>and</strong> as his own Hispaniola. But to him this was a<br />

matter of supposition <strong>and</strong> inference only, which he had no opportunity to verify, <strong>and</strong> he died<br />

without any real conception of the changes which his voyages had made in the map of the world.<br />

It was a century later that Raleigh visited the coast of <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> published the famous<br />

description in which he set down, nothing doubting, the account, which Shakespeare borrowed, of<br />

“men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders.” Although the whole northern coast of South<br />

America was called by him “<strong>Guiana</strong>,” neither in his voyage of 1595 nor in the voyage seventeen<br />

years later, which was the occasion of his execution, did he give any foundation, either by settlement<br />

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or by discovery, for <strong>British</strong> claim. <strong>The</strong>re was no <strong>British</strong> settlement until long after Raleigh’s death.<br />

<strong>The</strong> grant of <strong>Guiana</strong> by Charles II to Lord Willoughby, then Governor of Barbados, in 1664, was<br />

merely a manifestation of the easy good nature, in giving away things to which his own title was not<br />

clear, of which the merry monarch made another manifestation the same year in granting to his<br />

brother, the Duke of York <strong>and</strong> Albany, the region of which the commercial <strong>and</strong> the political capital<br />

still bear the names respectively of these two titles.<br />

Lord Willoughby was not so fortunate in making good by arms a defective title as was the King’s<br />

brother. For, whereas New-Amsterdam was actually captured by the <strong>British</strong> the same year that the<br />

Duke of York’s patent was issued <strong>and</strong> held until the close of the war, the Dutch remained<br />

throughout the masters of all that part of “<strong>Guiana</strong>” which was not French or Spanish. Fortunately<br />

for the Duke of York, the peace of Breda, in 1667, was made, not upon the basis of the “status<br />

quo,” but upon the basis of the “uti possidetis,” <strong>and</strong> so New Amsterdam remained English <strong>and</strong><br />

Surinam Dutch. To the modern observer it seems that the Dutch must upon this occasion have<br />

been greatly outwitted <strong>and</strong> not yet have acquired the sharp practice which was long afterward<br />

imputed to them by a <strong>British</strong> statesman: “In matters of commerce, the fault of the Dutch is giving<br />

too little <strong>and</strong> asking too much.”<br />

This is not the way in which the transaction appeared to those who took part in it, either at the<br />

peace of Breda or in the treaty of Westminster, in 1674, by which the cessions were confirmed.<br />

Burke, in his “Account of the European Settlements in America,” written about the middle of the<br />

eighteenth century, says: “At that time this was looked upon by many as a bad exchange, but it now<br />

appears that we have made an excellent bargain,” <strong>and</strong> this “appears” much more vividly at the end<br />

of the nineteenth century.<br />

Of course, these historical reminiscences have nothing whatever to do directly with the<br />

boundary dispute. <strong>The</strong> whole of what is now <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> Dutch <strong>Guiana</strong> was ceded to the Dutch by<br />

the treaty of Amiens, in 1802, but <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> was recaptured by the <strong>British</strong> the next year <strong>and</strong><br />

formally ceded to them by the Dutch in 1814. It is from this cession, as the diplomatic<br />

correspondence shows, that the existing <strong>British</strong> title is derived. But, although the old exchange of<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> for New-Netherl<strong>and</strong>s “has nothing to do with the case,” it should give to New-York<br />

something of the same interest in its progress with which a sympathetic person who has bought his<br />

exemption from a conscription follows the fortunes of his substitute.<br />

[29 December 1895]<br />

- 239 -<br />

Schomburgk’s Views in 1839<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Philadelphia Press<br />

LANCASTER, Penn., Dec. 28.—<strong>The</strong>re has been forwarded from this city to Secretary of State<br />

Olney a volume which may have some value in the present <strong>Venezuela</strong> controversy. This book was<br />

published in Edinburgh in 1843, <strong>and</strong> is a treatise on the fishes of <strong>Guiana</strong>, written by Robert<br />

Schomburgk, who surveyed the boundary line on which Great Britain now founds her claim to such<br />

a large share of territory belonging to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Prefixed to the book is a memoir of nearly a<br />

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hundred pages, including a lengthy account of his operations in <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> between the<br />

years 1835 <strong>and</strong> 1839. On Sept. 20, 1838, Schomburgk <strong>and</strong> a party of explorers sailed up the Takuta<br />

River <strong>and</strong> entered the Mamu. In a village in which they remained several days they were guests of<br />

the Indians. Continuing his account of the journey. Schomburgk says:<br />

“At length the column was put in marching order, the coxswain at the head, carrying the <strong>British</strong><br />

union flag, under which they had been marching for the last three ears through hitherto unknown<br />

parts of <strong>Guiana</strong>. Now it was to lead them beyond the <strong>British</strong> boundaries into regions known only to<br />

the copper-colored Indian; but they were animated with the hope of reaching for the first time from<br />

this side of the Continent, the point which Baron Humboldt had in 1800, after many difficulties,<br />

arrive at from the westward—namely, Esmeraldo, on the Orinoco.”<br />

This shows that, whatever surveys or lines Schomburgk may have made afterward, in 1838 <strong>and</strong><br />

1889, he admitted that that territory was alien to the <strong>British</strong>.<br />

[29 December 1895]<br />

- 240 -<br />

BRITISH GUIANA CLAIMS<br />

<strong>The</strong>ir Variations Since the Territory Was Acquired<br />

NO DEFINITE BOUNDARY UNTIL 1843<br />

Sir Robert H. Schomburgk Gave the English a Liberal Slice<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong>—Maps of Various Dates<br />

Immediately following the Peace of Paris, in 1815, which confirmed the right of Great Britain to<br />

the three provinces in <strong>Guiana</strong> which she had wrested from the Dutch, there were some enthusiasts<br />

in Engl<strong>and</strong> who conjectured that <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> comprised nearly all of South America below the<br />

Orinoco River.<br />

Sir Andrew Halliday, who visited <strong>Guiana</strong>, in a book published in 1837, in a glowing description<br />

of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> coast line of this rich <strong>and</strong> important colony may, as I have stated, extend to a little more<br />

than 200 miles; but its depth or length inl<strong>and</strong> has not so far as I am aware, been as yet determined.<br />

“One or two travelers do say that they had penetrated so far to the south that from the summit<br />

of the Cordilleras they could discern the South Atlantic Ocean; <strong>and</strong> that from said heights the waters<br />

parted north <strong>and</strong> south. Hence some have conjectured that this is the southern boundary of <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>, though its true latitude has neither been ascertained, nor is it at all stated in any work that I<br />

am aware of.”<br />

Sir Andrew did not venture to say that from the topmost heights in question there was a good<br />

view or the south pole <strong>and</strong> the Fiji Isl<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

One fact is made clear by Sir Andrew Halliday in his book, namely, that Great Britain, up to<br />

1837, had made no definite claim to boundaries for <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> had not even attempted to<br />

lay out boundaries.<br />

Exactly what Great Britain conquered from the Dutch were the colonies along the Essequibo.<br />

<strong>The</strong> contention or Great Britain has been that she is entitled to the whole immense valley of the<br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> to the entire Essequibo watershed, extending in all directions to the very ridges of<br />

high mountain ranges, hundreds of miles distant from the colonies which the <strong>British</strong> arms originally<br />

took by conquest.<br />

Sir Andrew Halliday’s statements regarding the haziness of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary were<br />

corroborated by Sir Robert H. Schomburgk, in a book published by him in London, in 1840, entitled<br />

“A Description of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.” <strong>The</strong> object of the work was to give an account of whatever related<br />

to the physical structure, natural productions, <strong>and</strong> present <strong>and</strong> future capabilities of the colony of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, including statistical information.<br />

<strong>The</strong> whole embraced the results of Schomburgk’s scientific expeditions of discovery in <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

from 1835 to 1839, under the direction of the Geographical Society of London. A map accompanied<br />

the book.<br />

In his preface Schomburgk said: “Though the accompanying map is incomplete, many of its<br />

details resting on information procured from the natives, yet the greater portion has been laid down<br />

from my own personal observations, <strong>and</strong> offers a correct view of the facilities which the numerous<br />

rivers <strong>and</strong> their tributaries afford for internal navigation, <strong>and</strong> will show how important it is to the<br />

colony that its boundaries should be more clearly defined than at present <strong>and</strong> freed from the<br />

encroaching claims of the adjacent States, which, if admitted, would deprive <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> of the<br />

greater part of her most valuable territory.”<br />

Schomburgk’s sketch map of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> gave to the <strong>British</strong> such a liberal slice of <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

that it was decided by the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office that he was just the right man to lay out a boundary<br />

line between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

Accordingly, in 1840, he was appointed as Her Majesty’s Commissioner for surveying the<br />

boundaries of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. He proceeded to South America <strong>and</strong> was engaged in that work for<br />

three years, completing his labors in 1843. <strong>The</strong>y found official expression in a line which has ever<br />

since been known as the “Schomburgk line.”<br />

A comparison of the boundary line in Schomburgk’s sketch map, made prior to 1840, with the<br />

“Schomburgk line” laid down by him as her Majesty’s Commissioner, will show that the two are<br />

practically identical. When Schomburgk drew his arbitrary line, he set up posts, to indicate <strong>British</strong><br />

dominion, at Point Barima, Amacuro, <strong>and</strong> other localities. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government made a<br />

vigorous protest, <strong>and</strong> Lord Aberdeen, then English Foreign Secretary, ordered the posts removed.<br />

This was taken to indicate that Engl<strong>and</strong> did not contend that she was entitled to all the watershed of<br />

the Essequibo.<br />

This is made clear by the fact that neither the Schomburgk line nor Lord Aberdeen’s proposed<br />

boundary, nor any suggested boundary of Engl<strong>and</strong>, until within very recently, included the<br />

watershed of the Cuyuni River, a tributary of the Essequibo. <strong>The</strong> most extreme claim of Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

until the present, was for a boundary crossing the Rio Cuyuni at a point east of its junction with the<br />

Uspania River.<br />

<strong>The</strong> fluctuating claims of Engl<strong>and</strong> are further illustrated by a map published in London in 1842,<br />

under the superintendence of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. <strong>The</strong> authorities<br />

given for the map are Humboldt, Schomburgk, Godazzi, <strong>and</strong> others. <strong>The</strong> difference between this<br />

line <strong>and</strong> the “Schomburgk line” will be seen on comparing the two.<br />

<strong>The</strong> old French geographers did not give <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> any territory to speak of west of the<br />

Essequibo River. <strong>The</strong> “Dictionaire Géographique Universel,” published in Paris in 1828, stated the area<br />

of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> to be only 3,120 square leagues. It called <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> the smallest of the<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>s.<br />

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In an old French map in the “Atlas Universel do Géographie,” published in Paris in 1839, the line of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> extends parallel, generally speaking, with the Essequibo River, distant only a few<br />

leagues west thereof. It included only the bottom l<strong>and</strong>s of the Essequibo Valley.<br />

Most instructive of all maps is that published in <strong>The</strong> New-York Times Dec. 18, <strong>and</strong> now<br />

reproduced, showing the various boundary lines proposed by Great Britain. It will be seen that the<br />

line of Lord Aberdeen, suggested by him in 1844, gave the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns a portion of inl<strong>and</strong> territory<br />

in exchange for a large slice of the coast.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Granville line of 1881 claimed still more of the ocean coast, <strong>and</strong> gave <strong>Venezuela</strong> no more of<br />

the interior than had been offered to her by Lord Aberdeen.<br />

<strong>The</strong> present <strong>British</strong> claim has been enlarged so as to take in all of the watershed of the Cuyuni<br />

River. It was not proposed by Great Britain until the valuable gold mines were discovered at the<br />

Cuyuni head waters.<br />

Sir Andrew Halliday, in the work already referred to, states that even as late as his time, fifty<br />

years after the <strong>British</strong> had conquered the country, the population was practically confined to the<br />

centres of the river valleys.<br />

He says: “As yet a few patches only along the seacoast <strong>and</strong> on the banks of its three great rivers<br />

have been subjected to cultivation.”<br />

Schomburgk himself, in his book “A Description of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>,” made it clear that only a very<br />

small part of the immense territory claimed from <strong>Venezuela</strong> by Great Britain was or had ever been<br />

colonized by the English or even discovered or traversed by them. As long ago as 1837,<br />

Schomburgk indicated, the claims of <strong>Venezuela</strong> on the one side <strong>and</strong> Brazil on the other reduced the<br />

territory of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> to 12,300 square miles. <strong>The</strong> Brazilians claimed as far north as the<br />

Siparunus River. <strong>Venezuela</strong> then claimed to the month of the Morocco, from there to the<br />

confluence of the Cuyuni <strong>and</strong> Mazaruni, along the western bank of the Essequibo to the confluence<br />

of the River Rupununi.<br />

According to Schomburgk, the total population of whites in the Essequibo Province in 1829 was<br />

only 476 men <strong>and</strong> 183 women. <strong>The</strong>re was still a thinly scattered population of the aborigines.<br />

Schomburgk’s sketch map of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> shows absolutely not a single English or Dutch<br />

settlement large or small in the entire country in dispute between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, save<br />

only along the banks of the Essequibo.<br />

He says in his book there were only seven towns or villages in all of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. None of<br />

them was west of the Essequibo River. <strong>The</strong>y were Georgetown, on the eastern flank or the<br />

Demerara; New-Amsterdam, on the Berbice River; Mahaica, on the west bank of the river of that<br />

name; Mahaicony, on the river of that name; Fredericksburg, on the isl<strong>and</strong> Wakenaam, in the month<br />

of the Essequibo; Williamstown, on the Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> Catharinesburg, on the same river.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Dutch,” says Schomburgk, “formerly cultivated the banks of the Essequibo 100 miles<br />

above its embouchure. If we except the three isl<strong>and</strong>s at the mouth of the river, cultivation does not<br />

extend at present five miles beyond its mouth.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> same remarks apply to the rich coast l<strong>and</strong> of the rivers Pomeroon <strong>and</strong> Morocco.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> claim sometimes advanced in support of the English that they were entitled at least to the<br />

country so far as the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> tributaries were navigable would never have given Great Britain<br />

a title of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory which she has claimed. Schornburgk says: “<strong>The</strong> Rivers Essequibo,<br />

Demerara, Berbice, <strong>and</strong> Corentyn may be navigated inl<strong>and</strong> by schooners or steamboats<br />

unobstructed to a distance of from 50 to 125 miles, where the rapids <strong>and</strong> cataracts offer the first<br />

impediment to further advance.”<br />

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[30 December 1895]<br />

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- 241 -<br />

CALLS SALISBURY A BULLY<br />

Michael Davitt of Irel<strong>and</strong> Discusses the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Question<br />

ENGLAND, HE SAYS, WILL YIELD<br />

Not a Possibility of War in His Judgment—He Predicts a<br />

Peaceful Settlement of the <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

CHICAGO, Dec. 29.—Michael Davitt, the Irish Nationalist, <strong>and</strong> member of Parliament from<br />

South Mayo <strong>and</strong> East Derry, is in this city on his way home from Australia.<br />

He said to-day that he did not think there was the slightest possibility of war between the United<br />

States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain.<br />

Lord Salisbury,” said Mr. Davitt, “is known in Great Britain <strong>and</strong> in Irel<strong>and</strong> as a bully whose<br />

policy when he has been at the head of the Government has been to try to intimidate little nations<br />

<strong>and</strong> powers throughout the world. He has been able to do so with impunity heretofore, but now he<br />

finds that behind little <strong>Venezuela</strong> st<strong>and</strong>s America, <strong>and</strong> he will discover that he will not be allowed to<br />

carry on the same policy toward this small State in South America that he <strong>and</strong> other English<br />

statesmen have carried out toward weak peoples <strong>and</strong> small Governments in other parts of the world.<br />

“For myself, I only can repeat that I am glad such a st<strong>and</strong> has been taken by the United States. It<br />

was about time, <strong>and</strong> the upshot of it will be that the reasonable dem<strong>and</strong> made by the President to<br />

have the whole trouble submitted to arbitration will be accepted by Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> then the seat of<br />

operations will be transferred from the newspapers to diplomacy. I believe that war is so far away<br />

that it is outside the realm of probability, because, after all, look at it in this light: <strong>The</strong> commercial<br />

relations between this country <strong>and</strong> Great Britain are so enormous that the people of the United<br />

States on the one h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> of Great Britain on the other practically would be insane if they<br />

jeopardized these trade relations on account of a small affair like this in <strong>Venezuela</strong>—a little 40,000<br />

square miles of worthless country.<br />

“This is particularly plain when it is taken into consideration that the President of the United<br />

States makes so favorable a proposition as to have the whole matter submitted for arbitration.”<br />

[30 December 1895]<br />

- 242 -<br />

COMMENDS THE ADMINISTRATION<br />

Harry Bingham, Leader of the New Hampshire Bar, on the Monroe Doctrine<br />

At a reunion of the New-Hampshire members of the Gr<strong>and</strong> Army of the Republic, held at<br />

Littleton, N. H. on Thursday, the principal speaker was Harry Bingharn, the leader of the New-<br />

Hampshire bar. Mr. Bingham devoted much of his speech to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, <strong>and</strong> among<br />

other things said:<br />

A gold-bearing region has been discovered in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Great Britain claims it as within<br />

the boundaries of her dominion. This contention has raised a first-class controversy, which is now in<br />

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full blast. Our Government is properly taking the ground that, according to its established policy,<br />

the gold-bearing region, if within the proper boundaries of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, cannot be taken from<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> without its consent, <strong>and</strong> that Great Britain must not encroach upon the territory of any of<br />

the countries upon this continent or plant new colonies upon it. Great Britain has also a controversy<br />

with one of the Central American States in which her real purpose is more obscure.<br />

Gold having been found in Alaska, it is said that Great Britain, as usual, is about to start a<br />

controversy, in which she will claim that the newly discovered gold has been found within the limits<br />

of her dominion.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> maintains impregnable fortifications at Halifax, Bermuda, Esquimault, <strong>and</strong> various<br />

other places on the Atlantic <strong>and</strong> Pacific coasts of America as naval stations, whence she can send on<br />

a moment’s notice sufficient force to bombard <strong>and</strong> burn our seaport cities, or like cities of any of<br />

our sister republics. It is certainly not pleasant for us <strong>and</strong> for the other American republics to realize<br />

that these fortifications that darken the coasts of America are stations for the colossal navies of<br />

Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> that ironclad ships, armed with all the modern implements of swift destruction,<br />

may issue from these stations <strong>and</strong> within twenty-four hours after orders received assail <strong>and</strong> destroy<br />

the seaports of America. And it is especially unpleasant <strong>and</strong> embarrassing for us <strong>and</strong> our sister<br />

republics to be compelled to hold debates with Great Britain for the settlement of these constantly<br />

occurring controversies, while she st<strong>and</strong>s with her arm of power uplifted, ready to strike us or them<br />

on the instant at a vital point.<br />

Our country in our dealings with foreign nations has had a wise policy that has been gradually<br />

developed according to circumstances. <strong>The</strong> present situation has developed circumstances that call<br />

for a further enlargement of that policy. <strong>The</strong> great nations of Europe are now maintaining immense<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ing armies <strong>and</strong> powerful navies, with all the materials necessary for immediate war on h<strong>and</strong>. It<br />

is contrary to the spirit of our institutions, <strong>and</strong> we do not desire to maintain corresponding<br />

armaments <strong>and</strong> corresponding readiness for immediate war; but we must do so or st<strong>and</strong> at great<br />

disadvantage in settling the territorial questions that are constantly arising with European powers,<br />

especially with Engl<strong>and</strong>. Hence it has become an object of great importance to us that the great<br />

powers of Europe, particularly Engl<strong>and</strong>, should not possess dominions on any part of this<br />

continent. <strong>The</strong> growth which our foreign policy has had in the past should continue. Washington,<br />

that far-seeing man, initiated this policy by announcing that the United States would not interfere<br />

with the affairs of the Eastern world; that it would not make any offensive <strong>and</strong> defensive alliances<br />

there; that it offered to all nations alike friendly relations, conceding nothing to one which it did not<br />

concede to the other. <strong>The</strong>se ideas were embodied tersely in the mottoes of succeeding<br />

Administrations in these words: “Good will <strong>and</strong> friendship to all nations, entangling alliances with<br />

none.” This policy was enlarged in 1823, <strong>and</strong> President Monroe then announced that European<br />

Governments must not plant new colonies, nor extend their existing possessions, nor interfere with<br />

existing Governments within the limits of the Western Hemisphere. This doctrine, called the<br />

“Monroe doctrine,” has been indorsed <strong>and</strong> approved by our people without distinction of party.<br />

<strong>The</strong> time has now arrived when circumstances dem<strong>and</strong> that in order that justice may be done,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the peace of nations preserved, there should be a further enlargement of our foreign policy. We<br />

ought to dem<strong>and</strong> or the great powers of Europe relinquishment of dominion over any part of the<br />

western hemisphere upon such terms as in view of the present situation are just <strong>and</strong> equitable, to be<br />

determined by arbitration or otherwise. In making this dem<strong>and</strong> we should not threaten war, hut we<br />

should base out claim upon those broad <strong>and</strong> equitable principles that have been recognized already<br />

by the controlling nations of the earth, <strong>and</strong> are getting better <strong>and</strong> better recognized as time goes on.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> principle has been recognized that territory may be taken from a nation <strong>and</strong> parceled out among<br />

other nations, or erected into a new <strong>and</strong> independent nation, that the sovereignty of a nation may be<br />

denied <strong>and</strong> a protectorate established, accordingly as by so doing wars may be done away with, the<br />

permanent peace of nations made secure, <strong>and</strong> the welfare of the world protected. Engl<strong>and</strong>, with the<br />

consent of the other great powers, occupies <strong>and</strong> controls Egypt for its good for the preservation of<br />

peace <strong>and</strong> for the purpose of maintaining the Suez Canal open to the commerce of the world.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> compelled China to open her ports to the commerce of the world on the ground that<br />

nations owed to each other reciprocal obligations in respect to trade <strong>and</strong> intercourse, <strong>and</strong> that if any<br />

nation shut itself up <strong>and</strong> refused to trade <strong>and</strong> have intercourse with the rest of mankind, it was the<br />

right of any nation, or nations, thereby debarred to compel, by force, such delinquent nation to<br />

perform its obligations to the outside world. Engl<strong>and</strong> conquered India, <strong>and</strong> now rules over the<br />

countless millions of people which inhabit that country. This act of invasion <strong>and</strong> conquest of ancient<br />

sovereignties the world approves, because India itself benefited thereby, <strong>and</strong> the welfare of the<br />

world promoted. Engl<strong>and</strong>, France, Germany, <strong>and</strong> other European nations are to-day engaged in<br />

subduing the wild tribes of Africa, Madagascar, Australia, <strong>and</strong> the numerous isl<strong>and</strong>s of Polynesia,<br />

<strong>and</strong> in planting colonies everywhere. Nobody objects. Everybody approves, <strong>and</strong> the welfare of the<br />

world is promoted by having the waste places of the earth, now haunted by savages alone, peopled<br />

by civilized men.<br />

America has always refrained, <strong>and</strong> will always refrain, from intermeddling with the affairs of the<br />

Eastern Hemisphere. We only dem<strong>and</strong> that the rights of our citizens lawfully sojourning there be<br />

respected. Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> her concert of European powers may settle the Eastern question to suit<br />

themselves. <strong>The</strong>y may maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire or dissolve it <strong>and</strong> parcel out its<br />

territory as they please. Upon them must rest the responsibility for the wrongs now or hereafter<br />

done to the Christian inhabitants of the Turkish territory. <strong>The</strong>y may regulate jointly or severally the<br />

affairs of Europe, Asia, <strong>and</strong> Africa, of Australia, <strong>and</strong> the many isles in the waters of the Eastern<br />

Hemisphere as unto them seemeth good. <strong>The</strong> United States will not interfere, but she claims, as one<br />

of the great powers of the earth, that her voice should be a potential one in regulating the affairs of<br />

the Western Hemisphere, <strong>and</strong> that she, with the other nations of America should determine the<br />

question as to the distribution of territory in that hemisphere. <strong>The</strong> well being of America <strong>and</strong> the<br />

welfare at the world dem<strong>and</strong> that it should be so. It would be a great relief to America if the great<br />

powers of Europe exercising dominion over American territory would ab<strong>and</strong>on such dominion <strong>and</strong><br />

permit the people of such territory to govern themselves.<br />

We have already discussed Spain <strong>and</strong> the character of the rule which she exercises in America.<br />

<strong>The</strong> other powers of Europe, with the exception at Engl<strong>and</strong>, hold dominion over territory in<br />

America of limited extent only <strong>and</strong> of small importance. Whether or not such dominion shall be<br />

surrendered is a question of little account, except in one case it would be obeying <strong>and</strong> in the other<br />

disobeying a general rule. Engl<strong>and</strong> claims to have great dominions in America as she does<br />

everywhere else. <strong>The</strong> substantial part of what she claims in America is Canada <strong>and</strong> the territory<br />

connected therewith in North America lying north of us <strong>and</strong> not including Alaska. This claim<br />

embraces a very considerable part of the earth, covering an area of at least 3,500,000 of square miles;<br />

a little of it inhabited <strong>and</strong> some of it uninhabitable. This vast Canadian territory is susceptible of<br />

indefinite development; but it is not now making progress. It in substantially at a st<strong>and</strong>still, <strong>The</strong>re is<br />

more emigration out of it than immigration into it. It would be so no longer if <strong>British</strong> domination<br />

was removed. English dominion is an incubus upon the territory north of us. White it continues<br />

there will be no prosperity, no go ahead. Enterprise will languish, business will stagnate, <strong>and</strong> there<br />

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will be no growth, but let the Canadian territories be free <strong>and</strong> independent, allow the people there to<br />

strike out for themselves <strong>and</strong> the march of progress will begin at once. <strong>The</strong> woodchopper’s ax will<br />

make the forests ring. Its mineral deposits will be discovered <strong>and</strong> made available. <strong>The</strong> hum of busy<br />

industries will be heard where now the noise of falling waters is the only sound that breaks the<br />

solemn stillness of nature. Population will increase at a rapid rate, <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong> values will be quadrupled<br />

many times. Everything will be booming.<br />

While, as we have seen, the removal of <strong>British</strong> domination would be a great boon to the nations<br />

now organized in the western hemisphere, it would be an infinitely greater boon to the people of<br />

those American territories now under <strong>British</strong> dominion. <strong>The</strong> domination of Engl<strong>and</strong> over any part<br />

of America is not beneficial to anybody there. It is offensive <strong>and</strong> annoying to everybody there. It is<br />

especially paralyzing to the territories over which it exists. It is an unqualified nuisance in every<br />

particular so far as America is concerned.<br />

So far as Engl<strong>and</strong> is concerned it would be better for her to give up her dominion in America.<br />

She gets no revenue from her Canadian territories. It must cost her heavily to maintain her fortified<br />

naval stations at Halifax, Bermuda, <strong>and</strong> Esquimault. <strong>The</strong> prosperity that independence will give to<br />

the people of the Canadian territories will enable them greatly to augment their trade with Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

<strong>and</strong> thus they will richly compensate her for any loss she may think she has suffered by granting<br />

such independence. Engl<strong>and</strong> has dominions from which she is deriving a profit where she is needed<br />

<strong>and</strong> desired sufficient in magnitude to keep all her governing capacity busily employed. Certainly it<br />

cannot be expected that she will desire to hold on to a dominion which affords her no profit, where<br />

she is neither needed or wanted, <strong>and</strong> where she is nothing but a nuisance to the people of that<br />

dominion <strong>and</strong> the people of all its neighboring countries.<br />

In regard to the foregoing suggestions, inquiry perhaps may be made somewhat in this way:<br />

Suppose all that has been stated to be true, <strong>and</strong> that the dominion of Engl<strong>and</strong> over any part of<br />

America is an unmitigated nuisance to the people of that dominion <strong>and</strong> to the people of every part<br />

of America. Suppose further that Engl<strong>and</strong> refuses to treat about surrendering her American<br />

dominions, <strong>and</strong> refuses to submit the question to arbitration, what can be done without it?” <strong>The</strong><br />

answer to this inquiry made on the case supposed is plain. <strong>The</strong> people of America would be fully<br />

justified in taking up arms <strong>and</strong> compelling Engl<strong>and</strong> to relinquish her dominion over every part of<br />

America. Such an undertaking, however, ought not to be entered upon by the American people<br />

unless after careful consideration they thought they could accomplish it, because such attempts<br />

when they fail are not productive of good, they only make matters worse. <strong>The</strong> circumstances of<br />

modern times have been <strong>and</strong> are such that strong nations, even when they had good cause, have<br />

hesitated about going to war. <strong>The</strong>y have delayed <strong>and</strong> debated long before resorting to that final<br />

arbitrator. <strong>The</strong> course, however, which we ought to take is not doubtful. Let us adhere to established<br />

foreign policy <strong>and</strong> the principles that underlie it at all times, on all occasions whatever political party<br />

may be in power. Let Engl<strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong> that we consider her existing dominion in America to be<br />

an unmitigated nuisance <strong>and</strong> that our people are unitedly determined that she must ab<strong>and</strong>on it. Let<br />

us give our reasons fully <strong>and</strong> continue in our opportunities without ceasing, <strong>and</strong> it is believed that<br />

she will yield. But if not <strong>and</strong> war must come, then let us do as we have done before in similar<br />

circumstances when we were much weaker than we are now. Let us trust in the God of battle.<br />

[31 December 1895]<br />

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- 243 -<br />

Approves the President’s Interposition<br />

From <strong>The</strong> Christian Work<br />

We heartily approve the interposition of the President in behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong> as an act of justice<br />

in behalf of a weaker State <strong>and</strong> an action carrying with it the quality of humanity. If we concede that<br />

the President might have assumed a less menacing attitude, we may also insist that Lord Salisbury<br />

might <strong>and</strong> should have been less exasperating <strong>and</strong> offensive in his dispatch to Mr. Olney, the rasping<br />

tone of which, in sending his reply, formed the immediate occasion, if it was not the efficient cause,<br />

of the President’s action. But, how ever wise or unwise any of the parties to the present controversy<br />

may have been is a matter of the past, discussion of which would probably not be profitable. <strong>The</strong><br />

important question for each of the parties is how to reach a settlement satisfactory <strong>and</strong> honorable<br />

alike to all. That may not be the boundary line determined by President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s commission, but<br />

assured1y neither will it be Lord Salisbury’s arbitrary Schomburgk boundary line. Of this latter there<br />

can be no question. Happily, the way to peace seems open.<br />

[31 December 1895]<br />

- 244 -<br />

VIEWS OF SENATOR SHERMAN<br />

He Agrees with President Clevel<strong>and</strong> on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Question<br />

Senator John Sherman expressed himself Sunday to a correspondent of <strong>The</strong> Philadelphia Press in<br />

Washington, as follows:<br />

I can only express my gratification that the general sentiment now prevailing both in the United<br />

States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain is that the controversy between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> ought not to<br />

be the occasion of estranged relations, much less of war. I am strongly in favor of the general<br />

principle announced by President Monroe that the United States will regard any forcible invasion of<br />

the territory of at American State by a European power as an unfriendly act. <strong>The</strong> boundary question<br />

between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain has been the subject of controversy for many years, <strong>and</strong> is a<br />

proper question to be settled by arbitration between those powers. Before the announcement of his<br />

doctrine by Mr. Monroe, Great Britain had acquired from Holl<strong>and</strong> a settlement at <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> country between that possession <strong>and</strong> the settlements in <strong>Venezuela</strong> was an unoccupied territory<br />

of little value except for minerals. <strong>The</strong> inroads of English settlers upon this region have given rise to<br />

disputes between the two Governments, <strong>and</strong> each at different times has refused to arbitrate the<br />

question of boundary.<br />

I do not feel justified in criticising the President for his message, as his assertion <strong>and</strong> definition<br />

of the Monroe doctrine is, I believe, a correct one, <strong>and</strong> whether it is a dogma of international law or<br />

of American policy, it has a strong hold upon all of the nations of these continents, <strong>and</strong> was<br />

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recognized <strong>and</strong> encouraged by Great Britain before its announcement by President Monroe. All<br />

parts of America are now occupied by civilized <strong>and</strong> Christian nations, the descendants of European<br />

ancestors, <strong>and</strong> they are no longer open to the conquests of European powers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> refusal of Lord Salisbury to arbitrate this question of boundary naturally created a feeling of<br />

resentment, but recent indications that this refusal will not be insisted upon by Great Britain have<br />

changed the whole current of public opinion, <strong>and</strong> now I believe the United States will, with the same<br />

unanimity expressed by Congress, cheerfully acquiesce in the decision of any fair tribunal that may<br />

be agreed upon between the two countries interested. <strong>The</strong> President in his communication to<br />

Congress opens the way to such a settlement by declaring that any boundary line fixed by the two<br />

continents will be cheerfully acquiesced in.<br />

[31 December 1895]<br />

- 245 -<br />

LODGE LOOKS FOR PEACE<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> the Result of a Misunderst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

THE MONROE DOCTRINE EXPLAINED<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Boundary Policy Has Been Dictated by Greed—Democrats<br />

in Sympathy with the Senator<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 30.—In a speech delivered in the Senate to-day on the subject of the<br />

Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> its application to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary question. Mr. Lodge presented a<br />

series of historical facts <strong>and</strong> apt allusions which will be read with interest on both sides of the<br />

Atlantic. <strong>The</strong> controversy was due, he acknowledged, to the mistaken idea in Engl<strong>and</strong> of the temper<br />

of the American people. <strong>The</strong> question, he contended, was one to be treated with the utmost gravity,<br />

for it involved the safety <strong>and</strong> honor of the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> speech is generally regarded by Senators as a fair exposition of the principle of the Monroe<br />

doctrine <strong>and</strong> its relation to the boundary dispute. Mr. Lodge spoke from printed slips for more than<br />

an hour, <strong>and</strong> had the closest attention. He frequently was interrupted by Democratic Senators with<br />

questions which disclosed their sympathy with his position.<br />

Mr. Lodge spoke upon the Monroe doctrine. He said that he had intended not to do so until the<br />

joint resolution introduced by him giving to the declaration made by Mr. Monroe in his message of<br />

December, 1823, the format sanction of Congress had received the consideration of the Committee<br />

on Foreign Relations. But since, the President had sent in his message on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n difficulty,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Congress, without a dissenting voice, had authorized the commission which the President<br />

requested. This action had led to much wild talk <strong>and</strong> cries more vocal than numerous from those<br />

who believe we should never do anything to clash with Engl<strong>and</strong>’s interests. This outcry, coupled<br />

with London’s attempt to frighten Congress by producing a stock panic, had tended to confuse the<br />

issue. He, therefore, thought a little cool explanation would not be out of place.<br />

Two cardinal principles, he said, had always governed the United States in its relations with<br />

foreign nations. <strong>The</strong> first was Washington’s neutrality doctrine, as laid down in the farewell address.<br />

<strong>The</strong> second was the Monroe doctrine, the history of which he traced in detail. <strong>The</strong> only attempt<br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

heretofore made by outside powers to break through that doctrine was the joint intervention of<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, France, <strong>and</strong> Spain in Mexico in 1861. A second case has now arisen, <strong>and</strong> the maintenance<br />

of the Monroe doctrine is again threatened, as it was by the French in 1862. This second attack upon<br />

the principle of the Monroe doctrine comes from Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> is made under cover of a<br />

boundary dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. In order to show the importance of this controversy, which has<br />

now reached a crisis affecting most gravely the honor, the interests, the rights <strong>and</strong> the well-settled<br />

policy of the United States, he sketched the history of the dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> of the negotiations between the two countries. He continued as follows:<br />

It will be observed, from this brief outline of the dispute, that no new rights have come to Engl<strong>and</strong> or to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> since 1814, i.e., since the declaration of President Monroe. <strong>The</strong>y have the rights of Spain <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

respectively, nothing more <strong>and</strong> nothing loss, <strong>and</strong> are entitled to exactly what those inherited rights give them. In<br />

1836 a <strong>British</strong> Minister acknowledged that Point Barima belonged to <strong>Venezuela</strong> by asking the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Government to erect a lighthouse there. In 1840 a <strong>British</strong> court in Demerara declared the territory of the Moroco,<br />

far to the east of the Orinoco, to be <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory. In 1841 an English engineer laid out a perfectly arbitrary<br />

line running from the mouth of the Orinoco in a southerly direction until it reached the western boundary of <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>. Lord Aberdeen disavowed this line, <strong>and</strong> proposed another starting at the River Moroco <strong>and</strong> going further<br />

into the interior. Lord Granville proposed another reaching further to the west. Lord Rosebery another inside the<br />

Schomburgk line, but coupled with the free navigation of the Orinoco. In 1893 he proposed a second line, <strong>and</strong><br />

meantime Lord Salisbury had extended the <strong>British</strong> claim while he was Secretary for Foreign Affairs.<br />

Every <strong>British</strong> Minister had offered a different line within which Great Britain would not consent to arbitrate,<br />

<strong>and</strong> every <strong>British</strong> Minister has gone beyond his predecessor in making fresh claims to territory beyond the line<br />

which he offered. At first sight this seems to denote inconsistency on the part of the <strong>British</strong> Government, but in<br />

reality their course has been just the reverse. <strong>The</strong>re is apparently just as much support for one line as another when<br />

they pass beyond the Valley of the Essequibo. From Schomburgk down, every line was entirely arbitrary, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

constantly growing claims beyond the various lines offered was in entire keeping with the policy of the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government. <strong>The</strong>ir object was to get as much new territory as they could if the matter ever came to a settlement,<br />

which they have used every artifice to delay<br />

Asserting his belief that Great Britain had no good claim to a foot of l<strong>and</strong> beyond the Essequibo,<br />

Mr. Lodge laid down the principle that if Engl<strong>and</strong>, with no authority but a disputed claim, seizes<br />

territory, <strong>and</strong> declines arbitration upon it, her action does not differ from seizing <strong>and</strong> holding new<br />

territory in the Americas by right of conquest. <strong>The</strong> seizure of this South American territory by<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, he asserted, was an absolute violation of the Monroe doctrine. He said:<br />

At the last session of Congress I called the attention of the Senate <strong>and</strong> of the country to the manner in which<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> had absorbed the Isl<strong>and</strong>s of the Pacific <strong>and</strong> to the necessity of our controlling the Hawaiian Isl<strong>and</strong>s, a<br />

necessity which now becomes more pressing with each succeeding day. I ask you now to look at the Caribbean Sea.<br />

I ask you to note the strong naval station which Engl<strong>and</strong> has established at St. Lucia. Follow a line thence to the<br />

westward, <strong>and</strong> you will find Trinidad, the development of which has been strongly pushed of late years; then<br />

Jamaica, <strong>and</strong> finally <strong>British</strong> Honduras. That line faces the South American coast. This territory, claimed from<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, is being pushed steadily to the westward along that coast, <strong>and</strong> the point at which it aims is the control of<br />

the mouths of the Orinoco, one of the great river systems of South America. <strong>The</strong> purpose of all these movements is<br />

written plainly on the map. If successful, they will give Great Britain control of the Spanish Main <strong>and</strong> make the<br />

Caribbean Sea little better than a <strong>British</strong> lake.<br />

We have seen <strong>British</strong> forces at Corinto. We know the attitude the <strong>British</strong> assume in <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong>y are<br />

attempting to take l<strong>and</strong> on the Alaskan boundary. <strong>The</strong>y have just denounced the modus vivendi <strong>and</strong> reopened in<br />

that way the perilous dispute of the Northeastern fisheries. It is not by accident that these events have all occurred<br />

or have all come to an acute stage within the past year. <strong>The</strong>y are not due to us, for we have committed no aggression<br />

upon anybody. Of all these difficulties which are now upon us, the most immediate is that involved in the dispute<br />

with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong>y tell us that this territory is remote <strong>and</strong> worthless. It is remote, perhaps, but it is not worthless,<br />

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for if it had been the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n possession of it would be undisturbed. But it matters not whether it is worthless or<br />

valuable. <strong>The</strong> tea tax was trivial but our forefathers refused to pay it, because it involved a great principle, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

attempt to collect it cost Great Britain her North American colonies. <strong>The</strong> American people believe to-day just as<br />

firmly in the principle at the Monroe doctrine. <strong>The</strong>y deem it essential to their honor, their safety, <strong>and</strong> their interests<br />

as a nation, <strong>and</strong> they are prepared to defend it when it is assailed.<br />

Mr. President, who is responsible for the unhappily strained relations between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States?<br />

As I have pointed out, we have not been the aggressors on any of the points now in dispute, whether in Alaska or<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. What then has strained our relations? <strong>The</strong> peremptory refusal to arbitrate this question of boundary.<br />

Who gave that refusal? Great Britain. We have appointed a commission, not to arbitrate between Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, but to inform us, after careful investigation, what the true divisional line, in its opinion, should be. Who<br />

has drawn an arbitrary line at boundary <strong>and</strong> declared that they would not arbitrate to the east of it? Not the United<br />

States, but Great Britain. Ultimatums are what strain relations, <strong>and</strong> they have came from Great Britain <strong>and</strong> not from<br />

us. I believe that this question will be peacefully settled by the good sense of the representatives of Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />

United States, but I am very clear that such settlement can only be reached by action on the part of Congress <strong>and</strong> of<br />

the President which shall be as temperate as it is firm, <strong>and</strong> which shall maintain the Monroe doctrine absolutely<br />

wherever it justly applies. <strong>The</strong> doctrine is as important to us as is the balance of power to Europe, <strong>and</strong> those who<br />

maintain the latter must not attempt to break down the principle which guards the integrity of the Americas <strong>and</strong><br />

protect them from the interference of foreign powers.<br />

In the course of Mr. Lodge’s historical review of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary question he was<br />

asked by Mr. Hill (Dem., N.Y.,) whether <strong>Venezuela</strong> had ever, at any time, refused arbitration.<br />

“Never,” Mr. Lodge replied.<br />

“I refer to that,” Mr. Hill explained “on account of a published interview with Mr. Lincoln in a<br />

Chicago newspaper, in which it was stated that <strong>Venezuela</strong> had refused arbitration.”<br />

“I never met,” Mr. Lodge said “with any instance in which <strong>Venezuela</strong> refused arbitration. So far<br />

as I am aware she has sought arbitration constantly. She has rejected one or two of the compromises<br />

offered b Great Britain. She rejected one of them because Great Britain insisted on free navigation<br />

of the Orinoco. I do not think that <strong>Venezuela</strong> has ever rejected arbitration. On the contrary, she has<br />

always sought it.”<br />

At another point in the narrative Mr. Lodge was asked by Mr. Ch<strong>and</strong>ler (Rep N.H.,) whether he<br />

had discovered any trace of the Indians with whom treaties had been said to have been made.<br />

“I have not,” Mr. Lodge replied. “<strong>The</strong>y must be concealed in the <strong>British</strong> ‘case’.”<br />

[31 December 1895]<br />

- 246 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN BOARD<br />

Justice Brewer Said to be Chosen for the Commission<br />

NO CONFIRMATION AT WHITE HOUSE<br />

<strong>The</strong> President Finds It Hard to Excuse the Men He Wants<br />

to Investigate <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s Boundary<br />

WASHINGT0N, Dec. 30.—Justice Brewer of the Supreme Court, it is announced positively in a<br />

local paper, has been offered <strong>and</strong> has accepted a. place on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission.<br />

Justice Brewer is silent on the subject, <strong>and</strong> at the White House it is stated that none of the names of<br />

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26 – 31 December 1895<br />

the Commissioners to be selected by the President will be announced until all the members have<br />

been chosen.<br />

An impression has been given by a Cabinet officer that the make-up or the commission will be<br />

submitted at to-morrow’s Cabinet meeting, <strong>and</strong> that after the names have been considered in that<br />

meeting the commission will be announced to the public.<br />

It is learned that the President has sent out many communications on the subject to leading<br />

citizens who would, if they would accept, comm<strong>and</strong> a large share of public confidence, but that<br />

many of those whom the President was disposed to select were unable, by reason of ill health or<br />

urgent private business dem<strong>and</strong>ing constant attention, to take up this important public work.<br />

From this report the inference is drawn that the commission will have less rather than more than<br />

five members.<br />

[31 December 1895]<br />

- 247 -<br />

MAKE-UP OF THE COMMISSION<br />

Justice Brewer Thinks It Possible Chief Justice Fuller May Be a Member<br />

ST. LOUIS, Mo., Dec. 29.—Justice David J. Brewer of the United States Supreme Court passed<br />

through this city to-day en route from San Antonio, Texas—where he has been at the bedside of a<br />

sick daughter—to Washington. Judge Brewer said the report that he had been asked to accept a<br />

place on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n commission was untrue.<br />

“I would not be surprised,’ he added, “if Chief Justice Fuller should be asked to take a place on<br />

the commission. He <strong>and</strong> the President are warm friends. Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> appointed him Chief Justice<br />

in 1888. <strong>The</strong> Chief Justice would make an excellent man for the place, but, although he is wiry <strong>and</strong> is<br />

capable of doing an immense amount of work, I do not think he would accept the post. His duties<br />

then would be too great for any man.<br />

“As to Gen. Harrison, I do not think that he would accept a place on the commission. He<br />

probably can make more money out of his law practice <strong>and</strong> not do such hard work. And then—<br />

although I do not know—he may be a c<strong>and</strong>idate for President.<br />

“If he is a c<strong>and</strong>idate for President he probably wishes to be where the politicians gather, <strong>and</strong> he<br />

would not have the time to do this if he should act on the commission. . .”<br />

[31 December 1895]<br />

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- Part 8 -<br />

January 1896<br />

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January 1896<br />

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- 248 -<br />

WAS SCHOMBURGK’S WORK<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Claim Began with the Knowledge of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s Wealth<br />

SALISBURY ANSWERED BY GRANVILLE<br />

Documentary Evidence that the Premier Did Not Correctly State the Facts<br />

in His Letter to Secretary Olney<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 31.—<strong>The</strong> State Department has made a discovery of considerable<br />

importance in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute, which throws new documentary light on the <strong>British</strong><br />

contention of ownership west of the Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong> Lord Salisbury’s refusal to agree to<br />

arbitration east of that line. In the opinion of those officials engaged in studying the various phases<br />

of the controversy, this official document demonstrates that Engl<strong>and</strong> had no idea of claiming a large<br />

part of <strong>Venezuela</strong> until Schomburgk’s scientific explorations had disclosed the great wealth of the<br />

region, <strong>and</strong> that she then determined to make exorbitant claims, trusting that part of them, at least,<br />

would stick.<br />

It is also their opinion that the document nullifies a large part of Lord Salisbury’s reply to<br />

Secretary Olney, by showing that the English Premier has not been entirely disingenuous in his<br />

relation of matters of fact. Lord Salisbury, in undertaking to correct Mr. Olney’s statement that the<br />

dispute began as least as early as 1814, which he says is founded on misconception, declares that the<br />

dispute on the subject of the frontier did not, in fact, commence until after the year 1840, <strong>and</strong> he<br />

then proceeds to narrate the true circumstances connected with the marking of what is called the<br />

Schomburgk line, in the main as follows:<br />

A grant was made in 1835 by the <strong>British</strong> Government for the exploration of the interior of the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Colony, <strong>and</strong> Mr. (afterwards Sir Robert) Schomburgk, who was employed on this service, on<br />

his return to the capital of the colony in July 1839, called the attention of the Government to the<br />

necessity for an early demarcation of its boundaries. In consequence he was appointed in<br />

November, 1840, Special Commissioner for provisionally surveying <strong>and</strong> delimiting the boundaries of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> notice of the appointment was given to the Governments concerned including<br />

that of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> intention of Her Majesty’s Government at that time was, when the work of<br />

the Commissioner had been completed, to communicate to the other Governments their views as to<br />

the true boundary of the <strong>British</strong> Colony, <strong>and</strong> then to settle any details to which those Governments<br />

might take objection.<br />

It is important to notice that Sir R. Schomburgk did not discover or invent any new boundaries.<br />

In submitting the maps of his survey, on which he indicated the line which he would propose to Her<br />

Majesty’s Government for adopting, Sir R. Schomburgk called attention to the fact that Her<br />

Majesty’s Government might justly claim the whole basin of the Cuyuni <strong>and</strong> Yuruari on the ground<br />

that the natural boundary of the colony included any territory through which flow rivers which fall<br />

into the Essequibo.<br />

“Upon this principle,” he wrote, “the boundary-line would run from the sources of the<br />

Carumani towards the sources of the Cuyuni proper, <strong>and</strong> from thence towards its far more northern<br />

tributaries, the Rivers Iruary (Yuruari) <strong>and</strong> Iruang (Yuruan), <strong>and</strong> thus approach the very heart of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n <strong>Guiana</strong>.” But, on grounds of complaisance to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, he proposed that Great Britain<br />

should consent to surrender her claim to a more extended frontier inl<strong>and</strong> in return for the formal<br />

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January 1896<br />

recognition of her right to Point Barima. It was on this principle that he drew the boundary-line<br />

which has since been called by his name.<br />

<strong>The</strong> newly discovered document consists of a letter from Viscount Leveson, (afterwards Earl<br />

Granville) <strong>British</strong> Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir James Stephen, permanent<br />

Under Secretary for the Colonies, written under instructions from Lord Palmerston, Secretary of<br />

Foreign Affairs, for the guidance of Lord John Russell, Secretary for War <strong>and</strong> Colonies. This<br />

important letter shows exactly what went on inside the <strong>British</strong> Cabinet at the time.<br />

Schomburgk had been sent out by the Royal Geographical Society in 1835 with funds supplied<br />

by the Government to explore the Orinoco country, <strong>and</strong> that on his return to Engl<strong>and</strong> in 1839, <strong>and</strong><br />

apparently as a result of his familiarity with the resources of that country, the Government chose<br />

him as the most available person to select the richest territory in <strong>Guiana</strong>, which would naturally<br />

constitute Engl<strong>and</strong>’s share in any subsequent division. <strong>The</strong> note is as follows:<br />

Foreign Office, 18 March 1840.<br />

Sir: I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant, relative<br />

to the expediency of an arrangement being made with the Brazilian, <strong>Venezuela</strong>n, <strong>and</strong> Netherl<strong>and</strong> Governments by<br />

which the boundaries of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> may be accurately defined.<br />

With reference to that part of your letter in which you state that Lord J. Russell considers it to be important<br />

that the boundaries of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> should be ascertained <strong>and</strong> agreed upon if possible, <strong>and</strong> that Mr. Schomburgk’s<br />

researches in those parts have qualified him in a peculiar manner to be of use, should the services of any person<br />

acquainted with the geography of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> be required for fixing the boundaries of the <strong>British</strong> territory, I am<br />

to state to you that the course of proceeding which Lord Palmerston would suggest for the consideration of Lord J.<br />

Russell is that a map of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> should be made out according to the boundaries described by Mr.<br />

Schomburgk, that the said map should be accompanied by a Memoir describing in detail the natural features which<br />

define <strong>and</strong> constitute the boundaries in question, <strong>and</strong> that copies of that map <strong>and</strong> Memoir should be delivered to<br />

the Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, of Brazil, <strong>and</strong> of the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s as a statement of the <strong>British</strong> claim. That, in the<br />

meanwhile, <strong>British</strong> Commissioners should be sent to erect l<strong>and</strong>marks on the ground in order to mark out by<br />

permanent erections the line of boundary so claimed by Great Britain. It would then rest with each of the three<br />

Governments above mentioned to make any objection which they might have to bring forward against these<br />

boundaries, <strong>and</strong> to state the reasons upon which such objections might be founded, <strong>and</strong> Her Majesty’s Government<br />

would then give such answers thereto as might appear proper <strong>and</strong> just.<br />

Lord Palmerston further considers that it would be expedient that the Brazilian detachment should be required<br />

to withdraw from Pirara <strong>and</strong> that the officer in comm<strong>and</strong> should be informed that any claim which Brazil may<br />

imagine itself to have to that village should be stated by the Brazilian Government to that of Great Britain, in order<br />

that it may be discussed <strong>and</strong> settled between the two Governments.<br />

I have, etc.,<br />

(Signed) LEVESON<br />

To James Stephen<br />

In reference to the last paragraph, it may be stated that Brazil did withdraw from Pirara, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

the southern boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> has now advanced over 100 miles beyond that point.<br />

[1 January 1896]<br />

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- 249 -<br />

ENGLAND’S CLAIM NOT TRIFLING<br />

Her Boundary, If Accepted, Will Take One-third of <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

“I cannot underst<strong>and</strong>,” Carlos C. Bolet, formerly Secretary of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Legation at<br />

Washington, <strong>and</strong> now in this city, said, “how any one except an Englishman, notably desirous of<br />

obscuring the real situation, can try to belittle the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n-<strong>Guiana</strong> boundary dispute, so called.<br />

“To say that it is ridiculous to talk of war over a trifling boundary dispute seems plausible<br />

enough; but, is this a trifling boundary dispute? No one should want war. I have no idea that war is<br />

within the limits of possibility. Engl<strong>and</strong> is not going to fight the United States over a ‘trifling<br />

boundary dispute.’ I have not considered that there was the least danger of war at any time, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

despite the fact that to my mind the question at boundary long since gave place to one of foreign<br />

aggression on this continent.<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States, from a pure sense of justice, might well extend its kindly offices to a weak<br />

sister republic against the encroachments at a strong European monarchy, but this country has an<br />

interest in the question of its own, <strong>and</strong> that for the reason that Great Britain has gone so far that her<br />

designs are palpable. No clever intrusion of the boundary question will afford an excuse for the<br />

attempt she is making to appropriate one-third of our country.<br />

“One-third, I say, <strong>and</strong> a third which includes the control of the mouth of the Orinoco River <strong>and</strong><br />

of valuable gold mines. <strong>The</strong> Statesman’s Year Book, their official publication, in 1885 placed the area of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> at 76,000 square miles. <strong>The</strong> same book in 1886 placed it at 109,000, an increase, you<br />

see, at 33,000 in one year. <strong>The</strong>y claimed 26,000 square miles in 1814. Now the maximum claim is<br />

something like 115,000 square miles.<br />

“By the treaty of London In 1814, between the Dutch <strong>and</strong> the English, the Essequibo River is<br />

given as the limit of the Dutch possessions that were ceded to Great Britain, but Engl<strong>and</strong> takes both<br />

sides of the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> both sides of all its tributaries. <strong>The</strong>n, because the ruins of some Dutch<br />

forts are found, farther up the coast toward the mouth of the Orinoco, she pushes her claims to take<br />

them in also. It is a matter of history that the Dutch were constantly invaders of the Spanish<br />

territory, which is now <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> they constructed fortifications to protect themselves, but they<br />

were invariably repulsed <strong>and</strong> driven back across the Essequibo.<br />

“Finally, in 1791, a treaty between the Spanish <strong>and</strong> Dutch was entered into <strong>and</strong> signed at<br />

Aranjuez, Spain. It was a treaty of extradition, <strong>and</strong> here again the Essequibo was named as the<br />

dividing line between the possessions of the two Governments. A photographic copy or this<br />

document, which is held by Spain, is now in the possession of the State Department at Washington,<br />

<strong>and</strong> will doubtless play an important part in the investigation by the commission to be appointed by<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re is another document, which shows that since the independence of <strong>Venezuela</strong> Great<br />

Britain has acknowledged that territory well within her present claim belonged to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It<br />

relates to Punta Barrima, <strong>and</strong> the English Government suggests that <strong>Venezuela</strong> should establish a<br />

lighthouse there.<br />

“More modern history shows how groundless are her present pretensions. Look in the<br />

Encyclopedia Britannica. <strong>The</strong> edition of 1887, I think, states the case as it then stood. <strong>The</strong><br />

comparatively small tract between the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> a line drawn south from Punta Barrima was<br />

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January 1896<br />

then in dispute, <strong>and</strong> each country agreed not to enter upon that tract pending the settlement of the<br />

question of boundary.<br />

“<strong>Venezuela</strong> kept faith, but Great Britain not only occupied that territory, but many times as great<br />

an area far beyond it.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> control of the Orinoco means the control of the interests at nearly the entire northern part<br />

of South America. Does this interest the United States?<br />

“Is President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message too strong? Does not is firm attitude now prevent a war<br />

which would follow a dispute of greater immediate import? I think it does.”<br />

Mr. Bolet spends a considerable part of his time correcting erroneous statements that creep into<br />

print, <strong>and</strong> combating the perversion of fact systematically persisted in by one or two of what he<br />

terms un-American papers.<br />

[1 January 1896]<br />

- 250 -<br />

COLONISTS ASK LAND CONCESSIONS WITHIN THE DISPUTED TERRITORY<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 31.—<strong>The</strong> leading editorial articles of Demerara (<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>) papers,<br />

which reached the State Department this morning, relate to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s annual message<br />

<strong>and</strong> its reference to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute. <strong>The</strong> Daily Chronicle, the Government organ,<br />

says President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s remarks really amount to this:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> established policy of the United States is firmly opposed to the forcible increase of<br />

European territory upon the American Continent,” <strong>and</strong>, conceding that this is a pretty plain<br />

proposition, declares that there is only one condition under which Great Britain is at all likely to<br />

concede the right of the United States to be sole arbiter of the destinies of the other American<br />

republics, <strong>and</strong> that is that she shall declare a protectorate over them <strong>and</strong> make herself responsible for<br />

their wrongdoings <strong>and</strong> liabilities, “in fact, assume toward them in deed as well as in word the part or<br />

a wet nurse.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> suggestion for arbitrating the whole dispute is ridiculed, <strong>and</strong> it is argued that the disparity in<br />

power between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> is the only thing that has delayed more prompt redress<br />

for the Yuruan incident. It is claimed that if <strong>Venezuela</strong> had been a great nation the indignity on the<br />

<strong>British</strong> flag would have been wiped out long ago, though the whole resources of the empire were<br />

required to achieve that end, <strong>and</strong> the threat is made that unless reparation for that insult is speedily<br />

made the character of the action adopted by Great Britain may render the necessity for further<br />

discussion respecting the boundary line between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> altogether<br />

unnecessary. <strong>The</strong> article concludes:<br />

“It must be apparent to all who study the matter that, should Lord Salisbury accept the suggestion thrown out<br />

by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> agree to submit the matter of the boundary line to arbitration, not reserving therefrom<br />

the territory lying on either side of the arbitrary line, such action would be tantamount to conceding that there is<br />

some doubt as to whether the Yuruan outrage was committed on <strong>British</strong> territory. If it were not, the dem<strong>and</strong> for<br />

reparation would appear in a vastly different light to that which it at present assumes. Of course, we may be told, in<br />

fact a portion of the American press has already told us, the territory is occupied by implication when Great Britain<br />

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dem<strong>and</strong>s an indemnity for the arrest of <strong>British</strong> policemen at Yuruan, seeing the arrest could not be complained of<br />

unless the place were assumed to be under <strong>British</strong> jurisdiction. It is difficult, however, to see where the implied<br />

occupation comes in.<br />

<strong>The</strong> occupation is an occupation de facto. <strong>The</strong> Union Jack files at Yuruan, <strong>and</strong> a <strong>British</strong> outpost is stationed<br />

there to indicate where the defined lines of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> reach to. Beyond this is contested territory, regarding the<br />

ownership of which Great Britain is quite prepared to arbitrate, <strong>and</strong> has all along been quite prepared to arbitrate.<br />

That however, she will fall in with the suggestion thrown out in the Presidential message <strong>and</strong> submit to arbitration<br />

her claims to the entire territory claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong> is not for a single moment supposable.”<br />

All the leading men of Georgetown, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, met Dec. 5 <strong>and</strong> formed a company to<br />

develop the country in dispute, petitioning the Government for “a concession of crown l<strong>and</strong>s lying<br />

north of the Cuyuni River between the meridian of longitude 60° <strong>and</strong> the western boundary of the<br />

colony, <strong>and</strong> between the latitude of 5° <strong>and</strong> 7° north.” <strong>The</strong> company undertakes within two years to<br />

h<strong>and</strong> over to the Government to be used in building roads <strong>and</strong> bridges to the coast, $500,000, <strong>and</strong><br />

to have a working capital of $750,000 additional.<br />

One of the principal speakers declared that they had recently had an opportunity of learning that<br />

the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, who was taking a<br />

great deal of interest in this colony, <strong>and</strong> who was inclined to push forward its development, was<br />

favorable to giving large concessions, <strong>and</strong> it struck a number of them that the colonists, who had<br />

borne the brunt of things so far, <strong>and</strong> who had spent <strong>and</strong> lost a good deal of money in the colony,<br />

should have a finger in the pie if there were any good things going. He had no doubt that the<br />

necessary money could be raised in Engl<strong>and</strong> after the colonies themselves had subscribed the<br />

preliminary expenses.<br />

A number spoke in the same line. One of them asked if any part of the territory applied for was<br />

affected in the boundary dispute. <strong>The</strong> Chairman replied that the whole of it was, but according to<br />

the cable dispatch that day, “Lord Salisbury said there would be no arbitration.”<br />

Over 15,000 shares were taken in the colony, <strong>and</strong> the company was fully organized. It appears<br />

from the official maps that the territory asked for amounts to nearly 5,000 square miles lying almost<br />

wholly west of the original Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong> therefore, according to Lord Salisbury’s<br />

contention, altogether in the disputed territory.<br />

[1 January 1896]<br />

- 251 -<br />

THE MAP NOT RELIABLE<br />

Schomburgk Made His Drawings for the Benefit of Botanists<br />

HE LAUGHED AT THE ENGLISH<br />

<strong>The</strong> German Was Himself Surprised at Britain’s Accepting His Work—<br />

Was Not a Practical Surveyor.<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 1.—When the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Commission shall be named <strong>and</strong><br />

shall be ready to proceed with its work of investigation. It looks as though the members might be<br />

furnished with material that is in large part unknown to the <strong>British</strong> claimants for territory beyond the<br />

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January 1896<br />

Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong> even within the line, which Great Britain has indicated as the one within<br />

which it could not consider its right to territory to be made a matter of dispute or of arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Star to-night publishes an interview with Prof. Scharff, son of Prof. <strong>The</strong>odore Scharff, late<br />

of the Imperial Normal School of Metz, which throws a new light upon the character of the socalled<br />

Schomburgk line <strong>and</strong> survey. Prof Scharff says:<br />

“We were residing in the Gr<strong>and</strong> Duchy of Baden when Schomburgk made his South American<br />

trip. Schomburgk was an adventurous <strong>and</strong> somewhat erratic fellow, with a passion for botany. Up to<br />

the time of his leaving the Fatherl<strong>and</strong> his life was that of the German student of the time. He drank<br />

his beer, fought his sword duels, <strong>and</strong> got into the regulation scrapes. He was well versed in botany,<br />

though, <strong>and</strong>, led by his restless, adventurous disposition, he w<strong>and</strong>ered to North America, to the<br />

West Indies, <strong>and</strong> finally to South America, winding up in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, where he settled down to<br />

work upon his botany. Schomburgk undertook a trip into the country lying between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> the Orinoco. He was not sent by any Government, <strong>and</strong> had nothing in view beyond an<br />

examination of the flora of the unknown region <strong>and</strong> satisfying his taste for adventure. It was a<br />

private scientific expedition, <strong>and</strong> nothing more.<br />

“As he journeyed into the interior, he made careful examination of the flora of each new section<br />

of country. He classified the region, geographically, according to the character of the plants he<br />

found.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> preparation of the maps came about in this way. When he located the flora of a certain<br />

section he collected specimens of the plants, pressing them upon a folio, <strong>and</strong> writing below the<br />

sample a description of the same. <strong>The</strong>n, on the back of the folio, he drew a rough map of the region,<br />

wherein the genera <strong>and</strong> species abounded. <strong>The</strong> map was a defining on paper of the area containing<br />

specific classes of plant life.<br />

“Now it happened that in his explorations Schomburgk came upon the huts <strong>and</strong> camps of<br />

<strong>British</strong> squatters at various places. Some of them were wood cutters, living in the forests to get out<br />

the valuable woods for shipment to Engl<strong>and</strong>, raising perhaps a few yarns or other vegetables around<br />

their habitations. Others were adventurers, prospectors, <strong>and</strong> hunters. When he found these places,<br />

Schomburgk naturally noted their location upon his maps for the guidance of brother botanists who<br />

might undertake expeditions into the interior.<br />

“I have seen those maps <strong>and</strong> studied botany from them. Schomburgk sent many packages or<br />

rare plants to my father out of friendship. Knowing his interest in botanical subjects, he would ship<br />

large bundles of tropical flowers pressed out on folios, <strong>and</strong> with the description of the country on<br />

the back as I have explained. <strong>The</strong> maps would be drawn upon a large scale when exhibiting the<br />

location of many varieties at plants within a defined area.<br />

“When Schomburgk came out of the forests <strong>and</strong> returned to <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, the Governor<br />

General saw his collection <strong>and</strong> took especial interest in the maps showing the location of the <strong>British</strong><br />

squatters, which he was pleased to call <strong>British</strong> settlements. <strong>The</strong> English Government immediately<br />

took Schomburgk in h<strong>and</strong>; his maps were accepted as geographical definitions, <strong>and</strong> the limits of his<br />

w<strong>and</strong>erings <strong>and</strong> of the discoveries of squatters as the boundary of <strong>British</strong> territory.<br />

“Schomburgk was not a surveyor <strong>and</strong> made no claim to be. He did not even make a<br />

topographical examination of the country he had traversed. He did not run a line, <strong>and</strong> the alleged<br />

<strong>British</strong> territory was merely the l<strong>and</strong> occupied by men who placed their foot upon the soil <strong>and</strong> said:<br />

‘This is English ground.’ Schomburgk knew the worthlessness of his so-called boundary of English<br />

possessions, but be was not concerned in what the English claimed. <strong>The</strong>y paid him for his maps <strong>and</strong><br />

he laughed in his sleeve at the claims they based upon them.<br />

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“I am satisfied from what I have heard my father say <strong>and</strong> from the communications from<br />

Schomburgk that his alleged boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> was an arbitrary one <strong>and</strong> had no basis or<br />

foundation in fact.”<br />

Copies of maps like those described are now in the possession of the family of a German<br />

resident of Washington, <strong>and</strong> will probably be dem<strong>and</strong>ed by the <strong>Venezuela</strong> commission when it sits<br />

in this country.<br />

<strong>The</strong> name of the late Prof. <strong>The</strong>odore Scharff is familiar those acquainted with the leading<br />

German educators <strong>and</strong> Faculties. He was one of the most distinguished botanists of the Continent,<br />

<strong>and</strong> was frequently sent upon scientific expeditions by the German Government. He was a friend of<br />

the now famous Schomburgk, <strong>and</strong> was in constant communication with him while the latter was in<br />

South America. It is Schomburgk’s testimony that came to him which is expected to throw a new<br />

light upon the Schomburgk maps.<br />

Prof. Scharrf, Sr., died about three years ago. His son, Prof. Emil Ludwig Scharff, furnishes the<br />

information given above.<br />

[2 January 1896]<br />

- 252 -<br />

FAVORS AN ADVISORY BODY<br />

Chamber of Commerce’s Action in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Matter<br />

Would Have United States Commission Act with Similar Board Named by Great Britain<br />

<strong>The</strong> Messrs. Smith Bring up the Cost of War to Merchants—<br />

Other Speakers Before the Chamber<br />

CARL SCHURZ’S SPEECH WELL RECEIVED<br />

At the monthly meeting of the Chamber of Commerce yesterday, attended by as many members<br />

as the spacious rooms of the Chamber could hold, resolutions were adopted in favor of an inquiry<br />

into the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute by a commission, in which Great Britain may have equal voice with the<br />

United States, with an additional arbitrator to be named by the two Governments, <strong>and</strong> appealing to<br />

the people of both countries to unite their efforts for a peaceful settlement of the controversy.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Committee on Foreign Commerce <strong>and</strong> the Revenue Laws presented the resolution of<br />

appeal. Its spirit <strong>and</strong> meaning were defined in an amendment offered by Carl Schurz, at the close of<br />

a well-studied speech, in which he suggested that the proposed court need not be called a council for<br />

arbitration, <strong>and</strong> that Engl<strong>and</strong> might consent to it if it were known by another name—an advisory<br />

body, for instance.<br />

Mr. Schurz did not advise submission to any encroachment upon American rights. On the<br />

contrary, a portion of his speech was given to demonstration of the impregnable condition of this<br />

country. Only the surface could be scratched by seaboard attacks. <strong>The</strong> interior would grow in<br />

strength with each year. He showed that no foreign power would go to war with this country unless<br />

forced to it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> meeting gave Mr. Schurz a rousing indorsement. Everything he said met with cordial<br />

response. His declaration for peace, but only with honor, stirred the greatest enthusiasm. Outbursts<br />

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January 1896<br />

of applause greeted every expression of loyalty <strong>and</strong> every utterance that favored a proper assertion<br />

of National dignity. In its manifestations of feeling the meeting did credit to the good sense <strong>and</strong><br />

patriotism of the merchants composing the Chamber.<br />

Petty commercial spirit was asserted in a mildly absurd way by Charles Stewart Smith <strong>and</strong> G.<br />

Waldo Smith. This league of the Smith family excited only derision. Henry M. Taber, who had a<br />

chair so close to the Smiths that he seemed to be infected by them, ventured to object to a phrase in<br />

the committee’s report, which ascribed to the American people “unanimous” support of the<br />

Monroe doctrine. Mr. Taber had hardly spoken his objection when Francis O. Matthiessen, in a<br />

voice ringing with indignant resentment, exclaimed:<br />

“Mr. Chairman, I think the Monroe doctrine does meet with the approval <strong>and</strong> the hearty support<br />

of the people.”<br />

A shout of assent <strong>and</strong> applause long continued followed this sentiment, contrasting most<br />

emphatically with the silence that had attended Mr. Taber’s plaint. In deference to the Smiths <strong>and</strong><br />

Mr. Taber, however, F. B. Thurber, Chairman of the committee which made the report, consented<br />

to scratch out the word “unanimous,” <strong>and</strong> the report <strong>and</strong> resolutions were adopted with the<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing that popular support of the Monroe doctrine was unanimous, barring the Smiths <strong>and</strong><br />

Mr. Taber. Abundant evidence appeared in the proceedings that if the Smith idea had become<br />

aggressive the Chamber would have throttled it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Resolutions Adopted<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolutions adopted were as follows, the first being the committee’s <strong>and</strong> the others Mr.<br />

Schurz’s, which the committee accepted:<br />

Resolved, That the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New-York, being profoundly impressed with the<br />

gravity of the situation which threatens the peace now <strong>and</strong> happily so long existing between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the<br />

United States, appeals to the common sense <strong>and</strong> the common interests of the people of both countries to avert the<br />

calamity of war by a resort to arbitration or other friendly negotiation, which has so often been found to be a<br />

sufficient <strong>and</strong> satisfactory mode of settling international disputes, <strong>and</strong> to which both Governments st<strong>and</strong> committed<br />

by profession, precedent, <strong>and</strong> the humanitarian spirit of the age.<br />

Resolved, That the President of the Chamber of Commerce appoint a special committee of fifteen members, of<br />

which the President shall be one, to consider the expediency of an effort to be made on its part in conjunction with<br />

similar organizations, in the interest of international peace <strong>and</strong> good underst<strong>and</strong>ing toward obtaining the submission<br />

of the whole <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute for investigation to a joint committee to be composed or the members<br />

of the commission already appointed by the President <strong>and</strong> an equal number of <strong>British</strong> subjects, <strong>and</strong> to be presided<br />

over by some man of eminent character <strong>and</strong> ability, to be agreed upon by the Governments of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the<br />

United States; the commission so constituted to be not a court of arbitration, but a Commission of Inquiry or<br />

Advisory Council, <strong>and</strong>, as such, to report the results of its investigation <strong>and</strong> its opinion to the Governments<br />

concerned for their decision.<br />

Resolved, further, That if the special committee of this Chamber finds it expedient that such an effort be made,<br />

it shall have power to enter in the name of the Chamber of Commerce into correspondence with other commercial<br />

organizations <strong>and</strong> other organizations of public-spirited citizens to enlist their co-operation <strong>and</strong> to do such other<br />

things as it may deem useful <strong>and</strong> proper to further the object in view.<br />

In accordance with the resolutions it was decided to appoint a committee of fifteen members to<br />

enlist the co-operation of other commercial bodies <strong>and</strong> associations in the movement.<br />

Since a common underst<strong>and</strong>ing that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute would be considered filled the<br />

meeting room with members, President Orr called for the report on this subject from the<br />

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Committee on Foreign Commerce <strong>and</strong> the Revenue Laws as soon as he took his gavel. <strong>The</strong><br />

committee is composed of Francis B. Thurber, Gustav H. Schwab, Stephen W. Carey, <strong>and</strong> William<br />

H. Robertson. In the preparation of its report, it had the aid of Abram S. Hewitt, Carl Schurz, <strong>and</strong><br />

Chauncey M. Depew.<br />

IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION<br />

Report of Committee on Foreign Commerce <strong>and</strong> Revenue Laws<br />

Mr. Thurber read the report, which was as follows:<br />

To the Chamber of Commerce:<br />

Your Committee on Foreign Commerce <strong>and</strong> the Revenue Laws respectfully reports that, since the last meeting<br />

of the Chamber <strong>and</strong> the one hundred <strong>and</strong> twenty-seventh annual celebration of its foundation, at which the<br />

continued revival of confidence <strong>and</strong> the steady improvement in business were subjects of general <strong>and</strong> just<br />

congratulation, a sudden <strong>and</strong> deplorable check has been given to our growing prosperity by an occurrence which no<br />

foresight could have anticipated <strong>and</strong> from a quarter whence such a blow was least to have been expected. <strong>The</strong><br />

President of the United States, in his annual message to the Congress, had referred to the pending dispute as to the<br />

boundary between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, in reference to which the good offices of our Government had<br />

been tendered <strong>and</strong> arbitration had been recommended; but there was nothing to indicate that a solution satisfactory<br />

to all parties might not be reasonably expected. <strong>The</strong> special message of the President on this subject came, therefore,<br />

as a sudden <strong>and</strong> unwelcome surprise to the commercial world, causing the apprehension of war to take the place of<br />

the calm spirit of confidence with which the approaching Christmas holidays were anticipated. <strong>The</strong> losses caused by<br />

the rude derangement of business, <strong>and</strong> by the fall in value of merch<strong>and</strong>ise <strong>and</strong> of securities are too painfully fresh to<br />

require discussion at our h<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

Upon the merits of the controversy between the United States <strong>and</strong> the Government of Great Britain it would<br />

be manifestly impolitic, if not improper, for the Chamber of Commerce to express any opinion while the subject is<br />

still under discussion between the responsible representatives of the two powers, but it seems to your committee to<br />

be eminently proper <strong>and</strong> desirable that this Chamber, which may without presumption claim to represent the<br />

commercial interests <strong>and</strong> feelings of the mercantile classes, should express its profound regret that the contingency<br />

of war between the two great English-speaking nations should have been suggested as a possible outcome of the<br />

pending correspondence in a controversy in which the American people have now, <strong>and</strong> probably can have, no more<br />

than a sentimental <strong>and</strong> passing interest.<br />

But for the suggestion that an ultimate resort to arms might become necessary, the work of diplomacy would<br />

have proceeded without disturbing public confidence, <strong>and</strong> the ultimate solution have been reached without causing<br />

needless ruin to many innocent persons <strong>and</strong> unmerited distress in many a household in which joy would otherwise<br />

have prevailed.<br />

Your committee feels also that the Chamber may properly reiterate its repeated declaration in favor of<br />

arbitration as a reasonable <strong>and</strong> the best method for the settlement of international disputes, <strong>and</strong> may express its<br />

regret that the Government of Great Britain has seen fit to decline, or to limit, the propositions which have<br />

heretofore been made by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> courteously <strong>and</strong> wisely reinforced by our Government, for the submission<br />

of the boundary dispute to the decision of impartial arbiters, <strong>and</strong> may voice the hope that Great Britain will yet see<br />

that it is alike magnanimous <strong>and</strong> wise to reopen the question in dispute with a weaker power, <strong>and</strong> submit to the<br />

unbiased judgment of mankind the decision of a question of no great moment in itself, but to which extraneous<br />

circumstances have given sufficient importance to raise the issue of peace or war between two powerful <strong>and</strong> kindred<br />

nations, whose intimate relations with each other <strong>and</strong> whose permanent welfare dem<strong>and</strong> at all times “peace with<br />

honor.”<br />

It seems to your committee that if the subject should be reviewed by both Governments in the spirit of mutual<br />

forbearance, looking rather to the future than to the past, <strong>and</strong> with the sterling common sense which has heretofore<br />

characterized the Anglo-Saxon race <strong>and</strong> gained for it the primacy of the world, the solution of the pending<br />

controversy will not be found to be attended with serious difficulty.<br />

<strong>The</strong> opportunity for this review will fortunately be presented when the report of the Commissioners created by<br />

the Congress of the United States for the purpose of investigating all the facts relating to the disputed boundary line<br />

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January 1896<br />

shall have been received <strong>and</strong> communicated in a friendly spirit to both parties to the controversy, in the expectation<br />

that it will either form a basis for adjustment by negotiation or for reference to impartial arbitration.<br />

This course s rendered the more easy because Great Britain takes no exception to the principles declared in the<br />

Monroe doctrine, which indeed, was formulated at the instance <strong>and</strong> with the approval of the great <strong>British</strong> Minister,<br />

Canning. who “sought to redress the balance of power in Europe, by calling into existence a new world in the<br />

West,” <strong>and</strong> because also the President has declared that there can be no objection to a conventional rearrangement<br />

of boundaries which may be satisfactory to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> that such a result will not be regarded by the United<br />

States as infringing upon its rights <strong>and</strong> interests, or as violating the spirit of the doctrine announced by President<br />

Monroe in 1823, <strong>and</strong> which still has the enthusiastic <strong>and</strong> unanimous support of the American people.<br />

During the present century about eighty cases of international dispute have been settled by arbitration. In the<br />

last twenty years these cases have occurred at the rate of two or three a year. <strong>The</strong>y have covered questions of<br />

boundary, of insult to the flag, of property, of personal injury—every question, in fact, with which nations have had<br />

to deal, except the one question of actual existence of the national life. In every case the difficulty has been settled<br />

for all time, <strong>and</strong> no war has ever grown out or any or them.<br />

Our country has settled more than forty of these difficulties. We have been literally “the peace nation of the<br />

world.” Great Britain has settled about a dozen in the same period, <strong>and</strong> all the nations of Europe have had from one<br />

to seven cases. All of the South American Republics, except two, <strong>and</strong> two of the Central American Republics, have<br />

done the same. As between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States there have been numerous controversies which have<br />

been thus settled from 1798 down to the present time. Among these were the St. Croix River boundary, the<br />

Passamaquoddy Bay dispute, <strong>and</strong> the northeastern boundary between the United States <strong>and</strong> Canada. This left the<br />

northwestern boundary between the United States <strong>and</strong> Canada unsettled, <strong>and</strong> in 1844 the controversy over this<br />

waxed so warm that it was made a party issue in this country. <strong>The</strong> parallel of 54 minutes 40 seconds was claimed as<br />

the northern boundary of the United States, <strong>and</strong> 54 minutes 40 seconds or fight became the Democratic campaign<br />

cry. Engl<strong>and</strong> contended for the forty-ninth parallel, <strong>and</strong> this was finally decided in her favor. <strong>The</strong>n came the<br />

Alabama claims <strong>and</strong> the fisheries dispute, the first being decided in our favor, <strong>and</strong> the latter against us, each side<br />

accepting the decision <strong>and</strong> paying the award like business men. <strong>The</strong>n came the seizure of Canadian sealing vessels by<br />

the United States in Bering Sea, which was arbitrated, <strong>and</strong> about $400,000 awarded to the owners of the seized<br />

vessels, which has not been paid, owing to the failure of Congress to make an appropriation therefor, <strong>and</strong> which we<br />

are in honor bound to settle without further delay. <strong>The</strong> Alaskan boundary remains to be determined, but a<br />

convention providing for a survey of part of the line has already been entered into by Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United<br />

States, <strong>and</strong> it is in a fair way of being settled in an equally reasonable manner.<br />

Your committee being convinced that their views as to a peaceful solution will have the support <strong>and</strong> sympathy<br />

of intelligent <strong>and</strong> patriotic people on both sides of the Atlantic, recommend to the Chamber the adoption of the<br />

following resolution designed to strengthen the efforts of the responsible officials of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United<br />

States to preserve the peace, with the aid <strong>and</strong> assistance of men of all races <strong>and</strong> creeds who look upon war as the<br />

greatest conceivable calamity, <strong>and</strong> upon peace <strong>and</strong> commerce as the most powerful agencies in promoting the<br />

progress of civilization, the growth of liberty, the spread of religion, <strong>and</strong> the general diffusion of happiness.<br />

Mr. Thurber’s Remarks<br />

<strong>The</strong> committee’s resolution followed. In support of the report <strong>and</strong> the resolution Mr. Thurber<br />

said:<br />

In submitting this report I would state that when excitement following the President’s message was at its height,<br />

<strong>and</strong> fortunes were crumbling in the financial world, it seemed to many members of the Chamber expedient that it<br />

should voice through a special meeting the great interests involved.<br />

A call for such a meeting was signed by double the required number of members, but as action by Congress was<br />

pending it was deemed advisable to await the regular monthly meeting, <strong>and</strong> afford an opportunity for sober second<br />

thought to assert itself.<br />

Desiring that the Chamber should have the benefit of the best minds <strong>and</strong> those most experienced in public<br />

affairs among our members, your committee sought the advice of the Hon. Abram S. Hewitt, the Hon. Carl Schurz,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Hon. Chauncey M. Depew, <strong>and</strong> we are greatly indebted to those gentlemen for assistance <strong>and</strong> wise counsel<br />

in the preparation of the report.<br />

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Pending the report of the eminent commission authorized by Congress <strong>and</strong> appointed by the President, your<br />

committee has not deemed it advisable to go into the merits of the controversy, but has confined this report to<br />

advocating peace <strong>and</strong> arbitration, <strong>and</strong> calling public attention to what these forces have accomplished during the<br />

present century in adjusting international differences.<br />

In this day <strong>and</strong> generation public opinion is the court of last resort, <strong>and</strong> religion <strong>and</strong> commerce should be allies<br />

in advocating the cause of human progress before this court. Public opinion can prevent unloosing the dogs of war,<br />

or even drive them back to their kennels if unloosed. This Chamber may well speak with authority in the interest of<br />

peace, for it has ever been foremost in upholding the honor of the Nation, as well as responding to the appeals of<br />

humanity.<br />

If necessity arises it will not hesitate at any sacrifice of blood or treasure to this end, but until that necessity is<br />

clearly apparent let us believe with Tennyson, that<br />

“<strong>The</strong> common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe.<br />

And the kindly earth shall slumber lapt in universal law.”<br />

Mr. President. I move the reception <strong>and</strong> adoption of the report <strong>and</strong> resolution.<br />

Throughout the reading of the report <strong>and</strong> resolutions <strong>and</strong> during Mr. Thurber’s remarks, the<br />

meeting was closely attentive, manifesting its approval of expressions of loyalty <strong>and</strong> National selfrespect<br />

with gratifying frequency.<br />

THE SPEECH OF MR. SCHURZ<br />

His Plan to Bring About a Body Which Shall Give Advice<br />

When Mr. Thurber had finished Mr. Schurz arose to second his motion. <strong>The</strong> meeting greeted<br />

Mr. Schurz heartily, <strong>and</strong> soon warmed to his enthusiasm. He said:<br />

As an honorary member of the Chamber of Commerce I am thankful for the privilege of seconding the<br />

resolution offered by the committee. I yield to no one in American feeling of pride, <strong>and</strong> as an American I maintain<br />

that international peace kept in justice <strong>and</strong> honor is an American principle <strong>and</strong> an American interest.<br />

As to the President’s recent message on the <strong>Venezuela</strong> case opinions differ. But I am sure that all good citizens,<br />

whether they approve or disapprove of it, <strong>and</strong> while they would faithfully st<strong>and</strong> by their country in time of need,<br />

sincerely <strong>and</strong> heartily wish that the pending controversy between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain be brought to<br />

a peaceable issue.<br />

I am well aware of the strange teachings put forth among us by persons that a war from time to time would by<br />

no means be a misfortune, but rather a healthy exercise to stir up our patriotism <strong>and</strong> to keep us from becoming<br />

effeminate.<br />

Indeed, there are some of them busily looking around for somebody to fight as the crazed Malay runs amuck<br />

looking for somebody to kill.<br />

<strong>The</strong> idea that the stalwart <strong>and</strong> hardworking American people, engaged in subduing to civilization an immense<br />

continent, need foreign wars to preserve their manhood from dropping into effeminacy, or that their love of<br />

country will flag unless stimulated by hatred of somebody else, or that they must have bloodshed <strong>and</strong> devastation as<br />

an outdoor exercise in the place of other sports—such an idea is as preposterous as it is disgraceful <strong>and</strong> abominable.<br />

Politicians Eager to Plunder<br />

It is also said that there are some American citizens of Irish origin who wish the United States to get into a war<br />

with Engl<strong>and</strong> because they believe that such a war would serve to relieve Irel<strong>and</strong> of the <strong>British</strong> connection. We all<br />

value the willingness of the Irish-born American citizens to fight for their adopted country if need be, <strong>and</strong> nobody<br />

will deny that their hearty love for their native l<strong>and</strong> is, as such, entirely natural <strong>and</strong> entitled to respect. But as<br />

American citizens, having sworn exclusive allegiance to the United States, not one of them should ever forget that<br />

this Republic has a right to expect of all its adopted citizens as to their attitude toward public affairs, especially<br />

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January 1896<br />

questions of peace or war, the loyal <strong>and</strong> complete subordination of the interests of their native countries to the<br />

interests of the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are also corrupt politicians eager to plunder the public under a cheap disguise of patriotism, <strong>and</strong><br />

unscrupulous speculators, looking for gambling <strong>and</strong> pilfering opportunities in their country’s trouble, <strong>and</strong> wishing<br />

for war as the piratical wrecker wishes for fogs or hurricanes. <strong>The</strong>y deserve the detestation of every decent man.<br />

But aside from these classes, it may safely be assumed that all seriously minded American citizens earnestly<br />

hope for a continuance of the long-existing friendly relations between this country <strong>and</strong> Great Britain. Gen.<br />

Sherman, whose memory is dear to us all, is reported to have said in his vigorous sway: “You want to know what<br />

war is? War is hell.” And nobody who has seen war as he had, <strong>and</strong> as some of us have, will question the truthfulness<br />

of his characteristic saying. True, war sometimes develops noble emotions <strong>and</strong> heroic qualities in individuals or in a<br />

people, but war is hell far all that. If our boasted civilization <strong>and</strong> Christianity are to mean anything, they should<br />

mean this: No war is justifiable unless it cause or object st<strong>and</strong>s in just proportion to its cost in blood <strong>and</strong><br />

destruction, <strong>and</strong> human misery <strong>and</strong> waste, <strong>and</strong> political corruption <strong>and</strong> social demoralization, <strong>and</strong> relapse of<br />

civilization, <strong>and</strong> even then it is justifiable only when every expedient of statesmanship to avert it has been<br />

thoroughly exhausted.<br />

I shall not discuss now whether those who honestly think that our present difference with Great Britain would,<br />

as to cause or object, justify war, or those who think the contrary are right.<br />

I expect them both to co-operate in an earnest endeavor to encourage those expedients of statesmanship by<br />

which war may be averted in either case. Confronting a grave emergency we must, as practical men, look at the<br />

situation not as it might have been or ought to be, but as it is. For several years our Government has been seeking<br />

to bring a boundary dispute between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> to a friendly settlement, but without success.<br />

Last Summer the President, through the Secretary of State, in a dispatch reviewing the case at length <strong>and</strong><br />

containing an elaborate disquisition on the Monroe doctrine, asked the <strong>British</strong> Government whether it would<br />

“consent or decline to submit the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question in its entirety to impartial arbitration,” calling for “a definite<br />

decision.” Lord Salisbury, after some delay, replied in a dispatch, also discussing the Monroe doctrine from his point<br />

of view, that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question might be in part submitted to arbitration, but he refused to submit it in its<br />

entirety as asked for. <strong>The</strong>reupon President Clevel<strong>and</strong> sent a message to Congress recommending appropriations for<br />

a commission to be appointed by the Executive, which commission shall make the necessary investigation of the<br />

boundary dispute, <strong>and</strong> report to our Government, <strong>and</strong> when such report is made <strong>and</strong> accepted it will, in the<br />

President’s opinion, be “the duty of the United States to resist by every means the appropriation by Great Britain of<br />

any l<strong>and</strong>s or the exercise of any governmental jurisdiction over any territory which, after investigation, we have<br />

determined of right belongs to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.” And Congress, by unanimously voting the appropriation asked for,<br />

without qualifications, virtually made the position taken by the President its own.<br />

Changed the Situation<br />

This correspondence <strong>and</strong> this message, by their tone as well as their substance, have essentially changed the<br />

situation. It is no longer a mere question of boundary or of the status of the Monroe doctrine, but, after a dem<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> a call for a definite decision <strong>and</strong> a definite refusal of the thing dem<strong>and</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> in answer to this something that<br />

may be understood as a threat of war, ft has assumed the most ticklish form of an international difference—the<br />

form of a question of honor.<br />

Questions of fact, of law, of interest, of substantial justice <strong>and</strong> right it may sometimes be difficult to determine,<br />

but there are rules of evidence, of legal construction, of equity, <strong>and</strong> precedents to aid us. A question of honor is<br />

often inaccessible to these aids, for it is a matter of sentiment. Affairs of honor have caused as many follies as affairs<br />

of love. It is a strange fact that, while the mediaeval conception of honor, which regarded the duel as the only<br />

adequate settlement of a question of this nature, has yielded to more enlightened views in several highly civilized<br />

countries, nations are in such cases still apt to rush to arms as the only means of satisfaction.<br />

It is generally said in Great Britain, as well as here, that there will be no war. <strong>The</strong> belief is born of the wish. It is<br />

so general because almost everybody feels that such a war would be a disaster not only calamitous, but also absurd<br />

<strong>and</strong> shameful to both nations. From the bottom of my heart I trust the prediction will prove true. But the prediction<br />

itself, with the popular sentiment prompting it, will not be alone sufficient to make it true. Bloody wars have<br />

happened in spite of an earnest popular desire for peace on both sides, especially when questions of honor inflamed<br />

the controversy. It may be in vain to cry “Peace! Peace!” on both sides of the ocean if we continue to flaunt the red<br />

flag in one another’s faces.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> commission just appointed by the Presidents indeed consists of eminent, patriotic, <strong>and</strong> wise men. <strong>The</strong>y will<br />

no doubt conduct their inquiry with conscientious care <strong>and</strong> fairness. So we think here. But we have to admit that<br />

after all it is a one-sided contrivance, <strong>and</strong> as such lacks an important element of authority. Suppose the report of the<br />

commission goes against the <strong>British</strong> contention. Suppose then we say to Great Britain, “Our investigation shows<br />

this <strong>and</strong> so we decide accordingly. Take this or fight! “How then? It is quite possible that a vast majority of the<br />

<strong>British</strong> people care very little about the strip of territory in dispute, <strong>and</strong> would have been satisfied to let the whole of<br />

it go to arbitration. It is not impossible even that Lord Salisbury himself, in view of the threatening complications in<br />

Europe <strong>and</strong> other parts of the world, <strong>and</strong> of the manifold interests involved, might at least rather let it be so<br />

submitted than have a long quarrel about it.<br />

Time When Commission Reports<br />

But it may be well doubted whether any statesman at the head of the <strong>British</strong> or any other great Government<br />

would think that he could afford to yield what he otherwise would be disposed to yield under a threat of war.<br />

Similar circumstances would produce similar effects with us. <strong>The</strong> fact is, therefore, that however peaceable the<br />

popular temper may be on both sides of the water, the critical moment will come at the time when the commission<br />

reports, <strong>and</strong>, if that commission remains one-sided, as it is now, the crisis may become more exciting <strong>and</strong> dangerous<br />

than ever.<br />

But in the meantime there will be something calling for the most earnest attention of the business world on<br />

both sides of the Atlantic. While that critical period is impending there will be—who knows how long?—a dark<br />

cloud of uncertainty hanging over both nations, an uncertainty liable to be fitfully aggravated on occasion, or even<br />

without occasion, by speculative manufacturers of rumors. Every business calculation will be like taking a gambler’s<br />

chance. <strong>The</strong> spirit of enterprise will be depressed by vague anxiety as to the future, by the paralysis of apprehension,<br />

<strong>and</strong> I need not tell you, as experienced business men, what all this means as to that confidence which is necessary to<br />

set in motion the rich man’s money <strong>and</strong> the poor man’s labor, <strong>and</strong> thus to develop general prosperity. It is of the<br />

highest importance, therefore, that this uncertainty be removed, or, at least, lessened as much <strong>and</strong> as soon as<br />

possible, <strong>and</strong> the peace sentiment prevailing here, as well as in Engl<strong>and</strong>, of which the friendly message from the<br />

Chamber of Commerce in Edinburgh is so cheering an evidence, may perhaps be practically set to work for the<br />

accomplishment of that end.<br />

A though occurred to me when studying President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s <strong>Venezuela</strong> message which indeed may well have<br />

occurred, at least in general outline, to many others at the same time, because it seems so natural. I was glad to<br />

notice that something in the same line was suggested by an English journal. <strong>The</strong> President has appointed an<br />

American commission to inquire into the <strong>British</strong> claims as to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary. As I have already pointed<br />

out, the findings of that commission will, owing to its one-sided origin, lack an essention element of the moral<br />

authority required to comm<strong>and</strong> general credit. <strong>The</strong> authority would be supplied it an equal number of eminent<br />

Englishmen designated by the <strong>British</strong> Government were joined to the commission to co-operate in the examination<br />

of the whole case, <strong>and</strong> if the two parties, to prevent deadlocks between them, agreed upon some distinguished<br />

person outside to preside over <strong>and</strong> direct their deliberations, <strong>and</strong> to have the casting vote—the joint commission to<br />

be not a court of arbitration, <strong>and</strong> as such to pronounce a final <strong>and</strong> binding decision of the whole case— the thing<br />

which Lord Salisbury objected to—but an advisory council to report the results of its inquiry into the whole case,<br />

together with its opinions, findings, <strong>and</strong> recommendations to the two Governments for their free acceptance or<br />

rejection.<br />

Possible Effect of His Plan<br />

It may be said that such an arrangement would not entirely remove the uncertainty as to the first outcome. I<br />

believe, however, that it would at least very greatly lessen that uncertainty. I think it possible that the findings <strong>and</strong><br />

recommendations of a commission so constituted would have high moral authority <strong>and</strong> carry very great weight with<br />

both Governments. <strong>The</strong>y would be likely to furnish, if not a complete <strong>and</strong> conclusive decision, at least a basis for a<br />

friendly agreement. <strong>The</strong> very appointment of such a joint commission by the two Governments would be apt at<br />

once to remove the question of honor, the most dangerous element, from the controversy, <strong>and</strong> thus go very far to<br />

relieve the apprehension of disastrous possibilities which usually has so unsettling <strong>and</strong> depressing an effect.<br />

I do not know, of course, whether such a plan would be accepted by either Government. I think, however, that<br />

each of them could assent to it without the slightest derogation to its dignity, <strong>and</strong> that if either of them received it<br />

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upon proper presentation, even with an informal manifestation of favor, the way would easily be opened to a mutual<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing concerning it. At any rate, it seems to me worth the while of a public-spirited <strong>and</strong> patriotic body like<br />

this, <strong>and</strong> of other friends of peace here or abroad to consider its expediency, <strong>and</strong> at the close of my remarks I shall<br />

move a tentative resolution to that effect, in addition to the one now pending.<br />

I repeat, I am for peace—not, indeed, peace at any price, but peace with honor. Let us underst<strong>and</strong>, however,<br />

what the honor of this great American Republic consists in. We are a very powerful people—even without an army<br />

or navy immediately ready for action. We are in some respects the most powerful people on earth. We enjoy<br />

peculiar advantages of inestimable value. We are not only richer than any European nation, in men, in wealth, <strong>and</strong> in<br />

resources yet undeveloped, but we are the only nation that has a free h<strong>and</strong>, having no dangerous neighbors, <strong>and</strong> no<br />

outlying or exposed possessions to take care of. We are in our continental position substantially unassailable. A<br />

hostile navy may destroy what commercial fleet we have, blockade our ports, <strong>and</strong> even bombard our seaboard<br />

towns. This would be painful enough, but it would be only scratching our edges. It would not touch a vital point.<br />

No foreign power or possible combination could attack us on l<strong>and</strong> without being overwhelmed on our own soil by<br />

immensely superior numbers. We are the best fitted, not perhaps for a war of quick decision, but for a long war.<br />

Better than any other nation we can, if need be, live on our own fat. We enjoy the advantages of not having spent<br />

our resources during long periods at peace on armaments of tremendous cost without immediate use for them, but<br />

we would have those resources unimpaired in time of war to be used during the conflict, substantially unassailable in<br />

our continental fastness, <strong>and</strong> bringing our vast resources into play with the patriotic spirit <strong>and</strong> the inventive genius<br />

<strong>and</strong> enterprise of our people. We would on sea as well as on l<strong>and</strong> wage offensive as well as defensive warfare, be<br />

stronger the second year of a war than the first, <strong>and</strong> stronger the third than the second, <strong>and</strong> so on.<br />

Owing to this superiority of our staying power a war with the United States would be to any foreign nation<br />

practically a war without end. No foreign power or possible combination in the Old World can, therefore,<br />

considering in addition to all this the precarious relations of every one of them with other powers, <strong>and</strong> its various<br />

exposed interests, have the slightest inclination to get into a war with the United States, <strong>and</strong> none of them will,<br />

unless we force to do so. <strong>The</strong>y will on the contrary carefully avoid such a quarrel as long as they can; <strong>and</strong> we may be<br />

confident that without firing a gun, <strong>and</strong> even without having many guns ready for firing, we shall always see our<br />

rights respected <strong>and</strong> our dem<strong>and</strong>s, if they are just <strong>and</strong> proper, may be, after some diplomatic sparring, at last fully<br />

complied with.<br />

Rule for Powerful Nation<br />

Now, what is the rule or honor to be observed by a power so strong <strong>and</strong> so advantageously situated as this<br />

republic is? Of course, I do not expect it meekly to pocket real insults, if they should be offered to it. But surely it<br />

should not, as out boyish jingoes wish it to do, swagger about among the nations of the world with a chip on its<br />

shoulder, <strong>and</strong> shaking its fist in everybody’s face. Of course, it should not tamely submit to real encroachments<br />

upon its right.<br />

But surely it should not, whenever its own notions of right or interests collide with the notion of others, fall<br />

into hysterics, <strong>and</strong> act as if it really feared for its own security <strong>and</strong> its very independence. As a true gentleman,<br />

conscious of his strength <strong>and</strong> his dignity, it should be slow to take offense. In its dealing with other nations it should<br />

have scrupulous regard not only for their rights, but also for their self-respects. With all its latent resources for war it<br />

should be the great peace power of the world. It should never forget what a proud privilege <strong>and</strong> what an inestimable<br />

blessing it is not to need <strong>and</strong> not to have big armies or navies to support. It should seek to influence mankind, not<br />

by heavy artillery, but by good example <strong>and</strong> wise counsel. It should see its highest glory, not in battles won, but in<br />

wars prevented. It should be so invariably just <strong>and</strong> fair, so trustworthy, so good-tempered, so conciliatory, that other<br />

nations would instinctively turn to it as their mutual friend <strong>and</strong> the natural adjuster of their differences, thus making<br />

it the greatest preserver of the world’s peace.<br />

This is not a mere idealistic fancy. It is the natural position of this great Republic among the nations of the<br />

earth. It is the noblest vocation <strong>and</strong> it will be a glorious way for the United States when the good sense <strong>and</strong> selfrespect<br />

of the American people see in it their “manifest destiny.” It all rests upon peace. Is not this peace with<br />

honor?<br />

<strong>The</strong>re has of late been much loose speech about “Americans.” Is not this good “Americanism?” It is surely today<br />

the Americanism of those who love their country most. And I fervently hope that it will be <strong>and</strong> ever remain the<br />

Americanism of our children <strong>and</strong> children’s children.<br />

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Mr. Schurz had enjoyed the sympathy of his audience from the beginning. Applause for him as<br />

he finished was long <strong>and</strong> hearty. Mr. Thurber followed him, saying:<br />

Mr. Chairman: As a matter or information, I would state that when I first read the resolution which Mr. Schurz<br />

has just offered, it seemed to me that it might possibly interfere with the free <strong>and</strong> clear workings of the<br />

Commissioners appointed by our Government to investigate this question; but the more I considered it the more it<br />

seemed a reasonable <strong>and</strong> proper step for this Chamber to initiate.<br />

Suppose, for instance, that we do not adopt the resolution, <strong>and</strong> do not take any steps in that direction, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

commission, which the United States Government has appointed goes on <strong>and</strong> makes its investigation <strong>and</strong> reports<br />

that in their opinion <strong>Venezuela</strong> is right <strong>and</strong> that we only have one recourse, <strong>and</strong> that is war; it would be too late then<br />

for such a step to be initiated as that proposed by Mr. Schurz’s resolutions, <strong>and</strong> hence I am inclined to think that it<br />

is a wise <strong>and</strong> proper step for this Chamber to take to place in the power at its President the appointment of a<br />

committee, which can go on <strong>and</strong> get up such a joint commission as is proposed by the resolutions; <strong>and</strong> hence, while<br />

I have not had time to confer with the other members of our Committee on Foreign Commerce individually, I<br />

should favor the adoption of the resolutions offered by Mr. Schurz as a supplementary step to the report <strong>and</strong><br />

resolutions offered by our committee.<br />

CHARLES STEWART SMITH’S IDEA<br />

Wants New-York Merchants to Consider What War Would Cost<br />

Mr. Taber then broke in. “Mr. Chairman,’ he complained, “there is one word in the admirable<br />

report of Mr. Thurber that I object to. He says that the Monroe doctrine has met with universal<br />

approval of the people of this country. I object to it because it is not true, <strong>and</strong> I say, also, that it<br />

ought not be true, unless we have a navy equal to that of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> an army ten times the<br />

size that it is at the present time.”<br />

This stirred up Mr. Matthiessen, who retorted from his st<strong>and</strong>ing place in a far corner: “Mr.<br />

