Web-economic-crisis-health-systems-and-health-web
Web-economic-crisis-health-systems-and-health-web Web-economic-crisis-health-systems-and-health-web
Chapter 3 | The impact of the crisis on the health system and health in France 91 4.3 Impact on efficiency Overall, the health care budget deficit was halved between 2009 and 2012, in part through an increase in SHI revenues and efficiency improvements, in spite of the fact that the volume of consumption of medical products and services increased by 2.8% in 2011, following a similar increase in 2010. However, the budget deficit reduction was mainly achieved through a reduction in hospital fees and drug prices. This worked as a buffer against the increase in prices of ambulatory health care services (Le Garrec, Bouvet & Koubi, 2012), which partly reflected the introduction of the pay-for-performance scheme. 4.4 Impact on health There is no specific monitoring of the impact of the economic crisis on health or related socioeconomic factors, but several surveys provide an overall picture on perceived health status and socioeconomic factors. For example, the Ministry of Health Directorate of Research, Studies, Evaluation and Statistics has commissioned an annual survey since 2000 that poses questions to a sample of about 4000 people on various socioeconomic issues (DREES, 2012d). During the course of the crisis, respondents perceived growing social injustice, decreasing confidence that the government can adequately address poverty and social exclusion, and decreasing belief that health insurance should be universal. At the same time, the percentage of respondents perceiving their health status as good rose to 74% in 2011, after a reported 71% in 2009 and 2010; likewise, access to health care continued to be considered universal by a high percentage of respondents (72%). At the same time, 26% thought themselves to be in poor health and among those, 6% in bad or very bad health; these results have remained stable and similar to previous years. Another report on poverty and social exclusion has been published every year since 2000 by the National Observatory in Poverty and Social Exclusion (Observatoire National de la Pauvreté et de l'Exclusion Sociale). In its report for 2012, the Observatory highlighted a steep increase in household debt overload in 2008 and a rise in poverty that was particularly marked for young adults (Observatoire National de la Pauvreté et de l'Exclusion Sociale, 2012). Finally, a scientific publication reported a significant increase in suicide rates for men (but not for women), by 4.7% in 2009 (representing 344 excess suicides) in comparison to increases of 5.5% in Germany and 10.4% in Greece (Chang et al., 2013). Preparedness Overall, two measures that were developed before the onset of the crisis may be considered to be the elements that buffered the impact of the crisis on individuals (at least to some extent). First, the active solidarity income was
92 Economic crisis, health systems and health in Europe: country experience created in 2009 and was extended, under certain conditions, to people under 25 years of age. In 2012, it was provided to almost 2.1 million households. Second, the CMU-C and ACS schemes enable people on low incomes to receive adequate health protection and have allowed an increasing number of people to benefit from such protection (see section 3.2). 5. Discussion 5.1 Drivers of change In terms of drivers of change, there has been no direct influence of non-national actors on health system responses in France, unlike in other countries. 10 The recent policy recommendations of the European Commission to France in 2013 focused on labour costs and pension schemes, and contained only nonspecific recommendations to increase the cost–effectiveness of health care expenditure. French politicians have publicly shown reluctance to adopt any such external advice. 11 Furthermore, no crisis-related funds were received from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the actors of the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and the IMF) did not play a role in the French crisis response. However, such absence of direct external actors will have to be qualified by long-term processes known as policy learning, transfer or convergence. Several international actors, such as the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, have been contributing to such developments, which coexist with transnational initiatives such as direct contacts and networks, for example, between national agencies or SHI funds. If, in some cases, these so-called soft-drivers may have been facilitators of change (e.g. the long-standing European EUnetHTA initiative in fostering a knowledge base for HTA (European Network for Health Technology Assessment, 2014), or the English National Health Service pay-for-performance experience, which inspired the French one), they were, however, not, per se, initiators of change in the context of the crisis. 5.2 Content and process of change Hence, there has been no direct influence or use of external agents in the crisis response, nor a concerted strategy to respond to specific phenomena. The main trigger for action in France was the fiscal pressure that pre-existed and was 10 At the EU level, such direct influence could have been attempted within the scope of the Stability and Growth Pact ensuring that Member States adopt appropriate policy responses to correct excessive deficits by implementing the Excessive Deficit Procedure. This procedure has been in place in France since 2009, and in that year, the European Commission recommended that France "swiftly implement the planned measures and reforms to contain current expenditure over the coming years, especially in the areas of health care and local authorities", without further specifications. 11 This was illustrated by representatives of the ruling Socialist Party, who stated that, instead of France following the recommendations, the European Commission should join French President François Hollande’s fight for "a smart economic policy, which conciliates thorough budget policy with the preservation of pro-growth investments" (EurActiv, 2013).
