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262 Economic <strong>crisis</strong>, <strong>health</strong> <strong>systems</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>health</strong> in Europe: country experience<br />

Reduction of overspending<br />

Overspending has been a long-st<strong>and</strong>ing problem in both primary <strong>and</strong> specialized<br />

care. Since 2008, if <strong>health</strong> care providers exceeded the amounts agreed in the<br />

contracts, they have had to pay back the amount overspent in the next year.<br />

This was done in the form of tariff measures (Table 8.5). Such tariff measures<br />

have been applied to care provided by GPs, medical specialists <strong>and</strong> hospital<br />

facilities <strong>and</strong> to some extent also to pharmaceutical care (clawbacks). Tariff<br />

measures applied to medical specialist care appeared not to be very effective,<br />

since the overspending in the area of specialist care remained relatively high<br />

in 2009–2011 (at 13–52%; see Table 8.2), whereas overspending on GP care<br />

<strong>and</strong> on the use of hospital facilities remained below 10% of their respective<br />

budgets in the same period. More measures to curb overspending have been<br />

implemented since the emergence of the <strong>crisis</strong>.<br />

Changes to somatic care<br />

In 2009, the normative times assigned to treatments by medical specialists<br />

<strong>and</strong> the compensation for supporting specialists (e.g. radiologists, medical<br />

specialists who are not the main responsible physicians <strong>and</strong> treating physicians)<br />

were reconsidered (i.e. recalculated with new assumptions) 7 <strong>and</strong> the Health<br />

Care Authority formulated measures aimed at recovering overspending. For<br />

example, the budget for tariffs for medical specialists was cut by €375 million<br />

in 2009 (Table 8.5). The announcement of further cuts in 2010 (€512 million)<br />

led to many protests by medical specialists, resulting in an agreement in<br />

December 2010, signed between the Association of Medical Specialists (Orde<br />

van Medisch Specialisten), the National Hospital Association (Vereniging van<br />

Ziekenhuizen) <strong>and</strong> the Ministry of Health. 8 The budget for specialized care<br />

was to be capped at €2 billion per year in 2012, with the growth in budget<br />

limited to 2.5% per year until the tariffs of medical specialists become part of<br />

the free negotiations between providers of secondary care <strong>and</strong> insurers, which<br />

is assumed will happen in 2015 (Association of Medical Specialists, National<br />

Hospital Association & Ministry of Health, 2010). At present (2014), 70%<br />

of hospital care is subject to price negotiations between insurers <strong>and</strong> hospitals,<br />

while the remaining 30% of tariffs is set by the Health Care Authority. However,<br />

7 Treatment times for medical specialists <strong>and</strong> supporting specialists are difficult to estimate <strong>and</strong> remain approximations<br />

of actual treatment times.<br />

8 Agreements between the Ministry of Health <strong>and</strong> <strong>health</strong> care providers or <strong>health</strong> insurers are concluded by their respective<br />

umbrella associations on their behalf. These associations have no means of controlling production of <strong>health</strong> care services<br />

or to sanction any unwanted behaviour of their members. The system of agreements works because there is always the<br />

latent threat that the Ministry of Health can impose measures, such as tariff cuts, if the agreed terms are not met (e.g.<br />

if there is overspending). Since the role of the government in the Dutch <strong>health</strong> care system is to watch from a distance<br />

rather than to be directly involved, the preference is to use agreements negotiated between the parties instead of imposing<br />

measures in a one-way fashion by the Ministry of Health. It is assumed that the <strong>health</strong> purchasing market (insurers<br />

purchase care from <strong>health</strong> care providers) will provide sufficient incentives for both insurers <strong>and</strong> providers to produce<br />

<strong>health</strong> care of good quality at acceptable prices. It is important to mention that the use of agreements between parties<br />

is part of Dutch political culture <strong>and</strong> such agreements also exist in other sectors, for example in the education sector.

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