Chairman, I think that the Monroe doctrine does meet with the approval <strong>and</strong> hearty support of the<br />

people.”<br />

As the applause for Mr. Matthiessen subsided, the voice of Charles Stewart Smith was first<br />

heard. He said:<br />

Mr. Chairman: Mr. Schurz has expressed an opinion which I believe to be eminently true, that in the event of a<br />

war with Great Britain or any foreign power the United States would be stronger the second year, <strong>and</strong> the third, <strong>and</strong><br />

the fourth, <strong>and</strong> so on, than the first. I have no doubt that that is entirely true. But let us see how we shall st<strong>and</strong> the<br />

first year.<br />

I will only occupy five or six minutes of your time; I will be as brief as possible, but I want to call your attention<br />

to two documents. One is a report of the Major General comm<strong>and</strong>ing the army to the Secretary of War, for 1895,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the other is the report of the Secretary of war for the same year.<br />

Quotes from Mr. Tilden’s Letter<br />

As a matter of introduction, allow me to quote from a letter written by the Hon. Samuel S. Tilden <strong>and</strong><br />

published in 1885. He was referring to the state of the revenue of the Government at that time <strong>and</strong> the paying off of<br />

the public debt so rapidly, <strong>and</strong> comparing that with the desirability of fortifying the wretched <strong>and</strong> defenseless<br />

condition of our harbors <strong>and</strong> our seacoast; <strong>and</strong> he said:<br />

“I am of the opinion that the latter [the protection of the harbors] is a paramount necessity, which ought to<br />

precede the reduction of the revenue, <strong>and</strong> ought also to precede an excessive rapidity in the payment of the public<br />

debt.”<br />

<strong>The</strong>n he goes on to say: “<strong>The</strong> property exposed to destruction in the twelve seaports— Portl<strong>and</strong>, Portsmouth,<br />

Boston, Newport, New-York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, New-Orleans Galveston, <strong>and</strong> San<br />

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Francisco—cannot be less in value than $5,000,000,000. To this must be added a vast amount of property<br />

dependent for its use on these seaports.”<br />

I read another extract “<strong>The</strong> range of the best modern artillery has become so extended that our present<br />

fortifications, designed to protect the Harbor of New-York, where two-thirds of the import trade <strong>and</strong> more than<br />

one-half of the export trade of the whole United States is carried on, are too near to the great populations of New-<br />

York City, Jersey City, <strong>and</strong> Brooklyn to be of any value as a protection. To provide effectual defenses would be the<br />

work of years.”<br />

<strong>The</strong>n he goes on to say that it is more than sixty years since the announcement of the Monroe doctrine; <strong>and</strong> he<br />

says at the close of that paragraph, which is the last that I will read:<br />

“It is clear that there ought to be some relation between our assertion of that doctrine <strong>and</strong> our preparation to<br />

maintain it.”<br />

Now, that was the opinion of a very wise man ten years ago. Now let us see what Gen. Miles <strong>and</strong> the Secretary<br />

of War say to-day. Gen. Miles says:<br />

“As the entire system of warfare has changed within a generation, we cannot rely upon the achievements of our<br />

fathers or the boasting of our own people to defend our political rights, property, or lives. <strong>The</strong> condition of this<br />

coast is one to tempt the avarice <strong>and</strong> cupidity of any fourth-rate naval power on the globe, <strong>and</strong> that it could be<br />

occupied by any first-class naval power is a fact apparent to any thoughtful, well-informed citizen.”<br />

He says again: “With all our boasted intelligence, pride of institutions, inventive genius, <strong>and</strong> superiority in many<br />

of the arts, industries, <strong>and</strong> commercial enterprises, we are as far behind in the modern appliances of war as the<br />

people of China or Japan.” And he speaks of the coast defenses as “the wretched, defenseless condition of the coast<br />

at the present moment.” He says further: “It is embarrassing for a military officer to acknowledge this condition of<br />

affairs <strong>and</strong> to record these facts. Yet he would do less than his duty to his country did he not endeavor to bring the<br />

truth before the Government, in order that it should be fully apprised of the true condition of affairs.”<br />

Again, he says that such was the condition six years ago, <strong>and</strong> substantially it it the same now. He recommended<br />

an appropriation of about ten millions of dollars a year, ten years ago, <strong>and</strong> in all we have appropriated for these<br />

coast defenses a million <strong>and</strong> a half. A very eminent engineer who has made the coast defenses a study has told me<br />

that it would take ten years to properly defend the City of New-York <strong>and</strong> its harbor; that we could not expend more<br />

than ten million a year profitably, <strong>and</strong> that we ought to calculate for a ten years’ expenditure of ten millions a year in<br />

New-York harbor alone.<br />

In 1885 or 1886 the Comm<strong>and</strong>ing General recommended an appropriation for twenty-seven seaports of<br />

$97,000,000, <strong>and</strong> that there be spent in the first year $21,000,000, <strong>and</strong> only eight or nine millions a year afterward.<br />

As a matter of fact, we have spent a million <strong>and</strong> a half. And the same language that is used by Gen. Miles is<br />

substantially repeated by the Secretary of War this year. He recommends for the harbor of New York 93 guns <strong>and</strong> a<br />

great number of mortars. We have, I believe, 2 guns in position, <strong>and</strong> we have built 2 twelve-inch, 2 ten-inch, <strong>and</strong> 5<br />

eight-inch of the 93 required. Of mortars there is a very much less proportion.<br />

Now, Mr. Chairman, before we brag quite so much, the merchants of New-York better consider what in the<br />

event of war, which Mr. Schurz has very justly considered as possible, although not probable, is going to be the<br />

effect on New-York as a city, <strong>and</strong> how much money we might be called upon to pay to Engl<strong>and</strong>’s fleet if it came<br />

into our ports.<br />

HE OPPOSED THE REPORT<br />

F. C. Moore Said It Reflected on the President of the United States<br />

Mr. Smith’s appeal to the pocket nerve of the meeting brought F. C. Moore, President of the<br />

Continental Fire Insurance Company, to his feet. He said:<br />

I am opposed to the resolutions <strong>and</strong> to the report of the committee, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the applause which it<br />

received, <strong>and</strong> especially the applause which followed the eloquent gentleman who so ably advocated it, which,<br />

however, may have been divided as a tribute to his talent rather than approval of the sentiments of this resolution. I<br />

am opposed to it for two important reasons..<br />

<strong>The</strong> first is, it is a reflection upon the President of the United States. It is unmistakable in its terms, Mr.<br />

President. And there is another important reason, <strong>and</strong> it would be sufficient for voting it down, it seems to me, <strong>and</strong><br />

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it is this: That to-day there is only one issue before this or any other body of United States citizens; it is the issue of<br />

whether or not we will support the Government of the United States. [Applause.]<br />

Now, Mr. President, under the Constitution of the United States President Clevel<strong>and</strong> did exactly what he is<br />

requited by the Constitution to do. He expressed his opinion of the relations of this Government with <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> with Great Britain. He was not called upon to express the opinion of this Chamber or the opinion of the<br />

majority of the American citizens, but his own, <strong>and</strong> he did it. It was, under the Constitution of the United States, the<br />

duty of Congress to do exactly what it did, <strong>and</strong> it did it, with remarkable <strong>and</strong> unprecedented unanimity. Now, there<br />

is the situation, Mr. President.<br />

Under the Constitution or the United States Congress has the right to make <strong>and</strong> declare war. Under the same<br />

Constitution the President of the United States is the Comm<strong>and</strong>er in Chief of the army <strong>and</strong> navy. When both of<br />

them speak it makes no difference what my friend Mr. Schurz thinks about the matter or what this or any other<br />

Chamber thinks about the matter; it is the duty of every American citizen to follow the lead <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> of the<br />

President <strong>and</strong> of Congress. (Cries of “No! No!” from the Smith section.] If I st<strong>and</strong> here alone, I want to be recorded<br />

as voting in the negative.<br />

Now, Mr. President, let us think for a moment. Why should we talk in this report about the horrors of war?<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is not a man in this country or in Great Britain who is not opposed to war, unless he is either a fool or a<br />

knave. It is unnecessary to say we are all opposed to war. It would be the greatest calamity of this or any other<br />

century, a. war with Great Britain. Also it is unnecessary to go into the question of whether this is a one-sided<br />

commission or not. I maintain that all of the sentiments expressed in this report are with propriety directed to Great<br />

Britain, which has refused to arbitrate, <strong>and</strong> should not be directed as a slur upon the President of the United States,<br />

who invited it.<br />

I want to remind the gentleman who has just taken his seat, <strong>and</strong> who was instrumental in calling this Chamber<br />

together, <strong>and</strong> for whom we all have such admiration <strong>and</strong> respect, that the last place where I met him was in the City<br />

of Strasburg, <strong>and</strong> in that city there were 30,000 soldiers, larger than our st<strong>and</strong>ing army, <strong>and</strong> if this Monroe doctrine<br />

does not mean just what the President of the United States says it means, you <strong>and</strong> I will live to see the day when we<br />

will have to have a st<strong>and</strong>ing army. [Groans from the Smiths.]<br />

Now, as to the sentiment of how much it will cost, or the present condition of the Government for defense,<br />

that is not an issue to-day. <strong>The</strong>re is only one really great issue. It is not what we fear. It is what our representatives in<br />

Congress <strong>and</strong> the President—I did not vote for him; I voted against him <strong>and</strong> spoke against him, but I have learned<br />

to admire his ability <strong>and</strong> his fearlessness, <strong>and</strong> I am with him in this. And now as far as the money consideration is<br />

concerned, it seems to me that that ought not to be mentioned by any body of American citizens.<br />

I would rather see every dollar I have in the world burned up for fuel under the boilers of a battleship than to<br />

see this country take any other st<strong>and</strong> than that which accords with its dignity <strong>and</strong> self-respect. . .<br />

A. FOSTER HIGGINS’S SPEECH<br />

He Heartily Approves of the Suggestions of Mr. Schurz<br />

A. Foster Higgins next spoke, following Mr. Moore. He said:<br />

Mr. Chairman. I came here to-day with the distinct determination that if there was any attempt to stigmatize the<br />

President or to in any way reflect upon him, I would have something to say. I confess, Sir, an agreeable surprise –<br />

not surprise, but an agreeable frame of mind, to read in this report nothing of the sort which my friend, Mr. Moore,<br />

has referred to. I do not find in this report any reflection upon the President. <strong>The</strong>re is expressed a regret that he has<br />

given such a message, by which our peaceful relations at this time of the year, when we are welcoming the Prince of<br />

Peace to the earth, have been rudely disturbed. I cannot believe that there is a man here that can have any other<br />

feeling upon that subject than a desire for peace. While I will st<strong>and</strong> by my country <strong>and</strong> make as great sacrifices as<br />

anybody else, I want to be sure that we are exactly right.<br />

I listened to Mr. Schurz’s address with great admiration <strong>and</strong> with a thrilling respect for him which I never shall<br />

lose. I hope his speech may be printed <strong>and</strong> circulated, not only among the members of this Chamber, but among all<br />

who wish a copy of it. It is full of noble sentiment, one that we cannot help but respect, I believe it is preaching to<br />

us the proper gospel; it is the gospel of self-respect first, <strong>and</strong> the same respect for your neighbor.<br />

I do not approach this question with any great respect for Great Britain’s position in it. I feel that she is wrong.<br />

But be that as it may, that is not a question here before us. I feel as Mr. Schurz has suggested, that we ought to use<br />

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every exertion which any human being is capable of to avert a dreadful calamity which none of us can look upon<br />

with any complacency. War is a final resort. It should be a final resort. Every other resort should first be tried. This<br />

question involves some very important considerations.<br />

Gentlemen, I came here with the conviction that the commercial spirit is not a proper spirit to follow when you<br />

are seeking after patriotism. <strong>The</strong> commercial spirit leads to a treat deal of demoralization. It leads men to commit<br />

injustice to their fellow-men. It leads men to form great corporations by which individual enterprise is crushed out.<br />

It leads necessarily to aggressions <strong>and</strong> to acts which we must regret. <strong>The</strong>refore, I do not feel that the commercial<br />

spirit is the proper spirit to adopt. It was the commercial spirit which opposed the very improvements in our<br />

harbors <strong>and</strong> defenses which Mr. Smith has referred to. <strong>The</strong> commercial spirit said we should never need them; that<br />

when we actually got into war the genius of the American people would be quite ample for the occasion.<br />

He Agrees with Mr. Schurz<br />

Now I do not want it to be understood we will take anything honorable position. A true <strong>and</strong> rounded life can<br />

only be one that has a noble end. I believe that the American Nation as a nation is exactly the same way. To put us<br />

down as money seekers <strong>and</strong> money hunters, to make it appear that we have nothing to consider but the money<br />

question, that we must not do this or that because of the great loss it is going to inflict upon us, is to humiliate this<br />

Nation. We have, in my opinion, the greatest destiny that any nation ever had, <strong>and</strong> my heart thrilled in response to<br />

Mr. Schurz when he said our destiny was to establish peace in the world.<br />

What is the cause of this controversy? A poor little weak nation, feeling utterly incapable of dealing with her<br />

competitor, comes to us <strong>and</strong> appeals to us to take up her quarrel. Well, we took it up, <strong>and</strong> we proposed to Great<br />

Britain to arbitrate. Now Great Britain has declined, <strong>and</strong> acts rather rudely about it; <strong>and</strong> I may think that she is the<br />

aggressor: but Mr. Schurz suggests a very nice remedy, <strong>and</strong> I feel that the destiny of this country is to hold out its<br />

h<strong>and</strong> to all oppressed nations, <strong>and</strong> to be constantly ready to extend our aid to every suffering being on the face of<br />

the globe. But I feel to-day the inconsistency of our noble position toward little <strong>Venezuela</strong> when contrasted with the<br />

position in view of the awful transactions in Armenia <strong>and</strong> Turkey. It is something that fills me with shame. I trust,<br />

Sir, that it will be the future or this great American Nation to always be ready, <strong>and</strong> at all cost, to extend its h<strong>and</strong><br />

toward an oppressed nation or an oppressed individual or a suffering individual, wherever it may be on the face of<br />

the globe.<br />

Now, I can add nothing to the remarks which Mr. Schurz has made. <strong>The</strong>y were perfect <strong>and</strong> complete. <strong>The</strong>y told<br />

us of the dreadful peril in which we st<strong>and</strong>. I cannot look upon that peril with complacency, although, when the time<br />

comes that we have to go to war, I shall endeavor to adjust myself to it <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong> my portion of the sacrifice; but I<br />

feel, as sensible men, we ought to do everything we can to avert such a calamity. I heartily approve of the<br />

suggestions of Mr. Schurz.<br />

G. WALDO SMITH’S VIEWS<br />

Says Something on the Line of Remarks of Charles S. Smith<br />

G. Waldo Smith was the next speaker. He said:<br />

Mr. Chairman: I desire to say just one word on the line of remarks of my distinguished friend Charles S. Smith.<br />

I sailed out of the harbor of San Francisco by the side of Gen. O. O. Howard only a few years ago, who we then<br />

engaged upon work connected with the army, <strong>and</strong> he said to ire that there were eleven powers who have it In their<br />

power to send ships by all the fortifications of San Francisco in spite of all that could be done to prevent them <strong>and</strong><br />

bombard the city.<br />

Gen. O. O. Howard, in comm<strong>and</strong> of the Department of the Pacific, having all the resources at his comm<strong>and</strong>,<br />

says there are eleven powers that can do that work at any moment they attempt it. At this very hour there is a large<br />

number of ships at the very strongest calibre, the most powerful <strong>and</strong> the best that money can comm<strong>and</strong>, ready to<br />

take steam <strong>and</strong> enter the harbor of San Francisco <strong>and</strong> the harbor of Portl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> lay those cities in ashes.<br />

It is time enough to talk about enforcing the Monroe doctrine not only over the American Continent, but over<br />

the entire hemisphere, when we have some preparation to do what we threaten to do. I will not say whether we are<br />

bound to interfere between a country having rights in South America <strong>and</strong> another country having rights there,<br />

whether we are bound in honor to maintain the rights of the weaker against the stronger. I will not raise that<br />

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question. I only want to say that for 100 years we have lived in the closest amity of friendship with the <strong>British</strong><br />

Nation on a line of 3,500 miles in extent, <strong>and</strong> any gentleman here can cross into any one of those provinces <strong>and</strong><br />

travel year after year <strong>and</strong> never know there was a United States of America unless he saw the American flag.<br />

I simply want to ask this question in conclusion: Is there anything in the <strong>British</strong> Government, <strong>and</strong> people, with<br />

a common history, with common industries, with a common religion, marching on with us arm in arm <strong>and</strong> shoulder<br />

to shoulder in the great work of civilizing the nations, is there anything in their Government which jeopardizes our<br />

lives <strong>and</strong> liberties <strong>and</strong> the pursuit of happiness <strong>and</strong> the permanency of republican institutions?<br />

This ended the speeches, <strong>and</strong> adoption of the report <strong>and</strong> resolutions followed promptly, with<br />

only a few dissenting votes. Before the Chamber proceeded to its other business, Mr. Orr read a<br />

friendly cable dispatch from Thomas Clark, Baronet, President of the Edinburgh Chamber of<br />

Commerce, urging a peaceful settlement of the dispute.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chamber decided to print Mr. Schurz’s speech in pamphlet form for general distribution. It<br />

was cabled in full to London last night.<br />

[3 January 1896]<br />

- 253 -<br />

MR. OLNEY WAS CORRECT<br />

Earl Granville proposed a General Arbitration<br />

A MISSTATEMENT BY LORD SALISBURY<br />

Upon the Accession of the New Ministry the Granville Agreement<br />

with <strong>Venezuela</strong> Was Repudiated<br />

WAHINGTON, Jan. 2.—<strong>The</strong> State Department is in a position conclusively to prove the<br />

statement of to-day’s London Chronicle, that “It is learned on the best authority that Earl Granville,<br />

in 1885, virtually concluded with Blanco a treaty containing an arbitration clause covering the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n international boundary dispute,” <strong>and</strong> that the Marquis of Salisbury, however, in coming<br />

into power later in the same year, virtually canceled this clause by limiting the provisions of the<br />

treaty to commercial questions. <strong>The</strong> Chronicle adds that “nothing could have been more<br />

unfortunate, inasmuch as the boundary dispute was on the eve of permanent settlement.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> records which <strong>Venezuela</strong> had already delivered to the United States Government before the<br />

Administration took such a firm st<strong>and</strong> in the matter with Engl<strong>and</strong> leave no doubt whatever on this<br />

point<br />

Gen. Blanco, in 1885, negotiated with Earl Granville a treaty of amity, commerce, <strong>and</strong><br />

navigation, to supplant the existing convention of 1825 between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong><br />

new treaty included three paragraphs providing for the arbitration of any <strong>and</strong> all differences, <strong>and</strong><br />

related particularly to the boundary dispute. Earl Granville’s letter accepting specifically the<br />

important clause is dated May 15, 1885, <strong>and</strong> in its entirety is as follows:<br />

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt on the 12th inst. of your note, dated the 6th inst., respecting the<br />

proposed new treaty between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

In reply, I have the honor to inform you that her Majesty’s Government agree to the substitution of the phrase<br />

“power” to be chosen by the high contracting parties, instead of “arbitrators” in the article respecting arbitration,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that they further agree that the undertaking to refer differences to arbitration shall include all differences which<br />

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January 1896<br />

may arise between the high contracting parties, <strong>and</strong> not those only those which arise on, the interpretation of the<br />

treaty.<br />

Her Majesty’s Government are also prepared to meet generally the wishes of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government as to<br />

river navigation <strong>and</strong> coasting trade as connected with it: but I beg leave to point out that this exception to most<br />

favored nation or national treatment should not interfere with ocean-going steamers touching consecutively at two<br />

or more ports of the republic.<br />

With regard to the arrangements made by <strong>Venezuela</strong> with Colombia, I have the honor to state that her<br />

Majesty’s Government will agree that the provisions of the most-favored-nation article proposed by them shall not<br />

include special arrangements with regard to local trade entered into by <strong>Venezuela</strong> with respect to traffic across the<br />

l<strong>and</strong> frontier.<br />

I trust that these modifications will meet your views, <strong>and</strong> that I may shortly hear from you that a formal draft<br />

treaty framed on that with Paraguay, with the addition of an article respecting arbitration, <strong>and</strong> the alteration in the<br />

most-favored-nation stipulation now suggested, may be prepared for your approval.<br />

<strong>The</strong> treaty was fully concluded less than two months afterward, but the Gladstone Government<br />

was overthrown at this time on questions wholly disconnected from <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matters, which<br />

were conducted in secret, <strong>and</strong> Lord Salisbury, succeeding Earl Granville as Foreign Secretary, found<br />

it incumbent upon himself to complete the negotiations, which he immediately proceeded to do by<br />

sending Gen. Guzman Blanco a note on July 27, absolutely reversing Earl Granville’s action. <strong>The</strong><br />

portion of the note referring to this clause is as follows:<br />

Her Majesty’s Government are unable to concur in the assent given by their predecessors in office to the<br />

general arbitration article proposed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> they are unable to agree to the inclusion in it of matters other<br />

than those arising out of the interpretation or alleged violation of this particular treaty. To engage to refer to<br />

arbitration all disputes <strong>and</strong> controversies whatsoever would be without precedent in the treaties made by Great<br />

Britain. Questions might arise such as those involving the title of the <strong>British</strong> Crown to territory, or other sovereign<br />

rights which her Majesty’s Government could not pledge themselves beforeh<strong>and</strong> to refer to arbitration.<br />

This letter removed all doubt as to the broad terms of Earl Granville’s agreement, for Lord<br />

Salisbury distinctly put such a construction on the treaty (which he concedes was assented to) that<br />

the title to the territory of the <strong>British</strong> Crown colony of <strong>Guiana</strong> had to be arbitrated under its specific<br />

terms.<br />

This throws an entirely new <strong>and</strong> unfavorable light on a portion of Lord Salisbury’s retort to<br />

Secretary Olney in the latter part of the Foreign Office dispatch of Nov. 26 last, in which he says:<br />

Mr. Olney is mistaken in supposing that in 1886 “a treaty was practically agreed upon containing a general<br />

arbitration clause, under which the parties might have submitted the boundary dispute to the decision of a third<br />

power or of several powers in amity with both.” It is true that Gen. Guzman Blanco proposed that the commercial<br />

treaty between the two countries should contain a clause of this nature, bat it had reference to future disputes only.<br />

Lord Salisbury deemed proper in this dispatch to underscore the word “future”, <strong>and</strong> it was<br />

printed in italics in the Foreign office official document. That there is an equivocation in this<br />

statement can hardly be doubted in connection with Salisbury’s own earlier letter to Gen. Guzman<br />

Blanco <strong>and</strong> Earl Granville’s notes.<br />

[3 January 1896]<br />

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- 254 -<br />

ITS CLAIM IS WORTHLESS<br />

Great Britain’s Pretensions in <strong>Venezuela</strong> Have No Good Basis<br />

DISCOVERY BY AN ENGLISH PAPER<br />

IMPORTANT CORRESPONDENCE IS FOUND<br />

<strong>The</strong> South American Republic’s Claim to <strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory Shown to be a Just One<br />

LONDON, Jan. 2.—A special representative of <strong>The</strong> Daily Chronicle who is now in Washington<br />

cables to that paper that he has obtained from a source, which he is pledged not to reveal, the<br />

official unpublished correspondence exchanged by Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> between November,<br />

1840, when Sir Robert Schomburgk was appointed to delimit the frontier of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />

April, 1842, when Engl<strong>and</strong> removed the boundary posts set up by Sir Robert Schomburgk.<br />

Señor Fortique, <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister to Great Britain, wrote to Lord Aberdeen, Colonial<br />

Secretary of State in the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel, in October, 1841, referring to <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s<br />

proposal to conclude a treaty an the boundaries, <strong>and</strong> protesting that before the proposal was<br />

answered a sentry-box built on the republic’s territory. Señor Fortique again urged that a boundary<br />

treaty be entered upon.<br />

Lord Aberdeen replied that he had received Sir Robert Schomburgk’s report that he had planted<br />

boundary posts at certain points in the country he had surveyed, being fully aware that the<br />

demarcation so made was merely a preliminary measure open to future discussion between Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It did not appear, however, that Sir Robert Schomburgk had left any<br />

building.<br />

Señor Fortique replied that Sir Robert Schomburgk had planted at the mouth of the Orinoco<br />

River several posts. He had also raised the <strong>British</strong> flag with a show of force <strong>and</strong> performed other<br />

acts of dominion In <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Extreme courtesy alone prevented <strong>Venezuela</strong> from forcibly excelling him from the country.<br />

After some delay, Lord Aberdeen replied to Señor Fortique, confirming his previous statement<br />

<strong>and</strong> adding that much unnecessary inconvenience would result from the removal of the posts, as<br />

they would afford the only tangible means by which her Majesty’s Government could be prepared to<br />

discuss the question of boundaries with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> posts were erected for that express purpose,<br />

<strong>and</strong> not, as the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government appeared to apprehend, as indications of dominion <strong>and</strong><br />

empire on the part of Great Britain.<br />

In the same dispatch Lord Aberdeen expressed pleasure at learning that the Governor of <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

had assured the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n emissaries that Great Britain had not occupied Point Barima.<br />

Señor Fortique again wrote to re-insist upon the removal of the posts in January, 1842.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle then quotes from the second note of Lord Salisbury to Secretary of State Olney the<br />

words:<br />

“At the urgent entreaty of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government, these two posts were afterward<br />

removed, as stated by Mr. Olney, but this concession was made on the distinct underst<strong>and</strong>ing that<br />

Great Britain did not thereby in any way ab<strong>and</strong>on her claim to that position.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle also quotes from the two documents in which this concession was made.<br />

<strong>The</strong> first document consists of a dispatch sent in March, 1842, by Henry Light, Governor of<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>, to Daniel O’Leary, <strong>British</strong> Consul at Caracas, stating that the Colonial Secretary had ordered<br />

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January 1896<br />

the Governor to remove the l<strong>and</strong>marks. <strong>The</strong> other document is a dispatch from Mr. O’Leary to the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government containing the substance of Gov. Light’s dispatch.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle remarks that nothing indicates the condition asserted by Lord Salisbury, <strong>and</strong> adds:<br />

“If the above documents are genuine, <strong>and</strong>. their source excludes suspicion, the Schomburgk line is<br />

proved worthless as a basis of any territorial claim whatever.”<br />

Commenting editorially on the subject, <strong>The</strong> Chronicle says:<br />

“We are bound to say, assuming, as we are bound to assume, the accuracy of our representative’s citations, that<br />

they vitiate Lord Salisbury’s second dispatch to Secretary Olney, <strong>and</strong> render it necessary for us to revise our whole<br />

view of the situation. Clearly, there can now be no question regarding the Schomburgk line as a ramrod thrust<br />

between <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. In a word Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States have a way out. We look to the statesmen<br />

on both sides to enlarge it until there is found complete escape from a situation of the utmost peril.”<br />

[3 January 1896]<br />

- 255 -<br />

DISPLEASED WITH SALISBURY<br />

English Papers Hint the Premier Has Hoodwinked the People<br />

LONDON, Jan. 3.—<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette says it has no reason to doubt that the dispatches<br />

which <strong>The</strong> Daily Chronicle quotes, containing the official unpublished correspondence exchanged by<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> between November, 1840, when Sir Robert Schomburgk was<br />

appointed to delimit the frontier of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> April, 1842, when Engl<strong>and</strong> removed the<br />

boundary posts set up by Schomburgk, are genuine. <strong>The</strong> Gazette presumes that Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong><br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> knew of these letters, <strong>and</strong> asks why, then, Secretary Olney did not use them to<br />

refute Lord Salisbury’s second dispatch. “Did he,” <strong>The</strong> Gazette asks, “deliberately prefer to pick a<br />

quarrel with Lord Salisbury?”<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette says: “<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> people are not being properly treated by the<br />

Government when it is left to the enterprise of a newspaper to discover, in a foreign country, that<br />

unpublished official correspondence upon which peace or war may depend, does not justify the<br />

statements of our own Foreign Minister.”<br />

Mr. Chamberlain, when shown at the Colonial Office a copy of <strong>The</strong> Chronicle’s accusation of<br />

cognizance on the part of the Government of the unpublished correspondence, declared that the<br />

charge was beneath contempt.<br />

Sir Charles Dilke, M.P., was to-day asked to State his views in regard to the new developments in<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute growing out of the discoveries of old correspondence by the special<br />

representative of <strong>The</strong> Daily Chronicle now in Washington. Sir Charles said he did not think that <strong>The</strong><br />

Chronicle’s disclosures would in any degree alter the situation. It was obvious, he said, that the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government would have published before this any documents likely to help its case. In<br />

regard to the boundary posts along the Schomburgk line mentioned in <strong>The</strong> Chronicle’s dispatches, he<br />

said the whole thing depended upon what was the exact position of these posts.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re appeared to be a good deal of ambiguity in the correspondence. A point near the mouth<br />

of the Orinoco River seemed to have been in the mind of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government at the time<br />

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the correspondence passed, but he thought that Lord Aberdeen could not have been referring to the<br />

same point in his reply to Senhor Forteque, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister to Great Britain at that time.<br />

He considered that the proposals of Great Britain had never been varied. Engl<strong>and</strong> had always<br />

contended that the site of the old Dutch fort was territory belonging to Great Britain, as the heir or<br />

the Dutch. Lord Aberdeen probably had in mind a line further in the interior <strong>and</strong> away from the sea,<br />

concerning which there had always been <strong>and</strong> still was a willingness to negotiate.<br />

As he understood it, Sir Charles Dilke said Lord Salisbury’s position was that in 1885 Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

was prepared to arbitrate the questions concerning the back country a great deal more freely than<br />

she is now, when a portion of the disputed territory is occupied by <strong>British</strong> subjects who have settled<br />

there on the strength of its being under <strong>British</strong> rule. Before answering the statement made in <strong>The</strong><br />

Chronicle, that the Schomburgk line was worthless, he said he would require to be informed what the<br />

Schomburgk line was.<br />

[4 January 1896]<br />

- 256 -<br />

COMMISSION IN SESSION<br />

Men to Investigate <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s Boundary Hold a Meeting<br />

JUSTICE BREWER CHOSEN PRESIDENT<br />

Credentials Read that the Report Is to be Made Direct to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>.<br />

CONSULTATION HAD WITH MR. OLNEY<br />

<strong>The</strong> Secretary of State Will Not Take Part In the Inquiry, However<br />

—To Meet Again Jan. 11<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 4.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission held its first meeting here to-day <strong>and</strong><br />

organized by electing Justice Brewer President.<br />

Four members at the commission were present. <strong>The</strong> members assembled at the State<br />

Department at 11 o’clock this morning for a discussion of the great work before them. <strong>The</strong> absentee<br />

was Andrew D. White of New-York, who will be in Washington Tuesday. Frederic R. Caudert was<br />

the first member of the commission to appear. He reached the State Department shortly after 10:30<br />

o’clock, <strong>and</strong> was shown into Secretary Olney’s office. Fifteen minutes later Justice David S. Brewer<br />

<strong>and</strong> Prof. Daniel S. Gilman arrived together, <strong>and</strong> at 11 o’clock Chief Justice Richard Alvey, the<br />

remaining Commissioner, put in his appearance, having just arrived from Hagerstown, Md.<br />

<strong>The</strong> four Commissioners remained with Secretary Olney for half an hour, discussing routine<br />

matters pertaining to their organization. Mr. Olney will not participate in any way in the work of the<br />

commission, <strong>and</strong> when the Commissioners emerged from his office into the diplomatic reception<br />

room he remained behind.<br />

Credentials of Commissioners<br />

Each member of the tribunal, with the exception of Prof. White, received his formal certificate<br />

of appointment from the President to-day. <strong>The</strong> form of this credential is peculiar <strong>and</strong> extremely<br />

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January 1896<br />

explicit, urging the Commissioners to proceed without delay, pointing out rules for their<br />

government, <strong>and</strong> noting that the report must be made to the President.<br />

<strong>The</strong> form of the credential is as follows:<br />

To David J. Brewer:<br />

You are hereby appointed member of the commission to investigate <strong>and</strong> report upon the true location of the<br />

divisional line between the territory of the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> that of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

It is expected that the commission will avail itself of all possible sources of information, will apply to the matter<br />

all pertinent rules of municipal <strong>and</strong> international law, <strong>and</strong> will make a report to the President of their conclusions,<br />

together with the evidence <strong>and</strong> documents submitted to <strong>and</strong> considered by them, with as little delay as is compatible<br />

with the thorough <strong>and</strong> impartial consideration of the subject to be dealt with.<br />

In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be patent <strong>and</strong> the seal of the United States to be hereunto<br />

affixed.<br />

Given under my h<strong>and</strong> at the City of Washington on the 4th day of January, in the year at our Lord one<br />

thous<strong>and</strong> eight hundred <strong>and</strong> ninety-six <strong>and</strong> of the independence of the United States of America the one hundred<br />

<strong>and</strong> twentieth.<br />

GROVER CLEVELAND<br />

By the President.<br />

RICHARD OLNEY, Secretary of State.<br />

Upon assembling in the diplomatic room the Commissioners immediately proceeded to the<br />

selection of a presiding officer, who will hereafter be designated as President. As was expected,<br />

Justice Brewer was chosen unanimously. <strong>The</strong> fact that he was named first on the list of the<br />

commissioners as announced by the President was the basis for this expectation, but Justice<br />

Brewer’s high st<strong>and</strong>ing as a jurist is understood to have been the real reason why he was the choice<br />

of his colleagues.<br />

President Brewer proceeded to administer the oath of office to the other Commissioners, <strong>and</strong><br />

then Commissioner Alvey acted in a like capacity for the President. <strong>The</strong> form of oath was as follows:<br />

I do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign <strong>and</strong><br />

domestic; that I will bear true faith <strong>and</strong> allegiance too the same; that I take this obligation freely, without mental<br />

reservation or purpose of evasion, <strong>and</strong> that I will well <strong>and</strong> faithfully discharge the duties of the office of member of<br />

the commission to investigate <strong>and</strong> report upon the location of the true divisional line between the territory of the<br />

Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Business Transacted<br />

A motion to appoint a clerk to act for the present temporary session of the commission was<br />

adopted, <strong>and</strong> J. Walter Blanford, private secretary of the Secretary of State, was accordingly<br />

designated.<br />

On motion of Mr. Coudert, the matter of the selection of quarters for the commission was left<br />

to President Brewer <strong>and</strong> Commissioner Alvey.<br />

Commissioner Gilman moved that an inquiry be made as to the best map showing the physical<br />

characteristics of the country in question <strong>and</strong> whether it could be reproduced in convenient form for<br />

the use of the commission. This was seconded by Commissioner Alvey <strong>and</strong> adopted, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

commission authorized Commissioner Gilman to make such inquiry.<br />

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This concluded all business for the present, <strong>and</strong> on motion of Commissioner Coudert the<br />

commission adjourned to meet Saturday next, Jan. 11, at 10:30 o’clock A.M. (unless the President of<br />

the commission selects another date) in the diplomatic room of the Department of State.<br />

It was 12.30 o’clock when the adjournment took place, <strong>and</strong> the commission had been in session<br />

for just one hour. <strong>The</strong> four Commissioners went back to Secretary Olney’s office, <strong>and</strong> after telling<br />

him of what they had done, walked over to the White House to pay their respects to President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong>y spent about fifteen minutes with Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> then went to luncheon.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission will exercise great care in the selection of a permanent clerk, as this matter is<br />

deemed to be of some importance. It is understood that a person who speaks <strong>and</strong> writes the Dutch,<br />

Spanish, <strong>and</strong> English languages is desired.<br />

Early Report Improbable<br />

Although the President, in the official appointment of each member of the <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

Commission, enjoins upon the commission the duty of making as early a report as possible<br />

consistent with thorough examination of the facts bearing upon the divisional line between<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the commission work as quickly as the subject will permit, it is<br />

not expected, by those who are familiar with business of this kind, that a report can be made short<br />

of three or four months. By the time the commission has been instructed by perusal of the<br />

documents in the case <strong>and</strong> the maps have been examined, the <strong>British</strong> position will be somewhat<br />

changed, <strong>and</strong> the way out of the contention will be satisfactory to all <strong>and</strong> humiliating to none.<br />

<strong>The</strong> reception in Engl<strong>and</strong> with astonishment of the news sent from this city by the<br />

correspondent of <strong>The</strong> London Chronicle, although it has all been taken from correspondence that<br />

has not been secret, is regarded as an indication that the subject has been less carefully investigated<br />

there than here, <strong>and</strong> that reliance was place too completely upon the bumptious arrogance of<br />

Chamberlain <strong>and</strong> the belief that the <strong>British</strong> people would accept his assurances without going to the<br />

trouble to inquire further to see whether be was justified in defying American sentiment for no<br />

better reason, perhaps, than to support a determination to acquire a reputation for conducting a<br />

vigorous colonial policy. When the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Commission has completed its work, it is believed<br />

that it will have collected the fist full, fair, <strong>and</strong> disinterested history of the boundary dispute in<br />

existence. It is the opinion of those who have studied the temper of the <strong>British</strong> press during the last<br />

week that there will be strong unofficial pressure brought to bear to induce Great Britain to<br />

contribute its share of the history, <strong>and</strong> that skilled b<strong>and</strong>s will be assigned to put it in such shape that<br />

it will be at once a history <strong>and</strong> an argument.<br />

[5 January 1896]<br />

- 257 -<br />

SALISBURY WILL CLIMB DOWN<br />

Negligence of Subordinates Will Be Used as a Convenient Ladder<br />

LONDON. Jan. 4—<strong>The</strong> cable dispatches sent from Washington by the special representative of<br />

<strong>The</strong> Morning Chronicle giving the unpublished correspondence anent the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary<br />

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January 1896<br />

dispute exchanged by Lord Aberdeen, Colonial Secretary in the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel, <strong>and</strong><br />

Señor Fortique, the then <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister to Engl<strong>and</strong>, seem to have burst on the Foreign Office<br />

as a surprise.<br />

It is almost incredible that the permanent officials at the Foreign Office, who are responsible for<br />

coaching the Prime Minister, would have been ignorant of this correspondence. Yet it is known in<br />

official circles that the brief on which Lord Salisbury based his reply to Secretary of State Olney did<br />

not mention the dispatches that were cabled to <strong>The</strong> Chronicle.<br />

It is understood that the Prime Minister is deeply chagrined because of this fact. He may mark<br />

his displeasure by insisting tat certain of the permanent officials shall retire.<br />

A measure like this would be a preliminary to a general surrender, <strong>and</strong> would afford a convenient<br />

bridge for Lord Salisbury’s retreat from the position he has assumed.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Foreign Office will prepare an extensive report on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute. This will be<br />

accompanied with maps showing the historical details of the territory in dispute. That Lord Salisbury<br />

will climb down seems to be assured.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Saturday Review (Independent) advocated the making of concessions to the United States. It<br />

quotes from a New-York paper to the effect that it will be better for Engl<strong>and</strong> to eat crow at home<br />

than to eat dirt abroad, <strong>and</strong> adds: “In view of our enemies on the Continent Lord Salisbury must<br />

yield. It’s better to eat a deal of some crow than any foreign dirt.”<br />

[5 January 1896]<br />

- 258 -<br />

MR. HENRY NORMAN’S REPORTS<br />

Immediately on the receipt in London of the unanimous action of both houses of Congress in<br />

response to the message of the President on the question of arbitration of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute<br />

with Great Britain <strong>The</strong> London Chronicle sent to this country Mr. Henry Norman, an associate editor<br />

of that journal His mission seems to have been to ascertain the real purpose of the American<br />

Government <strong>and</strong> the temper <strong>and</strong> opinion at the American people, to point out the probable or<br />

possible course of events <strong>and</strong> the policy open to the two Governments respectively, with the<br />

consequences likely to follow, <strong>and</strong> to furnish any information bearing on the differences between<br />

the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain or Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> that would help to guide either<br />

the public opinion or the Government at his own country. His first dispatch to his journal was<br />

published on Jan. 2 <strong>and</strong> proved to be extremely interesting <strong>and</strong> valuable.<br />

It has appeared proper to those American journalists who have criticised the President, not only<br />

to sustain the course of the English Government toward our own at this moment, but to endeavor<br />

to prove that in their variegated dealing with <strong>Venezuela</strong> the successive Ministers of her Majesty have<br />

always <strong>and</strong> in the minutest details been entirely <strong>and</strong>, so to speak, fatally right. Mr. Norman is not that<br />

kind of journalist He knows his profession <strong>and</strong> his duty to his conscience too well. Trained by years<br />

of travel <strong>and</strong> investigation in the far East, in novel surroundings among strange peoples, to the<br />

exercise of cool <strong>and</strong> broad judgment on intricate questions affecting the future of Great Britain, he<br />

has learned that no Government is infallible <strong>and</strong> that none can safely shut its eye to the facts when<br />

they have been discovered. He knew that the crux of the case of Lord Salisbury, whether in relation<br />

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to <strong>Venezuela</strong> or to the United States, was the Schomburgk line. All on one side of that now famous<br />

line Lord Salisbury is ready to arbitrate; all on the other side be claims has been <strong>and</strong> always will be<br />

<strong>British</strong> territory as to which his Government will not take the decision or the opinion of any one else<br />

whatsoever. Since this line brings within <strong>British</strong> control not only a very wide region of territory rich<br />

in gold mines, but the mouth of the Orinoco River, flowing well across the northern end of the<br />

continent <strong>and</strong> affording a base of operations from which the restless <strong>British</strong> advance could with ease<br />

<strong>and</strong> safety proceed, it is of the last importance that its authority <strong>and</strong> integrity from the earliest time<br />

should be maintained.<br />

Mr. Norman’s first discovery was that this is impossible, <strong>and</strong> he promptly published the fact. He<br />

obtained access in Washington to certain unpublished official correspondence between Great Britain<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> between November, 1840, when Sir Robert Schomburgk was appointed to delimit<br />

the frontier of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> April, 1842, when Engl<strong>and</strong> removed the boundary posts by him<br />

set up. This correspondence showed the following facts: First, that <strong>Venezuela</strong> had promptly<br />

protested against the erection of these posts; second, that Lord Aberdeen had replied that “the<br />

demarkation so made was merely a preliminary measure open to future discussion between Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>,” <strong>and</strong> had subsequently declared that “the posts were not erected, as the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government appeared to apprehend, as indications of dominion <strong>and</strong> empire on the part<br />

of Great Britain”; third, that Lord Aberdeen had expressed pleasure at the assurance of the<br />

Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> to <strong>Venezuela</strong> that “Great Britain had not occupied Point Barima,”<br />

(comm<strong>and</strong>ing the mouth of the Orinoco,) <strong>and</strong>, finally, that the posts were in part at least removed,<br />

<strong>and</strong> without any condition as to the bearing of their removal on the <strong>British</strong> claim. <strong>The</strong> statement<br />

closes as follows:<br />

“If the above documents are genuine, <strong>and</strong> their source excludes suspicion, the Schomburgk line is proved<br />

worthless as a basis of any territorial claim whatever.”<br />

Commenting editorially on the subject, <strong>The</strong> Chronicle said:<br />

“We are bound to say, assuming, as we are bound to assume, the accuracy of our representative’s citations, that<br />

they vitiate Lord Salisbury’s second dispatch to Secretary Olney, <strong>and</strong> render it necessary for us to revise our whole<br />

view of the situation. Clearly, there can now be no question regarding the Schomburgk line as a ramrod thrust<br />

between <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. In a word, Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States have a way out. We look to the statesmen<br />

on both sides to enlarge it until there is found complete escape from a situation of the utmost peril.”<br />

Having thus done to his country the very great service of pointing out that the position taken by<br />

its Government, <strong>and</strong> which Lord Salisbury had practically declared would not even be discussed, was<br />

untenable, <strong>and</strong> therefore must not only be discussed at home <strong>and</strong> abroad, but ought in fairness to be<br />

opened to change, Mr. Norman proceeded to enlighten his countrymen as to the real nature <strong>and</strong><br />

force of American opinion. Passing over certain deductions as to the relations of the East <strong>and</strong> the<br />

West, which are interesting but not conclusive, we call attention, <strong>and</strong> especially the attention of<br />

those who have chosen to regard the policy of the President as purely bellicose, to the following<br />

plain statement:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Schomburgk line is now proved destitute of any quality of permanence, <strong>and</strong> it therefore remains to<br />

consider the situation as affected by its removal. I can affirm positively that the American Government is, above<br />

everything, anxious for arbitration. Whatever may have been its actual result, the intention of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

message was amicable. <strong>The</strong> close entourage of the President to-day scouts the idea that it was not a message of<br />

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January 1896<br />

peace. But behind it has sprung up a National sentiment which it would be utter madness on the part of the English<br />

people to disregard or underestimate. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine is not worth discussing. All the learned pamphlets, the<br />

professors’ opinions, <strong>and</strong> the newspaper discussions of it are labor lost. <strong>The</strong> fact is that if <strong>Venezuela</strong> does not come<br />

within the four corners of the Monroe doctrine, then the new doctrine, the Olney doctrine, covers it, <strong>and</strong> American<br />

opinion overwhelmingly favors its general principles. Moreover, America dem<strong>and</strong>s arbitration as a sacred right, <strong>and</strong><br />

for this she will fight if needful.”<br />

Mr. Norman adds:<br />

“I am astounded at the depth <strong>and</strong> character of American feeling on this question. Men experienced, staid,<br />

elderly, conservative, many holding judicial positions of great responsibility, frankly declare their uncompromising<br />

support of this American doctrine. . . No greater mistake would be possible than for Engl<strong>and</strong> to regard the message<br />

as a mere party manoeuvre. If this latter view gains acceptance, the consequences of the mistake may be awful.<br />

When I reflect on the possibility of this, <strong>and</strong> know what I know of American opinion, I am profoundly depressed.<br />

Arbitration is dem<strong>and</strong>ed by every consideration dearest to civilized mankind.”<br />

Mr. Norman recites the various ways in which arbitration can be reached:<br />

“1. An arrangement can be made with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> he has assurance that that country would pay the<br />

additional indemnity dem<strong>and</strong>ed, express regret for the Yuruan incident, <strong>and</strong> request a renewal of diplomatic<br />

relations “if Engl<strong>and</strong> would agree to a reference of the whole question to any competent tribunal she might select.<br />

“2. Lord Salisbury could offer to join English Commissioners to the American Commissioners.<br />

“3. Lord Salisbury can open negotiations on the report of the American commission should this suggest a prima<br />

facie case for discussion.<br />

“4. Lord Salisbury can submit the English case, if invited, to the American commission. “Here, again,<br />

arbitration appears the inevitable <strong>and</strong> natural result.” Mr. Norman concludes with these grave words: “By declining<br />

arbitration in any shape, Lord Salisbury is courting for Engl<strong>and</strong> the ill will of two continents. Most weighty of all,<br />

<strong>and</strong> this is my most serious but confident conclusion, if he does, the American people will consider fighting the<br />

arbitration as fighting for peace.”<br />

It is a curious <strong>and</strong> not altogether pleasing fact that this sober <strong>and</strong> entirely truthful statement of<br />

the purpose of the President <strong>and</strong> of the real opinion of the American people must come as news,<br />

not only to Mr. Norman’s readers across the Atlantic, but a certain number who think themselves<br />

not the worst informed or least wise of the citizens old New-York.<br />

[6 January 1896]<br />

- 259 -<br />

THE ONLY PROPER POSITION<br />

A Republican Supports the President’s Attitude in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Controversy<br />

To the Editor of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times:<br />

Permit me to say a few words upon the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. Though a Republican, I have<br />

always been a strong supporter of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>. I consider his position, in his recent message, the<br />

only proper one, but I think the language of the last three paragraphs should have been more<br />

temperate, though they were written under great provocation.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> friendly offices of the United States have throughout been offered to Engl<strong>and</strong> in behalf of<br />

arbitration of the boundary line. <strong>Venezuela</strong> claims to the Essequibo River, but is willing to arbitrate.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> claims almost to the Orinoco River, <strong>and</strong> is willing to arbitrate only a portion of the territory<br />

in dispute, claiming absolutely the Schomburgk line or territory about 150 miles west of the<br />

Essequibo River; her extreme claim being for territory about 350 miles west of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claim<br />

of the Essequibo. <strong>The</strong> propositions of compromise called the Aberdeen <strong>and</strong> Granville lines, while<br />

drawing back from the Schomburgk line in some places, crossed it, <strong>and</strong> went beyond in others; but<br />

both lines—while giving up some of the sea-coast, which was not of so much importance to<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, as with the Isl<strong>and</strong> of Trinidad <strong>and</strong> her <strong>Guiana</strong> possessions <strong>and</strong> her fleet, she controlled the<br />

mouths of the Orinoco—advanced her territory westward of the Essequibo over 200 miles, <strong>and</strong> in<br />

the territory westward of the Schomburgk line 69 miles; drawing back at the coast, the Granville, 69<br />

miles, <strong>and</strong> the Aberdeen about 140 miles. <strong>The</strong>se conditions are apparently the only answers Great<br />

Britain has vouchsafed to the kindly offices of one of the proudest, most civilized, <strong>and</strong> most just<br />

nations on the earth. One last request was made by the President to Engl<strong>and</strong>. On July 20, 1895, the<br />

President says: “It is my wish to be made acquainted with the fact at such early date as will enable<br />

me to lay the whole subject before Congress in my next annual message.” This gave Engl<strong>and</strong> four<br />

months in which to consider <strong>and</strong> reply. How does Engl<strong>and</strong> treat a great nation she professes<br />

friendship for? Times her reply to reach the President about one week after Congress has assembled,<br />

<strong>and</strong> slaps the President <strong>and</strong> the American people in the face. Would this Nation have treated<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> so under any provocation?<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> to-day, with her ownership of the fortified Isl<strong>and</strong> of Trinidad, directly opposite the<br />

westward mouths of the Delta of the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> with the possession of Barima, as now asserted<br />

by the Schomburgk line, controls absolutely the entrance to the Orinoco, a river belonging to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> beyond dispute, <strong>and</strong> lying entirely, except its main mouth, in undisputed <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

territory. <strong>The</strong> Orinoco River stretches westwardly through <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong>, with the Apure, is<br />

navigable to the seventieth degree of longitude, or to a point 800 miles westward of the Schomburgk<br />

line. It has more than 400 navigable tributaries which traverse almost the entire territory of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Schomburgk line carries Engl<strong>and</strong> beyond the first range of mountains, <strong>and</strong> her<br />

extreme claim carries her beyond the second range, <strong>and</strong> within twenty miles of the Orinoco River, at<br />

a point 140 miles westward from its mouth. It leaves but one other river or any importance to cross<br />

to reach the Isthmus, viz., the Magdalena.<br />

<strong>The</strong> French began the Panama Canal. <strong>The</strong>y are again agitating its completion. American private<br />

enterprise started the Nicaragua Canal, made surveys <strong>and</strong> some preliminary construction. <strong>The</strong> hard<br />

times came, <strong>and</strong> several months ago our papers were full of the scheme to introduce a bill in<br />

Congress to have the canal built by, or its bonds guaranteed by the United States Government.<br />

Instantly the English papers notified us that the United States Government would never be allowed<br />

to own <strong>and</strong> possess the Nicaragua Canal. All inter-ocean canals should be neutral <strong>and</strong> their neutrality<br />

guaranteed by all the Christian nations of the earth, <strong>and</strong> not only the canals, but a zone around their<br />

entrances should also be neutral. I believe we have admitted the neutrality of the Nicaragua Canal<br />

under the concession. But the talk in the English papers came with a bad grace from a country that<br />

occupies Egypt against the protests of France, <strong>and</strong> controls the Suez Canal, built by the glory of<br />

Frenchmen. When Engl<strong>and</strong> possesses the limit of her claims she will then she will then be in a<br />

position to gather an army that could sweep <strong>Venezuela</strong>; will not have a mountain range to cross, no<br />

difficult river, as she would control the Orinoco with her gunboats, <strong>and</strong> she would then have<br />

navigable rivers on which to transfer her army, supplies, <strong>and</strong> ammunition to a point over 800 miles<br />

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west of the Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong> within 500 miles of the Panama Canal, with the Nicaragua Canal<br />

only 276 miles further, <strong>and</strong>, owning the Isl<strong>and</strong> of Jamaica, be only 550 miles from the Atlantic<br />

entrance to both canals. When she should desire to conquer <strong>Venezuela</strong>, at her convenience, she<br />

would do so, <strong>and</strong> then be in striking distance of the two canals, with a base from which to strike.<br />

Lord Salisbury says that Engl<strong>and</strong> does not want <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s territory, <strong>and</strong> wants to live on terms of<br />

friendship with her, but in the same dispatch says that the Monroe doctrine originated in Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

that it has not been accepted as international law, <strong>and</strong> that times have changed. When the march<br />

across <strong>Venezuela</strong> begins—say, in 1910, or before—will the English Ministry at that time say, We did<br />

want to live on terms of friendship with <strong>Venezuela</strong> but the canals have been built <strong>and</strong> times have<br />

again changed?<br />

Is the United States justified in her fears of English aggression? Has Engl<strong>and</strong> closed the<br />

Dardanelles against Russia, the greatest wrong of the nineteenth century? Since the President’s<br />

message, English papers have taunted us that we have forced Engl<strong>and</strong> to ab<strong>and</strong>on the Armenians to<br />

the fate that may await them, by our attack on Engl<strong>and</strong>. We have not made any attack. What may<br />

happen to what is left of the Armenians results from our resenting Engl<strong>and</strong>’s attack on us. What has<br />

happened to thous<strong>and</strong>s of them lies at Engl<strong>and</strong>’s door, <strong>and</strong> is partly owing to that jealousy of<br />

nations which we are trying to avoid on this continent, <strong>and</strong> primarily to Engl<strong>and</strong>’s dem<strong>and</strong> that the<br />

Straits should be closed to Russia.<br />

Did not Engl<strong>and</strong> invite France to join her in the Egyptian occupation as a temporary measure,<br />

both nations to retire when their mission was accomplished? France, probably for good reasons,<br />

refused. Did not Engl<strong>and</strong> go there alone? And now her mission is fulfilled, after France has over <strong>and</strong><br />

over again protested, she refuses to retire, <strong>and</strong> the Suez Canal becomes an English canal.<br />

Does not Engl<strong>and</strong> hold Gibraltar? A thorn in the side of proud Spain.<br />

Does not Engl<strong>and</strong> hold the mouths of the St. Lawrence, an apparent threat to the great lakes of<br />

the United States, though it is not a real one?<br />

Does not Engl<strong>and</strong> to-day comm<strong>and</strong> the mouths of the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> the entire inl<strong>and</strong> navigation<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong>? And does she from this position, with Trinidad <strong>and</strong> Jamaica, threaten not only the<br />

French canal, but alike that of Nicaragua?<br />

Did Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Mosquitoe protectorate mean the same thing?<br />

Have Japan <strong>and</strong> China no complaints?<br />

Did Engl<strong>and</strong> force this country to arbitration on the seal industry, a willingness to destroy an<br />

industry forever that her colonies could procure a temporary money benefit? She had her legal<br />

rights, <strong>and</strong> arbitrators decided in her favor. To our shame, we have not paid the money. <strong>The</strong>re was<br />

not precedent, but it could have been made one, <strong>and</strong> seal life preserved. No, the laws of God in seal<br />

propagation, <strong>and</strong> the friendship of this country, both set aside that <strong>British</strong> subjects might not be<br />

deprived of small <strong>and</strong> temporary profit, with the result that seat life will be extinguished. Are we in<br />

difference with the Alaskan boundary? <strong>The</strong>se questions did not seem to come up when Russia<br />

owned Alaska—only when a friendly power owns it, a power that is so thoroughly pledged to peace<br />

that the world st<strong>and</strong>s dumb when it shows fight.<br />

And what does the United States ask? Only arbitration, not an inch of territory. It is willing to<br />

give Engl<strong>and</strong> all that in justice is hers, though it may be against our own interests. Willing to have<br />

another point added to the already long list of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s strategic points on our long coast line, <strong>and</strong><br />

the interoceanic canals, if she is justly entitled to it, just as we st<strong>and</strong>, calmly watching the gradual<br />

fading away of our seal industry, that a court of arbitration, on Engl<strong>and</strong>’s dem<strong>and</strong> of legal right, has<br />

given to her, for want of a precedent to save it.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

We are told that we, so far away, have no interest in a case that places a power practically within<br />

easy striking distance of the canals, the only waterway to be between our Atlantic <strong>and</strong> Pacific coasts,<br />

except around the capes, while seal industry must be destroyed in the temporary interest of a colony<br />

whose seat of Government is over 3,000 miles away from the home of the seal, <strong>and</strong> the intervening<br />

space not much more than a wilderness, <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> herself over 6,000 miles distant from it. Shall<br />

the monument raised over the grave of the seal contain these words: “Sacred to the memory of<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s friendship <strong>and</strong> to the mistake of the Almighty in creating seal life <strong>and</strong> the laws of seal<br />

propagation in contravention of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s inflexible international code?”<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States st<strong>and</strong>s on a doctrine she considers necessary for the preservation of her<br />

National life. <strong>The</strong> moment European nations unite to dispute it, its necessity to us is shown. Only<br />

three other nations of Europe—Holl<strong>and</strong>, France, <strong>and</strong> perhaps Spain—besides Engl<strong>and</strong>, have any<br />

territorial interest on the mainl<strong>and</strong> of this continent. Does Gibraltar tempt Spain to help fasten the<br />

iron heel of Engl<strong>and</strong> on America? Will Egypt <strong>and</strong> the control of the Suez Canal tempt France to aid<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> in threatening a second French <strong>and</strong> the first American canal? Egypt <strong>and</strong> Cyprus, <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> Jamaica.<br />

<strong>The</strong> storm of Dec. 18 does not mean hatred to Engl<strong>and</strong>. Until then the Armenian question was<br />

the burning question of the hour. <strong>The</strong> American heart was close to Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> American wish was<br />

that the white squadron, side by side with Engl<strong>and</strong>’s flag, could force the straits, <strong>and</strong> with shotted<br />

guns stop Turkey’s outrages. It was Engl<strong>and</strong>’s isolated position that drew the American Nation<br />

toward her. Innocent even of suspicion, came the awakening to the fact that Engl<strong>and</strong> had spurned<br />

Americas peaceful offers <strong>and</strong> had snubbed us.<br />

War there cannot be. <strong>The</strong> men who made the charge at Balaklava, the most sublime exhibition at<br />

bravery the world has ever seen, do not withdraw from a false position train from fear. <strong>The</strong> men<br />

who held the heights at Gettysburg <strong>and</strong> the men who charged up to the guns where the line of<br />

human bravery merged into that at death are brave enough to retreat whenever they realize a false<br />

position. Withdraw, Engl<strong>and</strong>, from your untenable position of not arbitrating anything behind the<br />

Schomburgk line, depending upon prescription rights <strong>and</strong> colonization against only word of protest<br />

from a nation that has probably one gun to your one thous<strong>and</strong> to back its protest. And let the<br />

United States withdraw from its utterly untenable position that it shall be the arbitrator, if that is its<br />

dictum.<br />

Oh! Engl<strong>and</strong>, do not let our financial difficulties, nor our troubles here, nor our weakness tempt<br />

you to do a wrong, tempt you to refrain from what is right <strong>and</strong> just. <strong>The</strong> men of the North who<br />

poured out treasure <strong>and</strong> life to free the slave, <strong>and</strong> the men of the South—“the footsore Confederate<br />

soldiers, who turned their faces southward from Appomattox in April, 1865, ragged, half starved,<br />

heavy-hearted, enfeebled by want <strong>and</strong> wounds, having fought to exhaustion”—these are not the<br />

men who trade their country’s cause for gold.<br />

And Engl<strong>and</strong>, “times have changed”. <strong>The</strong> days of wooden vessels <strong>and</strong> low-power guns have<br />

passed away. <strong>The</strong> time for Engl<strong>and</strong>’s fleet <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>’s strategic positions, <strong>and</strong> that system that has<br />

justly excited the wonder of the world, to rule the earth, is passing also. <strong>The</strong>y are among the glories<br />

at the English Nation. <strong>The</strong> days when a reputation for aggression <strong>and</strong> oppression add to a nation’s<br />

strength <strong>and</strong> wealth will soon be a thing of the past. <strong>The</strong> day of iron-clad, high-power guns, <strong>and</strong> high<br />

explosives is with us. <strong>The</strong> day present is the day of arbitration <strong>and</strong> of peace. <strong>The</strong> god of war is giving<br />

way to the god of right <strong>and</strong> justice. You have isolated yourself. You have gradually affronted every<br />

nation until only one was left, <strong>and</strong> her you have just struck. Would it not be well to ab<strong>and</strong>on old<br />

lines <strong>and</strong> take the higher ground? Is not the friendship of nations better than their hate? We have<br />

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been looking forward friendly <strong>and</strong> sorrowfully to your day of trouble we knew must come if you<br />

continued as of old, thankful only that we should not have a h<strong>and</strong> in it. <strong>The</strong> question of the<br />

Dardanelles, Gibraltar, <strong>and</strong> of Egypt is for you to determine, not for us to counsel. But keep <strong>Guiana</strong>,<br />

for it is yours by right, <strong>and</strong> take all of the disputed claim that arbitrators will give you <strong>and</strong> welcome.<br />

Dem<strong>and</strong> that all interoceanic canals shall be neutral <strong>and</strong> respect It. Keep your strategic positions on<br />

our Atlantic coast, for you own them. Keep Canada, for it is yours, <strong>and</strong> it will be safer to you in the<br />

friendship of the United States than if it bristled with English cannon <strong>and</strong> was defended by the<br />

heroes or Inkerman.<br />

But should it be different, <strong>and</strong> nations nearer your isl<strong>and</strong> home than we are come in conflict with<br />

your aggressive policy, <strong>and</strong> war ensue, the struggle will be awful. We may not be there to help, for<br />

we are bound to others by b<strong>and</strong>s of friendship in our days of trouble, <strong>and</strong> our own backs have<br />

smarted—though our sympathy will be for you. And should you meet with misfortune <strong>and</strong> the h<strong>and</strong><br />

be laid too heavily on your shoulder, you might find the white squadron by your side with shot <strong>and</strong><br />

shell to stay the h<strong>and</strong> of the oppressor.<br />

It would not be the first time that parent head has pillowed on the bosom of a sturdy child in<br />

time of trouble, <strong>and</strong> found the strong, vigorous arm entwined around her. If you call this hate, what<br />

is friendship?<br />

T. R.<br />

New-York, Jan. 4, 1896.<br />

[9 January 1896]<br />

- 260 -<br />

NO REBELS IN VENEZUELA<br />

Every Man a Patriot <strong>and</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ing by President Crespo<br />

PEACE PREVAILS IN THE COUNTRY<br />

Statement Made by Ex-Minister Peraza—English Colonial Office Denies<br />

That Cannon were Sent to Cuyuni<br />

Bolet Peraza, ex-Minister from <strong>Venezuela</strong> to the United States, who is now in New-York City,<br />

emphatically denies that there is a revolution in his country. He says the report that rebels in<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> had formed an alliance with the English is absurd.<br />

My information,” said the ex-Minister yesterday, “shows that the country is in complete peace. I<br />

have had no advices by cable, but if such a state of affairs existed as is reported, we certainly would<br />

have heard of it. <strong>Venezuela</strong>n newspapers of Dec. 30, to h<strong>and</strong>, contain no mention of even a possible<br />

revolutionary disturbance. Every one of my countrymen is heartily satisfied with the action of the<br />

United States <strong>and</strong> our own Government, <strong>and</strong> the people are now awaiting patiently, though, of<br />

course, anxiously, the result at the deliberations of the commission appointed by President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> to determine the exact boundary line between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

“I am sure President Crespo or Congress will take no action on this question without first<br />

consulting the Government of the United States. <strong>Venezuela</strong> is thoroughly aware of its<br />

responsibilities before the whole civilized world in the impending dispute. <strong>The</strong> United States listened<br />

to our appeal, <strong>and</strong> nobly upheld our rights. Under the circumstances, the acts attributed to some<br />

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<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns in these sensational dispatches are not alone discreditable, but an insult to our common<br />

sense <strong>and</strong> patriotism.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> report of an alliance between the rebels of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> is to me absurdly<br />

ridiculous. <strong>The</strong>re is no revolution in <strong>Venezuela</strong> to-day. <strong>The</strong> country, to a man, is now with President<br />

Crespo. Internal strife has been ab<strong>and</strong>oned, <strong>and</strong> all factions have rallied to the Government’s<br />

support in the present crisis. I do not believe <strong>Venezuela</strong> harbors a citizen so base or degraded who<br />

would be guilty of such a treasonable act as treating with <strong>British</strong>ers against <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> home Government <strong>and</strong> the United States have the support of the whole of <strong>Venezuela</strong> today.”<br />

CANNON NOT SENT TO CUYUNI<br />

Story Printed in a New-York <strong>News</strong>paper Denied<br />

LONDON, Jan. 9.—<strong>The</strong> Colonial Office has issued a note, declaring that the statement printed<br />

in a New-York newspaper to-day, in an alleged cable dispatch from Caracas. <strong>Venezuela</strong>, that <strong>British</strong><br />

troops, with cannon, have arrived at Cuyuni, is absolutely unfounded.<br />

SAYS THERE IS NO REBELLION<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Minister Andrade Claims Peace Prevails in His Country<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, Señor Andrade, discredits the rumored<br />

revolutionary movement reported exclusively by cable to a New-York newspaper which, he claims,<br />

has always been inimical to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> which has so bitterly opposed President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

action in that country’s behalf. <strong>The</strong> Minister points to the coincidence that the cablegrams alleged to<br />

have been detained in transit through Cuba are received simultaneously with the arrival of the<br />

overdue mail steamer from La Guayra, <strong>and</strong> declares that he attaches no importance to these<br />

dispatches, except that they confirm his belief that alleged exclusive cable news to this newspaper<br />

was invariably unreliable.<br />

Señor Andrade’s official mail from Caracas reached him this morning, <strong>and</strong> it showed that the<br />

entire country was united in its enthusiasm over President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message on the boundary<br />

dispute.<br />

Whatever revolutionary sentiments existed before that time were utterly dispelled by the great<br />

national joy over President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s utterances, <strong>and</strong> never had the people been more united.<br />

Minister Andrade is confident that the would have been notified by cable if any such alarming<br />

condition of affairs had suddenly arisen as reported, <strong>and</strong> the message would not have been sent by<br />

way of Cuba if subject to delay there.<br />

Regarding the reinforcement of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> police station on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n frontier, the<br />

Minister said this probably related to the orders which, it was reported, were issued by the <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> Legislature, with Mr. Chamberlain’s advice, last October, to send more police to the Cuyuni<br />

station, which was situated on the eastern point of the confluence of the Uruan <strong>and</strong> Cuyuni Rivers.<br />

It was in this vicinity that the Uruan incident occurred, for which Great Britain was reported to have<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>ed an indemnity <strong>and</strong> sent an ultimatum. It was said at that time that a Maxim gun <strong>and</strong><br />

several men would he sent to that point, <strong>and</strong> doubt was expressed that a Maxim gun could ever be<br />

transported to that point, as no roads lead through the country <strong>and</strong> the way is considered practically<br />

impassable.<br />

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January 1896<br />

It was well known, at any rate, that it would take over a month to reach the spot from Demerara,<br />

<strong>and</strong> in the meantime <strong>Venezuela</strong> had plenty of time to reinforce its guard on the west side of the<br />

Cuyuni, opposite the <strong>British</strong> post, which had been stationed there since 1892. Unless the <strong>British</strong><br />

crossed the river, which they had hitherto refrained from doing, there would probably be no<br />

collision between the two forces. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns would, however, undoubtedly resist any<br />

encroachment on their undisputed territory.<br />

[10 January 1896]<br />

- 261 -<br />

GENERAL ARBITRATION DESIRED<br />

Members of Foreign Affairs Committee Send <strong>The</strong>ir Views to Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9.—Henry Norman, the special commissioner of <strong>The</strong> London Daily<br />

Chronicle in Washington, cables his paper to-day as follows:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> sentiment for arbitration is a ball which, once set rolling among a civilized people, cannot<br />

be stopped. I take it for granted that in some manner arbitration in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute is<br />

certain. <strong>The</strong>refore my work here is done. But that this temporary evil may prove the germ of a great<br />

good, I have desired to add a fresh impetus to the wider movement.<br />

“Now, President Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney preserve absolute silence, deeming their official<br />

positions incompatible with unofficial speech. Who, after them, represents the weightiest influence<br />

on American foreign affairs? Obviously the members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations<br />

<strong>and</strong> the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, I have been at pains to-day to learn the<br />

opinions at these gentlemen, <strong>and</strong> the results I have obtained will, I feel assured, be equally gratifying<br />

<strong>and</strong> potent in Engl<strong>and</strong>. One member of the Senate Committee, Roger Q. Mills of Texas, I was<br />

unable to find. But with this single exception I can present you with the views of the entire<br />

committee.<br />

To each member I put this question: “Would it, in your opinion, be well for the Governments of<br />

the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain to endeavor to agree upon the constitution of a permanent court<br />

or tribunal of arbitration, to which all questions at issue between the two Governments, not<br />

involving National autonomy or honor, should be submitted for decision when diplomatic<br />

negotiations fail?<br />

First, of course, I called upon Senator Sherman, the veteran Chairman of the Senate committee,<br />

a man whose career <strong>and</strong> personality have won the profoundest regard of his fellow-citizens, <strong>and</strong><br />

whose words should receive deep respect in Engl<strong>and</strong>. He replied:<br />

“‘Yes, you may quote me as strongly as you like in an affirmative reply.’ When I requested his<br />

own words for publication, he said: ‘I am in favor of the principle or arbitration for all questions that<br />

do not involve the autonomy of either of the two countries. I hope that the two Governments will<br />

agree upon such a mode of settlement for all controversies.’<br />

“Senator Sherman added that in his opinion Parliament should pass a resolution requiring the<br />

Ministry to take steps in this direction. <strong>The</strong>n, in turn, I called upon every member of the committee.<br />

<strong>The</strong> following opinions were given me by each with authority to publish them:<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

“Senator William P. Frye of Maine— ‘Two Christian nations so closely allied, <strong>and</strong> speaking the<br />

same language, surely ought not to resort to arms for the settlement of any difficulties involving<br />

anything less than their sacred national honor. I am decidedly in favor of arbitration.’<br />

“Senator C. K. Davis or Minnesota – ‘I should approve of a convention between the two<br />

countries to the effect that all controversies not involving the honor of either, or the established<br />

policy of either, should be referred to a tribunal of arbitration, to be constituted by the parties as the<br />

controversies arise, so far as the personnel of that tribunal is concerned, the convention providing in<br />

a general way that such tribunals should be established for each particular case as occasion for it<br />

might present itself.’<br />

“Senator Don Cameron of Pennsylvania— ‘<strong>The</strong> principle of arbitration is both wise <strong>and</strong><br />

humane, <strong>and</strong> the adoption of it by the two great English-speaking nations of the world would have<br />

great influence upon other civilized nations. It would be well at this particular time, for both<br />

America <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> to consider the subject seriously <strong>and</strong> practically, <strong>and</strong> I hope this will be done.’<br />

“Senator Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois— ‘<strong>The</strong> time has come in the history of the world when<br />

great nations should settle all controversies between them by arbitration <strong>and</strong> not by war. I should<br />

rejoice if practical steps were taken by both Governments to this end.’<br />

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts— ‘I am, of course, in favor of settling the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n question by arbitration, <strong>and</strong> I believe equally that all questions which can properly be<br />

disposed of by arbitration should be dealt with in that way by two such nations as the United States<br />

<strong>and</strong> Great Britain, <strong>and</strong>, if possible, by some general arrangement.’<br />

“All the foregoing are Republicans. <strong>The</strong> following are Democrats:<br />

“Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama— ‘I am in favor of the principle of international<br />

arbitration in settlement of disputes that properly fall within the purview of that method of<br />

settlement. I am in favor of the organization, by consent of what I may call the Christian powers,<br />

<strong>and</strong> of all other powers that can be induced to enter into the agreement, of a court or board of<br />

arbitration to which the Governments would agree that questions of the sort indicated should be<br />

submitted after the failure of diplomatic efforts to settle them; the personnel of such a board to be<br />

selected on each occasion that arises by agreement between the two contending powers, <strong>and</strong>, failing<br />

such agreement, they should agree upon a neutral power with authority to name the members of the<br />

board.’<br />

“Senator George Gray of Delaware referred me to his words, which I recently cabled, as<br />

covering the question, adding the assurance of his entire sympathy.<br />

“Senator David Turple of Indiana— ‘I think the constitution of a tribunal mutually appointed<br />

<strong>and</strong> agreed upon by the Governments of the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, to which could be<br />

referred disputed questions between the two powers, other than those relating to their autonomy<br />

<strong>and</strong> national sovereignty, would be of great service, not only to the two nations interested, but also<br />

to mankind, who would accept such action as a model to be followed <strong>and</strong> an example to be<br />

imitated.’<br />

“Senator John W. Daniels of Virginia— ‘I would regard it as a great achievement <strong>and</strong> in<br />

harmony with the aspirations of the two peoples, their mutual interests, <strong>and</strong> their closer friendship.<br />

All my mind goes forward to the belief that it would be well to create such a machine.’<br />

“Except for the accidental absence of Senator Mills, the above are the sentiments of the entire<br />

Senate committee.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs consists of nine Republicans <strong>and</strong><br />

six Democrats. <strong>The</strong> time at my disposal, the House having adjourned early, did not permit me to see<br />

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January 1896<br />

each member personally. But Robert H. Hitt of Illinois, the Chairman, is a veteran diplomatist,<br />

having been Secretary of the American Embassy in Paris <strong>and</strong> for years the Assistant Secretary of<br />

State here.<br />

“Him I found most sympathetic. Replying to the above question, he said: ‘It would be the best<br />

work they could do for the two nations <strong>and</strong> for mankind. And it should, if possible, be made to<br />

imply, if not pledge, their endeavor to so settle all the disputes they have, not only with one another,<br />

but with all other nations.’<br />

“I asked if I might regard him as expressing the sentiments of the entire committee, <strong>and</strong> he said:<br />

‘Not only of the committee, but of the whole House of Representatives. For the conciliation of<br />

interests <strong>and</strong> the wise search for right results we are all agreed here.’<br />

“He told me how Gen. Grant, the greatest fighting President America has ever had, <strong>and</strong> whom<br />

he accompanied officially during his European trip, never lost an opportunity to urge crowned heads<br />

<strong>and</strong> Prime Ministers to adopt arbitration instead of war. President Grant was keenly interested in the<br />

treaty of Washington of 1871, by which all outst<strong>and</strong>ing differences were arbitrated, <strong>and</strong> it was chiefly<br />

owing to his zeal that this treaty was brought about.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> above represents the weightiest body of opinion that could possibly be secured in the<br />

United States. In it there is not a single dissenting voice, <strong>and</strong> these are the men to whose<br />

consideration any question between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America would be first submitted <strong>and</strong> by whose<br />

decision the Senate <strong>and</strong> House would probably be guided. It is Impossible to believe that <strong>British</strong><br />

sentiment will not be moved to respond to such remarkable unanimity <strong>and</strong> such enlightened<br />

utterances. If not, then the world will see that America is ahead of Engl<strong>and</strong> in the most striking<br />

characteristic of a civilized people.<br />

“I must add that the expressions of opinion at the Capitol towards <strong>The</strong> Chronicle’s work in<br />

explaining American sentiment were of such a cordial, <strong>and</strong>, indeed, flattering nature, that you would<br />

not desire me to publicly repeat them.<br />

“It is cabled to-day that the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> police have occupied the extreme limits of the<br />

territory claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> American Government has brought heavy pressure to bear to<br />

prevent the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government from committing any overt act <strong>and</strong> thus precipitate a hostile<br />

situation. <strong>The</strong>refore it is imperatively necessary that the <strong>British</strong> Government instantly deny <strong>and</strong><br />

repudiate such a monstrous <strong>and</strong> fatal act as the armed occupation of territory while the question of<br />

arbitration is pending.<br />

“My work here is done. I propose to leave Washington immediately. <strong>The</strong> Schomburgk line is<br />

now ab<strong>and</strong>oned. <strong>The</strong> English public, underst<strong>and</strong>ing the American attitude, has changed its own<br />

attitude, <strong>and</strong> nothing blocks the way to a prompt settlement, not only of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n, but of all<br />

other matters, <strong>and</strong> they are numerous, now pending <strong>and</strong> creating international discord, <strong>and</strong> thereby<br />

placing our relations upon an amicable footing for the future. My last words shall be, <strong>and</strong> they must<br />

surely express <strong>British</strong>, no less than American sentiment, that the nation desiring arbitration is in a<br />

civilized attitude, <strong>and</strong> that the nation refusing it is in an uncivilized attitude.”<br />

[10 January 1896]<br />

- 262 -<br />

RESOLUTIONS IN CONGRESS<br />

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An Overhasty Representative <strong>and</strong> a Pushing Senator from Kansas<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9.—<strong>The</strong> publication of dispatches in a New-York newspaper,<br />

representing that the <strong>British</strong> had sent an armed force out upon the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n border, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

there was a serious revolution in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, aided <strong>and</strong> abetted by the <strong>British</strong>, was the cause of the<br />

introduction in the House to-day of a somewhat fiery resolution by Mr. Livingston of Georgia. If<br />

Mr. Livingston had waited a day he would have learned that there was absolutely nothing in the<br />

alarming report of warlike operations in the disputed territory. His resolution is as follows:<br />

That the President of the United States is hereby requested to forthwith ascertain whether Great Britain is<br />

advancing her outposts on the territory in dispute between her colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Republic of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, or is reinforcing posts heretofore established, with troops, police, or ordnance, <strong>and</strong> should the President<br />

become cognizant of the fact that a <strong>British</strong> military or police force is advancing to invade or reinforce, or since the<br />

17th day of December last has invaded or reinforced posts formerly occupied within said disputed territory, he<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> the immediate withdrawal of said soldiers <strong>and</strong> the reduction of the police force in said territory to not a<br />

greater number occupying the <strong>British</strong> outposts on the aforesaid 17th day of December, 1895.<br />

Mr. Boutelle (Rep., Me.) objected to consideration of the resolution, <strong>and</strong> it went to the<br />

Committee on Foreign Affairs.<br />

Another <strong>Venezuela</strong>n resolution was introduced in the Senate by Mr. Baker of Kansas,<br />

reaffirming the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> making additions thereto. Mr. Baker does not accept the<br />

Senate tradition that new members of that body should not be heard except on roll calls, for a year<br />

at least after having sworn in. He had a good deal to say yesterday in the Republican Caucus, <strong>and</strong> today<br />

he attracted considerable attention his advocacy at his resolution. He is in favor of war if<br />

necessary to maintain the principles of the Monroe doctrine.<br />

Mr. Baker’s resolution is as follows:<br />

Resolved, That the United States of America will regard it as an unfriendly act for any foreign power, without<br />

our consent, by war, treaty, purchase, or otherwise, to extend its territorial limits in the Western Hemisphere, on<br />

either of the American continents, or to, or over, any of the isl<strong>and</strong>s adjacent thereto, which this country seems<br />

necessary or proper for its self-preservation. And the United States of America reserves the right to be sole judge of<br />

this necessity.<br />

Resolved, That the principle herein enunciated is founded upon the law of self-preservation which from<br />

necessity, adheres in, <strong>and</strong> belongs to, every civilized nation as a sovereign <strong>and</strong> inalienable right; <strong>and</strong> this principle is<br />

attested by Washington’s farewell address <strong>and</strong> by President Monroe’s ever memorable message of Dec. 2, 1823.<br />

In closing his speech, Mr. Baker declared that the United States would maintain the position<br />

announced in his resolution by war, if necessary, in order that peace might come.<br />

“We shall not,” he said, “invite or provoke war. <strong>The</strong> justice of our cause will challenge <strong>and</strong><br />

comm<strong>and</strong> the admiration of the civilized world; but, if it does come, we will triumph in a cause<br />

which history will bless; <strong>and</strong> when the shock of fierce contending armies shall be heard no more,<br />

then we shall behold greater America, united, prosperous, <strong>and</strong> free, still the wonder <strong>and</strong> marvel of<br />

the world, matchless an unconquerable.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.<br />

[10 January 1896]<br />

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January 1896<br />

- 263 -<br />

A CONFERENCE PROPOSED<br />

Lord Playfair’s Plan for Settling the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

ARBITRATION THE END IN VIEW<br />

<strong>The</strong> London Post Indorses the Suggestion of <strong>The</strong> London Times for a Full<br />

Statement of the <strong>British</strong> Claim<br />

LONDON, Jan. 10.—<strong>The</strong> Chronicle to-morrow will publish the report at an interview with Lord<br />

Playfair, in which he suggests that a conference be held between American <strong>and</strong> English delegates for<br />

the purpose of defining the Monroe doctrine <strong>and</strong> of carrying through a system of arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Morning Post tomorrow, will say it believes the suggestion made by <strong>The</strong> Times that red tape be<br />

laid aside by the Government <strong>and</strong> a statement made of the <strong>British</strong> claim anent the <strong>Guiana</strong> frontier<br />

dispute, would be supported cordially by the people of Great Britain.<br />

In an interview to-day N. G. Burch, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Consul here, said that if the United States<br />

wished to make the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n High Commission unassailable it should appoint one or two<br />

European members, because of the necessity of an exhaustive study of European archives.<br />

Mr. Burch said he was inclined to believe that the present situation would lead to an interchange<br />

of ideas that would result in the resumption of diplomatic relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. He added that it was obvious that a war would be very disastrous to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, even<br />

though <strong>Venezuela</strong> should be backed by the United States.<br />

He did not believe, however, that the United States would be so ill-advised as to make <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

the scene of war, for in that case the protection of the United States would be disastrous to the<br />

country’s interests, whatever might be the result of the conflict.<br />

He was of the opinion that the intervention of the United States would conduce to an intelligent,<br />

mutual underst<strong>and</strong>ing between the disputants for a specific settlement.<br />

[11 January 1896]<br />

- 264 -<br />

THE ESSEQUIBO THE BOUNDARY<br />

Old Maps, an Authority in Engl<strong>and</strong>, Show This the True Line Between<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

M. Carey & Sons of Philadelphia published, in 1821, an atlas which was a reproduction,<br />

essentially, of a London work edited by M. Lavoisne. In 1823 H. C. Carey <strong>and</strong> I. Lea, the successor<br />

of M. Carey & Sons, published an American atlas, the maps, with the exception of the United States,<br />

following closely after Lavoisne’s Atlas. <strong>The</strong> New-York Times reproduces a map from each atlas, in<br />

both of which the Essequibo River is given as the boundary between Dutch <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> Spanish<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>. Lavoisne’s atlas was considered in Engl<strong>and</strong>, at that day, a good authority, as the large<br />

number of editions it went through shows. Not alone in a geographical sense, but historically, this<br />

atlas was accepted as an authority.<br />

390


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

In the historical part of Lavoisne’s atlas <strong>Guiana</strong> is described as follows:<br />

“<strong>Guyana</strong>—This name belongs to the great extent of country between the mouths of the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Amazon, which was formerly divided into Spanish, Dutch, French, <strong>and</strong> Portuguese <strong>Guyana</strong>. Spanish <strong>Guyana</strong> now<br />

forms part of the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Portuguese <strong>Guyana</strong> is comprehended within the Kingdom of Brazil,<br />

Dutch <strong>Guyana</strong>, or as most frequently called, Surinaum, extends from the Essequibo to the Maroni. . . French<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>, or Cayenne, extends along the coast from the Maroni to the Oyapuk.”<br />

Any student of history can thus clearly see that the rivers in each instance formed the boundary<br />

lines. By reference to the map, though, it will be seen that a small part of the territory of Dutch<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> extended to the westward of the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> was defined by a line drawn from Cape<br />

Nassau to a point on the Cuyuni or Guayani River, a short distance above its junction with the<br />

Essequibo <strong>Venezuela</strong> lays claim to this small piece of territory, <strong>and</strong> the text of Lavoisne’s atlas bears<br />

out its claim.<br />

It may be noted though, that none of the gold mines are found in this small strip. <strong>The</strong><br />

exceedingly valuable gold mines of the eastern part of <strong>Venezuela</strong> are located south of the Cuyuni<br />

River <strong>and</strong> between it <strong>and</strong> the Mazaruni. <strong>The</strong>se mines have been “exploited by the authority of the<br />

Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>,” as officially expressed in a bulletin of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government,<br />

being on the <strong>British</strong> side of the so-called Schomburgk line. <strong>The</strong> small piece of territory above<br />

described not being of special value it is doubtful if either party to the controversy would make<br />

strenuous claim to it as such.<br />

But <strong>Venezuela</strong> will undoubtedly interpose strong objections to any occupancy of territory by the<br />

English on the west bank of the Essequibo, at or near its mouth, on the ground that such occupancy<br />

would give control of the river. Thus <strong>Venezuela</strong> would be deprived of means of access to that great<br />

extent of her territory which form the bulk of what was known as Spanish <strong>Guiana</strong>. This territory is<br />

all drained by the tributaries of the Essequibo, which all flow into that river from the west, or<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n side, there being none from the east, or <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> side. It is thus obvious that in<br />

taking the Essequibo River as the boundary, it was the intent to give access to the country drained<br />

by its tributaries. Part of this country is even outside of the boundary claimed by Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> it is<br />

practically valueless, unless access can be had to it by means or the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> its tributaries, the<br />

only practicable means possible.<br />

[12 January 1896]<br />

- 265 -<br />

NEW LIGHT ON THE BOUNDARY<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Claim in <strong>Venezuela</strong> Again Proved Without Foundation<br />

BURLINGTON, Vt., Jan. 13.—Seneca Haselton, ex-Minister to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, has furnished <strong>The</strong><br />

Free Press a statement regarding the boundary of <strong>Guiana</strong>, in which he gives new facts bearing upon<br />

the point of legitimate jurisdiction over the territory at the mouth of the Orinoco River, now<br />

occupied by the <strong>British</strong>. He quotes from the works of Robert Montgomery Martin, published in<br />

1834-5 after about ten years of travel <strong>and</strong> research, entitled the “History of the <strong>British</strong> Colonies,” in<br />

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January 1896<br />

the preparation of which he had the assistance of many public officials <strong>and</strong> numerous other men<br />

resident in Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the colonies.<br />

<strong>The</strong> colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> Is carefully treated. Its western boundary is situated somewhere on<br />

the coast between the Pomeroon River <strong>and</strong> the Barima River. <strong>The</strong> colony is further described as<br />

extending about 200 miles along the coast westward from the Coventy River <strong>and</strong> so, by inference,<br />

stopping considerably east of the mouth of the Barima. <strong>The</strong> Parish of Trinity, the most westerly of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, is described as extending to the Pomeroon River, <strong>and</strong> “as far as the <strong>British</strong><br />

settlements extend.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> author had apparently never heard that any one claimed that <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> extended to the<br />

Amacoio. He describes the colony, it may be added, as lying to the eastward of the sixtieth parallel<br />

of west longitude, a description which distinctly excludes Point Barima. In 1836-7 Mr. Martin was<br />

given access to the Blue Books <strong>and</strong> to other official sources of information, with a view to the<br />

preparation of a work compassing the end desired by the House of Commons. <strong>The</strong> author’s right to<br />

designate his work as official was unquestioned. But, in the “History of the Colonies of the <strong>British</strong><br />

Empire,” published in 1836, the boundaries of Western <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> are again stated as in the<br />

earlier work.<br />

When Mr. Martin began his researches not more than ten years had elapsed since the cession<br />

from Holl<strong>and</strong> to Engl<strong>and</strong> of the colonies which constitute <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> when the history<br />

appeared twenty-five years had passed since the transfer of 1814. <strong>The</strong> actual extent of Dutch<br />

occupation was to Mr. Martin <strong>and</strong> Sir Robert Keer Porter a matter of comparatively easy<br />

determination, <strong>and</strong> the discovery of new evidence of an unambiguous character is necessary to<br />

warrant a more extensive <strong>British</strong> claim at this day that was made in the years 1830 to 1840.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> right to the entire territory embraced within the Schomburgk line is,” Mr. Haselton<br />

says, “open to serious question. <strong>The</strong> occupation In 1855 of Point Barima, at the mouth of the<br />

Orinoco, was on the fact of it <strong>and</strong> act of aggression upon the territory of the American republic, <strong>and</strong><br />

in view of the traditional <strong>and</strong> well-known policy of this country, the refusal to submit the right to<br />

such occupation to the judgment of impartial arbitration cannot be regarded but as an act of<br />

unfriendliness to the United States. Lord Salisbury did not in his reply to Secretary Olney refuse in<br />

precise terms to submit any territory within the Schomburgk line to arbitration, <strong>and</strong> the way to an<br />

impartial determination of existing <strong>British</strong> rights seems yet open.”<br />

[14 January 1896]<br />

- 266 -<br />

LORD SALISBURY’S POLICY<br />

<strong>The</strong> semi-official announcement made in <strong>The</strong> London St<strong>and</strong>ard this morning, <strong>and</strong> which we<br />

published yesterday, is extremely important. <strong>The</strong> significant part is as follows:<br />

Urged by friendly public opinion in the United States to place before the world as soon as may<br />

be the <strong>British</strong> case as regards the controversy with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the Cabinet on Saturday decided to<br />

respond to this amicable invitation by publishing the material documents in its possession bearing<br />

thereon. . .<br />

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“Lord Salisbury, as we announce elsewhere, has decided not to wait for the meeting of<br />

Parliament, but will publish, as soon as they can be got ready, all the documents in his possession<br />

bearing upon the disputed boundary between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> explanation offered by <strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard for the action on the part of the <strong>British</strong> Government is<br />

the spirit in which the American people received the troubles that during the past fortnight have<br />

crowded on Engl<strong>and</strong> from all parts of the globe. We have no doubt that this spirit has appeared very<br />

grateful to the English, as <strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard says, “at a moment when communities less generous thought,<br />

apparently, that a favorable opportunity had arisen for adopting a tone of insult, if not of menace.”<br />

But the “magnanimous attitude of the American Nation” ought not to have surprised our English<br />

friends. It was not only entirely consistent with the course at our Government regarding the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, but one essential motive of that course was a strong desire for the safe <strong>and</strong><br />

permanent friendship of the two peoples. This became perfectly plain to Mr. Norman when he<br />

observed the people <strong>and</strong> the Government on our own shores. It is becoming plain to an increasing<br />

number of Englishmen on the other side of the Atlantic, <strong>and</strong> Lord Salisbury <strong>and</strong> his associates in the<br />

Cabinet appear to underst<strong>and</strong> it. <strong>The</strong>y are now realizing that all that the American Government<br />

from first to last asked was a fair, impartial determination of the rights of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain, without the slightest intervention or influence by the United States. In that request there was<br />

manifest nothing but a friendly spirit<br />

When Lord Salisbury, possibly, <strong>and</strong> as now appears, probably, with defective information as to<br />

some important points in the history of the conduct of the <strong>British</strong> Government, saw fit to decline<br />

somewhat brusquely the request of the United States, Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> expressed very plainly his<br />

opinion as to what position the Government, should Congress concur, would take. <strong>The</strong> statement<br />

excited the people of both countries. But now that time has been given for the cooling of passion,<br />

<strong>and</strong> for the clearer perception of the actual elements of the situation, a new light has broken upon<br />

the mind of the English people <strong>and</strong> their Government. After their first hot assertion that the United<br />

States had “no interest” in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute, they have come to realize that across the ocean<br />

there was a powerful, stable, peaceful Nation which, without direct selfish interest, in the simple<br />

cause of justice to a weak neighbor, was capable of proceeding to extreme measures. That is a<br />

position which Englishmen can underst<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> which in their hearts they are sure, so soon as they<br />

do underst<strong>and</strong> it, to respect. Any difference arising from momentary misapprehension of the real<br />

purpose of the United States Government assumes an entirely changed character when that purpose<br />

becomes plain.<br />

<strong>The</strong> policy announced by <strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard as agreed upon by the <strong>British</strong> Cabinet is a manly<br />

manifestation of a friendly disposition, which will be cordially welcomed in the United States, <strong>and</strong><br />

will strengthen the sentiment of mutual respect which the two peoples must in the long run<br />

entertain for each other.<br />

It is inevitable that on the American side this sentiment should find expression at the moment<br />

when Engl<strong>and</strong> is facing the storm of jealousy, resentment, <strong>and</strong> possible animosity that has recently<br />

burst from all parts of Europe. We do not conceal from ourselves the elements in the character <strong>and</strong><br />

in the policy of the English nation that have aroused these feelings. But we cannot forget that in the<br />

history of Europe the names of the English sovereigns Elizabeth <strong>and</strong> William <strong>and</strong> the comm<strong>and</strong>er<br />

<strong>and</strong> statesman Wellington, in his time greater than his sovereign, are associated with the rescue of<br />

Western Europe from three successive attempts at despotic rule. And there is too much English<br />

blood in our veins to permit us to think that a great people with whom we have been, or are, on the<br />

verge of a controversy, are to be despised or hated because by us they are not feared.<br />

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January 1896<br />

[14 January 1896]<br />

- 267 -<br />

SALISBURY IS YIELDING<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Premier Making Advances to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

A JOINT COMMISSION PROPOSED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Boundary <strong>Dispute</strong> May Yet Be Referred to a Third Power for Settlement—Authors<br />

Acted Without Authority<br />

LONDON, Jan. 13.—It is learned upon good authority that Lord Salisbury is endeavoring,<br />

through a neutral power, to resume direct negotiations with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, proposing the appointment<br />

of a joint commission to delimit the disputed frontier.<br />

<strong>The</strong> joint commission failing to reach a complete agreement, the points in dispute are to be<br />

referred to a third power.<br />

<strong>The</strong> committee of the Society of Authors has examined into the circumstances of the issuing of<br />

the address of <strong>British</strong> literary men to their confreres in America; appealing to the latter to use their<br />

influence to prevent a war, <strong>and</strong> declares that the signers of the address are alone answerable.<br />

<strong>The</strong> use of the society’s paper, on which the address was issued, was unauthorized. <strong>The</strong><br />

committee avows the friendly feelings of the society for the Americans, but says it is of the opinion<br />

that action in international questions does not belong to the society’s corporate powers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard will tomorrow say it is pleased by the exchanges of diplomatic expressions of goodwill<br />

between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> again argues that a way must be found to<br />

reconcile Engl<strong>and</strong>’s view of her rights in <strong>Guiana</strong> with the sensibilities of the people of the United<br />

States. It will add: “It must be only a work of time to effect a satisfactory settlement. <strong>The</strong> simplest<br />

way would be a direct agreement with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It is obvious that we should have the good-will of<br />

the United States in such a solution.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> reiterates the importance of finding an honorable escape from the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

difficulty, <strong>and</strong> says:<br />

“If things are allowed to continue as they are now, there may be a war, no matter how many<br />

excellent people may be horrified at the idea. Lord Salisbury has never declined to arbitrate. It was<br />

upon the scope, not the principle, of reference that he <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> failed to agree. We believe that<br />

Lord Salisbury has clearly shown that <strong>Venezuela</strong> is in the wrong, but we are not impartial judges.<br />

<strong>The</strong> stronger the <strong>British</strong> case, the more eager should Lord Salisbury be to submit it to a competent<br />

court. Surely, we are willing to make a sentimental sacrifice for the sake of retaining the friendship of<br />

the United States. We expect something more from Lord Salisbury than an. argumentative victory<br />

on paper.”<br />

[14 January 1896]<br />

- 268 -<br />

VIEWS OF HENRY NORMAN<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

What the London Correspondent Says of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Matter<br />

POORER CASE THAN ENGLAND THOUGHT<br />

Lesson Taught that <strong>The</strong>re Is a Strong American Feeling to be Respected<br />

Henry Norman the assistant editor of <strong>The</strong> London Daily Chronicle, spent yesterday in this city. His<br />

recent work in Washington as special correspondent for his paper on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary<br />

question has given widespread prominence to his name.<br />

He was the first <strong>and</strong> last of the correspondents of English newspapers in this country who took<br />

the trouble to explore the archives of the State Department at Washington in order to see for<br />

himself what claims had been put forward by Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, respectively, during the past<br />

fifty years in regard to the true boundaries of <strong>Guiana</strong>. One of the earliest results of his labors was to<br />

show how Aberdeen, the English Foreign Secretary in the early forties, had distinctly repudiated the<br />

line drawn by Sir Robert Schomburgk. In Lord Aberdeen’s phrase, this line was not meant as a<br />

permanent boundary, but as a tentative line to serve as a basis for future negotiations.<br />

Mr. Norman is a thin, wiry man, about five feet ten inches in height. His face has a hardy<br />

paleness, his nose is strong, his eyes are clear, a good gray color, <strong>and</strong> look you straight in the face.<br />

He wears a pointed V<strong>and</strong>yke beard, <strong>and</strong> talks fluently <strong>and</strong> rapidly. He walked nervously, though not<br />

impatiently, across the floor of the parlor at the Waldorf, as he explained his mission to this country,<br />

<strong>and</strong> gave his views upon the present European situation to a group of reporters who had called<br />

upon him.<br />

“Two weeks ago,” he began, “<strong>The</strong> Daily Chronicle was alone among English papers in declaring<br />

the Schomburgk line to be absolutely without validity. <strong>The</strong> dispatches sent from Washington were<br />

the first knowledge which Englishmen in general had that the Schomburgk line had been repudiated<br />

as a definite boundary by a former Secretary for Foreign Affairs.<br />

“Everybody has now accepted this view, which is a great gain in the interests of peace. <strong>The</strong><br />

Schomburgk line not having any special sanction is no longer a line to fight for. In other words, like<br />

most other questions of boundary disputes where the title is not very clear, the respective territories<br />

of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> are peculiarly within the class of cases which can be properly settled<br />

by arbitration.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> London Times having come around to this view, as I see by this morning’s dispatches, simply<br />

means that the English Government has accepted this side of the case. You cannot make it too clear<br />

that <strong>The</strong> Times is nearly always inspired by the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office. It has a peculiar <strong>and</strong> unique<br />

character in that everything about foreign affairs printed in it is read every day in every foreign office<br />

in Europe. While other London papers are, in a sense, its rivals, we are all rather proud of its<br />

position in this respect. So that if <strong>The</strong> Times puts forward the view that there is nothing sacred about<br />

the Schomburgk line, it means that the <strong>British</strong> Government has ab<strong>and</strong>oned its former position as<br />

untenable.”<br />

Mr. Norman was asked what the effect of the President’s message to Congress was in Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

“I was in Engl<strong>and</strong> at the time.” he replied, “<strong>and</strong> it was certainly startling. <strong>The</strong> language of<br />

diplomacy is a peculiar tongue. When you want to declare war you use a peculiar phrase. <strong>The</strong><br />

diplomatists of Europe read into Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message more than I believe it meant to convey. If<br />

one European power had used such language to another the next day an order would have been<br />

issued for the mobilization of the troops.<br />

“Of course, we all know that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message meant nothing of this kind. I do not<br />

believe that it was in any sense of the term an electioneering move. At the same time, while<br />

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January 1896<br />

American politics are what they are, any decided action on the part of the President must tend to<br />

strengthen or weaken the party in power.<br />

My c<strong>and</strong>id opinion is that the English Government has since discovered that it has a poorer case<br />

than it thought it had. At the same time, the <strong>British</strong> side of the case is still known only to its Foreign<br />

Office, <strong>and</strong> I have no means of information about it different from any reader of the newspapers.<br />

“While the immediate effect of Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message <strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney’s dispatch may have<br />

been to cause some little bitterness between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States, I am convinced that a<br />

year hence the transactions will have the happiest outcome. It will teach English people that there is<br />

a public opinion in America entirely apart <strong>and</strong> distinct from that telegraphed to our papers from<br />

New-York City.<br />

“Opinion in this city is too much swayed by commercial considerations. Perhaps this has<br />

deluded Englishmen into thinking that Americans were altogether devoted to the pursuit of the<br />

almighty dollar. You may rest assured that Englishmen will never in future labor under this error.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y will have proper respect for the sentiment of the United States, as a whole, on all questions<br />

affecting the territorial integrity of the Western Hemisphere,<br />

“One thing showed by the recent international episode is that you cannot get up a war feeling in<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> against the United States. Hatred of the United States simply does not exist in Engl<strong>and</strong>. I<br />

am sorry to say that the converse of this statement is not true. <strong>The</strong>re is a feeling of great hostility<br />

here in some quarters, especially in the younger generation. Perhaps, a good deal of it is due to the<br />

school histories where the two wars with Engl<strong>and</strong> are part of the Nation’s glory. It is a very grave<br />

pity that the younger generations at the same race <strong>and</strong> with the same speech should be brought up<br />

with any feeling of antagonism to Engl<strong>and</strong>.”<br />

. . . Mr. Norman will sail to-morrow morning by the White Star steamship Majestic. He was<br />

unexpectedly recalled to London just as he was about to take a well-earned month’s vacation in this<br />

country.<br />

[14 January 1896]<br />

- 269 -<br />

ABERDEEN’S “IMPORTANT LETTER”<br />

It Has Been Published Before <strong>and</strong> Was Not Worth Copyrighting<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 14. —Senator Cabot Lodge <strong>and</strong> other well informed persons on the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n question at the Capitol <strong>and</strong> elsewhere, are laughing over the copyrighted London cable<br />

of <strong>The</strong> Chicago Associated Press, purporting to transmit to American readers the text of an “important<br />

letter” of Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Fortique, of date Jan. 31, 1842.<br />

<strong>The</strong> absurdity of this alleged “discovery” will be at once apparent when it is mentioned that the<br />

substance of this letter is repeatedly quoted in Senate Executive Document No. 226, Fiftieth<br />

Congress, first session, laid before the Senate by Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> July 26, 1888, (Pages 77-183, <strong>and</strong><br />

elsewhere,) <strong>and</strong> that the entire letter (which, by the way, <strong>The</strong> Chicago Associated Press misquotes) was<br />

read in open Senate by Mr. Lodge in his speech on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary question, Dec. 30,<br />

(Congressional Record, Page 420.) Why at this late day this ancient <strong>and</strong> well-known document<br />

should be copyrighted is as much of a mystery as the reason why some of the newspapers of the<br />

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same organization on the 4th of last July applied for a copyright on a fac-simile reprint of the<br />