- Page 73 and 74: 40 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 75 and 76: 42 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 77 and 78: 44 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 79 and 80: 46 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 81 and 82: 48 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 83 and 84: 50 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 85 and 86: 52 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 87 and 88: 54 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 89 and 90: 56 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 91 and 92: 58 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 93 and 94: 60 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 95 and 96: 62 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 97 and 98: 64 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 99 and 100: 66 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 101 and 102: 68 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 103 and 104: 70 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 105 and 106: 72 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 107 and 108: 74 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 109 and 110: 76 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 111 and 112: 78 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 113 and 114: 80 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 115 and 116: 82 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 117 and 118: 84 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 119 and 120: 86 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 121 and 122: 88 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 123: 90 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 127 and 128: 94 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 129 and 130: 96 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 131 and 132: 98 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 133 and 134: 100 Economic crisis, health systems
- Page 136 and 137: Chapter 4 The impact of the crisis
- Page 138 and 139: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 140 and 141: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 142 and 143: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 144 and 145: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 146 and 147: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 148 and 149: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 150 and 151: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 152 and 153: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 154 and 155: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 156 and 157: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 158 and 159: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 160 and 161: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 162 and 163: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 164 and 165: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 166 and 167: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 168 and 169: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 170 and 171: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
- Page 172 and 173: Chapter 4 | The impact of the crisi
92 Economic <strong>crisis</strong>, <strong>health</strong> <strong>systems</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>health</strong> in Europe: country experience<br />
created in 2009 <strong>and</strong> was extended, under certain conditions, to people under<br />
25 years of age. In 2012, it was provided to almost 2.1 million households.<br />
Second, the CMU-C <strong>and</strong> ACS schemes enable people on low incomes to<br />
receive adequate <strong>health</strong> protection <strong>and</strong> have allowed an increasing number of<br />
people to benefit from such protection (see section 3.2).<br />
5. Discussion<br />
5.1 Drivers of change<br />
In terms of drivers of change, there has been no direct influence of non-national<br />
actors on <strong>health</strong> system responses in France, unlike in other countries. 10 The<br />
recent policy recommendations of the European Commission to France<br />
in 2013 focused on labour costs <strong>and</strong> pension schemes, <strong>and</strong> contained only<br />
nonspecific recommendations to increase the cost–effectiveness of <strong>health</strong> care<br />
expenditure. French politicians have publicly shown reluctance to adopt any<br />
such external advice. 11 Furthermore, no <strong>crisis</strong>-related funds were received from<br />
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), <strong>and</strong> the actors of the Troika (European<br />
Commission, European Central Bank <strong>and</strong> the IMF) did not play a role in the<br />
French <strong>crisis</strong> response. However, such absence of direct external actors will have<br />
to be qualified by long-term processes known as policy learning, transfer or<br />
convergence. Several international actors, such as the European Observatory<br />
on Health Systems <strong>and</strong> Policies, have been contributing to such developments,<br />
which coexist with transnational initiatives such as direct contacts <strong>and</strong><br />
networks, for example, between national agencies or SHI funds. If, in some<br />
cases, these so-called soft-drivers may have been facilitators of change (e.g. the<br />
long-st<strong>and</strong>ing European EUnetHTA initiative in fostering a knowledge base<br />
for HTA (European Network for Health Technology Assessment, 2014), or<br />
the English National Health Service pay-for-performance experience, which<br />
inspired the French one), they were, however, not, per se, initiators of change<br />
in the context of the <strong>crisis</strong>.<br />
5.2 Content <strong>and</strong> process of change<br />
Hence, there has been no direct influence or use of external agents in the <strong>crisis</strong><br />
response, nor a concerted strategy to respond to specific phenomena. The main<br />
trigger for action in France was the fiscal pressure that pre-existed <strong>and</strong> was<br />
10 At the EU level, such direct influence could have been attempted within the scope of the Stability <strong>and</strong> Growth Pact<br />
ensuring that Member States adopt appropriate policy responses to correct excessive deficits by implementing the Excessive<br />
Deficit Procedure. This procedure has been in place in France since 2009, <strong>and</strong> in that year, the European Commission<br />
recommended that France "swiftly implement the planned measures <strong>and</strong> reforms to contain current expenditure over the<br />
coming years, especially in the areas of <strong>health</strong> care <strong>and</strong> local authorities", without further specifications.<br />
11 This was illustrated by representatives of the ruling Socialist Party, who stated that, instead of France following the<br />
recommendations, the European Commission should join French President François Holl<strong>and</strong>e’s fight for "a smart<br />
<strong>economic</strong> policy, which conciliates thorough budget policy with the preservation of pro-growth investments"<br />
(EurActiv, 2013).