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Chapter 1 | The impact of the crisis on the health system and health in Belgium 35 was transferred to the so-called Fund for the Future, to other subsectors of social security or was used for new initiatives. Moreover, the budget surplus allowed policy-makers to focus on protection measures to shelter citizens from potential access barriers to health care. A second innovation of the reforms at the beginning of the 1990s was the introduction of individual and collective financial responsibility for the sickness funds. These structural reforms had been in place for more than 15 years before the outbreak of the crisis, and accorded important protection to the system. No government for 541 days A second factor limiting the need for change was that between June 2010 and December 2011 Belgium had a caretaker government that could not impose austerity measures. The health budget for 2011 was consequently established under special circumstances: by a government that could not take new legal initiatives, in a context where the general government deficit was very large and where there was a surplus in the health care budget of €1.8 billion. Stakeholders were aware that this situation had protected the health care sector probably more than other sectors. They realized that the need to implement savings was inevitable and that the real growth cap could not be maintained given the economic situation. This is illustrated, for example, by the advice of RIZIV's Health Care Insurance Committee, consisting of representatives of the major stakeholders, to transfer €1464.9 million of the surplus in the health care budget (about 5.3% of the total health care budget) to other social security sectors. Moreover, while new initiatives costing €125.8 million in total were still honoured, at the same time savings measures were taken (worth €116.5 million) to compensate for the costs of the new initiatives. In 2012, there was no increase in the health care budget and the decision was taken to reduce the real growth cap for 2013 and 2014, although it still remained positive. Fiscal federalism reform The fiscal federalism reform (called the Sixth State Reform or Butterfly Agreement: Dutch, Vlinderakkoord; French L'accord papillon) is a third factor explaining health system changes. The reform gives more spending responsibilities to the federated entities (regions) (estimated at 4.5% of GDP in 2011), mainly in the areas of family allowances, health care and labour market policies (OECD, 2013a). The transfer of competencies in the health care sector relates to residential nursing care for older patients, hospital infrastructure and investment in the organization of primary care. The main option chosen in the reform was to maintain the financing and accreditation of basic (para)medical activities at the federal level and to transfer infrastructurerelated and organizational competences to the communities, with effect from
36 Economic crisis, health systems and health in Europe: country experience 1 July 2014. The Sixth State Reform is first and foremost a political agreement with a substantial transfer of powers in health care to the communities. The aim of the transfer is to have a more rational distribution of tasks, but the issue of conflicting incentives between government levels has not been addressed (OECD, 2013a). All of these background factors forced policy-makers to be more explicit about choices. Safeguarding and improving financial accessibility to high-quality health care was the first concern. A second priority was to ensure a sufficiently large workforce in the health care sector. The fact that budget proposals for 2012 and 2013 had to be formulated within tight budgetary margins raised awareness among stakeholders that measures to increase health care efficiency were inevitable. In that sense, several agreements (between sickness funds and health care professionals) contained structural measures (some not implemented yet) based on evidence-based medicine instead of the former linear cuts in indexation. Examples include the revision of the Belgian fee schedule (to take place in the years to come), whereby fees become better correlated with realtime investment and costs; measures to increase the attractiveness of general practice; the revision of financing mechanisms for medical imaging, dialysis and emergency care; the development of DMPs for chronic diseases; emphasis on preventive and conserving dental care; and the promotion of INN prescribing (see also section 3). For 2013 and 2014, priorities continued to be accessibility and quality of care. An important additional objective is financial transparency, especially in the ambulatory sector. Concrete initiatives include proposed new laws to increase accessibility to drugs for unmet medical needs and to introduce greater transparency for ambulatory care costs. The major breakthrough regarding transparency will be that, from 2016 onwards, the health care certificate that patients receive when they visit a doctor will mention explicitly the supplement paid over and above the official tariff, the latter equalling the sum of the reimbursed amount and the co-payment. The pressure on government budgets has also breached certain taboos, for example regarding the fight against social fraud, the monitoring of outliers in dental care, the lack of transparency in supplements paid by patients to medical doctors, the explicit comparison of the quality of care in hospitals, and so on. Measures have been applied in the dental care sector, for example, to reduce expenditure because a small group of outliers was exploiting the system, albeit in a legally correct manner as they could not be prosecuted for their excessive activities. 16 This was frustrating to the larger group of responsible dentists 16 To illustrate the extent of the excesses: simulations showed that 31 dentists (0.4% of all dentists) accounted for 1.35% and 1.30% of total expenditure for dental care in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
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Chapter 1 | The impact of the <strong>crisis</strong> on the <strong>health</strong> system <strong>and</strong> <strong>health</strong> in Belgium<br />
35<br />
was transferred to the so-called Fund for the Future, to other subsectors of<br />
social security or was used for new initiatives. Moreover, the budget surplus<br />
allowed policy-makers to focus on protection measures to shelter citizens from<br />
potential access barriers to <strong>health</strong> care. A second innovation of the reforms at<br />
the beginning of the 1990s was the introduction of individual <strong>and</strong> collective<br />
financial responsibility for the sickness funds. These structural reforms had<br />
been in place for more than 15 years before the outbreak of the <strong>crisis</strong>, <strong>and</strong><br />
accorded important protection to the system.<br />
No government for 541 days<br />
A second factor limiting the need for change was that between June 2010 <strong>and</strong><br />
December 2011 Belgium had a caretaker government that could not impose<br />
austerity measures. The <strong>health</strong> budget for 2011 was consequently established<br />
under special circumstances: by a government that could not take new legal<br />
initiatives, in a context where the general government deficit was very large <strong>and</strong><br />
where there was a surplus in the <strong>health</strong> care budget of €1.8 billion. Stakeholders<br />
were aware that this situation had protected the <strong>health</strong> care sector probably more<br />
than other sectors. They realized that the need to implement savings was inevitable<br />
<strong>and</strong> that the real growth cap could not be maintained given the <strong>economic</strong><br />
situation. This is illustrated, for example, by the advice of RIZIV's Health Care<br />
Insurance Committee, consisting of representatives of the major stakeholders, to<br />
transfer €1464.9 million of the surplus in the <strong>health</strong> care budget (about 5.3% of<br />
the total <strong>health</strong> care budget) to other social security sectors. Moreover, while new<br />
initiatives costing €125.8 million in total were still honoured, at the same time<br />
savings measures were taken (worth €116.5 million) to compensate for the costs<br />
of the new initiatives. In 2012, there was no increase in the <strong>health</strong> care budget<br />
<strong>and</strong> the decision was taken to reduce the real growth cap for 2013 <strong>and</strong> 2014,<br />
although it still remained positive.<br />
Fiscal federalism reform<br />
The fiscal federalism reform (called the Sixth State Reform or Butterfly<br />
Agreement: Dutch, Vlinderakkoord; French L'accord papillon) is a third<br />
factor explaining <strong>health</strong> system changes. The reform gives more spending<br />
responsibilities to the federated entities (regions) (estimated at 4.5% of GDP<br />
in 2011), mainly in the areas of family allowances, <strong>health</strong> care <strong>and</strong> labour<br />
market policies (OECD, 2013a). The transfer of competencies in the <strong>health</strong><br />
care sector relates to residential nursing care for older patients, hospital<br />
infrastructure <strong>and</strong> investment in the organization of primary care. The main<br />
option chosen in the reform was to maintain the financing <strong>and</strong> accreditation of<br />
basic (para)medical activities at the federal level <strong>and</strong> to transfer infrastructurerelated<br />
<strong>and</strong> organizational competences to the communities, with effect from