Declaration of Independence.<br />

“This letter,” said Senator Lodge this morning, “is not new to those who have studied the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. Nor does it in any measure strengthen the <strong>British</strong> case. <strong>The</strong> language of the<br />

letter of Lord Aberdeen is quite plain, <strong>and</strong> there can be no doubt about the meaning when he says<br />

that ‘her Majesty’s Government must not be understood to ab<strong>and</strong>on any portion of the rights of<br />

Great Britain over the territory which was formerly had by the Dutch in <strong>Guiana</strong>.’ No one disputes<br />

the rights of Great Britain to that territory, but the dispute arises out of the encroachments on<br />

territory that the Dutch did not possess, <strong>and</strong> to which she had no claim. <strong>The</strong> letter simply adds to<br />

the strength of the case of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> shows that at no time did the <strong>British</strong> Government claim<br />

what it is now claiming as English territory.<br />

“A few weeks later (after the Aberdeen letter of Jan. 31, 1842,) the marks referred to were<br />

removed. In other words, the <strong>British</strong> Government of that day disavowed the Schomburgk line,<br />

within which we are now told Great Britain cannot assent to arbitration. It requires half a century,<br />

however, to bring into clearer relief just what really was intended in reference to the Schomburgk<br />

line as a mere ‘preliminary step’ to future negotiations. Lord Aberdeen repudiated the Schomburgk<br />

line in 1841. In 1890 Lord Salisbury, then Prime Minister, repudiated the act of his predecessor,<br />

Lord Aberdeen. We can see in this way how that line from being the mere suggestion of an explorer,<br />

based on natural objects, has now become an immutable right beyond which discussion is out of the<br />

question. No new rights have come to Engl<strong>and</strong> or to <strong>Venezuela</strong> since the declaration of President<br />

Monroe. <strong>The</strong>y have the rights of Spain <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong> respectively, nothing more <strong>and</strong> nothing less, <strong>and</strong><br />

are entitled to exactly what those inherited rights give them.”<br />

[15 January 1896]<br />

- 270 -<br />

GOV. HEMMING’S POWERS<br />

Report that He Is Authorized to Treat with <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

WILL SAIL FOR GUIANA FEB. 26<br />

Strong Movement In Engl<strong>and</strong> in Favor of a General Arbitration Treaty<br />

with the United States<br />

LONDON, Jan. 14.—<strong>The</strong> Chronicle will say to-morrow it has reason to believe that Sir Augustus<br />

Hemming, the new Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, will have authority to treat with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, if the<br />

latter wishes. He will sail for his post of duty Feb. 26. Thus there will be ample time for <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

to announce whether she desires to resume negotiations on the boundary matter, <strong>and</strong> whether she<br />

will send delegates to Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

In reply to inquiries made at the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Consulate here as to the truth of <strong>The</strong> Chronicle’s<br />

statement, it was said that the Consulate had no knowledge on the subject. It was added that the<br />

situation as affecting Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> had only assumed a new phase, <strong>and</strong> that the<br />

statement relative to the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries were mere<br />

rumors.<br />

397


January 1896<br />

In its issue to-morrow <strong>The</strong> Graphic will say it has authority to deny the report that Great Britain<br />

has offered money to <strong>Venezuela</strong> in return for the latter’s acceptance of the Schomburgk line as<br />

marking the boundary between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> story is denied elsewhere.<br />

[15 January 1896]<br />

- 271 -<br />

ENGLAND MAY BE HEARD<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission Wants Evidence from Both Sides<br />

NOTICES SENT TO THE TWO NATIONS<br />

Britain Respectfully Asked to Furnish Proof of Ownership of <strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory<br />

INVESTIGATION HOSTILE TO NO ONE<br />

Whatever the Decision, the United States Will Make No Material Gain—<br />

Justice Is Promised<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20.—<strong>The</strong> members of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission met to-day at 11:30<br />

A.M, in their temporary quarters in the building partly occupied by the Inter-State Commerce<br />

Commission. Justice Brewer presided. <strong>The</strong> selection of S. Mallet Prevost of New-York as the<br />

executive officer of the commission was formally ratified. Mr. Prevost was not present, but it was<br />

stated that he would take hold of his duties next Wednesday.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission gave out for publication the following letter addressed to Secretary Olney last<br />

week, inviting information from the two Governments chiefly interested in the boundary<br />

controversy:<br />

OFFICE OF THE VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY COMMISSION<br />

WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 15. 1896.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Hon. Secretary of State.<br />

Dear Sir: I have the honor to state that the commission appointed by the President of the United States “to<br />

investigate <strong>and</strong> report upon the true divisional line between the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>” has<br />

organized by the election of David J. Brewer as its President, <strong>and</strong> is entering upon the immediate discharge of its<br />

duties.<br />

In so doing, it has, after careful consideration, concluded to address you on the question of securing, so far as<br />

possible, the friendly co-operation <strong>and</strong> aid of the two nations which are directly interested in the now pending<br />

boundary differences.<br />

It must have suggested itself to you, as it no doubt has to the President, that this commission, thus authorized<br />

to ascertain <strong>and</strong> report the boundary line between two foreign nations, bears only a remote resemblance to those<br />

tribunals of an international character of which we have had several examples in the past. <strong>The</strong>y were constituted by<br />

or with the consent of the disputants themselves, <strong>and</strong> were authorized by the parties immediately concerned to<br />

pronounce a final judgment. <strong>The</strong> questions at issue were presented by the advocates of the various interests, upon<br />

whose diligence <strong>and</strong> skill the tribunal might safely rely for all the data <strong>and</strong> the arguments essential to the formation<br />

of an intelligent judgment. <strong>The</strong>ir functions were therefore confined to the exercise of judicial powers, <strong>and</strong> they<br />

might fairly expect to reach a result satisfactory to their own consciences, while it comm<strong>and</strong>ed the respect of those<br />

whose interests were directly involved.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> present commission, neither by the mode of its appointment nor by the nature of its duties, may be said to<br />

belong to tribunals of this character. Its duty will be discharged if it will diligently <strong>and</strong> fairly seek to inform the<br />

Executive of certain facts touching a large extent of territory in which the United States has no direct interest.<br />

Whatever may be the conclusion reached, no territorial aggr<strong>and</strong>izement, nor material gain in any form, can<br />

accrue to the United States. <strong>The</strong> sole concern of our Government is the peaceful solution of a controversy between<br />

two friendly powers for the just <strong>and</strong> honorable settlement of the title to disputed territory <strong>and</strong> the protection of the<br />

United States against any fresh acquisitions in our hemisphere on the part of any European State.<br />

It has seemed proper to the commission, under these circumstances, to suggest to you the expediency of calling<br />

the attention of the Governments of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> to the appointment of the commission <strong>and</strong><br />

explaining both its nature <strong>and</strong> object. It may be that they will see a way, entirely consistent with their own sense of<br />

international propriety, to give the commission the aid that it is no doubt in their power to furnish in the way of<br />

documentary proof, historical narrative, unpublished archives, or the like. It is scarcely necessary to say that if either<br />

should deem it appropriate to designate an agent or attorney whose duty it would be to see that no such proofs were<br />

omitted or overlooked, the commission would be grateful for such evidence of good will, <strong>and</strong> for the valuable<br />

results which would be likely to follow therefrom.<br />

An act of either Government in the direction here suggested might be accomplished by an express reservation<br />

as to her claims, <strong>and</strong> should not be deemed an ab<strong>and</strong>onment or impairment of any position heretofore expressed.<br />

In other words, <strong>and</strong> in lawyers’ phrase, each might be willing to act the part of an amicus curiae, <strong>and</strong> to throw<br />

light upon difficult <strong>and</strong> complex questions of fact, which should be examined as carefully as the magnitude of the<br />

subject dem<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

<strong>The</strong> purposes of the pending investigation are certainly hostile to none, nor can it be of advantage to any that<br />

the machinery devised by the Government of the United States to secure the desired information should fail of its<br />

purpose.<br />

DAVID J. BREWER, President<br />

To this communication Secretary Olney replied, stating that he had communicated the<br />

suggestions of the commission to Sir Julian Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, <strong>and</strong> to Minister<br />

Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n representative, for transmission to their respective Governments.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission then adjourned till Friday next, it being the underst<strong>and</strong>ing that Friday is to be<br />

the business day of the commission. <strong>The</strong> only employes so far determined upon are the Secretary,<br />

(or executive officer,) one stenographer, <strong>and</strong> a doorkeeper <strong>and</strong> messenger.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission, finding that in New-Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> elsewhere there are collections of ancient<br />

maps, desires it to be understood that any documents of this kind intrusted to them for their<br />

information will be carefully preserved <strong>and</strong> returned to the owners.<br />

[21 January 1896]<br />

- 272 -<br />

THE FEELING IN BRITISH GUIANA<br />

A Good Deal of Excitement Shown over the Boundary <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

Special Correspondence to <strong>The</strong> United Press<br />

GEORGETOWN, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, Jan. 4.—A good deal of excitement is now shown here with<br />

regard to the boundary dispute, <strong>and</strong> the cable company’s office, where the public telegrams are<br />

399


January 1896<br />

posted daily, presents quite an animated appearance. Here <strong>and</strong> there groups of men assemble <strong>and</strong><br />

discuss every scrap of intelligence which comes to h<strong>and</strong>, while many of the principal merchants have<br />

the messages copied by a clerk or porter as soon as it is possible to gain access to the board on<br />

which the bulletins are posted.<br />

It must be remembered that the population of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> is what is known as a “mixed<br />

one”, <strong>and</strong> while the <strong>British</strong> section of the community places implicit confidence in the strength of<br />

the Imperial Government to assert her rights, or, at least, to take by might what territory she has<br />

claimed, subjects of other countries, who, perhaps, have more at stake, are not by any means so<br />

sanguine, knowing, as they do, that only the other day Great Britain doubted her right to the greater<br />

portion of the territory she now claims.<br />

Indeed, it was only after the auriferous wealth of the territory had been discovered that the<br />

Government raised the question as to whether it had a claim to the l<strong>and</strong>s of the northwest districts<br />

<strong>and</strong> the upper reaches of the River Cuyani, while it is a notorious fact that while the gold fever was<br />

at its height, the Government of the colony, acting upon instructions from the Imperial<br />

Government, caused it to be clearly understood that all applications for mining licenses were granted<br />

<strong>and</strong> must be accepted upon the conditions that in the event of a settlement of the boundary<br />

question the l<strong>and</strong> for which these licenses were granted might be found to be <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that no claim for compensation could be brought against the Government of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

At the opening of the legislative session on the 3d inst. the Administrator referred to the<br />

boundary question in the most guarded terms’. He said: “<strong>The</strong> Court at its meeting on Nov. 1 last<br />

year, with praiseworthy liberality <strong>and</strong> wisdom undertook to provide the funds necessary in case of<br />

emergency, to insure, as far as was in the power of this colony, the security of its borders <strong>and</strong> the<br />

maintenance of peace <strong>and</strong> order within its rightful possessions, <strong>and</strong> an undertaking was given by me<br />

in the name of the Government that only in case of necessity would use be made of that vote. In<br />

communicating the result of the Court’s deliberate action to the Secretary at State, this was clearly<br />

set out, <strong>and</strong> the position of affairs was held to necessitate a certain addition to the police force <strong>and</strong><br />

its armament. Orders have, therefore, been received <strong>and</strong> issued to this effect, <strong>and</strong> on two separate<br />

occasions has the Minister expressed his satisfaction at the action taken by this honorable Court.<br />

Members will, I trust, view the events which have taken place since the vote was passed as rendering<br />

it necessary <strong>and</strong> expedient, for the present at all events, for this Government to maintain a certain<br />

reserve in treating this matter, <strong>and</strong> while I assure them that the Government will, as soon as<br />

possible, give them more explicit particulars in this connection, I would appeal to the sound sense<br />

<strong>and</strong> good judgment which characterized their deliberations to continue the confidence they have so<br />

willingly extended to the administration, on the assurance that it will be most carefully respected.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> subject was then allowed to drop.<br />

<strong>The</strong> following day Col. McInnis, Inspector General of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> Police constabulary,<br />

left Georgetown for the <strong>British</strong> outpost at Yuruan, on, it is reported, a visit of inspection, at the<br />

direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Col. McInnis is accompanied by Lieut. Godfrey<br />

Fawcett, a young sapper attached to the East Indian Corps, but who is here on some secret mission<br />

in connection with the Colonial Office; also by Dr. Boase of the Colonial Medical Staff, Mr. Michael<br />

McTurk, Magistrate for the Northwest District, <strong>and</strong> a number of other men.<br />

Within the past few days some eighty additional constables have been drafted from Georgetown<br />

to the northwest district of the contested territory, <strong>and</strong> the medical officers are now engaged in<br />

“passing” another hundred men on the military-police force, for service within the disputed<br />

territory.<br />

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A report is current here that on Christmas Eve last, Mr. Michael McTurk, Magistrate, caused a<br />

large number of the United States flags to be taken down at Bartica, in the interior of this colony. It<br />

appears that the residents of Bartica had decided to decorate the streets in view of a visit of the<br />

Administrator, <strong>and</strong> among the decorations displayed, the Star-Spangled Banner was much in<br />

evidence. On the arrival of Mr. McTurk <strong>and</strong> Capt. Baker, Inspector of Prisons, the people were<br />

requested to haul down all the American flags, <strong>and</strong> this was done. <strong>The</strong> matter has created<br />

considerable dissatisfaction here, not so much from any importance to be attached to the display of<br />

bad taste, but as demonstrating the meanness of the mind that suggested it.<br />

[21 January 1896]<br />

- 273 -<br />

MUST NOT PROVOKE WAR<br />

Senator Wolcott Strongly Opposes the Davis Resolution<br />

COLORADO STATESMAN IS FOR PEACE<br />

<strong>The</strong> Monroe Doctrine Does Not Apply to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Case—<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> Should Be Our Ally, Not Our Foe<br />

WASHINGTON. Jan. 22.—<strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine had another inning in the Senate to-day when<br />

Mr. Wolcott made his promised speech in opposition to the position of the President <strong>and</strong> Congress<br />

on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary matter.<br />

<strong>The</strong> essence of Mr. Wolcott’s carefully prepared address is that the Monroe doctrine has no<br />

application to the controversy between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, that the National heart has not<br />

been fired by the President’s st<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> that it would be a good thing for civilization if Great Britain<br />

could increase its possessions in South America.<br />

Mr. Wolcott is always an entertaining talker, <strong>and</strong> to-day he invested his remarks with sufficient<br />

force <strong>and</strong> oratorical skill to entertain the many people who had gathered to listen to him. <strong>The</strong>re was<br />

evident appreciation of his statement that the phraseology of the Davis resolution reported by the<br />

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was objectionable <strong>and</strong> calculated to accentuate the strained<br />

relations now existing between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain. Mr. Walcott’s views are not<br />

shared by any considerable portion of the Senate.<br />

Mr. Wolcott bad to wait until after considerable routine business had been transacted before he<br />

made his speech. He began by saying:<br />

<strong>The</strong> extraordinary message of the President of the United States, having reference to a dispute exclusively<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, both friendly powers, was practically indorsed by both Houses of Congress.<br />

<strong>The</strong> responsibilities, therefore, which his action may have entailed, rest as well upon the legislative as the Executive<br />

departments of the Government, <strong>and</strong> are equally shared by all political parties. <strong>The</strong> recommendations of the<br />

President that a commission be appointed to inquire into the points of difference between the two Governments<br />

concerned, <strong>and</strong> to enlighten this country as to the true divisional line separating <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, were<br />

followed by Congress, <strong>and</strong> that commission, eminent in ability, <strong>and</strong> lacking only the joint sanction of the parties in<br />

interest, which sanction alone can give it vitality or usefulness, has only qualified.<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolution which the Committee on Foreign Relations has reported to this body, the effect at which may<br />

be, in my opinion, most far-reaching as affecting our policy <strong>and</strong> relations toward other <strong>and</strong> friendly Governments,<br />

requires some discussion <strong>and</strong> careful investigation before we commit ourselves to its declarations.<br />

401


January 1896<br />

Continuing, Mr. Wolcott contended that the so-called Monroe doctrine has been mis-applied In<br />

the pending controversy: that so much of President Monroe’s message as referred to the<br />

colonization of portions of America by European powers could have no applicability to any<br />

boundary dispute now existing in South America; that the hostility to the extension by European<br />

powers of their systems to any portion of this hemisphere, as expressed in that message, had especial<br />

reference to the systems of Government which were based on the divine right of Kings <strong>and</strong> which<br />

were directed to the overthrow of all republics wherever existing: that the Monroe doctrine was in<br />

no wise intended as insisting upon republican forms of government in this hemisphere, or as<br />

committing this Government to maintain the doctrine outside its own borders, or except as its own<br />

integrity might be affected; that this country is embarking upon a new <strong>and</strong> different policy from the<br />

one laid down by our fathers, <strong>and</strong> that from 1821 until now Congress has uniformly declined to<br />

define the so-called Monroe doctrine or to adopt it as a rule of action.<br />

He said existing conditions made it difficult to dispassionately discuss the Monroe doctrine at<br />

this time. It was not an easy or a gracious task to take a position which apparently involved in the<br />

slightest degree the ab<strong>and</strong>onment of that patriotic fervor which animated the breast of every citizen<br />

where our National pride or our country’s honor was in question. <strong>The</strong>re had been much tension for<br />

the past few weeks. <strong>The</strong> letter of the Secretary of State to Mr. Bayard was from a diplomatic point of<br />

view, almost incendiary.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President’s message glowed with the possibilities of war. Members of both houses of<br />

Congress, not to be outdone, followed the President’s suggestion as to the appointment of a<br />

commission with feverish haste. Just what the commission was to do, or how it was to do it, Mr.<br />

Wolcott added, nobody knew, but it had been created, <strong>and</strong> it now stood more a menace than a<br />

guarantee of peace.<br />

Fired the National Heart<br />

<strong>The</strong> efforts of the Government to fire the National heart had not been unavailing, nor was the<br />

work difficult. This country, he said, had had but two wars, except our own civil conflict <strong>and</strong> a war<br />

of conquest with the weak Government of Mexico. Both of them were with Great Britain, <strong>and</strong>,<br />

while the past eighty years had seen an entire readjustment of all our relations with the mother<br />

country, a readjustment which ought to make future war with her out of the question, there were<br />

still lurking some traces of the traditional resentment<br />

Mr. Wolcott entered into an exhaustive review of the origin <strong>and</strong> meaning of the Monroe<br />

doctrine <strong>and</strong> of its application by the United States.<br />

He added:<br />

Not only was the Monroe doctrine intended simply as a declaration of limited scope <strong>and</strong> purpose, but the<br />

circumstances under which it was given to the world were far different from that which now exist; <strong>and</strong> under<br />

present conditions its assertion <strong>and</strong> maintenance to the extent claimed by the President have largely ceased to be of<br />

paramount importance. It is essentially a doctrine of self-defense, promulgated for out own preservation <strong>and</strong> for no<br />

other purpose.<br />

<strong>The</strong> concern of President Monroe was not lest monarchies should be established in this hemisphere. He<br />

expressly recognized existing Governments <strong>and</strong> welcomed the empire of Dom Pedro in Brazil <strong>and</strong> Iturbide in<br />

Mexico as freely as the Governments of Bolivar; he protested not against despotic government, but against the<br />

forcible extension by the dreaded Holy Alliance in this Western world, of which he stood in well-grounded fear. <strong>The</strong><br />

fear was then real <strong>and</strong> the danger threatening. To-day, how different the picture! We have helped ourselves to what<br />

l<strong>and</strong> we needed; our own borders are defined, our Government eternally planted on the solid rock; our institutions<br />

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free; our people intelligent <strong>and</strong> lovers of liberty <strong>and</strong> devoted to free institutions. No danger threatens us from<br />

without. We are menaced by no foreign foe.<br />

And vast as are our resources, intelligent as are our people, we possess an element of strength even greater than<br />

those advantages afford us; <strong>and</strong> that is that nobody wants us. We are not desirable subjects for other countries.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is not a nation in the whole world that would take one of our sovereign States a gift with its people.<br />

It is idle to talk seriously of our integrity or perpetuity being threatened by an adjustment of boundary between<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. That which once seemed a danger <strong>and</strong> evoked the utterance of the Monroe doctrine<br />

has passed forever away, <strong>and</strong> has left nothing to vex us but the pride of expression to which we still cling.<br />

<strong>The</strong>n he spoke of the South American Republic in the severest terms. He said:<br />

Instead of developing into self-respecting republics, based upon law, advancing in morals <strong>and</strong> civilization, the<br />

people of South America have shown themselves so far, almost without exception, utterly unfitted for selfgovernment.<br />

<strong>The</strong>ir so-called republics are largely <strong>and</strong> usually military despotisms based on force <strong>and</strong> relying on<br />

blood-shedding <strong>and</strong> assassination for their establishment <strong>and</strong> for their brief continuances, extending only until the<br />

ruler should have amassed from the oppression of the people a fortune sufficient to enable him to live in luxury in<br />

Europe when he escapes or abdicates, or until some other revolutionist shall be able by violence to seize the reins of<br />

government. <strong>The</strong> rulers are despots <strong>and</strong> suffrage a farce.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re was no reason, Mr. Wolcott said, why the United States should help such people. He<br />

continued:<br />

Whatever of advancement <strong>and</strong> of progress for the human race the centuries shall being us must largely come, in<br />

my opinion, through the spread of the religion of Christ, <strong>and</strong> the dominance of the English-speaking peoples, <strong>and</strong><br />

whenever you find both, you find communities where freedom exists <strong>and</strong> law is obeyed. Blood is thicker than water,<br />

<strong>and</strong> until some just quarrel divides us, which heaven forbid, may these two great nations of the same lineage,<br />

traditions, <strong>and</strong> tongue st<strong>and</strong> as brothers, shoulder to shoulder, in the interest of humanity, by their union compelling<br />

peace, <strong>and</strong> awaiting the coming of the day when “Nation shall not lift sword against nation, neither shall they learn<br />

war any more.<br />

Mr. Wolcott’s speech was applauded by the people in the galleries.<br />

Senhor Mendonca, the Brazilian Minister, was in the Senate Chamber during the delivery of the<br />

address.<br />

[23 January 1896]<br />

- 274 -<br />

CHAMBERLAIN ON GUIANA<br />

Great Britain Desires Only What She Possesses in America<br />

BLOOD IS THICKER THAN WATER<br />

Discussion over South America Might Be Diverted to Concerted Action<br />

in Behalf of the Armenians<br />

LONDON, Jan. 25.—<strong>The</strong> Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies,<br />

delivered a speech at Birmingham this evening. He congratulated the country upon having at the<br />

head of its affairs Lord Salisbury, whose judgment <strong>and</strong> resolution had placed him the very first<br />

among the European statesmen.<br />

403


January 1896<br />

Referring to the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary dispute, Mr. Chamberlain said it had been trivial until it was<br />

suddenly elevated to grave importance by the intervention of the United States. <strong>The</strong>re seemed to be<br />

some misapprehension on both sides. <strong>The</strong> opinion seemed to have prevailed in Engl<strong>and</strong> that<br />

American statesmen wished to pick a quarrel while the Americans seemed to have thought that the<br />

<strong>British</strong> were disposed to impugn the Monroe doctrine, which they rightly held to be the most<br />

important to their own security.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y also seemed to have thought that the <strong>British</strong> were disposed to deal in a harsh <strong>and</strong> arbitrary<br />

manner with the smaller State. He believed that the American people <strong>and</strong> all that is best in the<br />

United States would regard with horror a needless war with their own blood <strong>and</strong> kindred. He also<br />

believed that President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, whose acquaintance he had the honor of making while he was in<br />

America, <strong>and</strong> who had a high reputation for straightforward, honorable dealing, would never drive<br />

the two kindred nations to strife.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the Americans could be assured from the utterances of Lord Salisbury <strong>and</strong><br />

Mr. Arthur Balfour, the First Lord of the Treasury, that Great Britain had no desire for a single inch<br />

of American territory beyond what she already right- fully possessed. All that was necessary to settle<br />

the trouble was more time <strong>and</strong> fuller knowledge.<br />

Meanwhile he would re-echo <strong>and</strong> reciprocate from the bottom of his heart Wolcott’s noble<br />

words. “Blood is thicker than water.” [Loud cheers.] That would always be the sentiment of every<br />

Briton. <strong>The</strong> two nations were more closely allied in sentiment <strong>and</strong> interest than any others, <strong>and</strong> while<br />

the <strong>British</strong> looked with horror on anything approaching fratricidal strife, they looked with pleasure<br />

upon the possibility of the Stars <strong>and</strong> Stripes <strong>and</strong> the Union Jack floating together in defense of a<br />

common cause sanctioned by community of sentiment.<br />

He added that, while the Continental nations regarded the sufferings of the Armenians with<br />

comparative indifference, the United Kingdom <strong>and</strong> the United States felt the deepest sympathy <strong>and</strong><br />

indignation.<br />

Mr. Chamberlain paid a tribute to the excellence of the American missions, <strong>and</strong> declared that the<br />

Americans were also interested in the sufferings of humanity for humanity’s sake, <strong>and</strong> not for any<br />

territorial ambition. Mr. Chamberlain concluded by saying:<br />

“Would it were possible that instead of wasting breath in a petty South American boundary<br />

dispute we could count on the powerful support of the United States in enforcing the<br />

representations which hitherto we have fruitlessly made in behalf of those who are suffering by<br />

Turkish tyranny <strong>and</strong> Turkish fanaticism.” [Cheers.]<br />

He concluded by declaring that the condition of Armenia was a danger <strong>and</strong> disgrace to Europe,<br />

but he did not believe that the resources of civilization had been entirely exhausted.<br />

Upon the conclusion of his address, Mr. Chamberlain was greeted with prolonged cheering.<br />

[26 January 1896]<br />

- 275 -<br />

GREAT WEALTH IN VENEZUELA<br />

Glowing Description of the Riches of the <strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory on the<br />

<strong>Border</strong>s of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 27—<strong>The</strong> last number of <strong>The</strong> South American Magazine, published in<br />

London, contains a glowing account of the riches of the disputed territory on the borders of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. It states that but for the recent extraordinary action of the President<br />

of the United States, the immense value the colony would have remained comparatively unknown to<br />

the world, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing it contains some of the richest <strong>and</strong> most easily worked gold fields in the<br />

world.<br />

<strong>The</strong> colony, it is said, was within fourteen days of a pleasant steamship journey from Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

<strong>and</strong> its population numbered 289,000, of which 12,000 were Portuguese <strong>and</strong> 4,000 were English, the<br />

balance consisting of negroes, Indians, <strong>and</strong> East Indian coolies. <strong>The</strong> climate of the country was<br />

extremely salubrious, <strong>and</strong> the great primeval forests contained immense stocks of valuable wood.<br />

Communication into the Interior was chiefly by means of steamships along the Essequibo. <strong>The</strong><br />

country would probably prove to be the richest gold-producing country ever discovered.<br />

In 1884 a few negroes <strong>and</strong> Indians went into the interior <strong>and</strong> brought down 250 ounces of gold.<br />

In 1889-90 the exports of gold from the colony were 32,332 ounces, <strong>and</strong> in 1894-5 they amounted<br />

to 134,047 ounces, making a total production of raw gold in a little over ten years of upward of<br />

£3,000,000 sterling. Up to the present time alluvial gold had been the only gold produced in the<br />

colony; but now they were preparing to attack the reefs, <strong>and</strong> machinery for that purpose was being<br />

rapidly shipped. <strong>The</strong> property of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> Development Syndicate was served by a<br />

Government fleet of steamers, a waterway existing between their own port <strong>and</strong> Georgetown. <strong>The</strong>ir<br />

property had produced some of the richest deposits of gold found in <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> yet nine-tenths<br />

thereof was as yet comparatively unexplored.<br />

[28 January 1896]<br />

405


January 1896<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- Part 9 -<br />

February – April 1896<br />

407


February – April 1896<br />

408


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 276 -<br />

STANLEY SAYS WE’RE RIGHT<br />

<strong>The</strong> African Explorer Writes About the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

Henry M. Stanley, the African explorer, now a member of the <strong>British</strong> Parliament, has written a<br />

letter to Major J. B. Pond of this city, touching on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. In the course of it, he<br />

says:<br />

Now, on this <strong>Venezuela</strong>n subject, I am entirely on the side of America, but I must admit that I am not surprised<br />

that the English papers backed up Lord Salisbury <strong>and</strong> differ from me. Taught by the virulent remarks of your<br />

journals, I had, of course, devoted much time to underst<strong>and</strong> it, whereas English editors were exceedingly ill<br />

informed about the matter. <strong>The</strong>n there are two or three injudicious remarks in Olney’s dispatch which put <strong>British</strong><br />

backs up, but after reflection it is wonderful how many have come round to my opinion that whatever the<br />

transgressions of Olney may be there is a great deal of justice in the American dem<strong>and</strong>. I feel quite sure now that so<br />

much is admitted it will not be long before the opinion becomes general that we were in the wrong in refusing<br />

arbitration, while the more I think of Olney’s dispatch the more impressed I am that Olney could scarcely have<br />

written otherwise than he did.<br />

For I argue that had he contented himself with the usual suave tone of diplomacy he would not have succeeded<br />

in rousing the attention of the Nation to the necessity of settlement. His dispatch would have lain quietly buried in<br />

the archives of the Foreign Office, whereas now every Englishman knows sufficiently of the subject to distinguish<br />

right from wrong, <strong>and</strong> while there is still a majority who take the dispatch to be an affront to <strong>British</strong> dignity, there is<br />

a minority increasing in numbers who think that <strong>British</strong> honor would be best consulted by considering the justice<br />

done to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> that <strong>British</strong> interests would be promoted by acquiescing with the American dem<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Mr. Stanley assured Major Pond that there existed in Engl<strong>and</strong>, in spite of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

episode, only the friendliest feelings toward America. It would be a long time, though, he said,<br />

before Engl<strong>and</strong> forgave the German Kaiser his dispatch to President Kruger on the Jameson<br />

capture.<br />

[5 February 1896]<br />

- 277 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN QUESTION<br />

Great Britain Should, <strong>and</strong> Probably Will, Submit It to Arbitration<br />

<strong>The</strong> North American Review for February prints an able, conservative, <strong>and</strong> temperate review of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n question by Mr. Andrew Carnegie, who was one of the United States delegates to the<br />

Pan-American Conference. Mr. Carnegie says:<br />

Great Britain has, therefore, necessarily acquired l<strong>and</strong>s “by hook or by crook” in any part of the<br />

world, as the United States has acquired l<strong>and</strong> adjoining her by just the same means. Our Indian<br />

treaties <strong>and</strong> subsidies, our Mexican war, would readily give us illustration, but with the United States<br />

we are not now concerned. It is from Engl<strong>and</strong>’s similar policy we have to draw, <strong>and</strong> no finer<br />

illustration of the modus oper<strong>and</strong>i can be given than her dealings with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. She begins<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

modestly by claiming a boundary; <strong>Venezuela</strong> requests her to submit her claims to arbitration; this is<br />

refused; me matter rests a while, when it appears that the boundary of Engl<strong>and</strong> has been shifted a<br />

good deal <strong>and</strong> embraces more territory adjoining <strong>Venezuela</strong>; another remonstrance from <strong>Venezuela</strong>,<br />

<strong>and</strong> another rest. When the question revives, Britain discovers she was mistaken again <strong>and</strong> did not<br />

claim enough, <strong>and</strong> her third claim extends far beyond the second. Finally, there is a fourth line<br />

drawn, which reaches over valuable auriferous deposits <strong>and</strong> really l<strong>and</strong>s Great Britain on the banks<br />

of the Orinoco.<br />

This was rather too much, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> asked the good offices of the United States to beg<br />

Great Britain to submit the question to peaceful arbitration. This Great Britain agreed to do in 1885<br />

through Lord Granville. <strong>The</strong>re would have been no <strong>Venezuela</strong> dispute had the doctrine of<br />

continuous foreign policy been adhered to, but the present Prime Minister of Great Britain, who is<br />

the one man wholly responsible for all that has occurred to embitter English-speaking men, actually<br />

refused to carry out the agreement of his predecessor to arbitrate the whole question. . .<br />

This is certainly one of the most flagrant exercises of brute force against a weak power which<br />

can be adduced to illustrate the propensity of the English-speaking race to absorb as much of the<br />

l<strong>and</strong> of the world as it possibly can, <strong>and</strong> this policy in the case of <strong>Venezuela</strong> would have been<br />

triumphantly successful had the question remained one between the very weak Lamb <strong>and</strong> the very<br />

strong Wolf. I do not mean to hold Great Britain up to peculiar opprobrium. What the race in Great<br />

Britain would do, the race upon this side would do, <strong>and</strong> no doubt has done—although it is but just<br />

to say that the natural instinct leading to abrupt appeal to force is somewhat modified in the<br />

American, through inter-mixture of blood with races less strongly possessed of the dominating<br />

spirit. He offers arbitration. I present this instance of the powerful grasping from the weak, not as an<br />

English trait, but as a race trait.<br />

Successive American Governments have done their best, to bring Great Britain back to its<br />

promise to arbitrate, made by Lord Granville in 1885, but without avail. Secretaries of State Bayard,<br />

Blaine <strong>and</strong> Gresham, in successive Administrations, have gently intimated to Great Britain that this<br />

was the only honorable course she could pursue, <strong>and</strong> that the United States would be greatly pleased<br />

if she fulfilled her agreement. It was, therefore, impossible for President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Administration<br />

to turn its back upon the cause of weak <strong>Venezuela</strong>, even it had so disposed. Previous Governments<br />

having listened to her appeal, <strong>and</strong> being convinced of the justice of her request for arbitration,<br />

which, as we see, Britain had herself acknowledged, the United States was bound to call upon Great<br />

Britain for a definite answer, whether or no she were willing to fulfill her honorable engagement <strong>and</strong><br />

submit her claims to an impartial judge for peaceful settlement, as she had agreed to do in 1885.<br />

<strong>The</strong> precise farm adopted in doing this does not touch the principle involved, but it is well<br />

frankly to admit that public opinion in the United States to-day favors the view that the menacing<br />

part of the President’s message had better been omitted. Asking Britain to carry out what she had<br />

agreed to do through Lord Granville, <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ing for arbitration, the President’s position was<br />

impregnable, <strong>and</strong> bound to win. Had he stopped with asking Congress for authority to appoint a<br />

commission to ascertain the true boundary between Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, solely for the guidance<br />

of the United States, the most potent part of his message as published would have been tenfold<br />

more potent, left to the imagination unsaid. . .<br />

Peaceful arbitration is the great gain of this century. It was my office to introduce to Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>, then President of the United States, as he is now, the delegation from the <strong>British</strong><br />

Parliament urging arbitration. In the conferences I had with him previous to his receiving the<br />

deputation, I found him as strong a supporter of that policy as I ever met. I do not wonder at his<br />

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outburst, knowing how deeply this man feels upon that question; it is to him so precious, it<br />

constitutes so great an advance over arbitrament by war that—even if we have to fight, that any<br />

nation rejecting it may suffer—I believe he feels that it would be our duty to do so, believing that<br />

the nation which rejects arbitration in a boundary dispute deserves the execration of mankind.<br />

It is only necessary for the people on both sides of the Atlantic to keep in mind that above all<br />

other considerations connected with this, in itself, most trivial dispute, there st<strong>and</strong>s imperiled the<br />

Christian substitute of peaceful arbitration for barbarous war. <strong>The</strong> dangerous stage has been already<br />

reached <strong>and</strong> passed. <strong>The</strong>re will be no war between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain either upon<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question or upon any other, because, the first has already planted itself upon the<br />

rock of arbitration, <strong>and</strong> the other is slowly but steadily moving toward its acceptance.<br />

No Government can live in Britain which dares squarely to persist in rejecting arbitration in a<br />

boundary dispute upon the American continent. <strong>The</strong>re is too much religion, too much conscience,<br />

too much sincere desire for peace <strong>and</strong> good-will among men, <strong>and</strong> far too much genuine kindly<br />

feeling among the people, from Queen to peasant, for their “kin beyond the sea,” to permit an<br />

Government to commit so great a crime.<br />

[5 February 1896]<br />

- 278 -<br />

ALL CALM IN BRITISH GUIANA<br />

No Excitement over the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 4.—Mail advices <strong>and</strong> newspapers from Demerara, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, dated<br />

Jan. 22, received at the Bureau of American Republics to-day, show that no excitement exists there<br />

over the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute, the colonists feeling assured that Engl<strong>and</strong> will fully protect<br />

their interests, as English capital is involved throughout the territory. <strong>The</strong> newspapers, while still<br />

attacking what they call “Clevel<strong>and</strong>isrn,” as applied to the Monroe doctrine, are more guarded in<br />

their comment than a few weeks ago, <strong>and</strong> nothing creeps into their news columns indicative of<br />

trouble with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, pending the dispute’s settlement.<br />

One of the papers distinctly recognizes the helplessness of the colony in the matter, <strong>and</strong> declares<br />

that the local militia force is designed for service exclusively within the colony, protection from<br />

assaults without resting wholly with the Imperial Government. This paper two months ago was<br />

urgently dem<strong>and</strong>ing great increases in the militia, to occupy the disputed territory <strong>and</strong> resist<br />

encroachments.<br />

<strong>The</strong> monthly meeting of the Legislature, which occurred Jan. 21, lasted only an hour, <strong>and</strong> was<br />

altogether devoted to eulogies of the departing Attorney General, who had been transferred as Chief<br />

Justice to Hongkong. <strong>The</strong> Acting Governor, however, warned the members that the February<br />

session would be devoted, to very important measures, of the nature of which he gave no<br />

intimation, but as the new Governor was to be expected at that time, it was presumed that the<br />

Imperial Government’s policy would be made known. While the colonists are apparently confident<br />

of imperial protection, they are seriously divided in their opinions as to the forms it will take.<br />

[5 February 1896]<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

- 279 -<br />

SEÑOR ANDRADE AMUSED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Claims of Clement Markham on <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s Boundary<br />

DISPROVED BY TREATIES ON RECORD<br />

Minister Andrade Shows the Absurdity of the Statements Inspired by<br />

the Salisbury Government.<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 6.—Minister Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, was amused to-day by<br />

the claim set forth by Comm<strong>and</strong>er Clement Markham, President of the Royal Geographical Society,<br />

in <strong>The</strong> London Times, to Engl<strong>and</strong>’s so-called indisputable rights to all the Essequibo basin to the<br />

westward of the already ab<strong>and</strong>oned Schomburgk line. <strong>The</strong> Minister says the article, coming from an<br />

officer of the <strong>British</strong> Government, is so misleading in its conclusions, which are reached from<br />

utterly false premises, that any one who has considered the official documents in the case would see<br />

the absurdity of it, but the public generally might be apt to attach some importance to the<br />

statements, which apparently are inspired by the Salisbury Government.<br />

By the treaty of Munster of 1648, between Spain <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong>, Spain’s right up to the Essequibo<br />

was recognized, <strong>and</strong> by the treaty of 1713 with Spain Great Britain obligated herself to defend<br />

Spain’s provinces as fixed by the Munster convention. With this underst<strong>and</strong>ing, Comm<strong>and</strong>er<br />

Markham’s reference to the treaty of 1814 takes a new light, directly opposite to his claim. That<br />

treaty was between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, by which the latter surrendered to the former<br />

“the Cape of Good Hope, <strong>and</strong> the establishments of Demerara, Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> Berbice.”<br />

Comm<strong>and</strong>er Markham’s claim that the establishment of Essequibo in this treaty included all<br />

waters draining into the Essequibo River was the <strong>British</strong> contention, until Schomburgk threw out<br />

part of it, <strong>and</strong> Lords Granville <strong>and</strong> Rosebery ab<strong>and</strong>oned most of the remainder.<br />

It only rests with <strong>Venezuela</strong> to prove before arbitrators, or to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

appointed by President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, that “the establishments of Demerara, Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> Berbice”<br />

were small groups of Dutch plantations at the mouths of rivers of those names, not extending back<br />

from the coast, <strong>and</strong> for the mast part not even occupied as late as 1839—twenty-five years after the<br />

treaty which gave them to Engl<strong>and</strong> by conquest from Holl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> exact limits <strong>and</strong> ownership of all<br />

these plantations are matters of record, upon which <strong>Venezuela</strong> is confident that <strong>British</strong> aggressions,<br />

which never succeeded until by force in the last sixteen years, will be proved unwarranted.<br />

Señor Andrade <strong>and</strong> all the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n officials have repeatedly called attention to the significant<br />

tact that, while Engl<strong>and</strong> has put forth all sorts of claims, no valid evidence of right in their support<br />

has ever been shown. <strong>Venezuela</strong>, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, has courted a study of the facts, <strong>and</strong> has never<br />

ceased her efforts to have the matter investigated by any impartial tribunal.<br />

Señor Andrade this morning received from English sources a copy of the official report of Gov.<br />

Light of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, delivered to Parliament in 1839, accompanied by a map of the Crown<br />

Surveyor, showing the exact extent of all <strong>British</strong> possessions on the South American mainl<strong>and</strong> at<br />

that time. <strong>The</strong> settlements of Essequibo did not extend over twenty miles above the mouth of that<br />

river, <strong>and</strong> were confined exclusively to its eastern bank, in territory which <strong>Venezuela</strong> does not<br />

dispute, <strong>and</strong> never has disputed. Some Dutch plantations, most of them ab<strong>and</strong>oned, are shown on<br />

the <strong>Guiana</strong> coast between the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> Pomaron, but these were confessedly of doubtful<br />

legality at the time.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>The</strong> preparation of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n evidence for the use of the commission appointed by President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> is nearly completed <strong>and</strong> it will be presented in about ten days.<br />

[7 February 1896]<br />

- 280 -<br />

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AS IT IS<br />

Senator Allen Delivers a Speech on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Question<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7.—Mr. Allen (Pop., Neb.,) addressed the Senate to-day on the subject<br />

of the Monroe doctrine. He said that he would consider the doctrine as an original proposition. It<br />

was a doctrine as old as the Government itself, <strong>and</strong> it arose out of, <strong>and</strong> was based upon, a prime<br />

necessity of all human government. No nation had ever existed or could exist without adopting <strong>and</strong><br />

applying, in its foreign relations, the doctrine of self-preservation generally ascribed to Monroe, <strong>and</strong><br />

known as the Monroe doctrine. <strong>The</strong> Government of the United States was to determine the<br />

question of the application of the doctrine.<br />

When the commission appointed by the President reported, it would be ample time for the<br />

United States to act. If it should then determine that the action of Great Britain in acquiring territory<br />

in <strong>Venezuela</strong> would imperil this Government by imperiling the rights of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, it would become<br />

the duty of this Government to marshal all the resources of its people to resist the threatened or<br />

actual invasion. If, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, we should determine, after due investigation <strong>and</strong> deliberation,<br />

that our interests would not be imperiled, it would be our duty to abstain from any interference with<br />

the action of Great Britain. He felt confident, however, that the dispute over the boundary line<br />

between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> was not for the primary purpose of obtaining territory, but<br />

for the purpose of gaining control of the Orinoco River, which leads into one of the richest portions<br />

of South America. If this were true, it would be our duty to repel the aggressive action of that<br />

nation.<br />

It was to be hoped that the people of <strong>Venezuela</strong> would not be over-elated at the attitude this<br />

country had taken; it was to be hoped that they would not be deceived by the language used in this<br />

chamber; it was to be hoped that their conduct would be conservative, <strong>and</strong> that nothing would be<br />

said or done by them in consequence of the friendly spirit manifested toward them by this country<br />

that would lead to rash or inconsiderate action.<br />

In conclusion, Mr. Allen said:<br />

If, unhappily, the time shall come, which God grant it may not, that American valor must again be displayed on<br />

the field of battle in defense of American institutions, <strong>and</strong> against foreign greed <strong>and</strong> aggr<strong>and</strong>izement, we may<br />

confidently expect the sons of America to march under the flag of the free, consecrated by the blood of a hundred<br />

years ago, to permanent <strong>and</strong> glorious victory. <strong>The</strong>n for every Grant there will be a Lee; for every Sherman a<br />

Johnston; for every Thomas a Jackson; for every Sheridan a Stuart, <strong>and</strong> Mason <strong>and</strong> Dixon’s line will be blotted from<br />

the map of the United States, <strong>and</strong> true Americans, North <strong>and</strong> South, welded by the blood of the Revolution, the war<br />

of 1812, <strong>and</strong> the war with Mexico, renewed by the estrangement of 1861, as lovers renew <strong>and</strong> intensify their<br />

affection by estrangement; soothed <strong>and</strong> sustained by a united <strong>and</strong> splendid American womanhood, will give to the<br />

world a lesson in valor that it has never known before. And when the end comes, as it surely will come, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

storm that has rocked us in a great civil strife for renewed American freedom shall have subsided, <strong>and</strong> the Nation<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

shall arise once more from the ashes of its deadly conflict with the enemies of human liberty, crowned with a new<br />

glory <strong>and</strong> encircled with a new halo, shall we not place the songs of our recent civil strife with the sacred memories<br />

of other days.<br />

Mr. Allen’s closing words were applauded heartily.<br />

[8 February 1896]<br />

- 281 -<br />

ITS FIRST MONTH OF WORK<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission in Session Once Again<br />

YESTERDAY’S MEETING OF THE BOARD<br />

Delay in Receiving Required Information from <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

Great Britain Is Unavoidable<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 7.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission turned the first month of its existence<br />

at its regular weekly meeting to-day, all the members being in attendance except Frederic H. Coudert<br />

of New-York.<br />

Considerable progress has been made in the preliminary study of the case since the last meeting.<br />

Justice Brewer <strong>and</strong> Judge Alvey have temporarily ab<strong>and</strong>oned their court duties <strong>and</strong> devoted their<br />

entire time to the accumulation <strong>and</strong> examination of evidence. Andrew D. White <strong>and</strong> Judge Alvey<br />

have pursued a systematic search through the vast collection of the Congressional Library,<br />

developing unexpected <strong>and</strong> valuable side lights on the contention, as well as data bearing directly<br />

upon the problem of finding the true divisional line, while Justice Brewer has been working over the<br />

documents <strong>and</strong> books of reference presented by the State Department.<br />

Secretary Malet-Prevost has kept the clerical staff of the commission busy all the week in the<br />

voluminous correspondence with libraries <strong>and</strong> individuals possessing desirable information, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

card catalogue of references has already reached healthy proportions.<br />

<strong>The</strong> delay in receiving the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n case has caused the commission some annoyance, but as<br />

an average of twenty-two days must elapse for reply to a communication to <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> as the<br />

commission’s formal request to Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> was not dispatched until Jan. 15, the<br />

answer of the latter Government cannot be expected for another week.<br />

Minister Andrade this morning received official mail from Caracas dated as late as Jan. 30,<br />

inclosing a decree of Jan. 10 constituting a commission to prepare the evidence for transmission.<br />

Minister Rojas or Foreign Affairs assured the Minister that the immediate delay would be amply<br />

compensated for in the end, as the documents submitted would be arranged for facility of<br />

examination by means of notes <strong>and</strong> cross- references, the local commission having been directed to<br />

classify in a synthetical manner the spirit <strong>and</strong> character of the papers in their relation to points of the<br />

controversy <strong>and</strong> to each other. Minister Andrade thinks the documents may come by the next<br />

steamer, or that, at any rate, he will be authorized to present all the papers in his possession.<br />

Up to this morning nothing had been heard from Great Britain, but the members of the<br />

commission incline to the opinion that the report to Parliament will contain an exhaustive<br />

exposition of the <strong>British</strong> argument in such a shape as to be readily considered.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

Justin Winsor, the Librarian of Harvard College, who had been requested by the commission to<br />

come to Washington as an expert, appeared before that body <strong>and</strong> gave much valuable information<br />

on geographical subjects. He has been a deep student in cartography, <strong>and</strong> for several hours the<br />

Commissioners cross-examined him with excellent results.<br />

Marcus Baker, the principal United States Government map expert, was also present at to-day’s<br />

session, <strong>and</strong> will follow up the commission’s ideas as to map-making in the geological survey which,<br />

by permission of the Secretary of the Interior, has been selected for that purpose. <strong>The</strong> great map<br />

upon which the commission will eventually draw “the true divisional line between the Republic of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>” is now in the course of preparation, <strong>and</strong> will be an elaborate affair. It<br />

will show only natural features, <strong>and</strong> will be of a composite nature, its accuracy being verified by<br />

reducing various authentic maps to the same scale <strong>and</strong> taking the coinciding data.<br />

Commissioner Coudert came down from New-York a little later, but in time to take part in most<br />

of the proceedings. He will return home to-night, but the other four Commissioners will work in<br />

Washington to-morrow an next week, holding no formal meeting, however, until next Friday.<br />

[8 February 1896]<br />

- 282 -<br />

AGAINST ENGLAND’S CLAIM<br />

Brazil Not in Sympathy with Great Britain’s Position<br />

PRESIDENT CLEVELAND APPLAUDED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Assertion of the American Doctrine Commended by Leaders<br />

of the Brazilian Congress<br />

ACTION IN THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC<br />

Attitude of the United States on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Question Indorsed—<br />

Great Britain’s Course Denounced<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9.—Those sensitive Americans who are irritated because a President of<br />

the United States in the year 1896 ventured to assert a doctrine of National interest that would be a<br />

warning to European nations that we shall not regard with indifference attempts, open or covert, to<br />

extend foreign claims to territory or to establish foreign modes of government on this continent,<br />

<strong>and</strong> who grow enthusiastic in their contempt for the young republics of South America, find in the<br />

utterances of sympathizing newspaper writers in a few South American papers what they accept as<br />

proof that in Brazil, the Argentine Republic, Chile, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> there is no fondness for us, as<br />

republicans or as human beings; that Southern republics are republican only in name, <strong>and</strong> that the<br />

people of those countries turn to Europe rather than to the United States for ideas, trade, money,<br />

<strong>and</strong> for friendship.<br />

This sort of American opinion comes, of course, from those who choose to be exasperated<br />

because the President reiterated the Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> possibly because the assertion of it may<br />

have impaired the value for a short time of some of the speculative undertakings with which halfhearted<br />

Americans may sometimes be connected, <strong>and</strong> which possibly lead them to be willing to<br />

sacrifice American feeling for profit. But the accusations are important, according to their truth or<br />

falsity. <strong>Venezuela</strong> may not be republican as the United States is. Chile may fall short of our<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing of what a republic should be. Brazil may be not fully settled under a republican form.<br />

But such as are the others, <strong>and</strong> such as is Brazil, there is, no doubt, in all of those countries that were<br />

under Spanish or Portuguese control a few years ago, a very strong sympathy with the republican<br />

feeling in the United States <strong>and</strong> a desire that the people of those countries shall by <strong>and</strong> by enjoy all<br />

the freedom that is now enjoyed by our people. Brazil, in forming a republic, adopted our<br />

Constitution with a few slight modifications. <strong>The</strong> people have friendly to the United States ever<br />

since before Dom Pedro was deposed. With all the South American States, Brazil has regarded with<br />

great concern the development of the controversy about the application of the Monroe doctrine.<br />

Brazil in Hearty Accord<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> sent his message on the <strong>Venezuela</strong> situation to the Congress on Dec. 17.<br />

Very promptly after it was made known, the Minister of Brazil sent by cable to his Government<br />

about 1,500 words of the most important statements contained in the communication. Owing to<br />

delays in the telegraphic service, the dispatch was not published in Rio until Dec. 19.<br />

Immediately upon the meeting of the Senate, on the 19th, a resolution congratulating President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> was adopted by a unanimous vote. This action was taken on the same day on which the<br />

United States Senate approved the message <strong>and</strong> passed the bill authorizing the commission asked for<br />

by President Clevel<strong>and</strong>. At the meeting of the House of Deputies, on the same day, Senhor<br />

Francisco Glycerico introduced a resolution congratulating the House of Representatives upon the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n message of the President. In submitting his resolution, Senhor Glycerico spoke as<br />

fol1ows:<br />

Mr. President: This morning’s papers contain telegrams giving a summary of the message addressed by<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong> to the United States Congress. According to that summary, the message is an explicit<br />

application of the Monroe doctrine, a doctrine which denies to the European powers the right to meddle in matters<br />

which concern the sovereignty of the nations of this continent.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Brazilian Senate, to which, under our legislative system, belongs the initiative in matters relating to<br />

international relations, has just passed a resolution congratulating President Clevel<strong>and</strong> on this act <strong>and</strong> assuring him<br />

of its political support <strong>and</strong> complete adherence to the Monroe doctrine.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chamber, not departing from the lines of conduct observed by it on such subjects, has concurred in<br />

offering its political support to the vote of the Senate, offering likewise its most express <strong>and</strong> sincere approbation of<br />

that doctrine of international policy set forth in so timely a manner to the nations of this continent by the<br />

distinguished President of the United States. [Applause.]<br />

What the Doctrine Means to Brazil<br />

Our own country has at this moment controversies of exceptional importance with European powers on our<br />

continent. It is very clear, then, that the vote of this Chamber will only concern the nature <strong>and</strong> application of the<br />

Monroe doctrine, <strong>and</strong> repeat the assurance of our sympathy with it without in any way associating it with the<br />

patriotic sentiments entertained with respect to our own international questions.<br />

I do not make this declaration in order to lessen the force of the political sentiment expressed in the motion I<br />

am about to present, but to put in a clearer light that it is the confirmed conviction of the Brazilians that the honor<br />

of its flag, the dignity of its institutions, <strong>and</strong> the sovereignty of its territory are, above everything else, superior to the<br />

hard contingencies involved in the efficiency of our resources [General applause.]<br />

My opinion is an opinion inspired less by the enthusiasm of the moment—although that would be quite<br />

justifiable—than by a sentiment of political conservatism, which reminds me that the nations of the world enjoy<br />

internal peace <strong>and</strong> the respect of others for their political independence <strong>and</strong> their territorial integrity in proportion as<br />

the idea is fixed in the public mind that the depositaries of its confidence do not lay the bases of its material<br />

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greatness by sacrificing in the slightest degree its moral gr<strong>and</strong>eur, but that they lay them securely <strong>and</strong> only in the<br />

sentiment of national honor <strong>and</strong> civic duty.<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolution of the Senate, like that which I am about to submit to the consideration of the Chamber,<br />

expresses no sentiment of aggression, but rather indorses that doctrine of American policy which recognizes <strong>and</strong><br />

proclaims the abstract principle of defense of the territorial sovereignty of this continent<br />

<strong>The</strong> people of the United States expect that the good sense <strong>and</strong> prudence of the other nations will concur in<br />

that doctrine, having an equal interest with themselves in its support, as an element of peace throughout the civilized<br />

world. And we mean offense to no one in offering to the leading American power the assurances of our solidarity<br />

with it in respect to the territorial sovereignty of the Western Continent.<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolution offered by Senhor Glycerico, the leader of the uncompromising Republicans,<br />

who constitute the great majority in that body, is as follows:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Chamber of Deputies of the United States of Brazil congratulates the House of Representatives of the<br />

American Union on the dignified message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, who so nobly defends the rights, the sovereignty,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the liberty of the American nations involved in the Monroe doctrine.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> resolution was submitted <strong>and</strong> passed unanimously <strong>and</strong> without discussion.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Extreme Republican View<br />

O Paiz, the organ of the extreme Republican Party in Brazil, in its Issue of Dec. 20, after giving<br />

its readers a summary of the leading points of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message in relation to the<br />

dispute between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, made the following remarks:<br />

<strong>The</strong> English, with their usual arrogance, which is born of the false presumption that everything not already the<br />

property of the United Kingdom is destined, sooner or later, to became so, have invaded the territory of <strong>Venezuela</strong>,<br />

attracted by the rich deposits of gold along the banks of the Orinoco.<br />

<strong>The</strong> check given to these adventurers by Gen. Crespo has embittered the relations of the two Governments,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Great Britain began to take steps to make its usurpation effective, appealing to the higher interests of<br />

civilization, when President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, through the Ambassador of the United States in London, expressed to the<br />

English Government the extreme displeasure that such threatened conquest was exciting in the American people,<br />

<strong>and</strong> proposed, as the solution most worthy of the power of Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the dignity of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, that all the points<br />

of this prolonged <strong>and</strong> dangerous controversy be submitted to impartial arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government was not disposed to accept the proposition of Mr. Olney, made through Mr. Bayard,<br />

<strong>and</strong>, fearing the loss of those valuable deposits of gold that made so large a figure in its covetous eyes, insisted on its<br />

policy of occupation <strong>and</strong> abuse of superior power, that had withstood the conciliatory advances of Gen. Crespo <strong>and</strong><br />

had forgotten the precedents by former English diplomats in the Bering Sea <strong>and</strong> Alabama questions.<br />

This obstinacy of the <strong>British</strong> Government in excluding all doubts in regard to the lawfulness of its title to the<br />

territory which it occupies by force is aggravated in the face of the civilized world by the impertinent ultimatum with<br />

which it is accompanied, usually a measure of last resort, but which, in <strong>British</strong> diplomacy, has become an ordinary<br />

proceeding.<br />

This abuse of force on the part of the Cabinet of St. James has excited the surprise, not only of the American,<br />

but also of the European press, including a portion of the English journals, all of which find reasons to fear the evil<br />

results of this easy way at settling disputed questions by a threat of force.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Ultimatum<br />

<strong>The</strong> ultimatum addressed to Gen. Crespo, dem<strong>and</strong>ing indemnification for the ill treatment of an English subject<br />

in a territory which Engl<strong>and</strong> claims as its own, simply because it has taken possession of it <strong>and</strong> established a police<br />

station in it, but which <strong>Venezuela</strong> regards as its property, seeing in the English occupation nothing more than a<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

threatened robbery <strong>and</strong> an attack on its sovereignty—that ultimatum, we say, may possibly cause Great Britain to<br />

lose its arrogance of conquest, that shocking audacity which, by the voice of its cannon, would drown the protests<br />

of nations feeble in military force but jealous of their honor.<br />

<strong>The</strong> individual in question was imprisoned while the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n forces were sweeping by force from their<br />

territory the intruding adventurers who had taken possession of the gold mines.<br />

<strong>The</strong> region in which the act took place had not been considered as part of the contested territory, but the<br />

English, as soon as they discovered the precious metal, considered it as their property, in the name of civilization<br />

<strong>and</strong> of the profits which, by right should belong to the English capital employed there in mining. Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

dem<strong>and</strong>ed satisfaction for the repulse of the adventurers <strong>and</strong> indemnification for the imprisoned.<br />

If Gen. Crespo should pay the amount dem<strong>and</strong>ed by the English Government, that act would be a recognition<br />

of the rights of Great Britain in the territory which he considered as belonging to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. For this reason he<br />

refuses to comply with the ultimatum, a refusal about which the opinion of the Government of the United States is<br />

not yet known. <strong>The</strong> English Government at once issued orders for the forces stationed in <strong>Guiana</strong> to invade the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n frontier, <strong>and</strong> has ordered the assembling of a fleet of twelve vessels to enforce the rights of the <strong>British</strong><br />

Crown to the gold of <strong>Venezuela</strong> by taking possession of the Custom Houses of that country.<br />

<strong>The</strong> lion of Engl<strong>and</strong> plants his paws upon American territory; <strong>and</strong> before this barefaced attempt at confiscation<br />

<strong>and</strong> pillage, wade under the ridiculous pretext of a service done to humanity, of this abuse of avarice <strong>and</strong> superior<br />

military power practiced on a free nation, the illustrious President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, who had already proposed arbitration<br />

as the only honorable means of settling disputes of this kind between nations who prize their honor, <strong>and</strong> have in the<br />

solution no other interest than the recognition of the right, resolved to protest against the extortion, <strong>and</strong> put a stop<br />

to the robbery, in the name of Monroe, in the name of the integrity of free <strong>and</strong> independent America.<br />

A Continental Defiance<br />

This act of the eminent statesman embodies a solemn defiance, addressed by the whole continent against the<br />

policy of robbery <strong>and</strong> usurping insolence which certain powers, particularly Engl<strong>and</strong>, have employed against the<br />

American nations. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine is a declaration that European powers shall not extend their possessions by<br />

a tax upon the integrity <strong>and</strong> sovereignty of the independent American nations. Up to this time that doctrine has not<br />

taken a practical form. <strong>The</strong> fact that there had not yet arisen a man strong enough to make an application of it gave<br />

the European powers the pretext for affirming that the Monroe doctrine had not yet received international sanction,<br />

as if the right of a nation to the integrity of its own territory was not a natural corollary of its autonomy, of its very<br />

political existence <strong>and</strong> constitutional sovereignty. Now, however, President Clevel<strong>and</strong> proposes to make the ideal of<br />

Monroe of practical <strong>and</strong> sensible effect.<br />

Our duty, the duty of all men on this continent oppressed by the cupidity <strong>and</strong> force of avaricious Europeans, is<br />

to give our most hearty support to the act of this great statesman, who has with unquestioned courage, undertaken,<br />

for once at least, to muzzle the hungry lion of Engl<strong>and</strong>. We have nothing to do with the particular interests that<br />

constitute the motive of this action. Whatever may have been the sentiment or ideas which inspired it, it is gr<strong>and</strong> in<br />

itself, reveals a superior intelligence, a strong will; is the declaration of a powerful race, the triumphant champions of<br />

America.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Congress of the Republic of the United States of Brazil, in passing yesterday, unanimously, the resolution<br />

of congratulation addressed to the American Congress, expressed the sentiments of the whole Brazilian nation, <strong>and</strong><br />

embodied its protest against any attempt that may be made to encroach upon its own dominion. As America must<br />

be for Americans, so Brazil must be for Brazilians. Let all the Governments learn from Clevel<strong>and</strong> to protect their<br />

own independence, respect each other’s sovereignty, <strong>and</strong> repel all usurpers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> author of the foregoing is one of the Senators from Rio de Janeiro in the Brazilian Senate,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the leader of the uncompromising Republicans in that body.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Only Opposition<br />

<strong>The</strong> only opposition to Brazil’s making common cause with the United States in opposition to<br />

<strong>British</strong> aggressions in America comes from a small body of political malcontents, discredited<br />

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partisans of the naval revolt, who have done penance without repentance, <strong>and</strong> hate the United States<br />

because, by its action, their cause was lost. This clique finds its mouthpiece in an organ which is the<br />

property of English interests, whose pages contain whole columns from its confrere in New-York,<br />

<strong>The</strong> Evening Post, <strong>and</strong> in <strong>The</strong> Rio <strong>News</strong>, edited by a half-breed Canadian-American, who, after<br />

being disappointed in his pretensions <strong>and</strong> tenders to the provisional Government, is the recognized<br />

sl<strong>and</strong>erer of the new republic, paid <strong>and</strong> maintained by the English colony in Rio.<br />

<strong>The</strong> speech of Senhor Ramiro Barcellos, in the Brazilian Senate, on the 21st of December, 1895,<br />

upon the reception by that body of a communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />

informing the Senate that he had sent by telegraph to the Congress of the United States the<br />

resolutions passed by both bodies of the Brazilian Congress, congratulating the American Congress<br />

on the message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>, was another expression at sympathy <strong>and</strong> approval.<br />

Senhor Barcellos’s Speech<br />

After repelling insinuations made that the passage of the resolutions had been inspired rather by<br />

the enthusiasm of the moment or in obedience to the plans of a political clique, the Senator entered<br />

upon his subject as follows:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Senate, the country, <strong>and</strong> all the American nations well underst<strong>and</strong> that the supreme ideal of Engl<strong>and</strong> is the<br />

absorption of this planet. [Interjection by another Senator: “Dieu et mon droit.”] <strong>The</strong> absorption of the entire planet<br />

is her aim, <strong>and</strong> the evidence of it is that, under the different administrations of her Government, whether by one<br />

party or the other, that policy is continually pursued, day after day, methodically, little by little, so that, of the other<br />

nations of the planet do not adopt serious measures to put a barrier to the realization of that ideal, it will sooner or<br />

later be carried into effect.<br />

<strong>The</strong> policy supported by all republicans of defending America from the crafty encroachment of European<br />

nations dates not from to-day, but from the earliest times of the Republic, <strong>and</strong> above all, of establishing a strong<br />

league between the different American nations to put a stop to the absorption of their territory <strong>and</strong> of maintaining<br />

their political integrity. This, too, has been the policy of the republican Government long since firmly settled in the<br />

spirit of the statesmen of our country. <strong>The</strong> spirit, then, that inspired those resolutions was not the inspiration of a<br />

moment, as is charged, but the expression of an idea already firmly lodged in our international political spirit.<br />

It is well, then, to show that not alone in Brazil is this the dominant idea; it is manifested as well in all the<br />

American nations: <strong>and</strong> not alone in the small <strong>and</strong> feeble ones, but in the very North American Republic, because it<br />

is evident that, without that unanimity of policy, the powerful European nations will, little by little, <strong>and</strong> in their own<br />

interests, solve the problems that now threaten to crush them. <strong>The</strong> great social question of getting rid of the excess<br />

of their population, <strong>and</strong>, at the same time, preserving their political dominion over their citizens who settle in distant<br />

l<strong>and</strong>s; in a word, pocketing two profits at once.<br />

<strong>The</strong> consequence to us of not defending ourselves from the operation of that policy whose purposes are no<br />

secret, because they are constantly translated into acts, will be our return to our former colonial condition. We are<br />

still a feeble nation, just beginning our national existence; from a commercial point at view a colony, still dependent<br />

upon Europe, <strong>and</strong> if we allow ourselves to be absorbed politically, we shall go back to our primitive condition.<br />

This is the simple truth, <strong>and</strong> while we act as public men we must not only have the present before our eyes, but<br />

must provide for the future, <strong>and</strong> observe the attitude of foreign nations toward us. Nothing could be plainer than<br />

this, <strong>and</strong> yet the attempt has been purposely made to distort its interpretation, <strong>and</strong> falsity its spirit. A nation, our<br />

neighbor, a very feeble nation, without military resources, is suffering from the violent aggression of a nation<br />

powerful, strong among the strongest.<br />

<strong>The</strong> English Attitude<br />

This great nation that is violating the rights of the weaker rejects the arbitration proposed for the settlement of<br />

the contested boundary, <strong>and</strong>, strangely enough, while pursuing this course with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, proposes the same<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

method of solution for its dispute with us—that is, to settle a question of ownership that was never before in<br />

dispute, of territory that has never been beyond our dominion.<br />

Now when the case is presented of a sister <strong>and</strong> friendly nation which, under the shadow of a threat, receives the<br />

protection of a North American republic, it was clearly our duty to congratulate the strong nation which, in all<br />

disinterestedness, <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ing by the principles of its international policy, removes from the region of theory to the<br />

dominion of fact those principles which it is the duty of all of us to adopt. [Applause.]<br />

It was in pursuance of this duty that the Senate gave its unanimous support to a message of the American<br />

President <strong>and</strong> now does not hesitate to affirm to the press or to any one, whoever he may be. Let us, then, have no<br />

insinuations, hypocritically breathed to create political discord, in the presence of a great international question<br />

involving the pride <strong>and</strong> dignity of the Brazilian nation.<br />

This act of the Congress must be considered <strong>and</strong> accepted by the President of the Republic as an act or<br />

solidarity, because no Brazilian would do it the injustice of supposing that such a body could put itself in opposition<br />

to the national interests.<br />

He must believe that it is inspired by no other than a patriotic sentiment, especially in regard to this gravest of<br />

questions, both from its nature <strong>and</strong> from the results it may produce.<br />

This is the view that must be taken of the action of the Senate, <strong>and</strong> I declare it aloud to all, <strong>and</strong> particularly to<br />

the press, whose Influence In these questions is very strong, in order that this wise <strong>and</strong> patriotic action of the<br />

Congress of the Republic of the United States of Brazil may not lose one iota of its merit.<br />

Senhor Nilo Pecanha’s Address<br />

Senhor Nilo Pecanha, in the Brazilian House of Deputies on Dec. 23. made a speech on the<br />

message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>. He said, in part, as follows:<br />

So precarious, so painful, <strong>and</strong> so grave is to-day the situation in regard to the international policy of the country,<br />

so pressing are the problems in which the honor of our country is involved, that every parliamentary effort to<br />

strengthen, protect, <strong>and</strong> encourage the right of Brazil is worth a crusade in the cause of civic honor.<br />

<strong>The</strong> message of President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has closed forever for the people of America the period of diplomatic<br />

hypocrisies. To North America has fallen the good fortune of consecrating the doctrine on which rests the<br />

sovereignty, the support of the independence <strong>and</strong> territorial integrity of the New World. To the higher conquests of<br />

maritime law <strong>and</strong> to the settled principles of internationalism, the Americans are now associated a determined <strong>and</strong><br />

heroic movement, are rallying to the banner of a weak nation, <strong>and</strong> repelling the advances of <strong>British</strong> rapine. It is not<br />

enough that we concur in the sentiment of the North American President, <strong>and</strong>, as Americans, applaud the resistance<br />

offered by <strong>Venezuela</strong>; we must tale part in the dispute, interested as we are, neighbors as we are, as a nation whose<br />

interests may become compromised in the hazards <strong>and</strong> course of this important struggle.<br />

I offer to the Chamber a copy of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times, which contains a map of the territory claimed by the<br />

English in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> a history of the pending question, as once understood by Lord Aberdeen, as now<br />

interpreted by Lord Granville, <strong>and</strong> showing the ever increasing pretentions, the usurping tendencies of the<br />

European invader.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns concede the territory lying between the Pomarons <strong>and</strong> the Cuyuni Rivers, <strong>and</strong> the English<br />

insist more strongly than ever on the Schomburgk line extending from the Orinoco to the end of the Roraima chain.<br />

But will not this same line, if prolonged toward the south, enter Brazilian territory reaching as far as Pirara, <strong>and</strong><br />

perhaps to Fort San Joaquin, on the Rio Branco, territory that is indisputably Brazilian? If the North Americans<br />

claim in the name of Monroe the right to mark the boundary line between the two countries, why should not we be<br />

prepared for the various possible solutions of the question, <strong>and</strong> thus avoid a second attack upon the integrity of our<br />

dear country?<br />

Will not <strong>British</strong> effrontery pretend that the Schomburgk line shall be applied to Brazil as well as to <strong>Venezuela</strong>?<br />

That shall never be. <strong>The</strong> Government of the republic must, in this as in all other international questions, speak to<br />

foreign nations as the mouthpiece of a proud, free, <strong>and</strong> civilized people.<br />

I regret that the President of the republic has not yet replied to the <strong>British</strong> proposition of arbitration in the<br />

question of Trinidad. Is his Excellency in doubt as to the matter? Does his Excellency think that it is a proper time<br />

to disregard the opinion of the country, which entire <strong>and</strong> unanimous, will never accept arbitration in regard to that<br />

which is indisputably <strong>and</strong> sacredly our own?<br />

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<strong>The</strong> public spirit is under a painful impression, <strong>and</strong> the fear is hanging over it that in this affair we may be as<br />

unsuccessful as we have been in other questions equally grave, equally stirring.<br />

<strong>The</strong> course of a certain part of the press, too, is making a disagreeable impression on the public mind. Were<br />

that press not Brazilian, one would say that its utterances were inspired by English influences; were it not the<br />

traditional defender of the nation <strong>and</strong> of the glory of the republic, it might be thought to be interested in the defeat<br />

of our great cause. It talks about the intervention of the United States. <strong>The</strong> policy of intervention is European, it is<br />

hostile to liberty, <strong>and</strong> almost always ready to impose the ignominious collar of annexation <strong>and</strong> protectorates.<br />

Witness the congress of Verona, of Leybach, <strong>and</strong> of Trappau. Behold its criminal interference in the affairs of<br />

Naples, <strong>and</strong> the unjustifiable attack upon the autonomy of Spain. That was the sinister policy of the imperial regime<br />

in Europe.<br />

Ask the Brazilian journalist who fought for emancipation on which side Engl<strong>and</strong> was found in the struggle<br />

which determined the fate of slavery in the United States.<br />

Let him remember the patriotic proclamation, full of passion <strong>and</strong> of eloquence:<br />

“We heard upon the high seas the whistle of a man-of-war, built by a confederacy of slave traders, backed by<br />

English gold, sailing from an English port, manned by English sailors, with the connivance of English officials, <strong>and</strong><br />

that in spite or the royal declaration of neutrality.”<br />

Let our President reply to Engl<strong>and</strong> as Engl<strong>and</strong> replied to America: “<strong>The</strong> arbitration proposed is offensive to the<br />

dignity of our country.”<br />

If there is sympathy for Great Britain to be discovered in Brazil, or dislike for the United States, it is not<br />

revealed in any of these speeches, provoked by President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message.<br />

[10 February 1896]<br />

- 283 -<br />

LET WELL ENOUGH ALONE<br />

Senator Smith of New-Jersey Discusses the Monroe Doctrine<br />

GIVES EXCELLENT ADVICE TO CONGRESS<br />

Opposes the Sewell <strong>and</strong> Davis Resolutions—He Is Satisfied<br />

the Administration Knows What It Is About<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10.—Senator Smith of New-Jersey to-day made his promised speech on<br />

the Monroe doctrine. It was a strong <strong>and</strong> earnest appeal to the Senate to leave the <strong>Venezuela</strong> matter<br />

for the present to the Administration, which, Mr. Smith said, was fully competent to h<strong>and</strong>le it.<br />

In opening his speech, Mr. Smith said it was not his intention to attempt a definition of what<br />

was known as the Monroe doctrine, nor to analyze the various arguments which had been made<br />

upon the question of National policy raised by the President’s message. He would say at the outset<br />

that he was opposed to the adoption of the resolution introduced by his colleague, <strong>and</strong> he was quite<br />

as strongly opposed to the adoption of the resolution introduced by the Senator from Minnesota,<br />

<strong>and</strong> reported in an amended form by the Committee on Foreign Relations, <strong>and</strong> would supplement<br />

these two assertions with the remark that he had little sympathy with the position assumed by the<br />

Senator from Colorado. Mr. Smith, in giving his reasons for his attitude in the matter, said:<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no occasion for any action of any kind upon this subject by this body at this time.<br />

We have done all that either prudence can justify or patriotism dem<strong>and</strong>. We have met the<br />

situation outlined to us by the President in such a manner as to show that there is no division of<br />

sentiment in the Government of the United States when any question of National honor is<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

involved. So much we have done unanimously in both houses without regard to party lines or<br />

personal feelings, because to have faltered or delayed would have been a violation of our plain<br />

duty to the American people. By entering upon a discussion of what we have already done, <strong>and</strong><br />

by reopening the question which we have already answered, we could only succeed in nullifying,<br />

or, at least, qualifying, the action we have already taken.<br />

Congress received Dec. 17 from the President a message outlining the position of this<br />

country as it related to the existing controversy between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. In that<br />

message the President pointed out, with his usual clearness of vision <strong>and</strong> characteristic vigor of<br />

expression, the bearing of that difficulty upon the welfare, integrity, <strong>and</strong> best interests of this<br />

Nation. He insisted, rightfully, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the United States were<br />

concerned in a controversy which might result in the seizure of American territory by a<br />

European Government. He proved conclusively from official correspondence the obvious desire<br />

of Great Britain to enlarge, so far as may be within its power, the domain of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. He<br />

directed attention to the efforts which have been made to induce Great Britain to submit the<br />

question of a boundary line between its possessions <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> to arbitration. He laid<br />

particular stress upon the fact that all such efforts had been in vain.<br />

Both houses have done all that the President <strong>and</strong> Secretary of State, charged with the<br />

responsibility of diplomatic negotiations with other powers, desired, <strong>and</strong> all that the people<br />

expected.<br />

It is not only unnecessary, but unwise, to either qualify or intensify our action thus taken in<br />

response to both an executive <strong>and</strong> a public dem<strong>and</strong>. This is the first <strong>and</strong> chief reason why I am<br />

opposed to the resolutions introduced by my colleague, as well as those recommended by the<br />

Committee on Foreign Relations.<br />

Nor can I agree with my colleague when he says that “this action was premature <strong>and</strong><br />

inopportune, in view of the business <strong>and</strong> financial condition of the country.” Such a confession<br />

is only stultification. If every act of a President of the United States involving National honor or<br />

National disgrace can only be taken with propriety when the business <strong>and</strong> financial condition is<br />

such as to warrant it, then great indeed must be the indignation of my colleague when he<br />

contemplates the conduct of George Washington, James Madison, <strong>and</strong>. above all, the many <strong>and</strong><br />

most “inopportune” acts of Abraham Lincoln.<br />

I will not make reply in any sense to the remarks submitted by the brilliant Senator from<br />

Colorado. I cannot, however, refrain from saying that, in his admiration of the courage <strong>and</strong><br />

persistence which have always characterized the English race, he may have overlooked or<br />

misjudged some of the causes which have in times past induced the exhibition of those<br />

admirable qualities.<br />

No harm can result from lauding the deeds of English sailors <strong>and</strong> English soldiers. But, Sir,<br />

for one, I prefer to contemplate the achievements of Washington, of Greene, of Putnam, of<br />

Allen, of Jackson, of Paul Jones, <strong>and</strong> even of Lafayette to those of Clive, Wellington, Nelson,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the others whose acts have made so deep an impression upon the mind <strong>and</strong> heart of the<br />

Senator from Colorado.<br />

This country, Sir, owes nothing to Engl<strong>and</strong>. If ties of kindred have been broken she was the<br />

aggressor. From the very beginning of the attempt of the noble men who achieved American<br />

independence to the present day the attitude of a Great Britain toward this Nation has been one<br />

first of contempt then of hostility, then of submission to force of arms, <strong>and</strong> since that time of<br />

ever increasing jealousy, until it became the part of wisdom <strong>and</strong> prudence to assume the<br />

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condescending <strong>and</strong> patronizing attitude perfectly typified in the language of Lord Salisbury in his<br />

letter to our Secretary of State.<br />

I come now, Mr. President, to the resolution submitted by the Senator from Minnesota upon<br />

behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, <strong>and</strong> I oppose the adoption of these upon the<br />

broad ground that there is no occasion or necessity for such definition of the Monroe doctrine<br />

by this body at this time. I do not object to the strong American position outlined by these<br />

resolutions, neither do I see much to criticise in their language when applied simply <strong>and</strong> solely to<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy. But I do insist that it is the height of folly to attempt to provide in<br />

this way for all cases trenching upon the principle represented by the Monroe doctrine, which<br />

may arise in the future.<br />

<strong>The</strong> only reason I have yet heard advanced for making a specific <strong>and</strong> official definition of the<br />

doctrine at this time is that foreign powers should not be enabled to say, as the Premier of Great<br />

Britain did say in his communication to the Secretary of State, that the principle had never been<br />

officially promulgated. It is insisted that we must not leave to them the privilege of excuse upon<br />

the ground that they have never heard of it. I am not prepared, Mr. President, to admit that this<br />

necessity has existed for a moment since President Monroe made his famous declaration, but<br />

even granting that this may have been so until very recently, it does seem to me very plain that<br />

such necessity does not exist to-day. <strong>The</strong> ringing message of the President of the United States,<br />

promptly supported by the unanimous vote of both houses of Congress, <strong>and</strong> by the unanimous<br />

sentiment of the country, is sufficient notice to every power in the civilized world that the<br />

Monroe doctrine is a fixed principle of this Government, to be maintained in all cases <strong>and</strong> at all<br />

hazards.<br />

Now, consider for a moment the attitude of our own people. <strong>The</strong>y upheld the President <strong>and</strong><br />

Congress in emphasizing <strong>and</strong> applying this great National principle to the case in h<strong>and</strong>, but signs<br />

multiply that their common sense does not <strong>and</strong> will not approve of unnecessary <strong>and</strong><br />

unwarranted action upon our part. We showed by our prompt co-operation our satisfaction with<br />

the position assumed by the President. We did all that he asked or desired, <strong>and</strong> turned the whole<br />

subject back, in accordance with his suggestion, into the proper diplomatic channels. <strong>The</strong><br />

problem is now where it should be, in the h<strong>and</strong>s of the President <strong>and</strong> Secretary of State. Every<br />

one of us knows <strong>and</strong> the people know that in the interest of both patriotism <strong>and</strong> prudence, it<br />

could not be in a better place.<br />

<strong>The</strong> patriotic sentiment of the United States is great <strong>and</strong> powerful, but it is not greater or<br />

more potent than the conservative common sense which characterizes our whole people. For<br />

one, I believe that they are satisfied. <strong>The</strong> most popular thing we could do to-day, <strong>and</strong> probably in<br />

the present condition of affairs the most beneficial thing we could do, would be to pass the<br />

necessary appropriation bills <strong>and</strong> go home. <strong>The</strong> mere fact that we are in session is a menace to<br />

the revival of business <strong>and</strong> the return of prosperity.<br />

As a Democrat, I might, for partisan reasons, rejoice in such a condition, while one branch<br />

of Congress contains an overwhelming Republican majority, <strong>and</strong> the other is controlled by a<br />

combination of Republicans <strong>and</strong> Populists; but as a citizen, professing to possess some portion<br />

of the common sense characteristic at my countrymen, I deplore it.<br />

Others may consider it a patriotic duty to remain here for the sole purpose of emphasizing<br />

devotion to the lost cause of silver, <strong>and</strong> of listening to discussions of an unjust <strong>and</strong> unwise tariff<br />

revision, which every Senator knows cannot be enacted into law, but I, for one, am free to say<br />

that I see no necessity for such action <strong>and</strong> feel no call to such duty. Of all the resolutions that<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

have been introduced, or may be introduced, I can think of but one for which I would cheerfully<br />

<strong>and</strong> gladly give my vote, <strong>and</strong> that is to adjourn sine die.<br />

If circumstances permitted us to take this course, I am confident the whole country would<br />

rise up <strong>and</strong> call us blessed; but since they do not, I suppose there is nothing to do but remain<br />

here, subject to the dominion of a Republican-Populistic combination, <strong>and</strong> bear as best we can<br />

the just reprobation sure to be visited upon this body as a whole by the great majority of<br />

thinking American people.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Republicans did not relish Mr. Smith’s concluding words.<br />

[11 February 1896]<br />

- 284 -<br />

THE QUEEN’S FRIENDLY WORDS<br />

<strong>The</strong> expressions in the Queens speech yesterday referring to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question were of an<br />

extremely friendly character, <strong>and</strong> it is, perhaps, not unwarrantable to infer that the Queen herself<br />

may have had somewhat more direct personal influence in framing them than she is accustomed to<br />

exert. We quote from the speech:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Government of the United States have expressed a wish to co-operate in terminating the<br />

differences which have existed for many years between my Government <strong>and</strong> the Republic of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> upon the boundary of that country <strong>and</strong> my colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. I have expressed my<br />

sympathy with the desire to come to an equitable arrangement, <strong>and</strong> I trust that further negotiations<br />

will lead to a satisfactory settlement.”<br />

In one sense this language is sufficiently guarded, <strong>and</strong> is properly so, but its spirit is beyond<br />

criticism. It distinctly recognizes as the motive of the United States “the desire to come to an<br />

equitable arrangement,” <strong>and</strong> it describes the proposition of the United States as due “a wish to cooperate.”<br />

So formal, dignified, <strong>and</strong> c<strong>and</strong>id a statement must be accepted as promising the removal or<br />

all serious obstacles to a peaceful adjustment.<br />

What will be the exact course or objective of the “further negotiations” to which the Queen<br />

refers with confidence cannot yet be stated. But, as we have frequently pointed out, there have been<br />

kept open from the start by the Government of the United States several ways in which fair<br />

negotiation might easily <strong>and</strong> with honor to all concerned attain a “satisfactory settlement.” We have<br />

entire confidence that when that result shall have been reached the respect of the world for the<br />

purposes of the United States <strong>and</strong> the principles by which they are guided will be strengthened, <strong>and</strong><br />

that both peace <strong>and</strong> justice in the relations of our country <strong>and</strong> our continent with other countries<br />

will rest on a foundation firmer than ever.<br />

[12 February 1896]<br />

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- 285 -<br />

HARCOURT ON MONROE DOCTRINE<br />

Balfour’s Reply to His Appeal for Arbitration About <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

QUEEN’S SPEECH DEBATE<br />

LONDON. Feb. 11.—<strong>The</strong> House of Commons after listening to the Queen’s speech in the<br />

House of Lords resumed its sitting at 4 o’clock, the usual hour of assembling, except on<br />

Wednesdays when the House meets at noon. <strong>The</strong> Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of<br />

State for the Colonies, entered the House shortly after it had been called to order <strong>and</strong> was<br />

vociferously cheered.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Right Hon. George J. Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, announced that Feb. 13 the<br />

Government would introduce a bill providing for the construction of works for naval purposes. <strong>The</strong><br />

announcement was received with cheers from all sections of the House.<br />

George J. Goschen, Jr., son of the Right Hon. George J. Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty<br />

<strong>and</strong> member for the East Grinstead Division of Sussex, moved the address in reply to the speech<br />

from the throne, <strong>and</strong> the motion was seconded by Sir Herbert E. Maxwell, member for<br />

Wigtownshire.<br />

Sir William Harcourt, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the late Ministry, <strong>and</strong> leader of the<br />

Opposition in the House, said he had never in all his experience met such critical circumstances as<br />

those with which they were now confronted. It was in the highest degree desirable, he said, that the<br />

misunderst<strong>and</strong>ing between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States over the Monroe doctrine should be<br />

removed in both countries at the earliest possible moment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government of the United States had expressed a desire to co-operate in a friendly solution<br />

of the dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> he was rejoiced to see in the speech from<br />

the throne that the prospect was welcomed.<br />

<strong>The</strong> only practical question remaining was whether in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n difficulty there had been<br />

any invasion of the rights of the United States, as upon that point no pronouncement had been<br />

made by the United States Government. It was, in his judgment, a doubtful question, whether the<br />

United States could not justly co-operate in the settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n difference in default of<br />

that Government’s having in its possession all of the information bearing thereon, which was at<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s disposal.<br />

Sir William said:<br />

I think the speech from the throne holds out the hope that the question is ready for immediate settlement No<br />

criticism of such a conclusion shall fall from my lips. Every member must feel deep responsibility in speaking on the<br />

subject, <strong>and</strong> take care that no word shall embarrass the Government in seeking a settlement. All the members ought<br />

to endeavor to aid in anything tending to smooth the ruffled feelings of Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America. [Cries of “Hear,”<br />

“Hear.”]<br />

Among the leading causes of irritation was the notion that arose in America that there was a disposition on the<br />

part of Great Britain to question the Monroe doctrine, for which Americans have an affectionate <strong>and</strong> passionate<br />

attachment. That notion is now disclaimed <strong>and</strong> dispelled. <strong>The</strong> Monroe doctrine is not a doctrine of international<br />

law, but a principle of national policy akin to what in the last century was called the balance of power, on which<br />

Great Britain had interposed in Belgium, Greece, <strong>and</strong> many other places.<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States, following the wise teachings of Washington, have declared that they would not interfere in<br />

European affairs, but it is their fixed policy to oppose the invasion of the territorial <strong>and</strong> political rights of the<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

American States. That is the Monroe doctrine. I cannot underst<strong>and</strong> why Engl<strong>and</strong>’s feelings should be ruffled by<br />

them.<br />

I rejoice to hear that the United States wish to co-operate to settle the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute. <strong>The</strong>re has been a<br />

great deal of newspaper talk that the irritating intervention of the United States ought to be resented. <strong>The</strong><br />

Government does not resent or repel this intervention. On the contrary, they announce that they are willing to cooperate.<br />

It has been said that the United States Commission is offensive to Great Britain. That is not the view of the<br />

Government, for Mr. Goschen, at Bristol, declared that he did not think there was cause for complaint. That was a<br />

complete acceptance of the commission. [Cries of “Hear,” “Hear.”]<br />

I regret the delay in the publication of the case of Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> that a prompt <strong>and</strong> honorable<br />

conclusion of the affair be arrived at.<br />

It cannot be denied that the ownership of a portion of the disputed territory is doubtful, though people who are<br />

the most ignorant of the matter pronounce on the ownership with the greatest confidence. It is the business of<br />

diplomacy to settle the matter. It is not creditable that the question should be allowed to fester until it shall break<br />

into a dangerous sore, breeding bad blood between the two great nations.<br />

It is the first duty of the Government to adopt a measure without delay to heal the trouble. [Cheers.] <strong>The</strong><br />

country without distinction of party dem<strong>and</strong>s the earliest solution of the question. [“Hear,” “Hear.”] <strong>The</strong>re are two<br />

methods of settlement. One by an amicable convention setting aside archive research. If that cannot be attained,<br />

what objection can there be to a reference to arbitration of a third power? [Cheers.]<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, to their honor, profess to be great advocates of arbitration throughout the<br />

world. <strong>The</strong>re are questions beyond the reach of arbitration. This is not one of them. According to Lord Salisbury’s<br />

dispatch of November, it is a question of the limitation of arbitration. You ought not to be too strict <strong>and</strong> arbitrary.<br />

It is not for one party to a dispute to define what is in dispute. If you chose to lay down a definite line excluding the<br />

extreme claims of one party, do you think it reasonable that the other side should be left open so you may gain by<br />

arbitration while they may gain nothing?<br />

Believing that both Governments are sincerely anxious to co-operate, it ought to be the object of every man on<br />

both sides of the Atlantic to do what he can to bring about a settlement [“Hear, hear!”] Diplomatic punctilios over<br />

past transactions ought not to st<strong>and</strong> in the way. <strong>The</strong> question is far too grave for party considerations. We must<br />

obliterate past controversies <strong>and</strong> apply our minds solely <strong>and</strong> singly to the question as it now st<strong>and</strong>s, make known to<br />

the world that sincere justice shall be done, <strong>and</strong> adapt the best means to see it done.<br />

Upon the conclusion of his speech Sir William was greeted with cheers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Right Hon. Arthur J. Balfour, First Lord of the Treasury <strong>and</strong> Government leader in the<br />

House, followed Sir William Vernon Harcourt. He said:<br />

Sir William has attacked some opinions that were never held by the Ministerial side. We never suggested for a<br />

moment that the United States intended to insult Great Britain in inquiring into the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary matter.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government does not see any reasons for offering any criticism of the Monroe doctrine.<br />

So far from looking at the appointment of the American commission as an insult, the United States<br />

Government having appealed to us in ordinary diplomatic intercourse to aid them with all the information at our<br />

disposal, at the earliest moment we shall give it, but when Sir William Vernon-Harcourt says that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

boundary is in obscurity, <strong>and</strong> no clear view can be taken, let me remind him that since 1844 Engl<strong>and</strong> has made<br />

serious <strong>and</strong> honest attempts to get it settled, for reasons not connected with English politics, ambition, or greed.<br />

Each attempt failed. We will not be prevented now by diplomatic punctilios or false pride from trying to finally<br />

settle it. [Cheers.]<br />

<strong>The</strong>re may be interests altogether apart from the future settlement of boundaries. We owe duties to our children<br />

in the colonies which we must perform. Unless they are defended we would not deserve the confidence of the<br />

country.<br />

It is impossible to foresee what general conclusions the American Commission or those who are inquiring into<br />

the <strong>British</strong> case here may arrive at, but I am certain that everyone, American or <strong>British</strong>, who is impartially<br />

considering the subject will be convinced that there never has been <strong>and</strong> is not now the slightest intention on the part<br />

of Engl<strong>and</strong> to violently attack the substance or sense of the Monroe doctrine. No illegitimate ambition, nor<br />

unworthy greed for territory or desire to step beyond the due limits or frontiers of the empire has ever animated the<br />

<strong>British</strong> policy throughout this long controversy.<br />

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I can only add that I shall rejoice, that the country, <strong>and</strong> the public opinion of the world will rejoice, if out of this<br />

toil shall spring the good fruit of a general system of arbitration. If that shall be the result of these controversies, I<br />

shall feel that all the evil done will have been more than compensated for <strong>and</strong> that a permanent guarantee of the<br />

good will of the English-speaking peoples on both sides of the Atlantic will have been obtained for all time. . .<br />

[Cheers.]<br />

[12 February 1896]<br />

- 286 -<br />

ENGLAND WILL FURNISH EVIDENCE<br />

Lord Salisbury Replies Courteously to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission’s Suggestion<br />

LONDON, Feb. 11.—A parliamentary paper has been issued containing the correspondence<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States since 1887 relative to the boundary of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

This correspondence shows that the successive Ministries have taken the position described by the<br />

Earl of Kimberley in 1895, namely, that Great Britain declines to arbitrate the question of the<br />

ownership of the settled parts of the territory claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> does not accept a material<br />

modification of the provisional boundary of 1886.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, she is willing to concede without arbitration a large part of the territory<br />

comprised in <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s extreme claim, <strong>and</strong> to arbitrate the question of the ownership of the<br />

intermediate zone.<br />

<strong>The</strong> correspondence concludes with recent dispatches exchanged by Secretary of State Olney<br />

<strong>and</strong> Lord Salisbury. <strong>The</strong> first of these dispatches, sent through Ambassador Bayard Feb. 3, informed<br />

Lord Salisbury that the American commission had been formed <strong>and</strong> was sitting at Washington, <strong>and</strong><br />

that being in no wise an arbitration tribunal, having had its duty limited to ascertaining the facts, it<br />

had suggested to Mr. Olney that it would be grateful for such assistance as could be obtainable<br />

through the co-operation of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong>refore, Mr. Olney applied to his Lordship, if entirely consistent with his sense of<br />

international propriety, to furnish such documentary proof, historical narrative in the unpublished<br />

archives, <strong>and</strong> other evidence within the power of the Government, <strong>and</strong> also any facilities<br />

conveniently possible.<br />

<strong>The</strong> dispatch quotes part of Justice Brewer’s letter to Secretary Olney, <strong>and</strong> concludes that the<br />

purpose of the investigation is certainly hostile to none, nor can it advantage any that the effort to<br />

procure the desired information should fail of its purpose, the sole concern of the United States<br />

being a peaceful solution of a controversy between friendly powers.<br />

Lord Salisbury replied Feb. 7, that any information at the comm<strong>and</strong> of the Government upon<br />

any subject of inquiry occupying the attention of the Government of the United States readily would<br />

be placed at the disposal of the President. He announced the collection of documents for<br />

Parliamentary proceeding, <strong>and</strong> promised Mr. Bayard advance copies as soon as they are complete.<br />

Mr. Bayard replied Feb. 10, thanking Lord Salisbury, <strong>and</strong> assuring him that the United. States<br />

Government would appreciate his courtesy.<br />

[12 February 1896]<br />

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- 287 -<br />

VENEZUELA COMMISSION PLEASED<br />

Effect of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Agreement to Submit Evidence—Documents Here <strong>and</strong> Abroad<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 14.—At their regular weekly meeting to-day, the members of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission expressed themselves as highly gratified with assurances that Great Britain<br />

would submit its evidence for consideration. This announcement at the opening of Parliament <strong>and</strong><br />

the assurance cabled by Ambassador Bayard, of which the commission was notified are expected to<br />

facilitate its labors in a great degree, <strong>and</strong> make the decision when reached practically unimpeachable.<br />

However complete the two cases may be found, it is still likely that experts sent abroad by the<br />

commission may be able to develop important documents which will at least throw valuable side<br />

lights on the controversy, <strong>and</strong> the idea that it will be necessary for the Secretary, <strong>and</strong> perhaps some<br />

at the members, to visit Europe has not been ab<strong>and</strong>oned.<br />

Justin Winsor of Harvard College, called in as cartographic expert, spent several days here last<br />

week in consultation with officers of the United States Geological Survey, who have charge of the<br />

commission’s maps. <strong>The</strong> chart upon which the commission will mark its true divisional line has been<br />

completed, <strong>and</strong> was laid before the meeting to-day.<br />

It is claimed to be the most perfect map of the northern part of South America in existence.<br />

Justices Brewer <strong>and</strong> Alvey <strong>and</strong> Andrew D. White have been constantly at work on the case, <strong>and</strong> have<br />

had frequent consultations in the commission’s offices. Mr. Coudert in New-York <strong>and</strong> Prof. Gilman<br />

in Baltimore have also been corresponding almost daily with the Secretary.<br />

All the members of the commission were present at to-day’s meeting. Mr. Ainsworth R.<br />

Spofford, Librarian of Congress, submitted a card catalogue he had made of the publications in the<br />

library bearing on <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the boundary dispute, numbering between 500 <strong>and</strong> 600<br />

references. Mr. Spofford also presented a review of bibliography on the subject, consisting of over<br />

100 additional works not in the Congressional Library’s possession, but must be sought elsewhere.<br />

As the commission has determined to leave no possible evidence unsought, this gave them a<br />

new idea of the magnitude of their task. Marcus Baker, the commission’s map expert, was also<br />

consulted this morning in reference to the enlargement of portions of the adopted map <strong>and</strong> other<br />

details.<br />

[15 February 1896]<br />

- 288 -<br />

ENGLAND’S CLAIM ON VENEZUELA<br />

<strong>The</strong> Statement of the <strong>British</strong> Case Is Now Being Printed<br />

LONDON, Feb. 15.—<strong>The</strong> debate in the House of Commons on the address in reply to the<br />

Queen’s speech will close on Thursday. According to <strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette, the debate on Mr. Jones’s<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> arbitration amendment will elicit from the Ministers a declaration that there is a cordial<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

entente with Washington regarding the procedure to be followed in deciding the claims of Great<br />

Britain.<br />

<strong>The</strong> statement of the <strong>British</strong> case in the <strong>Venezuela</strong> dispute prepared by Sir Frederick Pollock,<br />

Corpus Professor at Jurisprudence at Oxford University, is now being printed. It opens with a long<br />

history of the <strong>Guiana</strong> settlements, Spanish, Dutch, <strong>and</strong> English, <strong>and</strong> gives numerous quotations<br />

from authorities. A succession of maps is followed by a precis of the <strong>British</strong> case. It concludes with<br />

an appendix of references to the text <strong>and</strong> a number of documents.<br />

Fellows of the Royal Geographical Society who are supposed to know say that the book will<br />

present nothing new of importance.<br />

[16 February 1896]<br />

- 289 -<br />

VENEZUELA AND COMMONS<br />

Debate on Call for Arbitration Hushed at Balfour’s Request<br />

ATTACK ON SALISBURY’S DISPATCH<br />

Harcourt Defends the American Manner of Pressing for a Settlement<br />

of the Question— English Friendship.<br />

LONDON, Feb. 17.—L. Atherley-Jones, (Radical) member for Northwest Durham, moved an<br />

amendment to the address in reply to the Queen’s speech, deploring the absence from the speech<br />

from the throne of an assurance that the whole boundary dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong> will be referred to<br />

arbitration in accordance with the suggestion of the United States.<br />

Mr. Atherley-Jones declared that Great Britain had seven times changed the boundary line<br />

between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> asked how it could be claimed that the territory in<br />

dispute could be outside the pale of arbitration. He reviewed the question in all its aspects since<br />

1814.<br />

Before the motion could be seconded, the Right Hon. A. S. Balfour, First Lord of the Treasury<br />

<strong>and</strong> Government leader in the House, interposed, <strong>and</strong> appealed to the House, on his responsibility<br />

as a Minister of the Crown, not to continue the debate.<br />

He declared that the continuation of the debate would not serve the purpose Mr. Atherley-Jones<br />

had in view as it would not make an honorable solution of the difficulty easier. He therefore hoped<br />

that the House, realizing how grave the issues were, would not further discuss on this occasion the<br />

policy that had been or would be pursued.<br />

William Allan, (Advanced Radical,) member for Gateshead, then seconded the amendment. <strong>The</strong><br />

whole matter, he declared, was a tempest in a teacup. Gold, as usual, was at the bottom of the<br />

trouble.<br />

<strong>The</strong> whole country in dispute was a nest of yellow fever <strong>and</strong> was not worth fighting for.<br />

Henry Labouchere, the Radical leader, said that after the statement made by Mr. Balfour, it was<br />

impossible to continue the debate. [Cries of “Hear, hear!”] He hoped he might take it that the<br />

dispute would be speedily settled to the satisfaction of both countries.<br />

John Dillon (Anti-Parnellite), member for East Mayo, followed Mr. Labouchere. He said he<br />

trusted that no appeal from the Government would induce the mover of the amendment to<br />

429


February – April 1896<br />

withdraw his motion. <strong>The</strong> American people, he added, ought to have some indication of the<br />

intensity of the feeling existing in the House of Commons against the mere suggestion of a war with<br />

the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> action of the American Government had been most patient <strong>and</strong> forbearing, <strong>and</strong> it ought to<br />

be made known to the Americans that Lord Salisbury’s dispatch to Secretary Olney did not<br />

represent the feeling of the people of this country. He was glad to not the recent improved tone of<br />

public opinion. Even Lord Salisbury had turned his attention to insulting a somewhat smaller nation<br />

than the United States.<br />

In the view of nine-tenths of the people of Irel<strong>and</strong> the whole question ought to be submitted to<br />

unlimited arbitration. If the Ministry tried to plunge the country into a war for an unjust cause by<br />

refusing to grant arbitration, he had the right to claim that there would arise from millions of<br />

Englishmen <strong>and</strong> Irishmen a voice of the strongest possible condemnation. [Cries of “Hear, hear!”]<br />

Sir William Vernon-Harcourt, the Liberal leader in the House, said he was glad that the<br />

amendment had been moved in the interests of arbitration, but he did not think he could insist that<br />

the amendment was the best way to attain the end in view.<br />

Of course, such an amendment could not be accepted by the Government, <strong>and</strong> must, if pressed<br />

to a division, be lost by a large majority. If that happened, it would go forth to America that the<br />

House had pronounced against arbitration, although he was convinced that that was the end that all<br />

wished to be attained. [Cries of “Hear, hear!”]<br />

What the House had to do was to show that there was no difference of opinion on the subject.<br />

He was perfectly certain that both inside <strong>and</strong> outside the House the consensus of opinion was in<br />

favor of peaceful arbitration. <strong>The</strong>ir main object ought to be to express such opinion.<br />

It could not be done by joining issue on the amendment. He took the opportunity to deprecate<br />

the language sometimes used alleging that President Clevel<strong>and</strong> had acted from election motives.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re seemed to be a tendency in some quarters to think that the United States had acted in a<br />

sudden, offensive manner.<br />

As a matter of fact they had been pressing for a settlement of the question for the last ten years,<br />

always in a most friendly spirit. [Cries of “Hear,” “Hear.”] Every effort ought to be made to remove<br />

all causes of irritation.<br />

He trusted that no further delay would occur, <strong>and</strong> that everything would be done to bring<br />

about a speedy settlement. Sir William further said that the points of difference between Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States were insignificant <strong>and</strong> could easily be settled by the Cabinets of both<br />

countries, but if the populace on both sides were allowed to raise excitement through ignorance of<br />

the real matters at issue there would be great danger of strife.<br />

He appealed to Mr. Atherley-Jones to withdraw his amendment, which was done, the Speaker<br />

checking an attempt on the part of the Irish members to continue the discussion.<br />

[18 February 1896]<br />

- 290 -<br />

GUIANA BOUNDARY BROIL<br />

A Joint <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> American Commission in Preparation<br />

SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT SECURE<br />

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A Board of Conciliation, Rather Than of Arbitration, Expected from<br />

the Negotiations Now in Progress<br />

LONDON, Feb. 18.—<strong>The</strong> Central <strong>News</strong> says that the appointment of a joint <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

American Commission to settle the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute was suggested diplomatically a<br />

week ago. <strong>The</strong> matter has not yet assumed definite shape.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Right Hon. John Morley, formerly Chief Secretary for Irel<strong>and</strong>, who is contesting in the<br />

Liberal interest the seat in the House of Commons for the Montrose Burghs, delivered a speech at<br />

Forfar to-day. In the course of his remarks he said he rejoiced that there was every indication of a<br />

solution of the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary ii dispute by the appointment of a joint commission.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> will to-morrow say that the negotiations now in progress between the United<br />

States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain will result, according to the expectation of the best informed circles, in a<br />

satisfactory settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute<br />

<strong>The</strong> paper gives the lines on which the negotiations are proceeding. <strong>The</strong>y are virtually identical<br />

with the suggestions made by Mr. G. W. Smalley, the American correspondent of <strong>The</strong> Tines, for the<br />

appointment of a joint commission.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>News</strong> adds that the commission will serve rather as a board of conciliation than as an<br />

arbitration board. It is understood that before agreeing to the scheme which, as a last resort, would<br />

involve arbitration, Lord Salisbury would require an agreement regarding the settled districts.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>News</strong> remarks that the United States seems to assume a quasi suzerainty over <strong>Venezuela</strong>,<br />

which is a distinct advantage to Great Britain. It concludes that a settlement on the foregoing lines<br />

would be honorable to both countries, <strong>and</strong> would be heartily applauded by all parties here.<br />

<strong>The</strong> newspapers to-day are variously commenting on the amendment to the address in reply to<br />

the Queen’s speech moved in the House of Commons by L. Atherley Jones, deploring the absence<br />

from the speech from the throne of any expression favorable to arbitration of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

dispute, <strong>and</strong> also upon the proposal cabled to <strong>The</strong> Times by its American correspondent G. W.<br />

Smalley, for a joint commission, consisting of two <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> two American commissioners, to<br />

inquire into <strong>and</strong> report the facts to their respective Governments. Mr. Smalley’s suggestion is<br />

supposed to have originated in the Washington Cabinet.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette praises Mr. Balfour’s tact in ending the debate on Mr. Jones’s amendment<br />

yesterday, <strong>and</strong> repudiates Sir William Vernon Harcourt’s utterances in favor of arbitration, declaring<br />

that the Opposition leader asserts that Engl<strong>and</strong> is favorable to arbitration, but neglects to say what is<br />

to be arbitrated. Mr. Smalley’s proposition, <strong>The</strong> Gazette says, is equally as ambiguous as Sir William<br />

Harcourt’s assertion.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette is in thorough sympathy with the purpose of Mr. Jones’s amendment, but<br />

believes that it should not have been pushed, because its certain rejection would have induced belief<br />

in America that Parliament was opposed to arbitration. Such an impression, In view of the delicate<br />

negotiations pending, <strong>The</strong> Gazette says, would have been deplorable.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette expresses its approval of the plan for the settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

dispute cabled to <strong>The</strong> Times by its American correspondent. <strong>The</strong> Globe opposes the proposition.<br />

[19 February 1896]<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

- 291 -<br />

“ACTUAL SETTLERS” IN VENEZUELA<br />

<strong>The</strong> objection of the <strong>British</strong> Government to an unlimited arbitration of the question of<br />

boundary between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> has been narrowed down to an exceedingly fine<br />

point. It has been so amply shown that no validity attaches to “the Schomburgk line” by the man<br />

who drew it or by the Government in behalf of which he drew it that it can no longer be said to cut<br />

any figure in the dispute. <strong>The</strong> contention which has taken its place is undoubtedly the real<br />

contention. It is a comfort to come upon it stripped of all disguises. It is that, in the uncertainty<br />

about the boundary, a considerable number of <strong>British</strong> subjects have settled in the disputed territory,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that the <strong>British</strong> Government is bound to protect them.<br />

This contention is not put forward quite nakedly by the <strong>British</strong> Government. Indeed, it is not<br />

really presentable. But it is unofficially put forward by the volunteer representatives of that<br />

Government on both sides of the ocean. Merely to state it is to show how untenable it is. Indeed,<br />

the mere statement of it indicates that the actual settlers in question have settled upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

territory, which they either knew or suspected to be such, in the expectation that the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government would back them up without any regard to the merits of the case. <strong>The</strong> position that the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Government cannot ab<strong>and</strong>on its subjects tends to justify this expectation. It is, moreover,<br />

reinforced by argumentation tending to show the injustice of exposing the subjects of a highly<br />

civilized Government to the jurisdiction of a half-civilized Government.<br />

Merely to state this contention, we repeat, shows how untenable it is. It shows also how the<br />

contention is not even producible before a board of arbitration or any other tribunal of justice. No<br />

international tribunal could be expected to find that, <strong>Venezuela</strong> being half civilized <strong>and</strong> Great Britain<br />

highly civilized, territory occupied by people who preferred being <strong>British</strong> subjects to being<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n citizens should be awarded to Great Britain, however clearly it was proved that<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> was entitled to it. <strong>The</strong> proper answer to these people is not the <strong>British</strong> answer that halfcivilized<br />

nations have no rights that highly civilized nations are bound to respect. It is that people<br />

who settle upon disputed territory do so at the risk that it may be found to belong to the power of<br />

which they are not the subjects, <strong>and</strong> that an argument that the nation to which the l<strong>and</strong> belongs is<br />

“half civilized,” while the nation to which it does not belong is highly civilized, is irrelevant <strong>and</strong><br />

impertinent.<br />

<strong>The</strong> claim which Great Britain unofficially sets up to the territory in dispute would be equally<br />

good to the City of Caracas if a sufficient number of <strong>British</strong> settlers could be found there. Evidently<br />

it is not a claim that could be put in before a commission of impartial arbitrators. It is the claim of<br />

“Outl<strong>and</strong>ers,” <strong>and</strong> the same in South America <strong>and</strong> in South Africa. In South Africa Jameson<br />

undertook to make it good by force of arms, which indeed is the only appropriate method. But he<br />

failed because the “half-civilized” Kruger <strong>and</strong> his forces were ready for the “highly civilized” <strong>British</strong><br />

raiders, <strong>and</strong> captured all those whom they did not kill. Evidently Lord Salisbury could not venture to<br />

submit to an international tribunal the argument which his apologists venture to publish.<br />

[20 February 1896]<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 292 -<br />

ENGLAND’S CASE MADE UP<br />

Sir Frederick Pollock’s Report on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Controversy<br />

THE RECORDS OF HOLLAND AND SPAIN<br />

Great Britain’s Contentions Said to be Fully Maintained by<br />

Newly Discovered Evidence<br />

LONDON, March 4.—<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette publishes two columns of matter which it claims is<br />

a summary of the report made by Sir Frederick Pollock for submission to Parliament on the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter. <strong>The</strong> Gazette says that, besides having at his disposal documents in possession of<br />

the <strong>British</strong> Colonial <strong>and</strong> Foreign Offices, Sir Frederick Pollock has drawn freely upon information<br />

made accessible to the <strong>British</strong> Government by the keepers of the archives of Spain <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> material supplied by Holl<strong>and</strong> covers the period from the latter part of the sixteenth century<br />

to the second decade of the nineteenth century, <strong>and</strong> the Spanish documents cover the period since<br />

the first ascent of the Amazon by Orellana, in 1542, <strong>and</strong> from the first ascent of the Orinoco by<br />

Juan Martinez, until <strong>Venezuela</strong>, in 1830, assumed independent existence.<br />

<strong>The</strong> evidence includes the particulars <strong>and</strong> circumstances in which the <strong>British</strong> took possession of<br />

the whole of the Dutch West India colonies in 1781, 1796, <strong>and</strong> 1803, <strong>and</strong> the treaties under which<br />

these transferences were ratified, the first one being concluded in 1814, to which Spain was a party.<br />

<strong>The</strong> evidence also includes the story of the correspondence <strong>and</strong> negotiations with the various<br />

interested Governments by <strong>Venezuela</strong> from 1840 down to the present time.<br />

<strong>The</strong> information supplied by the Colonial Office comprises that collected by the successive<br />

Governors of the territory since the administration of Col. Nicholson, in 1803, as regards the extent<br />

<strong>and</strong> character of the Dutch occupation <strong>and</strong> exploration of the interior, <strong>and</strong> also the details of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n incursions into <strong>British</strong> territory between the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> the Cuyuni, the attempts of<br />

American concessionaires to establish themselves in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, the steps taken to maintain<br />

<strong>British</strong> ownership, <strong>and</strong> the work done by Great Britain to ascertain the natural <strong>and</strong> geographic<br />

boundary without prejudice to strict territorial rights beyond such boundary. <strong>The</strong>se documents,<br />

accompanied by important maps bearing thereon, show a <strong>British</strong> case of overwhelming strength<br />

against <strong>Venezuela</strong>n pretensions at ownership to the west bank of the Essequibo.<br />

<strong>The</strong> report shows that the Dutch, from the earliest times, had possession of the Coast of <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

as far north as the mouth of the Orinoco, such possession implying the right of ownership of the<br />

Hinterl<strong>and</strong>, a right exercised by the Dutch, who, in the sixteenth century, had coffee, cotton <strong>and</strong><br />

sugar plantations far up the rivers, <strong>and</strong> prospected for gold <strong>and</strong> silver in the basin of the Cuyuni.<br />

<strong>The</strong> early Dutch maps give the northwest boundary, starting from Barima Point, <strong>and</strong> taking a<br />

northwesterly course inl<strong>and</strong>, roughly parallel with the Orinoco, to the confluence of the Caroni <strong>and</strong><br />

the Orinoco. One of these maps, prepared for Louis XV of France by the King’s Geographer, Do<br />

Lisle, <strong>and</strong> printed in Amsterdam in 1774 shows the line of partition according to the bull issued by<br />

Pope Alex<strong>and</strong>er I allotting the whole of South America west of the Amazons to Spain, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

whole of the territory on east of the Amazons to Portugal. To the west of this is a large section<br />

extending from the Amazon to the mouth of the Orinoco marked “<strong>Guyana</strong>.” This is divided in two,<br />

the Dutch part extending from Barima to the River Mariwini, <strong>and</strong> the French part from the<br />

Marawini to Cape Nord, on the delta of the Amazon. <strong>The</strong> Spanish settlement of St. Thome, on the<br />

433


February – April 1896<br />

Orinoco, appears on this map, but the Dutch line from Barima is identical with the line representing<br />

the extreme <strong>British</strong> claim. <strong>The</strong> Essequibo is expressly taken out of the limits of the Spanish<br />

settlements, not only by the line mentioned, but by the words “Essequibe aux Holl<strong>and</strong>.”<br />

Sir Frederick Pollock proves that that Spaniards at no time established themselves in <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

proper until they overran part of the <strong>British</strong> territory to the Cuyuni in <strong>and</strong> since 1858. <strong>The</strong>y got no<br />

further than the Orinoco.<br />

<strong>The</strong> fact that St. Thome is marked on the French map as the extreme limit of their stations is<br />

borne out by a Dutch map, which in 1789 was prepared for the Committee of Colonies of the<br />

Batavian Republic by Major von Blouchenroeder. This map shows that the Dutch frontier begins at<br />

Barima, from which a straight line is drawn inl<strong>and</strong> with the words above it “Ancien poste Holl<strong>and</strong>ais<br />

sur les lirnites de possessiones Espagnoles.” This map was prepared to assist the statesmen who<br />

were negotiating the cession of the Dutch colonies in South America to Great Britain. Sir Frederick<br />

Pollock gives details showing that it was upon the basis of this <strong>and</strong> similar maps that the cession was<br />

defeated.<br />

Correspondence taken from the archives shows that when the Spanish showed themselves In<br />

the Cuyuni Valley the Dutch Government vigorously protested to Spain against the encroachments<br />

of her subjects upon Dutch territory. <strong>The</strong> archives show that Spain did not answer the protest of the<br />

Dutch Government. Certainly Spain did not assert her ownership of the region in question. <strong>The</strong><br />

States General of Holl<strong>and</strong> in 1759 <strong>and</strong> in 1769 set forth the Dutch territorial rights <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>ed<br />

reparation for Spanish violation thereof. <strong>The</strong> correspondence shows that the Dutch asserted<br />

ownership of the entire watershed of the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> laid great stress upon their rights to the<br />

Cuyuni, upon the upper reaches of which stream they had established gold diggings <strong>and</strong> had been on<br />

terms of intercourse with the Indian tribes there for 150 years in making researches.<br />

<strong>The</strong> evidence which Spain placed at the disposal of the Foreign Office shows that Spain did not<br />

rebut the claim made by the Dutch to the territory throughout the basin of the Cuyuni. <strong>The</strong> Spanish<br />

Government, however, condemned proposals made by the Governor of <strong>Guyana</strong>, who sought to<br />

push the Dutch out of the Cuyuni basin on the ground that they were too audacious in having<br />

attempted to show that the Province of Dutch <strong>Guiana</strong> was more extensive than was actually the<br />

case. This decision was ratified by the Spanish Council of State, though no reparation was made to<br />

the Dutch for the interference of the Spanish in their territory.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Dutch archives are so well kept that Sir Frederick Pollock has been able to make an<br />

irrefragable case for <strong>British</strong> ownership of the Cuyuni basin as having been inherited from the Dutch,<br />

though no absolute evidence is adducible to show how far the Dutch held the country between the<br />

natural geographical delimitation known as the Schomburgk line <strong>and</strong> the bank of the Orinoco.<br />

<strong>The</strong> report, after exhausting the evidence prior to English acquisition of the country, deals with<br />

the more recent diplomatic aspects of the cases which are not summarized.<br />

[5 March 1896]<br />

- 293 -<br />

LITTLE NEW DISCOVERED<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> Has Found Nothing Not Known to the Commission<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

WASHINGTON, March 4.—<strong>The</strong> cablegram giving a summary of the <strong>British</strong> brief in the<br />

boundary dispute, prepared by Prof. Sir Frederick Pollock, was read with deep interest by members<br />

of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission in town to-day.<br />

Entirely without prejudice to the merits of the case, which of course cannot be weighed until all<br />

the evidence accompanying Prof. Pollock’s argument is disclosed, the Commissioners are evidently<br />

gratified that the <strong>British</strong> Government, with all the resources it has enjoyed for securing evidence, has<br />

apparently not obtained much if any more testimony than the commission has been able to collect<br />

here during its short but energetic existence. In addition to the maps mentioned by Prof. Pollock, all<br />

of which have been accessible to the cartographic expert of the commission, Justin Wilson of<br />

Harvard, the latter official has made an exhaustive study of between 250 <strong>and</strong> 300 charts bearing<br />

directly upon the geographic phases of the controversy. <strong>The</strong> commission has also been able to refer<br />

to nearly 300 volumes relating to the dispute found in the Congressional Library, <strong>and</strong> through its<br />

agents has examined essential portions of more than 150 rare volumes in public <strong>and</strong> private<br />

collections in America, among others at the Lenox Library, New-York, <strong>and</strong> at the Harvard Library.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong> had already furnished to the State Department before the United<br />

States intervened in the affair last July, most of the correspondence which had been carried on with<br />

Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> complete copies of all the documents are promised by <strong>Venezuela</strong> before the end<br />

of this week.<br />

Secretary Malet-Prevost, after reading the dispatch to-day, said: “<strong>The</strong> brief abstract of Sir<br />

Frederick Pollock’s report is interesting as showing the care with which the case for Great Britain<br />

has been prepared, <strong>and</strong> the orderly <strong>and</strong> able manner in which it will be presented. <strong>The</strong> cable<br />

summary is, however, too general in its character to enable me to say positively what new matter it<br />

may present for the consideration of the commission. I can, of course, say nothing with regard to<br />

the statements of fact which he makes. It is evident, however, that the sources from which he draws<br />

the information upon which those conclusions <strong>and</strong> statements are based are in a great measure the<br />

same as those which the commission has been investigating in the preliminary work in which it has<br />

been engaged.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> cabled report makes no references to new matter, excepting possibly to such portions of<br />

the diplomatic correspondence between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> as may not have been<br />

communicate to our Government, <strong>and</strong> excepting also any private reports which the various<br />

Governors or <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> may have from time to time made to the Colonial office. As, however,<br />

those reports have, to a certain extent, formed the basis for various historical work, it may be that<br />

the information which they convey has in a great measure been already considered.<br />

“At all events nothing definitely can be said until the report itself is received. That it will be of<br />

valuable assistance in the consideration of the case there can be no doubt, <strong>and</strong> the commission<br />

awaits its receipt with great interest.”<br />

At the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Legation the statement of the <strong>British</strong> case was declared to be pitiably weak<br />

<strong>and</strong> easily disposed of. Minister Andrade said it did not contain any argument which had not already<br />

been fully met <strong>and</strong> disproved in documents furnished to Secretaries Bayard <strong>and</strong> Gresham by the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government. All the arguments now presented by Sir Frederick Pollock which had not<br />

been included in Lord Salisbury’s letters of Nov. 26 last, leading to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s special<br />

message, had already been ab<strong>and</strong>oned by <strong>British</strong> statesmen.<br />

It was preposterous now for Great Britain to attempt to go behind the treaty of Munster to<br />

show that the Dutch had settlements in <strong>Guiana</strong>, for up to that time Holl<strong>and</strong> was a Spanish<br />

dependency, just as <strong>Guiana</strong> was. With the recognition of the independence of the Dutch by the<br />

435


February – April 1896<br />

treaty of Munster in 1648 the Essequibo became the Eastern boundary of Spanish possessions, <strong>and</strong><br />

by the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, Engl<strong>and</strong> obligated herself to enforce that boundary.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Dutch colonies did not pass to Engl<strong>and</strong> until 1796, <strong>and</strong> from that time until 1836—forty<br />

years—every English map, cyclopedia, history, or other work hearing on <strong>Guiana</strong>, gave either the<br />

Essequibo or the Pomaron as the western English limit. Barima at the mouth of the Orinoco may<br />

have been occupied by the Dutch when Spain was the sovereign of Holl<strong>and</strong>, as shown by early<br />

maps, but Minister Andrade notes that Sir Frederick Pollock has found no map giving the Dutch<br />

that point after the treaty of Munster.<br />

No fear is expressed by the members of the Legation as to the result of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Commission’s labours. <strong>The</strong>y are confident that the decision will be entirely in conformity with the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n contention.<br />

[5 March 1896]<br />

- 294 -<br />

VENEZUELAN BLUE BOOK<br />

Documents Sustaining the <strong>British</strong> Contention About <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

SPANISH AND DUTCH SETTLEMENT<br />

Possession Acknowledged by the Treaty of Munster Which Great Britain Has Inherited<br />

LONDON, March 6.—<strong>The</strong> expected <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Blue Book, which is entitled “Documents <strong>and</strong><br />

Correspondence Relating to the Question of the Boundary of <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>,” will be issued<br />

by the Government to-night. <strong>The</strong> volume consists of 443 folio pages, with a separate book<br />

containing nine maps. <strong>The</strong> book opens with forty pages, comprising a preliminary statement dealing<br />

with the history of the territories from 1520 until the issuance of her Majesty’s memor<strong>and</strong>um to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> in March, 1890. <strong>The</strong> book is divided into historic periods, from the earliest time to 1648,<br />

from 1648 to 1796, <strong>and</strong> from 1796 to 1840. After that period references are made to various claims<br />

<strong>and</strong> dispatches <strong>and</strong> the report concludes with a brief summary. <strong>The</strong> preliminary matter is<br />

summarized as follows:<br />

<strong>The</strong> purpose of the present statement [the book says,] is to explain a general outline of the position of Great<br />

Britain in the long-pending dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, as regards the boundary between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> that<br />

country.<br />

<strong>The</strong> territories now known as <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> had been discovered before 1520. Between the<br />

date of their discovery <strong>and</strong> 1648 the Spaniards <strong>and</strong> the Dutch occupied portions of this territory, the extent of such<br />

occupation by each country to be a matter of consideration.<br />

In 1580 the United Provinces of the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s threw off their allegiance to the Spanish crown <strong>and</strong> war<br />

ensued, which lasted almost uninterruptedly for seventy years. In January 1648, peace was concluded by the treaty of<br />

Munster, by which Spain acknowledged the independence of the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> the two countries respectively<br />

confirmed their then possessions on the South American continent. From 1648 to 1796, with the exception of the<br />

interval between 1781 <strong>and</strong> 1783, the Dutch remained in possession of the territory they had occupied prior to the<br />

treaty of Munster, <strong>and</strong> extended their settlements within it.<br />

In 1796, the territory now known as <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> was acquired by Great Britain. That acquisition was<br />

recognized <strong>and</strong> confirmed by a treaty concluded in 1814. In 1810, <strong>Venezuela</strong> revolted, but her independent<br />

existence apart from the United States of Colombia, by which she was for a time merged, did not commence until<br />

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1830, <strong>and</strong> was not formally recognized by Spain until 1845. It is therefore held that the following conclusions have<br />

been clearly established:<br />

First—That prior to 1590, the Dutch had established themselves on the coast of <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

Second—That prior to 1596, the Spaniards had established no settlements in <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

Third—That by 1648, the Dutch settlements in <strong>Guiana</strong> extended along the coast the whole way from the River<br />

Maroni to the Barima, <strong>and</strong> inl<strong>and</strong> to various points in the interior upon the Rivers Essequibo, Cuyuni, Pomeroon,<br />

Waini, <strong>and</strong> Barima, their tributaries.<br />

Fourth—That up to 1725 the only settlement of Spaniards in <strong>Guiana</strong> was San Thome de Guayana, on the south<br />

bank of the Orinoco, originally founded in 1596, at a site shown on the sketch map.<br />

Fifth—That between 1723 <strong>and</strong> 1790 the only additional settlements founded by Spaniards in <strong>Guiana</strong> were those<br />

established by the Capuchin Missions south of the Orinoco, in the direction of the River Yuruari, <strong>and</strong> two villages<br />

on the Upper Orinoco, several hundred miles above San Thome de Guayana.<br />

Sixth—That Dutch occupation to the extent above indicated was perfectly well known in Spain, <strong>and</strong> that the<br />

attempts of the Spanish to dispossess the Dutch had wholly failed.<br />

Seventh—That subsequently to 1796, Great Britain has continuously remained in possession <strong>and</strong> her subjects<br />

have occupied further portions of the territory to which the Dutch established their title.<br />

From the first settlements to 1648, [the report continues,] the Dutch appear to have been the first. Early in the<br />

sixteenth century they turned their attention to <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> there is abundant evidence from Spanish sources that<br />

during the latter half of the century, prior to 1590, the Dutch established themselves on the coast of <strong>Guiana</strong>. In<br />

1595 the English explorer, Capt. Charles Leigh, found the Dutch established near the mouth of the Orinoco, a fact<br />

which is confirmed from Spanish sources. <strong>The</strong> first settlement by Spain in <strong>Guiana</strong> was in 1596, when Antonio de la<br />

Hoz Berrio founded San Thome de Guayana on the south bank of the Orinoco. A dispatch from Roque de Montes,<br />

Treasurer of Cumana, to the King of Spain, dated April, 1596, shows that the Spaniards did not then hold any part<br />

of <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

In the early part of the seventeenth century the various companies which were afterwards merged in the Great<br />

West India Company were employed in colonizing <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> had established several settlements there before<br />

1614, <strong>and</strong> the existence of these settlements was officially reported to Spain.<br />

<strong>The</strong> following extracts from memor<strong>and</strong>a on Guayana which were deliberated upon by the<br />

Spanish Privy Council are dated 1614. <strong>The</strong>y say in regard to the Dutch settlements then existing: “It<br />

is well clear that those coasts belong to them, far from the River Maranon to the River Orinoco, <strong>and</strong><br />

there are three or four more settlements which are very flourishing <strong>and</strong> from which they derive<br />

much utility <strong>and</strong> very good profit, with the mouths of those two rivers, making themselves masters<br />

of the possessions <strong>and</strong> fruits of the natives.”<br />

<strong>The</strong>se records show that the Dutch had at this time firmly settled themselves along the coast as<br />

far as the Orinoco.<br />

Spain’s Only Settlement in <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

In 1621 a charter of the Dutch West India Company granted by the States General of Holl<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> reaffirmed in 1637 gave Orinoco as the limit of the company’s territorial jurisdiction. From<br />

secret reports on the dominions of Spain in America addressed to the Spanish Government under a<br />

date of a few years before the conclusion of the treaty of Munster, it appears that the Dutch<br />

settlements extended from close to the Amazones to the Orinoco. <strong>The</strong> whole of this is therefore<br />

clear: That prior to the date of the treaty of Munster the Dutch settlements, to the knowledge of the<br />

Spanish Government, extended on the coast as far as the Barima <strong>and</strong> the River Amacura. <strong>The</strong> treaty<br />

concluded between Spain <strong>and</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s in January, 1648, confirmed the Dutch in all the<br />

possessions they had acquired in South America <strong>and</strong> gave them liberty to make fresh acquisitions<br />

wherever the Spaniards were not already established.<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

At the date of that treaty Spain had only one settlement in <strong>Guiana</strong>—San Thome de Guayana.<br />

After the treaty of Munster fresh negotiations were again issued by the States General to the Dutch<br />

West India Company, in which Orinoco was again treated as the limit of Dutch jurisdiction. From<br />

1648 to 1796 the Dutch colonies on the Essequibo, Pomeroon, <strong>and</strong> Morocco were reported as<br />

flourishing greatly <strong>and</strong> attracting fresh immigration, bidding fair to become the most flourishing of<br />

the tropical plantations in America. About 1664 Fathers Llauri <strong>and</strong> Vergara were sent to explore<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>, with a view to seeing whether a Jesuit mission should be founded. <strong>The</strong>y reported that the<br />

province had been ab<strong>and</strong>oned by the Spaniards.<br />

In 1684 the Dutch comm<strong>and</strong>er of Essequibo recommended that a strong little post be<br />

established at Barima, in place of a small watch house. By 1700 posts were established by the Dutch<br />

at places along the coast <strong>and</strong> in the interior. Three of the latter posts are named in the records, one<br />

being beyond Cuyuni. In 1714 the provisions of the Treaty of Munster expressly confirmed the<br />

Treaty of Utrecht. At that date Spain had no possession of any territory in <strong>Guiana</strong> beyond part of<br />

the right bank of the Orinoco. No Spanish settlements or missions existed in any other part of<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Dutch upon the coast extended along the Orinoco into the interior to the watersheds<br />

of the Essequibo, Cuyuni, Pomeroon, <strong>and</strong> Amacura.<br />

In 1730 the Dutch West India Company, by public notice, prohibited trade on the Rivers<br />

Massaruni <strong>and</strong> Cuyuni, except to its own agents. Between 1730 <strong>and</strong> 1790 a number of Capuchin<br />

missions established by the Spaniards were entirely confined to the district between the Orinoco <strong>and</strong><br />

Yuruari. From reports made from time to time by the Director General of the Dutch Colony, it<br />

appears that about 1748 the Spaniards were attempting to encroach on the Dutch territory in the<br />

neighborhood of the affluents of the Cuyuni. <strong>The</strong>reupon the Director General dispatched an<br />

emissary to remonstrate with the Spaniards, who were reported to have replied that the whole of<br />

America belonged to Spain. <strong>The</strong>se attempts of the Spaniards to extend their territory were entirely<br />

confined to the Cuyuni, adjoining the district already occupied by the Capuchin missions. A report<br />

of the Spanish Comm<strong>and</strong>ant of <strong>Guiana</strong> states that in 1750 the Dutch were in the interior on the<br />

Cuyuni, <strong>and</strong> at the mouth of the River Curumo, which flaws into said river.<br />

Between 1750 <strong>and</strong> 1752 the Capuchin Fathers from the missions applied to the Dutch<br />

Government for permission to trade in Dutch Cuyuni. <strong>The</strong>y were refused. In 1755 the Dutch, in<br />

order to prevent encroachments by the Spaniards on the territory of Yuruay, which they considered<br />

indisputably Dutch territory, established a post 150 miles higher up the Cuyuni.<br />

<strong>The</strong> position of this post is shown on a sketch map. <strong>The</strong> same year the Spanish comm<strong>and</strong>ant on<br />

the Orinoco complained to the Dutch of disorders at Barima, showing that the Dutch then had<br />

jurisdiction there.<br />

In 1758, as appears from a Spanish official report, a question having arisen regarding the rights<br />

of fishing, the Dutch claimed that their dominion extended from the ship’s mouth or gr<strong>and</strong> mouth<br />

of the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> that they were entitled to fish in that part of the river. From a report of Gov.<br />

Cumana, in 1761, to the King of Spain, it clearly appears that with the exception of the Fort San<br />

Thome de Guayana <strong>and</strong> the missions, the Spaniards had occupied territory on the right bank of the<br />

Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> that the local Spanish authorities had been engaged in ineffectual attempts to induce<br />

the Government to fortify the Orinoco at Angostura, so as to prevent the Dutch <strong>and</strong> Caribs from<br />

ascending the river. <strong>The</strong> report gives the names that were then known of sixteen villages or<br />

missions. Not one of the missions was extended.<br />

Coming to 1772, Spanish claims to the greater part of <strong>Guiana</strong> are raised in a report from the<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>ant of the province. An extract taken from the archives of the Indias proceeds to state that<br />

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the boundaries of this province <strong>and</strong> the Guayana boundaries are one. It is bounded on the north by<br />

the Lower Orinoco, on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the south by the Amazons, <strong>and</strong> on the<br />

west by the Rio Negro, etc.<br />

It is scarcely necessary to observe that this claim included the whole Dutch settlements <strong>and</strong><br />

French <strong>Guiana</strong> right down to the Amazon River, an extent of territory that Spain never attempted to<br />

occupy or even claim, unless the pretensions that the whole of America belonged to the Spanish<br />

King, by virtue of the Papal bull of 1496, can be regarded as a claim.<br />

In 1781 the <strong>British</strong> captured Dutch <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> marked the boundary upon the coast to the<br />

westward of Point Barima. A map of the newly acquired colony, drafted on the spot, <strong>and</strong> published<br />

in London in 1783, gives the name Barima to the River Amacura, <strong>and</strong> makes it the western<br />

boundary of the colony. <strong>The</strong> colony was restored to the Dutch in 1793 <strong>and</strong> again captured by the<br />

English in 1796. <strong>The</strong> English then marked the boundaries again.<br />

This summary of events conclusively establishes that during the whole period from 1648 to 1796<br />

the Dutch had uninterrupted possession of the entire coast line, from the River Corentin to Barima.<br />

During the same period they explored the upper portions of nearly all the rivers to a considerable<br />

extent, <strong>and</strong> made settlements in the adjacent districts. Prior to 1723 there was no settlement by the<br />

Spaniards in the territory, except at San Thome de Guayana, which was originally situated at about<br />

the spot indicated on the sketch map, <strong>and</strong> twice subsequently removed further up the river, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

between 1724 <strong>and</strong> 1796 the Capuchin Missions, established south of the Orinoco, gradually<br />

extended southward <strong>and</strong> eastward toward the Dutch territory, the furthest point occupied by the<br />

Spaniards being the village of Tumeremo, founded about 1788. Before 1796 Dutch settlements<br />

existed far up the Cuyuni, while a Dutch fort was established near Yuruari, at about the spot marked<br />

upon the sketch map. <strong>The</strong> Dutch had full control of the whole basin of the Cuyuni, <strong>and</strong>, with the<br />

exception of their settlement at San Thome de Guayana <strong>and</strong> the missions, the Spaniards exercised<br />

no authority nor dominion whatever over the territory now in dispute.<br />

Spanish Commissioner’s Report<br />

<strong>The</strong> third period, 1796 to 1840, opens with a quotation from the report of Spanish<br />

Commissioner Requena in July, 1802. After pointing out that the territory between the Orinoco <strong>and</strong><br />

Amazon Rivers belonged to Spain by right of discovery, he proceeds to state that the coasts had<br />

been ab<strong>and</strong>oned by the Spaniards for more than a century, <strong>and</strong> that the Dutch <strong>and</strong> French had<br />

founded colonies on them unopposed by Spain. He warned the Government that the Dutch were<br />

advancing up the Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> might advance from the Cuyuni <strong>and</strong> Caroni to the Orinoco <strong>and</strong><br />

take possession of the lower part of that river. This reference to the position of the Dutch on the<br />

Cuyuni is another of the many instances showing conclusively that their establishment on the<br />

Cuyuni was perfectly well known to the Spaniards for many years prior to 1802.<br />

A report to the comm<strong>and</strong>er of the <strong>British</strong> forces in the West Indies in 1802 shows that the<br />

Spanish occupation was confined at most entirely to the northern bank of the Orinoco. For about<br />

130 miles from Barima on the right bank there was no existing Spanish settlement or occupation of<br />

Old <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> original site of the fort of San Thome de Guayana still remained unoccupied. In<br />

1810 a careful report of the condition of Spanish <strong>Guiana</strong> sent by the Junta Superior to the King fully<br />

confirms the previous statements of the condition of Spanish enterprise in the district. <strong>The</strong> report<br />

states that the Governor never took a single step toward carrying out the design to settle the lower<br />

part of the Orinoco or to establish a Spanish village with a fort on the right bank.<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

In 1810 <strong>Venezuela</strong> declared her independence of the crown of Spain. In 1814 treaties were made<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s. <strong>The</strong> colonies of Essequibo, Demerara, <strong>and</strong> Berbice were<br />

retained by Great Britain. Negotiations at the same time between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> Spain resulted in<br />

a treaty by which the Spanish Government engaged that in the event of the commerce of the<br />

Spanish-American possessions being opened to foreign nations <strong>British</strong> commerce should be<br />

admitted to trade with those possessions as a most favored nation.<br />

Had any question existed of the right of Spain to ally portion of the territory long known as a<br />

Dutch colony it would have been raised then.<br />

In 1817 Gen. Bolivar, President of Colombia, with which <strong>Venezuela</strong> was then incorporated,<br />

issued an order from his headquarters at Angostura saying that the Governor of Guayana must be<br />

considered not only the governor or the fort at Old Guayana, but also as Military Governor of the<br />

Orinoco to its mouth. In 1827 an official report upon the extent <strong>and</strong> situation of the crown l<strong>and</strong>s of<br />

the colony gave the boundary of the colony recognized at that date as follows: On the north the<br />

seacoast from the mouth of the River Abari to Cape Barima, near the mouth of the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> on<br />

the west a line running north <strong>and</strong> south from Cape Barima into the interior.<br />

In 1831, in the course of an investigation connected with certain trials for murder, the<br />

jurisdiction of Great Britain had to be investigated. <strong>The</strong> evidence given clearly established that grants<br />

of l<strong>and</strong> had been made for considerable distances up the Essequibo. Massaruni, <strong>and</strong> Cuyuni Rivers,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that Dutch settlements <strong>and</strong> forts extended still further along these rivers. It was also shown that<br />

in the districts in question the Crown of Great Britain exercised all the rights by which nations<br />

usually indicate claims over territorial possessions, <strong>and</strong> further, that there had been continuous<br />

control over the Indians by the <strong>British</strong>.<br />

About 1831, a report was made by the second Fiscal of the Colony to the Lieutenant Governor,<br />

describing the effective control which had been exercised over the Indians by their protectors <strong>and</strong><br />

the Post holders. <strong>The</strong>se reports established clearly that the Indian tribes inhabiting the country in<br />

submission, owed allegiance to Great Britain. During this period <strong>British</strong> missionaries, from time to<br />

time, visited the various parts of the colonies <strong>and</strong> their reports show that the Spanish frontier was at<br />

the bead of the Cuyuni <strong>and</strong> Massaruni Rivers.<br />

From the facts detailed in this chapter, it is clearly established that Great Britain, on becoming<br />

possessor of the colony, succeeded to all the rights of the Dutch. After 1796, Great Britain extended<br />

her settlements <strong>and</strong> continuously exercised over the territory originally claimed by the Dutch all<br />

those rights by which nations usually indicate a claim of territorial possession. Neither Spain nor<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> after the latter’s independence had either possession of or dominion over the territory in<br />

question.<br />

A part of the fourth period after 1840 opens with an explanation that the first Schomburgk map<br />

in 1839 was not official, but an actual line prepared on the commission’s survey. In 1840 <strong>and</strong> 1842 it<br />

came to the knowledge of the Government that six years before correspondence had passed<br />

between the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> Consul at Caracas in which the latter, at the<br />

request of the <strong>British</strong> Vice-Consul at Angostura, proposed to <strong>Venezuela</strong> that they erect a beacon on<br />

Cape Barima in order to guide ships in the neighborhood of the Orinoco. This correspondence was<br />

in no way authorized. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government had no knowledge of it until it was communicated to<br />

them. <strong>Venezuela</strong> never returned a reply to the proposal. This was a period of discussions.<br />

<strong>The</strong> first overture was made by <strong>Venezuela</strong> in January, 1841, remonstrating at Schomburgk’s<br />

placing boundary posts at certain points. <strong>The</strong> statement here refers to Minister Fortique’s<br />

remonstrance <strong>and</strong> Lord Aberdeen’s reply, resulting in the removal of Schomburgk’s posts. It quotes<br />

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Lord Aberdeen’s declaration of January, 1842, that the removal of the posts must not be understood<br />

as meaning that Great Britain ab<strong>and</strong>oned any portion of her rights to the territory formerly held by<br />

the Dutch. In 1843, <strong>Venezuela</strong> renewed her application for a speedy conclusion of a treaty. Minister<br />

Fortique’s note of January, 1844, presented the first formal statement claiming that the territory of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> extended to the Essequibo.<br />

<strong>The</strong> main grounds of the claim were that Spain was the first discoverer <strong>and</strong> occupant of the New<br />

World, that the Spaniards at an early date, occupied <strong>and</strong> explored Orinoco <strong>and</strong> all the contiguous<br />

country on the Barima, Moroco, <strong>and</strong> Pomaroom; that at the time of the treaty of Munster the Dutch<br />

had no possessions in <strong>Guiana</strong>, at least on the northern, <strong>and</strong> western side of the Essequibo; that the<br />

Spanish dominion extended as far as the Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> that any possession of the Dutch westward<br />

of the river was a usurpation unapproved by Spain. After giving a summary of Lord Aberdeen’s<br />

reply to the preceding, a historic statement of the Dutch claims is quoted as proof that <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s<br />

based pretensions upon allegations relative to the Spanish <strong>and</strong> Dutch occupations are conclusively<br />

proved erroneous.<br />

In 1870 Señor Calcano readvances the claims on the same grounds as those of Señor Fortique,<br />

upon the addition, that the former relied upon the bull of Pope Alex<strong>and</strong>er VI as imparting fresh <strong>and</strong><br />

most valuable recognition, which, at the time it was issued, he said, was of decisive significance.<br />

Señor Calcano further alleged that the Capuchins occupied the space between the Orinoco, Cape<br />

Nassau, the sea <strong>and</strong> the river Caroni. <strong>The</strong>re is no trace of such occupation. <strong>The</strong> royal warrant of<br />

1736, defining the sphere of missionary enterprise in <strong>Guiana</strong> has been quoted as authority tor this<br />

statement. Reference to the original document shows that it contains no words to justify the<br />

assertion.<br />

<strong>The</strong> passage which has been cited in support of the contention of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is an interpolation.<br />

Señor Calcano further quoted an article from the Convention of Aranjuez, making the surrender of<br />

fugitive slaves effective between the Spanish establishments on the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> Essequibo,<br />

Demerara, Berbice, <strong>and</strong> Surinam, suggesting that Essequibo referred to the river. This suggestion is<br />

unfounded. A perusal of the convention shows clearly that the words used are a well known general<br />

description of the Dutch colony.<br />

Negotiations of Various Cabinets<br />

From this point the statement follows the better known history of the diplomatic negotiations<br />

between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Lord Salisbury, Lord Granville, <strong>and</strong> Lord Rosebery to the rupture of the<br />

diplomatic relations in 1887. Alluding to the statement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claim in the note or Señor<br />

Urbaneja in January, 1887, the statement proceeds: “<strong>The</strong> main additional grounds then put forward<br />

in support of the claim were a decree alleged to have been issued by the King of Spain in 1768,<br />

whereby <strong>Guiana</strong> was declared to be bordered on the south by the Amazon <strong>and</strong> on the east by the<br />

Atlantic. Reference to the decree shows that it has no bearing whatever upon the question of the<br />

boundary of the Dutch colonies.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> next statement, that as regards the territory of the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, to whose rights Great<br />

Britain succeeded, all in her power consisted of the establishments of Essequibo, Demerara, Berbice,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Surinam. This has never been denied by Great Britain <strong>and</strong> in no way meets the contention<br />

supported by the evidence already cited, that the Dutch colony of Essequibo was included in the<br />

whole watershed of that river <strong>and</strong> its tributaries <strong>and</strong> extended along the coast to the mouth of the<br />

Orinoco. As for the further statement that Spain, so far from consenting to usurpations, expelled<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

them by force, it will be seen by a more accurate statement of events that the attacks <strong>and</strong><br />

encroachments of Spain on the Dutch possessions were repelled by the Dutch <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong>.<br />

As regards the negotiations instituted by <strong>Venezuela</strong> in 1890 <strong>and</strong> 1893 for a renewal of diplomatic<br />

relations <strong>and</strong> a settlement of the boundary dispute, it is only necessary here to say that they failed of<br />

successful results in consequence of the persistence of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n negotiators in asserting claim<br />

to all the territory as far as the Essequibo or its immediate neighborhood.<br />

<strong>The</strong> above examination shows that the main grounds upon which the claim of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is<br />

supposed to be based, so far as it has been presented to Great Britain at different times during the<br />

last fifty years, have been as follows:<br />

First—<strong>The</strong> original discovery <strong>and</strong> the first exploration of the South American Continent by<br />

Spain, which are clearly irrelevant.<br />

Second—<strong>The</strong> bull at Pope Alex<strong>and</strong>er VI., which cannot be considered as having any real bearing<br />

upon the question.<br />

Third—<strong>The</strong> allegation that the occupation of <strong>Guiana</strong> by the Dutch was a violation of the treaty<br />

of Munster.<br />

This allegation has been shown to be unfounded.<br />

Fourth—Possession <strong>and</strong> occupation by the Spaniards of the territory south of the Orinoco,<br />

including the Rivers Barima, Moroco, <strong>and</strong> Pomeroon.<br />

It has been shown that the only Spanish settlements there at any time were San Thome de<br />

Guyama which was situated on the south bank of the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> which had been moved from<br />

time to time higher up the river, as it was destroyed by the <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> Dutch successively, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Capuchin settlements situated between the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> the Tumerimo, as has been previously<br />

described.<br />

Fifth—That the Dutch had never had any possessions north of the Essequibo.<br />

This statement has been shown to be equally erroneous, as perusal of the whole diplomatic<br />

correspondence will show that the <strong>British</strong> Government, while insisting that the just claims of Great<br />

Britain would entitle her to a boundary embracing practically the whole watershed of the Essequibo,<br />

the Cuyuni, the Yuruari, the Pomeroon, the Waini, <strong>and</strong> the Barima, has been willing to agree to a<br />

boundary within those limits which would give <strong>Venezuela</strong> far more territory than that to which she<br />

can show any title.<br />

From the summary given of the foregoing chapter it will be seen that Great Britain, while<br />

maintaining her just rights, has consistently shown a desire to make a fair arrangement with<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> as to boundary, <strong>and</strong> that the claim of <strong>Venezuela</strong> that her territory extends to the<br />

Essequibo has been based upon contentions which are in no way supported by the facts <strong>and</strong> cannot<br />

be justified upon any reasonable ground.<br />

Part fifth describes the maps <strong>and</strong> bases of the case. <strong>The</strong> first is an extract from the official chart<br />

of the Dutch West India Company by contemporaneous chartmakers of the approximate date of<br />

1635. It only deals with the coast line. It shows the reputed territory of the company as extended<br />

westward beyond Point Barima.<br />

<strong>The</strong> next map, by a leading Dutch geographer of 1640, is colored to show the boundary of the<br />

Dutch <strong>and</strong> Spanish colonies along the Orinoco.<br />

<strong>The</strong> next map, dated 1733, was prepared for a committee of the trade plantations. It shows the<br />

Dutch boundary extending from the Orinoco to the westward of Barima. In 1748 a map was<br />

prepared by Geographer Danville, compiled largely from Spanish sources. This was adopted in 1796<br />

by Father Sobreviela, a missionary having personal knowledge of <strong>Guiana</strong>. On it the boundary of<br />

442


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

Dutch <strong>Guiana</strong> starts a little to the east of Point Barima. <strong>The</strong> Dutch used this map in protesting<br />

against the proposed Spanish missions within their territory. Another map published in 1884 from<br />

Depons’s “Voyage en Amérique Méridionale,” taken from a manuscript map in the archives at<br />

Caracas, shows by dotted lines that the Dutch possessions were bounded by the Essequibo. Between<br />

that line <strong>and</strong> the Orinoco the country is marked as being independent. <strong>The</strong> text of Depons has a<br />

passage saying it is agreed that Spanish <strong>Guiana</strong>, which on the maps occupies thirty leagues of coast,<br />

does not in fact occupy an inch.<br />

<strong>The</strong> statement concludes with a repetition of the propositions maintained throughout the case. It<br />

ends by stating that the claim of <strong>Venezuela</strong> that her territory extends to the Essequibo River has<br />

been based upon contentions in no way supported by facts, <strong>and</strong> cannot be justified on any<br />

reasonable ground.<br />

<strong>The</strong> foregoing statement <strong>and</strong> the authorities contained in the documents annexed establish, if the<br />

matter is treated as one of strict right, the fact that Great Britain, as the successor to the Dutch, is<br />

entitled to the territory extending to Barima, including the water sheds of all rivers south of the<br />

Orinoco which flow into the Atlantic.<br />

<strong>The</strong> appendix of correspondence contains 235 documents, largely relating to the early<br />

administration of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> diplomatic part includes communications exchanged by Senor<br />

Michelena <strong>and</strong> Lord Rosebery in the abortive negotiations of 1893 to arrange for arbitration.<br />

[7 March 1896]<br />

- 295 -<br />

VENEZUELA AND BRITAIN<br />

American Commission in Possession of the Republic’s Statement<br />

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS PRESENTED<br />

All the Letters Excluded from the Blue Book Appear in the South American Defense<br />

WASHINGTON, March 10.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission formally received the first<br />

installment of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n case this morning from ex-Minister Scruggs, counsel for the South<br />

American republic, who presented copies of the volume upon which he has been engaged for the<br />

past six months, <strong>and</strong> which, he informed the commission, practically contained all the substance of<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n contention though considerable supplementary evidence is expected from Caracas<br />

<strong>and</strong> will he submitted as soon as it arrives.<br />

<strong>The</strong> volume, which contains 440 pages <strong>and</strong> a colored map, is entitled: “Official History of the<br />

Discussion Between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain on <strong>The</strong>ir <strong>Guiana</strong> Boundaries,” <strong>and</strong> is devoted<br />

exclusively to the exhibition of official correspondence, unlike the <strong>British</strong> Blue Book, without a<br />

word of comment or argument, divided into twelve sections, each covering a distinct phase of the<br />

negotiations since 1822.<br />

<strong>The</strong> preface of the book is the official letter of the Palmerston Ministry of March 18, 1840,<br />

already published in United Press dispatches, discrediting the Schomburgk line as an intended<br />

boundary, followed by the treaty of London of 1814, by which the Dutch ceded to Great Britain the<br />

“Cape of Good Hope <strong>and</strong> the establishments of Demerara, Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> Berbice.”<br />

443


February – April 1896<br />

<strong>The</strong> parts at the correspondence are:<br />

1. Instructions from Secretary of Foreign Affairs of ancient Colombia, of which <strong>Venezuela</strong> was<br />

a portion, in 1822, to her Minister in London, directing him to insist that colonists who had<br />

crossed the Essequibo should submit to Colombian laws or retire to their former<br />

possessions.<br />

2. Request of the <strong>British</strong> Minister, May 26, 1836, for <strong>Venezuela</strong> to establish a lighthouse at<br />

Point Barima.<br />

3. <strong>The</strong> Aberdeen negotiations, 1841-4.<br />

4. Disavowal of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s intention to claim <strong>Venezuela</strong>n <strong>Guiana</strong> in 1850.<br />

5. Effort to settle the dispute with Earl Derby, 1876.<br />

6. <strong>The</strong> first Salisbury <strong>and</strong> Granville negotiations, 1880-81.<br />

7. Negotiations in 1883-4 at Caracas.<br />

8. Gen. Guzman Blanco’s efforts in London with Sir Julian Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Earl Granville,<br />

1884-6, covering seventy-five pages of the book.<br />

9. Negotiations at Caracas, 1886-7, <strong>and</strong> reports of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission in disputed<br />

territory.<br />

10 <strong>and</strong> 11. Resumption of relations <strong>and</strong> negotiations between Lord Salisbury <strong>and</strong> Dr. Palido.<br />

1890, regarding a mixed commission to arbitrate west of Schomburgk line.<br />

12. <strong>The</strong> Rosebery compromise, 1893.<br />

13. Negotiations with the United States from 1893 to the present time, asking intervention,<br />

including all the correspondence relative to the effort of the Pope to secure Engl<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

consent to arbitration in 1894.<br />

Over 200 letters <strong>and</strong> official documents are given in full in the book, arranged in chronological<br />

sequence, very few of them having heretofore been quoted publicly.<br />

While no new facts of a popular nature that have not been referred to or abstracted in published<br />

statements of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s side appear in the book, it is understood that the complete presentation in<br />

extenso of all the documents makes it valuable for consideration by the commission, as all the<br />

<strong>British</strong> letters which were either overlooked or intentionally omitted from the English Blue Book are<br />

included, as well as much other official correspondence in which Engl<strong>and</strong> had no part or of which<br />

the English Government was not informed.<br />

Another advantage to the commission of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> book over the <strong>British</strong> Blue Book is that<br />

it is in strong contrast to the latter, which devotes most of its space to the period before the<br />

independence of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> to early maps which were already in the commission’s possession,<br />

while it extended arguments in support of the <strong>British</strong> claim merely repeat those advanced in the<br />

diplomatic correspondence replying to the reiterated appeals of <strong>Venezuela</strong> for arbitration.<br />

[11 March 1896]<br />

- 296 -<br />

VEXATIOUS URUAN INCIDENT<br />

Significance of its Intrusion in the Boundary <strong>Dispute</strong> Shown<br />

444


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

WASHINGTON, March 10.—<strong>The</strong> reiteration in London journals that negotiations are in<br />

progress between the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister at Washington to dispose of<br />

the Uruan incident has again received an unqualified denial from both diplomats concerned.<br />

It is conceded, however, that at some subsequent time, at the instance of Great Britain, a<br />

compromise may be effected through amicable mediation, which would remove any obstacle that<br />

may exist to the resumption of relations between the two countries as a preliminary to the<br />

arbitration of the boundary dispute upon the lines suggested by the United States, such arbitration to<br />

be entirely independent of the high commission, although supplemental to its labors.<br />

<strong>The</strong> details of the Uruan incident, which is insignificant compared with the boundary dispute,<br />

from which it is considered inseparable, have been magnified in Engl<strong>and</strong> into undue prominence,<br />

through the failure of the Government there to make any official statement regarding it. For the first<br />

time to-day the intrinsic unimportance of the affair is made plain through correspondence not<br />

hitherto made public.<br />

It appears that Baron Bodman, the German Chargé d’Affaires at Caracas, Nov. 8, 1894, had an<br />

interview with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister of Foreign Affairs which is best described in the following<br />

correspondence:<br />

Imperial Legation of Germany in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Caracas, Nov. 12, 1894.<br />

Mr. Minister:<br />

Last Thursday, by virtue of a telegraphic communication from my Government, I had the<br />

honor, in my character of being charged with the protection of <strong>British</strong> interests in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, to<br />

present a claim, in the name of the Royal Cabinet of Great Britain, against a violation of the frontier<br />

of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, perpetrated by <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soldiers on the Cuyuni River. At the same time I<br />

expressed the desire of the English Government that the officer who comm<strong>and</strong>s the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

troops on the Cuyuni River should receive orders to prohibit his soldiers from crossing the river, as<br />

well as from cutting trees on its right bank.<br />

His Excellency had the kindness to offer me an answer after having consulted the Council of<br />

Ministers. Wishing a solution of the matter satisfactory to the parties interested, I would be very<br />

grateful to his Excellency if a reply were given to me as soon as possible.<br />

BODMAN<br />

Department of Foreign Relations, Section of Foreign Public Law,<br />

No. 1,389, Caracas, Nov. 14, 1894.<br />

Honorable Sir:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government or the republic has taken into consideration the communication of your<br />

Honor received at this office the day before yesterday, when I was absent from Caracas, <strong>and</strong> in<br />

which your Honor, in reference to the telegram you made me acquainted with during the conference<br />

of last Thursday, <strong>and</strong> in your character of being charged with the protection of the <strong>British</strong> interests<br />

in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, asks with urgency an answer in regard to the so-called violation of the frontier of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> on the Cuyuni River, which reply, according to thy inference from the expressions<br />

used by your Honor, should offer the assurance that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soldiers must no longer cross<br />

said river, nor cut trees on its right bank.<br />

445


February – April 1896<br />

Your Honor will already have observed that the question here treated of is that universally<br />

known as the disputed boundary between the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> the English colony of<br />

Demerara.<br />

Since Engl<strong>and</strong> determined, not long ago, actually to occupy the portion of territory in dispute (in<br />

which the region of the Cuyuni was not, however, at first comprised, to which the telegram refers,<br />

<strong>and</strong> which is notoriously <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory) the republic has protested, seriously reserving to<br />

herself the right to vindicate her titles by the most righteous means, which, since then, moved by a<br />

spirit of conciliation, she earnestly submitted to the government of Her Majesty. Repeated new<br />

advances of the English line of occupation gave cause to other protests, which came to be the<br />

reiterated invocation of the rights that in this contest evidently are in favor of the republic.<br />

So Feb. 20, 1887, June 15 <strong>and</strong> Oct. 29, 1888, Dec. 16, 1889, Sept. 1, 1890, Dec. 30, 1891, <strong>and</strong><br />

finally, Aug. 26 <strong>and</strong> Oct. 6, 1893—that is to say, that every time any measure from the colonial<br />

authorities appeared extending the radius of the occupation, with manifest transgression of the<br />

status quo agreed upon in 1850—<strong>Venezuela</strong> has opposed with the voice of right <strong>and</strong> justice the acts<br />

exercised by Great Britain within a territory that the republic considers belonging to her, rights<br />

based on geographical <strong>and</strong> historical documents of incontestable value, on authorities of high<br />

repute, many of them English, on local traditions worthy of respect, <strong>and</strong> on facts of jurisdiction of<br />

the commissaries of agents of Her Catholic Majesty, <strong>and</strong> to be found in the public treaties previous<br />

to that of Aug. 13, 1814, whereby Holl<strong>and</strong> ceded to Great Britain her colonies of Demerara,<br />

Essequibo <strong>and</strong> Berbice.<br />

According to the information of which the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government is already in possession,<br />

that which happened on the right bank of the Cuyuni River was caused by a menace from the agent<br />

of the Demerara Government, who is called inspector of that region, to a <strong>Venezuela</strong>n named Loreto<br />

Lira, planter, established there for a good many years, <strong>and</strong> from the cutting down of trees upon<br />

some l<strong>and</strong>s by several of his countrymen who arrived there some days after the commemoration of<br />

the independence of <strong>Venezuela</strong> had been celebrated on that bank of the river (July 5,) in the house<br />

of the same Lira, <strong>and</strong> in that of a woman named Manuela Casanas.<br />

It is known that the same Colonial Agent from whom the threat to Lira had come stated to him<br />

afterward that he could continue his work with complete tranquillity, <strong>and</strong> it is also known that after<br />

the patriotic rejoicing to which they gave themselves up, on the before-mentioned July 5, in his<br />

house <strong>and</strong> that of Señora Casanas, a Captain with eight soldiers proceeding from the genera1<br />

commissariat of the Upper Cuyuni River, <strong>and</strong> the successor of Inspector Gallagher, named Douglas<br />

Barnes, asked permission to cross the river <strong>and</strong> to offer his friendship to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities.<br />

In spite of the manner in which the Colonial Agents have been proceeding in the occupation of<br />

the territory which <strong>Venezuela</strong> considers comprised within her limits, it has always been<br />

recommended, <strong>and</strong> most earnestly, to the authorities established by the republic within the same<br />

zone, that they avoid as far as compatible with national decorum all cause for collision with the<br />

agents of Demerara, since the Government wishes to solve the question of boundary by peaceful<br />

means, <strong>and</strong> not to make odious this old controversy.<br />

<strong>The</strong> assurances now asked, considering the present aspect of the question, would be equivalent,<br />

as will be easily understood by your Honor, to a tacit declaration in favor of the designs or Engl<strong>and</strong>,<br />

<strong>and</strong> would counteract, in fact, the protests previously made by the republic, which she still maintains<br />

with all its vigor, <strong>and</strong> which I have just again related for a better underst<strong>and</strong>ing. And upon stating so<br />

to your Honor, I fulfill the duty of renewing, through such a worthy medium, to the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government, the earnest desire of <strong>Venezuela</strong> of putting an end to the vexatious litigation by the use<br />

446


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

of the peaceful resorts counseled by modern law, <strong>and</strong> to which Engl<strong>and</strong> herself frequently appeals,<br />

as being a cultured nation, that has collaborated in the work of the present civilization.<br />

(Signed) P. EZEQUIEL ROJAS<br />

[11 March 1896]<br />

- 297 -<br />

GUIANA BOUNDARY LORE<br />

Archives of Spain <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong> to be Examined by Commission<br />

VENEZUELA’S DEFENDERS AT WORK<br />

WASHINGTON, March 13.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission at its regular meeting to-day, with<br />

all the members present, virtually reached the conclusion that the main points at issue in the dispute<br />

hinged on documents lying in the royal archives of Spain <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> perhaps some other<br />

countries <strong>and</strong> that while such documents would probably be quoted by each of the disputants in<br />

support of the contradictory claims presented, the duty would devolve on the commission not only<br />

to verify by actual examination all such citations, but, if practicable, to develop contemporary<br />

documents which might throw strong side lights upon the evidence submitted.<br />

While definite action was postponed until the full <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n cases shall have been<br />

formally brought under consideration, there remains no doubt that some or the Commissioners, or<br />

at all events the Secretary of the commission, Mr. Malet-Prevost, <strong>and</strong> agents under his direction, will<br />

soon be sent to Madrid <strong>and</strong> <strong>The</strong> Hague. It is explained that this determination is not due to the<br />

alleged discovery of mis-quotations In decrees <strong>and</strong> treaties already in the commission’s possession,<br />

but from the conviction that the final decision of the commission ought not to be open to any<br />

attack as to the inconclusiveness of the pivotal evidence upon which such decision will in all<br />

probability be found to depend.<br />

In the preliminary investigations of the commission they have been confronted with numerous<br />

conflicting maps <strong>and</strong> translations. While geographical discrepancies are within the power of the<br />

commission to harmonize through the enormous mass of corroborative charts it comm<strong>and</strong>s, the<br />

comparative indecipherability <strong>and</strong> partial illegibility of royal decrees are thought to be matters which<br />

necessitate personal <strong>and</strong> expert examination.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission expects to be in possession of the <strong>British</strong> Blue Book as well as the greater part<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s case early next week, <strong>and</strong> in view of this anticipation, Mr. Coudert <strong>and</strong> President<br />

Gilman, who have hitherto spent little time in Washington, will remain here for the present for daily<br />

meetings, at which the weighing <strong>and</strong> comparison of evidence will be prosecuted continuously.<br />

None of the Commissioners has yet had an opportunity to examine the <strong>British</strong> case, as the only<br />

available copy that has reached them was one of the advance edition sent by Ambassador Bayard to<br />

the State Department, which may contain typographical or other errors incident to hasty<br />

preparation. <strong>The</strong> regular copies for the commission will arrive here, in all probability, to-morrow<br />

evening or Monday next. While access to a State Department copy has been allowed, there has been<br />

no opportunity to examine it fully.<br />

447


February – April 1896<br />

It appears from the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n official report on the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary dispute that the<br />

expedition was sent out because <strong>Venezuela</strong> became alarmed lest the <strong>British</strong> should attempt to seize<br />

the entire Orinoco River <strong>and</strong> prevent the republic from using the stream in any way. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong><br />

Colonial Governor, Viscount Gormanston, had pushed his personal explorations incognito as far as<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n City or Angostura, or Ciudad Bolivar, 250 miles up the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> was most<br />

energetic in establishing military outposts through the interior.<br />

<strong>The</strong> chief of the commission, R. F. Seijas, formerly <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister to Engl<strong>and</strong>, found<br />

everything to confirm the most serious fears of his Government, <strong>and</strong> only through his energetic<br />

protests to the Colonial Governor <strong>and</strong> the activity of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Ministers abroad was the policy of<br />

boundary extension temporarily allowed to rest by Lord Salisbury. <strong>The</strong>se extracts from the report,<br />

which are verified by accompanying documents, show the state of affairs at the time <strong>and</strong> give an<br />

interesting insight into the methods pursued to populate the country:<br />

In 1883, as Mr. Thurn, Special Magistrate of the Pumaron District, affirms, there was no sign of human<br />

habitation at Barima, but there are now more than fifty flourishing English settlements, with the prospect of the<br />

number increasing. One hundred <strong>and</strong> twenty miles from the lower part of the river there was nothing existing at the<br />

time mentioned. In December, 1888, he could barely discern the probability of the discovery of gold in the district;<br />

but two or three months later it was found in considerable quantities.<br />

Barima <strong>and</strong> Amacuro, he says, are being populated rapidly. <strong>The</strong> dailies of the colony published petitions for<br />

grants of gold placers at both points, <strong>and</strong> at the Petoro; speculators organized expeditions; the banks of Georgetown<br />

loaned money <strong>and</strong> advanced it on shipments of gold; the Government provides transportation, <strong>and</strong> day by day news<br />

comes of the discovery of richer gold fields. With all these things, we are threatened with losing also the right bank<br />

of the Amacuro, <strong>and</strong> seeing the English occupying a great part of the banks of the Orinoco; for, upon discovering<br />

one single grain of gold on said coast, they will not hesitate a second to take that territory, encourage immigration,<br />

<strong>and</strong> correct maps.<br />

<strong>The</strong> English, who are very experienced colonizers, are making much profit by the discovery, <strong>and</strong> have found<br />

therein the medium of rapidly populating the usurped l<strong>and</strong>s. Posts which were formerly insignificant are to-day<br />

important villages, with a large number of laborers, where there are police agents, fiscal employes, schools,<br />

missionaries, <strong>and</strong> teachers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> agents of <strong>Venezuela</strong> have presented to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, among other<br />

documents, the official report of the Ministry of the Interior at Caracas to the Ministry of Foreign<br />

Relations, dated May 23, 1890, consisting of forty printed pages, covering the radical advances of the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Colonial officers into the disputed territory following the rich discoveries of gold from 1885<br />

to 1890, as investigated by a national commission appointed by <strong>Venezuela</strong> to make a scientific<br />

exploring expedition in <strong>Guiana</strong>n territory.<br />

<strong>The</strong> elaborate report of this commission is now for the first time disclosed, <strong>and</strong> shows,<br />

according to the testimony of <strong>British</strong> magistrates <strong>and</strong> others in the territory, that as late as 1883 no<br />

<strong>British</strong> settlements existed even as far west as the Pumaron River. As late as 1888 the settlements<br />

are referred to by the English as the “recently acquired district,” <strong>and</strong> the Colonial Government is<br />

shown to be exerting its authority in every way to rush immigrants into the interior, its success in<br />

some degree being shown by these figures of gold exports: 1885, 939 ounces; 1886, 6,518 ounces;<br />

1887, 11,906 ounces; 1888, 14,519 ounces, <strong>and</strong> for the first six months of 1889, 14,624 ounces.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se documents, <strong>and</strong> especially those relating to <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s formal protest against the<br />

usurpation, seem to place Viscount Gormanston, Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, in the light of<br />

suppressing the facts, although it is shown that he was in constant communication with Lord<br />

Salisbury. Testimony is adduced to demonstrate that the <strong>British</strong> authorities were most generous to<br />

448


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

the Indians, thereby securing access to the gold districts in the interior, deserted by <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns,<br />

who were attracted by <strong>British</strong> bl<strong>and</strong>ishments to the coast settlements. <strong>The</strong> publication has been<br />

submitted without argument, <strong>Venezuela</strong> relying altogether upon the simple statements of facts.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister has been notified by his Government that the first installment of<br />

official evidence for the consideration of the High Commission left La Guayra on the steamer<br />

Philadelphia, March 10, <strong>and</strong> is due to arrive in New-York next Tuesday. <strong>The</strong> documents relate<br />

exclusively to the period near the close of the eighteenth century, taken from the royal Spanish<br />

archives, <strong>and</strong> have not heretofore been accessible to Great Britain or, at least, are not quoted in the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Blue Book.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y are put forward to demonstrate the inadmissibility of Dutch claim to any territory west of<br />

the Essequibo. A large number of authenticated official maps, covering the same period, are<br />

included, none of which has hitherto been produced, as no occasion for their presentation has ever<br />

occurred.<br />

Minister Andrade has also been informed that the records of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Legations at Rome,<br />

Madrid, London, <strong>and</strong> Paris contain many documents bearing on the controversy, <strong>and</strong> these will be<br />

placed at the commission’s disposition, in a short time, those from Paris, Rome <strong>and</strong> Madrid in a few<br />

weeks.<br />

[14 March 1896]<br />

- 298 -<br />

BRITISH VENEZUELA BLUE BOOK<br />

<strong>The</strong> Evidence of Great Britain in its Contest for Territory<br />

Arranged in a Very Clear Way<br />

WASHINGTON, March 18.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Blue Book on <strong>Venezuela</strong> has made a favorable<br />

impression on the members of the High Commission <strong>and</strong> others who are studying it in Washington<br />

because of the fair appearance it has of presenting the <strong>British</strong> evidence in such shape that it may be<br />

easily verified by reference to the documents quoted <strong>and</strong> given in full in the 400 solid pages of<br />

appendix where the Spanish archives, both translations <strong>and</strong> original texts, are spread out <strong>and</strong><br />

referred to in the margins to their sources in Spain, the bundle, shelf, <strong>and</strong> alcove of libraries being<br />

given in many cases.<br />

<strong>The</strong> pivotal documents on which the main points of the <strong>British</strong> contention hinge are invariably<br />

given in their original language; accompanied by close translations, <strong>and</strong> while Prof. Pollock’s<br />

preliminary argument, which has been so widely quoted, makes very sweeping claims, the evidence<br />

in support of it is presented clearly on its merits.<br />

As an instance of the care with which even minor points are treated, Document No. 23 may be<br />

cited, which is the “Royal Cedula ratifying <strong>and</strong> approving the agreement made by the missionaries of<br />

the Orinoco in 1734, which Señor Calcano urged before Lord Derby in 1876 to support the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n contention. This document is not only shown in the original, with an almost literal<br />

translation, but in a footnote special attention is directed to certain words printed in italics in a<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n work (Spanish) published by order of Gen. Guzman Blanco in 1874, which, on Page<br />

285, quoted the following alleged citation front the cedula:<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

To the Capuchins is assigned the territory comprised between the seacoast which extends from the gr<strong>and</strong><br />

mouth of the Orinoco to the colony of Essequibo to Angostura of the Orinoco, from east to west.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Blue Book demonstrates that the correct quotation is as follows:<br />

<strong>The</strong>re remaining to the Rev. Fathers Capuchins, for the purpose at developing their missions, the territory <strong>and</strong><br />

district from the same Angostura downward to the gr<strong>and</strong> mouth of the said Orinoco, where they will distribute<br />

whatever missions may come to them.<br />

It thus appears that the words “the seacoast which extends from the gr<strong>and</strong> mouth of the<br />

Orinoco to the colony of Essequibo to,” were interpolated by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n agent without<br />

warrant, to support the claim to jurisdiction along the coast from the Orinoco to the Essequibo.<br />

<strong>The</strong> second appendix covers 200 pages, <strong>and</strong> discloses the correspondence bearing on the subject<br />

between thee home Government <strong>and</strong> the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> from 1799 to<br />

1893.<br />

Appendix III is a portfolio containing facsimiles in color of all the essential maps in the case.<br />

<strong>The</strong> counsel of <strong>Venezuela</strong> submitted to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission this morning a printed<br />

brief, presenting a bit of new <strong>and</strong> apparently conclusive evidence in support of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s claim. It<br />

refers to the map <strong>and</strong> description of <strong>Guiana</strong> contained in a two-volume large folio geography<br />

prepared by Thomas Myers, Professor in the Royal Military Academy of Woolwich in 1822. <strong>The</strong><br />

Essequibo is shown as the dividing line between <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> Spanish <strong>Guiana</strong>. Numerous citations are<br />

set forth in the brief to show that Engl<strong>and</strong> at that time recognized the limits now claimed by<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[19 March 1896]<br />

- 299 -<br />

GUIANA AND VENEZUELA<br />

BLUNDERS IN BLUE BOOK TO BE CORRECTED BY MEMORANDUM<br />

WASHINGTON, March 21.—Lord Salisbury has cabled the <strong>British</strong> Embassy here that a<br />

memor<strong>and</strong>um embodying the correction of minor clerical errors in the argument of the Blue Book<br />

on <strong>Venezuela</strong> will be forwarded for delivery to the United States Government, adding that, while the<br />

modifications are of no great importance, they materially add strength to the <strong>British</strong> statement.<br />

This official announcement from the <strong>British</strong> Premier directly contradicts the reports published in<br />

London papers that the errors discovered in Prof. Pollock’s compilation were intentional1y made to<br />

bolster up a weak cause.<br />

Secretary Mallet-Prevost, for the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, this afternoon issued the following<br />

statement:<br />

During the last week reports have been industriously circulated to the effect that the<br />

commission has reached a decision with reference to the boundary question favorable to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. This having been denied, the report has been circulated in another form, <strong>and</strong> it is<br />

450


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

now asserted that, while the commission, as a body, has reached no such conclusion, the<br />

Commissioners individually entertain the views referred to.<br />

It must be evident to all that so long as anything remains to be examined <strong>and</strong> considered the<br />

Commissioners are not in a position to form an opinion respecting the merits of the<br />

controversy. As a matter of tact, neither the commission nor the individual Commissioners are<br />

as yet in possession of all the evidence. <strong>The</strong> papers presented by <strong>Venezuela</strong> are but a part of<br />

what has been promised.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Blue Book of the <strong>British</strong> Government, while remarkably full <strong>and</strong> detailed, does not<br />

include all the documents which may be adduced in support of its contentions. <strong>The</strong> commission<br />

has not <strong>and</strong> will not limit itself to the consideration of what those two Governments may<br />

present. It has been engaged upon independent lines of inquiry, <strong>and</strong> will continue to follow those<br />

lines until all its sources of information shall have been exhausted.<br />

<strong>The</strong>n, <strong>and</strong> not until then, will it be in a position to form any opinion or to make any report.<br />

<strong>The</strong> so-called Uruan incident has been separated from the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute, <strong>and</strong><br />

practically terminated, it is understood, through the good offices of the United States, without<br />

the representatives of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the South American republic coming into direct<br />

relations regarding the affair.<br />

This Uruan incident, so called, had at one time a somewhat threatening aspect, but finally<br />

developed into comparative insignificance, capable of exceedingly tame adjustment. It is<br />

strenuously contended by those most intimately concerned that the incident never had an<br />

ultimatum stage, <strong>and</strong> that there was never any foundation for the report that a <strong>British</strong> fleet would<br />

be called upon to imitate the Corinto demonstration.<br />

While originally the claim presented through the German Legation in November, 1894, was<br />

for a violation of the frontier of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> therefore inseparable from the boundary<br />

controversy, at Secretary Olney’s instance Great Britain, a few weeks ago, modified it into a<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> similar in effect to that pressed by Italy against the United States on account of the New<br />

Orleans riots in 1890, which claim was settled by the payment by President Harrison of a certain<br />

sum of money out of the State Department contingent fund.<br />

It is understood that the Uruan dem<strong>and</strong> now simply becomes one for personal damages<br />

inflicted upon <strong>British</strong> property <strong>and</strong> persons by <strong>Venezuela</strong>n officials, leaving out of controversy<br />

the question whether the occurrence was upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory as being irrelevant. When<br />

Douglas Barnes, the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> constable, was arrested in July, 1894. by <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soldiers<br />

on the right bank of the Cuyuni River, which he had crossed to stop a <strong>Venezuela</strong>n planter from<br />

cutting trees on l<strong>and</strong> which he owned, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government paid Barnes $300 or $400<br />

on account of his imprisonment, which he personally considered as satisfactory.<br />

But when the Colonial Government heard of it, considerable indignation arose in Demerara,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the damages were soon magnified to enormous amounts, which at that period the home<br />

Government felt constrained to present as a claim against <strong>Venezuela</strong>. After two years, however,<br />

<strong>and</strong> in view of the changed aspect of the boundary dispute, the claim has dwindled to $5,000,<br />

<strong>and</strong> this amount is probably about what <strong>Venezuela</strong> will shortly pay, with the distinct<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing that it does not affect the title to the territory upon which the arrest occurred.<br />

[22 March 1896]<br />

451


February – April 1896<br />

- 300 -<br />

CLOSING DOWN THEIR WORKS<br />

Not Willing to Risk Money in the <strong>Dispute</strong>d <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Territory<br />

WASHINGTON, April 1.—<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> papers, dated as late as March 18, which reached the<br />

Bureau of American Republics to-day, indicate the ab<strong>and</strong>onment of Great Britain’s determination to<br />

insist upon retaining all the settlements established by Englishmen throughout the disputed territory<br />

should the <strong>Venezuela</strong> claims be sustained. In regard to these settlements Lord Salisbury wrote<br />

Secretary Olney four months ago that under no circumstances could they ever be surrendered to<br />

alien jurisdiction. <strong>The</strong> Georgetown Chronicle, however, in its issue of March 18, says:<br />

<strong>The</strong> public generally, <strong>and</strong> those interested in mining concerns particularly, have learned with regret that work<br />

has been closed down on the properties of the Winter syndicate, the Bartley syndicate, <strong>and</strong> the Barima Development<br />

Company. It is alleged that the reason the properties have decided to adopt this course is because they do not<br />

consider that, in the unsettled state of the boundary question, their rights are at present sufficiently secure to justify<br />

them in incurring the heavy expenditure which continued prosecution of the work would require.<br />

In another part of the paper a statement from Mr. Connolly, Superintendent of the Barima<br />

Company, is published, declaring that he had received instructions from London not to incur any<br />

additional heavy expenses until the Government gave grants to the property, “the company’s<br />

solicitors thinking it would be injudicious in the present position of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary<br />

dispute to spend money developing property which might be taken from them without<br />

compensation.” Other superintendents had received similar instructions from London headquarters.<br />

<strong>The</strong> location of these companies is the richest gold field that has yet been, found in <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />

the capital already invested there is greater than in any other locality in the colony.<br />

[2 April 1896]<br />

- 301 -<br />

INDEMNITY FOR URUAN AFFAIR<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Expects to Pay for Damages to Great Britain<br />

LONDON, April 1.—<strong>The</strong> Times to-morrow will publish a dispatch from Caracas, capital of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, saying that, according to a telegram received there from Washington, Great Britain will<br />

receive ₤1,000 indemnity on account of the Uruan incident.<br />

<strong>The</strong> local press, the dispatch says, condemns the weakness of the Government. <strong>The</strong> public<br />

generally are apathetic upon the subject.<br />

[2 April 1896]<br />

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- 302 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN COMMISSION<br />

Its Work Believed to be About One-Half Completed<br />

WASHINGTON, April 2.—Justice Brewer presided to-day over the first formal meeting of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission that has been held for the past two weeks, having returned from San<br />

Antonio, Texas, last night. All the members were in attendance, <strong>and</strong>, after careful individual study of<br />

the <strong>British</strong> Blue Book, entered into a rigid discussion of its arguments <strong>and</strong> evidence.<br />

To-day’s session was considered the most important so far held by the commission, which is<br />

now possessed of all the main features of the contention <strong>and</strong> the principal points upon which the<br />

dispute depends.<br />

<strong>The</strong> question of sending one or more representatives of the commission to Europe to verify the<br />

accuracy of the documents submitted by <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain was discussed, <strong>and</strong>, while no<br />

definite action was taken, the indispensability of the examination of Spanish, as well as Dutch,<br />

archives was recognized, <strong>and</strong> no doubt is expressed that a search will soon be ordered. <strong>The</strong><br />

commission has now been at work three months, <strong>and</strong> its labors are thought to be about half<br />

completed.<br />

In the House to-day Mr. Hitt reported favorably from the Committee on Foreign Affairs the<br />

resolution asking the President to transmit to Congress all the correspondence in the Department of<br />

State relating to mediation or intervention by the United States in the affairs of <strong>Venezuela</strong> since Dec.<br />

1, 1895, to date, <strong>and</strong> the resolution was agreed to.<br />

[3 April 1896]<br />

- 303 -<br />

VENEZUELA BOUNDARY QUARREL<br />

English Complaint of Lack of Reply to the Blue Book’s Case<br />

LONDON, April 3.—In its issue to-morrow <strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> will complain that <strong>Venezuela</strong> has<br />

made no reply to the <strong>British</strong> case presented in the Blue Book recently issued.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> question,” it says, “has become pressing. We are unable to learn whether the American<br />

commission has received anything from <strong>Venezuela</strong> beyond pamphlets narrating resistance to the<br />

<strong>British</strong> claims, while there is entire absence of a case on which to arbitrate.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> contends that <strong>Venezuela</strong> has never produced a single proof that she ever<br />

possessed jurisdiction over the territory to the eastward of the Orinoco River, but has confined<br />

herself simply to protests against alleged <strong>British</strong> encroachments.<br />

<strong>The</strong> paper also complains of <strong>Venezuela</strong> warping Lord Aberdeen’s statements made in 1844, for<br />

which reason it wonders less at Lord Salisbury’s reluctance to arbitrate with such opponents.<br />

[4 April 1896]<br />

453


February – April 1896<br />

- 304 -<br />

A DEMERARA REPORT DENIED<br />

Surveying Party Mistaken for an Expedition in <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

LONDON, April 4.—A news agency denies the statement contained in a recently published<br />

dispatch from Georgetown, Demerara, that a <strong>British</strong> expedition had left that place to establish a new<br />

station on the Cuyuni River west of the Schomburgk line, to open a new road to the Yuruan, as a<br />

protest against a big grant by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government to American capitalists in the gold<br />

country at the mouth of the Orinoco.<br />

It expresses the opinion that the statement contained in the dispatch referred to originated from<br />

preparations by an English surveying party for an inspection of the country between the Yuruni <strong>and</strong><br />

Cuyuni Rivers, to ascertain whether it is possible to build a road or railway to open up the gold<br />

fields.<br />

[5 April 1896]<br />

- 305 -<br />

A FAIR SETTLEMENT PREDICTED<br />

Negotiations as to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Matter Promise Good Results<br />

LONDON, April 5.—<strong>The</strong> Chronicle will say to-morrow that the negotiations between Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States concerning <strong>Venezuela</strong> are proceeding satisfactorily, <strong>and</strong> that a solution<br />

favorable to all is counted upon with confidence.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Times has received a publication, dated Atlanta, Ga., the cover of which bears the embossed<br />

stamp of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Legation at Washington. It is entitled “Official History of the Discussion<br />

Between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> on <strong>The</strong>ir <strong>Guiana</strong> Boundaries.” <strong>The</strong> documents contained in<br />

the publication date from 1822.<br />

Commenting upon the work, <strong>The</strong> Times says that all the documents are published in the <strong>British</strong><br />

Blue Book, except two from <strong>Venezuela</strong>n representatives to the State Department at Washington.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se <strong>The</strong> Times prints. <strong>The</strong> first is from Señor Lobo, dated Oct. 26, 1893, <strong>and</strong> the second from<br />

Señor Andrade, dated March 31, 1894.<br />

[6 April 1896]<br />

- 306 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN DISPUTE<br />

POSITION TAKEN BY PRESIDENT CLEVELAND JUSTIFIED<br />

This Shown by Facts Well Known in the <strong>British</strong> Colony—<br />

Probable Neutrality of the <strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

Great Britain Had No Title to the Northwest District <strong>and</strong> Spain Never Occupied It<br />

Some Pertinent Points in the Controversy<br />

Special Correspondence of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times<br />

GEORGETOWN, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, March 15.—Now that there is a probability of the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government consenting to submit the question of boundaries between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> to arbitration there is also the likelihood of the main feature in this long-st<strong>and</strong>ing dispute<br />

being clearly defined. What must be accepted as the premises to any consideration of the <strong>British</strong><br />

claims in this connection is, What were the Dutch possessions in this territory in 1798? <strong>The</strong> next,<br />

Was the territory in dispute ever occupied or possessed by the Spaniards, or by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns as<br />

their successors?<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is no doubt that the chief difficulty in connection with this question has been to ascertain<br />

what the Dutch actually ceded to Great Britain, but it is equally important to note that it does not<br />

necessarily follow that <strong>Venezuela</strong> has acquired a right to all or any of the territory east of the<br />

Orinoco not occupied by the Dutch, <strong>and</strong> when this has been stated, it should, to every reasonable<br />

mind, be sufficient to prove how logical <strong>and</strong> just was the position taken up by President Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

when he stated that the question was one which could only be settled by arbitration.<br />

It has been attempted to prove a great deal by the reproduction of the earlier maps of <strong>Guiana</strong>;<br />

references have been made at considerable length by Mr. Daly, President of the New-York<br />

Geographical Society: by Clements P. Markham, President of the Royal Geographical Society, <strong>and</strong><br />

others to ancient charts, but it is most important to note in connection with such chartographical<br />

references that maps can only prove claims, not titles, <strong>and</strong> therefore, while these ancient charts<br />

might be interesting, they cannot be accepted as evidence in the settlement of a question of<br />

boundaries. <strong>The</strong> Dutch ceded their possessions to Great Britain.<br />

Important also in this connection is the following extract from an official dispatch, dated from<br />

the Governor’s residence, Demerara, July 15, 1839, from Gov. Light to the Marquis of Normanby,<br />

in which the then Governor of Demerara wrote as follows: “I am enabled to reply to your<br />

Lordship’s dispatch No. 11, dated 12th March, <strong>and</strong> to that of your Lordship’s predecessor, No. 74,<br />

dated 1st December, 1838. I shall observe that there are no documents in the archives of the colony<br />

respect respecting the western or southern limits of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>; the memoir of Mr. Schomburgk<br />

is therefore valuable.”<br />

In the absence then of any documentary evidence as to the limits of the colony a reference must<br />

be made to history, <strong>and</strong> the historical records of the settlement of the Dutch on the <strong>Guiana</strong>n coast<br />

are pretty complete. We know how the Dutch first established a trading post at the Pomeroon, then<br />

their settlements on that river, then at Berbice, afterward on the Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> still later again on<br />

the Demerara River. We are told that in 1814 Berbice, Demerara, <strong>and</strong> Essequibo were finally ceded<br />

to Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> there should scarcely be any difficulty in defining the limits of these colonies at<br />

that time, or even at an earlier period.<br />

A reference might be made to the Dutch charts of the eighteenth century to prove the extent of<br />

the Dutch claims, but this is perhaps unnecessary since Lord Salisbury has stated upon what the<br />

<strong>British</strong> claims are based. Lord Salisbury, in his letter to Sir Julian Pauncefote of date Nov. 26, 1895,<br />

says: “<strong>The</strong> title of Great Britain to the territory in question is derived in the first place from conquest<br />

<strong>and</strong> military occupation of the Dutch settlements in 1796. Both on this occasion <strong>and</strong> at the time of a<br />

previous occupation, in 1781, the <strong>British</strong> authorities marked the western boundary of their<br />

455


February – April 1896<br />

possessions “as beginning some distance up the Orinoco, beyond Point Barima, in accordance with<br />

the limits claimed <strong>and</strong> actually held by the Dutch, <strong>and</strong> this has always since remained the frontier<br />

claimed by Great Britain.”<br />

But important in this connection is a sentence in Lord Salisbury’s letter to Mr. Olney on this<br />

subject, where he says: “Sir Robert Schomburgk did not discover or invent any new boundaries. He<br />

took particular care to fortify himself with the history of the case. He had further, from actual<br />

exploration <strong>and</strong> information obtained from the Indians, as at Barima <strong>and</strong> local traditions on the<br />

Cuyuni, fixed the limits of the Dutch possessions <strong>and</strong> the zone from which all trace of Spanish<br />

influence was absent. At the very outset of his mission he surveyed Point Barima, where the remains<br />

of a Dutch fort still existed, <strong>and</strong> placed here <strong>and</strong> at the mouth of the Amacura two boundary posts.”<br />

It is, perhaps, matter for sincere regret if his Lordship has been so grievously misled upon the<br />

actual facts as the above quotations would indicate. Surely the Marquis of Salisbury does not require<br />

to be told at this date that his statement with regard to Mr. Schomburgk is scarcely in strict<br />

accordance with truth, <strong>and</strong> that his reference to the Dutch possessions “beginning some distance up<br />

the Orinoco” is absolutely without foundation?<br />

Surely, Lord Salisbury could have learned that Robert Schomburgk drew his line from the east<br />

bank of the Amacura long before he visited these regions; that Mr. Schomburgk had for his<br />

authority for so doing the tradition mentioned by Hartsinck <strong>and</strong> Humboldt of a Dutch post having<br />

existed at Point Barima at one time, <strong>and</strong> the fact that “le Major von Bouchenroeder’ of the Batavian<br />

Republic had marked on his map of <strong>Guiana</strong> (1798) the “site of an ancient Dutch post,” while it is<br />

well known that the gallant Major had not only never visited the district but had never been in<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

True, Capt Thompson had in his map (1781) marked the Barima as the limits of the Dutch<br />

possessions according to their claims, but Netscher, who is the best authority on the Dutch<br />

possessions in <strong>Guiana</strong>, says: “If the authorities in Essequibo had thought they had a clear right to<br />

the territory up to the Barima, surely they would have placed their furthest frontier post upon that<br />

river <strong>and</strong> not upon the Moruca.”<br />

In point of fact, it is very evident that Schomburgk, in drawing his sketch line from the Amacura,<br />

took as his authority for doing so the map of Major von Bouchenroeder, <strong>and</strong> the latter has been<br />

charged by Netscher with having so drawn his line from “a desire on his part to give satisfaction to<br />

the national pride of his Government—that of the Batavian Republic.” But then, again, surely the<br />

noble Marquis is aware that even “le Major von Bouchenroeder” did not claim the existence of “a<br />

Dutch fort,” but rather “the site of an ancient Dutch post,” a mere trading depot or smuggler’s hut,<br />

if it even did exist, but which had certainly ceased to exist more than a century before the <strong>British</strong> had<br />

obtained possession from the Dutch. Surely Lord Salisbury knows ere this time that the Dutch never<br />

settled in or occupied any territory west of the Moruca?<br />

But since Lord Salisbury states his willingness to rest his case upon the <strong>British</strong> occupation of the<br />

Dutch settlements in 1796, he has narrowed the question down to a point that should not be<br />

difficult of solution. <strong>The</strong> only question then is: What were the Dutch possessions in 1796?<br />

In considering this point, it would perhaps be well to remember that according to the law of<br />

nations, a title to a country may be obtained by discovery, by possession, or by occupation;<br />

conquest, or treaty with the owners. <strong>The</strong> rights by discovery alone may be insufficient, as the<br />

country maybe held by a people sufficiently powerful to prevent occupation by the discoverers. Only<br />

in the case of uninhabited countries can discovery alone constitute a right. And what is certainly<br />

important here is that the Dutch obtained their title to what they did hold, by occupation, <strong>and</strong>,<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

therefore, when ceding their possessions, could, <strong>and</strong> did, only cede what was theirs by such<br />

occupation.<br />

It is generally conceded that in the latter part of the eighteenth century the post at the mouth of<br />

the Pomeroon, which had been destroyed in 1666, was replaced by one at the Moruca River, <strong>and</strong> no<br />

claim has ever been made to even claim that there ever was a Dutch post further to the westward at<br />

any subsequent period. Netscher has made this point particularly clear, though he goes on to state:<br />

“We also find in the State archives [Holl<strong>and</strong>) a manuscript map, apparently of about the middle of<br />

the eighteenth century, on which the still more westerly river Waini is marked as the boundary, but<br />

in no single document of this time do we find any mention made of a post or a garrison further<br />

west.” And then he goes on to point out that if the authorities had believed they had any right to the<br />

territory to the west of the Moruca they would not have marked their furthest frontier post at the<br />

Moruca.<br />

<strong>The</strong> facts connected with the establishment of an outpost at the Moruca are these: During the<br />

first occupation by the <strong>British</strong> referred to by Lord Salisbury, 1781, there was no post at either the<br />

Pomeroon or the Monica. <strong>The</strong> planters had suffered considerable loss by the running away of slaves,<br />

<strong>and</strong> although they had applied for the erection of a post at the Moruca to prevent this, the petition<br />

was not granted, as there was “no money in the chest.”<br />

During the French occupation, 1782-3, the planters had evidently renewed their application, for<br />

in 1784 a small post had been established at the mouth of the Moruca as a watchhouse for runaway<br />

slaves.<br />

Had Lord Salisbury desired further evidence as to whether the post at the Moruca was the most<br />

westerly point, a reference could have been made to Southey’s Chronological History of the West<br />

Indies, where it is stated: “On the 19th of January (1797) a party of Spaniards crossed the Orinoko<br />

to attack the outpost at Moroko, the most remote point of the colony of Essequebo.” (Vol III, p.<br />

121.)<br />

This together with the fact that there is not in the archives of Spain, Holl<strong>and</strong>, or <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

any proof of the existence of a Dutch post further west than the Monica, it might be accepted as<br />

conclusively proved that “ the Moroko was the mast remote point of the colony of Essequebo.”<br />

But, should the Marquis still retain a doubt as to that point, a reference might be made to the<br />

accompanying map, which not only shows what was believed to be the <strong>British</strong> possessions in the<br />

colony of Essequibo in 1858, but which has the further advantage of having been drawn by the<br />

Crown Surveyor of the <strong>British</strong> colony <strong>and</strong> dedicated to Gov. Light.<br />

What is certainly a most important feature of the map is the details as to the extent of the<br />

parishes in the several colonies. And as it is only the other day that an attempt was made to prove<br />

that all of the Northwest Territory up to the Barima <strong>and</strong> Amacura Rivers was within the colony of<br />

Essequibo, it is not a difficult matter to prove when the extension was made. <strong>The</strong> accompanying<br />

map certainly proves that in 1858 the colony of Essequibo did not extend beyond the Pomeroon,<br />

<strong>and</strong> for that the Monica would form the natural boundary, <strong>and</strong> it is probable that Great Britain will<br />

never succeed in proving more.<br />

But, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, it will be none the less difficult for <strong>Venezuela</strong> to prove any right to the<br />

territory from the Moruca to the Orinoco. It is a well-known fact that the Caribs never could <strong>and</strong><br />

never did tolerate the Spaniards. In every case where a settlement was attempted by the Spaniards<br />

east of the Orinoco, the Caribs succeeded in destroying it <strong>and</strong> driving out the settlers. With the<br />

exception of one attempt made in 1530 to settle on the east bank of the Lower Orinoco, (at the<br />

Barima,) the Spaniards never settled in what is known to-day as the Northwest Territory of <strong>British</strong><br />

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February – April 1896<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> if the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns have no other authority to break down on this point than Depons,<br />

they have a difficult task indeed. Speaking of the conquest of <strong>Venezuela</strong> by the Spaniards, Depons<br />

says: “Of all the conquests made in the New World, in the name of the King of Spain, that of the<br />

country in question was the most arduous, tedious, <strong>and</strong> we may add the most incomplete.” And<br />

again, to quote the same writer: “It is, in fact, certain that Spanish <strong>Guiana</strong>, which in the best charts is<br />

made to occupy thirty leagues from the mouth of the Oroonoko to Cape Nassau, never extended so<br />

far in that direction; the natives, who have uniformly asserted their independence, <strong>and</strong> have never<br />

been either converted, reduced or subjugated, continue still as free as they were before the discovery<br />

of the New World.”<br />

Bancrott says: “<strong>The</strong> Spaniards, however, have no other possession in this country, except their<br />

settlements on the eastern side of the River Oronoque, near the confines of its limits, <strong>and</strong>, therefore,<br />

can hardly be included among the proprietors of <strong>Guiana</strong>.” It is very apparent that Gumilla was right<br />

when he marked the large tract of country from the Orinoco to near the Essequibo, Naciones no<br />

conocidas.<br />

Is it not probable then that the Northwest Territory is entirely independent? Suppose this to be<br />

the case all that is required is either to divide the independent territory midway between the furthest<br />

occupation of both parties, to establish a protectorate over the natives, or, if they wish to have a<br />

voice in the matter, give them a choice of annexation to either <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> or <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

With regard to the <strong>British</strong> claims to the basin of the Cuyuni, these are said to rest upon the wellestablished<br />

principles of international law, <strong>and</strong>, therefore, can be left there, with the remark that, as<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> can prove occupation very considerably within the lines of the <strong>British</strong> claims, little<br />

difficulty need be anticipated in that direction.<br />

[6 April 1896]<br />

- 307 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN CONTROVERSY<br />

Ex-Minister Phelps’s Narrow View Not That of the American People<br />

From Harper’s Weekly<br />

<strong>The</strong> speech on the <strong>Venezuela</strong> controversy which was recently made by ex-Minister Phelps had<br />

the very great advantage of clearness <strong>and</strong> power. It was a weighty utterance, <strong>and</strong> there is a certain<br />

attractive simplicity about the argument that this country ought not to interfere in the affairs of<br />

foreign countries except to protect its material interests—itself. <strong>The</strong>re seems, however, to be<br />

something more in the Monroe doctrine than the old rule that every nation has the right to defend<br />

itself against the acts of other nations that immediately <strong>and</strong> directly threaten its material well-being.<br />

A nation has the right to protect itself against remote consequences, <strong>and</strong> to guard against such evil<br />

results of international neighborhood as may be reasonably conjectured.<br />

Far example, it is clearly within the right of the United States to insist that no European power<br />

shall extend its territorial possessions on this hemisphere, on the ground that the greater the<br />

European interests in America the more likely is America to be involved in European<br />

complications—such complications, for instance, as result from the propinquity <strong>and</strong> actual contact<br />

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of European nations in Africa. If Europeans are ever to fight in South America as they now threaten<br />

to fight in Africa, or even if the quarrelling between them shall he no more than the uncomfortable<br />

bickering that threatens to result in war, but that really never does, the United States will find it<br />

difficult, if not impossible, to remain outside of the arena of disturbance. We should almost certainly<br />

find ourselves involved in the European controversies against which Washington warned his fellowcountrymen.<br />

To come to particulars, this country has the right to object to the increase of <strong>British</strong> power in<br />

America, <strong>and</strong> to endeavor to prevent it. No one knows better than Mt. Phelps that Engl<strong>and</strong> is not a<br />

good neighbor to the United States. In fact, Mr. Phelps’s writings on the seal question have<br />

conveyed to a good many minds the impression that he was almost ready to go to extremes in that<br />

controversy. It is perfectly sure that war with <strong>Venezuela</strong> on the boundary question would be absurd,<br />

but it also true that the United States has the right to say that its interests are threatened by every<br />

attempt on the part of a European Government to bring Europe <strong>and</strong> European complications<br />

nearer to us by imposing European institutions upon an unwilling American people. Moreover, this<br />

is not only the attitude of the present Administration: it is the attitude of the people of the United<br />

States, <strong>and</strong> it is recognized as a just <strong>and</strong> proper attitude by the statesmen of both of the great English<br />

parties. It is an established fact so far as the English-speaking world is concerned.<br />

[15 April 1896]<br />

- 308 -<br />

NO EXECUTIVE ACTION TAKEN<br />

Meeting of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission <strong>and</strong> its Work<br />

WASHINGTON, April 14.—<strong>The</strong> regular weekly meeting of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary<br />

Commission to-day was devoted to the reading of the reports made by the various members on the<br />

sub-topics to which they were individually assigned. No executive action was taken, <strong>and</strong> the question<br />

of sending a member or members abroad to collect information was not discussed. It is not likely<br />

that this subject will be taken up for some time, as a mass of matter is expected shortly by the<br />

commission from the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister in Washington, which will undoubtedly prove of much<br />

value, consisting, as it does, of certified copies of original documents <strong>and</strong> a number of maps relating<br />

to the disputed territory.<br />

For many years the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government has been collecting material from original sources<br />

at Rome, Madrid, <strong>The</strong> Hague, <strong>and</strong> London, <strong>and</strong> these documents, as stated in these dispatches some<br />

days ago, are now being translated, under the direction of Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister<br />

here. <strong>The</strong>ir bearing on the work of the commission is important, in view of their certified<br />

authenticity, <strong>and</strong> a number of them embrace the full text of papers from which extracts only were<br />

given in the <strong>British</strong> Blue Book [which] presented Lord Salisbury’s side of the case.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission has received from Engl<strong>and</strong> a notification that errors existing in the Blue Book<br />

would be corrected in an additional publication, which will also present the full text of documents<br />

only partially given in the original publication In addition, Mr. Scruggs, ex-Minister of the United<br />

States to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> counsel for the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government before the commission, has<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

furnished more material from Caracas, with maps of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n possessions, so that<br />

the commission has a vast store of material to assist in its deliberations.<br />

[15 April 1896]<br />

- 309 -<br />

BLUE BOOK UNRELIABLE<br />

IMPORTANT EVIDENCE AS TO THE VENEZUELAN CASE SUPPRESSED<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government Points Out What Seems an Intentional Omission of Part of a<br />

Document—It Appears that Prior to Schomburgk’s Time <strong>The</strong>re Were No Records<br />

as to the Boundary Line in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, April 17.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government has laid before the High<br />

Commission an authentic document secured recently among the official records of the colony of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> which throws grave suspicion upon the accuracy of the Salisbury Blue Book, upon<br />

which Engl<strong>and</strong> expressed a willingness to rest her claim to the disputed territory. This newly found<br />

document, in the opinion of those impartially studying the merits of the controversy, calls for a full<br />

<strong>and</strong> explicit explanation from Great Britain to the Parliament for whose accurate information the<br />

Blue Book ostensibly was published. <strong>The</strong> inaccuracies do not appear in Prof. Pollock’s argument,<br />

but in what purports to be the presentation of all the evidence in the case.<br />

<strong>The</strong> disclosure relates to Document No. 17, which commences on Page 181 of the official<br />

publication, continues over four pages, <strong>and</strong> amounts to considerably more than a full newspaper<br />

column. <strong>The</strong> document in question is the letter from Gov. Light of the colony to the Marquis of<br />

Normanby, dated July 15, 1839, transmitting a report from Schomburgk regarding his travels under<br />

the auspices of the Royal Geographical Society before the distinguished botanist had been employed<br />

by the Government to devise a provisional boundary line. As presented in the Blue Book, this letter<br />

opens as follows:<br />

Mr. Schomburgk, employed by the Geographical Society to obtain information in the interior of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> adjoining countries, who has lately arrived at Georgetown, having furnished me with the annexed memoir <strong>and</strong><br />

map, I am enabled to reply to your Lordship’s dispatch No 11, dated 12th of March, <strong>and</strong> to that of your Lordship’s<br />

predecessor. No. 74, dated 1st December, 1838.<br />

Right at this point in the middle of the opening paragraph the <strong>British</strong> official editors of the<br />

evidence have cut out the only matter in the letter that bears upon the merits of the dispute, <strong>and</strong><br />

have laid themselves open to a charge of garbling an official paper. In the Blue Book the document<br />

goes on from this point to speak of other matters irrelevant to the dispute <strong>and</strong> immaterial to a<br />

consideration of the case. <strong>The</strong> remainder of the paragraph, as well as the second paragraph of the<br />

letter, both of which were suppressed without the formality of the usual marks showing that any<br />

omission was made, <strong>and</strong> which are now supplied through <strong>Venezuela</strong>n channels, were as follows:<br />

I shall observe there are no documents in the archives of the colony respecting the western or southern limits<br />

of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> memoir of Mr. Schomburgk is, therefore, valuable; it confirms the opinions of the<br />

Superintendent of Essequibo, as to the western limits <strong>and</strong> points out what may be fit subjects for discussion with<br />

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the different Governments whose territories border on <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Colombian Government is desirous of<br />

ascertaining theirs.<br />

I have had the honor of mentioning in my dispatch No. 105, dated Dec. 17, the predatory excursions of the<br />

Brazilians near Fort St Joachim. Mr. Youd, the missionary, has been warned to leave Pirara; the Brazilian authorities<br />

have claimed it, <strong>and</strong> having sent an officer to discover an ancient boundary mark within the limit, it appears he<br />

assumed the identity of an isolated stump of a tree with the l<strong>and</strong>mark sought. <strong>The</strong> limits of this province may be<br />

everywhere defined by rivers <strong>and</strong> chains of mountains more conveniently than by parallels, which may be proved by<br />

Mr. Schomburgk’s memoir. Under the impression that, as civilization has begun among the aborigines that the<br />

<strong>British</strong> nation alone can protect them, I cannot too strongly urge the immediate decision of the limits of <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong><br />

Mr. Schomburgk’s merits as a geographer will naturally point him out as a fit person to be employed in any<br />

commission for the question of boundary.<br />

<strong>The</strong> fact here established that there were no documents in the archives of the colony respecting<br />

the western or southern limits of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> at that critical period when both Brazil <strong>and</strong><br />

Colombia were resisting the first encroachments of Engl<strong>and</strong>, in the opinion of those now studying<br />

the question, seriously weakens the <strong>British</strong> contention, <strong>and</strong> for that reason apparently there was no<br />

hesitation in suppressing it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> duty of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n High Commission is practically to find out whether the limits of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> have been extended since the Monroe doctrine was enunciated in 1823, <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> having been ceded to the English by the Dutch in 1814. <strong>The</strong> confession that in 1839 the<br />

colony was without a document bearing upon its southern or western boundary transfers the entire<br />

burden of proof upon Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> is held to invalidate all the <strong>British</strong> claims which cannot be<br />

substantiated fully by Dutch <strong>and</strong> Spanish records. Under ordinary circumstances the great mass of<br />

those archives quoted in the Blue Book might have had great weight with the High Commission, but<br />

the discovery of falsification in quoting an English letter has thrown a cloud over all the other pages<br />

of the book, <strong>and</strong> to-day the entire publication is regarded with distrust.<br />

Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister here, is having translated for the commission the report<br />

of Don José Digurja, the Spanish Colonial Governor in 1763 to the Crown, which will be presented<br />

to the commission in a week or two. <strong>The</strong> Blue Book gave two <strong>and</strong> a half pages to this document,<br />

which is considered by all concerned the most important extant on the relative limits of Dutch <strong>and</strong><br />

Spanish territory before Engl<strong>and</strong> appeared on the scene in South America. <strong>The</strong> closely written<br />

manuscript of this authenticated report, which is now being translated, covers 398 pages, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

commission will be enabled to neglect the <strong>British</strong> extracts of it <strong>and</strong> study the complete report.<br />

[18 April 1896]<br />

- 310 -<br />

GLOOMY VENEZUELA VISION<br />

American Correspondent of <strong>The</strong> Times Blames Salisbury<br />

LONDON. April 21.—<strong>The</strong> Times will to-morrow publish a long dispatch from G. W. Smalley, its<br />

correspondent in America, which is devoted to dispelling the illusions that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

boundary dispute has passed a dangerous stage, that the negotiations are prospering, <strong>and</strong> that the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Blue Book on the subject created a favorable impression in the United States.<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

Mr. Smalley says that not one of the foregoing beliefs is well founded. No agreement as to the<br />

principles has been reached, <strong>and</strong> the negotiations are at a st<strong>and</strong>still. Nobody seems to know when or<br />

how they will be renewed or the dead-lock removed. If the American Commission draws the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary adverse to Great Britain’s claims the alternative stated in President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

message will have to be faced.<br />

Mr. Smalley casts the onus for this on Lord Salisbury, who rejected the proposals made by the<br />

Washington Government in February, <strong>and</strong> who does not appear to have made counter proposals.<br />

<strong>The</strong> dispatch dilates upon the reasons for prompt action for, it says, the uncertainties are many, <strong>and</strong><br />

the perils grave.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Times commenting upon the foregoing, will to-morrow say that it cannot fully share the<br />

gloomy anticipations contained in the dispatch although the reminder is not, perhaps, untimely. It<br />

contends that Mr. Smalley elsewhere in his dispatch shows that Lord Salisbury has taken other<br />

action for opening a discussion of a scheme for general arbitration, to which the paper attaches<br />

importance.<br />

It also contends that if the general project fails, Great Britain ought yet to be able with prudence<br />

to resume the specific case with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> paper remarks upon the good will of the<br />

Washington Government testified in Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s eloquent letter to Consul Parker, the<br />

sentiments in which are reciprocated in all circles here.<br />

[22 April 1896]<br />

- 311 -<br />

BRITISH PRESS ON VENEZUELA<br />

A Variety the of Opinions Expressed on the Boundary Difficulty<br />

LONDON, April 22.—<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette, commenting on the dispatch to <strong>The</strong> Times from G.<br />

W. Smalley, the correspondent of that paper in the United States, representing that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

dispute is still a question of great gravity <strong>and</strong> cause for alarm, says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> revival of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question reminds us that even the wars in Africa are trivial<br />

compared with the real danger which has existed in the west since December. <strong>The</strong> American<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> that the United States shall decide our quarrels <strong>and</strong> settle our frontiers is inadmissible, <strong>and</strong><br />

no amount of talking around the matter will make it anything else. President Clevel<strong>and</strong> in his<br />

message last December referred everything to a special commission <strong>and</strong> then, when it was too late,<br />

attempted to negotiate. We are now told to be prepared for a report that is hostile to Great Britain.<br />

What will happen then?<br />

“Either the Washington Government will allow the report to remain a dead letter or carry out its<br />

threat to enforce a decision by resort to war. <strong>The</strong>re is reason to believe that an attempt will now be<br />

made to work up an English feeling in favor of the surrender of our Government. This is vain. Our<br />

position is simply that <strong>British</strong> frontier questions are matters for negotiation only with the parties<br />

concerned.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette says: “<strong>The</strong> American correspondent of <strong>The</strong> Times seems to be in a state of<br />

undue alarm, possibly because Lord Salisbury did not accept his plan of settlement.”<br />

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<strong>The</strong> Globe says: “All the hopes of the weak-kneed of the compliance of Great Britain with the<br />

views of the United States are groundless.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette says: “Except for a petty amour propre there was no reason why Lord<br />

Salisbury should have rejected the proposal for a joint commission.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Echo asks: “Does Lord Salisbury represent the general judgment of the Cabinet? If he does<br />

not, he should either acquiesce therein or cease to occupy the offices of Prime Minister <strong>and</strong><br />

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs <strong>and</strong> give way to the Duke of Devonshire. We should then be<br />

in safer h<strong>and</strong>s.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily Chronicle (Liberal) to-morrow will say: “<strong>The</strong> seriousness of the situation may be<br />

gathered from the dispatch sent to <strong>The</strong> Times by its American correspondent. <strong>The</strong> article will<br />

commend the serious spirit in which <strong>The</strong> Times receives Mr. Smalley’s dispatch, <strong>and</strong> will appeal to<br />

Lord Salisbury to settle the trouble <strong>and</strong> vouchsafe the crowning mercy of a permanent treaty of<br />

arbitration with the United States.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> will say that the alarmist dispatch sent by Mr. Smalley is not justified by the state<br />

of the case as known by the Ministers. <strong>The</strong> <strong>News</strong>’s article will support Lord Salisbury’s attitude<br />

respecting the settled districts, <strong>and</strong> will say it must not be supposed that nothing but Lord Salisbury’s<br />

amour propre is concerned or that he ought to yield the point immediately because of Mr. Smalley’s<br />

impatience.<br />

Nevertheless, the paper will express regret at the delay in the settlement or the questions at issue<br />

<strong>and</strong> urge the Premier to hasten to define the settled districts so that negotiations may be resumed.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>News</strong> will express regret also that the United States Government is not able to agree to Great<br />

Britain’s proposed treaty of arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>News</strong> will further say that the remarks of United Status Ambassador Bayard at Birmingham<br />

to-day prove that the existing peaceful relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States will<br />

remain unchanged, <strong>and</strong> pays tribute to the Envoys who have represented the United States in<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> for years past, saying that the peace <strong>and</strong> good will expressed in their collected speeches<br />

would furnish a whole gospel of international brotherhood, none of them, however, being finer in<br />

tone than Mr. Bayard’s.<br />

[23 April 1896]<br />

- 312 -<br />

QUESTIONS ABOUT VENEZUELA<br />

Labouchere Is Evaded, but Vernon-Harcourt Is Threatening<br />

LONDON, April 23.—In the House of Commons to-day Mr. Labouchere asked the<br />

Government a number of questions in regard to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute.<br />

Among them were whether the plan proposed by the United States Government to refer the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n frontier dispute to a commission composed of two English, two American, <strong>and</strong> one<br />

neutral member, or the Chief Justices of Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States <strong>and</strong> one neutral member,<br />

had been declined by Great Britain; whether <strong>Venezuela</strong> had been excluded from the general scheme<br />

of arbitration which Great Britain had submitted to the United States; whether negotiations<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States still continue, <strong>and</strong> whether any agreement is probable before<br />

the United States Congress adjourns in May.<br />

In reply to these questions Mr. Curzon, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said that<br />

negotiations with the United States in regard to <strong>Venezuela</strong> were still proceeding, but it was not<br />

advisable at this time to make any statement on the subject.<br />

Mr. Labouchere asked whether the Government expected a favorable result from the<br />

negotiations. Mr. Curzon said that that was unquestionably the hope of her Majesty’s Government.<br />

Sir William Harcourt said: “I give notice that I will ask a question upon this subject Monday next.”<br />

[24 April 1896]<br />

- 313 -<br />

GRAVITY OF VENEZUELA AFFAIR<br />

Times’s Correspondent Says He Told the Views of the Executive<br />

LONDON, April 24.—<strong>The</strong> Times will to-morrow publish a dispatch from George W. Smalley, its<br />

American correspondent, affirming that the statements contained in his dispatch of Tuesday last are<br />

the views of the American Executive. He says that be might have used stronger language without<br />

exaggerating the apprehension existing in Washington.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Times, commenting upon Mr. Smalley’s dispatch, expresses surprise at the condition of affairs<br />

that he sets forth, <strong>and</strong> argues that Washington is under a misunderst<strong>and</strong>ing.<br />

In the dispatch published by <strong>The</strong> Times on Tuesday last Mr. Smalley said that the illusions that the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute had passed a dangerous stage, that the negotiations were prospering,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that the <strong>British</strong> Blue Book on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter had created a favorable impression in the<br />

United States were not well founded.<br />

He added that no agreement as to principles had been reached <strong>and</strong> that the negotiations were at<br />

a st<strong>and</strong>still. Nobody seemed to know when or how they would be renewed <strong>and</strong> the dead-lock<br />

removed.<br />

If the American Commission drew the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary adverse to Great Britain’s claims,<br />

the alternative stated in President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message would have to be faced. Mr. Smalley puts the<br />

onus for this on Lord Salisbury, who had rejected the proposals made by the Washington<br />

Government in February, <strong>and</strong> who did not appear to have made counter proposals.<br />

<strong>The</strong> dispatch dilated upon the reasons for prompt action, for the uncertainties were many <strong>and</strong><br />

the perils grave.<br />

[25 April 1896]<br />

- 314 -<br />

PROGRESS IN VENEZUELA CASE<br />

Balfour’s Reply to Harcourt <strong>and</strong> Conditions in Washington<br />

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LONDON, April 27.—Sir William Harcourt, in accordance with notice given by him April 23,<br />

asked the Government what, if any, arrangements had been made to conclude by arbitration a<br />

settlement of the differences between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain in regard to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

A. J. Balfour, First Lord of the Treasury, said that arrangements to arbitrate in respect to the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n <strong>and</strong> other questions was a matter which both the <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States<br />

Governments had in view.<br />

<strong>The</strong> latest communications on the subject which had been received from the United States,<br />

Friday, were under consideration. <strong>The</strong>y dealt with the general question of arbitration <strong>and</strong> the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute. To give further information concerning the matter, he concluded, would at the<br />

present time be inexpedient.<br />

[28 April 1896]<br />

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February – April 1896<br />

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- Part 10 -<br />

May – July 1896<br />

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May – July 1896<br />

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- 315 -<br />

Vernon-Harcourt Urges Investigation <strong>and</strong> Diplomatic Settlement<br />

LONDON, May 5.—Sir William Vernon-Harcourt, leader of the Opposition in the House of<br />

Commons, spoke at a meeting to-night of the National Liberal Club. . .<br />

Sir William . . . said that a great majority of the people of the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain<br />

were eager for an early <strong>and</strong> peaceful settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> question. He confessed that he was<br />

impatient that a settlement was so long delayed. It was to settle such questions that diplomacy<br />

existed. No personal pride or diplomatic obstinacy should be allowed to prevent a settlement.<br />

[6 May 1896]<br />

- 316 -<br />

SECOND VENEZUELA BLUE BOOK<br />

It Is Not to be Published Until Delivered at Washington<br />

LONDON, May 6.—<strong>The</strong> announcement is made that a second Blue Book on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

matter will be ready of May 13, but that it will not be published until a copy shall have been<br />

delivered to the authorities at Washington.<br />

[7 May 1896]<br />

- 317 -<br />

PROF. BURR GOING TO HOLLAND<br />

To Secure Information for the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

WASHINGTON, May 8.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission’s chief historical expert, Prof. George<br />

L. Burr will sail for Holl<strong>and</strong> to-morrow to investigate the Dutch records bearing upon the <strong>Guiana</strong>n<br />

boundary dispute. Prof. Burr, who holds the Chair of History at Cornell University, has been in<br />

Washington for the past two months developing evidence relating to Dutch claims in South<br />

America. He is said to have extraordinary personal qualifications for the researches he is to make at<br />

<strong>The</strong> Hague, Middleburg, Amsterdam, <strong>and</strong> other cities of the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, where documents are<br />

believed to exist which cannot fail to influence the final decision of the commission.<br />

In the <strong>British</strong> Blue Book, nearly all the allusions to Dutch records are given in a general way,<br />

without precise reference to the volume or archives where they can be found <strong>and</strong> verified or<br />

amplified. As that parliamentary publication also fails to give copies of important documents that in<br />

all likelihood are extant, as they are referred to by many historical writers, the commission has<br />

deemed it advisable to have Prof. Burr make an exhaustive examination of all the evidence upon<br />

which many Blue Book arguments rest. Prof. Burr’s studies with the commission developed a<br />

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May – July 1896<br />

number of statements by both English <strong>and</strong> Dutch claiming to be based upon original records, <strong>and</strong><br />

an attempt will be made to settle beyond a doubt many discrepancies <strong>and</strong> inconsistencies, or to find<br />

explanations for them. In sending this expert abroad, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission gives notice that<br />

it does not propose, to base its findings of fact in the dispute upon any authorities, however<br />

eminent, but to go back to the source from which those authorities derived their information or<br />

claimed to have done so, <strong>and</strong> ascertain with certainty the real facts.<br />

Prof. J. Franklin Jameson of Brown University has been here for the past week, pursuing a<br />

course of study similar to that of Prof. Burr, among the vast amount of documents, books <strong>and</strong> maps<br />

that have been collected. <strong>The</strong> commission is now looking forward to the receipt of the<br />

supplementary Blue Book, which is promised for next week, <strong>and</strong> which is expected to contain<br />

unedited copies of all the documents quoted in the first book, which, by their incomplete condition<br />

<strong>and</strong> the suppression of portions favorable to <strong>Venezuela</strong> caused such unfavorable comment. Soon<br />

after this paper appears, an expert, similar to Prof. Burr, will probably be sent to Spain. <strong>The</strong> original<br />

documents from <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s claim are still in process of translation, <strong>and</strong> may not be presented to<br />

the commission for several weeks.<br />

[9 May 1896]<br />

- 318 -<br />

VENEZUELA AGREES TO PAY<br />

She Does Not Consent, However, to Apologize to Great Britain<br />

CARACAS, <strong>Venezuela</strong>, May 18.— <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government has agreed to pay the ₤1,600<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>ed by Great Britain for the Uruan incident, (the arrest <strong>and</strong> imprisonment of a <strong>British</strong> police<br />

officer,) on condition that it is considered simply as indemnity for personal damages, <strong>and</strong> not as<br />

affecting the boundary dispute.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government, however, has not consented to make a public apology to Great<br />

Britain as a prerequisite to the resumption of diplomatic relations, though it is understood that the<br />

United States, in carrying out its friendly purpose as an adviser of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, counseled that this<br />

condition should be complied with, in accordance with the terms of the <strong>British</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>.<br />

[19 May 1896]<br />

- 319 -<br />

BRITISH GUIANA ADVERTISED<br />

One Result of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Message on <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, May 23.—Advices from <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> just received by the Bureau of<br />

American Republics indicate that the colonists are deriving considerable comfort from the fact that<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message to Congress on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affairs has given <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> much<br />

valuable advertising. It is claimed that where even Englishmen a year ago knew of Demerara only as<br />

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a place where sugar came from, they had their attention attracted to it immediately after the<br />

appointment of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, <strong>and</strong> the varied resources of the colony were made<br />

familiar to everybody, with the effect of attracting immigration <strong>and</strong> capital.<br />

One of the Georgetown papers, referring to this matter, discloses a State secret. <strong>The</strong> Georgetown<br />

Chronicle declares that at the height of the excitement Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary for the<br />

Colonies, “set on foot a scheme to colonize the frontier, so that actual occupation might be added to<br />

the numerous indisputable claims to control the territory in the northwest of the colony.” “We<br />

know,” says <strong>The</strong> Chronicle, “that he forwarded to the Colonial Government an offer made by a<br />

syndicate of home capitalists of whose bona fides he was thoroughly convinced.” It seems that<br />

leading colonists who were consulted privately in the matter did not think the terms of Mr.<br />

Chamberlain’s syndicate were liberal enough, <strong>and</strong> the matter was dropped. <strong>The</strong> significant fact<br />

developed by these statements is that just when the <strong>British</strong> Prime Minister was giving official<br />

assurances to the United States as to Engl<strong>and</strong>’s intention in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter the Colonial<br />

Secretary was apparently fostering a scheme which did not exactly accord with Lord Salisbury’s<br />

assurances.<br />

<strong>The</strong> latest <strong>Guiana</strong> papers give information respecting the alleged violation of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

customs laws by the schooner New Day, which incident it was feared at one time would lead to a<br />

<strong>British</strong> ultimatum. It is now admitted, as stated in <strong>The</strong> United Press dispatches at the time, that <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> claims <strong>and</strong> the boundary controversy were not affected by the incident, but that the vessel’s<br />

cargo was destined for <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory for which an Englishman friendly to President Crespo’s<br />

Government held a <strong>Venezuela</strong>n concession.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Georgetown Daily Chronicle contains the following:<br />

Respecting the statements that have recently been published to the effect that her Majesty’s steamship Cordella<br />

was to enter the Orinoco to release the schooner New Day, <strong>and</strong> that she would be opposed in her err<strong>and</strong> by the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n forces, a Trinidad contemporary underst<strong>and</strong>s that this Is the result of complications arising out of the<br />

grant by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government of the old Manoa concession. Mr. Turnbull, an Englishman, is the<br />

concessionaire of iron-mining rights in the Imotaca region. He had some mining machinery <strong>and</strong> plant brought out<br />

here, (to Trinidad,) <strong>and</strong> it was placed on board the schooner New Day, a <strong>British</strong> vessel trading among the isl<strong>and</strong>s, to<br />

be taken up the Orinoco. By the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n law a vessel cannot be engaged in the coasting trade along the Main<br />

unless it is flying the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n flag. <strong>The</strong> schooner committed irregularities in l<strong>and</strong>ing the machinery at some port<br />

up the Orinoco. It should have gone right up to Ciudad Bolivar <strong>and</strong> had the cargo passed, <strong>and</strong> then brought it back<br />

<strong>and</strong> discharged it. As a result or the irregularity, the machinery <strong>and</strong> a steam launch were seized by the authorities <strong>and</strong><br />

the schooner held. Mr. Turnbull is now in Caracas, trying to obtain the release of the schooner <strong>and</strong> cargo.<br />

[24 May 1896]<br />

- 320 -<br />

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS<br />

Great Britain Still Negotiating on the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Question<br />

LONDON, June 11.—In the House of Commons to-day Right Hon. George N. Curzon, Under<br />

Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated in reply to an interrogation by Mr. Thomas R. Buchanan,<br />

Scotch Liberal, that the negotiations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States upon the<br />

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May – July 1896<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n question would proceed, but that the Government could not make any further<br />

statement in regard to the matter at present.<br />

[12 June 1896]<br />

- 321 -<br />

VENEZUELA TAKES ACTION<br />

A Force of Her Troops Enters the <strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory<br />

KINGSTON, Jamaica, June 17.—According to advices received here, the territory in dispute<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> has been entered by a force of troops from the latter country.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soldiers compelled a party of <strong>British</strong> surveyors, who were at work in the district,<br />

to suspend operations.<br />

<strong>The</strong> surveying party retreated <strong>and</strong> appealed to the authorities for support.<br />

LONDON, June 17.—Official reports have been received at the Foreign Office of an incursion<br />

into <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> by <strong>Venezuela</strong>n troops.<br />

[18 June 1896]<br />

- 322 -<br />

THE BRITISH ARE AROUSED<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s Incursion into the <strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory the Cause<br />

LONDON, June 18.—<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette says that the Colonial Office is taking a very serious<br />

view of the incursion of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, into the disputed territory.<br />

“It is impossible,” the paper adds, “to permit the boundary decision to be anticipated by forcible<br />

violations of the frontier, <strong>and</strong> it is hoped that the Government at Caracas will explain <strong>and</strong> apologize;<br />

otherwise, it may be necessary for Engl<strong>and</strong> to take strong measures.”<br />

In the House of Commons to-day Mr. George N. Curzon, Under Foreign Secretary, stated that<br />

the Government would continue its efforts to expedite the settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> dispute by<br />

some form of arbitration, <strong>and</strong> would shortly lay upon the table of the House the papers regarding<br />

the negotiations in that direction.<br />

[19 June 1896]<br />

- 323 -<br />

LOOKING TOWARD ARBITRATION<br />

Great Britain Willing to Accept It in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Case<br />

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LONDON, June 19.—<strong>The</strong> Foreign Office officials deny the truth of the report that a conflict<br />

has taken place between <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> at Point Barima, in the disputed territory of<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>The</strong> Foreign Office is not informed that there has been any trouble in the disputed territory<br />

whatever.<br />

In the House of Commons to-day Mr. George N. Curzon, Under Foreign Secretary, stated that<br />

Sir Julian Pauncefote, <strong>British</strong> Ambassador at Washington, had been authorized to receive <strong>and</strong> report<br />

any proposals that might be made to him by the representative of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in Washington in<br />

regard to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute. <strong>The</strong> representative of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in Washington had<br />

been so informed, but so far, Mr. Curzon said, he had not made any proposals.<br />

Negotiations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States, Mr. Curzon continued, were in<br />

progress for an agreement upon a treaty of arbitration. With reference to the frontier question, he<br />

said, as far as he Government was concerned, the failure to settle the difficulty with <strong>Venezuela</strong> had<br />

not offered any obstacle in the way of the conclusion of the general arrangements respecting<br />

arbitration, which the Government hoped to see completed.<br />

[20 June 1896]<br />

- 324 -<br />

ARRESTED BY THE VENEZUELANS<br />

GEORGETOWN, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, June 22.—It is learned here that Mr. Harrison, a <strong>British</strong><br />

official, while overseeing a number laborers who were employed in making a road from Barima to<br />

Cuyuni, was arrested on June 15 on an order from Caracas <strong>and</strong> taken to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n station<br />

opposite Yuruan. <strong>The</strong> arrest has caused much excitement among the <strong>British</strong> there, who look to<br />

Great Britain to take immediate action in the matter.<br />

[23 June 1896]<br />

- 325 -<br />

MR. HARRISON’S ARREST<br />

MORE TROUBLE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND VENEZUELA<br />

One English Paper Calls on the Government to Take Vigorous Action at Once—Señor<br />

Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, Thinks the Incident Has Been Greatly Exaggerated—<br />

May Interfere with the Settlement of the Uruan Case<br />

KINGSTON, Jamaica, June 23.—<strong>The</strong> report received here from Georgetown, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

yesterday, that Mr. Harrison, the chief of a <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> surveying party which was engaged in<br />

constructing a road from Barima to Cuyuni, was arrested on June 15, by orders from Caracas, <strong>and</strong><br />

conveyed to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n station opposite Yuruan, is confirmed by advices received here this<br />

morning from several sources.<br />

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May – July 1896<br />

LONDON, June 23.—<strong>The</strong> Government has received a cablegram from Georgetown, <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>, confirming the report of the capture by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns of the <strong>British</strong> civil engineer<br />

Harrison, who is now detained at the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n station opposite Yuruan.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette this afternoon publishes an article upon the arrest of Mr. Harrison, the<br />

<strong>British</strong> official, who, on June 15, while at the head of a number of engineers <strong>and</strong> laborers engaged in<br />

making a road from Barima to Cuyuni, was arrested upon an order from Caracas <strong>and</strong> conveyed to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory. <strong>The</strong> Gazette vigorously prods the Government, <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s to know how long<br />

they will continue to endure the insolence of the Government at Caracas out of regard for the<br />

susceptibilities of the Government at Washington.<br />

WASHINGTON, June 23.—Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, though still without<br />

official advices concerning the reported arrest of the <strong>British</strong> surveyor, Harrison, in the disputed<br />

territory along the Cuyuni River, expresses confidence that the importance of the affair will be found<br />

to have been considerably magnified. He calls attention to the fact that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n post on the<br />

Cuyuni is connected with Caracas by telegraph, the Government lines extending through all that<br />

portion of the country which had not up to the past year been occupied by <strong>British</strong> colonial police. In<br />

his opinion it would be by this means alone that the alleged occurrence of June 15 could have so<br />

soon reached the outside world, <strong>and</strong> as all the publications emanate from Georgetown via London,<br />

he is sure that the arrest must have taken place very early this month, as over a week would be<br />

consumed in getting the news by river to Georgetown.<br />

Moreover, declares Mr. Andrade, the re ported arrest is wholly unlike the affair known as the<br />

Uruan incident, for which <strong>Venezuela</strong> was willing to make reparation without apology. On the Uruan,<br />

year before last, <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soldiers crossed the river where the <strong>British</strong> were cutting wood, <strong>and</strong><br />

dragged off a colonial policeman into <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, while in the latest case the arrested man<br />

was not an officer <strong>and</strong> was on l<strong>and</strong> concededly under <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authority pending the boundary<br />

settlement.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Minister thought he would naturally hear if any representations regarding the affair had been<br />

made by Great Britain, but he had not yet heard of any. Nor did he believe any complaint could<br />

st<strong>and</strong> when all the reports agreed that the affair occurred in territory which had never been occupied<br />

by the <strong>British</strong>, but had all along been in the peaceful possession of his own Government.<br />

It is probable that this latest episode may complicate the final settlement of the Uruan incident.<br />

<strong>The</strong> settlement of this affair was left with Sir Julian Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Señor Andrade, the<br />

representatives, respectively, at Washington of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> delay in reaching a<br />

satisfactory adjustment of the case has been caused by the great length of time necessary for the<br />

exchange of correspondence. Communications, for example, addressed by Sir Julian to Mr. Andrade,<br />

were forwarded through the slow medium of the mails to Caracas. As the Latin-Americans are never<br />

disposed to act hastily in matters even of the greatest importance, several weeks would ordinarily<br />

elapse before Mr. Andrade received a reply from his Government. When this was communicated to<br />

Sir Julian a further delay of a fortnight or more would occur before the latter could be made<br />

acquainted with the wishes of the London Foreign Office.<br />

Some months ago <strong>Venezuela</strong> expressed a willingness to pay the indemnity. She has also<br />

transferred the military comm<strong>and</strong>er in whose department the incident occurred to another post. <strong>The</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns object to any further concessions believing that these should sufficiently satisfy Great<br />

Britain of their intention to act fairly in the premises. Great Britain, as has been previously stated in<br />

these dispatches, dem<strong>and</strong>s an apology, <strong>and</strong> at this point the negotiations are dead-locked. What<br />

effect the more recent incident will have upon the final settlement can only be conjectured, but it is<br />

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obvious from the utterances of the <strong>British</strong> press that they will now be more insistent upon an<br />

apology than ever.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, on account of this <strong>and</strong> other pending matters of importance, has not<br />

been able to leave for Newport, as it was his intention to do before the Summer had so far advanced<br />

this year. It is deemed probable that some important arbitration developments in the line of the<br />

recent statement of Mr. Curzon to the <strong>British</strong> Parliament may soon occur, but on this subject no<br />

information can be obtained either from the <strong>British</strong> Embassy or Secretary Olney, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister asserts that he is without advices on the subject.<br />

[24 June 1896]<br />

- 326 -<br />

Appointments in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

COLON. June 23.—Advices received here from Georgetown, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, are to the effect<br />

that <strong>The</strong> Demerara Official Gazette publishes an ordinance appointing certain Indians in the interior<br />

Captains <strong>and</strong> Constables, with a uniform commission <strong>and</strong> salary. <strong>The</strong> object is to check the<br />

encroachments of neighbors. <strong>The</strong> new artillery that was mounted for the defense of Georgetown<br />

has been tried in the presence of the Governor, Sir Augustus Hemming.<br />

[24 June 1896]<br />

- 327 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA COMMISSION<br />

Each Member Will Continue His Work During the Summer<br />

WASHINGTON, June 23.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government has presented to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Commission the second volume of its certified copies of Spanish archives bearing upon the<br />

boundary dispute, <strong>and</strong> has promised the third <strong>and</strong> concluding volume in a few days.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se books consist of about 300 printed pages each, <strong>and</strong> are so exhaustive of the material<br />

believed to exist among Spanish historical records that the commission has concluded from their<br />

examination that it will be superfluous in all probability to send agents to Madrid for original<br />

research, as it was at first thought to be necessary. It will trust entirely to the <strong>British</strong> blue books <strong>and</strong><br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n documents, <strong>and</strong> it is believed that neither Government has overlooked any evidence<br />

at Seville or Madrid.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission is expecting further important results from the investigation of its<br />

representatives in Holl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Rome, <strong>and</strong> has decided in view of the character of evidence now<br />

being developed not to attempt to reach definite conclusions on the many points at issue with<br />

unnecessary haste, but to wait a few months longer before arriving at a decision on the dispute. All<br />

the members will continue their studies of the evidence, <strong>and</strong> the reports which have been presented<br />

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May – July 1896<br />

by the commission experts, <strong>and</strong> although separated much of the time from their colleagues, will each<br />

be in close touch with their office at Washington during July <strong>and</strong> August.<br />

Justice Brewer has already gone to Lake Champlain <strong>and</strong> Prof. Gilman to North East Harbor,<br />

Me. Both have their secretaries with them <strong>and</strong> expect to accomplish more work in the next month<br />

or so than could be done in Washington during the heated term. Prof. Andrew D. White is now at<br />

Ithaca <strong>and</strong> Judge Alvey is at Hagerstown, Md. <strong>The</strong>y have agreed to meet the other members at any<br />

time during the Summer that a consultation may be thought desirable, <strong>and</strong> it is probable that such a<br />

meeting will be had next month at Boston.<br />

Secretary Mallet-Provost will be in Washington at least twice a month during the Summer, <strong>and</strong><br />

will be in constant communication with the Commissioners. <strong>The</strong> clerical force will be busily engaged<br />

in keeping up the records, reports, <strong>and</strong> map work not yet completed. Commissioner Coudert is the<br />

only member who will go abroad, <strong>and</strong> he will visit Rome to examine <strong>and</strong> report upon an interesting<br />

collection from the Vatican affecting the case.<br />

[24 June 1896]<br />

- 328 -<br />

MEDIATION NOW THE WAY<br />

GREAT BRITAIN SEEKS UNITED STATES INFLUENCE IN VENEZUELA<br />

Departing from the Ultimatum Methods Formerly Employed, the <strong>British</strong> Government Asks<br />

the Good Offices of the State Department to Secure Crown Surveyor Harrison’s Release—<br />

Arrested for Working in <strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory<br />

LONDON, June 24.—A representative of <strong>The</strong> United Press was informed at the Foreign Office<br />

to-day that the Government would certainly take immediate <strong>and</strong> energetic measures to obtain the<br />

release of Mr. Harrison, the <strong>British</strong> surveyor who was recently arrested in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> is now<br />

detained at the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n station, opposite Yuruan. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government’s action, the Foreign<br />

Office authorities added, would probably be taken through the offices of the United States<br />

Government.<br />

WASHINGTON, June 24.—As soon as Secretary Olney returns to the State Department, where<br />

he is confidently expected to-morrow, he will receive from Sir Julian Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong><br />

Ambassador a request from the <strong>British</strong> Government to use his good office with <strong>Venezuela</strong> to secure<br />

the release from imprisonment of Crown Surveyor Harrison, who is reported to have been arrested<br />

by <strong>Venezuela</strong>n police while he was engaged in constructing a road connecting the Barima <strong>and</strong><br />

Cuyuni Rivers in the disputed territory. This action of Great Britain is considered in diplomatic<br />

circles a radical departure from the ultimatum methods hitherto practiced on American republics,<br />

<strong>and</strong> much significance it attached to this fact as probably indicating the considerable progress made<br />

toward an arbitration agreement, <strong>and</strong> the practical acknowledgment that the United States is a party<br />

in interest in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute as well as in future controversies regarding territory on the<br />

American Continent<br />

While it is universally admitted that the new incident is exceedingly unfortunate just at this<br />

juncture, there is great diversity of opinion in fixing the blame. Even the <strong>British</strong> Government has the<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New York Times (1887-1904)<br />

most indefinite knowledge of the exact locality where the arrest took place, although it is claimed<br />

that the surveying party had no authority to go outside of territory occupied exclusively by<br />

Englishmen for the last ten years.<br />

No official knowledge of the arrest has yet been received at the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Legation, where<br />

confidence is expressed that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government would have sent a notice of the affair,<br />

perhaps for the information of the United States Government, the moment the facts became known<br />

at Caracas. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns, however, find considerable satisfaction in the information that Great<br />

Britain will appeal to Secretary Olney in the matter, as indicating that it is not considered of so<br />

serious a nature as at first apprehended. <strong>The</strong>y place the whole blame for whatever has occurred on<br />

Joseph Chamberlain’s aggressive colonial policy. <strong>The</strong>y point to the fact that under date of Dec. 19,<br />

1894, they complained to Secretary Gresham of the proposed road, upon which Surveyor Harrison<br />

was employed, <strong>and</strong> called attention to the fact that as the route lay in <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory a conflict<br />

would be unavoidable. One paragraph of that letter reads:<br />

<strong>The</strong> persistency of the <strong>British</strong> Government in excluding from arbitration all that portion of the territory which<br />

it has held for years rendered the action of the last Commissioner of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to Engl<strong>and</strong> null <strong>and</strong> void: rendered<br />

inefficacious the good intentions of the Executive of the republic, <strong>and</strong> stimulated the ambition of certain agents of<br />

the colony who have in view nothing but the pleasing prospect presented by a territory exceedingly rich in natural<br />

resources.<br />

Some of them on Oct. 24 last procured the introduction in the legislative chamber of Demerara, of a<br />

proposition looking to the construction of a road which is to unite the upper Barima with the Cuyuni, which<br />

involves a fresh project for the unlawful appropriation of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory, <strong>and</strong> the manifest tendency of which<br />

is to increase the difficulty of reaching a peaceful settlement of the controversy. <strong>The</strong> Secretary of the Government<br />

requested that the proposition should be postponed until he could consult the Colonial Department, <strong>and</strong>, what was<br />

still more important, obtain its approval of an application for power to raise a large loan from which could be taken<br />

the amount necessary to open the proposed road. <strong>The</strong> Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, through its Consul at Demerara,<br />

advised the Governor of the colony that the execution of the project would undoubtedly bring about a collision<br />

with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities in that region, <strong>and</strong> would be the cause of further embittering a controversy which it<br />

is important to both parties to put on a more friendly footing.<br />

This appeal was effective for the time being. <strong>The</strong> road was ab<strong>and</strong>oned until in August last year,<br />

when the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, sent to <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> his call for<br />

the colony to raise funds for machine guns, an increased police force, <strong>and</strong> the construction of the<br />

Barima Road. This was resisted by the Colonial Legislature, with the exception of defense armament,<br />

until the arrival of the new Governor from Engl<strong>and</strong>, a few months ago, when they were induced to<br />

appropriate the money or a survey the road.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns now claim that the responsibility rests wholly with Great Britain after the warning<br />

that went to the Foreign Office through colonial as well as through United States channels. It is<br />

contended at the Legation here that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities who made the arrest must of<br />

necessity have been in their own territory, as they are not permitted to cross the frontier under any<br />

circumstances.<br />

<strong>The</strong> two English ports are on the right bank of the Cuyuni <strong>and</strong> the left hank of the Amacura.<br />

Those of <strong>Venezuela</strong> are directly opposite them, <strong>and</strong> this status quo has been rigidly observed by the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns. In their opinion Harrison must have been arrested within the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n line, <strong>and</strong><br />

only after warning to keep out. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns to a man also are aware that they have everything<br />

to gain by peaceful methods, <strong>and</strong> it is incredible to their friends here that they could have so<br />

disobeyed orders as to break the status quo. It is said, however, that if Secretary Olney calls on<br />

477


May – July 1896<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> in response to Great Britain’s request, that a full report will undoubtedly be forthcoming<br />

as soon as the Caracas authorities can investigate.<br />

[25 June 1896]<br />

- 329 -<br />

GREAT SATISFACTION IN ENGLAND<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Press Speak Well of the United States <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

LONDON, June 26.—<strong>The</strong> Chronicle, commenting on the statement that <strong>Venezuela</strong> had ordered<br />

the release of Crown Surveyor Harrison, will to-morrow say that President Crespo acted gracefully<br />

<strong>and</strong> wisely. It adds that the incident has done good in showing that Great Britain <strong>and</strong> America are<br />

now on such terms that the former can request the good offices of the latter when <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

misbehaves.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Post will say it is not an altogether comforting reflection that Mr. Harrison’s release was due<br />

to the influence of the United States, although under the peculiar conditions of the case there was<br />

no very evident alternative to seeking American intervention.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard will say that it was better for all parties that Mr. Harrison’s release was effected<br />

through the friendly offices of the United States than by a direct peremptory dem<strong>and</strong> addressed to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> incident encourages the hope that it will lead to a settlement of the Anglo-<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute <strong>and</strong> the resumption of diplomatic relations.<br />

[27 June 1896]<br />

- 330 -<br />

ENGLAND ASKS OUR ASSISTANCE<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government Requested to Settle the Trouble over Harrison’s Arrest<br />

WASHINGTON June 25.—Sir Julian Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, called on Secretary<br />

Olney to-day <strong>and</strong>. it is understood, presented a request from his Government that Mr. Olney would<br />

use his good offices to bring about a friendly settlement of the trouble over the arrest of Harrison,<br />

the <strong>British</strong> surveyor, by <strong>Venezuela</strong>n police. Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, was another<br />

caller, <strong>and</strong> presumably came on the same business that brought Sir Julian.<br />

Secretary Olney said this morning that he was not yet aware of any decision of the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government to make public the correspondence between her Majesty’s Ministers <strong>and</strong> the State<br />

Department, relating to an agreement of arbitration synchronous with its publication in the United<br />

States. . .<br />

[27 June 1896]<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 331 -<br />

MR. HARRISON RELEASED<br />

VENEZUELA ACTS PROMPTLY IN ORDERING HIS FREEDOM<br />

No Doubt, However, that He Was Prosecuting His Surveying Work on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Territory—His Location Was Not in the <strong>Dispute</strong>d <strong>British</strong> Territory—<strong>The</strong> Incident<br />

Likely to Induce Engl<strong>and</strong> to Submit to Arbitration<br />

WASHINGTON, June 26.—Minister Andrade at noon to-day received the following cablegram<br />

<strong>and</strong> immediately sent a copy to Secretary Olney:<br />

CARACAS. June 26.—Rojas, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister at Washington:<br />

It was yesterday when the National Commissary of Cuyuni telegraphed occurrence. Harrison <strong>and</strong> nineteen<br />

others crossed to the left bank of the Cuyuni to open a road. <strong>The</strong> Sub-Commissary of Acarabesi protested in<br />

writing. Harrison insisted, <strong>and</strong> the Sub-Commissary took him to the post of El Dorado. As soon as the<br />

Government was informed thereof, it ordered the release of Harrison <strong>and</strong> asked details.<br />

<strong>The</strong> post, El Dorado, referred to in the cablegram, is directly across the river from the <strong>British</strong><br />

station of Uruan. <strong>The</strong> dispatch confirms the impression that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns were not at fault, <strong>and</strong><br />

that the status quo observed for several years was broken by the Harrison surveying party. Secretary<br />

Olney will notify Sir Julian Pauncefote of Harrison’s prompt release <strong>and</strong> the circumstances under<br />

which he was arrested.<br />

Señor Rojas’s dispatch announcing Harrison’s release relieved State Department <strong>and</strong> diplomatic<br />

circles of the tremendous tension they have been under for several days, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the<br />

prevailing confidence that the blame would not be found to rest altogether with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns.<br />

<strong>The</strong> main question, which is understood to have caused Secretary Olney most concern, was the<br />

exact location of Harrison’s defiance of the written <strong>Venezuela</strong>n protest. All doubts on this point<br />

were set aside when the geographical experts consulted decided that the proposed line of road from<br />

the upper Barima to the Cuyuni, where the surveying party was stopped, was clearly west or the<br />

Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong> therefore in territory which the <strong>British</strong> had hitherto refrained from violating.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Acarabesi River <strong>and</strong> the Schomburgk line are identical at <strong>and</strong> near the Cuyuni, the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n district in which the arrest was made being named for the river. A number of<br />

Englishmen <strong>and</strong> Americans are engaged in mining <strong>and</strong> other pursuits in this district, but they<br />

recognize <strong>Venezuela</strong>n jurisdiction <strong>and</strong> operate under <strong>Venezuela</strong>n licenses. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> police<br />

militia has not attempted to exercise authority in the district.<br />

It is thought among officials that, in view of the latest developments, public clamor in Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

against the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns will promptly subside, <strong>and</strong> that in a spirit of fair play the authorities of the<br />

South American republic will be treated hereafter with much greater respect. Under such<br />

circumstances, confidence is expressed that the incident will give a strong impetus to the movement<br />

in favor of settling the whole question by arbitration, instead of undoing all that had been<br />

accomplished through Secretary Olney’s firm <strong>and</strong> persistent dem<strong>and</strong> that all boundary disputes on<br />

the American Continent must be included in any general arbitration treaty between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />

United States.<br />

Sir Julian Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, had an interview with Secretary Olney this<br />

afternoon, presumably on that point.<br />

479


May – July 1896<br />

[27 June 1896]<br />

- 332 -<br />

SURVEYOR HARRISON’S ARREST<br />

He Was Working in Territory Never Before Claimed by <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

LONDON, June 27.—As might be supposed, the arrest of Crown Surveyor Harrison by<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns, on what is claimed to be <strong>British</strong> territory, caused many energetic newspaper protests<br />

<strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>s that immediate action be taken to compel his release. A <strong>British</strong> official of <strong>Guiana</strong>, who<br />

is home on leave of absence, has supplied the Government with information regarding the locality<br />

where the arrest was made, <strong>and</strong> has thrown considerable light on the matter.<br />

<strong>The</strong> place where the trouble occurred is Aacarabisi Creek, between the Barama <strong>and</strong> Cuyuni<br />

Rivers. Until seven years ago the country thereabouts was covered with primeval forest. It was then<br />

placed in charge of Mr. Thorn, a Government agent, <strong>and</strong> a complete chain of stations was formed<br />

throughout the region, the area of which is 10,400 square miles. Farming grants were opened out,<br />

<strong>and</strong> are now well scattered along the banks of the Barama River, which is not to be confounded with<br />

the Barima River, the former for all its course being to the mouth of the Barima. <strong>The</strong> territory is to<br />

the eastward of the provisional line, within which, according to Lord Salisbury, no question of title<br />

can be admitted.<br />

Gold was discovered in the region, <strong>and</strong> the metal has already been taken to Georgetown in<br />

surprising quantities. Mr. Thorn still administers the territory, with the assistance of a staff, which<br />

includes a Magistrate, physicians, Collector of Taxes, police, <strong>and</strong> mine officers. Three public<br />

hospitals have been erected, at Morajhana, Arakuka, <strong>and</strong> Baramanni. A weekly steamer runs to<br />

Georgetown, <strong>and</strong> steam launches ply on both the Barama <strong>and</strong> Barima Rivers. <strong>Venezuela</strong> has done<br />

nothing to develop the country, which appears to a certain class of Englishmen to give Great Britain<br />

a clear title to the region. It is true however, that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns did not seek to interfere with the<br />

colony until it was learned that gold had been discovered, trading developed, <strong>and</strong> that the settlers<br />

were prosperous.<br />

<strong>The</strong> official declares that the delay in the settlement of the boundary dispute is proving ruinous.<br />

Surveyor Harrison, he adds, is a cool-headed officer. Before he was appointed to <strong>Guiana</strong> be was in<br />

the service of the Canadian Government, <strong>and</strong> took part in the suppression of the Riel rebellion.<br />

[28 June 1896]<br />

- 333 -<br />

VENEZUELA AND GREAT BRITAIN<br />

State Department Officials Irritated over <strong>The</strong>ir Troubles<br />

WASHINGTON, July 2.—State Department officials do not conceal a certain irritation in<br />

discussing the latest phase of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute with Great Britain, growing out of<br />

the recent arrest of Mr. Harrison’s engineering party by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n troops.<br />

480


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>The</strong> department was informed to-day that the arrest of the English engineers was without<br />

justification, inasmuch as they were strictly within the limits of the territory held by the <strong>British</strong> for<br />

more than ten years. This raises a question as to the accuracy of the reports received through<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n channels, which were that the <strong>British</strong> were trespassers on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n soil. Advices<br />

received to-day state that the arrest occurred at the confluence of the Acarabise River, at a point east<br />

of the Schomburgk line.<br />

That the engineers were promptly released is a circumstance which is not sufficiently satisfying<br />

to the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office, if its sentiment be properly reflected in the London press. <strong>The</strong> English<br />

Government will dem<strong>and</strong> an apology <strong>and</strong> a money indemnity before the incident shall be regarded<br />

as closed. Coming as it does at a time when the Uruan difficulty of a year ago was in a fair way of<br />

settlement, it complicates the situation, <strong>and</strong> will undoubtedly delay that harmonious adjustment of<br />

relations between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain which is considered a necessary precedent of the<br />

boundary dispute.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Legation is without later advices from Caracas than those printed in these<br />

dispatches several days ago. But the State Department has used the cables freely in communicating<br />

with the United States Minister at the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n capital, <strong>and</strong> it is not doubted that the<br />

embarrassments which this country must suffer in connection with the matter have been made clear<br />

to President Crespo.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government has been flatly informed that Great Britain will not be satisfied<br />

with the payment of a small sum of money as compensation for the arrest at Sergt. Barnes <strong>and</strong><br />

several of his subordinates a year ago, which has now become a part of the diplomatic history of the<br />

two countries, <strong>and</strong> is known as the “Uruan incident.” President Crespo has been informed that the<br />

punishment of the comm<strong>and</strong>er of the department in which the arrest occurred, <strong>and</strong> the payment or<br />

the indemnity, must be followed also by an apology which will go further than all other<br />

considerations combined.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n contention is that an apology would be tantamount to an acknowledgment of<br />

Great Britain’s ownership of the territory in question, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing it was east at the Schomburgk<br />

line. To this the <strong>British</strong> reply that if the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns did not know they were in the wrong, they<br />

would have given Lord Salisbury no satisfaction whatever. In other words, if <strong>Venezuela</strong> is willing to<br />

punish the officer responsible for the arrest <strong>and</strong> pay the indemnity for the indignity imposed upon<br />

them, it is proper that they should make a complete reparation, which would include an apology<br />

also. It is <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s refusal to make this apology that has lengthened the delay in closing the<br />

incident.<br />

<strong>The</strong> correspondence between the State Department <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office with<br />

reference to a treaty of arbitration between the two Governments will not be made public before the<br />

next fortnight. While the correspondence is practically finished, there are yet several important<br />

letters in transit which must be received <strong>and</strong> answered before it is deemed desirable that all the<br />

communications bearing an the subject shall be given to the press. Those who are familiar with the<br />

correspondence assert that its tone is most friendly, <strong>and</strong> that it indicates a disposition on both sides<br />

to agree to some convention which will relegate Anglo-American disputes to a. friendly board of<br />

arbitration. <strong>The</strong> draft of the convention can be quickly prepared, <strong>and</strong> it is expected, if the<br />

correspondence shall show both Governments predisposed to such a settlement of their<br />

disagreements, that it will be drawn before Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> Sir Julian Pauncefote leave the city<br />

on their annual vacations, which, this year at least, they richly deserve, since the last twelve months<br />

has found them continually at their desks, with scarcely a day’s recreation.<br />

481


May – July 1896<br />

[3 July 1896]<br />

- 334 -<br />

A TREATY OF ARBITRATION<br />

<strong>The</strong> Correspondence Between This Country <strong>and</strong> Great Britain<br />

WASHINGTON, July 9.—Another delay has occurred in making public the correspondence of<br />

the State Department <strong>and</strong> the London Foreign Office relative to the new Anglo-American treaty of<br />

Arbitration. It is purposed under this treaty to refer all matters of dispute to a friendly board of<br />

arbitrators. It was expected that the correspondence bearing upon the subject, which has been in<br />

progress for some months, would be given to the press this week.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are, however, important letters in transit which must first be answered before this is done.<br />

It was announced to-day at the State Department that the correspondence would not be made<br />

public before the 19th inst. It is explained that there ate many letters yet to be written before the<br />

complete underst<strong>and</strong>ing is reached.<br />

<strong>The</strong> importance of the subject is such that it is deemed advisable to publish the correspondence<br />

at this stage of the proceedings, in order that both countries may underst<strong>and</strong> how well their<br />

diplomatic representatives are succeeding. <strong>The</strong> utmost confidence is expressed at the State<br />

Department that the successful preparation of such a treaty will result from the efforts which are<br />

now being made. <strong>The</strong> correspondence may not be closed before late Autumn, but it is not doubted<br />

that when this conclusion is reached the way will be fully prepared for the drafting of an arbitration<br />

treaty which will be satisfactory to both countries, <strong>and</strong> forever preclude the possibility or war<br />

between the English-speaking nations.<br />

With the publication of the correspondence, Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, Sir<br />

Julian Pauncefote, will leave the city on their annual vacations. This will not necessarily delay the<br />

exchange of whatever letters may be written before the correspondence is complete, but it will<br />

afford to each a brief session of much needed rest.<br />

[10 July 1896]<br />

- 335 -<br />

THE TREATY OF ARBITRATION<br />

Diplomatic Correspondence with Great Britain to be Published<br />

WASHINGTON, July 16.—Decidedly the most interesting recent event in diplomatic circles<br />

will be the publicity given in Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States on Saturday next to the<br />

correspondence between the two countries with reference to a treaty of arbitration. <strong>The</strong> exchange of<br />

letters between Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> Lord Salisbury has been effected through the <strong>British</strong><br />

Ambassador at Washington, Sir Julian Pauncefote. While the correspondence has been in progress<br />

for nearly half a year, the number of important letters which have passed has been comparatively<br />

482


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New York Times (1887-1904)<br />

limited. What it is lacking in numbers, however, is more than made up in the length of some of the<br />

communications, <strong>and</strong> the whole, if published, would fill many columns of print.<br />

<strong>The</strong> correspondence covers two points—first, with reference to a general treaty of arbitration,<br />

<strong>and</strong>, second, the final disposition of the boundary dispute between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. It<br />

is said at State Department that, if the treaty of arbitration be agreed upon, it will not only simplify<br />

but materially aid the settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> dispute. <strong>The</strong> tone of the correspondence is most<br />

friendly, <strong>and</strong> it shows the progress that has been made with reference to arbitrating all differences<br />

between the great English-speaking nations. It is made public at this time in order that <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

American citizens may see for themselves what progress is being made, but it is not definitive. <strong>The</strong>re<br />

are numerous concessions yet to be made before a substantial agreement can be reached.<br />

Secretary Olney has been very insistent upon certain points, to some of which the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government has yielded a reluctant consent, but upon others there is a wide divergence of opinion.<br />

It is still hoped that a middle course will be found upon which both Governments can agree, so that<br />

the treaty may be framed early next Winter <strong>and</strong> laid before the Senate in time for favorable action<br />

before its adjournment in March next.<br />

It Is expected that Secretary Olney will leave Washington for his Summer outing shortly after the<br />

publication of the correspondence. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, Señor Andrade, will both take their departures at the same time, as neither, in<br />

view of the complications between the three countries, can absent himself from Washington until<br />

the Secretary sets the example.<br />

Titer <strong>British</strong> Government, so far as can be learned, is not likely to attach any serious importance<br />

to the arrest of the Crown surveyor, Mr. Harrison, in <strong>Venezuela</strong> last month. <strong>The</strong> London Foreign<br />

Office has ordered an investigation, <strong>and</strong> an explanation will be dem<strong>and</strong>ed of President Crespo, but it<br />

is not believed that it will complicate the settlement of the boundary dispute. That matter has gone<br />

so far <strong>and</strong> is regarded as of such importance that occurrences of this character, irritating as they<br />

necessarily are to <strong>British</strong> sensibilities, are received as a natural consequence of such contentions. So<br />

far as the Uruan incident (the arrest of Sergt. Barnes <strong>and</strong> other members of the <strong>British</strong> colonial<br />

police a year ago) is concerned, there are no new developments. Great Britain insists upon an<br />

apology in addition to a money indemnity. It is not certain that this apology will be made, although<br />

all the correspondence on the subject shows that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government deprecates the<br />

occurrence. State Department officials indulge the hope, therefore, that under these circumstances<br />

<strong>and</strong> in the interest of a harmonious settlement of the boundary dispute <strong>Venezuela</strong> may make greater<br />

concessions than would ordinarily be the case.<br />

[17 July 1896]<br />

- 336 -<br />

ARBITRATION YET FAR OFF<br />

THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND ARE UNABLE TO AGREE<br />

Lord Salisbury Suggests a Plan <strong>and</strong> Secretary Olney Makes a Counter-Proposal – Result of<br />

Negotiations Thus Far Shown by the Published Correspondence—Differences Which Now<br />

St<strong>and</strong> in the Way of Agreement<br />

483


May – July 1896<br />

WASHINGTON, July 17.—<strong>The</strong> efforts of the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain to agree upon a<br />

general arbitration treaty for the settlement of all controversies, through the establishment of a<br />

permanent tribunal, as well as the progress of diplomatic negotiations toward solving the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n problem, are set forth in thirteen communications made public by the State Department<br />

to-night. While they constitute the first authoritative disclosures upon these great questions since<br />

President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s famous Christmastide message to Congress, it will be found that previous<br />

reports of the negotiations between the two Governments have accurately outlined the course of<br />

events.<br />

Little substantial progress toward a general arbitration treaty is disclosed by the documents. An<br />

outline in part of the proposed procedure is given, <strong>and</strong> the views of the two Governments are so<br />

explicitly stated that future discussion may be confined toward narrowing the few divergencies of<br />

method. <strong>The</strong> further fact is made apparent that the United States has not relaxed its vigilance in<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>ing a just settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary question <strong>and</strong> has rejected the <strong>British</strong><br />

proposals for arbitrating that dispute under terms involving the surrender of any part of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s<br />

claims.<br />

<strong>The</strong> correspondence opens with a letter from Ambassador Bayard to Lord Salisbury, dated Feb.<br />

27 last, stating that his instructions continued to indicate an urgent desire to have the <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

boundary question removed as soon as practicable from the atmosphere of possible controversy,<br />

<strong>and</strong> proposing an entrance forthwith upon negotiations at Washington between the <strong>British</strong><br />

Ambassador <strong>and</strong> the Secretary of State. Mr. Bayard added that Secretary Olney greatly desired that<br />

there should be propounded a cleat definition of the “settlements” by individuals in the disputed<br />

territory which, it was understood, Great Britain wished excluded from the proposed arbitration.<br />

Lord Salisbury, in his reply, on March 3, said his Government readily concurred in the<br />

suggestion, <strong>and</strong> had sent instructions to Sir Julian Pauncefote, directing him to discuss the question<br />

either with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n representative or the United States, acting as the friend of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. He<br />

had asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the precise meaning attached to the word,<br />

“settlements”.<br />

Lord Salisbury’s Plans<br />

Lord Salisbury’s instructions to Sir Julian Pauncefote, dated March 5, form the third document,<br />

<strong>and</strong> are devoted to the system for general international arbitration, negotiations for the<br />

establishment of which had been interrupted by Secretary Gresham’s death. Lord Salisbury submits<br />

the following heads of a treaty for arbitration in certain cases:<br />

1. Her Britannic Majesty <strong>and</strong> the President of the United States shall each appoint two or more permanent<br />

judicial officers for the purpose of this treaty, <strong>and</strong> on the appearance of any difference between the two powers,<br />

which, in the judgment of either of them, cannot be settled by negotiation, each of them shall designate one of the<br />

said officers as arbitrators, <strong>and</strong> the two arbitrators shall hear <strong>and</strong> determine any matter referred to them in<br />

accordance with this treaty.<br />

2. Before entering on such arbitration, the arbitrators shall select an umpire, by whom any question upon which<br />

they disagree, whether interlocutory or final, shall be decided. <strong>The</strong> decision of such umpire upon any interlocutory<br />

question shall be binding upon the arbitrators. <strong>The</strong> determination of the arbitrators, or, if they disagree, the decision<br />

of the umpire, shall be the award upon the matters referred.<br />

3. Complaints made by the nationals of one power against the officers of the other; <strong>and</strong> pecuniary claims or<br />

groups of claims, amounting to not more than £100,000, made on either power by the nationals of the other,<br />

whether based on an alleged right by treaty or agreement or otherwise; all claims for damages or indemnity under<br />

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the said amount; all questions affecting diplomatic or consular privileges; all alleged rights of fishery, access,<br />

navigation, or commercial privilege, <strong>and</strong> all questions referred by special agreement between the two parties, shall be<br />

referred to arbitration in accordance with this treaty, <strong>and</strong> the award thereon shall be final.<br />

4. Any difference in respect to a question or fact or of international law, involving the territory, territorial rights,<br />

sovereignty, or jurisdiction of either power, or any pecuniary claim or group of claims of any kind, involving a sum<br />

larger than £100,000, shall be referred to arbitration under this treaty. But, if in any such case, within three months<br />

after the award has been reported, either power protests that such award is erroneous in respect to some issue of<br />

fact, or some issue a international law, the award shall be reviewed by a court composed of three of the Judges of<br />

the Supreme Court of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> three of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States; <strong>and</strong> if the<br />

said court shall determine, after hearing the case, by a majority of not less than five to one, that the said Issue has<br />

been rightly determined, the award shall st<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> be final, but in default of such determination, it shall not be valid.<br />

If no protest is entered by either power against the award within the time limited, it shall be final.<br />

5. Any difference, which, in the judgment of either power, materially affects its honor or the integrity or its<br />

territory shall not be referred to arbitration under this treaty, except by special agreement.<br />

6. Any difference whatever, by agreement between the two powers, may be referred for decision by arbitration,<br />

as herein provided, with the stipulation that, unless accepted by both powers, the decision shall not be valid.<br />

<strong>The</strong> time <strong>and</strong> place of their meeting <strong>and</strong> all arrangements for the hearing <strong>and</strong> all questions of procedure shall be<br />

decided by the arbitrators or by the umpire if need be.<br />

In the instructions, Sir Julian is told that all matters in dispute cannot be referred to arbitration;<br />

that neither Government is willing to accept arbitration upon issues involving national honor or<br />

integrity, but within this wide region the United States desires to go further than Great Britain. A<br />

system of arbitration being a novel arrangement, the limits must be determined by experiment, <strong>and</strong> it<br />

would be wiser to make a modest beginning than to hazard the success of the principle by<br />

adventuring upon doubtful grounds. Where the issues concern the State so that defeat is a serious<br />

blow to the credit or power of the litigant, Lord Salisbury says that nations cannot afford to leave<br />

controversies by which their national position may be affected or a number of their fellow-subjects<br />

transferred to a foreign rule to the deciding vote of one man, <strong>and</strong> that man a foreigner.<br />

Secretary Olney Amends<br />

Secretary Olney, in reply, April 11, declares that Lord Salisbury’s proposals are welcomed with<br />

the keenest appreciation of their value <strong>and</strong> of the enlightened <strong>and</strong> progressive spirit which animates<br />

them. So far as they manifest a desire that the two great English-speaking peoples of the world shall<br />

remain in perpetual peace, he fully reciprocates that desire on behalf of the Government <strong>and</strong> people<br />

of the United States.<br />

To himself personally, nothing could bring greater satisfaction than to be instrumental in the<br />

accomplishment of an end so beneficent. But, by the direction of the President, he proposes the<br />

following substitute for Lord Salisbury’s Articles IV <strong>and</strong> V:<br />

IV. Arbitration under this treaty shall also be obligatory. In respect of all questions now pending or hereafter<br />

arising, involving territorial rights, boundaries, sovereignty, or jurisdiction, or any pecuniary claim or group or claims<br />

aggregating a sum larger than £100,000, <strong>and</strong> in respect of all controversies not in this treaty specially described,<br />

provided, however, that either the Congress of the United States, on the one b<strong>and</strong>, or the Parliament of Great<br />

Britain, on the other, at any time before the arbitral tribunal shall have convened for the consideration of any<br />

particular subject matter, may by act or resolution declaring such particular subject matter to involve the National<br />

honor or integrity, withdraw the same from the operation of this treaty; <strong>and</strong>, providing further, that if a controversy<br />

shall arise when either the Congress of the United States or the Parliament of Great Britain shall not be in session,<br />

<strong>and</strong> such controversy shall be deemed by Her Britannic Majesty’s Government, or by that of the United States,<br />

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May – July 1896<br />

acting through the President, to be of such nature that the National honor or integrity may be involved, such<br />

difference or controversy shall not be submitted to arbitration under this treaty until the Congress <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Parliament shall have had opportunity to take action thereon.<br />

In the case of controversies provided for by this article the award shall be final, if concurred in by all the<br />

arbitrators. If assented to by a majority only, the award shall be final unless one of the parties, within three months<br />

from its promulgation, shall protest in writing to the other that the award is erroneous in respect of some issue of<br />

fact or of law. In every such case, the award shall be reviewed by a court composed of three of the Judges of the<br />

Supreme Court of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> three of Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, who, before<br />

entering upon their duties, shall agree upon three learned <strong>and</strong> impartial jurists, to be added to said court in case they<br />

shall be equally divided upon the award to be made. To said court there shall be submitted a record in full of all the<br />

proceedings of the original arbitral tribunal, which record, as part thereof, shall include the evidence adduced to<br />

such tribunal. <strong>The</strong>reupon said court shall proceed to consider said award upon said record, <strong>and</strong> may either affirm<br />

the same or make such other award as the principles of law applicable to the facts appearing by aid record shall<br />

warrant <strong>and</strong> require, <strong>and</strong> the award so affirmed or so rendered by said court, whether unanimously or by a majority<br />

vote, shall be final. If, however, the court shall be equally divided upon the subject of the award to be made, the<br />

three jurists agreed upon as hereinbefore provided shall be added to the said court, <strong>and</strong> the award of the court so<br />

constituted, whether rendered unanimously or by a majority vote, shall he final. . .<br />

<strong>The</strong>se amendments, he argued, make all disputes prima facie arbitral, <strong>and</strong> places where it<br />

belongs, in Congress <strong>and</strong> Parliament, the right <strong>and</strong> power to decide whether they are arbitrable or<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> assertion by force of arms. <strong>The</strong> administration in authority, he says, when a serious<br />

international controversy arises, is often exposed to influences not wholly favorable to its impartial<br />

consideration. It is liable to view the honor of the country as not distinguishable from the good of<br />

the party. And if war <strong>and</strong> not arbitration is to be evoked, the direct representative of the people, at<br />

whose cost <strong>and</strong> suffering war must be carried on, should be properly charged with the responsibility<br />

of making it.<br />

By the scheme, as amended, the controversy is finally ended, whereas, under the original<br />

proposition, there would be an award only in rare cases, in which the six appellate arbiters favored it,<br />

either unanimously or by a majority of five to one. Mr. Olney thinks such an arrangement would be<br />

dangerous. In all cases in which the arbitrators were equally divided or stood four to two, public<br />

feeling in each country would be aroused by the protracted proceedings <strong>and</strong> the chances of a<br />

peaceful outcome would be prejudiced, rather than promoted. It is also pointed out that the United<br />

States, having no European alliances, has more to fear than Great Britain from the bias of foreign<br />

judges.<br />

Approximate Results Sought<br />

Secretary Olney finally contends that to insist upon an arbitration scheme so constructed that<br />

miscarriages of justice can never occur, is to insist upon the unattainable, <strong>and</strong> is equivalent to a<br />

relinquishment altogether of the effort in behalf of a general system of national arbitration. An<br />

approximation to truth – results which, on the average <strong>and</strong> in the long run, conform to right <strong>and</strong><br />

justice—is all that the “lot of humanity” permits us to expect from any plan. In conclusion,<br />

Secretary Olney says:<br />

It only remains to observe that is Article 4, as amended, should prove acceptable, no reason is perceived why<br />

the pending <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute should not be brought within the treaty by express words of inclusion. If<br />

however, no treaty for general arbitration can be now expected, it cannot be improper to add that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

boundary dispute seems to offer a good opportunity for one of these tentative experiments at arbitration which, as<br />

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Lord Salisbury justly intimates, would be of decided advantage, as tending to indicate the lines upon which a scheme<br />

for general arbitration can be judiciously drawn.<br />

Secretary Olney, on May 8 forwarded through Ambassador Bayard a request from the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission sitting in Washington for references as to the claim set forth in the <strong>British</strong><br />

Blue Book of English sovereignty over coast between the Pomeroon <strong>and</strong> Point Barima, for which the<br />

commission said it had been unable to find any warrant, <strong>and</strong> on May 30 Lord Salisbury sent Mr.<br />

Bayard a memor<strong>and</strong>um on the subject prepared by the Attorney General <strong>and</strong> took the opportunity<br />

to promise cordial assistance to the commission in the search for facts.<br />

Lord Salisbury, writing May 16 to Sir Julian Pauncefote, in rejoinder to Secretary Olney’s counter<br />

proposals, disclaims any intention to exclude the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute, but holds that the system of<br />

arbitration ought to be applicable to all civilized countries. He says he is encouraged by Secretary<br />

Olney’s approval of Article 3 <strong>and</strong> the policy it is designed to sanction, <strong>and</strong> regrets that the two<br />

Governments should neglect the opportunity for embodying this common view in a separate<br />

convention.<br />

Lord Salisbury says he fears that the first result of compulsory arbitration of territorial claims will<br />

be an enormous multiplication of their number, <strong>and</strong> he questions whether the benefits of preventing<br />

war from such disputes may not be outweighed by a system generating a multiplicity of international<br />

litigation, blighting the prosperity of the border countries exposed to it <strong>and</strong> leaving the inhabitants<br />

under the enduring threat either of a forcible change of allegiance or of exile. He declares that there<br />

are essential differences between individual <strong>and</strong> national rights to l<strong>and</strong> which make it impossible to<br />

apply the well-known laws of real property to a territorial dispute. In conclusion, Lord Salisbury<br />

says:<br />

It appears to me that under these circumstances it will be wiser, until our experience of international arbitration is<br />

greater, for nations to retain in their own h<strong>and</strong>s some control over the ultimate result of any claim that may be<br />

advanced against their territorial rights.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Question<br />

Sir Julian Pauncefote, on June 1, had a conference with Secretary Olney regarding the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy, <strong>and</strong> two days later sent the Secretary the instructions from Lord Salisbury<br />

upon which his visit had been based. In these, under date of May 22, the <strong>British</strong> Premier foresees<br />

the possibility of failure in the attempt to agree on the general arbitration system, <strong>and</strong> proposes a<br />

settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute, in which he declares that from the first it had been<br />

objectionable to subject to the decision at an arbiter, who, in the last resort, must of necessity be a<br />

foreigner, the rights of <strong>British</strong> colonists who have settled in the country believing it to be <strong>British</strong>.<br />

A commission con3isting of four members, two to be <strong>British</strong> subjects <strong>and</strong> two citizens of the<br />

United States, is proposed to report upon the facts which affect the rights of Spain <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong> at<br />

the date at Great Britain’s acquisition of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. Upon the report of such commission, it Is<br />

stipulated that Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> shall endeavor to agree on a boundary, but, failing in<br />

this, a tribunal shall be appointed, on <strong>British</strong>, one <strong>Venezuela</strong>n, <strong>and</strong> they to select a third, who should<br />

fix the line of boundary: but with a proviso that it should not include as <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory any<br />

territory which was occupied by <strong>British</strong> colonists on or before Jan. 1, 1887, or as territory of Great<br />

Britain any occupied by <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns at the same time.<br />

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May – July 1896<br />

Mr. Olney, on June 12, declared that his Government was unable to treat this proposal as well<br />

adapted to bring the dispute to a speedy conclusion, or as giving due recognition to the just rights of<br />

the parties concerned. Secretary Olney adds:<br />

But as Great Britain asks for the rule <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> opposes it, the inevitable deduction coincides with the<br />

undisputed fact, namely, that the former’s interest is believed to be promoted by the rule, while the latter’s will be<br />

prejudiced.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> is not to be stripped of her rightful possessions because the <strong>British</strong> Government has<br />

erroneously encouraged its subjects to believe that such possessions were <strong>British</strong>. In but one<br />

possible contingency could any claim of that sort by Great Britain have even a semblance of<br />

plausibility. If Great Britain’s assertion of jurisdiction on the faith of which her subjects made<br />

settlements in territory subsequently ascertained to be <strong>Venezuela</strong>n could be shown to have been in<br />

any way assented to or acquiesced in by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the latter power might be held to be concluded<br />

<strong>and</strong> to be estopped from setting up any title to such settlements. But the notorious facts of the case<br />

are all the other way. <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s claims <strong>and</strong> her protests against alleged <strong>British</strong> usurpation have<br />

been constant <strong>and</strong> emphatic <strong>and</strong> have been enforced by all the means practicable for a weak power<br />

to employ in its dealings with a strong one, even to the rupture of diplomatic relations. It would<br />

seem to be quite impossible, therefore, that Great Britain should justify her asserted jurisdiction over<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory upon which <strong>British</strong> subjects have settled in reliance upon such assertion by<br />

pleading that the assertion was bona fide, without full notice of whatever rights <strong>Venezuela</strong> may<br />

prove to have.<br />

An Amended Proposal<br />

Secretary Olney declares that, in the opinion of the United States, Lord Salisbury’s proposals can<br />

be made to meet the requirements <strong>and</strong> justice of the case only if amended along the following lines:<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission upon facts should be so constituted by adding one or more members that it must reach a<br />

result that cannot become abortive <strong>and</strong> possibly mischievous.<br />

That commission should have power to report upon all the facts necessary to the decision of the boundary<br />

controversy, including the facts pertaining to the occupation of the disputed territory by <strong>British</strong> subjects.<br />

<strong>The</strong> proviso by which the boundary line, as drawn by the arbitral tribunal of three, is not to include territory<br />

bona fide occupied by <strong>British</strong> subjects or <strong>Venezuela</strong>n citizens on the first of January, 1887, should be stricken out<br />

altogether, or there might be substituted for it the following:<br />

“Provided, however, that in fixing such line, if territory of one party be found in the occupation of the subjects<br />

or citizens of the other party, such weight <strong>and</strong> effect be given to such occupation as reason, justice, the rules of<br />

international law, <strong>and</strong> the equities of the particular case may appear to require.”<br />

Secretary Olney on the same day, June 12, acknowledged the copy of Lord Salisbury’s dispatch<br />

of May 18, <strong>and</strong> promised speedy consideration, but declared that in the meantime he desired again<br />

to call attention to the fact that so far as the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute was concerned the position of the<br />

United States had been plainly defined not only by the Executive, but by the unanimous concurring<br />

action or both branches of Congress, <strong>and</strong> that a genuine arbitration finally disposing of the<br />

controversy would be cordially welcomed.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, he declared that, “while a treaty of general arbitration providing for a<br />

tentative decision merely upon territorial claims might be accepted by this Government as a step in<br />

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the right direction, it would not feel at liberty to include the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute within the<br />

scope of such a treaty.” “It is deemed advisable.” he adds, “to be thus explicit in the interest of both<br />

Governments, that the pending negotiations for a genera treaty of arbitration may proceed without<br />

any misapprehension.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Last Word<br />

<strong>The</strong> correspondence ends with a letter dated June 22 from Secretary Olney to Sir Julian<br />

Pauncefote, in which he replies to Lord Salisbury’s of May 18. He says that while this Government is<br />

unable to concur in all the reasoning or conclusions of Lord Salisbury, it is both impressed <strong>and</strong><br />

gratified at the earnest <strong>and</strong> serious attention which the important subject under discussion is<br />

evidently receiving, <strong>and</strong> expresses the hope that persistent effort in the line of the pending<br />

negotiations will have results which, if not all that the enthusiastic advocates of international<br />

arbitration anticipate, will be a decided advance upon anything heretofore achieved in that direction.<br />

He finds that Lord Salisbury’s dispatch discards all general phraseology <strong>and</strong> makes a clear<br />

distinction between non-arbitrable or territorial controversies <strong>and</strong> all others. <strong>The</strong> advantages of this<br />

sharp division line, he thinks, are very great, <strong>and</strong> the fact that it has been drawn shows that the<br />

progress of the discussion is eliminating all but the vital points of difference.<br />

Secretary Olney then proceeds to show that if Lord Salisbury’s plan of rejecting an award could<br />

be permitted there would be no real arbitration at all. He insists that the acceptance should come in<br />

advance.<br />

<strong>The</strong> American plan is to reserve the right not to go into an arbitration if the territorial claim in<br />

dispute involves National honor <strong>and</strong> integrity. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> proposals also reserve this right. <strong>The</strong> vital<br />

difference, he says, is that under the <strong>British</strong> plan “the parties enter into an arbitration <strong>and</strong> determine<br />

afterward, when they know the result, whether they will be bound or not. Under the proposals of<br />

the United States, the parties enter into an arbitration, having determined beforeh<strong>and</strong> that they will<br />

be bound. <strong>The</strong> latter is a genuine arbitration, the former is a mere imitation, which may have its uses<br />

but, like all other imitations, cannot compare in value with the real article.”<br />

Secretary Olney, referring to Lord Salisbury’s desire to exclude territorial claims, says that a treaty<br />

to settle them is the only thing now contemplated by Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States. He cannot<br />

imagine where all the speculative claims feared by Lord Salisbury are coming from, <strong>and</strong> he does not<br />

hesitate to say that the apprehensions thus expressed, if not wholly groundless, “are of a highly<br />

fanciful character.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> document then goes into a technical legal discussion of international law, as applicable to<br />

territory, <strong>and</strong> closes with the following keen point:<br />

By the original proposals of Lord Salisbury, contained in the dispatch of March 5 last, a protested award is to be<br />

void unless sustained by the appellate tribunal of six judges by a vote of 5 to 1. He has since suggested that such<br />

protested award may be allowed to st<strong>and</strong> unless a tribunal of five Supreme Court Judges of the protesting country<br />

shall set it aside for some error of fact or some error in law. Without committing myself on the point, it occurs to<br />

me as worthy of consideration whether the original proposals might not be so varied that the protested awards<br />

should st<strong>and</strong> unless set aside by the appellate tribunal by the specified majority. Such a change would go far in the<br />

direction of removing that want of finality to the proceedings which, as has been urged in previous dispatches, is the<br />

great objection to the original proposals.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Secretary has received no reply as yet to the last communication.<br />

489


May – July 1896<br />

[18 July 1896]<br />

- 337 -<br />

COMMENT IN ENGLAND<br />

Views of London <strong>News</strong>papers on the Arbitration Questions<br />

LONDON, July 17.—<strong>The</strong> Morning Post, commenting upon the correspondence between Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States touching the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute, will say to-morrow that in<br />

the perusal of the correspondence the impression arises that Mr. Olney, the American Secretary of<br />

State, is not so much anxious for a settlement of the questions as he is for a chance of putting Lord<br />

Salisbury in the wrong.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Graphic, treating of the same subject will say: “<strong>The</strong> attitude of the United States is<br />

uncompromising. Mr. Olney wants his own way or be will accept nothing.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> will remark upon Lord Salisbury’s unusual concession to democratic spirit by<br />

inviting the opinion of the country before deciding the question. It urges the people to carefully<br />

consider a matter of such enormous importance. It says that the questions at issue are eminently<br />

capable of adjustment <strong>and</strong> compromise. Lord Salisbury’s dispatches, it says, are very interesting <strong>and</strong><br />

suggestive, but are unduly fearful lest Mr. Olney’s perhaps sometimes too “slapdash” language<br />

should be absolute. Lord Salisbury should have the courage to risk something for an experiment so<br />

eminently desirable. Mr. Olney should recognize that even a few steps are better than no advance.<br />

Regarding <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> advocates Mr. Carnegie’s suggestion, that there should be<br />

no transfer of the settled districts, but that the possessor of the disputed territory should pay<br />

compensation if the arbitrators should decide that their possession was not de jure.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard discusses the matter temperately. It admits it would be no small advantage to be able<br />

to deal with the American statesmen rather than with the shifty politicians presiding over the policy<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It considers Lord Salisbury’s policy of inserting adequate safeguards against a<br />

miscarriage of justice more practical than Mr. Olney’s view that Great Britain might trust the United<br />

States not to raise frivolous claims, but Great Britain, it says, could not tolerate the condition of<br />

things that would arise if some southern republic, in backing which the Washington Government<br />

should become involved, should raise a fantastic dem<strong>and</strong> for a slice of <strong>British</strong> territory.<br />

[18 July 1896]<br />

- 338 -<br />

SUBMITTED TO THE LORDS<br />

<strong>The</strong> Arbitration Matter Discussed at Length by Salisbury<br />

LONDON, July 17.—In the House of Lords to-day, Lord Salisbury laid upon the table the<br />

papers relating to the boundary dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Lord Salisbury, in<br />

presenting the documents, said that negotiations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States in<br />

regard to the <strong>Venezuela</strong> matter were still in progress. <strong>The</strong> Government, he added, did not believe<br />

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that the claim made by <strong>Venezuela</strong> was a suitable subject for arbitration, but when the facts of the<br />

case as regarded the past history of <strong>Venezuela</strong> were fully ascertained, he thought that the diplomatic<br />

question involved could be easily adjusted.<br />

Lord Salisbury stated that concurrently with the negotiations which were in progress with the<br />

United States in regard to the dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, negotiations were also<br />

going on between the <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> American Governments, contemplating the establishment of a<br />

scheme of general arbitration of questions which might arise between the two nations.<br />

This, however, he said, was a matter which required great care <strong>and</strong> circumspection. Lord<br />

Salisbury said that he had taken an unusual course in the early production of the papers in the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> case, for the reason that the recess of the United States Congress had begun, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

recess of the <strong>British</strong> Parliament would soon be commenced. It, therefore, had been thought that it<br />

might be convenient for the House to know what was going on. <strong>The</strong> negotiations between the<br />

United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain were still incomplete, he said, but they were advancing amicably.<br />

In pursuing the negotiations, the Government had taken two courses. In the first <strong>and</strong> the smaller<br />

question with <strong>Venezuela</strong> upon which negotiations had been carried on with the United States rather<br />

than with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, no conclusion as yet had been arrived at. Difficulties had arisen from the fact<br />

that the claim made by <strong>Venezuela</strong> placed a very large proportion—about two-thirds—of <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>, including considerable territory which had been settled a great number of years, under<br />

arbitration. <strong>The</strong> Government never had thought that the question of the ownership of the territory<br />

ought to be arbitrated. In respect to unsettled territory, the Government always had been willing to<br />

arbitrate, but it was necessary to distinguish between the two. <strong>The</strong> Government’s view had been that<br />

at this stage arbitration was not a suitable remedy. <strong>The</strong> first thing was to ascertain the real facts<br />

respecting the past. It was impossible to proceed any faster than they had done, because they had<br />

not yet obtained the full facts necessary to the adjustment of the case. <strong>The</strong> labor involved had been<br />

enormous.<br />

Lord Salisbury announced that the Government would shortly place upon the table of the<br />

House another Blue Book in regard to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, which would enable the House to see the extent<br />

of the labors of the Government in the matter. When the facts were ascertained, he said, it probably<br />

would be easy to settle the matter. If not, it still would be perfectly easy to settle the particular issues<br />

at stake.<br />

Concurrent with these negotiations, Lord Salisbury continued, the Government had reopened<br />

the negotiations which were commenced during the time of the Ministry of Lord Rosebery upon the<br />

question of general arbitration, which were terminated, partly in consequence of the lamented death<br />

of one of the negotiators, <strong>and</strong> partly owing to the difficulty, which yet had not been surmounted, of<br />

dealing with cases so large <strong>and</strong> affecting interests so vital that statesmen thought twice before<br />

deciding.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re had been much discussion with the United States upon these points. He thought the<br />

tendency of the Government of the United States was to desire a rapid <strong>and</strong> summary decision.<br />

In the view of the Government, as the principle of obligatory arbitration was to be applied for<br />

the first time, it would be attended with considerable hazard <strong>and</strong> doubt. In his opinion<br />

circumspection <strong>and</strong> careful procedure were desirable.<br />

Some machinery for appeal also ought to be provided for a protest in one form or another, in<br />

order to prevent the miscarriage of justice to the great possible detriment of the large population of<br />

the <strong>British</strong> colonies, through any error on the part of an arbitrator. One difficulty, however, was<br />

pressing upon them.<br />

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May – July 1896<br />

He did not know how far the obligatory arbitration system would give rise to speculative claims.<br />

<strong>The</strong> answer of the United States was that such claims were not likely to arise between the United<br />

States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain. <strong>The</strong>re was no doubt, he said, that to a certain extent this was true, but it<br />

must not be forgotten that in recent years the United States had shown a disposition to adopt the<br />

cause of the many republics of South America. He did not quarrel about that, however, as that was<br />

what Great Britain had done in regard to the frontiers of Sweden, Pol<strong>and</strong>, Belgium, <strong>and</strong> Portugal.<br />

Great Britain would not deny that the United States had the same right. That rendered it possible for<br />

the claims of such powers to become matters for arbitration. <strong>The</strong>refore, the Government had to<br />

exercise a very considerable degree of caution. <strong>The</strong> Government, he said, had been reproached for<br />

delay, but he thought that in a matter of such extreme importance an error might affect the national<br />

interests for a long time. Above all, the interests of the colonies required careful consideration at<br />

every step. He would rather, he said, incur the charge of unnecessary delay than that of wild<br />

precipitation, which would involve the country in difficulty.<br />

[18 July 1896]<br />

- 339 -<br />

ARBITRATION AND VENEZUELA<br />

It is impossible, we think, for any intelligent <strong>and</strong> impartial person to read the abstract that has<br />

been given out in London of the correspondence upon international arbitration without sympathy<br />

<strong>and</strong> admiration. <strong>The</strong> contrast in tone between the letters from the State Department <strong>and</strong> from the<br />

Foreign Office is in some points striking, but on each side there is equally evident, it seems to us, a<br />

complete good faith <strong>and</strong> an honest determination to avoid war in regard not merely to pending but<br />

to possible controversies, if war can be avoided without the risk of evils that may be worse than war.<br />

That there are such evils is a truth which no “national”—to adopt the French term which Lord<br />

Salisbury employs to avoid the awkwardness of “subject” or “citizen”—which no “national” of a<br />

great <strong>and</strong> proud State will be inclined to dispute.<br />

We have already pointed out the c<strong>and</strong>or <strong>and</strong> friendliness of Lord Salisbury’s speech in the House<br />

of Lords accompanying the submission of the correspondence. It is a pleasure to note that the<br />

English press in general equally recognizes the exhibition of these qualities in the American side of<br />

the correspondence. One London journal does indeed say that Mr. Olney seems to be less anxious<br />

to settle the questions than to put Lord Salisbury in the wrong. But this seems to us an entire,<br />

though a natural, misapprehension. Lord Salisbury is a veteran diplomatist. <strong>The</strong> Secretary of State is<br />

an experienced lawyer <strong>and</strong> a novice in diplomatic correspondence. <strong>The</strong> difference is a difference of<br />

intellectual habit which must find expression in the manner of conducting such a correspondence.<br />

<strong>The</strong> business of a negotiator is to convince his correspondent that he himself is in the right. <strong>The</strong><br />

business of an advocate is to convince some third party that he is in the right <strong>and</strong> his adversary in<br />

the wrong, <strong>and</strong> this habit of a lifetime must betray itself in negotiations in which the manner of the<br />

advocate is not in place. But we fail to find, as we think any discriminating reader must fail to find,<br />

any more mental reservation or any more lack of a complete good faith in the letters of Mr. Olney<br />

than in those of Lord Salisbury, <strong>and</strong> we are glad to find that this view is the one commonly taken by<br />

the English press.<br />

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Meanwhile, upon the main question it is impossible not to recognize some force in each of the<br />

opposed contentions. Mr. Olney, on the one h<strong>and</strong>, contends that if arbitration is to amount to<br />

anything of value as a safeguard against war, provision must be made rot carrying it to a final result,<br />

which both parties have beforeh<strong>and</strong> agreed to accept. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, Lord Salisbury contends<br />

that there are subjects that are not properly arbitrable <strong>and</strong> in respect of which the agreement of a<br />

great nation to submit to arbitration would be tantamount to an abdication of its national claims <strong>and</strong><br />

conceivably an act of national suicide. No patriotic American will be likely to gainsay him on this<br />

point. It is often evident that each correspondent is thinking of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary, even<br />

when no overt reference to it is made. <strong>The</strong> hope for a peaceful <strong>and</strong> friendly solution of that question<br />

is that the report of our commission shall be so impartial <strong>and</strong> so thorough that it shall by moral<br />

weight impose itself as authoritative upon the <strong>British</strong> public, <strong>and</strong> so upon the <strong>British</strong> Government.<br />

Meanwhile, we can see no reason why one of Lord Salisbury’s proposals with which Mr. Olney<br />

does not appear to have dealt should not be acted upon. In the scheme of a. treaty suggested by<br />

Lord Salisbury one article gives a list of the classes of questions which he esteems to be clearly<br />

arbitrable. <strong>The</strong>se include:<br />

“Complaints made by the nationals of one power against the officers of the other: all pecuniary claims or<br />

groups of claims amounting to not more than ₤100,000, made on either power by the nationals of the other,<br />

whether based on an alleged tight by treaty or agreement or otherwise; all claims for damages or indemnity under<br />

the valid amount; all questions affecting diplomatic or consular privileges; all alleged rights of fishery, access,<br />

navigation, or commercial privilege, <strong>and</strong> all questions referred by special agreement between the two parties, shall be<br />

referred to arbitration, in accordance with this treaty, <strong>and</strong> the award thereon shall be final.”<br />

Lord Salisbury proposes that this article shall be made a separate convention. It seems to us that<br />

he weakens the case by proposing a limitation in amount of the pecuniary claims. Some questions he<br />

withholds as matter of principle, but there it no principle in consenting to arbitrate a claim for<br />

£105,000 upon the same conditions as a claim of £95,000. But, with this exception, there can be no<br />

objection to the separate enactment of this article. It will be seen that it embraces many classes of<br />

questions <strong>and</strong> among them many of those which are most apt to produce international irritation.<br />

Best of all, the conclusion of such a treaty would constitute a permanent tribunal of arbitration. <strong>The</strong><br />

principle would he embodied in the laws of the two countries, <strong>and</strong> the scope <strong>and</strong> jurisdiction of the<br />

tribunal could subsequently be enlarged. It would be an indisputable guarantee of good faith on each<br />

side. Such a guarantee, indeed, is already provided in the tone of the correspondence now made<br />

public. While we must recognize the difficulties or the case, the spirit in which it has been<br />

approached gives encouragement to the belief that these difficulties will be overcome.<br />

[19 July 1896]<br />

- 340 -<br />

VENEZUELAN SURPRISE EXPECTED<br />

Mr. Storrow, It Is Said, Will H<strong>and</strong>le the <strong>British</strong> Without Mercy<br />

WASHINGTON, July 19.—Something of a sensation in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute is expected in a<br />

day or two, possibly to-morrow, when a retort to the Pollock argument, which prefaced the <strong>British</strong><br />

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May – July 1896<br />

blue book, is delivered to the commission <strong>and</strong> made public simultaneously in this country <strong>and</strong><br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>. Up to this time the agents of the Caracas Government have contented themselves with<br />

putting up evidence before the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, <strong>and</strong> pointing out the numerous<br />

inconsistencies <strong>and</strong> false deductions in the <strong>British</strong> case, but since the distinguished Boston lawyer,<br />

James J. Storrow, has become associated with Mr. Scruggs in <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s behalf the case has been<br />

whipped into legal shape, <strong>and</strong> a brief has been prepared which is understood to h<strong>and</strong>le Lord<br />

Salisbury, Prof. Pollock, <strong>and</strong> the other <strong>British</strong> lawyers <strong>and</strong> diplomats without gloves.<br />

It is said that Mr. Storrow has utterly demolished the vital points of the <strong>British</strong> contention <strong>and</strong><br />

turned Prof. Pollock’s favorite arguments against Lord Salisbury’s pretensions.<br />

In Mr. Storrow’s few months’ connection with the case its entire conduct has been changed<br />

from one of defense to that of most vigorous aggressiveness. It is said that Mr. Storrow was secured<br />

as associate counsel at the suggestion of Secretary Olney, whose classmate he was at Harvard Law<br />

School. In addition to being the chief legal adviser of the Bell Telephone Company <strong>and</strong> other great<br />

corporations, Mr. Storrow has always been a deep student in international law <strong>and</strong> foreign affairs.<br />

His library includes one of the few complete sets in this country of the Royal Geographical Society<br />

publications. He was a participant on the winning side of the controversy between Dana <strong>and</strong><br />

Lawrence twenty years ago over the charge of plagiarism in editing Wheaton’s “International Law.”<br />

[20 July 1896]<br />

- 341 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN BRIEF<br />

Strong Paper Submitted to the Commission by Mr. Storrow<br />

ANSWER TO THE BRITISH CLAIMS<br />

Based, It is Said, on a True Divisional Line According to the Undisputed Evidence<br />

REFUTATION OF POLLOCK’S ARGUMENT<br />

Exposure of the Inconsistencies of the English Contentions with Respect to<br />

the Famous Schomburgk Map<br />

WASHINGTON, July 20.—<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s brief, prepared by Counsel Storrow <strong>and</strong> presented today<br />

to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> counsel, is said to be the most important paper<br />

that has appeared in the case. It is alleged that in this brief, for the first time, a true divisional line in<br />

accordance with the evidence, is laid down, <strong>and</strong> that Lord Salisbury’s contention as to settlements is<br />

shown to be a mere diplomatic quibble, utterly unsupported by law or fact, <strong>and</strong> unworthy of any<br />

consideration by the commission, Mr. Storrow takes the ground that there never has been any<br />

<strong>British</strong> sovereignty in the disputed territory; that the Dutch never gained the slightest foothold in the<br />

Orinoco Basin, <strong>and</strong>, therefore, never transferred what did not exist to Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> caps his<br />

arguments by setting up proofs that the Schomburgk line, as held by Lord Salisbury, was a forgery<br />

perpetrated by the English Government twenty years after Schomburgk’s death.<br />

<strong>The</strong> brief opens with Lord Salisbury’s statement of Jan. 10, 1880, that the boundary claimed by<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> to the Esequibo River would involve the surrender of a province inhabited by 40,000<br />

<strong>British</strong> subjects, which had been in the uninterrupted possession of Holl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain<br />

successively for two centuries, <strong>and</strong> sweeps this away with the reiteration of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s offer, in<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New York Times (1887-1904)<br />

asking for arbitration in 1890, to recognize Great Britain’s rights to its settlements on both banks of<br />

the Esequibo, to reserve for itself the banks of the Orinoco, which the treaty of Aranjuez had<br />

recognized as Spanish, <strong>and</strong> which every English Ministry except Lord Salisbury’s had offered to<br />

recognize <strong>and</strong> to arbitrate the rest, which consisted entirely of territory where, even then, Engl<strong>and</strong><br />

had no settlements.<br />

Salisbury’s Claim of 1880<br />

<strong>The</strong> brief assumes, for the sake of argument, that Engl<strong>and</strong> may have a right by occupation to<br />

settlements on the alluvial l<strong>and</strong> at the mouth of the Esequibo, but maintains that the Spaniards held<br />

possession of all <strong>Guiana</strong> from the discovery in 1500 until <strong>Venezuela</strong> succeeded to the territory, <strong>and</strong><br />

that Spain successfully resisted all efforts of the Dutch as well as of Sir Walter Raleigh “<strong>and</strong> other<br />

freebooters” to effect a lodgment.<br />

Mr. Storrow says the <strong>British</strong> claim confessedly has no basis except occupation, <strong>and</strong> the rules of<br />

law applied even to the facts alleged not only give no support to the <strong>British</strong> attempt to extend the<br />

boundary, but are specifically <strong>and</strong> affirmatively fatal to it. He attacks the so-called temporary posts in<br />

the Cuyuni Basin <strong>and</strong> at Barima Point by showing that they were mere trading stations, quickly<br />

destroyed by the Spanish, who maintained sovereignty over the region, <strong>and</strong> proves that the actual<br />

settlements of the Dutch <strong>and</strong> Spanish were always separated by 150 miles of forest.<br />

Quotes the Law<br />

Mr. Storrow quotes the law authorities as follows, to support the two rules of law which<br />

designate where between these actual settlements the boundary line shall run:<br />

First – When, either by nature or by the habits of the settlers, a tract has been defined, the rule is that the first<br />

occupation or a part is in law an entry upon <strong>and</strong> possession or the whole. But the entry of a second claimant cannot<br />

displace the legal possession of the first beyond the actual occupation or that second.<br />

Second – Where, between the settlements of two nations in a country otherwise wild, there are features which<br />

form a natural barrier or line of demarkation, <strong>and</strong> which in a long series of years have not been overpassed nor<br />

attempted to be overpassed by the actual settlements of either party, the law makes that line the international<br />

boundary.<br />

<strong>The</strong> brief claims that such a tract <strong>and</strong> line exist <strong>and</strong> that the Dutch <strong>and</strong> English settlements never<br />

attempted to pass it until the invasion of the armed English force at the time of the gold discovery,<br />

about a dozen years ago.<br />

<strong>The</strong> historical evidence of the Dutch <strong>and</strong> Spanish conflicts are discussed to show that the<br />

Spanish always were in actual occupation of the country up to the small range of mountains which<br />

the Cuyuni breaks through to enter the Essequibo. <strong>The</strong>se cataracts effectually prevented access to<br />

the interior in the time of the Dutch as they do to-day in the case of English, compelling the latter to<br />

seek ingress from the mouth of the Orinoco, for which Harrison was building the road from Barima<br />

last month, when he was arrested in <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Spaniards, it is alleged, always exercised dominion over this great unsettled tract, by<br />

excluding other nations from it, <strong>and</strong> when the Dutch sought to take slaves from this section, with<br />

the help of the Carribs, as the Dutch archives prove, the Spanish drove them out, destroyed their<br />

stations on the Upper Essequibo, <strong>and</strong> imprisoned the Dutchmen.<br />

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May – July 1896<br />

<strong>The</strong> Oregon Boundary Case<br />

<strong>The</strong> Oregon boundary case which made much international law, is applied to the existing<br />

dispute, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> arguments in that celebrated case are turned squarely against Lord Salisbury’s<br />

present contention by showing that while private occupation in time may give a private title, no<br />

occupation can create sovereign dominion unless it be directly authorized or adopted by the<br />

Government of the settler at the outset <strong>and</strong> for the announced purpose of acquiring sovereignty.<br />

Evidence is then adduced which tends to turn Prof. Pollock’s arguments of law against his case.<br />

It is shown that Spain discovered the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> the Dutch fort on that river was built on the<br />

foundations of the older Spanish one; that the real road to the Interior Cuyuni-Mazeruni Basin is by<br />

way of the Spanish settlements on the Orinoco, <strong>and</strong> that it was those settlements which barred the<br />

way of Raleigh <strong>and</strong> all other seekers after El Dorado. It is urged that when the English, as they have<br />

done, concede that the Spaniards controlled the entire Orinocos, they lost their last argument upon<br />

which they could claim Barima.<br />

What Lord Stowell Said<br />

Mr. Storrow quotes Lord Stowell, the highest English authority in the case of the Mississippi<br />

River to show that those who own the watershed thereby possess the delta, isl<strong>and</strong>s, <strong>and</strong> shores<br />

below, these are unfit for habitation <strong>and</strong> never have been inhabited. <strong>The</strong> claim of either the Dutch<br />

or of the English to hold the mouth of the great Spanish river is alleged to be utterly untenable <strong>and</strong><br />

Mr. Storrow says every English <strong>and</strong> Dutch historian who pretends to serious consideration of the<br />

matter re-echoed without knowing it the judgement of Lord Stowell, which, oddly enough, escaped<br />

the notice of Prof. Pollock <strong>and</strong> Lord Salisbury.<br />

After citing the Treaty of Aranjuez to show by both the literal translation <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong><br />

rendering that the Dutch made no claim to the controlling shore of the Orinoco, Mr. Storrow takes<br />

up the Schomburgk line <strong>and</strong> traces its history. Incidentally, he finds that the <strong>British</strong> Blue Book leaves<br />

out part of a sentence out of Schomburgk’s memoirs therein quoted which shows that Schomburgk<br />

had no idea that his line would amount to anything until its termini at least should be agreed upon<br />

by the disputants.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, it is said, never agreed to any of it. After Barima had been suggested as one end of<br />

the line <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> protested, the assurance was given by Lord Palmerston that it was only to be<br />

considered “as a statement of the <strong>British</strong> claim,” <strong>and</strong> subsequently the same thing was said by Lord<br />

Granville in 1881. Lord Aberdeen in 1884, <strong>and</strong> Lord Rosebery, in 1886, offered to agree to lines<br />

which they declared “would secure to <strong>Venezuela</strong> the undisturbed possession of the mouths of the<br />

Orinoco.”<br />

This, it is argued, was because Great Britain, under those Ministers, <strong>and</strong> in fact, under all except<br />

Salisbury, felt that neither in law nor in good conscience could a claim to Barima be insisted upon.<br />

Mr. Storrow says: “Lord Salisbury is the only Minister who insisted upon a different view, <strong>and</strong> his<br />

claim grew time he recurred to the subject.”<br />

A Change of Base<br />

<strong>The</strong> line marked by Schomburgk on the maps published by himself <strong>and</strong> by the Government, Mr.<br />

Storrow says, had been declared at the outset to be the definition of the <strong>British</strong> claim as merely a<br />

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basis for discussion; but now Great Britain said it owned territory within that line, <strong>and</strong> that would be<br />

submitted to arbitration was territory formerly claimed far outside of it.<br />

But even the Schomburgk line had been altered <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>ed. In every map <strong>and</strong> every<br />

description of it down to 1886, which was twenty years after Schomburgk’s death, it was shown <strong>and</strong><br />

described approximately as a north <strong>and</strong> south line, cutting across the Cuyuni <strong>and</strong> across its southern<br />

basin. This includes the maps of 1840, 1841, <strong>and</strong> 1847, published in the reports of his explorations;<br />

five separate maps published directly by the Government or by the Government authority—1840,<br />

1867, 1875, 1876 <strong>and</strong> 1885—<strong>and</strong> ten in the official “colonial list,” 1877-86— one of which maps,<br />

namely, that of 1875, in the Government publication of the Geological Survey, was stated in the text<br />

to be from a tracing of Schomburgk’s final map in the possession of the Government.<br />

<strong>The</strong> great map of the colony, about 5 by 4 feet in size, prepared by the Government surveyors<br />

1875, <strong>and</strong> based on a tracing of Schomburgk’s map bearing Schomburgk’s name, <strong>and</strong> still officially<br />

known as “Schomburgk’s map”, <strong>and</strong> published by Stanford in 1876, (dated 1875,) by procurement<br />

of the Colonial Government, showed the north <strong>and</strong> south line <strong>and</strong> a note on its face said: “<strong>The</strong><br />

boundaries indicated in this map are those laid down by the late Robert Schomburgk.”<br />

An Alleged Discovery<br />

But in 1886, twenty years after Schomburgk’s death, the Colonial Office “discovered” that all<br />

these maps were wrong; that Schomburgk’s line went around by the great bend of the Cuyuni. It<br />

thereupon compelled Stanford to conceal his existing maps, <strong>and</strong> to change his plate by erasing the<br />

boundary which went across the headwaters of the Barima <strong>and</strong> across the Cuyuni, <strong>and</strong> by inserting<br />

another, which went around the great bend, <strong>and</strong> the maps so changed in 1886 still bore the date<br />

1875, <strong>and</strong> no other date.<br />

<strong>The</strong> new line first invented or asserted in 1886 thus appeared as if it were the original line of<br />

1875, supported by the authority of the surveyors, whose names still appeared on the map, as<br />

before. This was perilously near the alteration of ancient l<strong>and</strong>marks <strong>and</strong> spoliation of records. It<br />

evidently deceived Lord Salisbury, who, Feb. 13, 1890, asserted it to be “the line surveyed by Sir R.<br />

Schomburgk in 1841.” He did not survey this line in 1841 or in any other year.<br />

In the course of his discussion of the Schomburgk line Mr. Storrow says:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Schomburgk line was originally nothing but a speculative attempt or proposal to form the subject of discussion<br />

<strong>and</strong> negotiation. It has not in itself the slightest probative or presumptive value. It was stated merely as a definition<br />

of the <strong>British</strong> claims, <strong>and</strong> the attempt, after it had stood forty years, to alter both its location <strong>and</strong> its character, gives<br />

rise to reflections which it is not necessary to dwell upon. Nor would the recent attempt st<strong>and</strong> any better if some<br />

unpublished papers in the Colonial Office should lend a color of justification to it. <strong>The</strong> value of the line as a<br />

limitation of the <strong>British</strong> claim does not lie in the opinion of Schomburgk, but in the fact of its authoritative<br />

publication. It must also be pointed out that in 1850 the two nations agreed that there should be no occupation of<br />

the disputed territory by either, <strong>and</strong> that in 1884, <strong>and</strong> subsequently, Great Britain invaded it with an armed force <strong>and</strong><br />

took possession up to the exp<strong>and</strong>ed “Schomburgk line.” On Feb. 20, 1887, <strong>Venezuela</strong> severed diplomatic relations<br />

with Great Britain.<br />

A North <strong>and</strong> South Line<br />

Mr. Storrow says that the investigations demonstrate that Schomburgk died under the<br />

impression that he had drawn a north <strong>and</strong> south line, <strong>and</strong> the publications of his brother, who<br />

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May – July 1896<br />

traveled with him, contain the same line. It also is claimed that this line never was altered until the<br />

discoveries of gold outside the original line gave a new speculative value to the region.<br />

<strong>The</strong> line of all these authentic maps, it is alleged, strikes the Cuyuni, not at the Acarabisi River,<br />

where the Harrison surveying party was arrested last month, but at the Otomong River, which is<br />

twenty miles east of it, or below the Acarabisi. Schomburgk planted stakes on the Acarabisi <strong>and</strong> at<br />

several other places, but the streams by which he placed them turned out to be, as he states in his<br />

report, much further to the west than he had supposed. <strong>The</strong>y were, therefore, it is argued, far to the<br />

west of the line which in his memoir he had attempted to justify. It is for that reason undoubtedly<br />

that he made the line on the final map to run from Arakita, on the Amakura, to Otomong, very<br />

nearly north <strong>and</strong> south, straight across the country.<br />

His larger map of 1844, from which Brown made tracings, expressed his final conclusion, <strong>and</strong><br />

after he had approved these publications during the twenty years of his life <strong>and</strong> the Government had<br />

approved them for over forty years, it is not permissible, in Mr. Storrow’s opinion, to alter it after<br />

his death, upon a supposed inference from remarks made in any of his unpublished reports—if<br />

there be any such remarks.<br />

Mr. Storrow again takes up the “settled” districts <strong>and</strong> says:<br />

We have pointed out that <strong>Venezuela</strong>, for the sake of settlement, was ready to exempt the settled districts in an<br />

arbitration. <strong>The</strong> region which it did then require to be arbitrated, <strong>and</strong> in which the recent gold diggings are found,<br />

contains no settlements even to-day. <strong>The</strong>y are worked exclusively by negroes, who are hired on the coast <strong>and</strong> go up<br />

for three months at a time. <strong>The</strong>re are no houses there, for they live in huts built in the Indian fashion or mere<br />

shanties, <strong>and</strong> no families <strong>and</strong> no permanent residents, unless that term be applied to a few negroes who have<br />

kitchen gardens, <strong>and</strong> perhaps a few foremen or officials whose duties keep them there. Nor have the English spent<br />

any money for permanent improvements in these regions. With scarcely an exception, the gold is got by simple<br />

washing, by h<strong>and</strong> labor. <strong>The</strong> highest estimate of the total capital put in is $2,000,000, <strong>and</strong> that is chiefly to pay wages<br />

<strong>and</strong> current expenses until the product can be marketed. <strong>The</strong> output of gold, by official returns, has been<br />

$10,500,000. <strong>The</strong> Government gets a royalty of 90 cents an ounce, say rising $500,000; its royalty last year was<br />

$119,000.<br />

“From the best information to be got from its Blue Books <strong>and</strong> reports,” says Mr. Storrow, in<br />

conclusion, “Engl<strong>and</strong>’s total expense for clearing streams, roads, <strong>and</strong> everything else would be less<br />

than that. So, if every <strong>British</strong> subject or resident were required to-day to quit those regions with only<br />

what he would naturally carry with him. the colony would be $8,000,000 the richer for its invasion of<br />

the territory we claim, <strong>and</strong> no one would leave his ‘home’.”<br />

[21 July 1896]<br />

- 342 -<br />

BRITONS INVADE CUYUNI<br />

ARMED COLONISTS ENTER THE DISPUTED TERRITORY<br />

<strong>The</strong>y Go to Complete Surveys Begun by Mr. Harrison on the <strong>Border</strong>l<strong>and</strong> Claimed<br />

by <strong>Venezuela</strong>—<strong>The</strong> Force of Police, with the Surveyors, Carry 100 Rounds<br />

of Ball Cartridges Per Man, Though Instructed Not to Fight<br />

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WASHINGTON, July 22.—Mail advices from Demerara indicate that the <strong>British</strong> have not by<br />

any means ab<strong>and</strong>oned the survey of the road through the disputed territory on the border with<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Though the official surveyor, Mr. Harrison is returning to Georgetown, a special force of 20<br />

armed men, under the comm<strong>and</strong> of Police Inspector Shaw, left Georgetown June 24, under<br />

instructions to protect the surveyors in the Cuyuni Basin.<br />

Mr. Im Thurn has also been hurried to the Acarabesi to deliver a protest against <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

interference. It is stated that force, however, is not to be used, <strong>and</strong> in the event of a large body of<br />

hostile <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns presenting themselves, the officer in charge has explicit instructions to retire<br />

without offering any resistance.<br />

It is stated that at the time of Mr. Harrison’s arrest only nine miles of the survey remained to be<br />

completed, <strong>and</strong> it is extremely probable that the remaining distance has been covered since that<br />

time. Mr. Harrison had not yet arrived at Georgetown, although he was known to be on the way.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Georgetown newspapers say that the policemen were fully equipped with haversacks,<br />

hammocks, etc., <strong>and</strong> a hundred rounds of ball cartridges each.<br />

[23 July 1896]<br />

- 343 -<br />

ENGLAND’S VENEZUELAN BLUE BOOK<br />

<strong>The</strong> Dutch, It Is Claimed, Controlled the <strong>Dispute</strong>d Region 200 Years<br />

LONDON, July 22.—<strong>The</strong> promised Blue Book on <strong>Venezuela</strong> was issued this evening. It<br />

comprises 356 pages, their contents consisting of documents from the Dutch <strong>and</strong> Spanish archives<br />

from 1521 to 1796.<br />

An official summary is prefixed, which claims that the documents prove that for more than two<br />

centuries prior to 1796 the Dutch controlled the territories which are now in dispute, <strong>and</strong> that their<br />

control was recognized by the Spaniards.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard will to-morrow say that if a day is not afforded the Opposition in the House of<br />

Commons to discuss general <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration, the second reading of the Appropriation<br />

bill will enable the discussion to be raised. It is the general opinion of the Opposition that Lord<br />

Salisbury is too timid <strong>and</strong> hesitating in responding to the advance of Secretary of State Olney. . .<br />

[23 July 1896]<br />

- 344 -<br />

SEARCH RECORDS CENTURIES OLD<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> Officials Seek Proof of Dutch Rule on the Orinoco<br />

WASHINGTON, July 23.—<strong>The</strong> last issue of <strong>The</strong> Demerara Chronicle, that of July 8, which has just<br />

reached the Bureau of American Republics, says:<br />

499


May – July 1896<br />

“For several weeks past the important inquiry, the nature of which was partially referred to in an<br />

article with regard to the relations that existed between our Dutch predecessors in the colony <strong>and</strong><br />

the aboriginal Indians, has been progressing in the Government buildings. <strong>The</strong> archives at the rear<br />

of <strong>Guiana</strong> public buildings are packed with a mass of documents that has been accumulating for<br />

centuries. Many of them are in the original Dutch <strong>and</strong> French, <strong>and</strong> these are systematically<br />

overhauled <strong>and</strong> translated for the purpose of discovering whether or not they contain matter that<br />

may prove of value in strengthening the position the <strong>British</strong> Government has maintained in regard<br />

to the boundary line existing between this colony <strong>and</strong> the adjacent republic.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> contents of many of these documents are, of course, relatively of little value, but we learn<br />

from conversation current among authorities evidently well informed that so far as the search has<br />

proceeded it has been successful in unearthing several important points of evidence that appear to<br />

establish beyond all doubt that the Dutch colonists west of the Essequibo occupied territory <strong>and</strong><br />

exercised jurisdiction to the mouth of the Orinoco. <strong>The</strong> nature of the evidence in this direction that<br />

has already been brought to light <strong>and</strong> the value thereof may be judged from the fact that in one of<br />

the documents is the record of an order by the Dutch Court of Policy to erect a fort <strong>and</strong> station<br />

Dutch soldiers at their boundary on the Oronoque. It appears that a military officer obtained<br />

audience from the Court of Policy to ask for provision being made for troops which were expected<br />

to arrive daily. <strong>The</strong>re was no accommodation for them in Stabroek, <strong>and</strong> he had orders to keep them<br />

on board the ship until proper provision was made for their reception.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Court of Policy decided that forts should be erected at Caurabana, Mahaica, <strong>and</strong>, as stated,<br />

on the Dutch boundary at the ‘Oronoque’. Other documents discovered show that the estimate of<br />

the cost <strong>and</strong> plan of the fort at Courabana were actually prepared, <strong>and</strong> it may reasonably be<br />

supposed that further search will furnish similar evidence with regard to the fort at Orinoco.<br />

“An old record of the law courts has also been found, we underst<strong>and</strong>, showing that the French<br />

during their occupation of this colony exercised jurisdiction over the country extending to the<br />

mouth of the Orinoco. <strong>The</strong> document in question relates to a case in which an Indian who had<br />

murdered a white man in the Amacura district was brought to justice by the French.<br />

“While the search has revealed other evidence of the occupation of <strong>and</strong> jurisdiction over the l<strong>and</strong><br />

in dispute by the Dutch, it has also directed attention to important documents relating to the<br />

boundary which are probably to be found in the archives of Holl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> progress of the inquiry<br />

may therefore be confidently expected to bring to light further documentary proof of the extent of<br />

the Dutch possessions, as we have reason to believe the greater part of the records is still<br />

untouched.”<br />

[24 July 1896]<br />

- 345 -<br />

VENEZUELAN MATTER IN COMMONS<br />

<strong>The</strong> Foreign Office Not Ready to Give Additional Information<br />

LONDON, July 27.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question was again brought up in the House of<br />

Commons to-day by an interrogatory by John Morley, formerly Chief Secretary for Irel<strong>and</strong>, who<br />

asked for information regarding the papers on the subject recently laid upon the table of the House.<br />

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In replying to the question, George Curzon, Parliamentary Secretary of the Foreign Office, said<br />

that the statement in defense of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s claim recently submitted to the American High<br />

Commission had not reached the Foreign Office. When it was received it would be laid upon the<br />

table.<br />

Mr. Morley then asked further questions germane to the subject, in reply to which Joseph<br />

Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, said that he was unable to give the information<br />

asked for. He added that the population within the territory in dispute could only be determined,<br />

first by negotiation, <strong>and</strong> afterward by local inquiry.<br />

[28 July 1896]<br />

- 346 -<br />

THE ARREST OF HARRISON<br />

It Was Only Made After a Warning from the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns<br />

Special Correspondence of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times<br />

DEMERARA, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, July 13.—Mr. Harrison, the Government surveyor who was<br />

arrested by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns at Acarabisci Creek, on the boundary of the territory now occupied by<br />

the <strong>British</strong> on the one h<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns on the other, has returned to headquarters here<br />

<strong>and</strong> has reported in detail the circumstances connected with his arrest <strong>and</strong> detention by the officers<br />

of the neighboring republic.<br />

<strong>The</strong> official report is the effect that on the 6th of June an armed force of <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns crossed<br />

the Acarabisci to where Mr. Harrison <strong>and</strong> his party were engaged on the construction of a road that<br />

is intended to connect the Barima <strong>and</strong> Barama gold-bearing districts with the Cuyuni, <strong>and</strong> insisted<br />

upon the work being stopped forthwith, on the grounds that the territory was in dispute <strong>and</strong><br />

therefore should not be disturbed. Mr. Harrison pointed out that he was only carrying out his<br />

orders, <strong>and</strong> could not suspend the operations without instructions from his Government. <strong>The</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n comm<strong>and</strong>er then informed him that unless the work was stopped he would have to<br />

resort to force to compel suspension. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns then retired to the opposite side of the<br />

creek, <strong>and</strong> for some days kept a close watch on the movements of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> staff.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns again crossed the creek on Sunday, June 14, <strong>and</strong> the comm<strong>and</strong>er, Sub-<br />

Commissario Gomez de Garcio, intimated to Mr. Harris that as no notice had been taken of his<br />

protest he had no other alternative than to take him (Harrison) under arrest, so as to emphasize the<br />

protest of <strong>Venezuela</strong> against the <strong>British</strong> assuming the right to exercise authority <strong>and</strong> jurisdiction over<br />

the territory in dispute.<br />

Mr. Harrison pointed out how undesirable it was that such a step should be taken on a Sunday,<br />

<strong>and</strong> after some further conversation Gen. Garcia withdrew his men <strong>and</strong> again retired to the opposite<br />

bank of the creek. But before 9 o’clock the following morning Gen. Garcio, accompanied by some<br />

twenty fully armed men, returned to the <strong>British</strong> camp <strong>and</strong> Mr. Harrison was immediately placed<br />

under arrest.<br />

<strong>The</strong> officer second in charge of the <strong>British</strong> expedition was a German named Klautky, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns were at first inclined to arrest him along with his chief, but on Mr. Harrison’s pointing<br />

501


May – July 1896<br />

out that Klautky was a German subject <strong>and</strong> that complications might arise if he was arrested, they<br />

decided not to interfere with him.<br />

After his arrest, Mr. Harrison was placed on board a small corial <strong>and</strong> conveyed to El Dorado, the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n outpost, opposite the <strong>British</strong> station at Uruan. It took nine days to make the trip up the<br />

river, <strong>and</strong> in consequence of the exposure Mr. Harrison became seriously ill. On the following day<br />

his condition was so precarious that information had to be sent to the Inspector (Henderson) at the<br />

<strong>British</strong> station, <strong>and</strong> the dispenser from there at once crossed to where Mr. Harrison was. Later on he<br />

returned to Uruan <strong>and</strong> reported to Inspector Henderson the precarious condition of Harrison, <strong>and</strong><br />

Inspector Henderson crossed <strong>and</strong> lodged a protest with Gen. Macpherson, the officer in comm<strong>and</strong><br />

of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n post, against the detention of Harrison, pointing out that Harrison’s life was<br />

being seriously endangered by being detained in a place that lacked every convenience <strong>and</strong> comfort<br />

for an invalid.<br />

Gen. Macpherson at first declined to do anything in the matter, but later it was agreed that Mr.<br />

Harrison be conveyed across the river to the <strong>British</strong> station on the bond of Inspector Henderson<br />

that he would be given up when required by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities. Gen. Macpherson July 1<br />

sent word to Uruan that he had been instructed by telegraph from Caracas to release Mr. Harrison,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the latter, having considerably improved, shortly after set out for Georgetown, which was<br />

reached July 10.<br />

[30 July 1896]<br />

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- Part 11 -<br />

August – December 1896<br />

503


August – December 1896<br />

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- 347 -<br />

VENEZUELAN COMMISSION WORK<br />

Bulk of Evidence in—Now to Tell What it Establishes<br />

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8.—<strong>The</strong> work of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission has entered<br />

upon a new stage during the last month. Heretofore the efforts of the Commissioners have been<br />

directed mainly to securing the evidence upon which the final report is to be based. <strong>The</strong> work from<br />

now on will very largely consist in examining <strong>and</strong> classifying the information already collected. <strong>The</strong><br />

<strong>British</strong> Government., it is presumed has put into its two voluminous Blue Books all the Information<br />

upon which it relies to support its claim. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government has done the same thing in<br />

its three volumes of transcripts from the Spanish archives <strong>and</strong> other documents.<br />

Independent of this, the commission has been searching on its own account. <strong>The</strong> Congressional<br />

library in Washington <strong>and</strong> many public <strong>and</strong> private libraries in various parts of the country have<br />

been ransacked for historical anti cartographical information. <strong>The</strong> archives at <strong>The</strong> Hague have been<br />

gone through with a. thoroughness that not even the seal of Great Britain or <strong>Venezuela</strong> has<br />

heretofore attempted, <strong>and</strong>, as a result, important documents, which the world thought lost or<br />

destroyed, have been unearthed. This work, although not yet terminated, is nearing completion.<br />

Sir Clement R. Markham, President of the Royal Geographical Society, has been in<br />

correspondence for some months with the Secretary of the commission, <strong>and</strong> has furnished valuable<br />

information on the subject of the Schomburgk line, accompanying it by copies of maps on file in the<br />

Colonial Office, some of which have never been published. It may be said, briefly, that while<br />

information is looked for from Rome, from <strong>The</strong> Hague, <strong>and</strong> possibly from other places, the bulk of<br />

the evidence is in, <strong>and</strong> the question now is to determine what it is which that evidence establishes.<br />

In order to solve this problem, a number of preliminary reports are being prepared. Among<br />

these way be mentioned special reports upon the geographical <strong>and</strong> physical characteristics of the<br />

region in dispute; reports upon the evidence presented by the 300 or more, maps which have been<br />

published since the discovery of America; reports upon the facts of occupancy <strong>and</strong> settlement, as<br />

given by historians, <strong>and</strong> separate reports upon the same facts as developed by the documents from<br />

the Dutch <strong>and</strong> Spanish archives; critiques upon the arguments of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Governments as they appear in the <strong>British</strong> Blue Books, <strong>and</strong> in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n brief. <strong>The</strong>se reports<br />

are being prepared for the most part by the Commissioners at their respected homes.<br />

President Brewer spent several days this week at the office of the commission here. He was<br />

joined Thursday by Mr. Mallet-Prevost, the Secretary, <strong>and</strong> the two spent the day in consultation.<br />

President Brewer has now gone to his home in Vermont, while the Secretary, it is understood will<br />

remain for some time in Washington.<br />

[9 August 1896]<br />

- 348 -<br />

ARBITRATION IS POSSIBLE<br />

THE VENEZUELAN QUESTION IN A FAIR WAY TO SETTLEMENT<br />

505


August – December 1896<br />

Great Britain Shows a Disposition to Accept the Proposal Made by the United States, <strong>and</strong><br />

the Commons Accords with the Idea—<strong>The</strong> Basis of Agreement Submitted by Secretary<br />

Olney for the State Department—<strong>The</strong> Correspondence<br />

LONDON, Aug. 14.—In the House or Commons to-day Sir William Harcourt, the leader of the<br />

Opposition, asked in regard to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n situation if the proposal contained in the dispatch<br />

sent to the Foreign Office by the United States Government June 12 last had removed the<br />

difficulties, <strong>and</strong> further inquired whether there were any prospects for a speedy submission of the<br />

question to arbitration.<br />

A. J. Ba1iour, First Lord at the Treasury, said that the Government was still considering the<br />

proposal made by the United States Government, which was regarded by tat Foreign Office as<br />

opening the way for an equitable settlement of the difficulty. <strong>The</strong> Government, he added, had every<br />

expectation that the pending negotiations would lead to an early <strong>and</strong> satisfactory result.<br />

Sir William Harcourt said that the House would regard Mr. Balfour’s statement as satisfactory,<br />

<strong>and</strong> asked to have the papers on the subject prepared to be presented to the House.<br />

Mr. Balfour replied that the Government would present the papers to the House as soon as<br />

might be consistent with public interest.<br />

[15 August 1896]<br />

- 349 -<br />

Another Blue Book on <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

LONDON, Aug. 24.—<strong>The</strong> Government will issue another—the third—blue book on the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n question on Friday next. <strong>The</strong> book will deal especially with the Schomburgk line.<br />

[25 August 1896]<br />

- 350 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN QUESTION<br />

A Belief that the Negotiations Are in a Promising Stage<br />

LONDON, Sept 30.—<strong>The</strong> Chronicle says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re is some reason to believe that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n negotiations have reached a promising<br />

stage both with reference to the boundary dispute <strong>and</strong> an arbitration treaty with America.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> wording of the foregoing does not suggest that the statement is inspired. Everybody<br />

believes that the boundary dispute will be settled amicably, but such steps will not be taken pending<br />

the report of the American <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission. Only the permanent officials of the Foreign<br />

<strong>and</strong> Colonial Offices are on duty in those departments at the present time, <strong>and</strong> they will act in<br />

merely routine matters until the return of the Ministers. Lord Salisbury is too busy with Turkey now<br />

to attend to <strong>Venezuela</strong> even if Secretary Olney should press the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter. No such action<br />

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on the part of Mr. Olney is expected at present, however, as it would be a slight to President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s commission.<br />

[1 October 1896]<br />

- 351 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> Gold Miners<br />

COLON, Columbia, Oct. 1.—Advices received here from <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> are to the effect that<br />

the yield of gold in that country is steadily increasing, <strong>and</strong> mining property is rising in value. Shares<br />

in the Barima Mine of the par value of $5 are now selling at $15, <strong>and</strong> a further advance in value is<br />

expected. <strong>The</strong> greater portion of the gold-producing territory is within the domain claimed by<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[2 October 1896]<br />

- 352 -<br />

VENEZUELAN SETTLEMENT IN SIGHT<br />

With It Out of the Way, Engl<strong>and</strong> Is Ready to Face the East<br />

LONDON, Oct 2.—<strong>The</strong> Speaker says: “Sir Julian Pauncefote, <strong>British</strong> Ambassador to the United<br />

States will shortly return to Washington, but it is reported, upon credible authority, that he will not<br />

leave Engl<strong>and</strong> before a satisfactory solution or the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n troubles has been reached. Those<br />

behind the scenes are the most sanguine of such an ending of the controversies; indeed, the<br />

questions at issue are said to be already virtually solved. When all is well in the West, we may face<br />

the East with greater confidence.”<br />

[3 October 1896]<br />

- 353 -<br />

THE ARBITRATION QUESTION<br />

No Communications Between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> This Country for a Month<br />

LONDON, Oct. 6.—Information has been furnished to <strong>The</strong> United Associated Presses that no<br />

communications have passed between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States upon the subject of<br />

arbitration in over a month. Important developments in connection with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, however, will<br />

probably occur within the month of October.<br />

507


August – December 1896<br />

A settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute is by no means imminent, <strong>and</strong> it is not true, as has been<br />

alleged, that Great Britain is making concessions to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Much depends upon Mr.<br />

Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, who sailed from New-York for Engl<strong>and</strong> on Sept.<br />

30, though his desires in the matter are subject to the approval of Lord Salisbury. <strong>The</strong> latter, the<br />

Foreign Office officials say, is hopeful that the arbitration question will be soon solved, but he is at<br />

present very much occupied with the Eastern question.<br />

[7 October 1896]<br />

- 354 -<br />

ENGLAND’S WORD VIOLATED<br />

A RAILROAD AUTHORIZED ON DISPUTED GUIANA TERRITORY<br />

<strong>The</strong> Colonial Legislature Grants a Concession to Build Along a Line Which Lord Salisbury<br />

Has Conceded to be of Doubtful Title—<strong>The</strong> Bill Rushed Through, in Spite of Earnest<br />

Protests—This Government May Remonstrate<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 6.—According to belated advices from <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> which have just<br />

reached Washington, the promise to maintain the status quo pending negotiations has again been<br />

violated by Great Britain in a manner that may possibly lead to remonstrance from this<br />

Government. Briefly, the Colonial Legislature has authorized the construction of a railway through<br />

territory which Lord Salisbury has conceded to be of doubtful title along the modified Schomburgk<br />

line <strong>and</strong> outside of the so-called settled districts to which Engl<strong>and</strong> has denied the application of the<br />

arbitration principle.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Demerara Chronicle of Sept. 16, which came to the State Department to-day, contains a<br />

verbatim report, extending over five columns, of a session of the Colonial Legislature held Sept. 4,<br />

which granted a concession for a railway along the right bank of the Kaituma River to the rich<br />

Barima gold fields, which have never been claimed by the colony until a few years ago. It was<br />

necessary to suspend the rules to enact the legislation, as the requisite time for its consideration had<br />

not elapsed. <strong>The</strong> Kaituma River flows north into the Barima, fifty-five miles above the mouth of<br />

the latter, <strong>and</strong> it was pointed out that the railway would reduce the journey, which now consumes<br />

five or six days, to two or three hours.<br />

<strong>The</strong> bill was rushed through by its promoters, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the protest of some conservative<br />

members that it was not clear to whom the concession was being granted or the exact location of<br />

the line. <strong>The</strong> only amendment that was secured provided that the Government could purchase the<br />

line after fifteen years.<br />

<strong>The</strong> local newspapers, which have heretofore, without exception, supported drastic measures<br />

against <strong>Venezuela</strong>, laughingly declare that it is not possible to charge the Legislature with dilatoriness<br />

in dealing with the proposition, <strong>and</strong> the Government organ, <strong>The</strong> Chronicle, says: “We admit that there<br />

was a certain amount of incongruity <strong>and</strong> perhaps something that was slightly irregular in the<br />

proceedings. But really, as the Government takes no risks <strong>and</strong> has its rights guarded at every point,<br />

the public has no reason to complain.”<br />

[7 October 1896]<br />

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- 355 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA SITUATION<br />

A London Paper Says that Engl<strong>and</strong> Has Been Insulted<br />

LONDON. Oct. 7.—<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette devotes a leading article to discussion of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n situation, in which the paper insists that no progress whatever has been made toward a<br />

settlement of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> paper recites the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n affronts <strong>and</strong><br />

outraged perpetrated upon English officials, <strong>and</strong> concludes by saying:<br />

“If such insults <strong>and</strong> outrages had been addressed to the meanest sister republic in South<br />

America, there would have been war long ago. Any other European power would not have stood it a<br />

week, yet we sit with folded h<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> permit one slap in the face to succeed another. We hope<br />

most sincerely that the negotiations with the United States will result peacefully, but nothing is to be<br />

gained by shutting our eyes <strong>and</strong> crying ‘Peace!’ where there is no peace.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Gazette adds that <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s attitude in regarding the construction of a railway to the<br />

Barima as a violation of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory is an insult.<br />

[8 October 1896]<br />

- 356 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN TROUBLES<br />

Minister Andrade Refuses to Discuss <strong>The</strong>m at All<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 8.—Minister Andrade of <strong>Venezuela</strong> distinctly refuses to discuss in any<br />

manner the action of the <strong>British</strong> Guianian Colonial Government in granting a concession along the<br />

Kaituma River to the Barima gold fields within the disputed territory, beyond expressing his surprise<br />

at the news.<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> being a Crown Colony, the acts of the Legislature become law when approved by<br />

the Governor, unless vetoed by the Crown, a prerogative seldom or never exercised. <strong>The</strong> laws of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> require an interval of fifteen days to elapse between the introduction of a bill <strong>and</strong> its<br />

final passage. This particular concession was introduced fourteen days before the adjournment of<br />

the Legislature <strong>and</strong> was rushed through under a suspension of the rules. As nearly as can be<br />

gathered, the line of the proposed railroad runs in the same direction as that over which an attempt<br />

was made some time ago to construct a wagon-road, which attempt resulted in the arrest by the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities of the <strong>British</strong> Colonial County Surveyor, Harrison, who, however, was<br />

subsequently released. <strong>The</strong> route lies miles outside the Aberdeen line as laid down in the maps<br />

accompanying the <strong>British</strong> Blue Book.<br />

By the convention of 1850 between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, both parties agreed not to<br />

occupy certain territory so long as it remained in dispute. This promise was repeated by the <strong>British</strong><br />

Foreign Office to Minister Bayard. <strong>Venezuela</strong> has never advanced one inch, but in 1894 Minister<br />

Andrade officially complained to Secretary Gresham that advances were being made by Great<br />

Britain, in violation of the status quo, <strong>and</strong> Secretary Gresham addressed a protest to the <strong>British</strong><br />

509


August – December 1896<br />

Government on behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong> through Ambassador Bayard. <strong>The</strong>n followed the resolution<br />

adopted by Congress at the instance at Mr. Livingston of Georgia, requesting the President to use<br />

his good offices to have the whole matter referred to arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> present encroachment in proposing to construct a railroad directly to the gold mines is<br />

regarded as more serious than any that have preceded it, particularly if it should turn out (as is<br />

deemed more than probable) that the finding of the States High Commission should be that the<br />

“true divisional line” brings all these mines within <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory.<br />

[9 October 1896]<br />

- 357 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA COMMISSION<br />

A Meeting Yesterday, but Nothing Definite Accomplished<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission held its first meeting today<br />

since the Summer adjournment. All of the members were present. <strong>The</strong> session, which occupied<br />

the entire day, was devoted to the consideration of the reports presented. No final decision,<br />

however, can be arrived at until after the receipt of the report now being prepared by Prof. Burr,<br />

whose return from Europe is expected by the end of this month. Among the documents laid before<br />

the commission were advance sheets of a book entitled “<strong>The</strong> Boundary Question Between <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>,” devoted to a defense of the <strong>British</strong> claim, by Joseph Strickl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re was also presented a revised copy of Mr. Storrow’s summary, hitherto published, of the<br />

proposed brief for the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government, to which had been added a caustic note on the<br />

Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong> a second brief entitled “<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Question,” prepared by William L.<br />

Scruggs of counsel for the South American republic.<br />

Two hundred <strong>and</strong> thirty-six pages in the shape of advance sheets of a third brief, prepared by a<br />

commission of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government at Caracas were also laid before the commission. Much<br />

or the matter in these documents was already familiar to the commission<br />

<strong>The</strong> next meeting will be held on Wednesday, the 28th inst., at which time Prof. Burr is expected<br />

to be present, <strong>and</strong> from that time on continuous sessions of the commission will probably be held<br />

until a final decision is reached.<br />

[11 October 1896]<br />

- 358 -<br />

NO DECISION REACHED YET<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> Commission Has More Evidence to Examine<br />

WASHINGTON Oct. 14.—Respecting the report that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission<br />

had practically decided the matters submitted to it in favor of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Mr. S. Mallet-Prevost, the<br />

Secretary of the commission said to-day:<br />

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“<strong>The</strong> statement that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission has come to a decision sustaining<br />

the claims of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in the boundary dispute between that country <strong>and</strong> Great Britain is entirely<br />

without foundation. <strong>The</strong> commission is not yet in possession of all the facts necessary to form a<br />

definite judgment, <strong>and</strong> will not be until the return of Prof. Burr from Europe about the end of this<br />

month. He is to bring with him new <strong>and</strong> important historical information, which must be carefully<br />

examined before any decision can be arrived at. Any statements therefore to the effect that a<br />

decision has been reached are entirely premature.”<br />

Nevertheless, there is an extremely prevalent opinion that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n side of the question<br />

has to a considerable extent been substantiated.<br />

[15 October 1896]<br />

- 359 -<br />

INSTRUCTIONS TO PAUNCEFOTE<br />

Reported that the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Trouble Is Near Settlement<br />

LONDON, Oct. 20.—With reference to assertion published in <strong>The</strong> Speaker Saturday that Sir<br />

Julian Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador to the United States, on his return to his post would<br />

be the bearer of instructions that would secure a favorable solution or the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n frontier<br />

dispute, certain papers publish a news agency statement, which purports to be official, to the effect<br />

that it is a patent fact that Sir Julian has all along been charged with a mission directed to a<br />

settlement of the question.<br />

He has started for the United States with certain instructions, it is alleged, <strong>and</strong> the negotiations<br />

will be reopened immediately upon his arrival. It is too early, however, it is suggested, to say whether<br />

the <strong>British</strong> proposals are likely to be accepted. “Happily,” the statement runs on, “a better feeling is<br />

being manifested between the peoples, <strong>and</strong> it frequently happens that such manifestations helped to<br />

an amicable conclusion that would not otherwise be practicable.”<br />

[21 October 1896]<br />

- 360 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA DISPUTE<br />

ANDREW D. WHITE TELLS OF THE COMMISSION’S WORK<br />

Researches in Many Countries Contribute Much Valuable<br />

Information—Not Seeking a Cabinet Position<br />

Ex-President Andrew D. White of Cornell University, a member of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary<br />

Commission, was at the Fifth Avenue Hotel yesterday. Some have brought his name into politics as<br />

a suitable man to be the next Secretary of State. He is not seeking the appointment, <strong>and</strong> said, when a<br />

reporter of <strong>The</strong> New-York Times asked him if there was anything to be said on the subject:<br />

511


August – December 1896<br />

“No; I simply know what I read in the newspapers. I expect Mr. McKinley will make his own<br />

selections for his Cabinet, <strong>and</strong> will choose able men.<br />

“Is Bryanism likely to appear again in the politics of this country?”<br />

“I do not think it will appear in the form it took in the last campaign. I do not believe the<br />

Democratic Party will again be led astray by it. If business improves <strong>and</strong> general prosperity comes to<br />

the country during the next four years, the issues raised by Bryan <strong>and</strong> his followers will not appear.<br />

<strong>The</strong> rise in the price wheat, <strong>and</strong> the drop in the price of silver toward the close of the campaign,<br />

took away all argument from Bryan’s cause, <strong>and</strong> nothing was left for him <strong>and</strong> his followers, but the<br />

attempt to arouse class feelings.”<br />

‘Is the work of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission about completed?”<br />

“<strong>The</strong>re is yet much to be done in the minor details, such as printing <strong>and</strong> issuing the material the<br />

commission has gathered, but the real work for which the commission was appointed is completed.<br />

In view of the recent turn of the affair, it is possible that the report of the commission may not be<br />

made.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> commission has served a useful purpose, because it has brought about the best way to<br />

arrive at the solution of the question. <strong>The</strong> commission has worked steadily <strong>and</strong> has brought together<br />

a large mass of important material, classified it, <strong>and</strong> gotten it into proper connection with the matter<br />

at issue.<br />

“Dr. Winsor of Harvard has examined nearly three hundred maps, <strong>and</strong> has made a careful<br />

report. Prof. Burr of Cornell has worked in various libraries in this country, at the archives in <strong>The</strong><br />

Hague <strong>and</strong> in London, <strong>and</strong> has sent from time to time reports of great value, enabling the<br />

commission to settle some difficult points. Prof. Jameson of Brown University has studied on<br />

special subjects in the libraries in this country <strong>and</strong> abroad, <strong>and</strong> has submitted reports. Experts have<br />

been at work in the archives of the great mission orders in Rome, especially of the Jesuits <strong>and</strong><br />

Franciscans, <strong>and</strong> have sent us from time to time maps <strong>and</strong> statements showing extensions of<br />

Spanish missions into the disputed territory. <strong>The</strong> certified copies of the most important documents<br />

bearing on the case in the Spanish archives have been laid before us.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> commission has prepared probably the best map ever made of the whole territory between<br />

the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> the Essequibo Rivers, <strong>and</strong> in addition special maps which will be published with<br />

the documents to the number of twenty or thirty. All of this matter will be transferred to the<br />

Arbitration Tribunal <strong>and</strong> cannot fall to be of the greatest use to that body in saving a vast deal of<br />

trouble <strong>and</strong> great expense. It will also allow that body to discharge its duty in much less time than it<br />

could otherwise have done. <strong>The</strong> work, therefore, of our commission has been preliminary <strong>and</strong><br />

preparatory to the work of the Arbitration Tribunal.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> establishment of the Arbitration Tribunal has been most honorable to the present<br />

Administration, <strong>and</strong> it seems to me will act as a guarantee of continued peace between the United<br />

States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain. This second great arbitration so clearly points the peaceful solution of<br />

international difficulties that peace may be considered as permanently established between the two<br />

nations, no matter how difficult the questions which may arise hereafter.”<br />

Mr. White said the only question the commission had not touched upon was that of the fifty<br />

years’ occupancy of the settlers. That, he added, would have to be settled by expert testimony.<br />

[25 October 1896]<br />

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- 361 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 26.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission will meet again on Wednesday, when<br />

Prof. Burr, who is expected to arrive in New-York to-morrow, will present his preliminary report on<br />

his researches in the archives of <strong>The</strong> Hague, which is understood to elucidate several points of the<br />

boundary controversy. <strong>The</strong> final installment of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n brief is also expected at this meeting.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission has not yet commenced to formulate its decision.<br />

[27 October 1896]<br />

- 362 -<br />

BOUNDARY OF VENEZUELA<br />

THE BRITISH CASE SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Commission Receives a Book Published by Authority of the Governor of <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>—<strong>The</strong> Control over the <strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory by Essequibo—Contents of the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Blue Books—<strong>The</strong> Commission to See Prof. Burr<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28.—<strong>The</strong> completion of the <strong>British</strong> case in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary<br />

dispute, according to the underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, was signalized at the<br />

meeting of that body to-day by the receipt from Secretary Olney of an important publication<br />

“printed by the authority or his Excellency the Governor of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>” in the colony. <strong>The</strong><br />

document, which is uniform in appearance with the earlier <strong>British</strong> Blue Book, is entitled “<strong>The</strong><br />

Boundary Question. <strong>The</strong> Control over the <strong>Dispute</strong>d Territory by Essequibo by Means of Her Posts,<br />

Indian Captains. <strong>and</strong> Protectors of Indians, Mainly from the records of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, by James<br />

Rodway.” it is divided into six sub-divisions as follows:<br />

1—Area of jurisdiction.<br />

2—Posts <strong>and</strong> postholders.<br />

3—Indian Captains.<br />

4—<strong>The</strong> Indian protectorate.<br />

5—<strong>The</strong> watershed of the Essequibo, <strong>and</strong><br />

6—<strong>The</strong> Pomeroon district.<br />

This volume has been expected for some time, <strong>and</strong> surprise is expressed that it should be<br />

transmitted through the American Consul at Demerara rather than through Ambassador Bayard, as<br />

was the case with the other volumes. <strong>The</strong> first <strong>and</strong> second Blue Books were devoted to the Pollock<br />

argument, with documents <strong>and</strong> maps. <strong>The</strong> second [sic] or supplemental volume gave most of the<br />

documents in extenso <strong>and</strong> corrections to which attention had been called. <strong>The</strong> fourth was a surprise<br />

to all concerned, as it contained simply a reprint of Counsel Storrow’s preliminary argument against<br />

the Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong> did not have the customary blue cover. No. 5 was a reply to Mr. Storrow,<br />

<strong>and</strong> it has been stated for some time that the sixth <strong>and</strong> final volume would be devoted to the Indian<br />

protectorate.<br />

513


August – December 1896<br />

At the commission meeting to-day all the members except Dr. Andrew D. White, who was<br />

absent, participated in discussions of the evidence. After a recess for luncheon the meeting<br />

continued throughout the afternoon.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission adjourned this afternoon to meet again to-morrow for the purpose of<br />

conferring with Prof. Burr relating to his researches in Holl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

[29 October 1896]<br />

- 363 -<br />

PROF. BURR’S RESEARCHES<br />

Examined a Lot of Old Documents at <strong>The</strong> Hague<br />

Prof. George L. Burr, chief historical expert of the American <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, who has<br />

been abroad examining documents bearing on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute, arrived yesterday<br />

on board the White Star line steamer Teutonic, from Liverpool. Prof. Burr made no stay in this city,<br />

but left on the 11.30 A. M. train for Washington.<br />

When seen at the dock <strong>and</strong> questioned as to the result of his mission to Europe, Prof. Burr said<br />

as far as he individually was concerned his labor of research had been entirely satisfactory.<br />

“My mission,” he said, “was to find out geographical conditions. I examined a great body of<br />

documents which before had not been searched. I found them in Dutch archives at <strong>The</strong> Hague,<br />

where I went direct from here.<br />

“My work was not in connection with diplomats, but I was accorded every possible courtesy,<br />

both in Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong>. <strong>The</strong> documents I examined went back as far as the sixteenth century.<br />

Prof. Burr said he had formed no conclusions favorable to one side or the other.<br />

When asked whether the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, had brought a settlement of<br />

the question with him when he returned to this country, the professor said he did not know.<br />

<strong>The</strong> documents found in the Dutch archives naturally contained very good material.<br />

Asked whether he thought the question in dispute would be shortly settled, Prof. Burr replied: “I<br />

cannot say; I fervently hope it will. <strong>The</strong> evidence is so vague that it must be interpreted. I have right<br />

to anticipate the commission.<br />

Dr. De Hann of Johns Hopkins University accompanied Burr abroad, <strong>and</strong> assisted him in his<br />

research.<br />

[29 October 1896]<br />

- 364 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN QUESTION<br />

Sir Edward Clarke, Solicitor General under the Liberal Government, has aroused a good deal of<br />

bad feeling by his speech to his constituents at York on the 15th. Referring to the report which will<br />

be made by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission he said: “That report would be against this country<br />

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(Engl<strong>and</strong>) not because it was a hostile commission,” but because he believed “no honest <strong>and</strong><br />

impartial commission could decide in favor of the claims of this country upon the evidence.” And<br />

he urged a prompt settlement of the matter.<br />

In the discussion that naturally followed it was alleged by Lord Salisbury’s supporters that Sir<br />

Edward Clarke, in portions of the speech containing this remarkable avowal, showed that he was<br />

not familiar with “the evidence.” We think that the allegation is not without foundation, for certain<br />

portions of the evidence which he declared that he had not seen discussed, <strong>and</strong> on which he placed<br />

considerable emphasis, undoubtedly had been discussed, both in the English papers <strong>and</strong> in this<br />

country. But what is significant about the speech is that a member of the present Parliament <strong>and</strong> a<br />

former Solicitor General should make such an extreme statement at all, <strong>and</strong> should base upon it a<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> for an immediate settlement of the question involved. That shows a very different condition<br />

of mind from the one that prevailed only a few months since in Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

In connection with this incident in Engl<strong>and</strong> there is to be noted the remark of Prof. Burr, the<br />

geographic expert who has been making investigations in Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong>, to aid the<br />

commission in its labors. When asked whether he thought the question would shortly be settled, he<br />

replied: “I cannot say; I fervently hope so. <strong>The</strong> evidence is so vague that it must be interpreted. I<br />

have no right to anticipate the commission.”<br />

This reveals in reality the character of the whole question. It is gravely to be doubted whether<br />

there is evidence on either side, whether geographic or historic, that is not “so vague that it must be<br />

interpreted.” It is not only possible but probable that the American Commission may find itself<br />

unable definitely to describe a boundary that in their judgment sharply divides the possessions of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> from those of Great Britain. If that should prove to be the fact, the commission will, of<br />

course, declare it.<br />

What, then, will be the course to pursue? Clearly it would be unreasonable for either party to<br />

insist upon forcibly maintaining a claim that a commission so impartial <strong>and</strong> competent as that<br />

named by the President can neither wholly approve nor wholly reject. Both parties, on such a<br />

decision by the commission, ought to see the necessity of accepting a compromise, to be reached<br />

either by negotiation between themselves or by the friendly offices of the United States, or by some<br />

agency to which both should agree. If this should be the outcome it must be noted that it is in effect<br />

that sought by the action of our Government, which simply asked that a matter of such obvious<br />

doubt <strong>and</strong> difficulty should not be decided by one party alone—that it should be settled not<br />

arbitrarily, but by reasonable arbitration.<br />

[30 October 1896]<br />

- 365 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN COMMISSION<br />

Members to Study the Evidence <strong>and</strong> Reassemble Nov. 10<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct. 29.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission adjourned this afternoon to<br />

reassemble Tuesday, Nov. 10, the interim to be devoted to independent study by the individual<br />

members, <strong>and</strong> the preparation of his formal report on the Dutch archives by Prof. Burr, the chief<br />

historical expert.<br />

515


August – December 1896<br />

To-day’s session, which was devoted to a close examination of Prof. Burr’s discoveries,<br />

demonstrated that the commission’s experts had unearthed much important evidence at <strong>The</strong> Hague<br />

regarding the Dutch settlements in <strong>Guiana</strong> that had escaped the attention of both the disputing<br />

nations.<br />

Among other valuable finds was a map which had been altogether unknown to the Dutch<br />

authorities, who were astonished at the skill with which Profs. Burr <strong>and</strong> De Haan found connecting<br />

links in the fabric of evidence they were weaving. Secretary Mallet-Prevost says that while Prof.<br />

Burr’s return cannot be said to signalize the speedy conclusion of the commission’s labors, a distinct<br />

advance is made toward the decision.<br />

[30 October 1896]<br />

- 366 -<br />

LONDON HAS A WRONG VIEW<br />

Comment in <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> on the Kaituma Railway<br />

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2.—<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> newspapers, which reached the State Department<br />

to-day, disagree with the London press over the Kaituma Railway episode, <strong>and</strong> advocate compliance<br />

with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n remonstrance about the violation of the status quo.<br />

Some weeks ago the Colonial Legislature passed under suspension of rules <strong>and</strong> without adequate<br />

consideration, a grant for a railway up the Kaituma River, into the disputed territory, with a<br />

provision that the survey should be made at once <strong>and</strong> the construction should commence in January.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> vigorously protested to the United States against this breach of faith, Great Britain having<br />

promised to preserve existing conditions until the whole territorial dispute was settled. When this<br />

affair was published in dispatches of <strong>The</strong> United Associated Presses, London newspapers commented<br />

upon it with many disparaging remarks in regard to the United States <strong>and</strong> possible intervention. In<br />

now appears that the Demerara papers, which take their cues from the Colonial authorities, are<br />

discussing the matter in quite a different tone, admitting that the action of the Colonial Legislature at<br />

this junction was calculated to upset all plans for arbitration.<br />

In the copies reaching here to-day the possibility of international friction over a minor issue is<br />

deplored, <strong>and</strong> the London papers are advised not to lose their temper. Confidence is expressed that<br />

the forthcoming settlement of the boundary question will give the colony the projected railway line,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that no actual work will be attempted on it until that decision is rendered. From other sources it<br />

is learned that this changed attitude in the colony is due to a very forcible cablegram from Mr.<br />

Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies.<br />

[3 November 1896]<br />

- 367 -<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

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LONDON. Nov. 7.—<strong>The</strong> Pall Mall Gazette announces that it is authorized to deny the truth of<br />

the report that Great Britain has granted railway concessions in the interior of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the line of<br />

the proposed railway crossing territory reserved for delimitation. <strong>The</strong> projected railway, if built at all,<br />

<strong>The</strong> Gazette says, will not encroach upon the Schomburgk line. If Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States<br />

agree to settle the <strong>Venezuela</strong> matter by arbitration the line of the proposed railway will be referred to<br />

the arbitrators wherever it touches debatable l<strong>and</strong>.<br />

[8 November 1896]<br />

- 368 -<br />

LORD SALISBURY’S ADDRESS<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Foreign Policy as to <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Other Countries<br />

LONDON. Nov. 9.—When Lord Salisbury arose to reply to the toast. “Our Ministers,” he<br />

received an ovation.<br />

Lord Salisbury’s Speech<br />

After thanking the Lord Mayor <strong>and</strong> the others present for the warmth of the welcome extended<br />

to him he said:<br />

“I thank the Ambassador of the United States for his presence here <strong>and</strong> for joining a great<br />

historic meeting. By the few words he has uttered he has raised his own plane of observation so high<br />

above the mere level of party that, though contrary to practice to remark upon the internal politics<br />

of other States, I may be permitted, without impertinence, to congratulate him upon the splendid<br />

pronouncement the great people he represents have made in behalf of the principles which lie at the<br />

base of all human society. [Cheers.] It is rather bathos to have to turn therefrom to the rather<br />

unimportant controversy his country <strong>and</strong> ours have had in recent months. I only do so for the<br />

purpose of expressing the belief that it is at an end. [Cheers.] You are aware that in the discussion had<br />

with the United States on behalf of their friends in <strong>Venezuela</strong> our question has not been whether<br />

there should be arbitration, but whether arbitration should have unrestricted application, <strong>and</strong> we<br />

have always claimed that those who apart from historic right had the right which attaches to<br />

established settlements should be excluded from arbitration. Our difficulty for months has been to<br />

define the settled districts, <strong>and</strong> the solution has, I think, come from the Government of the United<br />

States that we should treat our Colonial empire as we treat individuals; that the same lapse of time<br />

which protects the latter in civic life from having their title questioned should similarly protect an<br />

English colony, but beyond that, when a lapse could not be claimed, there should be an examination<br />

of title <strong>and</strong> all the equity dem<strong>and</strong>ed in regard thereto should be granted.<br />

“I do not believe I am using unduly sanguine words when I declare my belief that this has<br />

brought the controversy to an end. [Loud cheers.]<br />

“It is a matter of no small satisfaction to the Government that at a time when anxious social<br />

questions which are far more important than political questions are troubling the United States, <strong>and</strong><br />

therefore troubling the world, we should remove any semblance of political difference that might<br />

hinder common action in defense of the common heritages of society.<br />

517


August – December 1896<br />

We have had an anxious year at the Foreign Office, but we have floated into a period of<br />

comparative calm, <strong>and</strong> I do not intend to trouble you with matters that have passed away.”<br />

[10 November 1896]<br />

- 369 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA DISPUTE<br />

LORD SALISBURY SAYS IT IS AT AN END<br />

Official Statement to That Effect Made by Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Prime Minister at the<br />

Lord Mayor’s Banquet—An Address by Ambassador Bayard<br />

LONDON, Nov. 9.—At the banquet given this evening to celebrate the installation into office<br />

of George Faudel Philips, the new Lord Mayor of London, Lord Salisbury made the statement that<br />

in his belief the controversy between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States with reference to <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

was at an end.<br />

This utterance of Salisbury’s was the important feature of the banquet. It was made in the course<br />

of a speech, in which, as Premier, according to the custom of recent years. Lord Salisbury made a<br />

statement concerning the foreign <strong>and</strong> domestic policies of the Government. Ambassador Bayard<br />

made an address in response to the toast, “<strong>The</strong> Foreign Missions.”<br />

Mr. Bayard, in treating of the community of interests of the nations of the world, all being<br />

affected by the doings of others, referred to the Presidential election in the United Status, saying:<br />

“I am very sure that it was in no narrow party sense, no merely National sense, that the heart of<br />

the people which it is my highest honor to represent was echoed in a verdict that could not be<br />

misunderstood, st<strong>and</strong>ing as it does for National honor <strong>and</strong> the continuity of National obligations,<br />

making the world safer in the trust of each part, <strong>and</strong> speaking as emphatically as the human mind<br />

<strong>and</strong> human heart ever spoke in favor of that honesty which is an essential condition of civilization<br />

everywhere.”<br />

Lord Salisbury was the next speaker. After referring in the kindliest terms to Mr. Bayard <strong>and</strong> the<br />

result of the Presidential election in the United States, which he said embodied the “splendid<br />

pronouncement of a great people in behalf of the principles which lie at the base of all human<br />

society,” the Premier made his statement with reference to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n trouble.<br />

“It is rather bathos,” he said, “to turn to the rather unimportant controversy his (Bayard’s)<br />

country <strong>and</strong> ours has had in recent years. I only do so for the purpose of expressing the belief that it<br />

is at an end.”<br />

This announcement <strong>and</strong> the balance of Lord Salisbury’s remarks with reference to the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n case provoked enthusiastic applause from all present.<br />

<strong>The</strong> banqueting hail of the Guildhall, where the Lord Mayor’s banquet was served, was crowded,<br />

many of those present being of world-wide celebrity, including Prime Minister Salisbury, the Right<br />

Hon. George J. Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty; Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for<br />

India; Lord Halsbury. Lord High Chancellor: the Right Hon. Charles T. Ritchie, President or the<br />

Board of Trade; Gen. Lord Wolseley, Comm<strong>and</strong>er in Chief of the <strong>British</strong> Forces: Gen. Sir Herbert<br />

Kitchener, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army; the Right Hon. William Court Gully, Speaker of the House<br />

of Commons, <strong>and</strong> the Hon. Thomas P. Bayard, the American Ambassador.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

[10 November 1896]<br />

- 370 -<br />

COMMENTS OF THE LONDON PRESS<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States Both Won a Victory<br />

LONDON, Nov. 9.—<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong>, commenting to-morrow upon Lord Salisbury’s speech at<br />

the Guildhall, will say in reference to his explanation of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n matter that the terms of the<br />

settlement as stated by the Prime Minister are perfectly satisfactory, involving no surrender of<br />

essential principles. <strong>The</strong> solution arrived at will enable each side to claim a victory. Lord Salisbury<br />

can justly say he succeeded in protecting the rights of the <strong>British</strong> settlers, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney can claim<br />

with literal truth that he succeeded in bringing Great Britain to consent to arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Post will say that the settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n dispute is wholly satisfactory to Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily Graphic holds that the solution of the vexatious question reflects the highest credit<br />

upon a concerned. It fully justifies the intervention of the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard will briefly welcome “the auspicious announcement.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle will say that it finds Salisbury’s statement rather puzzling. It doubts whether settled<br />

colonists exist in any great numbers, but supposes it is all right.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily Telegraph says the terms of the settlement leave the dignity <strong>and</strong> interests of Great Britain<br />

<strong>and</strong> the United States unimpaired.<br />

[10 November 1896]<br />

- 371 -<br />

A TRIUMPH FOR OLNEY<br />

General Treaty of Arbitration May Be Submitted to the Senate—Great Britain<br />

Has Yielded Many of Her Contentions<br />

WASHINGTON. Nov. 10.—Americans who have followed the <strong>Venezuela</strong> case, <strong>and</strong> who are<br />

impatient to hear from their own Government the latest developments of the effort to bring about<br />

arbitration of the boundary dispute, are doubtless wishing to-night that a banquet could be provided<br />

at which Secretary Olney might add to the welcome information last night volunteered by Lord<br />

Salisbury at the Lord Mayor’s dinner In London. That Secretary Olney has something to say there is<br />

no sort of doubt. That he will not say it is almost as certain as that the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office has<br />

from the first of this dispute, been much more willing to surrender information than has been the<br />

Department of State of the United States.<br />

Lord Salisbury has said that the controversy is at an end. Secretary Olney does not talk about it<br />

as freely, <strong>and</strong> the assumption must be that he does not feel justified in being so emphatic <strong>and</strong><br />

conclusive as was Lord Salisbury. That he is gratified is evident <strong>and</strong> he has reason to be. A glance at<br />

the correspondence, begun in February last, <strong>and</strong> just made complete by the release of two letters<br />

519


August – December 1896<br />

referred to in Lord Salisbury’s revelations last night, shows that Mr. Olney has argued the <strong>British</strong><br />

Foreign Office around to his side of the proposition for arbitration so completely that he must come<br />

out of the State Department entitled to wear some plumes of satisfaction. He has about achieved the<br />

greatest of victories in the name of arbitration.<br />

An important contention insisted upon by Mr. Olney, to which Lord Salisbury has as yet offered<br />

no convincing answer, is that in any scheme of arbitration, either general or particular <strong>and</strong> special,<br />

between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, it must be agreed beforeh<strong>and</strong> that the arbitration shall<br />

be final. Lord Salisbury argued that in certain cases there should be the right of appeal after<br />

arbitration which Secretary Olney cogently insisted would make arbitration farcical.<br />

While much remains to be cleared up in the correspondence to be published, it is plain that the<br />

treaty of arbitration of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary will be offered to the Senate with a proviso that the<br />

finding of the arbitrators must be final, <strong>and</strong> that, in defining the boundary, the line will be run so as<br />

to exclude all settlements not made within fifty or forty years. Secretary Olney suggested sixty years<br />

as the limit within which settlement of occupation should be regarded as valid for establishing a<br />

right to claim, <strong>and</strong> it is understood that Lord Salisbury proposed forty years as a substitute. <strong>The</strong><br />

fifty-year limit of occupation, therefore, seems to have been the compromise accepted as reasonable<br />

<strong>and</strong> satisfactory as a basis of agreement.<br />

<strong>The</strong> prompt action of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Commission in announcing that it will defer its<br />

report is at the suggestion of the Department of State. It would be indelicate <strong>and</strong> perhaps<br />

embarrassing for that body to go on preparing its report on the matter with the announcement from<br />

Salisbury that the dispute is settled. But there is assurance that the material collected by the<br />

commission will not be cast aside.<br />

It will be submitted to the President in due season, <strong>and</strong> by <strong>and</strong> by it is supposed that it will find<br />

its way into print after the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns shall have accepted the settlement that has been brought<br />

about by the exercise by the United States of its good offices to settle a vexatious <strong>and</strong> sometimes<br />

threatening question, which not many months ago appeared likely to embroil at least two nations in<br />

war.<br />

As yet <strong>Venezuela</strong> has not taken part in the effort to settle the boundary, except through the<br />

United States. With its settlement, or perhaps before, in order to facilitate business, it is probable<br />

that <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain will once more resume diplomatic relations.<br />

Secretary Olney’s effort to bring about a settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary dispute will be a<br />

great achievement if it shall result in a finding acceptable to Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>; but it shall<br />

bring about a convention between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain for the arbitration of all<br />

disputes between those countries, as a Secretary Olney hopes it will, the winning of the pacific<br />

adjustment of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>-<strong>Guiana</strong> boundary will constitute but a small part of the claim that the<br />

Secretary will have won to the gratitude of two great nations.<br />

[11 November 1896]<br />

- 372 -<br />

THE CORRESPONDENCE<br />

Secretary Olney Insists on a Clear Statement of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s Position<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

WASHINGTON, Nov. 10.—Two letters which were exchanged between the United States <strong>and</strong><br />

Great Britain regarding <strong>Venezuela</strong> since the presentation of Mr. Olney’s counter proposition of June<br />

12, were given to the press at the State Department this afternoon, <strong>and</strong> help materially to clear up<br />

the situation. In a dispatch of May 22, 1896, Lord Salisbury had proposed an evenly divided<br />

commission to report upon territory in dispute outside the so-called settled districts, <strong>and</strong> Secretary<br />

Olney had suggested the provision for a commission of unequal numbers. <strong>The</strong> next dispatch was<br />

from Lord Salisbury to Sir Julian Pauncefote, <strong>and</strong> was as follows:<br />

Foreign Office, July 3, 1896.<br />

Sir:<br />

I have to acknowledge your Excellency’s dispatch of 15th June, inclosing a note from Mr. Olney,<br />

in which he explains the reasons that induce the Government of the United States to withhold their<br />

assent from the proposals with respect to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n frontier contained in my dispatch of the<br />

22d May.<br />

<strong>The</strong> arguments by which Mr. Olney supports this view will receive the careful consideration of<br />

Her Majesty’s Government. I am not now writing to you for the purpose of discussing them. My<br />

object in addressing your Excellency is to point out, that in a matter of some importance, Mr.<br />

Olney—owing doubtless to the inadequacy of my own explanation—has misapprehended the<br />

purport of the proposal which I had the honor to make to him—he states that ‘it appears to be a<br />

fundamental condition that the boundary line, decided to be the true one by the arbitrators, shall not<br />

operate upon territory bona fide occupied by a <strong>British</strong> subject—shall be deflected in every such case<br />

so as to make such territory part of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.’<br />

This was not the intention of my proposals, <strong>and</strong> the language of my dispatch of 22d May does<br />

not, I think, fairly bear this construction. I proposed that ‘the tribunal should not have power to<br />

include such districts as the territory of <strong>Venezuela</strong>,’ but I did not propose that they should<br />

necessarily be assumed, without further proof, to be part of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. I only stipulated that the<br />

ownership of them was not to be decided by the tribunal, which, in our judgement, was inadequate<br />

for this purpose, though it was adequate for the assignment of the unsettled districts. <strong>The</strong> settled<br />

districts shown to be in dispute by the inquiries of the commission were to be disposed of by<br />

subsequent negotiation.<br />

<strong>The</strong> claim of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is so far-reaching that it brings into question interests <strong>and</strong> rights which<br />

cannot properly be disposed of by an unrestricted arbitration. It extends as far as the Essequibo: it<br />

covers two-thirds of the Colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>; it impeaches titles which have been unquestioned<br />

for many generations. <strong>The</strong>se districts must be treated separately, <strong>and</strong> until further inquiry has thrown<br />

more light upon the matter, it is only by reserving the settled districts generally that this can be done.<br />

<strong>The</strong> view of Her Majesty’s Government is that, where the matter in issue is of great importance<br />

<strong>and</strong> involves rights which belong to a considerable population, <strong>and</strong> are deeply cherished by them,<br />

special precautions against any miscarriage of justice are required, of which I have indicated the<br />

general character in this correspondence, but which are not required where a little unoccupied<br />

territory is alone in question.<br />

It is for this reason that Her Majesty’s Government proposed to except these districts from the<br />

jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, though it could deal adequately with the disputed claims to<br />

territory that is not occupied. But they did not intend by that stipulation to ask the Government of<br />

the United States to prejudge any questions which had been raised, or might be raised, with respect<br />

521


August – December 1896<br />

to the ownership of settled districts. This part of the subject, confessedly the most difficult part,<br />

would have been reserved for separate examination.<br />

I should wish you to offer this explanation to Mr. Olney when you have an opportunity, <strong>and</strong> if<br />

he desires it, give him a copy of this dispatch. I will reserve for another occasion the observations<br />

which, after consideration, I may have to make in reply to the general argument of his note.<br />

(Signed) SALISBURY<br />

Secretary Olney’s reply to this letter follows:<br />

Department of State.<br />

Washington, July 13, 1896<br />

Secretary Olney’s Reply<br />

Your Excellency:<br />

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt from you of a copy of Lord Salisbury’s dispatch to<br />

you of the 3d inst. Its object is to explain that his Lordship, in his previous dispatch of May 22, did<br />

not intend that the boundary line fixed by the proposed arbitral tribunal should include in <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> any territory bona fide occupied by a <strong>British</strong> subject January 1, 1887. But as such territory<br />

must fall upon one side or the other of any complete boundary line, <strong>and</strong> was certainty not in any<br />

event to be assigned to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, all the present explanation would seem to show is that Lord<br />

Salisbury’s proposals of May 22 contemplated not a complete boundary line, but a part or parts of<br />

such line—namely, such part or parts as might divide uninhabited or unsettled territory. Such a<br />

conclusion requires a heroic construction of a paper which, in terms, “proposes the following basis<br />

of settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute,” by which the to Governments are to endeavor<br />

to agree “to a boundary line” upon the basis of a certain report, <strong>and</strong> by which, in absence of such an<br />

agreement, an arbitral tribunal is to “fix the boundary line upon the basis of such report.”<br />

Nothing in this language intimates that anything less than a complete boundary line, is to be the<br />

outcome of the plan suggested.<br />

<strong>The</strong> discussion, however, is hardly worth pursuing. If Lord Salisbury did not make us meaning<br />

clear in the dispatch of May 22, he certainly is entitled to make it clear now. <strong>The</strong>re is another part of<br />

the dispatch which seems in me of more importance <strong>and</strong> upon which I wish to base an inquiry.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> claim of <strong>Venezuela</strong>,” it is claimed, “is so far-reaching that it brings into question interests<br />

<strong>and</strong> rights which cannot properly be disposed of by an unrestricted arbitration. It extends as far as<br />

the Essequibo; it covers two-thirds of the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>; it impeaches titles which have<br />

been unquestioned for many generations.” That <strong>Venezuela</strong> claims territory extending to the<br />

Essequibo or covering two-thirds of the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> cannot be regarded as being of<br />

itself an insuperable obstacle to unrestricted arbitration. But the objection that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claim<br />

“impeaches titles which have been unquestioned for many generations” is undoubtedly of the most<br />

weighty character. <strong>The</strong> inquiry I desire to put, therefore, is this. Can it be assumed that Her Majesty’s<br />

Government would submit to unrestricted arbitration the whole of the territory in dispute, provided<br />

it be a rule of the arbitration, embodied in the arbitral agreement, that territory which has been in<br />

the exclusive, notorious, <strong>and</strong> actual use <strong>and</strong> occupation of either party for even two generations, or,<br />

say, for sixty years, shall be held by the arbitrators to be the territory of such party? In other words,<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

will Her Majesty’s Government assent to unrestricted arbitration of all the territory in controversy<br />

with the period for the acquisition of title by prescription fixed by agreement of the parties in<br />

advance at sixty years?<br />

I inclose copy of the dispatch for Lord Salisbury’s use. I should be glad to have its substance<br />

transmitted by cable, that it may he published with the other correspondence on the 18 inst.<br />

(Signed)<br />

RICHARD OLNEY<br />

[11 November 1896]<br />

- 373 -<br />

ENGLISH PRESS COMMENTS<br />

It Looks Like a Square Backdown by Great Britain<br />

LONDON, Nov. 11.—<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette asks whether the agreement will not throw into<br />

arbitration all the region between the Schomburgk line <strong>and</strong> the settled territory of <strong>Guiana</strong>, which<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> has declared would never be submitted to arbitration, which course the United States has<br />

declared Engl<strong>and</strong> would be forced to take.<br />

“If it does,” says <strong>The</strong> Gazette, “the American claim that the agreement is a square backdown on<br />

the part of Great Britain will be difficult to disprove.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Globe, commenting upon the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration treaty, says it welcomes the agreement,<br />

because it releases the United States from a false <strong>and</strong> dangerous position. If the commission had<br />

reported adversely to Great Britain, the paper adds, President Clevel<strong>and</strong> would have been forced to<br />

attempt to coerce Great Britain or eat humble pie, with the result that if the Washington<br />

Government had seen fit to enter the unequal contest with Engl<strong>and</strong>, the development of the United<br />

States would have been retarded for half a century.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Globe also says: “It must be clearly understood that the constitution of the new arbitration<br />

tribunal is not to establish a precedent for arranging all further disputes between the United States<br />

<strong>and</strong> the United Kingdom in North <strong>and</strong> South America, nor are we ready to recognize Monroeism as<br />

international law.”<br />

[12 November 1896]<br />

- 374 -<br />

FREDERIC R. COUDERT RETURNS<br />

Thinks the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n <strong>Dispute</strong> Will Be Finally Settled Soon.<br />

Frederic H. Coudert, one of the members of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission, returned<br />

yesterday from Washington <strong>and</strong> expressed himself as highly delighted with the outcome of the<br />

controversy between this Government <strong>and</strong> Great Britain.<br />

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August – December 1896<br />

“I cannot say anything about future details,” said Mr. Coudert. “It will take some time yet for<br />

them to be disposed of. <strong>The</strong> outcome is sure to be of great benefit in the way of an example. <strong>The</strong><br />

commission had been in session only two days when the news of Lord Salisbury’s announcement<br />

reached us. We have on h<strong>and</strong> a large mass of evidence which has not yet been discussed. It is not<br />

likely now that we will have to take this up. Everything will be turned over to the board of<br />

arbitration to be selected. Our labors have now practically been suspended. No decision that could<br />

be given by an ex parte tribunal could give perfect satisfaction to both sides, <strong>and</strong> possibly not to<br />

either.<br />

“We shall not try to make any formal report upon the merits of the case until a decision is<br />

reached by the international tribunal, as we believe that the way had best be left perfectly clear for an<br />

amicable underst<strong>and</strong>ing. It may be that we will never make any formal report upon the question at<br />

the dispute. That all depends upon what action may be taken by the new factor in the United States.<br />

Of course, we shall make a report upon our labors, saying what we have been doing while in session.<br />

At present, however, no report of ours involving the question at issue will be allowed to interfere<br />

with the amicable settlement of the disagreeable question.<br />

“Lord Salisbury’s announcement, while it comes in the nature of a pleasant surprise, is<br />

nevertheless an acknowledgment that Engl<strong>and</strong> has gracefully yielded to the dem<strong>and</strong>s of our<br />

Government <strong>and</strong> will become a party to an arbitration treaty that will no doubt be acceptable to<br />

both Governments. I have never had any doubt that Engl<strong>and</strong> would accede to our terms, but I did<br />

not think that the difficult would be settled as soon as this.<br />

“Lord Salisbury has done the very best possible thing under the circumstances, <strong>and</strong> I think that<br />

in two weeks’ time Sir Julian Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Secretary of State Olney will sign the protocol of the<br />

proposed treaty which will entirely settle the dispute, <strong>and</strong> also adjust the boundary line between<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> an <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

“No matter how the question is settled, I feel that the work of the commission has not been in<br />

vain, as we have gathered together a lot of useful information that will be valuable in years to come.<br />

<strong>The</strong> suggestion of a permanent court to try all disputed questions of international boundary is, I<br />

think, a good one, but I do not know that such a scheme is to be incorporated in the proposed<br />

treaty.<br />

“Regarding the clause at the treaty that provides that in the ‘settled districts’ a term of fifty years<br />

of undisturbed residence shall be regarded as giving the right of possession, I think it is no more<br />

than right. It is only another illustration of the law of vested interests. Of course, if the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns<br />

sit idly by <strong>and</strong> see the English make improvements <strong>and</strong> cultivate the l<strong>and</strong> for such a length of time,<br />

then certainly they ought not to reap the rewards of another’s work.”<br />

[12 November 1896]<br />

- 375 -<br />

PRESIDENT GILMAN TALKS<br />

<strong>The</strong> War Cloud with Which the Year Opened Dissipated<br />

BALTIMORE, Nov. 11.—President Gilman of Johns Hopkins University, <strong>and</strong> one of the<br />

members of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, was asked to-day for his opinion as to whether the effect<br />

524


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

of the published decision was to make the Monroe doctrine international law or to establish a virtual<br />

protectorate on the part of this country over <strong>Venezuela</strong>. He declared himself very unwilling to be<br />

interviewed until more definite information as to the provisions of the treaty was in his possession.<br />

Finally, however, he made the following statement:<br />

“It is obvious that all the data requisite to the formation of an opinion have not yet been made<br />

public by the United States or Great Britain; but enough has been said to show that the principle of<br />

arbitration is heartily accepted by both nations, <strong>and</strong> that they are very near in complete accord upon<br />

the best method of procedure, if, indeed, they are not absolutely so.<br />

“It will be time enough to consider the relations of the correspondence between Lord Salisbury<br />

<strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney to the recognition of the Monroe doctrine when that correspondence is published.<br />

All that need be said at the moment is that the Administration, in every difficult <strong>and</strong> embarrassing<br />

controversy, has succeeded in securing a concert of action between the parties interested, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

this is in the interest of peace <strong>and</strong> international good will. <strong>The</strong> war cloud with which the year opened<br />

has been dissipated by arguments, investigations <strong>and</strong> concessions.”<br />

[12 November 1896]<br />

- 376 -<br />

THE PRESIDENT PLEASED<br />

SETTLEMENT OF VENEZUELAN MATTER A VICTORY<br />

Many Congratulations Received—<strong>Venezuela</strong> Practically Ignored in the Final<br />

Negotiations—Further Delays Necessary<br />

WASHINGTON, Nov. 11.—Telegrams of congratulation on the peaceable settlement of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy are pouring in on the President.<br />

Though the concessions made by Great Britain are not all that were at first dem<strong>and</strong>ed, her<br />

agreeing to arbitrate the question at all, even in its qualified form, is regarded by the Administration<br />

as a decided victory for this country.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President finds further satisfaction in the result because it is, in his opinion, an assurance<br />

that a general treaty of arbitration between this country <strong>and</strong> Great Britain will now be concluded<br />

before the expiration of his term. He is keenly desirous of negotiating such a treaty. It will be<br />

considered a guarantee of peace between the two greatest nations of the world for all time.<br />

Moreover, it will pave the way for similar treaties between this <strong>and</strong> others of the great powers, a<br />

consummation devoutly to be wished.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is already speculation as to the membership of the American part of the commission. <strong>The</strong><br />

prevailing opinion among public men here seems to be that the two will be taken from the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Commission, <strong>and</strong> that Justice Brewer <strong>and</strong> Frederic H. Coudert are the most likely ones to<br />

be so honored.<br />

[12 November 1896]<br />

525


August – December 1896<br />

- 377 -<br />

THE ARBITRATION COMMISSION<br />

King Oscar of Sweden Will Probably Be the Fifth Member<br />

LONDON, Nov. 11.—Information comes from the Foreign Office that King Oscar II of<br />

Sweden <strong>and</strong> Norway will be asked to act as the fifth member of the board of arbitration to which<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute will be referred for settlement.<br />

<strong>The</strong> officials of the Foreign Office take exceptions to the statements which have been made that<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> will not be represented directly in the arbitration tribunal. <strong>The</strong> Foreign Office authorities<br />

suggest that there is still doubt whether <strong>Venezuela</strong> will have her own member of the tribunal. At any<br />

rate, Great Britain regards the United States’ representatives as acting for <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

It is understood that Lord Esher will retire from the office of Master of the Rolls early in 1897,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that Sir Richard E. Webster, Attorney General, will succeed him. Sir Robert B. Finlay, Solicitor<br />

General, will conduct the case of Great Britain before the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitration Commission. Sir<br />

Edward Clarke is debarred from taking any part in the proceedings, in consequence of his recent<br />

speeches unfavorable to the <strong>British</strong> contentions.<br />

[12 November 1896]<br />

- 378 -<br />

A TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, the United States, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> Will Sign<br />

LONDON, Nov. 12.—<strong>The</strong> New-York correspondent of <strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard affirms that instead of<br />

entering upon a contract with <strong>Venezuela</strong> or the United States, Great Britain will sign an agreement<br />

with both. <strong>The</strong> Anglo-American document will not be technically a treaty; it will merely be a<br />

protocol for preparing an Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n treaty. This is owing to the delay that would arise in the<br />

ratification of a treaty through the peculiar <strong>Venezuela</strong> laws.<br />

<strong>The</strong> progress of the arbitration will thus be greatly facilitated, since the protocol will stipulate<br />

that the findings of the arbitration court must be completed before Feb. 9. Each Instrument will<br />

refer to the other, compelling them to be construed together, but the less formal document is the<br />

more important of the two.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> will to-morrow say that rumors are current of a resumption of diplomatic<br />

relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[13 November 1896]<br />

- 379 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN UMPIRE<br />

526


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

KING OSCAR OF SWEDEN MAY BE SELECTED TO ACT<br />

Governments at Washington <strong>and</strong> London Speculating on the<br />

Composition of the Commission of Arbitration.<br />

WASHINGTON. Nov. 12.—President Clevel<strong>and</strong> will consider it a bit of good fortune if he may<br />

be able, on Dec. 7 or 8, to announce the agreement of the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain to a treaty<br />

of arbitration of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>-<strong>Guiana</strong> boundary.<br />

If the protocol is approved before that time, the announcement of the fact may come from<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, either for Great Britain or for <strong>Venezuela</strong>. From whatever direction it may come, the<br />

President is not likely to overlook the aim that Secretary Olney has constantly kept in sight. He has<br />

disregarded all opportunities for popularity to be secured by publication of the correspondence as it<br />

led toward arbitration, preferring to await the tendency of Great Britain to acknowledge, as some of<br />

the <strong>British</strong> papers admit that Lord Salisbury has, that the Monroe doctrine is having the force of<br />

international law in such controversies as this between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain.<br />

Acting merely as “the friend of <strong>Venezuela</strong>,” the United States Government has about brought<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain together again in diplomatic relations, which will have been resumed<br />

when the Minister of <strong>Venezuela</strong> shall sign the treaty that is proposed for the arbitration of the<br />

boundary between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

It is not expected that it will be necessary to consult the Senate of the United States in the<br />

matter, so that the delay that might occur through a partisan division of that body will be avoided.<br />

Secretary Olney is apparently of the same opinion as Lord Salisbury, in considering the controversy<br />

ended. <strong>The</strong> manner of selection of the arbitrators for Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the mere<br />

detail as to whether King Oscar of Sweden, or a substitute shall act as umpire, are considered as<br />

comparatively unimportant details.<br />

<strong>The</strong> admission is made at the State Department that King Oscar of Sweden may be called into<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration, but only in case of a disagreement by the four arbitrators appointed in<br />

the first instance as to the selection of the fifth member, when the King will be asked to designate<br />

some person as President of the tribunal. This is considered an exceedingly distant contingency, as<br />

no doubt is felt that the four original appointees will have no difficulty in reaching common ground<br />

on the matter with the same facility that they are expected to reach a conclusion on the evidence in<br />

the boundary dispute. It is further said that it has never been contemplated that the King himself<br />

should be the final arbitrator, or that the tribunal should hold its sessions in Norway or Sweden,<br />

although the locality is left to their discretion. As all the evidence in the controversy has now been<br />

collected together in Washington, there is suggested a bare possibility that they might deem it<br />

advantageous to meet here, but the documents <strong>and</strong> other data are rapidly being arranged in such a<br />

way by the commission that they could be taken to any desirable place without difficulty.<br />

[13 November 1896]<br />

- 380 -<br />

PLANS AS TO VENEZUELA<br />

TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT FOR A SETTLEMENT<br />

527


August – December 1896<br />

Two Arbitrators to be Chosen by the United States <strong>and</strong> Two by Great Britain—<br />

<strong>The</strong> Fifth Member to Preside<br />

LONDON, Nov. 13.—<strong>The</strong> Chronicle will to-morrow publish what it claims to be a complete<br />

summary of the agreement regarding the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. <strong>The</strong> article is entitled “Heads of a<br />

Proposed Agreement Between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain for the settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Boundary Question as Agreed upon Between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States of America.”<br />

<strong>The</strong>re are four heads. Under the first the appointment of an arbitration tribunal to determine the<br />

boundary is provided for.<br />

Under the second head provision Is made for the appointment of a tribunal of five members,<br />

two be nominated by the Supreme Court of the United States, two by the Supreme Court of Great<br />

Britain, while the fifth member is to be a jurist selected by the other members.<br />

In the event of these four members failing to agree upon the selection of the fifth member, King<br />

Oscar of Sweden <strong>and</strong> Norway will select him. <strong>The</strong> fifth member will be President of the tribunal,<br />

<strong>and</strong> he may be a Judge of either the Supreme Court of the United States or the similar court of<br />

Great Britain.<br />

Under the third head the tribunal is directed to examine all the facts necessary to decide the<br />

controversy regarding the territory known to belong to the United Netherl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> the Kingdom of<br />

Spain, when Great Britain acquired <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

Under the fourth head it is provided that the arbitrators shall ascertain all the facts necessary to<br />

arrive at a proper decision. <strong>The</strong>y must be governed in their findings by three short rules, the most<br />

important of which provides a prescription of fifty years. <strong>The</strong> arbitrators may give effect to the<br />

rights of settlers. In establishing the facts the ordinary rules of law shall prevail.<br />

<strong>The</strong> agreement is dated Nov. 12, 1896, <strong>and</strong> is signed by Secretary of State Olney <strong>and</strong> Sir Julian<br />

Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador to the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Chronicle adds that the foregoing will be the basis of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n treaty.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette says that Right Hon. H. H. Asquith, M. P., formerly Home Secretary, <strong>and</strong><br />

Sir George Baden-Powell, M. P., will probably be appointed to represent Great Britain on the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Tribunal.<br />

Treating of the settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, <strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong>, in its issue to-morrow,<br />

will comment upon certain Tory complaints that Lord Salisbury climbed down from the position<br />

first assumed by him, which was that there was “nothing to arbitrate,” <strong>and</strong> also upon the complaints<br />

of some French <strong>and</strong> German critics that Lord Salisbury has improperly exalted the United States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> paper contends that there is no doubt that Lord Salisbury did climb down somewhat, but<br />

that Secretary of State Olney did likewise. It adds that Lord Salisbury has in nowise admitted the<br />

new version of the Monroe doctrine, either theoretically or formally, but that Mr. Olney has<br />

succeeded to some extent in establishing it. It will be interesting, <strong>The</strong> <strong>News</strong> concludes, to see how far<br />

Mr. Olney or his successor is willing to follow up the step.<br />

[14 November 1896]<br />

- 381 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN COURT<br />

<strong>The</strong> Men Whom, It Is Supposed, Lord Salisbury Will Appoint<br />

528


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

LONDON, Nov. 14.—Sir Richard Webster, Attorney General, is supposed to be disqualified<br />

for membership in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration court, as he is committed to an opinion through his<br />

advocacy of the <strong>British</strong> case. Sir Edward Clarke, ex-Solicitor General, <strong>and</strong> Sit Frederick Pollock,<br />

Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence of Oxford University, are also disqualified, the former through<br />

his opposition to the <strong>British</strong> claims <strong>and</strong> the latter by his support of them.<br />

It is surmised that Lord Salisbury will select Lord Herschell, formerly Lord High Chancellor <strong>and</strong><br />

now a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, <strong>and</strong> Lord Davey, a Lord of Appeal<br />

in Ordinary, <strong>and</strong> also a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It may be, however,<br />

that Prof. Thomas Erskine Holl<strong>and</strong>, Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford University,<br />

will be selected as one of the <strong>British</strong> judges.<br />

[15 November 1896]<br />

- 382 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA BOUNDARY<br />

CONGRESS WILL NOT HELP TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE<br />

By the Agreement Between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, the Senate<br />

<strong>and</strong> the House Are Avoided<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1.—In course of time, probably before Major McKinley shall have been<br />

inaugurated as President of the United States, the Congress will be informed, by a message from the<br />

President, that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>-<strong>Guiana</strong> dispute has been amicably settled, <strong>and</strong> that he settlement has<br />

been approved by the United States as the mutual friend of the disputants.<br />

Unless the negotiations now in progress fail utterly, this settlement will be brought about<br />

without the cooperation of the Congress in either branch. <strong>The</strong> danger to which an attempt to bring<br />

about such a settlement would have been exposed was early appreciated by the Secretary of State.<br />

<strong>The</strong> difficulty of avoiding the Congress was also great. <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain were not on<br />

good terms. Years ago, in consequence or the attitude of <strong>Venezuela</strong> toward Great Britain in this<br />

matter, diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed. Two nations not having<br />

diplomatic intercourse are at a decided disadvantage then there is a bone of contention between<br />

them.<br />

Secretary Olney was determined that the controversy should be settled, if possible, <strong>and</strong> it was an<br />

outcome of this determination that brought on the announcement by the President in his message to<br />

the Congress about a year ago, in which the Monroe doctrine was reasserted, <strong>and</strong> the determination<br />

of the Administration expressed to regard as an unfriendly act the effort of any European nation to<br />

extend its territory on this Continent at the expense of any American nation. <strong>The</strong> assumption was<br />

that the United States Government would proceed, by force, to maintain the Monroe doctrine. But<br />

correspondence between the Department of State <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office brought about<br />

quite a different result. An agreement between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain was reached by<br />

the terms of which, if carried out, Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> will be brought together in friendly<br />

intercourse, <strong>and</strong> the boundary dispute settled without resort to bloody <strong>and</strong> expensive war.<br />

Acting as a friend of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the Secretary of State <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador have agreed<br />

to the basis of a settlement of the boundary dispute. <strong>The</strong> terms of the agreement have been<br />

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August – December 1896<br />

repeatedly referred to. <strong>The</strong> most important thing about this agreement is that by acting only as the<br />

friend of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain the United States Government has avoided much delay <strong>and</strong><br />

all opposition that might spring from factional opposition in the United States. <strong>The</strong> Senate can be<br />

depended upon, as now constituted, to refuse approval to most propositions sent to the Senate for<br />

its advice <strong>and</strong> consent.<br />

If Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister in Washington shall succeed in the mission upon<br />

which he was sent to Caracas, by in impressing upon <strong>Venezuela</strong> the responsibility for failure to bring<br />

the negotiations to a successful issue, it is believed that the terms approved by Secretary Olney will<br />

be accepted, <strong>and</strong> that upon the return of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister there will remain to be completed<br />

only a few details so immaterial to the main questions that they can be settled without arousing the<br />

national pride of either nation to the dispute.<br />

Several gains will be made by bringing the controversy to a close in this way. Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> will resume amicable intercourse as one result of the friendly intervention of the United<br />

States.<br />

<strong>The</strong> unfriendliness of the United States Senate to the Administration will become of no<br />

importance whatever as an obstacle. With the signing of the agreement by the Minister of <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> the Ambassador of Great Britain all necessity for a preliminary treaty between the United States<br />

<strong>and</strong> Great Britain will be done away with. <strong>Venezuela</strong> will secure such of her territory as the<br />

arbitrators decide is of right hers to hold; Great Britain will have a boundary clearly <strong>and</strong> indisputably<br />

defined, <strong>and</strong> the United States will secure a recognition of the Munroe doctrine at the same time that<br />

a war has been averted against a nation entirely unprepared to offer battle to so strong an antagonist<br />

as Great Britain.<br />

Señor Andrade has gone to <strong>Venezuela</strong> fully impressed with the importance of overcoming any<br />

opposition that may be offered by unreasonable patriots who would prefer to assert the right of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> to the most ancient <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary rather than yield an inch. Domestic differences<br />

may make this difficult in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> thwart the purposes of Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> Sir Julian<br />

Pauncefote. But a refusal of the terms offered may justify the United States Government in<br />

withdrawing its good offices. Such an outcome would be mortifying to the United States <strong>and</strong><br />

disastrous, perhaps, to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, which might be obliged to ask for a resumption of diplomatic<br />

relations with Great Britain in order to secure a less satisfactory adjustment only after a prolonged<br />

<strong>and</strong> hurtful war. <strong>The</strong> United States would be unwilling to be involved in that war. After a war the<br />

United States might be called upon to undertake again precisely the negotiations which have<br />

progressed almost to a conclusion without the firing of a gun, the loss of a life, or the sacrifice of<br />

national pride.<br />

If the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress proves to be moderate <strong>and</strong> appreciative of the efforts of the United<br />

States, the boundary controversy may be settled before President Clevel<strong>and</strong> leaves Washington for<br />

his new home in Princeton.<br />

[2 December 1896]<br />

- 383 -<br />

BRITISH GUIANA BOUNDARY<br />

Rules Governing the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitrators<br />

530


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>The</strong> London Chronicle publishes the rules which it says will govern the arbitrators under the treaty<br />

between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> according to the agreement arranged between negotiators upon<br />

behalf of Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States. It appears to settle in favor of Engl<strong>and</strong> the mooted point<br />

whether private occupation or political administration is included within the period of prescription.<br />

Both are included. How much practical effect this will have in enlarging Engl<strong>and</strong>’s award is<br />

doubtful. But it is certain that while Engl<strong>and</strong>’s individual occupation is comparatively limited <strong>and</strong><br />

recent, scarcely ante-dating the discovery of gold, Engl<strong>and</strong>’s political control is a question of a very<br />

different sort. <strong>Venezuela</strong>, for example, has not had “political control” within the Schomburgk line<br />

since it was drawn, in 1841. Quite possibly the arbitrators may rule that disputed or protested<br />

control is no control at all, but the point will certainly be contested. <strong>The</strong> agreement was in <strong>The</strong><br />

Times of Nov. 14. <strong>The</strong>se are the supplementary rules:<br />

1. Adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall make a good title. <strong>The</strong><br />

arbitrators may deem exclusive political control of a district, as well as actual settlement there,<br />

sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to make title by prescription.<br />

2. <strong>The</strong> arbitrators may recognize <strong>and</strong> give effect to rights <strong>and</strong> claims resting on any other ground<br />

whatever valid according to international law, <strong>and</strong> on any principles of international law which the<br />

arbitrators may deem to be applicable to the case, <strong>and</strong> which are not in contravention of the<br />

foregoing rules.<br />

3. In determining the boundary line, if the territory of one party be found by the tribunal to have<br />

been at the date at this treaty in occupation of the citizens or subjects of the other party, such effect<br />

shall be given to such occupation as reason, justice, the principles of international law, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

equities of the case shall, in the opinion of the tribunal, require.<br />

[2 December 1896]<br />

- 384 -<br />

THE REAL VENEZUELAN QUESTION<br />

In the present situation in the United States Senate it is plainly a good thing that no action by<br />

that body is needed to carry out the proposed settlement of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. But it is<br />

a still better thing that the proposed settlement does not involve positive action by the American<br />

Government at all, but is to be carried out by the two Governments directly interested. In this fact<br />

lies much if not most of the value of the outcome of the policy of the United States Government as<br />

developed in the last year.<br />

This is a point which has escaped the attention of the leading journals of Engl<strong>and</strong>, or, if they are<br />

aware of it, they do not give it the weight it should have, <strong>and</strong> make assumptions quite inconsistent<br />

with it. Papers of all parties—Liberal, Radical, Conservative, <strong>and</strong> Unionist—after Lord Salisbury’s<br />

Guildhall speech joined in crying out, in effect, that at last the United States had been forced to take<br />

the responsibility for their policy in the <strong>Venezuela</strong> matter, <strong>and</strong> could thenceforth be made to keep all<br />

the South American Republics in order. <strong>The</strong> English papers declared that their Government, having<br />

been induced by our Government to settle a dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong> on terms practically dictated by<br />

the United States, ignoring <strong>Venezuela</strong>, all future business with that little nation, or with others of<br />

531


August – December 1896<br />

South America, would be done through <strong>and</strong> by the United States, <strong>and</strong> at our risk. We had assumed a<br />

virtual protectorate <strong>and</strong> must take all the responsibilities that go with a protectorate.<br />

Nothing of the sort is true. If Lord Salisbury had tried to conduct his negotiations on any such<br />

basis, <strong>and</strong> with the purpose of securing an open or implied acknowledgment by the United States of<br />

any such unlimited liability, the negotiations would have come to a prompt, perhaps to a disastrous,<br />

close. What the United States Government has done in this whole question is really very simple. It<br />

can easily be disentangled from the long <strong>and</strong> voluminous record, because the real purpose of our<br />

Government has been distinctly conceived <strong>and</strong> clearly kept in view. <strong>The</strong> United States Government<br />

has insisted that Great Britain, in a dispute involving the essential territorial rights of an American<br />

State, should not enforce its own decision, but should consent to submit the dispute to an impartial<br />

arbitration.<br />

Great Britain has consented. <strong>The</strong> President has done what he could to arrange the terms of the<br />

arbitration. <strong>The</strong>re the matter ends. We have not undertaken to force <strong>Venezuela</strong> to accept arbitration,<br />

nor are we bound, if she does accept it, to force her to carry out the decision arrived at. We have<br />

provided a way by which justice may be done. That is all that <strong>Venezuela</strong> had any right to ask us to<br />

do <strong>and</strong> all that we had any right to try to do, <strong>and</strong> our position is made clear <strong>and</strong> impregnable by the<br />

terms reached between the two Governments directly involved.<br />

[7 December 1896]<br />

- 385 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN TREATY<br />

A CHIEF FEATURE OP THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE<br />

<strong>The</strong> Agreement Under Which Arbitration is to Proceed—<br />

Proposed Treaty between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> This Nation<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 6.—<strong>The</strong> probable assent of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to the proposed treaty of<br />

arbitration of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary dispute through the good offices of the United States <strong>and</strong><br />

the practical conclusion of a general arbitration convention between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United<br />

States, it is stated, will form two of the most important diplomatic announcements in the President’s<br />

message to Congress tomorrow.<br />

What is understood to be in nearly all essential particulars a copy of the preliminary agreement<br />

entered into some weeks ago between Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> Sir Julian Pauncefote on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

matter is made public. <strong>The</strong> draft of the proposed treaty itself, which the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, Mr.<br />

Andrade, carried with him to Caracas to lay before his Government, is more elaborate than this<br />

agreement.<br />

It starts with a preamble of considerable length, <strong>and</strong> in that portion which refers to the fifty-year<br />

occupation of territory in dispute embodies other points besides mere occupancy <strong>and</strong> political<br />

control, which will be taken into consideration by the tribunal. <strong>The</strong>se are expressed in technical<br />

terms, which international lawyers will underst<strong>and</strong>, but which would not be readily comprehended<br />

by others. <strong>The</strong> language of the agreement signed by Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> Sir Julian Pauncefote is<br />

largely informal. For instance, there is a blunt reference to the “King of Sweden,” without any of the<br />

customary terms of courtesy <strong>and</strong> full titles. <strong>The</strong> agreement is substantially as follows:<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Agreement<br />

1. An arbitral tribunal shall be immediately appointed, to determine the boundary line between<br />

the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

2. <strong>The</strong> tribunal shall consist of two members nominated by the Judges of the Supreme Court of<br />

the United States <strong>and</strong> two members nominated by the Judges of the <strong>British</strong> High Court of Justice,<br />

<strong>and</strong> a fifth selected b the four persons so nominated; or in the event of their failure to agree within<br />

three months from the time of their nomination, selected by the King of Sweden. <strong>The</strong> person so<br />

selected shall be the President of the tribunal. <strong>The</strong> persons nominated by the Judges of the United<br />

States <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> High Court of Justice, respectively, may be judges of either of said courts.<br />

3. <strong>The</strong> tribunal shall investigate <strong>and</strong> ascertain the extent of the territories belonging to, or that<br />

might be lawfully claimed by the United Netherl<strong>and</strong>s or by the Kingdom of Spain, respectively, at<br />

the time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> shall determine the<br />

boundary line between the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

4. In deciding the matter submitted, the arbitrators shall ascertain all facts which they deem<br />

necessary to a decision of the controversy, <strong>and</strong> shall be governed by the following rules, which are<br />

agreed upon by the high contracting parties as rules to be taken as applicable to the case, <strong>and</strong> by<br />

such principles of international law not inconsistent therewith as the arbitrators shall determine to<br />

be applicable to the case.<br />

Rules of the Tribunal<br />

<strong>The</strong> rules which are to govern the tribunal have been broadened in the treaty itself, but as<br />

covered in the preliminary agreement they read:<br />

“1. Adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall make good title. <strong>The</strong><br />

arbitrators may deem exclusive political control of a district as well as actual settlement thereof<br />

sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to make title by prescription.<br />

“2. <strong>The</strong> arbitrators may recognize <strong>and</strong> give effect to rights <strong>and</strong> claims resting upon any other<br />

ground whatever valid according to existing international law <strong>and</strong> on any principle of international<br />

law which the arbitrators may deem to be applicable to the case <strong>and</strong> are not in contravention to the<br />

foregoing rules.<br />

“3. In determining the boundary line, if the territory of one party be found by the tribunal to<br />

have been in the occupation of the subjects or citizens of the other party, such effect shall be given<br />

to such occupation as reason, justice, the principles of international law, <strong>and</strong> the equities of the case<br />

shall, in the opinion of the tribunal, require.”<br />

Advices received from Caracas do not bear out the impression that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Cabinet is<br />

dissatisfied with the treaty or that Minister Andrade who will shortly return to the United States, will<br />

bring with him the draft of a new treaty as modified by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n authorities. On the contrary,<br />

there are grounds for the belief that President Crespo <strong>and</strong> his Constitutional advisers have given<br />

their full adhesion to the proposed treaty.<br />

Under these circumstances, it will be signed by Mr. Andrade, representing the South American.<br />

Republic, <strong>and</strong> by Sir Julian, on the part or Great Britain, after which the United States will drop out<br />

of the matter well satisfied to have been the medium of bringing the two countries together <strong>and</strong> of<br />

effecting a settlement of their long dispute through the peaceful channel of an international Board of<br />

Arbitrators.<br />

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August – December 1896<br />

<strong>The</strong> Treaty Will Be Ratified<br />

It was only in this way, it is asserted on high authority, that such a conclusion could have been<br />

reached, as diplomatic relations between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain have long been suspended,<br />

<strong>and</strong> it was well known that her Majesty’s Government would not consent that <strong>Venezuela</strong> should<br />

have any voice in the selection of the board. While it is entirely true that the ratification of the treaty<br />

must still depend upon the will of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress, no doubt is felt that that body will<br />

indorse President Crespo’s action.<br />

In regard to a general treaty of arbitration between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain it is stated<br />

that the President’s message will show that negotiations are practically concluded <strong>and</strong> that it will be<br />

the President’s pleasure within a few weeks at the utmost to lay the treaty before the Senate for its<br />

consideration. It is substantially finished now, excepting a few matters of detail that are still the<br />

subject of correspondence, but respecting which there will be little if any additional delay.<br />

[7 December 1896]<br />

- 386 -<br />

VENEZUELA IS SATISFIED<br />

She Accepts the Treaty of Arbitration with Great Britain<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 7.—<strong>Venezuela</strong> has accepted the arbitration as agreed upon by Secretary<br />

Olney <strong>and</strong> Sir Julian Pauncefote.<br />

Secretary Olney received to-day a cablegram from Minister Andrade, at Caracas, that the<br />

memor<strong>and</strong>um between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States for the settlement of the boundary<br />

question had been accepted by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government.<br />

Minister Andrade’s cablegram further stated that the memor<strong>and</strong>um will be published at Caracas<br />

this afternoon, <strong>and</strong> that an extra session of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress would be called as soon as<br />

possible, in order that the memor<strong>and</strong>um may be carried into effect by the necessary treaty between<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[8 December 1896]<br />

- 387 -<br />

SECRETARY OLNEY’S REPORT<br />

General Arbitration with Great Britain Foreshadowed<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 7.—<strong>The</strong> report of the Secretary of State, to which President Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

referred in his message to Congress, states that “the relations of the United States with foreign<br />

powers continue upon that footing of harmony <strong>and</strong> friendliness which has been their fortunate<br />

characteristic for so many years.” <strong>The</strong> report summarizes the more important questions which have<br />

occupied the attention or the department during the current year.<br />

534


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

THE VENEZUELAN DISPUTE<br />

General Arbitration Foreshadowed as the Outcome of the Discussion<br />

Of the dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> it says: “<strong>The</strong> long-protracted dispute<br />

between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> in regard to the boundary between the latter republic <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> has, for a number of years past, attracted the earnest attention of this Government<br />

<strong>and</strong> enlisted its often renewed friendly offices to bring about an adjustment of the question in the<br />

best interests of right <strong>and</strong> justice, as determinable by the historical record <strong>and</strong> the actual facts. <strong>The</strong><br />

extended discussion of the subject culminated in July of last year, in an. elaborate presentation to the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Government of the views of the United States touching the opportune-ness <strong>and</strong> necessity of<br />

a final disposition of the points at issue by the pacific resort of an equitable arbitration.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> entire correspondence having been laid before Congress by the President with his message<br />

of Dec. 17, 1895, that body provided for the appointment of a commission of eminent jurists to<br />

examine <strong>and</strong> report touching the ascertainable facts of the controversy, with a view to enable this<br />

Government to determine the further course in the matter. That commission has pursued its labors<br />

unremittingly during the present year, its researches being greatly aided by the elaborate statements<br />

placed at its disposal by both the interested Governments, together with a mass of documentary<br />

evidence furnished from the archives of the European countries that shared in the early discoveries<br />

<strong>and</strong> settlement of South America.<br />

Amicable Counsels Prevail<br />

“Pending this arduous investigation, however, the Governments of the United States <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain have omitted no endeavor to reach a friendly underst<strong>and</strong>ing upon the main issue of principle<br />

through diplomatic negotiation, <strong>and</strong> it is most gratifying to announce that amicable counsels have<br />

prevailed to induce a satisfactory result, whereby the boundary question <strong>and</strong> its associated phases<br />

have been at last eliminated as between this country <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong>. A complete accord has been<br />

reached between them, by which the substantial terms of a treaty of arbitration to be concluded by<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> have been agreed upon, the provisions of which embrace a full<br />

arbitration of the whole controversy upon bases alike just <strong>and</strong> honorable to both the contestants. It<br />

only remains for the two parties directly concerned to complete this equitable arrangement by<br />

signing the proposed formal treaty, <strong>and</strong> no doubt is entertained that <strong>Venezuela</strong>. which has so<br />

earnestly sought the friendly assistance of the United States toward the settlement of the vexatious<br />

contention, <strong>and</strong> which has so unreservedly confided its interests to the impartial judgment or this<br />

Government, will assent to the formal adjustment thus attained, thus forever ending a dispute<br />

involving far-reaching consequences to the peace <strong>and</strong> welfare of the Western Continent.<br />

General Arbitration Probable<br />

“Coincidentally with the consideration of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary question, the two<br />

Governments have continued negotiations for a general convention, in the line of the<br />

recommendations of the <strong>British</strong> House of Commons, to which previous messages of the President<br />

have adverted, that all differences hereafter arising between the two countries <strong>and</strong> not amenable to<br />

ordinary diplomatic treatment should be referred to arbitration. <strong>The</strong> United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain,<br />

having given repeated proof of their acquiescence in the great principle involved, not only by treaties<br />

535


August – December 1896<br />

between themselves by severally by concluding like adjustments with other powers for the<br />

adjudication of disputes resting on law <strong>and</strong> fact, the subject was naturally approached in a<br />

benevolent spirit of agreement, <strong>and</strong> the negotiations have so satisfactorily progressed as to<br />

foreshadow a practical agreement at an early date upon the text of a convention to the desired end.”<br />

[8 December 1896]<br />

- 388 -<br />

VENEZUELAN TREATY SAFE<br />

Its Details Were Known to President Crespo Long Ago<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12.—It is ascertained from official sources that every detail of the<br />

proposed <strong>Venezuela</strong>n treaty was communicated to Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, before<br />

he left Washington, <strong>and</strong> was by him cabled to President Crespo at Caracas, <strong>and</strong> the approval of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government was obtained by cable before Mr. Andrade started on his purely<br />

perfunctory mission of carrying over a copy of the proposed treaty to submit to the Cabinet.<br />

“This,” said a high official to-day, “was simply done to invest the instrument with that dignity<br />

<strong>and</strong> character so dear to the Latin-American heart. <strong>The</strong>re was not a word in the treaty which was not<br />

previously known to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government, <strong>and</strong> which had not been approved in advance.”<br />

“How do you account for the fact,” was asked, “that Mr. Andrade, before leaving the city,<br />

asserted that he was simply going over to New York to visit the Horse Show, <strong>and</strong> that he did not<br />

know anything about any treaty, but had been kept in darkest ignorance of the progress of the<br />

negotiations?”<br />

Oh, that is diplomacy,” was the reply.<br />

“Will the treaty be concluded before the close of Secretary Olney’s administration?”<br />

“Most assuredly.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> statement in these dispatches yesterday that ex-Minister Michelena’s attack on the treaty was<br />

purely a political move directed against Crespo is confirmed by dispatches received from Caracas today.<br />

Michelena is described as “always pestiferous,” <strong>and</strong> it is stated that his efforts have fallen flat<br />

<strong>and</strong> will fail.<br />

[13 December 1896]<br />

- 389 -<br />

MINISTER ANDRADE COMING<br />

Believed That He Has Power to Sign the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Treaty<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 24.—Mr. Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister to the United States, who<br />

went to Caracas two months ago to lay the protocol of the new boundary treaty with Great Britain<br />

before the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Cabinet, is expected to reach Washington on Saturday of this week. <strong>The</strong> State<br />

536


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

Department, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing reports to the contrary, has every reason to believe he has been<br />

empowered by President Crespo to sign the treaty on behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Department has been fully advised of the protests which a few ambitious politicians in the<br />

republic made against the treaty, but its information is that these influences were strongly repressed<br />

by Crespo, who, while not satisfied with every detail, believed the treaty to be on the whole all that<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> can consistently ask. If Mr. Andrade, as is expected, shall reach Washington by Monday<br />

next, himself <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador will, meet—presumably at the <strong>British</strong> Embassy—almost<br />

immediately, <strong>and</strong> formally sign the protocol, thus clearing the way for that settlement “of the true<br />

divisional line between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>” which formed the subject of President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s special message to Congress a year ago, <strong>and</strong> which, it was feared for a time, would<br />

involve us in war with her Majesty’s Government.<br />

[25 December 1896]<br />

- 390 -<br />

ARBITRATION IS ASSURED<br />

TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN TO BE SIGNED THIS WEEK<br />

Señor Andrade <strong>and</strong> Sir Julian Pauncefote Arranging Final Details<br />

in Relation to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Settlement<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 28.—<strong>The</strong> latest information respecting the Anglo-American treaty,<br />

under the terms of which all future disputes between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain not<br />

involving the National honor of the two Governments are to be referred to an arbitration tribunal, is<br />

that it will be signed by the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote, <strong>and</strong> by Secretary Olney,<br />

representing the United States, this week. <strong>The</strong> last point of difference between the two gentlemen<br />

was settled a few days ago <strong>and</strong> the result cabled to Lord Salisbury for his approval. State Department<br />

officials believe that Lord Salisbury’s reply, which is expected to be favorable, will reach Washington<br />

not later than Wednesday, in which event the formal signing of the treaty will immediately follow. It<br />

is predicted to-day that the treaty will be sent to the Senate within a few days after the reassembling<br />

of Congress next week.<br />

<strong>The</strong> international incident of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute is considered closed as far as the<br />

United States is concerned, <strong>and</strong> all further negotiations for its adjudication lie wholly with the two<br />

parties to the controversy, <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain. At the State Department it is that with the<br />

acceptance by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Executive three weeks ago of the heads for the proposed treaty of<br />

arbitration as signed by Sir Julian Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney on Nov. 12, the friendly intervention of<br />

the United States had been completed <strong>and</strong> the only additional acts of the United States in the matter<br />

will be the publication of the evidence <strong>and</strong> reports collected by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n High Commission<br />

<strong>and</strong> the eventual reference to the United States Supreme Court of the concurrent request of the two<br />

countries for the appointment of two jurists as members of the tribunal.<br />

[29 December 1896]<br />

537


August – December 1896<br />

- 391 -<br />

THE TREATY OF ARBITRATION<br />

A year ago to-day nobody could possibly have foreseen what the ultimate result of the special<br />

message of the President upon the question of the boundary between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

would be. <strong>The</strong>re were many who thought it meant war. <strong>The</strong>re were more who, regarding it as an<br />

obstacle to peace, yet maintained that peace would be preserved in spite at it. But not a solitary<br />

prophet proclaimed that it would establish peace between the foremost two of the English-speaking<br />

nations on a firmer basis than ever <strong>and</strong> make it more difficult than it had before been for a flurry of<br />

popular excitement or a fog of popular confusion to hurry Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> America into war.<br />

It is true that the option of going to war is still left open to both nations, <strong>and</strong> it is well that this<br />

should be so. War remains, what it has always been, the “last argument of Kings.” A nation which<br />

proclaims that under no compulsion will it fight invites oppression <strong>and</strong> insult. In the proposals for a<br />

Pan-American union which involved a general scheme of arbitration more than one State refused to<br />

acquiesce beforeh<strong>and</strong> in an unlimited application of the scheme. Questions of national honor <strong>and</strong><br />

questions of territorial integrity, they declared, were not arbitrable. This is the ground that Lord<br />

Salisbury has taken, <strong>and</strong> a reservation is accordingly made in the treaty. When either nation is really<br />

bent upon war, the right of carrying out the national will remains to it under the treaty.<br />

But, while the right remains, the difficulty of exercising it is immensely increased. It is quite true<br />

that a nation so disposed may withdraw from arbitration almost any question under the pretense<br />

that it is not arbitrable. But it must do so deliberately, formally, <strong>and</strong> in the face of the world. It is not<br />

to be expected that a great nation will ever resume to quibble under such a scrutiny <strong>and</strong> such a<br />

responsibility, that it will venture to withdraw from arbitration a question which to impartial<br />

mankind seems a proper subject for arbitration. We have had but one war with Great Britain since<br />

the war by which we obtained our independence of her. It is difficult to imagine that the war of<br />

1812 could have occurred if the treaty now ready for signature had then been in force. It is<br />

inconceivable that the claims for the enforcement of which the war was undertaken would have<br />

been either presented to a tribunal of arbitration or withheld from it under the pretension, publicly<br />

made <strong>and</strong> submitted to the judgment of mankind, that they were not proper for arbitration.<br />

As we have said, the great result now about to be consummated would not have been brought<br />

about but for the action which so many of us a year ago deprecated or deplored. That Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

America might submit their disputes to arbitration was merely a vague aspiration or a pious opinion<br />

until the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question made of it a living issue <strong>and</strong> forced it to a solution. It is to be hoped<br />

that the treaty may receive its signature before the close of the year <strong>and</strong> of the holiday season. No<br />

more acceptable New Year’s gift could be made to mankind than the agreement which marks the<br />

longest stride ever taken toward reducing to practice the sentiment of the Christmas season: “Peace<br />

on earth, good will toward men.”<br />

[30 December 1896]<br />

538


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- Part 12 -<br />

1897 - 1898<br />

539


1897 – 1898<br />

540


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 392 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN TREATY<br />

Only Point of Difference on the Place of Tribunal’s Meeting<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 11.—Sir Julian Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Minister Andrade as Plenipotentiaries of<br />

their respective countries to negotiate the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong> arbitration treaty have, it is claimed, not<br />

yet completed their work, although the main points of the convention as agreed upon in the Olney<br />

memor<strong>and</strong>um were long ago disposed of. Other details, with one or two exceptions, involved no<br />

delay. <strong>The</strong> place of meeting of the tribunal is the chief point of difference, <strong>Venezuela</strong> preferring<br />

Washington.<br />

Minister Andrade says that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress could, however, even at this late day, be<br />

assembled on a few days’ notice, <strong>and</strong> he expressed the hope that the treaty will be ready for<br />

ratification early in February, although he declines to say how long it will take to reach an agreement.<br />

It is believed that the two Plenipotentiaries reached a practical agreement last week on a<br />

provisional treaty, <strong>and</strong> that copies thereof have been sent to London <strong>and</strong> Caracas in which blank<br />

spaces were left for the place of the tribunal’s sessions, to be filled in by cable messages.<br />

No doubt is expressed in the certain eventual ratification of the treaty which has been considered<br />

by all parties to have been practically concluded, on Nov. 12, when Sir Julian <strong>and</strong> Secretary Olney<br />

signed the memor<strong>and</strong>um.<br />

[12 January 1897]<br />

- 393 -<br />

HISTORY OF THE TREATY<br />

It Represents the Ideas of the President, Gresham, <strong>and</strong> Olney<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 11.—President Clevel<strong>and</strong> has to-day crowned his Administration as Chief<br />

Magistrate by sending to the Senate a general treaty of arbitration negotiated by Secretary of State<br />

Richard Olney <strong>and</strong> her Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador, Sir Julian Pauncefote.<br />

With the approval of the Senate, this will, it is believed, prove to be an instrument of inestimable<br />

benefit in assuring a continuance of cordial relations between the two great English-speaking<br />

powers, <strong>and</strong> will entitle the President <strong>and</strong> Secretary Olney to the gratitude of many generations of<br />

Americans.<br />

<strong>The</strong> treaty that was signed to-day has been negotiated within a year of the time when the two<br />

Governments began to address themselves seriously to the question. General arbitration had been<br />

proposed when the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n controversy became critical, <strong>and</strong> the necessity for disposing at once<br />

of that dispute made it easy to try arbitration in that case, to test the practicability of extending the<br />

jurisdiction of arbitration. <strong>The</strong> success met with in reaching a basis of agreement to arbitrate the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>-<strong>Guiana</strong> boundary matter pointed the way to the larger <strong>and</strong> more important general<br />

arbitration treaty, <strong>and</strong> under the terms of the thirteen articles in the pending convention about<br />

everything upon which the United States may disagree with Great Britain, except questions touching<br />

541


1897 – 1898<br />

National integrity or honor, will hereafter be settled by a court of arbitrators <strong>and</strong> an umpire to be<br />

selected by the court.<br />

<strong>The</strong> First Step<br />

<strong>The</strong> first step toward the accomplishment of this gratifying result was taken by the late Secretary<br />

Gresham, in February, 1896. Ambassador Bayard asked Lord Salisbury to permit her Majesty’s<br />

Ambassador at Washington to enter upon negotiations with Secretary of State Olney for a<br />

settlement of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>-<strong>Guiana</strong> boundary by arbitration. This was on March 3, readily<br />

concurred in by Lord Salisbury, who gave permission to Sir Julian Pauncefote to discuss the<br />

question, either with a representative of <strong>Venezuela</strong> or that of the United States as the friend of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

In a note to Sir J. Pauncefote, written March 5, 1896, Lord Salisbury referred to the fact that a<br />

year earlier communications had been exchanged between Sir J. Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Secretary Gresham<br />

upon the establishment of a system of international arbitration for the adjustment of disputes<br />

between the two Governments. It appeared to Lord Salisbury that the occasion was favorable for<br />

renewing the discussion upon a subject in which both nations feel a strong interest. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong><br />

Prime Minister discussed the question at liberal length asserting at the outset that “neither<br />

Government is willing to accept arbitration upon issues in which the National honor or integrity is<br />

involved.” He sent the heads of a proposed plan for two permanent judicial officers to be named by<br />

each Government. Upon the appearance of difference, not to be settled by negotiation, each power<br />

was to designate one of the permanent officers as arbitrators, they to select an umpire, whose<br />

decision was to be binding upon the arbitrators. But provision was made for an appeal to a court<br />

composed of three Judges of the Supreme Court of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> three of the Judges of the<br />

Supreme Court of the United States, in which a decision must be rendered by a vote of not less than<br />

five to one to make a valid determination.<br />

Mr. Olney Objects<br />

Secretary Olney, on April 11, wrote to Ambassador Pauncefote to commend much that had<br />

been suggested by Lord Salisbury, but objecting to the requirement that an award must be concurred<br />

in by five out of six appellate arbitrators. He proposed certain substitute heads, providing, in place<br />

of the features in Lord Salisbury’s plan regarded as objectionable, a scheme making all disputes<br />

prima facie arbitrable, each dispute to go before the tribunal unless Congress or Parliament should<br />

displace the jurisdiction, any agreement by the arbitrators to be final or a decision on appeal to three<br />

Justices of the Supreme Court of each country to be final if agreed to by a majority of the appellate<br />

tribunal.<br />

Mr. Olney argued that when Congress <strong>and</strong> the Parliament had agreed that a dispute was<br />

arbitrable it would be inconsistent with any reasonable theory of arbitration that an award concurred<br />

in by the arbitrator of the defeated country should be appealable by that country. He stated this<br />

proposition elaborately, analyzing Lord Salisbury’s propositions to show why they must be modified<br />

to make an agreement to arbitrate effective, when arbitration was to be resorted to. Mr. Olney<br />

closed his letter by suggesting that if no treaty for general arbitration could be then expected it was<br />

not improper to add that the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary dispute seemed to offer a good opportunity for<br />

one of those tentative experiments at arbitration which, as Lord Salisbury had intimated, would be<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

of decided advantage as tending to indicate the lines upon which a scheme for general arbitration<br />

could be judiciously drawn.<br />

Lord Salisbury Yields<br />

Lord Salisbury’s answer to Mr. Olney was full <strong>and</strong> learned, <strong>and</strong> his argument was directed largely<br />

against the submission to arbitration of territorial disputes. He was plainly against surrendering<br />

control over claims of that kind. He did not look for a hearty adoption <strong>and</strong> practice of arbitration in<br />

the case of territorial dem<strong>and</strong>s, “unless the safety <strong>and</strong> practicability of this mode of settlement are<br />

first ascertained by a cautious <strong>and</strong> tentative advance.” <strong>The</strong> suggestion by Secretary Olney that a trial<br />

of arbitration be made in the <strong>Venezuela</strong> case was accepted. <strong>The</strong> negotiations for the agreement<br />

between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain cleared the way for the later <strong>and</strong> more important treaty<br />

between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain.<br />

While the success of the Administration in securing an agreement to arbitrate the <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

boundary was gratifying to Secretary Olney, <strong>and</strong> the implied recognition of the force of the Monroe<br />

Doctrine was regarded as a triumph for the United States, the Secretary of State undoubtedly<br />

considers the treaty of general arbitration as a more important achievement, <strong>and</strong> one of greater<br />

value, not only for the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, but to the whole world. It is a victory for<br />

peace, making war impossible far trivial reasons, <strong>and</strong> supplying the machinery which may reduce the<br />

chances of war in cases that might otherwise involve two great nations in bloody <strong>and</strong> expensive<br />

strife.<br />

[12 January 1897]<br />

- 394 -<br />

CLAIMED AS A BRITISH VICTORY<br />

WASHINGTON Jan. 12.—<strong>The</strong> first <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> papers published since the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

agreement between this country <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> reached the State Department to-day, dated as late as<br />

Dec. 23. <strong>The</strong>y show that the whole arrangement, particularly the fifty-year clause, is highly<br />

satisfactory to the colonists, who consider that Great Britain has got the best at the bargain in every<br />

way.<br />

While the utterances are cautious, the papers express satisfaction “that Great Britain was able to<br />

secure its side without any recognition of the Monroe Doctrine.”<br />

[13 January 1897]<br />

- 395 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA AFFAIR<br />

Uruan Military Post Discontinued by the <strong>British</strong><br />

543


1897 – 1898<br />

WASHINGTON. Jan. 22.—By direction of Lord Salisbury the military post of the Uruan, in<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, which led to acute trouble with <strong>Venezuela</strong>, has been discontinued.<br />

An Indian post holder has been substituted for the police garrison, in obedience to directions<br />

from the Colonial Office in London, <strong>and</strong> one of the greatest thorns in <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s side is thereby<br />

removed.<br />

<strong>The</strong> news of the ab<strong>and</strong>onment of the post reached the State Department to-day through the<br />

Demerara newspapers, which made the announcement Jan. 6. <strong>The</strong> colonists are philosophical over<br />

the setback, <strong>and</strong> claim that the Indian holder will constitute as effective a maintainer of their<br />

territorial title as the soldiers, who will not be exposed to the frequently fatal malarial influences of<br />

the locality. It also is stated the indemnity secured from <strong>Venezuela</strong> on account of what was known<br />

as the “Uruan incident,” has been apportioned among the Britons involved, Inspector Barnes <strong>and</strong><br />

Baker getting $2,500 each, <strong>and</strong> the constables $500 each.<br />

[23 January 1897]<br />

- 396 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA TREATY<br />

Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Judge Brewer Arbitrators for the Republic<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28.—Justice Brewer of the Supreme Court to-day practically confirmed<br />

the report that Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> himself had been selected as arbitrators on behalf of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> in the matter of the settlement of the boundary-line dispute between that country <strong>and</strong><br />

Great Britain. <strong>The</strong> formal signing of the treaty has not yet been done, but Sir Julian Pauncefote, the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Ambassador, <strong>and</strong> Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, have been in daily conference,<br />

<strong>and</strong> it is understood that the convention is now ready for signatures.<br />

While these conferences have been in progress, various matters in detail, it is said, have been<br />

considered <strong>and</strong> determined on by the parties to the controversy, one of which was the choice by<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> of Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer as its arbitrators.<br />

<strong>The</strong> selection of Justice Brewer, who for a year or so has been the head of the commission<br />

appointed by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> to make an investigation of the boundary-line question for the<br />

United States, is accepted as proof that the conclusions reached by the commission, which as yet<br />

have been withheld from the public, are that <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s claims are well founded. If it were<br />

otherwise, it is claimed, <strong>Venezuela</strong> would not commit her case to an unfriendly arbitrator.<br />

Sir Julian Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Señor Andrade expect to complete the boundary arbitration treaty <strong>and</strong><br />

sign it in time to send the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n copy to Caracas for ratification by the steamer leaving New<br />

York for La Guayra a week from to-day. <strong>The</strong> delay in the negotiations has been caused altogether by<br />

the conceded desirability of naming the arbitrators in the draft instead of providing for their<br />

subsequent selection. It was decided that considerable time might be saved in this way, which would<br />

also present the additional advantage of making known to both the contracting parties who the<br />

individual arbitrators would be before the exchange of ratifications.<br />

This suggestion, which came from <strong>Venezuela</strong>, received the prompt acquiescence of Lord<br />

Salisbury, <strong>and</strong> it is understood that the four representatives have already been named. <strong>The</strong> place of<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

meeting is also understood to be closed by agreement on Geneva, Switzerl<strong>and</strong>, instead of Brussels,<br />

proposed by Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> Washington, proposed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[29 January 1897]<br />

- 397 -<br />

VENEZUELA TREATY SIGNED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Ceremony Performed in Secretary of State Olney’s Office Yesterday Afternoon<br />

SPECIAL PEN FOR THE SIGNING<br />

Sir Julian Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Señor Andrade Amicably Settle the Controversy<br />

Between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 2.—<strong>The</strong> Anglo- <strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration treaty was signed by Sir Julian<br />

Pauncefote, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, <strong>and</strong> Señor José Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, in the office<br />

of Secretary Olney, at the State Department, at 4:30 o’clock this afternoon, signalizing the amicable<br />

termination of a controversy that has lasted nearly a century, as well as the resumption of diplomatic<br />

negotiations between two countries which had been suspended for ten years.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, accompanied by Mr. Henry Outram Bax-Ironside, attaché of the<br />

embassy, reached the department just before 4 o’clock, <strong>and</strong> a few minutes later the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Minister appeared with Mr. Manuel M. Ponte, Jr., Secretary of Legation, <strong>and</strong> Mr. James S. Storrow,<br />

the counsel of <strong>Venezuela</strong> before the commission <strong>and</strong> the arbitration tribunal.<br />

Señor Andrade brought with him a magnificent pen, with which the important document was<br />

subsequently signed. It was sent to him by his brother, who, it is universally conceded, will be the<br />

next President of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Republic, <strong>and</strong> to whom it will be returned as a souvenir. It<br />

consisted at a gold pen fastened in a holder made from an eagle’s quill, bearing midway from the top<br />

a gold heart thickly incrusted with diamonds. While the two plenipotentiaries were formally<br />

exchanging their credentials, the copies of the treaty, which was printed, were carefully compared by<br />

Mr. Bax-Ironside <strong>and</strong> Mr. Cridler, Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau of the State Department, who<br />

made all the drafts of the document <strong>and</strong> printed the copies. <strong>The</strong>se were in the English language,<br />

Spanish not being used, although the tongue of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the only difference being that in the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n copy that country is mentioned always first, <strong>and</strong> in the <strong>British</strong> vice versa.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Ambassador signed “Julian Pauncefote” to both copies, Señor Andrade following,<br />

affixed his signature, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Cridler affixed their respective seals. <strong>The</strong> formalities having been<br />

quickly completed, there was a general exchange of congratulations, which were pressed upon<br />

Secretary Olney with particular cordiality, <strong>and</strong> before 5 o’clock the negotiators had returned to their<br />

official residences.<br />

An interesting effect of the treaty will be the abolition of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission,<br />

of which Justice Brewer is President. <strong>The</strong> dissolution will occur when Secretary Olney notifies<br />

Justice Brewer that the purposes for which it was organized have been made null by the signing of<br />

the treaty. <strong>The</strong> evidence taken by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission will be laid before the treaty tribunal<br />

when it convenes.<br />

[3 February 1897]<br />

545


1897 – 1898<br />

- 398 -<br />

FULL TEXT OF THE TREATY<br />

Provision for the Arbitration Between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 2 —<strong>The</strong> full text of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n treaty follows:<br />

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> Irel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United<br />

States of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, being desirous to provide for an amicable settlement of the question which has<br />

arisen between their respective Governments concerning the boundary between the Colony of<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, having resolved to submit to arbitration the<br />

question involved, <strong>and</strong> to the end of concluding a Treaty for that purpose, have appointed as their<br />

respective Plenipotentiaries:<br />

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> Irel<strong>and</strong>, the Right<br />

Honourable Sir Julian Pauncefote, a Member of Her Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council,<br />

Knight Gr<strong>and</strong> Cross of the Most Honourable Order of Bath, <strong>and</strong> of the Most Distinguished Order<br />

of St. Michael <strong>and</strong> St. George, <strong>and</strong> Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary <strong>and</strong> Plenipotentiary to<br />

the United States:<br />

And the President of the United States of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Señor José Andrade, Envoy Extraordinary<br />

<strong>and</strong> Minister Plenipotentiary of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to the United States of America:<br />

Who having communicated to each other their respective full powers, which were found to be in<br />

due <strong>and</strong> proper form, have agreed to <strong>and</strong> concluded the following Articles: —<br />

ARTICLE I<br />

An Arbitral Tribunal shall be immediately appointed to determine the boundary-line between the<br />

Colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

ARTICLE II<br />

<strong>The</strong> Tribunal shall consist of five jurists; two on the part of Great Britain, nominated by the<br />

members of the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Council, namely, the Right Honourable<br />

Baron Herschell, Knight Gr<strong>and</strong> Cross of the Most Honourable Order of Bath, <strong>and</strong> the Honourable<br />

Sir Richard Henn Collins, Knight, one of the Justices of Her Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court of<br />

the Judicature; two on the part of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, nominated, one by the President of the United States<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, namely, the Honourable Melville Weston Fuller, Chief Justice of the United States of<br />

America, <strong>and</strong> one nominated by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States of America,<br />

namely, the Honourable David Josiah Brewer, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States<br />

of America; <strong>and</strong> of a fifth jurist to be selected by the four persons so nominated, or in the event of<br />

their failure to agree within three months from the exchange of ratification of the present Treaty, to<br />

be so selected by His Majesty the King of Sweden <strong>and</strong> Norway. <strong>The</strong> jurist so selected shall be the<br />

President of the Tribunal.<br />

In the case of death, absence, or incapacity to serve of any of the four Arbitrators above named,<br />

or in the event of any such Arbitrator omitting or declining or ceasing to act as such, another jurist<br />

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of repute shall be forthwith substituted in his place. If such vacancy shall occur among those<br />

nominated on the part of Great Britain, the substitute shall be appointed by the members for the<br />

time being of the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Council, acting by a majority, <strong>and</strong> if<br />

among those nominated on the part of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, he shall be appointed by the Justices of the<br />

Supreme Court of the United States, acting by a majority. If such vacancy shall occur in the case of<br />

the fifth Arbitrator, a substitute shall be selected in the manner herein provided for with regard to<br />

the original appointment.<br />

ARTICLE III<br />

<strong>The</strong> Tribunal shall investigate <strong>and</strong> ascertain the extent of the territories belonging to, or that<br />

might lawfully be claimed by the United Netherl<strong>and</strong>s or by the Kingdom of Spain respectively at the<br />

time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the Colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> shall determine the<br />

boundary-line between the Colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

ARTICLE IV<br />

In deciding the matters submitted, the Arbitrators shall ascertain all facts which they deem<br />

necessary to the decision of the controversy, <strong>and</strong> shall be governed by the following Rules, which<br />

are agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties as Rules to be taken as applicable to the case, <strong>and</strong><br />

by such principles of international law not inconsistent therewith as the Arbitrators shall determine<br />

to be applicable to the case—<br />

RULES<br />

(a) Adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall make a good title. <strong>The</strong><br />

Arbitrators may deem exclusive political control of a district, as well as actual settlement thereof,<br />

sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to make title by prescription.<br />

(b) <strong>The</strong> Arbitrators may recognise <strong>and</strong> give effect to rights <strong>and</strong> claims resting on any other<br />

ground whatever valid according to international law, <strong>and</strong> on any principles of international law<br />

which the Arbitrators may deem to be applicable to the case, <strong>and</strong> which are not in contravention of<br />

the foregoing rule.<br />

(c) In determining the boundary-line, if territory of one Party be found by the Tribunal to have<br />

been at the date of this Treaty in the occupation of the subjects or citizens of the other Party, such<br />

effect shall be given to such occupation as reason, justice, the principles of international law, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

equities of the case shall, in the opinion of the Tribunal, require.<br />

ARTICLE V<br />

<strong>The</strong> Arbitrators shall meet at Paris, within sixty days after the delivery of the printed arguments<br />

mentioned in Article VIII, <strong>and</strong> shall proceed impartially <strong>and</strong> carefully to examine <strong>and</strong> decide the<br />

questions that have been, or shall be, laid before them, as herein provided, on the part of the<br />

Governments of Her Britannic Majesty <strong>and</strong> the United States of <strong>Venezuela</strong> respectively.<br />

Provided always that the Arbitrators may, if they shall think fit, hold their meetings, or any of<br />

them, at any other place which they may determine.<br />

547


1897 – 1898<br />

All questions considered by the Tribunal, including the final decision, shall be determined by a<br />

majority of all the Arbitrators.<br />

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall name one person as its Agent to attend the Tribunal,<br />

<strong>and</strong> to represent it generally in all matters connected with the Tribunal.<br />

ARTICLE VI<br />

<strong>The</strong> printed Case of each of the two Parties accompanied by the documents, the official<br />

correspondence, <strong>and</strong> other evidence on which each relies, shall be delivered in duplicate to each of<br />

the Arbitrators <strong>and</strong> to the Agent of the other Party as soon as may be after the appointment of the<br />

members of the Tribunal, but within a period not exceeding eight months from the date of the<br />

exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty.<br />

ARTICLE VII<br />

Within four months after the delivery on both sides of the printed Case, either Party may in like<br />

manner deliver in duplicate to each of the said Arbitrators, <strong>and</strong> to the Agent of the other Party, a<br />

Counter-Case, <strong>and</strong> additional documents, correspondence, <strong>and</strong> evidence, in reply to the Case,<br />

documents, correspondence, <strong>and</strong> evidence of the other Party.<br />

If in the Case submitted to the Arbitrators either Party shall have specified or alluded to any<br />

report or document in its own exclusive possession, without annexing a copy, such Party shall be<br />

bound, if the other Party thinks proper to apply for it, to furnish that Party with a copy thereof, <strong>and</strong><br />

either Party may call upon the other , through the Arbitrators, to produce the originals or certified<br />

copies of any papers adduced as evidence, giving in each instance notice thereof within thirty days<br />

after delivery of the Case, <strong>and</strong> the original or copy so requested shall be delivered as soon as may be,<br />

<strong>and</strong> within a period not exceeding forty days after receipt of notice.<br />

ARTICLE VIII<br />

It shall be the duty of the Agent of each Party, within three months after the expiration of the<br />

time limited for the delivery of the Counter-Case on both sides, to deliver in duplicate to each of the<br />

said Arbitrators, <strong>and</strong> to the Agent of the other party, a printed argument showing the points, <strong>and</strong><br />

referring to the evidence upon which his Government relies, <strong>and</strong> either party may also support the<br />

same before the Arbitrators by oral argument of Counsel; <strong>and</strong> the Arbitrators may, if they desire<br />

further elucidation with regard to any point, require a written or printed statement or argument, or<br />

oral argument by Counsel upon it; but in such case the other party shall be entitled to reply either<br />

orally or in writing, as the case may be.<br />

ARTICLE IX<br />

<strong>The</strong> Arbitrators may, for any cause deemed by them sufficient, enlarge either of the periods<br />

fixed in Articles VI, VII <strong>and</strong> VIII by the allowance of thirty days additional.<br />

ARTICLE X<br />

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<strong>The</strong> decision of the Tribunal shall, if possible, be made within three months from the close of<br />

the argument on both sides.<br />

It shall be made in writing <strong>and</strong> dated, <strong>and</strong> shall be signed by the Arbitrators who may assent to<br />

it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> decision shall be in duplicate, one copy thereof shall be delivered to the Agent of Great<br />

Britain for his Government, <strong>and</strong> the other copy shall be delivered to the Agent of the United States<br />

of <strong>Venezuela</strong> for his Government.<br />

ARTICLE XI<br />

<strong>The</strong> Arbitrators shall keep an accurate record of their proceedings, <strong>and</strong> may employ the<br />

necessary officers to assist them.<br />

ARTICLE XII<br />

Each Government shall pay its own Agent <strong>and</strong> provide for the proper remuneration of the<br />

Counsel appointed by it, <strong>and</strong> of the Arbitrators appointed by it or in its behalf, <strong>and</strong> for the expense<br />

of preparing <strong>and</strong> submitting its Case to the Tribunal. All other expenses connected with the<br />

Arbitration shall be defrayed by the two Governments in equal moieties.<br />

ARTICLE XIII<br />

<strong>The</strong> High Contracting Parties engage to consider the result of the proceeds of the Tribunal of<br />

Arbitration as a full, perfect, <strong>and</strong> final settlement of all the questions referred to the Arbitrators.<br />

ARTICLE XIV<br />

<strong>The</strong> present Treaty shall be duly ratified by Her Britannic Majesty <strong>and</strong> by the President of the<br />

United States of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, by <strong>and</strong> with the Congress thereof, <strong>and</strong> the ratifications shall be<br />

exchanged in London or in Washington within six months from the date hereof.<br />

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this Treaty <strong>and</strong> have hereunto<br />

affixed our seals.<br />

Done in duplicate, at Washington, the second day of February, one thous<strong>and</strong> eight hundred <strong>and</strong><br />

ninety-seven.<br />

[3 February 1897]<br />

JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE (Seal)<br />

JOSÉ ANDRADE (Seal)<br />

549


1897 – 1898<br />

- 399 -<br />

A PAGE OF HISTORY<br />

“It was intended to apply to every stage of our National life, <strong>and</strong> cannot become obsolete while<br />

our Republic endures.” So wrote President Clevel<strong>and</strong> of the Monroe doctrine in his <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

message of Dec. 17, 1895.<br />

“It Is impossible to admit that the [the principles of the Monroe doctrine] have been inscribed<br />

by any adequate authority in the code of international law,” wrote Lord Salisbury in his letter of<br />

Nov. 26, 1895, to Sir Julian Pauncefote, “<strong>and</strong> the danger which such admission would involve is<br />

sufficiently exhibited by the strange development which the doctrine has received in Mr. Olney’s<br />

h<strong>and</strong>s.”<br />

“Great Britain’s assertion of title to the disputed territory,” said Mr. Olney in his letter of July 20,<br />

1895, to Mr. Bayard, “combined with her refusal to have that title investigated, being a substantial<br />

appropriation of that territory to her own use, not to protest <strong>and</strong> give warning that the transaction<br />

will be regarded as injurious to the interests of the people of the United States, as well as oppressive<br />

in itself, would be to ignore an established policy with which the honor <strong>and</strong> welfare of this country<br />

are closely identified.”<br />

“But they [her Majesty’s Government cannot consent to entertain or to submit to the arbitration<br />

of another power or of foreign jurists, however eminent, claims based on the extravagant<br />

pretensions of Spanish officials in the last century,” rewrote Lord Salisbury to Sir Julian Pauncefote<br />

in his second letter, of Nov. 26.<br />

Nevertheless, Article I of the treaty signed by Sir Julian <strong>and</strong> Señor Andrade in the office of<br />

Secretary Olney on Tuesday declares that “an arbitral tribunal shall he immediately appointed to<br />

determine the boundary line between the colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>”; <strong>and</strong> in Article XIII the high contracting parties “engage to consider the result of the<br />

proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration as a full, perfect, <strong>and</strong> final settlement of all the questions<br />

referred to the arbitrators.”<br />

And so a just case triumphs. Sustained with firmness <strong>and</strong> with reason on the part of President<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Secretary Olney, it was considered with c<strong>and</strong>or by Lord Salisbury <strong>and</strong> the law officers<br />

of the Crown who were his advisers, <strong>and</strong> decided in a spirit of fairness that does honor to the<br />

English people. It is an important <strong>and</strong> valuable page of history, equally creditable to the two great<br />

nations that have written it.<br />

<strong>The</strong> tribunal named in this treaty, Baron Herschell <strong>and</strong> Sir Ricard Henn Collins on the part of<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> on the part of <strong>Venezuela</strong> Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer of the United<br />

States Supreme Court, together with a fifth jurist to be chosen by these four, will have before them<br />

the task of ascertaining how much of the disputed territory belonged to, “or might lawfully be<br />

claimed” respectively by, Spain <strong>and</strong> Holl<strong>and</strong> at the time Great Britain “took title” from the Dutch.<br />

Judge Charles P. Daly, President of the American Geographical Society, in a careful review of the<br />

testimony of the maps <strong>and</strong> authorities a year ago, declared that it would be difficult if not impossible<br />

to determine “the true divisional line,” but that a board of arbitration might draw “what, in view of<br />

all the circumstances, would be a fair line of separation or boundary.” <strong>The</strong> evidence collected by our<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Commission will of course be put at the disposal of the tribunal, now that the necessity<br />

of pursuing its own investigations has terminated.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

It is interesting to observe the care with which the treaty provides that copies of all reports <strong>and</strong><br />

documents in the exclusive possession of either party shall be delivered to the other party on<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>. This forethought is likely to avert any such “battle of the maps” as ensued upon the<br />

negotiation of the Ashburton treaty, when Webster’s map, found in Paris, supporting the English<br />

claim, <strong>and</strong> the old map, found In the Foreign Office, authenticated by the h<strong>and</strong>-writing of George<br />

III, sustaining our contention, were made the subject of such bitterness <strong>and</strong> suspicion.<br />

<strong>The</strong> only part of the treaty that is now likely to occasion serious anxiety is “Rule A,” which<br />

awards title by prescription to any part of the disputed territory on proof of adverse holding for fifty<br />

years. This rule is made applicable not only to private rights, but to the political control of a district,<br />

even without actual settlement. We may be sure that Great Britain’s case will be fortified with more<br />

abundant proofs under this rule than the case of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, as her citizens are more likely not only<br />

to have pushed into the disputed territory, but also to have preserved the tangible records of their<br />

occupancy.<br />

[4 February 1897]<br />

- 400 -<br />

WHITE HOUSE PRESENTATION<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>ns Send Gifts to President Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Secretary Olney<br />

as a Token of Appreciation<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 5.—<strong>The</strong> Red Parlor of the White House was the scene to-day of a<br />

presentation by Mr. Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, to President Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Secretary Olney,<br />

of a testimonial from the Governor <strong>and</strong> people of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n State of Zulia, in token of their<br />

appreciation of the efforts made by the President <strong>and</strong> Mr. Olney to bring about a peaceable<br />

settlement of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary dispute.<br />

<strong>The</strong> testimonial consisted of a rosette <strong>and</strong> cane, each formed of specimens of precious woods<br />

from the Zulian forests. <strong>The</strong> cane contained 125 pieces <strong>and</strong> the rosette 172 pieces.<br />

It is probable that the presents will be placed in the State Department Library. <strong>The</strong> President <strong>and</strong><br />

the Secretary of State could not accept them as personal gifts without the consent of Congress.<br />

[6 February 1897]<br />

- 401 -<br />

VENEZUELA TREATY SAFE<br />

Assurances from Caracas that It Will Be Ratified<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13.—Satisfactory assurances have just been received from Caracas here<br />

that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary treaty will be ratified promptly.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Government is in a position to assert this confidently after the careful canvass that has been<br />

made among its supporters. <strong>The</strong> opposition is declared to be confined to an insignificant minority,<br />

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1897 – 1898<br />

which has weakened instead of gaining strength as a result of its efforts to upset the work of the<br />

negotiators.<br />

[14 February 1897]<br />

- 402 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN TREATY<br />

It Probably Will Be Ratified at Caracas Next Week<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 19.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress will meet at Caracas to-morrow when it<br />

is expected President Crespo’s message will strongly urge the prompt ratification of the <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

boundary arbitration treaty. It is thought at the Legation here that this treaty will take the precedence<br />

over all other matters, <strong>and</strong> the impression is that decisive action will be secured next week. No<br />

doubt whatever is expressed that the agreement will be approved without modification, <strong>and</strong> that the<br />

necessary executive steps soon will be taken to give effect to its provisions.<br />

It is definitely announced that the tribunal of arbitration will not meet in Paris to consider<br />

evidence before the Summer of 1898, as all the intervening time will be required for the completion<br />

of evidence <strong>and</strong> the presentation of arguments. <strong>The</strong> time of meeting must be arranged to meet the<br />

convenience of Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer, who consented to serve an the board only<br />

on the assurance that the sessions should be held during the long vacations of the United States<br />

Supreme Court.<br />

[20 February 1897]<br />

- 403 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN TREATY<br />

An Obstacle to Its Prompt Ratification in Its Language<br />

WASHINGTON, Feb. 25.—An obstacle to the prompt ratification of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

arbitration treaty has been encountered in a provision of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Constitution necessitating<br />

the use of the Spanish language in documents for consideration of the Congress. When the<br />

convention was concluded, Feb. 2, both the copies signed by the plenipotentiaries were in the<br />

English language, this being deemed advisable, as the proceedings of the tribunal would be<br />

conducted in that tongue. This departure from the customary rule of having treaties in the languages<br />

of the countries participating has led to a delay that will in all probability postpone the exchange of<br />

ratifications for some time, though it was thought every precaution had been taken to secure the<br />

approval of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress to the agreement before March 4.<br />

With a view of expeditiously remedying the difficulty, a translation of the document has been<br />

hurriedly but carefully made, <strong>and</strong> sent to Engl<strong>and</strong> for Lord Salisbury’s formal approval, Sir Julian<br />

Pauncefote hesitating to assume so great a responsibility alone, <strong>and</strong> a duplicate was forwarded to<br />

Caracas to- day by mail. If corrections are required by the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office they will be cabled<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

here <strong>and</strong> repeated to Caracas by the same method, but in any event it is thought unlikely that<br />

President Crespo will be able to lay the treaty before Congress for at least another week, <strong>and</strong> fears<br />

are expressed that the delay will be of much longer duration, on account of the exceeding precision<br />

required in rendering Article 4 of the treaty, which includes the memor<strong>and</strong>um of rules governing the<br />

arbitration agreed upon by Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> Sir Julian Pauncefote, Nov. 12 last. This<br />

memor<strong>and</strong>um, constituting the gist of the entire settlement, while perfectly clear in the English<br />

idiom, loses some of its exactness in Spanish.<br />

<strong>The</strong> belief is expressed, however, that <strong>Venezuela</strong> will not be able before the tribunal to dispute<br />

the English version.<br />

[26 February 1897]<br />

- 404 -<br />

VENEZUELAN TREATY SIGNED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Spanish Draft Accepted by Andrade <strong>and</strong> Pauncefote<br />

— Report of the United States Commission Made to President<br />

WASHINGTON Feb. 27.—At the <strong>British</strong> Embassy at noon to-day the Spanish draft of the<br />

Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n treaty was signed by Sir Julian Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Señor Andrade, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

document is finally ready for submission to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress, conforming to the<br />

Constitutional provision of being in the language of that country.<br />

Not until this morning did Sir Julian receive Lord Salisbury’s cabled authority to sign the<br />

translated copy, <strong>and</strong> upon being notified, Señor Andrade waived all the formalities of going to<br />

neutral ground at the State Department, <strong>and</strong>, accompanied by Secretary Ponte at his legation, at<br />

once drove to the <strong>British</strong> Embassy, where the signatures <strong>and</strong> seals were affixed.<br />

Lord Salisbury suggested no change in the document, <strong>and</strong>, after signing it, Señor Andrade cabled<br />

his Government at Caracas of the successful conclusion of the negotiations.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission terminated its existence to-day at noon, when its members, Justice<br />

Brewer. Frederic H. Coudert <strong>and</strong> Andrew D. White, Justice Alvey, <strong>and</strong> President Oilman,<br />

accompanied by Secretary Mallet-Prevost, called on the President <strong>and</strong> delivered its report on the<br />

work accomplished in the year of its existence.<br />

While the report does not indicate any conclusion as to the merits of the controversy which led<br />

to the appointment of the commission, its work having stopped before the actual “determination of<br />

a true divisional line between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> arid <strong>Venezuela</strong>” had actually been undertaken, it is<br />

understood that the enormous mass of evidence collected through the commission’s efforts will<br />

make the decision possible by an impartial court in future.<br />

This evidence, which has not yet been printed, is completely arranged for filing in the archives of<br />

the State Department where it will be available for the arbitral tribunal which will meet in Paris in<br />

1898.<br />

To-day’s visit to the President was brief <strong>and</strong> marked with cordial expressions of the President’s<br />

satisfaction.<br />

[28 February 1897]<br />

553


1897 – 1898<br />

- 405 -<br />

SENDS MINISTER TO ENGLAND<br />

Diplomatic Relations Between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> Resumed<br />

WASHINGTON, March 2.—Secretary Olney received the following dispatch from our Minister<br />

at Caracas this afternoon:<br />

“<strong>Venezuela</strong> has appointed Minister to Engl<strong>and</strong> Dr. Juan Pietrie, who is now in Europe as<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister to Germany <strong>and</strong> Spain.”<br />

This act is a practical resumption of diplomatic relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[3 March 1897]<br />

- 406 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA REPORT<br />

<strong>The</strong> report of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Commission is not only the record of a piece of public work which<br />

has been most faithfully performed. It has the curious fate of having been rendered quite useless for<br />

its original purpose by the progress of events, <strong>and</strong> yet of serving even a more important purpose <strong>and</strong><br />

of having a value beyond that which was expected of it.<br />

For the original purpose of the appointment of the commission was to inform our Government<br />

whether the facts of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary disputed warranted our interference in that dispute.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> had maintained that a European power was attempting to extend its political system<br />

beyond the bounds of its existing colonies or dependencies. For more than seventy years it had been<br />

our avowed policy to resist such an extension on the part of any European power. In this case we<br />

had urged Great Britain to submit the dispute with <strong>Venezuela</strong> to an impartial tribunal of arbitration,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Great Britain had declined to do so. It therefore became necessary for us to know the merits of<br />

the case for our own guidance, <strong>and</strong> it was for that purpose that the commission was appointed.<br />

But before the commission had concluded its labors it became evident that we had no need of it.<br />

In the interval Great Britain had consented to our original proposition to submit her claim to<br />

arbitration. In the result of the arbitration we were bound beforeh<strong>and</strong> to acquiesce, as were both the<br />

contending parties. But before this conclusion was reached the United States commission had<br />

collected all the information extant that bore upon the question at issue <strong>and</strong> had established that the<br />

question is one in which neither party can sustain its whole contention, <strong>and</strong> is therefore eminently<br />

one to be settled by arbitration. <strong>The</strong> commission is therefore fully justified in saying that its own<br />

work, while it has been terminated by the treaty of arbitration, “has been a factor of no<br />

inconsiderable importance in the solution of the problem.” Moreover, it has collected for the use, as<br />

it turns out, of another tribunal all the evidence in the case, <strong>and</strong> has collected it <strong>and</strong> presented it with<br />

complete impartiality. <strong>The</strong>re is no need either or duplicating or of verifying its investigations. Its<br />

report will necessarily “impose itself” upon the tribunal of arbitration. <strong>The</strong> commission has, in<br />

effect, done the work of the tribunal for it in advance, <strong>and</strong> in this way has rendered even a more<br />

important service than it was appointed to render to the cause of justice <strong>and</strong> the cause of peace.<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

[3 March 1897]<br />

- 407 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN TREATY<br />

President Crespo’s Message to Congress Regarding the Document Received Here.<br />

THIS NATION GREATLY PRAISED<br />

It Is Believed that the Treaty Will Be Ratified by an Almost<br />

Unanimous Vote—<strong>The</strong> Proceedings Which Will Follow<br />

WASHINGTON, March 11.—<strong>The</strong> State Department to-day received a copy of President<br />

Crespo’s message to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress, Feb. 20, sent by the American Minister at Caracas, in<br />

which he discusses the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration treaty at considerable length. He says in part:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Department of Foreign Affairs has given during the past year particular attention to the<br />

boundary question of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, a question of absorbing interest ever since his Excellency, Mr.<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>, demonstrated to the world the way in which the United States intended to exercise the<br />

intervention solicited by <strong>Venezuela</strong>. After this the dispute assumed a most favorable aspect.”<br />

He narrates in detail the course taken by the United States in establishing the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Commission, <strong>and</strong> the voluminous proof which <strong>Venezuela</strong> submitted to that body in support of its<br />

rights to the disputed territory, <strong>and</strong> continues:<br />

“While the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government, through the patriotic <strong>and</strong> earnest efforts of its Foreign<br />

Office, was presenting <strong>and</strong> urging its rights before the Boundary Commission, the State Department<br />

at Washington, with laudable efforts, was endeavoring to secure arbitration from the <strong>British</strong><br />

Ministry, in order to adjust with greater facility <strong>and</strong> success this unpleasant dispute of almost a<br />

century. <strong>The</strong> first official knowledge the Executive power had of the means employed to induce our<br />

powerful adversary to accept arbitration unreservedly <strong>and</strong> unconditionally, for which <strong>Venezuela</strong> had<br />

always contended, was derived from the publication of the correspondence between the<br />

Governments at Washington <strong>and</strong> London from February to June of the past year, <strong>and</strong> which, being<br />

so favorable to this republic, was sent here to be translated into Spanish <strong>and</strong> printed. Latterly this<br />

Government, through its Legation at Washington, was consulted as to a point in relation to those<br />

negotiations for arbitration. <strong>The</strong> reply of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister of Foreign Affairs, with an<br />

opinion contrary to that which was seemingly suggested on this point, arrived in Washington at the<br />

time when the answers from Great Britain were expected as to the determinate points of the<br />

arbitration.”<br />

This Government’s Efforts<br />

.<br />

“At this juncture the Government was informed that on the 12th of November there had been<br />

signed in Washington by his Excellency Mr. Olney, Secretary of State of the United States, <strong>and</strong> Sir<br />

Julian Pauncefote, Ambassador of Her Britannic Majesty in Washington, a protocol with the<br />

essential bases for a treaty between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, which, by means of arbitration,<br />

would put an end to the old dispute between the two nations. <strong>The</strong> bases were then submitted by the<br />

Washington Government for the consideration of this Government by means of a letter to me from<br />

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1897 – 1898<br />

his Excellency Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>, in which he manifested the noble desire to see accepted a compact<br />

which, in his opinion, was just <strong>and</strong> advantageous.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> responsibilities of those who are intrusted with the administration of public affairs by the<br />

suffrage of the people increase <strong>and</strong> become graver when the preservation of interests closely linked<br />

with the National life is the subject to be dealt with. <strong>The</strong>re is in the breast of the Chief Magistrate<br />

who has the good of the Republic at heart a struggle between the ideas of the moment <strong>and</strong> those<br />

born of a concern for the future.<br />

“To study well the former <strong>and</strong> the latter, to weight the advantages <strong>and</strong> risks of the one <strong>and</strong> the<br />

other without silencing the dictates of conscience <strong>and</strong> reason, such are the duties, truly arduous, of<br />

the ruler during whose term of office has chanced to fall the settlement of an affair which, like that<br />

of the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary question, has been growing graver—a struggle without a truce <strong>and</strong> full of<br />

lamentable incidents to the party weak to material defenses. Public opinion, to which the governing<br />

power must always listen, especially when the territorial integrity is the subject of discussion,<br />

manifested itself so divided as to the bases proposed to <strong>Venezuela</strong> that it would have been in vain<br />

for the most expert observer to have deduced from such adversity of opinions any expression of the<br />

public sentiment.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Government, in forming its opinion, should naturally take into consideration the<br />

conditions under which the protocol was signed <strong>and</strong> presented. One of the signers was the Secretary<br />

of State of the Nation which, fully alive to the grave consequences of its action, generously<br />

interposed in this dispute, seeking an arrangement which would at once preserve the laws of the<br />

National decorum <strong>and</strong> the continental integrity. <strong>The</strong> recourse to arbitration offered itself, <strong>and</strong>,<br />

although by no means in the manner wished for by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, was more consonant than any other<br />

with the desires manifested.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> Government deemed it proper to insert in the treaty a provision that <strong>Venezuela</strong> should<br />

have a voice in the naming of the arbitral tribunal. As soon as this change was proposed its<br />

acceptance was procured. <strong>The</strong> action of the United States had produced a result the after effects or<br />

which were, from a moral point of view, indispensably subject to the effective <strong>and</strong> powerful prestige<br />

of said Nation.”<br />

Speedy Action Asked For<br />

“<strong>The</strong> plan of settlement was presented for the consideration of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, with no proposition<br />

for co-operative participation, contrary to the sovereignty <strong>and</strong> independence of the republic; further,<br />

as the United States had conducted the negotiations according to their judgment alone, the definite<br />

acceptance of the bases will always involve for them a sort of friendly responsibility which will be in<br />

every case a guarantee of future harmony between the two nations represented by the arbitral<br />

tribunal.<br />

“It is eminently just to recognize the fact that the great Republic has strenuously endeavored to<br />

conduct this matter in the most favorable way, <strong>and</strong> the result obtained represents an effort of<br />

intelligence <strong>and</strong> good will worthy of praise <strong>and</strong> thanks from us who are so intimately acquainted<br />

with the conditions of this most complicated question.<br />

“It is your duty, according to the constitutional law of the republic, to examine the treaty which<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister Plenipotentiary signed in accordance with the bases referred to <strong>and</strong> the<br />

change proposed by the executive power in regard to the formation of the arbitral tribunal. And as<br />

this is an affair of such importance involving as it does such sacred interests, I beg you that from the<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

moment it is presented for your consideration you will postpone all other business until you shall<br />

decide upon it.”<br />

An unsigned copy of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary treaty was sent to Caracas for the information of<br />

the Ministry a fortnight ago. A Spanish translation of the treaty, signed by Sir Julian Pauncefote <strong>and</strong><br />

Señor Andrade, was mailed on the 7th inst., <strong>and</strong> will reach Caracas on Saturday of this week. It will<br />

be laid by President Crespo before the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Senate on Monday next. Under the rules of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Congress, all bills <strong>and</strong> treaties are discussed on alternate days for a period of six days, in<br />

order that members who were absent on the first day may have an opportunity of participating in<br />

the debates, while the Senate generally may have the additional time in which to consider <strong>and</strong> digest<br />

the matter under discussion. <strong>The</strong> treaty will thus reach a vote on Saturday, the 20th inst.<br />

Approval of the Treaty Undoubted<br />

All the advices from Caracas indicate its approval by the Senate by a practically unanimous vote.<br />

<strong>The</strong> opposition papers in Caracas still criticise certain provisions of the treaty, but maintain that,<br />

notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing these objections, it ought to receive the approval of the Senate.<br />

After the treaty has had a similar approval from the <strong>British</strong> Parliament, ratifications will be<br />

exchanged in Washington between Sir Julian <strong>and</strong> Señor Andrade. Within the three months following<br />

this exchange, the tribunal of arbitration will endeavor to select the fifth member of the board,<br />

failing in which the appointment will be made by King Oscar of Sweden. <strong>The</strong> evidence will then be<br />

submitted to the arbitrators <strong>and</strong> the five members will not come together until next Summer a year,<br />

when they will meet in Paris prepared to settle the points at issue.<br />

‘Meanwhile, diplomatic relations between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, which have been<br />

suspended for a term of years, will be renewed. Mr. Pietra, who is now a general diplomatic<br />

representative in Europe for <strong>Venezuela</strong>, will receive such enlarged powers for the time being as will<br />

enable him to represent his country in Great Britain. Until Mr. Pietra shall present himself at<br />

London, announcing the desire of his country to resume diplomatic relations, no appointment will<br />

be made by Great Britain, inasmuch as <strong>Venezuela</strong> was the first to sever these relations, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

request for the renewal must first come from her.<br />

[12 March 1897]<br />

- 408 -<br />

GUIANA BOUNDARY TREATY<br />

Minister Andrade Expects Ratification in <strong>Venezuela</strong> This Week<br />

WASHINGTON. April 6.—Although he has no official advices on the subject, Minister<br />

Andrade expects that the <strong>Guiana</strong> boundary arbitration treaty will be ratified by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Congress <strong>and</strong> signed by the President this week. After its ratification by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the <strong>British</strong><br />

Government will formally approve it, <strong>and</strong> then ratifications will be exchanged either at Washington<br />

or London.<br />

<strong>The</strong> active resumption of diplomatic relations between the two Governments, which have been<br />

suspended for some time, is expected to promptly follow the ratification.<br />

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1897 – 1898<br />

[7 April 1897]<br />

- 409 -<br />

VENEZUELAN TREATY RATIFIED<br />

Minister Thomas Sends the <strong>News</strong> to Washington<br />

WASHINGTON, April 7.—Confirmation of the reported ratification by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Congress of the arbitration treaty has come to the State Department from United States Minister<br />

Thomas at Caracas, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n capital. He sent the following cablegram, dated yesterday:<br />

“Treaty was ratified by Congress yesterday.”<br />

[8 April 1897]<br />

- 410 -<br />

JAMES J. STORROW DEAD<br />

Boston Lawyer Who Was Counsel for <strong>Venezuela</strong> in the Arbitration Proceedings<br />

WASHINGTON, April 15.—Judge James J. Storrow, a lawyer of Boston dropped dead to-day<br />

in the Congressional Library.<br />

Judge Storrow took an important part in the proceedings incident to the arbitration treaty<br />

between the Governments of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> for the settlement of the boundary line<br />

dispute.<br />

He was appointed special counsel by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government to represent it, <strong>and</strong> his brief<br />

was considered one of the clearest <strong>and</strong> best presentations on the boundary question that was<br />

prepared. After Minister Andrade <strong>and</strong> Sir Julian Pauncefote had agreed on the terms of a treaty, Mr.<br />

Storrow accompanied the former to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, when the treaty was presented to the President of<br />

that country. He returned to the United States with Mr. Andrade, <strong>and</strong> since then spent most of his<br />

time in Washington.<br />

He appeared to be in good health, <strong>and</strong> his sudden death was a great shock to his friends.<br />

[16 April 1897]<br />

- 411 -<br />

COURCEL AS ARBITRATOR<br />

Probability that the French Jurist <strong>and</strong> Diplomat Will Be Chosen in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Case<br />

THE COURT TO SIT IN 1898<br />

Little Doubt that the Four Arbitrators Will Agree upon Baron Courcel,<br />

in Which Event King Oscar Will Not Be Called On<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

WASHINGTON, April 18.—<strong>The</strong> name of Baron Courcel, the eminent French jurist <strong>and</strong><br />

diplomat, at present French Ambassador to Great Britain, probably will be chosen as the fifth, or<br />

final, arbitrator in the court of arbitration between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great Britain. <strong>The</strong> treaty of<br />

arbitration recently ratified by these two Governments provides that the fifth arbitrator shall be<br />

chosen by the four designated to represent the two countries, <strong>and</strong> in the event of their inability to<br />

agree on a fifth, then King Oscar of Norway <strong>and</strong> Sweden is to name the final arbitrator. <strong>The</strong>re<br />

appears to be little doubt, however, that the four arbitrators will reach an agreement, <strong>and</strong> with this<br />

end in view, semi-official inquiries have been made as to the availability of Baron Courcel. His<br />

choice would add another notable name to a court which promises to be remarkable for the<br />

personnel of its members, who thus far are Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer, in behalf of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Baron Herschell <strong>and</strong> Sir Richard Henn Collins in behalf of Great Britain.<br />

<strong>The</strong> court will meet in Paris in the Summer or 898, the preceding time being required for the<br />

exchange of pleadings In the meantime, <strong>and</strong> within three months of the exchange of ratifications,<br />

the final arbitrator must be chosen. As the treaty is ratified by both Governments, the formal<br />

exchange of ratifications will follow at an early day, either in Washington or London, <strong>and</strong><br />

negotiations toward naming the fifth arbitrator will immediately follow in order that an agreement<br />

may be reached within the three months prescribed by the treaty.<br />

Up to the time of his sudden death a few days ago, Mr. James S. Storrow, chief counsel for<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, had made careful inquiry as to the availability of Baron Courcel as the fifth arbitrator.<br />

<strong>The</strong> abilities of the French diplomat were regarded as eminently fitting him for the place. It was felt,<br />

however, that as France had a boundary dispute with Brazil involving the same points as the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>-<strong>British</strong> case, Baron Courcel might have fixed convictions concerning the issue involved.<br />

Mr. Storrow conferred with the French Embassy in Washington, <strong>and</strong> the general conclusion reached<br />

was that Baron Courcel could have no prejudices by reason of the Franco-Brazilian boundary<br />

contest, which also has been submitted to arbitration by a treaty just signed.<br />

Baron Courcel is one of the foremost jurists of Europe, <strong>and</strong> as such was chosen as President of<br />

the court of arbitration between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain on the Bering Sea question. He<br />

comes from one of the old Royalist families of the empire, but is a sturdy Republican, <strong>and</strong> has taken<br />

front rank among French leaders. It was during the strained condition of European affairs a year<br />

ago, requiring skillful diplomacy, that France availed herself of his services as Ambassador to Great<br />

Britain. He speaks English fluently, which would materially aid in a court made up of Englishspeaking<br />

arbitrators.<br />

[18 April 1897]<br />

- 412 -<br />

VENEZUELA BOUNDARY TREATY<br />

Final Ratification Exchanged Between Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

at Washington Yesterday<br />

WASHINGTON, June 14.—<strong>The</strong> final ratification of the boundary treaty between Great Britain<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> was exchanged at the State Department at 3 o’clock this afternoon.<br />

559


1897 – 1898<br />

Because this exchange of ratifications marked the closing chapter in the negotiations begun in<br />

the last <strong>and</strong> deciding phase, almost two years ago, the occasion was marked with some formality.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re were present in the diplomatic room of the State Department Sir Julian Pauncefote, Señor<br />

Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, <strong>and</strong> his Secretary of Legation; Acting Secretary of State William<br />

R. Day, <strong>and</strong> Assistant Secretary Thomas W. Cridler, who has been instrumental in framing the<br />

various treaties, protocols, <strong>and</strong> other writings connected with the treaty.<br />

What remained to be done to-day was to exchange the copies of the treaties held by each party<br />

<strong>and</strong> to sign what is known as the exchange protocols. For this purpose Señor Andrade brought<br />

along the same magnificent golden penholder, with its eagle quill <strong>and</strong> diamond-studded heart, that<br />

had been used last February to sign the original drafts of the treaties. This pen is the property of the<br />

brother of the Minister, <strong>and</strong> was made for this particular purpose. It will be sent to <strong>Venezuela</strong> now<br />

that it has fulfilled its functions, not to be used again, but to he preserved as a relic.<br />

When the signing was over <strong>and</strong> each of the parties held the exchange copies of the treaties, there<br />

was a mutual exchange of congratulations, <strong>and</strong> Mr. Cridler was thanked for the pains he had taken<br />

to prepare all of the documents for the occasion.<br />

<strong>The</strong> treaty now becomes binding upon both Governments, Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

they must at once begin the preparation of the eases to be submitted to the arbitrators, who will<br />

meet in Paris for organization, probably some time next Winter.<br />

With to-day’s ceremony, the connection of the United States Government with the negotiations<br />

ceases, <strong>and</strong> the two Governments will be left to work out the boundary dispute to a conclusion,<br />

unless there should be some totally unexpected interruption in the workings of the machinery which<br />

has been so carefully prepared to insure a settlement of this celebrated cause.<br />

[15 June 1897]<br />

- 413 -<br />

ENGLISHMEN FIRED UPON<br />

Comm<strong>and</strong>er of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Frontier Police Exchanges Shots with a Hunting Party<br />

AND IS SLIGHLY WOUNDED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Englishmen, by a Strategic Move, Capture Him <strong>and</strong> His Force—<br />

A Truce Patched Up <strong>and</strong> No International Complications Likely<br />

KINGSTON. Jamaica. Aug. 24.—Advices just to h<strong>and</strong> from the northwest territory of <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> tell of an attack made on an English settler <strong>and</strong> his party by the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n frontier police.<br />

George H. Moore is a grant holder on the English side of the Amacura River. <strong>The</strong> other day he left<br />

his residence with a party of Englishmen for a fishing <strong>and</strong> hunting expedition to Barima.<br />

When the boat got opposite to the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n outpost station at the mouth of the Amacura, the<br />

party were hailed by the garrison <strong>and</strong> informed that they would not be allowed to proceed. Mr.<br />

Moore asked why, on what grounds, <strong>and</strong> by what authority?<br />

No answer was given, <strong>and</strong> thereupon the boat which had been puffed up at the challenge, hauled<br />

its wind <strong>and</strong> proceeded outward. On seeing this Col. Castania, the officer in comm<strong>and</strong> of the station<br />

ran out on the shore flourishing a rifle <strong>and</strong> yelling that be would shoot if the boat did not run in.<br />

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Not believing that the officer could be in earnest Mr. Moore made a derisive reply, whereupon<br />

Castania opened fire. By the time he had got two shots Moore <strong>and</strong> his friends were answering, <strong>and</strong><br />

Castania was hit in the leg. <strong>The</strong> wound was a very slight one, but it stopped him, <strong>and</strong> he hobbled<br />

into the station.<br />

Meanwhile the soldiers of the guard were seen to be busy with a gun that stood on a little<br />

eminence <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>ed the mouth of the river. To get out of range Moore had to run his boat<br />

right in under the gun. Seeing this the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns supposed that the Englishmen were going to<br />

surrender, <strong>and</strong> ran down to meet them.<br />

But Moore <strong>and</strong> his friends were by this time in a fine rage <strong>and</strong> up to mischief. <strong>The</strong> opportunity<br />

was too good to be lost. At the first sign of fight the whole garrison of six men had run out off the<br />

station to man the gun, leaving their arms in the building. When the boat grounded within a few<br />

yards of the station door, the garrison were still some twenty yards oft, <strong>and</strong> there was only Castania<br />

in the station nursing his wounded leg.<br />

Apparently Castania bad not seen the boat coming in. At any rate before he knew what hit him<br />

Moore <strong>and</strong> his three companions were in the station <strong>and</strong> had him down, <strong>and</strong> by the time the<br />

garrison were on h<strong>and</strong> they found four rifles covering them.<br />

Castania threatened the Englishmen with instant death <strong>and</strong> destruction, calling on his men to<br />

shoot down the “gringoes.” But unfortunately, the “gringoes” were between the men <strong>and</strong> their arms,<br />

thus being completely masters of the situation.<br />

Eventually a truce was patched up, <strong>and</strong> the party of Englishmen left their disconcerted assailants<br />

cowed, but in no amiable mood. <strong>The</strong> incident was at once reported to the colonial authorities at<br />

Georgetown, but it appears that sooner than interrupt the present friendly conditions of diplomatic<br />

negotiations, no action has been taken in the matter. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government is reported to<br />

have recalled Castania from the frontier, but it is not known what has been done with him.<br />

<strong>The</strong> strangest part of the matter is, that since this incident the Colonial Government has<br />

stringently enforced in the whole frontier region the regulations against citizens carrying arms of any<br />

sort, <strong>and</strong> the police have accordingly disarmed the settlers. This action has created great<br />

dissatisfaction, <strong>and</strong> a petition is to he sent to the Governor embodying a protest <strong>and</strong> threatening to<br />

ab<strong>and</strong>on the territory if the means of self-defense on emergencies are not restored or an adequate<br />

protective police force provided.<br />

[31 August 1897]<br />

- 414 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA BOUNDARY COMMISSION<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Commission was less than a year in existence, having been appointed<br />

Jan. 1, 1896, <strong>and</strong> notified by Secretary of State Olney on Dec. 28 of the same year, with the<br />

assurance of the highest appreciation by the President of “the diligence, skill, <strong>and</strong> effectiveness” with<br />

which its labors had been conducted, that there was no further occasion for the prosecution of those<br />

labors.<br />

In closing up its work, the commission put in permanent, convenient, <strong>and</strong> useful form the<br />

results of its labors – results declared by Secretary Olney to be “of great <strong>and</strong> permanent value to the<br />

561


1897 – 1898<br />

peoples of the three countries concerned” in the controversy about the <strong>Venezuela</strong>-<strong>Guyana</strong> boundary<br />

that led to its appointment. <strong>The</strong> commission made a closing report to President Clevel<strong>and</strong> on Feb. 7<br />

of this year; but that report conveyed to those who read it no information or opinion to show that<br />

the Commissioners had been absolutely convinced for one side or the other. Indeed, the<br />

Commissioners carefully avoided saying more than that “there is no such absolute certainty of right<br />

on the part of either [<strong>Venezuela</strong> or <strong>Guiana</strong>] as to justify a more forcible assertion thereof.”<br />

Great Britain had maintained very positive language about this boundary dispute until the<br />

American commission began its work. This may have come to be the case because it was assumed<br />

that the controversy would never be pressed as it was after President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s startling message<br />

of 1895. But the <strong>British</strong> examination, or re-examination, of the case seems to have been taken up at<br />

the same time that our Commissioners took it up; presumably their examiners became acquainted<br />

with the same history that was looked up, verified, compared <strong>and</strong> sifted by our Commissioners, <strong>and</strong><br />

the <strong>British</strong> assent to have the question between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> submitted to arbitration<br />

justifies the conclusion that the <strong>British</strong> examiners were convinced, quite as early as the American<br />

Commissioners, that there was “no such absolute certainty of right on the part of either as to justify<br />

a more forcible assertion thereof.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission made a report in four: volumes, Volume I appearing last. Volumes II, III, <strong>and</strong><br />

IV, presenting Prof. Burr’s quotations from the Dutch archives <strong>and</strong> documents furnished by the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government, cartographical reports <strong>and</strong> an atlas of seventy-six maps, were followed by<br />

the first volume, containing the report of the commission <strong>and</strong> the historical reports of Prof. T.<br />

Franklin Jameson <strong>and</strong> Prof. George Lincoln Burr. This historical volume of 400 pages is the most<br />

interesting of the four produced by the commission, <strong>and</strong> in many respects the most important, al<br />

though it may be assumed that the cartographical history collected contributed in some degree to<br />

bring about the consent of Great Britain to submit its contention to an arbitral tribunal.<br />

Prof. Jameson, in his report on “Spanish <strong>and</strong> Dutch Settlements Prior to 1648,” beginning with<br />

the history of Santo Thomé, at the head of the Orinoco delta, <strong>and</strong> examining the question of “other<br />

Spanish settlements,” the missions, Dutch ports, <strong>and</strong> the question of Point Barima, finds no<br />

evidence of any Spanish occupation of the disputed territory in 1648, nor of any but temporary<br />

occupation of it before that time. Nor does he find evidence of any Dutch occupation in 1648<br />

northward or westward of the Essequibo, nor any evidence of occupation of Point Barima before<br />

1648.<br />

Prof. Burr, whose investigations were more extended <strong>and</strong> minute than those of Prof. Jameson,<br />

involving laborious examination of archives, concluded, as the result of his examination of the<br />

meaning of Articles V <strong>and</strong> VI of the Treaty of Münster, that: “It is improbable that in the intent of<br />

its framers <strong>and</strong> its ratifiers, the Treaty of Münster conceded to the Dutch a right to win from the<br />

natives l<strong>and</strong>s claimed by Spain,” <strong>and</strong> that “It does not appear that it was ever interpreted in this<br />

sense by either Spain or the Dutch.”<br />

His examination of the Dutch archives led Prof. Bunn to infer the assumption by the Dutch<br />

Government of a right to plant colonies in the district known as the Wild Coast; but he found<br />

nothing to suggest that this was counted exclusively a Dutch right; nor was there, in the grants<br />

examined by him, any claim of sovereignty over the coast as a whole.<br />

When he looked carefully through all the accessible archives he found that the earliest Dutch<br />

expedition to <strong>Guiana</strong>, then conceived of as a part of the Spanish Kingdom of Peru, reached that<br />

coast in 1598, <strong>and</strong> was formally recognized by the Dutch States General as one to a place<br />

theretofore unvisited by Netherl<strong>and</strong>ers. <strong>The</strong> earliest date of Dutch occupation was 1613, <strong>and</strong> there<br />

562


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

was no intimation of any claim by the Dutch to <strong>Guiana</strong> as a whole, or to any part of its western<br />

Coast. Occupation of the Essequibo by the Dutch dates from 1625: settlement began in 1657, was<br />

carried on with vigor in the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> Pomeroon; trade, very primitive in its methods <strong>and</strong><br />

narrow in its limits, after the middle of the eighteenth century passed from the h<strong>and</strong>s of the Dutch<br />

to the Spanish. Generally, the testimony of the Dutch archives is that there was no exclusive claim<br />

by the Dutch to the <strong>Guiana</strong> coast, <strong>and</strong> that even as late as 1801-2 the delimitation of the <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

boundary was in doubt.<br />

On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the history of the Spanish claim as to the boundary in <strong>Guiana</strong> was not clearly<br />

made out. <strong>The</strong>re were Dutch remonstrances in 1759 <strong>and</strong> 1769, to which Spanish authorities never<br />

gave formal answer. Claims were once or twice implied by the Spanish authorities of the Orinoco,<br />

when encroachments by the Dutch were made upon the Cuyuni. But among all the claims Prof.<br />

Burr found none which bad the form of an official utterance or which undertook to state with<br />

definiteness the rightful course of a boundary.<br />

Enough has been given to show that there has been for many years much blind following, by<br />

diplomatic officers <strong>and</strong> careless historians, of misleading assertions concerning the <strong>Venezuela</strong>-<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> boundary; <strong>and</strong> the turn that was given to the controversy by the United States becomes most<br />

satisfactory to contemplate in the light of this report, which will doubtless be a new light to the<br />

arbitral tribunal that is to settle the boundary for Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[9 September 1897]<br />

- 415 -<br />

BRITISH-VENEZUELA UMPIRE<br />

Fifth Arbitrator Chosen Without King Oscar’s Assistance<br />

WASHINGTON, Sept. 24.—A final decision has been reached by the arbitrators who are to<br />

determine the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary line, as to the fifth arbitrator, or umpire, who is to act<br />

with them. His name is for the present withheld. It is not Baron Courcel, whose name has been<br />

mentioned in this connection, nor King Oscar of Sweden, who was to name the umpire only in case<br />

the arbitrators failed to agree.<br />

An agreement was reached without the necessity of calling on the Swedish sovereign. <strong>The</strong><br />

umpire is a European, but this is said to without significance, since no question involving the<br />

Monroe doctrine is to be submitted to the tribunal. <strong>The</strong> arbitrators In behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong> are Chief<br />

Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme Court.<br />

[25 September 1897]<br />

- 416 -<br />

ARBITRATION AND VENEZUELA<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> Will Continue the Old Negotiations—Signor Andrade to Go to London<br />

563


1897 – 1898<br />

From <strong>The</strong> London St<strong>and</strong>ard<br />

A correspondent says: “I have reason to state that neither the State Department at Washington<br />

nor Sir Sultan Pauncefote, <strong>British</strong> Ambassador now on leave, has received any instructions to reopen<br />

negotiations on the question of general arbitration between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the United States, for<br />

the very reason that there is no need for instructions, <strong>and</strong> that the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain<br />

have never actually broken off the arbitration negotiations, which have only been delayed on<br />

account of the necessity of passing the Tariff bill. <strong>The</strong> arbitration negotiations will be continued next<br />

month in the most friendly manner, when Sir Julian Pauncefote returns to his post at Washington,<br />

<strong>and</strong> may state that on this side of the Atlantic In diplomatic circles there is a great desire to come to<br />

a settlement with a fair recognition of each country’s claims. Sir Julian Pauncefote had interviews<br />

yesterday with the permanent officials of the Foreign Office in Downing Street, mainly for the<br />

purpose of knowing when it would be absolutely necessary for him to return to his post, which<br />

practically depends upon the date when the special Commissioners for Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United<br />

States—Mr. D’Arcy Thomson (Engl<strong>and</strong>) <strong>and</strong> Prof. Jordan (United States)—on the Bering Sea<br />

inquiry, return from their special inquiry in Alaska as to scaling.<br />

“It is believed that these officers cannot reach Washington where the negotiations are to be<br />

continued until late in October, when it is necessary that Sir Julian Pauncefote should be at his post,<br />

<strong>and</strong> his intention is that he should be at Washington when the Bering Sea Special Commissioners<br />

arrive, so that negotiations may not be delayed. <strong>The</strong> two experts were due in the middle of October,<br />

but it is now more likely they cannot return until November, in which case Sir Julian Pauncefote will<br />

not return to Washington until the end of October. His Excellency will, however, remain in town<br />

from now to the time of his departure to the States, as matters may at any moment dem<strong>and</strong> his<br />

attention. In connection with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question, I am able to state that every appearance of<br />

negotiations is favorable. <strong>The</strong> announcement of M. Andrade’s appointment as the new President of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> did not come in the least as a surprise. It was all along expected. He is the elder brother<br />

of the M. Andrade, <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister at Washington, who so ably carried out with Sir Julian<br />

Pauncefote the negotiations on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question.<br />

<strong>The</strong>re is even more favorable news in that there is an almost certain possibility that Signor<br />

Andrade of Washington may be appointed at once permanent resident Minister to this country for<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. It is, of course, known that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister at Berlin was accredited to this<br />

country at a certain time in the negotiations, but his appointment was considered temporary. M.<br />

Andrade, brother of the President <strong>and</strong> representative of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in America, has the whole history<br />

of the negotiations in re the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> frontier at his fingers’ ends, <strong>and</strong> negotiations would be<br />

much expedited by his appointment to this country. M. Andrade is a very well read diplomatist, a<br />

man well informed upon every subject, <strong>and</strong> even outside this is one of the most courteous servants<br />

in the foreign diplomatic service. He will no doubt be a persona grata at the Court of St. James’s.<br />

[26 September 1897]<br />

- 417 -<br />

Fifth <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitrator<br />

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LONDON, Oct. 1.—<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> says this morning that the fifth <strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitrator will<br />

be an international lawyer of the highest reputation, whose name will be published in the course of a<br />

few days if he finally accepts the post.<br />

[1 October 1897]<br />

- 418 -<br />

BRITISH-VENEZUELA BOUNDARY<br />

M. Maertens, the Russian Jurist, Chosen as Umpire <strong>and</strong> President<br />

of the Arbitration Court<br />

WASHINGTON, Oct 13.—<strong>The</strong> international court of arbitration which is to pass on the<br />

<strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary has been completed by the selection of M. Maertens, a distinguished<br />

Russian jurist, as umpire, <strong>and</strong> arrangements are being made for the assembling of the court at Paris<br />

during the late Summer or Fall of next year.<br />

In the meantime the briefs of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> of <strong>Venezuela</strong> are being prepared, but none of<br />

the papers has yet been submitted. M. Maertens will act not only as umpire, but also as President of<br />

the court.<br />

<strong>The</strong> announcement that a European umpire had been chosen was made in these dispatches<br />

some time since, but the name had been withheld until the sanction of the Czar could be secured for<br />

M. Maertens’s services as arbitrator. Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> each submitted a list of<br />

distinguished jurists who would be acceptable as umpire. <strong>The</strong>se embraced some of the most noted<br />

men of Europe, but M. Maertens’s name was the only one on the lists of both countries. He is an<br />

official of the Russian Foreign Office, professor of international law at the University of St.<br />

Petersburg, <strong>and</strong> author of “Maertens’s Treaties,” the st<strong>and</strong>ard book of reference on all the treaties of<br />

the world. Little doubt is felt as to his acceptance.<br />

Prof. Maertens was one of the delegates named by the Russian Government to represent it at the<br />

approaching Bering Sea sealing conference in this city. It is understood that his selection as the fifth<br />

arbitrator <strong>and</strong> head of the commission makes at impossible for him to participate in the Washington<br />

conference, so that the Russian interests in the meeting probably will remain in the care of Mr.<br />

Botkine <strong>and</strong> the two delegates who will sit with him.<br />

[14 October 1897]<br />

- 419 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA BOUNDARY<br />

Documents Found in Georgetown Are Said to Confirm the <strong>British</strong> Contention<br />

COLONIAL ARCHIVES SEARCHED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Memor<strong>and</strong>a Give a Running History of the Dutch Settlement of <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

During the Seventeenth Century<br />

565


1897 – 1898<br />

LONDON. Nov. 25.—A letter received here from Georgetown, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, announces that<br />

Great Britain’s legal experts have unearthed in the Colonial archives there a series of volumes<br />

containing memor<strong>and</strong>a giving a running history of the Dutch settlement of <strong>Guiana</strong>, from the middle<br />

to near the close of the seventeenth century, fully confirming the <strong>British</strong> boundary claims.<br />

<strong>The</strong> memor<strong>and</strong>a, it is added, were written or dictated by the Comm<strong>and</strong>er of the settlement, the<br />

seat of the Government being on the River Essequibo. <strong>The</strong>y contain frequent references to trading<br />

expeditions to the Dutch depots on the Upper Cuyuni, to the Moruca, <strong>and</strong> to all the northwest<br />

country which the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns assert the Dutch never possessed.<br />

It is claimed that the discoveries clear the question <strong>and</strong> will greatly facilitate the work of the<br />

arbitrators.<br />

[26 November 1897]<br />

- 420 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN DOCUMENTS<br />

Colonial Office Believes <strong>The</strong>m “Altogether Insignificant”<br />

LONDON, Nov. 27.—<strong>The</strong> newspapers were apparently too previous in crowing over the find<br />

of alleged important <strong>Venezuela</strong>n documents at Greytown,* which was immediately hailed as settling<br />

the case, <strong>and</strong> as a useful rebuff to American “meddlers in their neighbors’ concerns.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Colonial Office now announces that the value of the documents is believed to be<br />

“altogether insignificant,” <strong>and</strong> that they will not necessitate an alteration in the statement of the<br />

<strong>British</strong> case, as already submitted.<br />

[28 November 1897]<br />

(Editor’s note: * This is obviously an error in the original report. It should be “Georgetown”.)<br />

- 421 -<br />

BRITISH-VENEZUELA BOUNDARY<br />

Briefs to be Ready In February, When the Arbitration Court Will Sit<br />

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29.—<strong>The</strong> briefs in the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> arbitration case are expected to<br />

be ready the middle of February, <strong>and</strong> the preliminary work of the arbitration court will then begin.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Government has named Dr. Rojas, a prominent lawyer <strong>and</strong> diplomat, lately resident<br />

in Paris, as its agent before the court. With him will be associated eminent counsel, whose names<br />

have not yet been announced.<br />

It had been intended to hold the court at Paris, but the sessions ma be held at London, St.<br />

Petersburg, or some other convenient point. In the meantime the briefs will be forwarded to the<br />

President of the court, <strong>and</strong> thence distributed to the individual members. It is thought that the case<br />

will not be closed <strong>and</strong> a decision reached before the end of the coming year.<br />

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[30 December 1897]<br />

- 422 -<br />

VENEZUELA BOUNDARY CASE<br />

<strong>British</strong> Experts Returning to Engl<strong>and</strong> with Evidence<br />

CARACAS, <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Dec. 31.—A report has reached here that two legal experts who were<br />

commissioned by the Government of Great Britain to go to <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> to collect evidence in the<br />

boundary dispute are returning to Engl<strong>and</strong> with many volumes of testimony bearing upon the<br />

question, which will simplify the work of the commission when it meets. <strong>The</strong> wonder here is that<br />

this testimony has not been unearthed at an earlier date.<br />

Francis B. Loomis, the American Minister, sailed for the United States on the last “D” Line<br />

steamer. It is generally understood here that his mission to Washington is in connection with the<br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> boundary question. It is expected that the absence of the Minister will be brief. . .<br />

[7 January 1898]<br />

- 423 -<br />

VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY REPORT<br />

Committee Completed Its Work <strong>and</strong> Kept Within the Appropriation<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 25.—Responding to a Senate resolution the President sent to the Senate<br />

to-day a statement by the Secretary of State in regard to the report of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary<br />

committee <strong>and</strong> also a statement by the Auditor for the State Department concerning the accounts of<br />

the commission.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Auditor states that no accounts have been received since September last, <strong>and</strong> there is now<br />

remaining of the $100,000 appropriated for the commission $2,205. Secretary Sherman says in his<br />

communication that the business of the commission has been concluded <strong>and</strong> within the limits of the<br />

appropriation. He also says the supply of copies of the report printed by the commission has been<br />

practically exhausted. <strong>The</strong> report will be reprinted for the use of the Senate.<br />

[26 January 1898]<br />

- 424 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Retains Counsel<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 30.—Severo Mallet- Prevost of New York, a member of the firm of<br />

Curtis, Mallet-Prevost & Colt, has been retained by the Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong> as junior counsel<br />

567


1897 – 1898<br />

before the arbitration tribunal to determine the boundary line between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

[31 January 1898]<br />

- 425 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Arbitration<br />

LONDON, Feb. 24.—In the House of Commons to-day Sydney Buxton, Radical, member for<br />

Poplar, (Tower Hamlets) questioned the Government as to the progress of <strong>Venezuela</strong>-<strong>Guiana</strong><br />

boundary arbitration. Mr. Curzon, in reply, called attention to length of time necessary for delivering<br />

the cases, <strong>and</strong> said he could not promise an early settlement.<br />

[25 February 1898]<br />

- 426 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Cases<br />

WASHINGTON, March 10.—It has been arranged that the cases prepared by counsel in the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary arbitration shall be exchanged in this city the 16th of the present month. <strong>The</strong><br />

exchange will take place between Sir Julian Pauncefote <strong>and</strong> Señor Andrade, <strong>and</strong> four months later<br />

the counter-cases will be exchanged.<br />

[11 March 1898]<br />

- 427 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA ARBITRATION<br />

Cases Relative to the Boundary Exchanged in Washington<br />

WASHINGTON, March 18.—By arrangement between the parties, Sir Julian Pauncefote for<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> Señor Andrade for <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the cases relative to the boundary arbitration<br />

prepared by counsel on either side have been exchanged.<br />

<strong>The</strong> documents will be forwarded to their respective Governments by the Ambassador <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Minister to serve as the basis for the counter cases to be exchanged later on, <strong>and</strong> to prepare the way<br />

for the arbitration commission to meet in Paris next Fall.<br />

[19 March 1898]<br />

568


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 428 -<br />

VENEZUELA HONORS HARRISON<br />

She Chooses the Ex-President as Counsel Before the Board of Arbitration<br />

WASHINGTON, May 21.—Ex-President Harrison has, it is learned upon high authority to-day,<br />

been selected by the Government of <strong>Venezuela</strong> as counsel to represent it before the Board of<br />

Arbitration appointed to settle the historic boundary dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[22 May 1898]<br />

- 429 -<br />

VENEZUELA’S BOUNDARY CASE<br />

<strong>The</strong> Tribunal to Settle the Pending Issues with Great Britain Will Assemble In Paris<br />

WASHINGTON. May 22.—<strong>The</strong> tribunal which is to adjust the dispute between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

Great Britain as to the boundary between the former country <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> will assemble in<br />

Paris next February. <strong>The</strong> claims of both countries are now being made up. <strong>The</strong> case of <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

was laid before the members of the tribunal on March 16 last, <strong>and</strong> the counter claims of Great<br />

Britain will be presented on the 18th of July.<br />

<strong>The</strong> personnel of the tribunal was determined by the treaty of Washington in 1897, Chief Justice<br />

Fuller <strong>and</strong> Assistant Justice Brewer of the Supreme Court being selected by <strong>Venezuela</strong> to represent<br />

her interests. <strong>The</strong>y <strong>and</strong> the two representatives of Great Britain have chosen, in accordance with the<br />

terms of the treaty, the fifth member of the tribunal in the person of M. de Mertens, the eminent<br />

authority on international law, <strong>and</strong> Chief Counselor of the Russian Foreign Office.<br />

At the sittings of the tribunal the agent of <strong>Venezuela</strong> will be Dr. José Maria de Rojas. Dr. Rojas<br />

will be assisted in the conduct of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s case by ex-President Benjamin Harrison as chief<br />

counsel, with ex-Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy of New York, <strong>and</strong> Mr. S. Mallet-Prevost,<br />

former Secretary of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, as assistant counsel.<br />

[23 May 1898]<br />

- 430 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n <strong>Dispute</strong><br />

LONDON, Aug. 25.—Sir Robert Threshie Reid, formerly Solicitor General <strong>and</strong> Attorney<br />

General, has been appointed additional counsel for Great Britain in the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary<br />

arbitration.<br />

[26 August 1898]<br />

569


1897 – 1898<br />

- 431 -<br />

THE BRITISH-VENEZUELA CASE<br />

Arbitrators from the United States to Represent the Republic<br />

in Its Boundary Claims<br />

WASHINGTON. Sept. 24.—<strong>The</strong> approaching meeting at Paris of the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> court<br />

of arbitration, of which Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer are arbitrators in behalf of the<br />

republic, will be hardly second in importance to the meeting at Paris of the Peace Commission,<br />

owing to the crisis which the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n question raised between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain during the Clevel<strong>and</strong> Administration <strong>and</strong> the extent to which the Monroe doctrine is<br />

involved. <strong>The</strong> present plans are for the court to hold a preliminary session in January, at which time<br />

Justice Brewer will go to Paris.<br />

But Chief Justice Fuller is not likely to go to the first meeting, as the United States Supreme<br />

Court will be very busy about that time, <strong>and</strong> two members of the bench cannot be spared at the<br />

same time. Justice Brewer, probably, will arrange for a postponement until May, at which time both<br />

he <strong>and</strong> the Chief Justice will be free to join the other arbitrators <strong>and</strong> take up the serious business of<br />

the commission.<br />

<strong>The</strong> case <strong>and</strong> counter cases between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> have been completed. Minister<br />

Andrade of <strong>Venezuela</strong> recently submitted to the <strong>British</strong> Embassy here the counter case of the<br />

republic, <strong>and</strong> simultaneous with this the <strong>British</strong> counter case was h<strong>and</strong>ed to Dr. Rojas, the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> agent in Paris. <strong>The</strong> papers make one of the most voluminous international controversies<br />

ever brought to arbitration. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> case <strong>and</strong> counter-case fill eleven large volumes, one atlas,<br />

<strong>and</strong> a number of detached maps, while the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n case fills six volumes <strong>and</strong> three atlases. Thus<br />

the court will have before it a record comprising seventeen volumes, four atlases, <strong>and</strong> some<br />

additional maps.<br />

With the record all made up, it remains only for the counsel for the two parties to submit their<br />

briefs. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> brief will be prepared by ex-President Harrison, ex-Senator Tracy, <strong>and</strong> Mr.<br />

Malet-Prevost. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> brief will be presented by the foremost lawyers of Engl<strong>and</strong>, including Sir<br />

Richard Webster.<br />

It is expected that Mr. Harrison <strong>and</strong> Gen. Tracy will be present <strong>and</strong> make oral arguments when<br />

the court assembles in May. Thus the personnel of the advocates, as well as the arbitrators, will give<br />

unusual importance to the hearing. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> arbitrators are headed by Baron Herschel, former<br />

Lord Chancellor of Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong>, like Chief Justice Fuller, the official head of the judiciary.<br />

Associated with him is Sir Richard Henn Collins. <strong>The</strong> fifth arbitrator, who occupies the attitude of<br />

an umpire, is the noted Russian jurist <strong>and</strong> international law writer, Maertens. <strong>The</strong> latter is acting for<br />

the arbitrators up to the time of their meeting, receiving the papers, briefs, etc.<br />

[25 September 1898]<br />

- 432 -<br />

AN “INVASION” OF BRAZIL<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

How Gifts of Union Jacks Among <strong>Guiana</strong> Indians Nearly Plunged<br />

Great Britain Into War<br />

KINGSTON, Jamaica. Oct 25.— Several months ago the daily telegraphic bulletins announced<br />

to the world that there had been an English invasion of Brazil across the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> frontier, <strong>and</strong><br />

that the invaders were inciting the Brazilian Indians to revolt against the authority of the republic<br />

<strong>and</strong> assume allegiance to the <strong>British</strong> crown. Although there was no war on between the two nations,<br />

in view of the precedent of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s assumption of sovereignty in <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory not long<br />

before, the story was accepted with some degree of credence. <strong>The</strong> stir soon subsided, <strong>and</strong> nothing<br />

inure was heard of the matter. <strong>The</strong>re was, however, some foundation for the report, the facts about<br />

which have only now been given out.<br />

<strong>The</strong> interior of <strong>Guiana</strong> is to a great extent a terra incognita. Its limits are assumed, not defined.<br />

<strong>British</strong> authority is represented not by the conventional machinery of a police department <strong>and</strong><br />

regular stations among the Indian population, but by a Magistrate having comprehensively indefinite<br />

jurisdiction, whose authority is locally represented by the Indian headmen. By dint of continuous<br />

traveling he manages to pay annual visits to these frontier settlements, when he easily overtakes the<br />

year’s accumulation of civil <strong>and</strong> criminal cases, solemnizes the necessary marriages, records the<br />

births <strong>and</strong> deaths, <strong>and</strong> last, but not least, presides at the great annual “Paiwarri Festival” whereat he<br />

delivers a message from the Queen <strong>and</strong> receives the renewal of the vows of allegiance from the<br />

chiefs of the section.<br />

January of this year found Mr. Magistrate McTurk at the village of Sawarawou, on the river of<br />

the same name, on the Brazilian frontier. Among the presents to the headman on that occasion was<br />

a Union Jack—the first that had ever penetrated that region. Just why Mr. McTurk was authorized<br />

to distribute flags among her Majesty’s Indian vassals on the frontier this year is not stated, but this<br />

fact is the key to the invasion story.<br />

<strong>The</strong> headman (his name nowhere appears in the official note, probably for good orthographical<br />

reasons) at once developed an unreasoning ostentatious pride in this novel badge of office, <strong>and</strong> no<br />

sooner was Mr. McTurk’s back turned than he removed it from its pole <strong>and</strong> paraded it in procession<br />

for miles around, irrespective of political boundaries, declaring that this was the emblem of the great<br />

English Queens <strong>and</strong> that whoever looked upon it became her subjects <strong>and</strong> consequently under his<br />

immediate control.<br />

In the face of the bright flag no one ventured to dispute the claim; on the contrary, the Indians<br />

of the entire region, Brazilian as well as English, paid him homage. Like many a greater man, this<br />

newly acquired popularity quite turned his head. Like a certain “Little Corporal” who once<br />

performed on a wider stage, the humble headman assumed, <strong>and</strong> was readily accorded, truly imperial<br />

sway if not state, his arrogance occasioning no little trouble to the regular Brazilian traders who had<br />

worked the territory for generations.<br />

<strong>The</strong> traders duly appealed to the Brazilian authorities, interpreting the antics of the headman into<br />

a <strong>British</strong> invasion. Of course, the authorities in London knew no more about the alleged “invasion”<br />

than did those of Rio, <strong>and</strong> the Georgetown Government could throw no light on the subject. But<br />

the traders continued to complain, while the headman continued his usurpation of power, in blissful<br />

ignorance of the fact that he was setting the diplomacy of two nations by the ears.<br />

At length some inkling of the truth reached Georgetown, when Mr. McTurk was dispatched post<br />

haste to the frontier to set matters straight. But now another complication arose. By this time the<br />

headman began to suspect that all was not right with him, <strong>and</strong> hearing that Mr. McTurk was coming<br />

571


1897 – 1898<br />

up to depose him, he promptly sent off couriers to inform that gentleman that it would be as much<br />

as his life was worth to put his foot in the territory with any such hostile intent. <strong>The</strong> warriors of the<br />

tribes for miles around were ready to support him, <strong>and</strong> he would st<strong>and</strong> no nonsense.<br />

Mr. McTurk has more than once proved himself to be as brave as any average Scotchman; but,<br />

his heroism not being of the “penny dreadful” type, he deemed it imprudent to take the possible<br />

risks for so trumpery a cause, <strong>and</strong> resorted to diplomacy. He promptly camped where the message<br />

reached him, <strong>and</strong> thence opened negotiations with the recalcitrant chief. <strong>The</strong> latter proved obdurate<br />

<strong>and</strong> arrogant, <strong>and</strong> as there was no way of getting anything like an adequate force up the tortuous<br />

stream <strong>and</strong> through the dense forests except at an enormous cost, <strong>and</strong> it would never do to depute<br />

the subjection of the rebellious chief to Brazil, a compromise was decided on. This was eventually<br />

arranged, the headman consenting to go down to Georgetown <strong>and</strong> surrender his papers <strong>and</strong><br />

precious flag on condition that immunity be guaranteed him.<br />

This closed the Incident, Great Britain making the necessary apologetic explanations to Brazil.<br />

Since then Mr. McTurk has been busily engaged making a special tour of his stations for the purpose<br />

of collecting the flags distributed last year, the Colonial Government fearing other possible<br />

complications.<br />

[13 November 1898]<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- Part 13 -<br />

1899 - 1904<br />

573


1899 – 1904<br />

574


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 433 -<br />

MINISTER ANDRADE RETURNS<br />

To Attend the Formal Meeting of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission in Paris<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 6.—Señor Andrade, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister, has returned to<br />

Washington from a vacation in his own country. He expects to go to Paris to attend the meeting of<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission, Jan. 25.<br />

It is understood, however, that this meeting will be purely formal, for purposes of organization<br />

<strong>and</strong> in order to receive the briefs of the counsel on both sides. An adjournment will then be taken<br />

until some time in May, when, it is believed, the arguments will begin.<br />

[7 January 1899]<br />

- 434 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Commission Meeting<br />

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9.—Justice Brewer will sail from New York next Wednesday for Paris to<br />

attend the meeting of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, of which he <strong>and</strong> Chief Justice Fuller are<br />

members.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission was to have met on the 25th inst., but a postponement until May 14 has been<br />

arranged, so that the forthcoming meeting will do nothing more than formally ratify the<br />

postponement already agreed upon.<br />

[10 January 1899]<br />

- 435 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Sessions<br />

LONDON, Jan. 23.—<strong>The</strong> Times says this morning: “Owing to the immense mass of documents<br />

put in, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration sessions are expected to last for several months.”<br />

[23 January 1899]<br />

- 436 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN COMMISSION<br />

A Preliminary Session Will Be Held at Paris To-morrow<br />

575


1899 – 1904<br />

PARIS, Jan. 23.—Councillor Maartens, Professor of International Law at the University of St.<br />

Petersburg, who is umpire in the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration, arrived here on Saturday <strong>and</strong><br />

promptly visited M. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gen. Horace Porter, the United States<br />

Ambassador, <strong>and</strong> Sir Edmund J. Monson, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador.<br />

Sir Edmund Monson will give an elaborate banquet to the members of the Diplomatic Corps in<br />

Parts on Wednesday, at which all the members of the Arbitration Commission will be present. On<br />

Thursday M. Delcassé will give a luncheon to the arbitrators, the United States <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong><br />

Ambassadors, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister. Next Monday evening Gen. Porter will give a dinner to<br />

the arbitrators <strong>and</strong> to the Diplomatic representatives of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> arbitrators will hold a preliminary session on Wednesday in apartments assigned them at the<br />

offices of the Foreign Minister, when they will arrange as to their procedure. An adjournment will<br />

then be taken till the middle of April.<br />

[24 January 1899]<br />

- 437 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN COMMISSION<br />

Preliminary Sitting Was Purely Form <strong>and</strong> Nothing Was Achieved<br />

PARIS, Jan. 25.—<strong>The</strong> preliminary sitting of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Court of Arbitration this morning<br />

was purely formal. <strong>The</strong> court met in the room which was used by the Spanish-American Peace<br />

Commissioners, at the Foreign Office here.<br />

<strong>The</strong> arbitrators only sat for half an hour.<br />

Sir Richard Webster, the Attorney General of Great Britain, made a brief speech, <strong>and</strong> Prof.<br />

Maertens, the umpire of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Commission <strong>and</strong> Professor of<br />

International Law at the University of St. Petersburg, replied. In so doing he thanked the French<br />

Government for its hospitality. <strong>The</strong> next meeting of the commission will take place on May 25.<br />

<strong>The</strong> arbitrators, the Russian Ambassador, Prince Ouroussoff; the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador, Sir<br />

Edmund J. Monson; the United States Ambassador, Gen. Horace Porter, <strong>and</strong> the high Foreign<br />

Office officials lunched with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Delcassé, to-day. <strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong><br />

Ambassador gave a diplomatic dinner to the party this evening, to which the arbitrators were invited.<br />

[26 January 1899]<br />

- 438 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission at a Dinner<br />

PARIS, Jan. 30.—<strong>The</strong> United States Ambassador, Gen. Horace Porter, gave a dinner this<br />

evening in honor of the members of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Commission. <strong>The</strong> company<br />

included, in addition to the arbitrators, Sir Edmund J. Monson, the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador; Prince<br />

Ourossoff, the Russian Ambassador; Count Tornielli-Brusati di Vorgano, the Italian Ambassador;<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

M. Delcassé, French Minister for Foreign Affairs; Col. John Jacob Astor, <strong>and</strong> Mr. George<br />

V<strong>and</strong>erbilt.<br />

[31 January 1899]<br />

- 439 -<br />

ANGLO-VENEZUELAN TRIBUNAL<br />

<strong>The</strong> American Members of the Arbitration Board to Go to Paris<br />

—Arguments for <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

WASHINGTON, March 16.—Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer of the Supreme Court will<br />

leave the United States for Paris so as to arrive there about May 25 next, at which time the oral<br />

arguments on the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration will be heard. <strong>The</strong> hearing is expected to cover<br />

three months, after which the court is expected to devote about three months to the consideration<br />

of the question, giving a decision probably in November.<br />

Ex-President Harrison <strong>and</strong> ex-Secretary of the Navy Tracy probably will go to Paris at the same<br />

time, as they are the leading counsel for <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong>ir brief has been presented, <strong>and</strong>, owing to its<br />

general interest copies have been distributed among Senators, Representatives, <strong>and</strong> public men<br />

generally in Washington. It covers about 800 printed pages, <strong>and</strong> is in rather marked contrast to the<br />

brevity of the <strong>British</strong> brief of Sir Richard Webster, covering only 55 pages. <strong>The</strong> conclusion of the<br />

brief is as follows:<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, with great respect but with great confidence, now admits to this high tribunal the very serious issues<br />

involved. She does this in the happy belief that in the short but brilliant history of arbitration tribunals this one will<br />

find a conspicuous place, <strong>and</strong> will recommend to other nations the use of this great agency or peace. <strong>Venezuela</strong> has<br />

no direct representative upon this tribunal; <strong>and</strong> by this fact, it is more nearly assimilated to the great courts of justice<br />

from which the idea of representation is wholly absent. No other international tribunal has presented this feature.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y have been too much the conference of representatives, rather than the consultations of Judges, to whom the<br />

parties are quite indifferent.<br />

<strong>The</strong> one tends to unsatisfactory compromises, the other to decrees that establish rights. In the very constitution,<br />

therefore, of this tribunal we have the strongest appeal to the sense of impartial justice <strong>and</strong> the surest ground of<br />

hope that the judgment may confirm the faith of those who believe that it is possible to bring the nations to a bar<br />

that will treat them with the same impartiality that is shown to individual litigants. When that confidence is fully<br />

established the era of a universal peace will be near.<br />

<strong>The</strong> brief is signed by Benjamin Harrison, Benjamin F. Tracy, S. Mallet-Prevost, <strong>and</strong> James<br />

Russell Soley, counsel for <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

[17 March 1899]<br />

- 440 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitration<br />

577


1899 – 1904<br />

WASHINGTON, April 1.—Arrangements have been made for the sailing on May 11 of ex-<br />

President Harrison <strong>and</strong> ex-Secretary Tracy for Paris, where they will act as counsel for <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

before the international court of arbitration, which meets in Paris on May 25. Chief Justice Fuller<br />

<strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer, who are arbitrators, will probably go at the same time.<br />

[2 April 1899]<br />

- 441 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN ARBITRATION<br />

It Is Postponed Presumably Because of the Peace Conference<br />

WASHINGTON, May 10.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration, which was to begin at Paris on<br />

the 24th of this month, has been postponed until June 15.<br />

An inference has been drawn from this postponement that the Czar’s peace congress will be<br />

brief, as Mr. Maertens, the eminent Russian jurist, is one of the Russian delegates to the Czar’s<br />

congress <strong>and</strong> also one of the arbitrators on the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n question. It was impossible,<br />

therefore, for him to be present at both events.<br />

A postponement of the meeting in Paris was therefore arranged until June 15, with the<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing that Mr. Maertens’s services at <strong>The</strong> Hague would not be required beyond that date.<br />

Being one of the Czar’s personal representatives, it is hardly expected Mr. Maertens would leave the<br />

congress while it was in session, so that the arrangement just concluded is taken to indicate that the<br />

peace congress will be over by June 15, thus giving about three weeks for discussion.<br />

[11 May 1899]<br />

- 442 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS, May 17.—Owing to the attendance at the Czar’s Peace Conference, to open tomorrow<br />

at <strong>The</strong> Hague, of Prof. Martens, Professor of International Law at the University of St. Petersburg<br />

<strong>and</strong> final arbitrator of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Commission, the meeting of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Commission has been postponed for the present.<br />

[18 May 1899]<br />

- 443 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Arbitration<br />

578


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

WASHINGTON, May 22.—Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer of the United States<br />

Supreme Court expect to sail for Paris on the 31st inst., whither they go to participate in the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary arbitration.<br />

[23 May 1899]<br />

- 444 -<br />

MR. HARRISON IN PARIS<br />

<strong>The</strong> ex-President Has an Interview with President Loubet<br />

—Speaks of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS, May 27.—Ex-President Harrison, accompanied by Gen. Horace Porter, United States<br />

Ambassador, this morning had an interview lasting a quarter of an hour with M. Delcasse, Minister<br />

of Foreign Affairs. <strong>The</strong> interview was of the most cordial character.<br />

This afternoon Mr. Harrison <strong>and</strong> Ambassador Porter called upon President Loubet. After a<br />

ceremonious introduction, they dropped all formality <strong>and</strong> conversed in the most friendly manner<br />

upon topics of interest to the two countries. M. Loubet said he was especially pleased to meet Mr.<br />

Harrison, who was “doubly his colleague, both being heads of sister republics <strong>and</strong> both lawyers.” He<br />

also said he desired to congratulate Mr. Harrison upon the mission with which he had been intrusted<br />

<strong>and</strong> which had brought him to Paris; <strong>and</strong> expressed gratification that the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

had elected to meet in France.<br />

Mr. Harrison replied in a similar vein, saying he was rejoiced at the meeting of the commission in<br />

Paris, as it gave him an opportunity of visiting for the first time a country for which he had the most<br />

profound admiration, <strong>and</strong> which was united to his own by so many inseparable bonds. He then<br />

thanked M. Loubet for the cordial hospitality of the Commissioners, whose mission was one of<br />

peace, <strong>and</strong> for the interest shown in their work.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President <strong>and</strong> ex-President then drifted to the general subject of arbitration, Mr. Harrison<br />

expressing the view that it was essential, in order to make the use of arbitration general, that the<br />

representative idea should be eliminated from such tribunals. In order that they should retain purely<br />

judicial character every member of arbitration tribunals should, he thought, be absolutely indifferent<br />

to the individual interests of the parties in litigation.<br />

In the course of an interview with a representative of the Associated Press, Mr. Harrison said<br />

that President Loubet seemed to be a sincere friend of arbitration. Mr. Harrison also said that the<br />

original date for the meeting of the commission was chosen with a view to enabling the American<br />

members to return to the United States in October, but under present circumstances, Prof. de<br />

Martens had fixed the new date for June 15, as he expected that his part of the business at <strong>The</strong><br />

Hague would be over then. He added that although it was difficult to say when the work of the<br />

commission would be completed, he hoped it would be terminated by the end of August.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission, he said, would probably hold four meetings weekly, each of four hours’<br />

duration. This means from eight to ten weeks of effective work, into which will be crowded the<br />

whole case, with the pleadings of counsel.<br />

Regarding the Peace Conference, Mr. Harrison said he thought the principal object for which it<br />

had been called would not be attained, but that some form of arbitration or a step toward its<br />

579


1899 – 1904<br />

adoption may be the outcome of the meeting. Ex-President Harrison <strong>and</strong> Mrs. Harrison have<br />

accepted an invitation to the parliamentary dinner to be given by President Loubet on Monday next.<br />

[28 May 1899]<br />

- 445 -<br />

THE BRITISH-VENEZUELA CASE<br />

Russia Blamed for the Delay in the Arbitration Proceedings<br />

WASHINGTON, June 6.—<strong>The</strong>re is considerable dissatisfaction in official <strong>and</strong> diplomatic circles<br />

over the continued postponement of the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration proceedings, as the delay<br />

causes personal inconvenience to Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer, who are arbitrators, <strong>and</strong> to<br />

ex-President Harrison <strong>and</strong> ex-Secretary Tracy, who are counsel, as well as the <strong>British</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n officials now gathered at Paris. <strong>The</strong> postponement was caused by Russia naming Mr.<br />

Mertens, who is on the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission, as one of the Russian delegates at <strong>The</strong> Hague<br />

Conference. Although most of the American <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n officials are now in Paris, they are<br />

unable to proceed with the work, <strong>and</strong> it is said that there is doubt whether Mr. Mertens will be free<br />

by the 25th instant, the day to which the court adjourned its meeting.<br />

<strong>The</strong> suggestion was made to-day in a high diplomatic quarter that it would be well for Russia to<br />

withdraw Mr. Mertens from the representation at <strong>The</strong> Hague <strong>and</strong> permit him to proceed with the<br />

arbitration at Paris, as the interests as well as the convenience of all three Governments would be<br />

much subserved thereby. This could be more readily done, it was pointed out, as Russia would still<br />

be well represented at <strong>The</strong> Hague by such eminent diplomats as Baron de Stael <strong>and</strong> Count<br />

Mouravief. <strong>The</strong> desirability of some such arrangement has been officially discussed, <strong>and</strong> it may be<br />

brought to the attention of the Russian authorities unless they take the initiative by freeing Mr.<br />

Mertens from his duties at <strong>The</strong> Hague, so that the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration can proceed.<br />

[7 June 1899]<br />

- 446 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA BOUNDARY<br />

Members of the Commission Going to Paris to Begin Work<br />

LONDON. June 8.—<strong>The</strong> Attorney General, Sir Richard Webster Q. C.; Sir Robert Treshie Reid<br />

Q. C., the former Attorney General, <strong>and</strong> G. R. Askwith of the <strong>British</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary<br />

Commission started for Paris to-day. Others leave at the end of the week, <strong>and</strong> the Lord Chief<br />

Justice, Baron Russell of Killowen, <strong>and</strong> Sir Richard Henn Collins, Lord Justice of Appeal, will leave<br />

for the French capital shortly, in order to be present at the opening of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary<br />

arbitration, June 15. Counsel for <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Mr. Mallet-Prevost, Secretary of the Boundary<br />

Commission, have statements of the case, amounting to 6,000 pages of closely printed matter in<br />

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Spanish, Dutch, French <strong>and</strong> English, accompanied by 200 maps. <strong>The</strong> opening speech of Sir Richard<br />

Webster is expected to last sixteen days.<br />

[9 June 1899]<br />

- 447 -<br />

VENEZUELAN ARBITRATION<br />

First Meeting of the Commissioners to be Held at Paris This Morning—<br />

Rules of Procedure Adopted<br />

PARIS, June 14.—A preliminary <strong>and</strong> informal meeting of counsel engaged in the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

arbitration was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this morning.<br />

<strong>The</strong> meetings of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission will be held in the apartment which was placed at<br />

the disposal of the Spanish-American Peace Commission. It was also used in the Bering Sea<br />

arbitration. Workmen have been busy all day in preparing it <strong>and</strong> arranging the furniture.<br />

<strong>The</strong> first formal meeting of the Commissioners will be at 11 o’clock to-morrow morning.<br />

At this morning’s informal conference a series of rules of procedure was adopted. Prof. F. de<br />

Martens, the umpire in the dispute, who is Professor of International Law in the University of<br />

Petersburg, <strong>and</strong> a permanent member of the Council of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Russia,<br />

as well as a member of the Russian delegation at <strong>The</strong> Hague Peace Conference, proposed the rules,<br />

to which some amendments were made at the suggestion of other members of the tribunal. <strong>The</strong><br />

hours of session were fixed from 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. with half an hour for luncheon, <strong>and</strong> it was agreed<br />

to hold five sessions weekly after Prof. de Martens has finished his work at <strong>The</strong> Hague, which he<br />

expects, will be about the end of next week. M. Martin, an official of the French Foreign Office, was<br />

appointed permanent Secretary of the tribunal.<br />

It is expected that the arguments will be begun to-morrow, after a brief inaugural address by<br />

Prof. de Martens, Sir Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General opening the case on behalf of<br />

Great Britain. A number of counsel will speak. <strong>The</strong> order of their addresses is to be left to the<br />

counsel themselves.<br />

Prof. de Martens was seen at the Hotel Chatham this evening. Regarding the delay in beginning<br />

the work of the tribunal he said:<br />

“I have been detained by work at <strong>The</strong> Hague, <strong>and</strong> the postponement of my arrival here was<br />

arranged with the consent of the other members of the tribunal. <strong>The</strong> proceedings could have been<br />

begun <strong>and</strong> continued last October, but they were postponed at the instance of the Americans, owing<br />

to the fact that Chief Justice Fuller of the United States Supreme Court was obliged to attend to<br />

official duties at home, which occupied him until last month.<br />

“I shall return to <strong>The</strong> Hague after to-morrow’s session, but shall come back here next week. I<br />

expect then to be compelled to return again to <strong>The</strong> Hague for a few days, but on my return to Paris<br />

I shall stay with the tribunal until its work is completed.”<br />

Questioned respecting the prospects of the prospects of the Peace Conference at <strong>The</strong> Hague,<br />

Prof. de Martens declined to say more than that he expected the proceedings would be concluded<br />

about the end of this month, with “distinctly practical results.”<br />

581


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[15 June 1899]<br />

- 448 -<br />

VENEZUELA CASE OPENED<br />

<strong>The</strong> Arbitration Tribunal Begins Its Work in Paris<br />

GREAT BRITAIN HEARD FIRST<br />

Sir Richard Webster Gives a Review of<br />

the Boundary Question <strong>and</strong> Discusses Former Treaties<br />

PARIS, June 15.—<strong>The</strong> first formal meeting of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Commission opened<br />

this morning. <strong>The</strong> arbitrators, counsel, <strong>and</strong> others began assembling at the Foreign Office shortly<br />

before 11 o’clock. <strong>The</strong>y were received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. M. Delcassé in the<br />

apartment in which the tribunal will sit. <strong>The</strong>se are thee rooms used at the meeting of the Spanish-<br />

American Peace Conference <strong>and</strong> during the Bering Sea arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> main room is an oblong chamber luxuriously decorated, having rich moldings on the walls<br />

<strong>and</strong> ceilings <strong>and</strong> heavy gilt ornamentations, relieved by frescoes in light tones. <strong>The</strong> ceiling is light<br />

blue, <strong>and</strong> in its centre are magnificent gilt ch<strong>and</strong>eliers. On a raised dais at the end of the room,<br />

facing the entrance, are five massive gilt armchairs for the arbitrators, with a table in front of them.<br />

Below the dais are half a dozen long tables, placed across the room, for counsel <strong>and</strong> clerical staff. All<br />

the furniture is upholstered in bright red, with gilt frames. A large colored map of the disputed<br />

territory hangs on the wall to the right of the arbitrators, with a smaller map of the whole of South<br />

America beside it.<br />

Altogether there were about forty persons connected with the tribunal present. <strong>The</strong> arbitrators<br />

<strong>and</strong> most of their staffs were dressed in frock coats. <strong>The</strong>re were less than a dozen spectators in the<br />

portion of the apartment roped off for the general public, <strong>and</strong> half a dozen ladies, including Mrs.<br />

Benjamin Harrison <strong>and</strong> others belonging to the American party.<br />

<strong>The</strong> arbitrators took their seats soon after 11 o’clock. Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller <strong>and</strong> Sir<br />

Richard Henn Collins, Lord Justice of Appeals, sitting on the right of Prof. de Martens, the umpire,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Baron Russell of Killowen, Lord Chief Justice of Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Justice David S. Brewer sitting<br />

on his left h<strong>and</strong>. Ex-President Benjamin Harrison, Gen. Benjamin K. Tracy, <strong>and</strong> the remainder of<br />

the Americans sat at the tables at the left side of the room, facing the court, <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong><br />

representatives were seated at tables on the right side. Counsel used the desks which served during<br />

the Bering Sea deliberations.<br />

WELCOMED BY M. DELCASSÉ<br />

<strong>The</strong> proceedings opened at 11:20, when M. Delcassé briefly addressed the tribunal in French.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Foreign Minister said it gave him special pleasure to welcome the high commission in behalf of<br />

the Government of the Republic, which, he added, was greatly pleased at the fact that Paris had<br />

been chosen for the sitting of the tribunal, among whom he saw such eminent men, some of whom<br />

had occupied with distinction the highest positions. Under the Presidency of M. de Martens, who<br />

was universally acknowledged as an authority on international law, he continued, their labors could<br />

only result happily in the interests of the dispute <strong>and</strong> in the interests of humanity, for it would<br />

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constitute another step toward the realization of the noble project which, launched from an<br />

illustrious throne, was making rapid way into the hearts <strong>and</strong> consciences of the people, <strong>and</strong> had thus<br />

imposed itself with singular force on the solicitude of those who govern them. M. Delcassé<br />

concluded by thanking the arbitrators for having accepted the hospitality of France.<br />

Prof. de Martens replied, thanking the French Foreign Minister for his welcome <strong>and</strong> for the<br />

hospitality extended to the arbitrators. <strong>The</strong> speaker recalled the fact that he came here seven years<br />

ago to attend the Bering Sea arbitration. Referring to the work being done at <strong>The</strong> Hague in the<br />

matter of arbitration, he said the Peace Conference sought not merely to arrange a settlement of<br />

conflicts, but the avoidance of conflicts, <strong>and</strong> expressed the hope that the present tribunal would<br />

have the result of promoting the welfare <strong>and</strong> prosperity of the two countries interested.<br />

<strong>The</strong> professor then announced the rules of procedure agreed upon at yesterday’s conference, <strong>and</strong><br />

said the arbitrators would meet every day excepting Sundays.<br />

Sir Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, thereupon arose <strong>and</strong> said that in order to<br />

meet the view of ex-President Harrison <strong>and</strong> the other American counsel, in which the English<br />

representatives concurred, he proposed that they meet only four days in the week, in view of the<br />

extremely heavy work before them.<br />

MR. HARRISON RAISES A SMILE<br />

Mr. Harrison said he thought there would be in four days’ work enough for ordinary men, <strong>and</strong><br />

he evoked a general smile as, looking around on the gathering of the most eminent jurists of Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> America, he added: “And we are all ordinary men.’ <strong>The</strong> work before them, he added,<br />

would be a tremendous strain upon counsel.<br />

Prof. de Martens agreed that four days’ meeting per week would he sufficient, arranging that the<br />

arbitrators would not meet on Fridays, Saturdays or Sundays.<br />

Sir Richard Webster then asked: “As the learned Prof. Martens is going back to <strong>The</strong> Hague<br />

tonight, what days does he propose to give us next week?”<br />

<strong>The</strong> professor replied that he hoped to give them two days during the latter half of next week,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that he would write from <strong>The</strong> Hague on Sunday fixing the day of his arrival.<br />

After this Sir Richard Webster announced that counsel had arranged that he should speak first,<br />

then two <strong>Venezuela</strong>n counsel, next Great Britain, with possibly two counsel, then <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />

next Great Britain. <strong>The</strong> final speech was to be made by <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Sir Richard opened his speech by<br />

mentioning that he had the privilege years ago to appear in the same room as junior counsel in the<br />

Bering Sea case, He was st<strong>and</strong>ing at the very desk which served at that time. It was a. significant fact<br />

that <strong>Venezuela</strong> was represented by distinguished men of the American Republic, while America was<br />

represented on the bench by two judges of the very highest position. It was a great honor for<br />

himself <strong>and</strong> his colleagues to address such a tribunal.<br />

<strong>The</strong> loading counsel for Great Britain then paid a tribute to Prof. de Martens, whose reputation<br />

was international, <strong>and</strong> said:<br />

I shall probably have to say much with which my friends disagree, but I am sure they will extend<br />

to us the courtesy of forbearance, which we desire to extend to them <strong>and</strong> which is customary<br />

between counsel in these cases.”<br />

Continuing, Sir Richard said he only intended to touch to-day upon the general topics underlying<br />

the whole discussion, <strong>and</strong> proceeded to give geographical <strong>and</strong> historical review of the whole<br />

question, going hack to the time of Columbus.<br />

583


1899 – 1904<br />

SIR RICHARD WEBSTER’S SPEECH<br />

In the course of his remarks he said he regarded the Treaty of Munster as a most important<br />

matter for the tribunal, as Great Britain held that Spain was not entitled to claim the whole of the<br />

Western world in view of the fact that she was established in the position of the Dutch. He<br />

presumed American counsel took an utterly different view of the construction of both the Munster<br />

<strong>and</strong> Utrecht Treaties, <strong>and</strong> thought the arguments advanced by American counsel were not<br />

characterized by that breadth which might be expected from such eminent counsel.<br />

<strong>The</strong> representative of Great Britain then took up the terms of the treaty of arbitration, <strong>and</strong> laid<br />

great stress on the <strong>British</strong> contention that the treaty was a contract between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain, <strong>and</strong> not between the Spaniards <strong>and</strong> Dutch. <strong>The</strong> tribunal, he contended, had to decide the<br />

boundary between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> at the present time, <strong>and</strong> not between the Spaniards<br />

<strong>and</strong> Dutch in 1814.<br />

Counsel then said that, in order to clear up any misunderst<strong>and</strong>ing, he announced that Great<br />

Britain recognized <strong>Venezuela</strong> as the successor of Spain, <strong>and</strong> he submitted that the boundary, as it<br />

might have been settled in 1814, was not the same as it ought to be defined to-day. Respecting the<br />

fifty years’ title clause, Great Britain submitted that it ought to come back from the date of the<br />

conclusion of the treaty of arbitration. Counsel was adverse to holding that fifty years ought to<br />

constitute a title, whatever might be the paramount title of the other power, as this would cut both<br />

ways.<br />

Where such a case was proved the matter could be settled in one of three wars – by deflecting<br />

the boundary line with territorial compensation elsewhere, without territorial equivalent, or by the<br />

payment of compensation, adding that the tribunal had absolute discretion in the matter.<br />

Sir Richard Webster spoke in a clear voice, <strong>and</strong> the arbitrators <strong>and</strong> counsel followed the speech<br />

closely, making notes <strong>and</strong> occasionally asking him to clear up a doubtful point. He occupied the<br />

remainder of the day in an explanation, with the aid of the map on the wall, of the geographical<br />

difficulties of the dispute, <strong>and</strong> concluded the opening stage of his speech shortly before 4 o’clock,<br />

when the tribunal adjourned. Prof. de Martens said he hoped to be able to hold the next meeting on<br />

the coming Wednesday.<br />

<strong>The</strong> members of the tribunal were photographed this afternoon, grouped on the steps at the<br />

entrance of the Foreign Office.<br />

<strong>The</strong> officials of the Foreign Office provided a substantial luncheon for the Commissioners <strong>and</strong><br />

their staffs in a hall adjoining the courtroom.<br />

[16 June 1899]<br />

- 449 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA BOUNDARY<br />

Hearing Before the Paris Arbitration Commission Resumed<br />

SIR R. WEBSTER’S ARGUMENT<br />

Deals with the History of the Country from 1500 to 1637—<br />

Says Spain Controlled Only a Small Portion<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

PARIS, June 21.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission reassembled at 11 o’clock this<br />

morning. Sir Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, resumed his speech on behalf the case<br />

of Great Britain.<br />

Dealing with the period from 1500 to 1637, he said that Great Britain was unable to rely on the<br />

data relating to Spanish <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n control, <strong>and</strong> was compelled to fall back upon the discovery<br />

<strong>and</strong> circumnavigation, so-called, of the unit of <strong>Guiana</strong>. <strong>Venezuela</strong>, he said, argued that <strong>Guiana</strong> was a<br />

defined area, <strong>and</strong> had taken part of it in the name of the whole, taking such possession as to entitle it<br />

to the whole.<br />

In minute detail Sir Richard reviewed the work of the various explorers upon whom <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

relied, claiming they were not relevant to the territory of <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> adding that the statements<br />

made before the United States Commission must not be used in argument against Great Britain, as<br />

frequent deductions were made which were totally unsupported, as Justice Brewer, a former member<br />

of that commission, would doubtless remember.<br />

According to Sir Richard Webster, the first explorer who really reached <strong>Guiana</strong> was De Berrio,<br />

<strong>and</strong> his expedition was intended, Sir Richard added, to apply to a different part of the country <strong>and</strong><br />

for a different object than that alleged by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, who sought to apply it to a small district. He<br />

protested against the expedition in question being “pieced on” so as to establish this “so-called<br />

Spanish title,” further asserting that “it had failed miserably, as both the Dutch <strong>and</strong> Spanish<br />

historians agreed that there was only one Spanish settlement on the Orinoco before 1720.<br />

As to the Spanish coasting voyages, Sir Richard said the Spaniards occasionally traded, but the<br />

Dutch traded <strong>and</strong> settled. By the truce of 1609 the Dutch position was known <strong>and</strong> acknowledged by<br />

Spain, <strong>and</strong>, as Motley, the historian had stated “the orange flag of the republic was to float over all<br />

America from Manhattan Isl<strong>and</strong> to the shores of Brazil <strong>and</strong> the Straits of Magellan, provided Philip<br />

had not ships <strong>and</strong> soldiers to vindicate with the sword that sovereignty which Spanish swords <strong>and</strong><br />

genius had once acquired.”<br />

Continuing, the <strong>British</strong> counsel claimed that discovery when not followed by occupation was of<br />

no value as the basis of title, inasmuch as nations had never consented to the contrary doctrine.<br />

Discovery, if accompanied by a certified or notorious intention to acquire, gave a prior opportunity<br />

of acquiring, which opportunity it would be a violation of the comity of nations to interfere with<br />

prematurely.<br />

<strong>The</strong> occupation of vacant parts of the world, treated as not in the possession of a distinct owner,<br />

was not a case of transfer of possession, for there were no parties between whom such a convention<br />

could pass. <strong>Guiana</strong> was vacant. <strong>The</strong> Dutch settled <strong>and</strong> controlled it, while the Spaniards held one<br />

miserable spot on the Orinoco, which could not control the huge district lying between the Orinoco<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Essequibo.<br />

Sir Richard Webster then detailed the exploits of the Dutch in conjunction with Sir Walter<br />

Raleigh, bringing his argument up to the year 1637.<br />

Lord Chief Justice Russell caused an amusing diversion when Sir Richard Webster, in the course<br />

of his argument, described the cannibalistic attacks at San Thomé. He asked Sir Richard if the latter<br />

did not know that this was a libelous statement. Sir Richard replied that he could not vouch<br />

personally for its accuracy, but it was good history.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission adjourned at 4 o’clock until to-morrow.<br />

[22 June 1899]<br />

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1899 – 1904<br />

- 450 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission<br />

PARIS, June 27.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission met to-day. Sir Richard Webster, the<br />

<strong>British</strong> Attorney General, continued his argument in support of the case of Great Britain.<br />

[28 June 1899]<br />

- 451 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS, June 28.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Commission resumed its sessions this morning,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Sir Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, continued his presentation of the case of<br />

Great Britain. During the afternoon President Loubet received the members of the commission.<br />

<strong>The</strong>y were introduced to him by Prof. Martens, the umpire in the boundary dispute.<br />

[29 June 1899]<br />

- 452 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY<br />

<strong>Dispute</strong> as to Whether Documents Can Be Submitted in Part<br />

PARIS, June 29.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Commission was again in session to-day <strong>and</strong> the<br />

leading counsel for Great Britain, Sir Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, continued his<br />

presentation of his side of the case. <strong>The</strong> commission adjourned to Wednesday.<br />

Objecting to certain abstracts of documents introduced by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Sir Richard Webster<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>ed that the entire documents should be presented to the court if any reliance was to be<br />

placed upon the portions submitted.<br />

Benjamin Harrison, on behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, demurred to this contention on the ground that the<br />

time for filing documents had passed.<br />

Baron Russell of Killowen, one of the arbitrators, remarked that the tribunal could<br />

scarcely rely upon half a document when it was asserted that the whole bore a different meaning. It<br />

was finally decided that copies of the documents should first be submitted to the counsel for<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. Mr. Harrison intimated that he had thought argument would be heard before this<br />

opportunity was afforded.<br />

[30 June 1899]<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 453 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitration Commission<br />

PARIS, July 6.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitration Commission resumed its sessions to-day. Sir<br />

Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> General, continued his argument of the ease of Great Britain.<br />

[7 July 1899]<br />

- 454 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary<br />

PARIS, July 7.—At to-day’s sitting of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitration Commission Sir Richard<br />

Webster, leading counsel for Great Britain, continued his presentation of the <strong>British</strong> side of the case.<br />

[8 July 1899]<br />

- 455 -<br />

THE VENEZUELAN COMMISSION<br />

Sir Richard Webster Presents a Chronological Review to 1816<br />

PARIS, July 8.—At to-day’s session of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitration Commission, Sir Richard<br />

Webster, Attorney General of Great Britain, presented in support of the <strong>British</strong> Case a chronological<br />

review up to the year 1816.<br />

He will continue this feature of his argument Monday.<br />

[9 July 1899]<br />

- 456 -<br />

Honors <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS, July 9.—Sir Edmund John Monson, <strong>British</strong> Ambassador to France, last evening<br />

entertained at dinner the members of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Tribunal.<br />

[10 July 1899]<br />

587


1899 – 1904<br />

- 457 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Work<br />

PARIS, July 10.—At to-day’s session of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Commission Sir Richard<br />

Webster, in behalf of Great Britain, brought the chronological review up to the year 1841.<br />

<strong>The</strong> United States Ambassador, Gen. Horace Porter, will give a dinner <strong>and</strong> reception to-night in<br />

honor of the members of the commission <strong>and</strong> counsel.<br />

[11 July 1899]<br />

- 458 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission’s Progress<br />

PARIS, July 11.—At to-day’s session of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Commission, Sir Richard<br />

Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, continued his argument in behalf of the ease of Great<br />

Britain.<br />

At the close of the session of the commission the members were photographed.<br />

[12 July 1899]<br />

- 459 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS, July 12.—At the session of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Commission to-day, Sir Richard<br />

Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, in continuing his presentation of the case of Great Britain,<br />

brought his chronological review up to 1896. He will close his speech to-morrow.<br />

[13 July 1899]<br />

- 460 -<br />

FIGHTING VENEZUELA’S CLAIMS<br />

PARIS, July 13.—Sir Richard Webster, Attorney General of Great Britain, concluded, to-day,<br />

before the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Commission, his presentation of the <strong>British</strong> case.<br />

During the course of his remarks he said it would be a deathblow to arbitration if the courts<br />

sanctioned such claims as advanced by <strong>Venezuela</strong>. It would, he added, in fact, imply that an<br />

unsupported claim amounted to a title.<br />

<strong>The</strong> sessions of the commission were then adjourned until Wednesday next.<br />

588


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

[14 July 1899]<br />

- 461 -<br />

NO INTEREST IN VENEZUELA<br />

London Is Indifferent to This Question of Arbitration<br />

Special to <strong>The</strong> New-York Times<br />

LONDON, July 14.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitration tribunal has adjourned until Wednesday, after<br />

listening to Sir Richard Webster for thirteen days.<br />

<strong>The</strong> matter excites no interest here.<br />

[15 July 1899]<br />

- 462 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commissioners Dined<br />

PARIS, July 17.—Mr. Mallet-Prevost entertained the members of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration<br />

Tribunal at dinner this evening.<br />

[18 July 1899]<br />

- 463 -<br />

EL DORADO IN VENEZUELA<br />

Vast Natural Wealth of the Guruari <strong>and</strong> Delta Territory Claimed by Great Britain<br />

WASHINGTON, July 18.—Mr. Frank B. Loomis, the American Minister to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, was at<br />

the State Department to-day, having recently arrived in the United Status from his post. Mr. Loomis<br />

says that business in <strong>Venezuela</strong> is considerably depressed owing to the low price of coffee.<br />

<strong>The</strong> people of the country, he says, are very hopeful that the result of the boundary line<br />

arbitration will confirm <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s title to the disputed territory, which turns out to be fabulously<br />

rich in gold, silver, copper, <strong>and</strong> other minerals. Some diamonds have also been discovered.<br />

Mr. Loomis says that a great project for a huge canal system to connect the waters of the<br />

Orinoco, Amazon, <strong>and</strong> Platte is being discussed, but the vast sum necessary to construct it,<br />

estimated at from $100,000,000 to $300,000,000, staggers the projectors.<br />

[19 July 1899]<br />

589


1899 – 1904<br />

- 464 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> Commission<br />

PARIS, July 19.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitration Commission did not meet to-day as intended, but<br />

will meet on Friday.<br />

[20 July 1899]<br />

- 465 -<br />

VENEZUELA’S CASE OPENED<br />

Spain, Maitre Prevost Declared, Settled Her Rights by Discovery<br />

PARIS, July 21.—Maitre Prevost opened the case for <strong>Venezuela</strong> at to-day’s sitting of the <strong>British</strong>-<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission.<br />

Maitre Prevost cited authorities on international law to show that the right of discovery gives<br />

prior rights under conditions, which be claimed, Spain fulfilled. Spain had occupied <strong>and</strong> settled<br />

points on all the important rivers between the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> the Amazon in 1630<br />

[22 July 1899]<br />

- 466 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary<br />

PARIS, July 24.—Mr. Mallet-Prevost, Secretary of the Boundary Commission, on behalf of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, continued his argument to-day before the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission.<br />

[25 July 1899]<br />

- 467 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitrators Entertained<br />

PARIS. July 25.—Baron Russell of Killowen, Lord Chief Justice of Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> a member of<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitration Commission, entertained his colleagues of the commission at dinner today.<br />

[26 July 1899]<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 468 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitration Argument<br />

PARIS, July 28.—M. Mallet-Prevost, Secretary of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, to-day continued his presentation of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n case. He dealt with the period<br />

from 1609 to 1648, where, he contended, the Spaniards were all-powerful in <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

[29 July 1899]<br />

- 469 -<br />

GEN. ANTONIO G. BLANCO DEAD<br />

Ex-Dictator of <strong>Venezuela</strong> Expires in Paris—He Did Much to Develop the Country<br />

PARIS, July 29.—Gen. Antonio Guzman Blanco, ex-President of <strong>Venezuela</strong> is dead.<br />

Gen. Antonio Guzman Blanco played a most important part in the history of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. For<br />

many years be was the absolute dictator of the country, either in name or in fact, <strong>and</strong> he was in the<br />

habit of calling himself its “pacificator <strong>and</strong> regenerator.” While he used his power to amass a large<br />

private fortune, it is generally acknowledged that his was the principal influence in establishing a<br />

better Government than had existed prior to his time <strong>and</strong> in developing the material resources or<br />

the nation.<br />

He was born at Caracas in 1828. His father was the private secretary of Simon Bolivar, <strong>and</strong> was<br />

at one time a member of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Cabinet. Living in an atmosphere of revolution, he became<br />

a soldier when a mere boy. His rise to power occurred in 1863, when, at the head of a revolutionary<br />

force, be marched on Caracas <strong>and</strong> overthrew the existing Government, of which Gem José Antonio<br />

Paez was President.<br />

A new Government was organized, with Gen. Tovar Castro as President <strong>and</strong> Gen. Blanco as<br />

Vice President. <strong>The</strong> latter, however, was the real head of the Administration, <strong>and</strong> for nearly twentyfive<br />

years thereafter his was the controlling mind in the Government.<br />

A new Constitution was proclaimed on March 28, 1864, making large extensions in the popular<br />

rights. From 1867 to 1871 the country was disturbed by various revolutionary movements, all of<br />

which were suppressed by the strong h<strong>and</strong> of Blanco. In December, 1871, he was proclaimed<br />

provisional President, or Dictator, <strong>and</strong> in 1873 he was regularly elected President. He was re-elected<br />

in 1877, <strong>and</strong> again in 1881, <strong>and</strong> he exercised complete control over the Administration of Gen.<br />

Joaquin Crespo, who succeeded him as President in 1884. It was not until 1888 that a popular<br />

revolution put an end to his authority <strong>and</strong> placed Dr. Pablo Rojas Paul in the Presidential chair.<br />

Under the direction of Blanco as Dictator <strong>and</strong> President a system of compulsory public<br />

education was organized, telegraph <strong>and</strong> postal systems were established, <strong>and</strong> many railroads <strong>and</strong><br />

other public works were constructed. <strong>The</strong> projects undertaken <strong>and</strong> carried out by him resulted in an<br />

enormous increase in the commerce <strong>and</strong> wealth of the country. By an amended constitution adopted<br />

through his influence in 1881, the twenty States of which the republic had originally been composed<br />

were consolidated into eight Sates, five Territories, anti one colony, <strong>and</strong> the General Government<br />

was centralized <strong>and</strong> strengthened.<br />

591


1899 – 1904<br />

<strong>The</strong> arbitration of the boundary dispute between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, which is now in<br />

progress at Paris, was first suggested by Gen. Blanco in 1882, when he directed the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Minister in London to suggest to the <strong>British</strong> Government that means of settling the question. In<br />

1884, after he had given up the Presidency, but while he still retained his almost dictatorial power in<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, Gen. Blanco went to London as Minister Plenipotentiary for the purpose of reaching a<br />

settlement of the dispute. On his way he stopped in Washington <strong>and</strong> conferred with the Secretary of<br />

State, who instructed James Russell Lowell, then United States Minister in London, to use his<br />

discretion as to how far his good offices could profitably be employed, but at any rate, to “take<br />

proper occasion to let Lord Granville know that we are not without concern as to whatever may<br />

affect the interests of a sister republic on the American continent <strong>and</strong> its position in the family of<br />

nations.” As the result of combined efforts of Gen. Blanco <strong>and</strong> Mr. Lowell, Lord Granville agreed<br />

to a general arbitration of the boundary question, but before the treaty was signed Lord Salisbury<br />

became Premier, <strong>and</strong>, upon his refusal to conclude the arrangement made by his predecessor, the<br />

negotiations came to an end for the time being.<br />

His mission to Engl<strong>and</strong> was Gen. Blanco’s last important public service. Being out of office, <strong>and</strong><br />

for a time absent from <strong>Venezuela</strong>, his influence waned, <strong>and</strong> a strong party sprang up by which he<br />

was accused of having used his power for private gain. During the temporary occupation of Caracas<br />

by a revolutionary force, numerous statues of himself which he had caused to be erected in the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n capital were demolished by his enemies. One of these statues bore the following<br />

inscription, which Blanco had dictated: “To that Illustrious American, the Pacificator <strong>and</strong><br />

Regenerator of the United States of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Gen. Antonio Guzman Blanco.” <strong>The</strong>se words are an<br />

index to the pride <strong>and</strong> self-esteem which were among Gen. Blanco’s most striking characteristics.<br />

Shortly after his fall from power, Gen Blanco took up his residence in Paris with his wife <strong>and</strong><br />

five children. He became noted in the French capital as a d<strong>and</strong>y in dress <strong>and</strong> a brilliant entertainer,<br />

the fortune which he had amassed in <strong>Venezuela</strong> enabling him to gratify all his tastes for pleasure <strong>and</strong><br />

luxury. One of his daughters is married to the Duc de Morny, a leader in the fashionable life of<br />

Paris.<br />

[30 July 1899]<br />

- 470 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission<br />

PARIS. July 31.—At to-day’s session of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, M. Mallet-Prevost, the Secretary of that body, continued his presentation of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n case. Baron Russell of Killowen, Lord Chief Justice of Engl<strong>and</strong>, suggested the<br />

advisability of M. Mallet-Prevost curtailing his argument, but Melville W. Fuller, Chief Justice of the<br />

United States Supreme Court, intervened in favor of the speaker. <strong>The</strong> court will continue its sitting<br />

to-morrow.<br />

[1 August 1899]<br />

592


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 471 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS, Aug. 1—At the session to-day of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, the argument of M. Mallet-Prevost, the Secretary of the commission, in his<br />

presentation of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n case, was confined to evidence showing that after 1761 the whole<br />

trade of <strong>Guiana</strong> was in the h<strong>and</strong>s of Spain.<br />

[2 August 1899]<br />

- 472 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary History<br />

PARIS, Aug. 2.—M. Mallet-Prevost, Secretary of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, in his presentation of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n case before that body to-day devoted his<br />

argument to showing that up to 1814 Spain had effective control of the coast from the Orinoco to<br />

the Essequibo.<br />

[3 August 1899]<br />

- 473 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Case<br />

PARIS, Aug. 7.—At the session of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission today,<br />

M. Mallet-Prevost, the Secretary of the commission, in continuing his presentation of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n case, discussed various claims relative to the interior of <strong>Guiana</strong>, quoting documents to<br />

show that the Dutch never went above the first cataracts of the Essequibo <strong>and</strong> other rivers.<br />

[8 August 1899]<br />

- 474 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS, Aug. 8.—M. Mallet-Prevost, the Secretary of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary<br />

Arbitration Commission, at to-day’s sitting of that body continued his presentation of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n case, <strong>and</strong> devoted the day to showing that the Dutch never claimed territory which<br />

Great Britain now says they owned.<br />

593


1899 – 1904<br />

[9 August 1899]<br />

- 475 -<br />

VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY CASE<br />

M. Mallet-Prevost Concludes His Presentation To-day—Three Blue Books<br />

PARIS, Aug. 9.—M. Mallet-Prevost, the Secretary of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary<br />

Arbitration Commission, at to-day’s sitting of that body proceeded with his presentation of the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n ease <strong>and</strong> introduced evidence with the object of proving the Spaniards ejected the<br />

Dutch from the Cuyuni River in the right of jurisdiction. M. Mallet-Prevost will conclude his<br />

argument to-morrow, when Prof. R. Soley will discuss the question from the date of the <strong>British</strong><br />

occupation in 1814.<br />

[10 August 1899]<br />

- 476 -<br />

ARBITRATION A SLOW METHOD<br />

<strong>The</strong> London Times Comments on the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Case<br />

LONDON, Aug 12.—<strong>The</strong> Times, in an editorial this morning on the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary<br />

arbitration, complains that the proceedings are unnecessarily protracted <strong>and</strong> expresses a fear that the<br />

example thus set will “operate to prejudice the arbitral mode of settling differences.” It says:<br />

“Unfortunately this is a too common drawback to international references. Witness also the<br />

Delagoa <strong>and</strong> Bering Sea cases. If the system is not to break down tribunals must exercise a free h<strong>and</strong><br />

in discouraging the prodigies of physical energy in which modern advocates are too prone to<br />

indulge.”<br />

[12 August 1899]<br />

- 477 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission<br />

PARIS, Aug. 12—<strong>The</strong> sessions of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission<br />

were resumed to-day. Prof. John R. Soley began his argument on behalf of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n side of<br />

the ease, treating of the period of the <strong>British</strong> possession of the Essequibo. He declared that up to<br />

1856 Great Britain only possessed Moruca. <strong>The</strong> sittings of the commission will be continued on<br />

Monday.<br />

[13 August 1899]<br />

594


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

- 478 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS, Aug. 14.—At to-day’s session of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission Prof. John R. Soley, in continuing his presentation of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n case, discussed<br />

the question of military control <strong>and</strong> jurisdiction, neither of which, prior to 1850, he said, had<br />

extended west of the Essequibo River.<br />

[15 August 1899]<br />

- 479 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Argument<br />

PARIS. Aug. 15.—Prof. John R. Soley continued his argument at the session to-day of the<br />

Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission, in behalf of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n side of the ease,<br />

claiming that English jurisdiction never extended beyond the Essequibo River. After to-morrow’s<br />

session an adjournment will be taken until Aug. 25.<br />

[16 August 1899]<br />

- 480 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Court Adjourns<br />

PARIS, Aug. 16.—At to-day’s session of’ the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, Prof. John R. Soley, in continuing argument in behalf of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n case, made a<br />

general attack on the case of Great Britain. He then quoted evidence as to <strong>Venezuela</strong>n influence in<br />

the same territory. <strong>The</strong> court adjourned until Aug. 26.*<br />

[17 August 1899]<br />

(* This date is an error in this news item. <strong>The</strong> court adjourned until Aug. 25.)<br />

- 481 -<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Argument Resumed<br />

PARIS, Aug. 25.—<strong>The</strong> sittings of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission<br />

were resumed to-day. Prof. John H. Solely, continuing his argument in behalf of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> case,<br />

595


1899 – 1904<br />

said that, while evidence of <strong>British</strong> sovereignty was absent, proofs existed of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s control. He<br />

devoted much of his time to an interpretation of the agreement of 1850.<br />

[26 August 1899]<br />

- 482 -<br />

VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY MAPS<br />

Prof. Soley Charges that Schomburgk’s Show Private Motives<br />

PARIS, Aug. 26.—At the session to-day of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, Prof. John R. Soley, in continuing his argument in support of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n case,<br />

devoted the day to a criticism of Sir Robert Schomburgk’s maps. He declared that Sir Robert’s<br />

guiding motives were to be found in private <strong>and</strong> not in official data, the main object being to give<br />

Barima Point, comm<strong>and</strong>ing the whole Orinoco, to Great Britain.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission adjourned until Monday.<br />

[27 August 1899]<br />

- 483 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS. Aug. 29.—Prof. John H. Soley, on behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, concluded his argument before<br />

the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission at noon to-day. Sir Robert Thresie Reid,<br />

Q. C. former Attorney General, who followed, said <strong>Venezuela</strong> claims to be the residuary legatee of<br />

the ancient Spanish claim, though neither she nor Spain did anything for 280 years in the disputed<br />

territory.<br />

[30 August 1899]<br />

- 484 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> Boundary Argument<br />

PARIS, Aug. 30.—At the session to-day of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, Sir Robert Thresie Reid, Q. C., former Attorney General, continued his argument on<br />

behalf of Great Britain. He said he had examined carefully the contentions in the Oregon case of<br />

1792 <strong>and</strong> the Louisiana controversy of 1805, contending that the rights of the first corner were<br />

identical with those of the second, <strong>and</strong> he argued that Spain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> were not entitled to<br />

claim special rights over the Dutch <strong>and</strong> English.<br />

596


<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

[31 August 1899]<br />

- 485 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS, Aug. 31.—At to-day’s session of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, Sir Robert T. Reid, Q. C., former Attorney General, continued his argument for Great<br />

Britain. He contended that even it were true that the Dutch ab<strong>and</strong>oned Amakuru fort in 1648 there<br />

was ammp1e evidence to show they held, without dispute, the Orinoco almost to its source <strong>and</strong> the<br />

whole of the Essequibo.<br />

[1 September 1899]<br />

- 486 -<br />

English Control of <strong>Venezuela</strong>n L<strong>and</strong>s<br />

PARIS, Sept. 1.—Sir Robert Thresie Reid, Q. C., former Attorney General of Great Britain, at<br />

to-day’s session of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission produced evidence in behalf<br />

of the <strong>British</strong> contention to show how thorough was <strong>British</strong> control in the disputed territory,<br />

granting of licenses for fishing <strong>and</strong> timber cutting, <strong>and</strong> claimed that Great Britain’s judicial authority<br />

was absolute up to the banks of the Amakuru. He also declared that <strong>Venezuela</strong> gave no evidence in<br />

support of her claim to sovereignty except an empty assertion.<br />

[2 September 1899]<br />

- 487 -<br />

VENEZUELA’S ARGUMENT<br />

PARIS. Sept. 4.—Sir Robert Thresie Reid, Q. C., former Attorney General of Great Britain, today<br />

concluded his argument before the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission, presenting the<br />

case for Engl<strong>and</strong>. Counsel said that Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> before the tribunal held absolutely the<br />

same footing, the question being one of comparative title.<br />

George Askwith, junior counsel, continued the argument of Engl<strong>and</strong>’s case. He expressed regret<br />

that his adversaries had not yet given the legal view of the present controversy. Mr. Askwith referred<br />

to Spain’s claim to the whole of America, <strong>and</strong> said the presentation of <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s case was<br />

whimsical. He added that no European nation admitted this Spanish claim, <strong>and</strong> that the Dutch,<br />

when they obtained their independence, upheld their right of settling in the West Indies <strong>and</strong> carried<br />

it into effect.<br />

597


1899 – 1904<br />

[5 September 1899]<br />

- 488 -<br />

Gen. Tracy Argues for <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

PARIS, Sept. 7.—Gen. Benjamin F. Tracy, before the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission to-day, took up his argument in behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, devoting the greater part of the<br />

day to a discussion of the international rules relating to the rights of discovery. He claimed that<br />

Spain had satisfied all the requirements, <strong>and</strong> that the Orinoco <strong>and</strong> Amazon inclosed the ancient<br />

Province of Spain. <strong>The</strong> commission then adjourned until Monday.<br />

[8 September 1899]<br />

- 489 -<br />

VENEZUELAN VERDICT SOON<br />

WASHINGTON, Sept. 13.—Information has reached officials here that the <strong>British</strong>- <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

court of arbitration now sitting at Paris will conclude its work <strong>and</strong> render a final decision about the<br />

first of the coming month.<br />

This is due to the desire of Chief Justice Fuller, one of the arbitrators, to return to Washington in<br />

time for the opening of the Supreme Court, on Oct. 10.<br />

Mr. Harrison has announced to his colleagues that he will make only a brief speech, <strong>and</strong> this has<br />

permitted an underst<strong>and</strong>ing to close the work about the first of the month <strong>and</strong> to render a verdict<br />

on the question before the arbitrators separate.<br />

[14 September 1899]<br />

- 490 -<br />

VENEZUELAN COMMISSION<br />

Sir Richard Webster Begins His Final Speech for Great Britain<br />

PARIS, Sept. 15.—At to-day’s Session of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission Gen. Benjamin F. Tracy concluded his argument, contending that Great Britain could<br />

not obtain rights previous to 1850 in consequence of an agreement made that year.<br />

Sir Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, began the final speech in behalf of Great<br />

Britain. He urged that the whole case of <strong>Venezuela</strong> was built upon the paramount title of Spain, <strong>and</strong><br />

that Mr. Tracy had failed to reply to his colleague’s speech, which completely shattered such a title.<br />

<strong>The</strong> session will be continued to-morrow.<br />

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[16 September 1899]<br />

- 491 -<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission<br />

PARIS. Sept. 16.—At to-day’s session of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, Sir Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, completed his review of the treaty<br />

of Munster. He strongly attacked the theory of overlordship of Spain, <strong>and</strong> showed the importance of<br />

considering the matter of spheres of influence. He urged that <strong>Venezuela</strong> had no title to Barima.<br />

Though it might have been offered by various Ministers as a concession, it really belonged to<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

[17 September 1899]<br />

- 492 -<br />

VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY<br />

PARIS, Sept. 18.—At to-day’s session of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, Sir Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, continuing his argument on behalf<br />

of Great Britain, dwelt upon the alliance between the Dutch <strong>and</strong> the Indians.<br />

Describing the colony as it was in 1714, at the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, he claimed that the<br />

Dutch then owned all that is now contended for by Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> argued that the acts of<br />

Spanish interference during the eighteenth century had been without effect.<br />

Describing the colony in 1814, be asserted that, at the time of the transfer to Engl<strong>and</strong>, all the<br />

territory <strong>and</strong> all the rivers owned by the Dutch passed from the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s to Engl<strong>and</strong>.<br />

Sir Richard criticised the report of M. Mallet-Prevost, Secretary of the commission <strong>and</strong> one of<br />

the counsel for <strong>Venezuela</strong>, upon the maps that have been laid before the tribunal, <strong>and</strong> then<br />

commenced to sketch the <strong>British</strong> period of occupation. He will conclude his argument to-morrow.<br />

[19 September 1899]<br />

- 493 -<br />

GEN. HARRISON’S ARGUMENT<br />

Begins Final Speech for <strong>Venezuela</strong> Before Boundary Commission<br />

PARIS. Sept. 19.—Sir Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General before the Anglo-<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission, concluded his argument in behalf of Great Britain<br />

to-day.<br />

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1899 – 1904<br />

He said that the conclusion of the agreement of 1850 led to the development of the territory<br />

which the proceedings of <strong>Venezuela</strong> had arrested, <strong>and</strong> urged that no portion of the territory ought<br />

to be h<strong>and</strong>ed to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, as the decision was to proceed on the ground of right <strong>and</strong> not of<br />

compromise or concession.<br />

Ex-President Benjamin Harrison then began the final speech for <strong>Venezuela</strong>. He said <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

dem<strong>and</strong>ed that her interests be decided on the ground of strict right <strong>and</strong> urged that Spain, until<br />

interrupted by the Dutch, peacefully colonized the coast of <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> always intended to return<br />

there. Spain, Mr. Harrison pointed out, had obtained a title to <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> could only lose it by<br />

cession, ab<strong>and</strong>onment, or prescription arising against her.<br />

[20 September 1899]<br />

- 494 -<br />

GEN. HARRISON SPEAKS FOR VENEZUELA<br />

PARIS, Sept. 20.—Before the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission to-day ex-<br />

President Benjamin Harrison continued his argument in behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, declaring that both<br />

sides admitted there was a common, coterminous boundary between <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />

that any idea of a space in which Great Britain could advance was alien to the views of her Ministers<br />

<strong>and</strong> to those expressed in the diplomatic correspondence, to the use of which Sir Richard Webster,<br />

the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, had protested that the aggressive surveyor, Sir Robert Schomburgk,<br />

had advanced the English boundaries, <strong>and</strong> that Lord Salisbury <strong>and</strong> Sir Richard Webster had<br />

advanced them further. Continuing, Mr. Harrison said that if Barima Point was left in other h<strong>and</strong>s<br />

than those of <strong>Venezuela</strong> a dangerous situation would be created, both for <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> Great<br />

Britain.<br />

[20 September 1899]<br />

- 495 -<br />

GEN. HARRISON’S ARGUMENT<br />

Expounds <strong>Venezuela</strong>’s Claim Before Boundary Commission<br />

PARIS, Sept. 21.—Continuing his argument in behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong> before the Anglo-<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission, to-day, ex-President Benjamin Harrison said the<br />

issue of diplomatic correspondence showed that Great Britain had never claimed more than the<br />

Dutch had. He held that the legal <strong>and</strong> political departments of the <strong>British</strong> Foreign Office did not<br />

seem to agree, the latter taking its inspiration from the surveyor, Sir Robert Schomburgk, while Sir<br />

Richard Webster, the <strong>British</strong> Attorney General, went further <strong>and</strong> claimed the extended Schomburgk<br />

line.<br />

Continuing, Mr. Harrison said he proposed to show that the Dutch rights of 1814 were much<br />

smaller than those of any line now suggested by Great Britain, <strong>and</strong> that those lines were now extinct<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

through the disputed territory. Any extension, he asserted, of the original lines could only be claimed<br />

through prescription or adverse holding, <strong>and</strong> all the rest of the country belonged to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> commission adjourned until Monday.<br />

[22 September 1899]<br />

- 496 -<br />

Dinner to <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitrators<br />

PARIS, Sept. 23—Sir Richard Henn Collins, Lord Justice of Appeal of the <strong>British</strong> High Court of<br />

Judicature, <strong>and</strong> one of the members of members of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Commission, gave a dinner this evening to his associates in the tribunal <strong>and</strong> to the counsel. Mr. <strong>and</strong><br />

Mrs. Benjamin Harrison <strong>and</strong> Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Mrs. Fuller were present.<br />

[23 September 1899]<br />

- 497 -<br />

ENGLISH RIGHTS LIMITED.<br />

Gen. Harrison Defines the Dutch Rights in <strong>Venezuela</strong> Territory<br />

PARIS, Sept. 25.—Before the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission to-day, ex-President<br />

Harrison continued his argument on behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Mr. Harrison contended that, while the<br />

Dutch rights in the so-called “intermediate territory” had been acquired by conquest, these rights<br />

must be limited by the law of conquest, <strong>and</strong> the treaty of Munster strictly limited them.<br />

M. de Maartens, President of the tribunal, asked Mr. Harrison where he found the word<br />

“delimitization” in the treaty.<br />

Mr. Harrison replied that he would show that delimitization was a necessary effect, which did<br />

not, as had been claimed by Sir Richard Webster, on behalf of Great Britain, permit the Dutch to<br />

acquire concessions, except from the Portuguese in Brazil.<br />

[26 September 1899]<br />

- 498 -<br />

VENEZUELAN COMMISSION<br />

Mr. Harrison Will Conclude His Argument for <strong>Venezuela</strong> To-day<br />

PARIS, Sept. 26.—Former President Benjamin Harrison, in continuing his argument in favor of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> before the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission to-day, declared that for<br />

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1899 – 1904<br />

half a century prior to the treaty of Munster all the nations interested in America recognized how<br />

great was the importance attached to discovery, <strong>and</strong> an actual law existed on the subject.<br />

Mr. Harrison further declared that Great Britain had set up the question of discovery in the New<br />

Netherl<strong>and</strong>s controversy of 1865, <strong>and</strong> had pressed it as a governing law, although it was now<br />

endeavoring to exclude <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> a part of the coast.<br />

Harrison will conclude his argument to-morrow.<br />

[27 September 1899]<br />

- 499 -<br />

VENEZUELAN AWARD MONDAY<br />

Gen. Harrison Concludes His Argument Before Boundary Court<br />

PARIS, Sept. 27.—At to-day’s session of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Tribunal<br />

ex-President Harrison concluded his argument on behalf of <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Mr. Harrison claimed that all the acts of Spain before the arrival of the Dutch gave her absolute<br />

sovereignty over the whole of <strong>Guiana</strong>, <strong>and</strong> that she would have incorporated it as a province but for<br />

the warlike intervention of the Dutch. In closing he expressed his deep obligation to his associate<br />

counsel <strong>and</strong> his thanks for the generous hospitality of France. So far as the distinguished counsel of<br />

Great Britain were concerned, he said that, however sharp had been the discussion, there had been<br />

only the kindliest personal <strong>and</strong> professional regard.<br />

<strong>The</strong> tribunal then rose. It is expected that the award will be delivered on Monday next.<br />

[28 September 1899]<br />

- 500 -<br />

VENEZUELA BOUNDARY DISPUTE<br />

Little Interest Is Shown in Either London or Paris<br />

LONDON, Sept. 30.—Gen. Benjamin F. Tracy’s name was on the St. Louis passenger list, but<br />

he did not appear at the Waterloo Station this morning. He would naturally be anxious to return<br />

without delay, as his work with the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commission is ended.<br />

<strong>The</strong> work of the commission attracted no attention in Paris. Ex-President Harrison <strong>and</strong> Sir<br />

Richard Webster are credited with making the best arguments. No interest whatever appears to be<br />

taken here in the result of the commission’s work.<br />

[1 October 1899]<br />

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- 501 -<br />

VENEZUELA DISPUTE DECIDED<br />

Boundary Commission Will Announce Its Award To-day—<br />

It Is Said to Favor Great Britain.<br />

PARIS, Oct. 2.—It is announced that the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Commission will give its<br />

award at noon to-morrow, as the tribunal has just risen, after concluding its deliberations.<br />

<strong>The</strong> award will be read in the presence of the representatives of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Secretaries are now writing it out, <strong>and</strong> have so notified Messrs. Buchanan <strong>and</strong> Rojas.<br />

It is said on good authority that the award will be a decided victory for Great Britain.<br />

Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer start for London Wednesday, <strong>and</strong> will sail for New York<br />

on the While Star Line steamer Majestic Oct. 11.<br />

Ex-President Benjamin Harrison goes to Berlin Wednesday. From there he will go to <strong>The</strong><br />

Hague, Brussels, <strong>and</strong> London, where he will spend a few days prior to sailing for the United States<br />

Oct. 18.<br />

Sir Richard Webster, Mr. George H. Askwith, <strong>and</strong> Messrs. Im Thurn, Buchanan, <strong>and</strong> others go<br />

to London on Wednesday.<br />

[3 October 1899]<br />

- 502 -<br />

GREAT BRITAIN WINS VENEZUELA CASE<br />

She Gets Territory Covering Almost Her Extreme Claim<br />

CONCESSIONS TO VENEZUELA<br />

Orinoco River Lies Wholly Within Her Jurisdiction<br />

Counsel Discuss the Award—<strong>The</strong> Arbitration, <strong>The</strong>y Say, Was Merely a<br />

Diplomatic Compromise—Great Britain Well Satisfied<br />

PARIS, Oct 3.—<strong>The</strong> Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission rendered its verdict<br />

to-day, fixing the boundary line between the United States of <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> the colony of <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong>. Great Britain obtains almost its extreme claim, offset, however, by a cession of a small<br />

amount of l<strong>and</strong> near the Orinoco River <strong>and</strong> in the interior. <strong>The</strong> river remains wholly within<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory.<br />

<strong>The</strong> verdict was read at 12:05 P. M. <strong>and</strong> was unanimous.<br />

<strong>The</strong> award of the tribunal, briefly summarized, means that of the 60,000 square miles claimed,<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> obtains only 100, formed partly of the marsh l<strong>and</strong> near the River Barima, <strong>and</strong> a portion in<br />

the interior; while Great Britain retains all the forest country.<br />

M. de Martens, the umpire, who has presided over the deliberations of the tribunal entered the<br />

room, accompanied by the other four members of the tribunal. After they had taken their seats in<br />

the presence of the counsel of the two parties, of Sir Edmund J. Monson, <strong>British</strong> Ambassador to<br />

France, the entire staff of the <strong>British</strong> Embassy, <strong>and</strong> a large concourse of people, M. de Martens rose<br />

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1899 – 1904<br />

<strong>and</strong> in his opening sentences announced that the court would read the award, which had been<br />

unanimously arrived at, in English <strong>and</strong> in French. D’Oyly Carte, private secretary to Baron Russell<br />

of Killowen, one of the <strong>British</strong> members of the tribunal, read the English text <strong>and</strong> M. de Martens<br />

read the French.<br />

<strong>The</strong> decision is as follows:<br />

TEXT OF THE DECISION<br />

“Starting on the coast at Point Playa, the frontier shall follow a straight line to the confluence of the Barima <strong>and</strong><br />

the Maruima, thence following the thalweg of the latter to its source. <strong>The</strong>nce it shall proceed to the confluence of<br />

the Haiowa <strong>and</strong> the Amakuru; thence following the thalweg of the Amakuru to its source in the Plain of Imataka;<br />

thence in a southwesterly direction along the highest ridge of the Imataka Mountains to the site the source at the<br />

Barima <strong>and</strong> the principal chain of the Imataka Mountains; thence in a southeast direction to the source or the<br />

Acarabisi.<br />

“Following the thalweg of the Acarabisi to the Cuyuni, the northern bank of which it shall follow in a westerly<br />

direction to the confluence of the Cuyuni <strong>and</strong> the Vanamu; thence along the thalweg of the Vanamu to its<br />

westernmost source; thence in a straight line to the summit of Mount Roraima; thence to the source of the Cotinga.<br />

“From this point the frontier shall follow the thalweg of the Cotinga to its confluence with the Takutu; thence<br />

along the thalweg of the Takutu to its source; thence in a straight line to the most western point of the Akarai<br />

Mountains, the highest ridge of which it shall follow to the source of the Corentin, otherwise called the Cutari River,<br />

whence it will follow the course of the river.<br />

“It is stipulated that the frontier hereby deliminated reserves <strong>and</strong> in no way prejudices questions actually existing<br />

or that may hereafter arise between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the Republic of Brazil, or between the Republic of Brazil <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. In fixing the above delimitation, the arbitrators consider <strong>and</strong> decide that, in time at peace, the Rivers<br />

Amakura <strong>and</strong> Barima shall be open to navigation by the merchant shipping of all nations, due reserve being made<br />

with regard to equitable regulations <strong>and</strong> the payment of light dues <strong>and</strong> other like imposts, on condition that the dues<br />

levied by <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> on ships traversing the parts of those rivers owned by them respectively<br />

shall be imposed in accordance with the same tariff on <strong>Venezuela</strong>n <strong>and</strong> <strong>British</strong> vessels. <strong>The</strong>se tariffs are not to<br />

exceed those of all other countries. <strong>The</strong> award proceeds also upon the condition that neither <strong>Venezuela</strong> nor <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> shall impose any customs duty on goods carried in vessels, ships or boats passing through these rivers, such<br />

customs being levied only on goods l<strong>and</strong>ed “upon <strong>Venezuela</strong>n territory or on the territory of Great Britain<br />

respectively.”<br />

After the reading the President of the tribunal rose <strong>and</strong>, speaking in English, said he was glad to<br />

announce that, after three months of hard work, the court had unanimously decided upon the award<br />

which had just been read. It was a pleasant duty now to restore the former good underst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

between the contending parties<br />

He then eloquently thanked his colleagues <strong>and</strong> the respective counsel, tendering on behalf of the<br />

tribunal special thanks for the hospitality extended to all by France. <strong>The</strong>se sentiments he repeated in<br />

French.<br />

Benjamin Harrison, the principal counsel for <strong>Venezuela</strong>, then made a few remarks, <strong>and</strong> was<br />

followed by Sir Richard Webster, principal counsel for Great Britain, who thanked the French<br />

Government for its hospitality, <strong>and</strong> said that Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> would work side by side in<br />

harmony.<br />

<strong>The</strong> sitting was then adjourned.<br />

When asked his opinion regarding the award, Sir Richard Webster said he was satisfied. Mr.<br />

Harrison, replying to the same inquiry, said, “It might be worse.”<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

COUNSEL DISCUSS THE AWARD<br />

Subsequently Mr. Harrison <strong>and</strong> M. Mallet-Prevost, who were interviewed jointly, pointed out<br />

that Great Britain up to the time of the intervention of the United States distinctly refused to<br />

arbitrate any portion of the territory east of the Schomburgk line, alleging that its title was<br />

unassailable. This territory included the Atacuri River <strong>and</strong> Point Barima, which is of the greatest<br />

value strategically <strong>and</strong> commercially.<br />

<strong>The</strong> award, continued the counsel for <strong>Venezuela</strong>, gives Point Barima, with a strip of l<strong>and</strong> fifty<br />

miles long, to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, which thereby obtains entire control of the River Orinoco. Three thous<strong>and</strong><br />

square miles in the interior are also awarded to <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Thus, by a decision in which the <strong>British</strong><br />

arbitrators concurred, the position taken up by Great Britain in 1895 is shown to be unfounded.<br />

This, however, as the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n counsel pointed out, in nowise expresses the full extent of<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s victory. Great Britain had claimed 30,000 square miles of territory west of the<br />

Schomburgk line, <strong>and</strong> this she was disposed to arbitrate in 1890. Every foot of that section is now<br />

awarded to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> President of the tribunal, in his closing address to-day, the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n counsel remarked,<br />

had commented upon the unanimity of the present judgment, <strong>and</strong> had referred to it as a proof of<br />

the success of the arbitration; but in the opinion of counsel it did not require much intelligence to<br />

penetrate behind this superficial statement, <strong>and</strong> to see that the line drawn is a line of compromise,<br />

<strong>and</strong> not a line of right.<br />

If the <strong>British</strong> contention were right, the line should have been drawn further west; if it were<br />

wrong, the line should have been drawn much further east. <strong>The</strong>re was nothing in the history of the<br />

controversy, or in the legal proceedings involved, counsel contended, which could adequately<br />

explain why the line should be drawn where it had been.<br />

<strong>The</strong> counsel for <strong>Venezuela</strong> went on to say that, so long as arbitration was conducted on such<br />

principles, it could not be regarded as a success, at least by those who believe that arbitration should<br />

result in the admission of legal rights <strong>and</strong> not in compromises really diplomatic in character.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> had gained much, but was entitled to much more, <strong>and</strong> in the judgment of the joint<br />

counsel for <strong>Venezuela</strong>, if the arbitrators were unanimous, it must be because their failure to agree<br />

would have confirmed Great Britain in the possession of even more territory.<br />

GREAT BRITAIN SATISFIED<br />

One of the counsel for Great Britain made the following statement:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> award practically indorses the judgment of Sir Robert Schomburgk, whose line it follows<br />

except in a few particulars. Great Britain acquires the whole of the River Cuyuni, including a site<br />

which <strong>Venezuela</strong> alleged to be a fort at the junction of the Curumu <strong>and</strong> the Cuyuni. <strong>The</strong> marshy<br />

Barima district has been awarded to <strong>Venezuela</strong>, possibly on the principle of national security, but<br />

with the condition that the river shall be a free waterway to all nations. This piece of l<strong>and</strong> covers<br />

about thirty square miles.<br />

“It had been offered with much more l<strong>and</strong> by every <strong>British</strong> Foreign Minister since the time of<br />

Lord Aberdeen.<br />

Great Britain has substantiated almost all her extreme claim. All the valuable plantations <strong>and</strong><br />

gold fields are now indisputably settled within <strong>British</strong> territory.”<br />

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1899 – 1904<br />

M. DE MARTENS’S OPINION<br />

M. de Martens, when interviewed, repeated what he had said in his address to the court, adding:<br />

“I am of the opinion that this tribunal of arbitration is of exceptional importance, inasmuch as it<br />

is the first tribunal after the Peace Conference at <strong>The</strong> Hague.<br />

“It is also important because it is the first tribunal of the kind in which certain rules of procedure<br />

have been laid down <strong>and</strong> communicated to counsel as obligatory—rules which have been adhered to<br />

throughout.<br />

“<strong>The</strong>se rules are the same as were proposed by the Russian Government for the Conference at<br />

<strong>The</strong> Hague, <strong>and</strong> approved there in July. As they had been laid down by the arbitration tribunal in<br />

January, they were applied long before the convention at <strong>The</strong> Hague took them into consideration.<br />

“Another point of great importance is that ever since 1873 all awards had been decided by a<br />

majority; but this is the first occasion where the decision was unanimous, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing the great<br />

interests involved <strong>and</strong> the extent of the territory at stake, the boundary which is laid down by the<br />

judges is a line based upon justice <strong>and</strong> law.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> judges have been actuated by a desire to establish a compromise in a very complicated<br />

question, the origin of which must be looked for at the end of the fifteenth century.”<br />

[4 October 1899]<br />

- 503 -<br />

THE VICTORY AT PARIS<br />

<strong>The</strong> arbitration tribunal, made up of the most competent persons available to Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>, that has been sitting in Paris for many weeks discussing the respective claims of Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> as to the just <strong>and</strong> proper boundary between the possessions of those nations<br />

in South America, yesterday reached a conclusion by unanimous action, thus dispensing, we assume,<br />

with the necessity for action by the distinguished referee accepted to render a decision in the event<br />

or a disagreement by the arbitrators.<br />

An agreement that could satisfy each side <strong>and</strong> both sides is certainly bound to be satisfactory to<br />

those on the outside. <strong>The</strong> Schomburgk line, the traditional <strong>and</strong> contentional lines of Great Britain<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the much-talked-of aggressive <strong>and</strong> extreme lines marked by <strong>British</strong> imperialists, the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n line stretching back to the Essequibo River, all appear to have been ab<strong>and</strong>oned as a rule<br />

by which the arbitrators were finally controlled in reaching a decision. Great Britain gives up<br />

something; <strong>Venezuela</strong> yields at points. At all events, Great Britain acts a little less than some of her<br />

statesmen have claimed, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> retains more than she would have saved if she had decided<br />

to submit her case to settlement by the sword.<br />

<strong>The</strong> determination of this vexed question is chiefly of importance <strong>and</strong> interest to the United<br />

States as an illustration of the superiority of arbitration over war as a method of settling international<br />

disputes. If the good offices of the United States, suggested by Secretary Olney <strong>and</strong> urged by him<br />

with remarkable vigor <strong>and</strong> eventual conviction upon Lord Salisbury, had been rejected or received<br />

with less than the grace that Great Britain accepted them, does any one doubt what would have been<br />

the result?<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

It would have been a speedy case of settlement by the display <strong>and</strong> use, if it became necessary, on<br />

one side of a formidable navy, supported by such l<strong>and</strong> forces as might be required, <strong>and</strong> on the other<br />

of an army that could not long contend, without foreign assistance, against its powerful, wellequipped,<br />

<strong>and</strong> resolute antagonist.<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> would have been constrained beyond any shadow of doubt, if she had faced this<br />

conflict alone, to yield all that Great Britain had claimed, <strong>and</strong> as much more, by way of indemnity<br />

for the expense to which Great Britain had been forced, as the victorious comm<strong>and</strong>er saw fit to<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> with the conquered nation.<br />

With this deplorable prospect facing <strong>Venezuela</strong>, it was to good purpose that President Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

gave notice to Great Britain “that the traditional <strong>and</strong> established policy of this Government is firmly<br />

opposed to a forcible increase by any European power of its territorial possessions on this<br />

continent; that this policy is as well founded in principle as it is strongly supported by numerous<br />

precedents; that as a consequence the United States is bound to protest against the enlargement of<br />

the area of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> in derogation of the rights <strong>and</strong> against the will of <strong>Venezuela</strong>; that<br />

considering the disparity in strength of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, the territorial dispute between<br />

them can be reasonably settled only by friendly <strong>and</strong> impartial arbitration, <strong>and</strong> that the resort to such<br />

arbitration should include the whole controversy, <strong>and</strong> could not be satisfied if one of the powers<br />

concerned is permitted to draw an arbitrary line through the territory in debate <strong>and</strong> to declare that it<br />

will submit to arbitration only the portion lying on one side of it.”<br />

This was strong language. It might have provoked a far-reaching <strong>and</strong> destructive war, as<br />

melancholy as it would have been destructive of life <strong>and</strong> property.<br />

It was fortunate for all concerned, not less for <strong>Venezuela</strong> than for the greater powers that were<br />

interested <strong>and</strong> likely to be more deeply involved, that it became a contest for a broad, humane, wise<br />

principle.<br />

That principle having been admitted by Great Britain as one that should control civilized nations<br />

in their dealings with each other, the decision to be reached by the Paris tribunal became a matter of<br />

small consequence, in comparison with the gratification afforded to all reasonable men in the<br />

consent of one of the strongest of powers to prove its right to be considered great by the<br />

submission of an international contention to the test of reason <strong>and</strong> justice rather than of violence.<br />

[4 October 1899]<br />

- 504 -<br />

COMMENT IN LONDON<br />

<strong>The</strong> Times Reflects on Gen. Harrison’s Statement—<br />

United States Expected to Compel Acceptance.<br />

LONDON, Oct. 4.—<strong>The</strong> Times this morning, referring to the award of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Tribunal of Arbitration, says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> award, on the whole, favors Engl<strong>and</strong>, since, with trifling exceptions, which do not appear<br />

of material importance to us, it practically approves the Schomburgk line as the true frontier.<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong> has repeatedly offered to surrender the Barima Point with a much larger slice of territory<br />

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1899 – 1904<br />

than is now awarded if <strong>Venezuela</strong> would ab<strong>and</strong>on the more preposterous portion of her general<br />

claim.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> monstrous nature of that claim is best shown by the text of the award. It included sixty<br />

thous<strong>and</strong> [square] miles of territory, while the award gives her about two hundred square miles of<br />

unsurveyed country <strong>and</strong> swamp, or very much less than any of the <strong>British</strong> Ministries whose<br />

proposals for a compromise she rejected were prepared to offer her out of friendly regard.”<br />

Proceeding to argue that the award is a moral triumph <strong>and</strong> justification of Great Britain’s justice<br />

<strong>and</strong> moderation, <strong>The</strong> Times expresses the hope that it will satisfy “our opponents,” <strong>and</strong> adds:<br />

“We must leave Mr. Harrison <strong>and</strong> M. Mallet-Prevost, if there is any truth in the attacks on the<br />

award attributed to them in interviews, to settle the propriety of such utterances with Justice Fuller<br />

<strong>and</strong> Justice Brewer, the eminent American jurists, who joined in the decision.<br />

“Of the good taste of their observations everybody can form his own opinion. We at least have<br />

no reason on other grounds to quarrel with the singular imputation they cast upon their own Judges<br />

when they declare: ‘If the arbitrators are unanimous it must be because a failure to agree would have<br />

confirmed Great Britain in the possession of even more territory.’ That assertion implies that a<br />

majority were ready to give Engl<strong>and</strong> even more than she obtained.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Times publishes a map <strong>and</strong> five columns from its Paris correspondent, giving a full history of<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong> dispute.<br />

All the morning papers express satisfaction at the award <strong>and</strong> devote much space to the subject,<br />

illustrated with maps.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily Mail thinks the decision neither very bad nor very good from a <strong>British</strong> st<strong>and</strong>point, <strong>and</strong><br />

says:<br />

“It is the usual compromise, but it is gratifying to know it is unanimous. It is the first recorded<br />

instance where a Judge voted against his own country. We do not doubt that the United States will<br />

oblige <strong>Venezuela</strong> to accept the verdict <strong>and</strong> to act fairly in any trouble that may arise regarding the<br />

enforcement of the decision.<br />

“We may feel satisfied that a possible cause of dispute with the United States is removed at a<br />

small cost”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Morning Post in an editorial refers to President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s accusations of aggression <strong>and</strong> bad<br />

faith against Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the Americans’ denunciation <strong>and</strong> says:<br />

“Lord Salisbury is to be congratulated, but whether his forbearance is justified will be better<br />

known when the comments of the American Government <strong>and</strong> press on the award have been<br />

heard.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> paper expresses the opinion that the matter does not altogether justify the principle of<br />

arbitration, especially the intervention of third parties to impose arbitration, <strong>and</strong> concludes:<br />

“Before we can assent unconditionally that arbitration was the best solution we should like to<br />

know what arbitration <strong>and</strong> many years of discussion have cost <strong>and</strong> to compare the total with that of<br />

a reasonable estimate for such an expedition as could have settled the quarrel fifteen or twenty years<br />

ago.<br />

<strong>The</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard makes similar comments, but more courteously, <strong>and</strong> says:<br />

“Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s unmannerly intervention did not harm us, or change Anglo-American relations<br />

since then. Not a little is due to those American politicians who realized that Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s<br />

message was a mistake. <strong>The</strong> American people may rest assured that we are quite content with the<br />

decision, <strong>and</strong> with the means whereby which it was reached. All concerned in the arbitration are to<br />

be congratulated.”<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily <strong>News</strong> says:<br />

“<strong>Venezuela</strong> had better have accepted Lord Aberdeen’s offer in 1884, or Lord Rosebery’s in<br />

18S6. It is a brilliantly successful example of the way in which nations ought to settle such<br />

differences. Seldom has a blessing pronounced upon peacemakers been more fully bestowed. By<br />

yielding on a point of dignity if not of honor Lord Salisbury has secured the lasting friendship of the<br />

United States, <strong>and</strong> acquired for a <strong>British</strong> colony almost everything the colonists wished to retain.<br />

<strong>The</strong> award is an epoch in the history of mankind, <strong>and</strong> Lord Salisbury should be congratulated both<br />

by his friends <strong>and</strong> opponents.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily Chronicle regards the award as a fair compromise <strong>and</strong> says it supposes that Lord<br />

Salisbury will be disposed to make the best of a decision which brings a long, tedious controversy to<br />

an end. <strong>The</strong>re is no doubt, says <strong>The</strong> Chronicle, that the award will be welcomed by the nation as a<br />

whole.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily Graphic says it trusts the decision will be a lesson to “tail-twisting American jingoes.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Daily Telegraph thinks it will be rather difficult now to realize retrospectively the excitement<br />

which the subject caused three years ago, <strong>and</strong> says that “compromise, which is the essence of<br />

arbitration, is the keynote of the award.”<br />

[4 October 1899]<br />

- 505 -<br />

THE DISPUTE IS 400 YEARS OLD<br />

Character of Conflicting Claims Set Up<br />

—Aggressive Action by the Clevel<strong>and</strong> Administration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> decision of the Paris Commission has finally settled a dispute which, in some form or other,<br />

had been going on for four centuries, <strong>and</strong> which, by President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s message of Dec. 17, 1895,<br />

became an issue for the two great English-speaking peoples that many people at the time believed<br />

would lead to war between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Clevel<strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n message was issued on the ground that Great Britain, by<br />

contemplating vigorous steps against the Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> in attempting to enforce her<br />

conception of the boundary line between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, was transgressing the<br />

principle of the Monroe doctrine. <strong>The</strong> territory in dispute included the Yuruary Valley, in which gold<br />

mines of great richness had recently been discovered, <strong>and</strong> the possession of which, it was said,<br />

would go far to put Great Britain in control of the navigable mouth of the Orinoco, which plays a<br />

conspicuous part in the commercial <strong>and</strong> political relations of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, Colombia, <strong>and</strong> Brazil.<br />

In October, 1895, a sensation was caused in the United States, but only vaguely manifested in<br />

Engl<strong>and</strong>, by the report that Great Britain had addressed an ultimatum to the South American<br />

republic dem<strong>and</strong>ing an apology <strong>and</strong> a money indemnity for an outrage committed the year before at<br />

Yuruary, within the disputed zone. Some diplomatic correspondence followed between Secretary of<br />

State Olney <strong>and</strong> the <strong>British</strong> Premier, Lord Salisbury, <strong>and</strong> on Dec. 17 President Clevel<strong>and</strong> submitted<br />

to Congress the correspondence in the case, accompanying it with a special message, which was<br />

considered the most striking feature of his Administration. He vigorously supported Mr. Olney in<br />

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1899 – 1904<br />

the contention that the dispute was one for arbitration, <strong>and</strong> warned Engl<strong>and</strong> that no arbitrary seizure<br />

of territory would be permitted by the United States.<br />

Moreover, he asked Congress for authority to appoint a commission to determine the merits of<br />

the ease. <strong>The</strong> authority was given, not without some hesitation on the part of the Senate, however,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the personnel of the commission was announced Jan. 1, 1896. <strong>The</strong> commission, which was not<br />

officially recognized by Great Britain, began its investigation of the case.<br />

On Feb. 27, 1897, the commission discontinued its sittings, as on the second of that month<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> had signed in Washington a treaty by which they agreed to submit the<br />

boundary dispute to arbitration; the Board of Arbitration to consist of two members chosen by each<br />

Government <strong>and</strong> a fifth to be selected by these or, in the case of disagreement, to be named by King<br />

Oscar of Sweden. <strong>The</strong> jurists selected to represent <strong>Venezuela</strong> were Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Associate<br />

Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme Court. Great Britain’s representatives were Baron<br />

Russell of Killowen, Lord Chief Justice of Engl<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Justice Sir Richard Henn Collins. In<br />

December, 1897, it was announced that Prof. Martens, a distinguished Russian jurist <strong>and</strong> authority<br />

on constitutional <strong>and</strong> international law, had been selected as the fifth member of the commission,<br />

which began its work In Paris on June 15 last.<br />

Sir Richard Webster opened the case in behalf of Great Britain. He was assisted by Sir Robert<br />

Reid. Ex-President Harrison appeared for <strong>Venezuela</strong>, assisted by Gen. B. F. Tracy, ex-Secretary of<br />

the Navy; M. Mallet-Prevost, Secretary of President Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Boundary Commission of 1896, <strong>and</strong><br />

the Marquis de Rojas.<br />

Prior to 1895, Engl<strong>and</strong> had attempted to demark her territory as follows: Late in 1840 she<br />

asserted her right to the Atlantic coast as far as the Orinoco delta, <strong>and</strong> in the following year Sir<br />

Robert Schomburgk set out the boundary line. This was protested by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> soon after<br />

Schornburgk’s posts in the Orinoco region were destroyed. In 1844 Great Britain proposed a<br />

boundary line beginning west of the Pomaron River. <strong>The</strong> extreme <strong>British</strong> claim was made in 1881,<br />

when she extended a line westward to another line beginning twenty-nine miles west of the Moroco<br />

River, thus asserting her right to the valleys of the Pomaron <strong>and</strong> the <strong>Guiana</strong>.[sic] According to Lord<br />

Rosebery’s line of 1886, she claimed territory to the bank of the <strong>Guiana</strong> [sic] River. By S<strong>and</strong>erson’s<br />

line of 1890 she proposed a division of territory, beginning at the junction of the Amakuru <strong>and</strong><br />

Orinoco.<br />

And by the last Rosebery line of 1893 she proposed a conventional frontier beginning at the<br />

mouth of the Amakura <strong>and</strong> running so as to include the upper waters of the Cumaná, <strong>and</strong> thence to<br />

the sierra of Usupamo.<br />

[4 October 1899]<br />

- 506 -<br />

THE VENEZUELA ARBITRATION<br />

We have never entertained the expectation that the decision of the arbitrators selected by Great<br />

Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> to determine the right boundary line between the possessions of those two<br />

nations in South America would be entirely satisfactory to both nations. It was almost certain, in<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

fact, from the moment that it was decided to submit the contention to arbitration that Great Britain<br />

would come out with so much of her pretension sustained as to cause disappointment to the<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n hope that the line of demarkation between <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong> would be<br />

restored to the line of the Essequibo River.<br />

<strong>The</strong> “compromise” arrived at by the reported unanimous action of the four arbitrators, which<br />

was of course agreed to by Mr. Martens, the distinguished fifth member of the board, compels the<br />

conclusion that Chief Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Associate Justice Brewer, the Americans representing<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> in the arbitration, were convinced that the claims of <strong>Venezuela</strong> for adherence to the<br />

Essequibo boundary line could not properly be approved. Justice Brewer was perhaps the American<br />

present who was best prepared to justify any st<strong>and</strong> for <strong>Venezuela</strong> that he thought should be taken<br />

<strong>and</strong> adhered to.<br />

He was a member of the American commission appointed by President Clevel<strong>and</strong> that<br />

investigated the case thoroughly, in order to fortify the Administration in its determination to<br />

support <strong>Venezuela</strong> at some serious hazard, if the records of history appeared to sustain that position.<br />

Of course, the counsel for both sides are more or less disappointed. This feeling is naturally less<br />

poignant on the <strong>British</strong> side than on the side of <strong>Venezuela</strong>, which has lost some territory that was<br />

hers by tradition but occupied <strong>and</strong> improved by Great Britain – through ignorance of or indifference<br />

to its value—by <strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>Venezuela</strong> gets control of the Orinoco littoral <strong>and</strong> the strategic<br />

comm<strong>and</strong> of the entrance to that river by the surrender of Point Barima by the <strong>British</strong>. Great Britain<br />

gets a vast area of l<strong>and</strong> about which <strong>Venezuela</strong> probably knows nothing except that Great Britain<br />

has occupied <strong>and</strong> developed it until its discovered richness <strong>and</strong> presumed resources are coveted by<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> press is generally gratified. Its reflections are not free from selfishness, but while<br />

there are occasional doubts expressed as to whether the experiment of arbitration has demonstrated<br />

the superiority of that method of settling grave international disputes, there is visible something<br />

better than a disposition to brag because arbitration was tried <strong>and</strong> Great Britain did not come out<br />

badly injured. <strong>British</strong> pride is sustained because Great Britain is permitted to hold so much for the<br />

possession of which she might have been called upon to fight two foes instead of one: <strong>and</strong> we fully<br />

reciprocate that form of <strong>British</strong> rejoicing that is satisfied with the result because it vastly improves<br />

reciprocal respect between the United States <strong>and</strong> Great Britain.<br />

[5 October 1899]<br />

- 507 -<br />

GREAT BRITAIN FARED WELL<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Award Pleases the London <strong>News</strong>papers—<br />

Result of Compromise, Not Arbitration<br />

LONDON, Oct 4.—<strong>The</strong> award of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Commission is<br />

referred to by the afternoon papers as eminently satisfactory from the English point of view, but as<br />

hardly a proof of the practicability of universal arbitration.<br />

<strong>The</strong> Pall Maul Gazette says:<br />

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1899 – 1904<br />

“Without doubt Great Britain has done uncommonly well, as is proved by the comments of former President<br />

Harrison. If it were not already sufficiently obvious, it is now made clear that the arbitration has shown the<br />

disposition of one Government to be pleasant <strong>and</strong> patient rather than risk a sinful <strong>and</strong> unnatural quarre1. This must<br />

have its impression in America, <strong>and</strong> thus must have sown good seed, which has already grown into a flourishing<br />

plant.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> St. James’s Gazette says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> outcome is not the result of arbitration, but of friendly compromise, as stated by former President<br />

Harrison. We have not got all we wanted, nor all to which we are entitled; but arbitration has resulted in giving<br />

<strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> an indisputable title to the northwestern district, where her future lies.<br />

“Every one will gladly join in the universal congratulations to the tribunal upon the happy result of difficult <strong>and</strong><br />

delicate labors.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Westminster Gazette says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> result is decidedly satisfactory. <strong>The</strong> extreme contentions of both parties have been set aside; but the<br />

substantial point is that Great Britain gets more than on various occasions she had expressed herself as willing to<br />

concede to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

“<strong>The</strong> practical feature of the case is that we have substantially succeeded against <strong>Venezuela</strong>, while vastly<br />

improving our relations with the United States. <strong>The</strong> award <strong>and</strong> the rapidity with which it was rendered cannot fail to<br />

give a strong impetus to international arbitration.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> Globe, adopting its usual offensive tone, says:<br />

“For once arbitration has not operated to our disadvantage. <strong>The</strong>re are others besides the <strong>Venezuela</strong>ns who<br />

should now recognize that Great Britain will not suffer what she considers her rights to be subjected to the<br />

terrorism of warlike menace, whether in one part of the world or in another, whether by a great power or a small<br />

State.”<br />

[5 October 1899]<br />

- 508 -<br />

JUDGE BREWER’S OPINION<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>’s Arbitrator Tells How the Verdict Was Reached<br />

FINAL AWARD A COMPROMISE<br />

<strong>The</strong>re Were Differences on Every Point, but No Real Casting of Votes—<br />

Each Conceded Something<br />

PARIS, Oct. 4.— From a conversation had this evening with Justice Brewer of the United States<br />

Supreme Court regarding the award of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration Tribunal, it appears that<br />

the deliberations of the court did not proceed as smoothly <strong>and</strong> with the spontaneous unanimity<br />

which a perusal or the award would lead one to believe. Justice Brewer, in reply to a question, said:<br />

“Until the last moment I believed a decision would be quite impossible, <strong>and</strong> it was by the greatest conciliation<br />

<strong>and</strong> mutual concessions that a compromise was arrived at. If any of us had been asked to give an award, each would<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

have given one differing in extent <strong>and</strong> character. <strong>The</strong> consequence of this was that we had to adjust our different<br />

views, <strong>and</strong> finally to draw a line running between what each thought right.”<br />

Being asked whether political considerations influenced the award the Justice said he could not<br />

admit that, as such an admission would reflect on the Judges, but there was no doubt that the<br />

present insurrection in <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> the consequent feeling of instability weighed to a certain<br />

extent in the balance.<br />

In reply to an inquiry as to what questions separated the Judges. Justice Brewer replied:<br />

“Nearly every point. In the first place, European lawyers do not look upon the question of prior rights resulting<br />

from rights of discovery in the same way we do. <strong>The</strong>n, the question of the nature of control <strong>and</strong> the extent of<br />

influence <strong>and</strong> relationship with the native races, <strong>and</strong> many such matters are not viewed in the same manner on either<br />

side of the Atlantic. In fact, the whole situation is not so keenly appreciated by Europeans as it is by Americans.”<br />

Replying to a query regarding the deliberations within the court, Mr. Brewer said that there was,<br />

properly speaking, no casting of votes. Each Judge conceded something in turn.<br />

With regard to the proceedings in open court, he said the hearing of arguments might have been<br />

considerably curtailed had the case been heard exclusively by either an English or an American<br />

court, but the Judges thought it prudent to allow counsel full liberty in order to make matters clearer<br />

to the President, who, after all, was not a lawyer.<br />

Asked whether, according to his own opinion, <strong>Venezuela</strong> was entitled to more than she actually<br />

received, Justice Brewer, after some hesitation, shrugged his shoulders, <strong>and</strong> said he would rather say<br />

nothing on that subject, <strong>and</strong> concluded by remarking that, whatever the two parties might think of<br />

the award, <strong>Venezuela</strong> received Barima Point, which gives her full control of the interior of her<br />

country, <strong>and</strong> Engl<strong>and</strong> is confirmed in the possession of territory, in the development of which she<br />

has spent considerable money <strong>and</strong> energy, but “the principal blessing is that the two nations can at<br />

last develop peacefully, side by side, large tracts of territory, which, owing to previous antagonisms,<br />

have remained unproductive.”<br />

[5 October 1899]<br />

- 509 -<br />

BENJAMIN HARRISON’S FEE<br />

Ex-President May Have Trouble Getting $250,000 from <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

Special to <strong>The</strong> New-York Times<br />

WASHINGTON. Oct. 6.—A suggestion was made to-day of the possibility that a diplomatic<br />

officer of the United States might have to be employed to collect a lawyer’s fee for an ex-President<br />

of the United States. <strong>The</strong> situation, it was admitted, would be unprecedented if it presented itself,<br />

but is not thought likely that it will.<br />

<strong>The</strong> fee involved, so it is reported, is $250,000, promised by the present <strong>Venezuela</strong>n<br />

Government to Benjamin Harrison for his service as legal counsel of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Republic before<br />

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1899 – 1904<br />

the Paris Arbitration Commission. It was suggested that in the event of the triumph of the<br />

insurrectionists in <strong>Venezuela</strong>, now almost at the gates of the capital city, Caracas, the obligation of<br />

the preceding administration might be repudiated, inasmuch as the benefits derived by <strong>Venezuela</strong><br />

from the award are doubtful.<br />

In this case State Department officials are of the opinion that the debt would be regarded as one<br />

of honor, partly on account of Mr. Harrison’s high position as the former Chief Executive of the<br />

Republic whose good offices were alone responsible for averting war <strong>and</strong> securing arbitration to<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>. <strong>The</strong> obligation is none the less binding, it is urged, because the question was only<br />

considered during Harrison’s <strong>and</strong> won during Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s Administration.<br />

[7 October 1899]<br />

- 510 -<br />

VENEZUELA AND ALASKA<br />

We look upon the submission to arbitration of the <strong>Venezuela</strong> boundary dispute as a victory for<br />

us in which the immediate parties to the contention <strong>and</strong> the rest of the civilized world ought to be<br />

glad to participate. According to the decision at Paris, a line has been drawn between the extremes<br />

of the two contentions. Both sides are bound to accept this conclusion without appeal or official<br />

criticism. In the United States it must be accepted as a just determination, by a court for which we<br />

were largely responsible, of a question that menaced the peace of nations. To be courageously<br />

consistent, it may be urged that, having exerted great pressure upon Great Britain to submit this<br />

matter to arbitration, we cannot refuse to comply with a similar request by Great Britain that we<br />

submit to arbitration the Alaska boundary dispute.<br />

We have .not yet reached the stage of negotiations in which our authorities consider it imperative<br />

that arbitration need to be invoked in this case. Our rights on the mainl<strong>and</strong> for thirty miles from the<br />

coast—“clear National rights,” they are called by Prof. J. B. Moore, in an article on the subject in the<br />

current North American Review—are demonstrated without the intervention of arbitrators, <strong>and</strong><br />

probably will be settled by simple, direct negotiation. But we should be bound, having advocated the<br />

principle of arbitration for other nations, to accept it for the determination of this controversy if it<br />

should reach a stage so critical as to menace the peace of the two leading nations urging arbitration<br />

as a wiser t means of adjusting differences than the older <strong>and</strong> more brutal method of war.<br />

[7 October 1899]<br />

- 511 -<br />

CONCESSION TO VENEZUELA<br />

<strong>British</strong> Counsel Says It Is of No Value,<br />

as Barima Point <strong>and</strong> Coast Will Vanish in a Few Decades<br />

LONDON, Oct. 7.—George Askwith, junior counsel for Great Britain before the Anglo-<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration Tribunal, reviewing the history of the arbitration in <strong>The</strong> Speaker<br />

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today, maintains that the decision benefits Great Britain <strong>and</strong> the cause of the arbitration in general.<br />

He says:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> territorial sovereignty over Barima Point <strong>and</strong> the whole coastline granted to <strong>Venezuela</strong> will<br />

probably vanish in three or four decades, owing to the inroads of the sea upon the s<strong>and</strong>banks <strong>and</strong><br />

mud.”<br />

[8 October 1899]<br />

- 512 -<br />

BRITAIN PRAISES ARBITRATORS<br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> Commission’s Work Contrasted<br />

with the Delagoa Bay Tribunals<br />

Special to <strong>The</strong> New-York Times.<br />

LONDON, Oct 7.—<strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n arbitrators have received many compliments in the <strong>British</strong><br />

press. <strong>The</strong> result is considered a compromise, but is accepted as proving that if arbitration is to be a<br />

success the tribunal must be composed of distinguished men, the majority of whom should be<br />

practical lawyers.<br />

<strong>The</strong> work of the commission is contrasted favorably with that of the Delagoa Bay arbitration,<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Swiss are blamed for dilatory action.<br />

[8 October 1899]<br />

- 513 -<br />

VENEZUELA IS SATISFIED<br />

President <strong>and</strong> the Press Pleased with the Boundary Awards<br />

THE VALUE OF BARIMA POINT<br />

Its Possession Said to be of Great Advantage to the Republic<br />

by the Intelligent Classes<br />

CARACAS, <strong>Venezuela</strong>. Oct. 7.—<strong>The</strong> award of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Arbitration<br />

Tribunal has been received here with satisfaction. <strong>The</strong> intelligent classes consider that the possession<br />

of Barima Point will prove of great advantage to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

In the course of an interview today, President Andrade said:<br />

“<strong>The</strong> result is a cause of rejoicing for this country, because justice <strong>and</strong> the laws of the civilized<br />

world have restored a portion of usurped territory, <strong>and</strong> demonstrated the soundness of our claim.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> newspapers universally welcome the award.<br />

[8 October 1899]<br />

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- 514 -<br />

HONOR FOR BRITISH JURISTS<br />

Banquet Is Given Representatives in the <strong>Venezuela</strong> Arbitration<br />

LONDON, Dec. 11.—<strong>The</strong> Royal Societies Club gave a banquet this evening to Lord Chief<br />

Justice Russell <strong>and</strong> Sir Richard Henn Collins, Lord Justice of Appeal, who were Great Britain’s<br />

representatives in the arbitration of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n boundary dispute. <strong>The</strong> company, which<br />

included all the chief members of the English bench, was large <strong>and</strong> very distinguished.<br />

Sir Clements Robert Markham, President of the Royal Geographical Society, who presided,<br />

proposed the toast of the evening, “<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Members of the Anglo-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n Arbitration<br />

Commission. In the course of his remarks, he said the results of the arbitration had fully justified the<br />

work of Schomburghk.<br />

Baron Russell of Killowen, responding, alluded, to the interesting character of the labors of the<br />

tribunal <strong>and</strong> pointed out that Spain, although possessing some of the qualities of a great nation, had<br />

failed as a colonizing power because she had relied upon fire <strong>and</strong> sword instead of upon equal<br />

before the<br />

After expressing his regret at the absence from the banquet of Justice Fuller <strong>and</strong> Associate<br />

Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme Court, he paid a high tribute to their ability, as well as<br />

to the erudition, knowledge of international law, <strong>and</strong> judicial spirit displayed by Prof. de Maartens,<br />

who presided over the tribunal’s deliberations.<br />

“Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>,” said Lord Russell in concluding, “have obtained all which they<br />

were respectively entitled. <strong>The</strong>re is no question that the result is a triumph for arbitration; <strong>and</strong> it is<br />

especially important as proving the possibility of settling disputes without bloodshed or leaving a<br />

heritage of hatred.”<br />

[12 December 1899]<br />

- 515 -<br />

Brazil Objects to <strong>Venezuela</strong> Award<br />

RIO JANEIRO. Dec. 13.—<strong>The</strong> Government of Brazil will officially protest against the award of<br />

the Arbitration Tribunal at Paris of part of the frontier between the Cotinga <strong>and</strong> Takutu Rivers,<br />

which territory, it is said, belongs to Brazil, <strong>and</strong> was not included in the protocols establishing the<br />

tribunal which arbitrated the <strong>British</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong>n questions.<br />

[14 December 1899]<br />

- 516 -<br />

IN FOREIGN LANDS<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

THE LAST PHASE OF THE VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE.—Advises from<br />

Georgetown, <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, show that the Commissioners appointed by <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Republic of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to limit the boundary in accordance with the terms of the award of the Paris<br />

Arbitration Tribunal have begun work. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commissioners recently joined the <strong>Guiana</strong><br />

Commissioners in Georgetown. After being hospitably received <strong>and</strong> entertained by the Acting<br />

Governor, Sir Cavendish Boyle, they departed for Point Playa – the point on the coast that marks<br />

the boundary between the two countries – the Commissioners for <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong> having left<br />

Georgetown a few days previously.<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Commissioners are M. McTurk, C.M.G.; H. I. Perkins, Capt. Baker, <strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Dr.<br />

Widdip. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Commissioners, numbering eight, are: Engineering Chief – a Señor Felipe<br />

Aguenevere; First Assistant Engineer – Señor Santiago Aguenevere; Second Assistant Engineer –<br />

Señor Abraham Tirabo; Legal Adviser – Dr. Trino Celis Rios; Physician – Dr. Elias Toro; Engineer<br />

Draughtsman – Señor Lorenzo Mallecco Osio; Engineer’ Secretary- Señor José Maria Idarro Cerezo;<br />

Interpreter – Señor Gustav E. Michelena.<br />

<strong>The</strong> boundary will be fixed right up to Dutch <strong>Guiana</strong> without prejudice, however, to the claim of<br />

Brazil, with which a boundary dispute is pending. It is believed that the work of fixing the boundary<br />

will be a difficult <strong>and</strong> dangerous task on account of the nature of the ground <strong>and</strong> the risks of the<br />

climate, <strong>and</strong> the Commissioners do not expect that they can complete their work until 1902.<br />

[30 December 1900]<br />

- 517 -<br />

MR. CLEVELAND’S PRINCETON LECTURE<br />

Ex-President Discusses the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Boundary Trouble<br />

Received with Loud Cheers by the Student Body—<br />

Many Prominent Persons Present<br />

Ex-President Grover Clevel<strong>and</strong> delivered last night, at Alex<strong>and</strong>er Hall, Princeton University, the<br />

first of two lectures on the national boundary dispute between Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, which<br />

dispute involved the boundary line separating <strong>Venezuela</strong> from the <strong>British</strong> colony of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se lectures, like Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s address of last year, are given in the course founded by Henry<br />

Stafford Little.<br />

Prof. Woodrow Wilson in a brief <strong>and</strong> fitting speech introduced the speaker. As Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong><br />

arose to begin his lecture he was greeted with three long, loud cheers from the student body. He was<br />

strongly applauded several times while delivering the lecture. A number of prominent people from<br />

Trenton, New York, <strong>and</strong> Philadelphia were in attendance.<br />

Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> at the outset spoke of the vagueness on the subject of boundary lines in the<br />

establishment both of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Republic <strong>and</strong> of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>. He said that from the first<br />

there was evident need of “extraneous assistance” before bounds so loosely named could be “exactly<br />

fixed.” He then referred to the initiation of the dispute in 1841 between the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n Minister to<br />

Great Britain <strong>and</strong> Lord Aberdeen, Chief Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. <strong>The</strong> making of the<br />

Schomburgk survey <strong>and</strong> its bearing upon the dispute were fully explained. <strong>The</strong> lecturer said:<br />

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“In 1896, thirty-two years after the discontinuance of efforts on the part of Great Britain <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>Venezuela</strong> to fix by agreement a line which should divide their possessions, <strong>Venezuela</strong> was<br />

confronted, upon the renewal of negotiations for that purpose, by the following conditions:<br />

“A line proposed by her, founded upon her conception of strict right, which her powerful<br />

opponent had insisted could not in any way be plausibly supported, <strong>and</strong> which therefore she would<br />

in no event accept.<br />

An indefiniteness in the limits claimed by Great Britain, so great that of two boundary lines<br />

indicated or suggested by her one had been plainly declared to be merely a preliminary measure open<br />

to future discussion between the Governments of Great Britain <strong>and</strong> <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the other was<br />

distinctly claimed to be based upon generous concessions <strong>and</strong> a desire to avoid all cause of serious<br />

controversies between the two countries.<br />

“A controversy growing out of this situation impossible or friendly settlement except by such<br />

arrangement <strong>and</strong> accommodation as would be satisfactory to Great Britain, or by a submission of<br />

the dispute to arbitration.<br />

“A constant danger of such an extension of settlements in the disputed territory as would<br />

necessarily complicate the situation <strong>and</strong> furnish a convenient pretext for the refusal of any<br />

concession respecting the l<strong>and</strong>s containing such settlements.<br />

“A continual profession on the part of Great Britain of her present readiness to make<br />

benevolent concessions, <strong>and</strong> of her willingness to co-operate in a speedy adjustment while not<br />

substantially reducing her pretensions, <strong>and</strong> certainly not attempting in a conspicuous manner to<br />

hasten negotiations to a conclusion.<br />

“A tremendous disparity in power <strong>and</strong> strength between <strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>and</strong> her adversary, which<br />

gave her no hope, in case the extremity of force or war was reached, of defending her territory or<br />

preventing its annexation to the possessions of Great Britain.<br />

It was in 1876 that <strong>Venezuela</strong> appealed to the United States, begging our Government to give<br />

the subject its kind consideration <strong>and</strong> take an interest in having due justice done to <strong>Venezuela</strong>.<br />

“This,” said the lecturer, “appears to be the first communication addressed to our Government on<br />

the subject of a controversy in which we afterward became very seriously concerned.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> lecturer, quoting constantly from documents, showed the repeated appeals of <strong>Venezuela</strong> to<br />

Great Britain in favor of settling the question by arbitration on the whole subject, declaring that<br />

their constitution prevented them from making grants of territories except by a process the result of<br />

arbitration.<br />

Meantime Engl<strong>and</strong> constantly refused arbitration on the general subject, declaring that it feared<br />

the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n constitution would still be used as a pretext for disobedience to an award. Great<br />

Britain also objected to the arbitration requested by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, fearing that an award might be made<br />

in favor of the <strong>Venezuela</strong>n claim, in which case “an important territory which has for a long period<br />

been inhabited <strong>and</strong> occupied by her Majesty’s subjects <strong>and</strong> treated as part of the colony of <strong>British</strong><br />

<strong>Guiana</strong> would be severed from the Queen’s dominions.”<br />

On this Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> said: “Engl<strong>and</strong> alone had treated it as part of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>: her immense<br />

power had enabled her to do this, <strong>and</strong> her own decrees seemed to promise greater advantages<br />

against her weak adversary than arbitration could possibly assure.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> Government at one time offered a plan of arbitration which did not cover the entire<br />

disputed territory, but never consented to arbitration such as proposed by <strong>Venezuela</strong>, <strong>and</strong> which<br />

would include the entire territory in dispute. <strong>The</strong> lecturer last night brought down with much detail<br />

the narrative to September, 1893. At the end of the lecture, Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong> said:<br />

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>-<strong>Venezuela</strong> <strong>Border</strong> <strong>Dispute</strong> – Reports from <strong>The</strong> New-York Times (1887-1904)<br />

“Here closed a period in this dispute, fifty-two years in duration, vexed with agitation, <strong>and</strong><br />

perturbed by irritating <strong>and</strong> repeated failures to reach a peaceful adjustment. Instead of progress in<br />

the direction of a settlement of their boundaries, the contestants could only contemplate, as results<br />

of their action, increased obstacles to fair discussion, intensified feelings of injury, extended assertion<br />

of title, ruthless appropriation of the territory in controversy, <strong>and</strong> an unhealed breach in diplomatic<br />

relations.<br />

Mr. Clevel<strong>and</strong>’s second <strong>and</strong> concluding lecture on the subject to be given to-night, will deal<br />

principally with the part taken by the United States in the settlement of the long controversy which<br />

resulted in arbitration <strong>and</strong> a fixed boundary line.<br />

[28 March 1901]<br />

- 518 -<br />

BRITAIN WINS ARBITRATION<br />

Gets Award Against Brazil in the <strong>Guiana</strong> Frontier Case<br />

ROME, June 15.—<strong>The</strong> award of the King of Italy in the Anglo-Brazilian arbitration regarding<br />

the frontier of <strong>British</strong> <strong>Guiana</strong>, which was h<strong>and</strong>ed to the <strong>British</strong> Ambassador <strong>and</strong> to the Brazilian<br />

Minister here yesterday, is in favor of Great Britain.<br />

<strong>The</strong> decision consists of a preamble, followed by the award delimiting the boundary. <strong>The</strong><br />

preamble says that it cannot be admitted that Portugal or Brazil obtained possession of the disputed<br />

territory, while Holl<strong>and</strong> first <strong>and</strong> Great Britain afterward did establish effective rights of sovereignty<br />

over certain portions only. As the rights of Brazil <strong>and</strong> Great Britain in those zones cannot be<br />

precisely fixed, it has been decided to divide the territory according to a line drawn by nature.<br />

<strong>The</strong> award is as follows:<br />

<strong>The</strong> frontier is determined by a line starting from Mount Kakontipu <strong>and</strong> continuing easterly along the<br />

watershed to the source or the River Ireng to the confluence of the Tacutu, following the course of the Tacutu to<br />

where it joins the line of the frontier established by the declaration attached to the treaty of arbitration on Nov. 6,<br />

1901.<br />

By virtue of that declaration all the zone in dispute east of the line of the frontier will belong to Great Britain,<br />

<strong>and</strong> all the part west will belong to Brazil. <strong>The</strong> Rivers Ireng <strong>and</strong> Tacutu will remain open to free navigation of both<br />

States.<br />

[16 June 1904]<br />

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