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[632] <strong>Final</strong> <strong>Judgment</strong> 730<br />

We might also have a good idea as to another reason why Lyndon<br />

Johnson decided not to run for re-election in 1968. Maybe the Israeli<br />

nuclear issue was—dare I say it—"another factor" (maybe even the<br />

"primary" reason) that LBJ decided to step down.<br />

Maybe "domestic factors" such as unrest over the Vietnam War were<br />

just the public issues that we heard about in the press—for we certainly<br />

never heard about Israel and the bomb. This is speculation, of course, but<br />

quite reasonable speculation indeed.<br />

ISRAEL AND THE BOMB: FROM JFK TO LBJ<br />

But no more speculation. Let's see what Israeli writer Avner Cohen has<br />

said more recently about the transition from JFK to LBJ and its impact on<br />

Israel's nuclear arms program: On page 195 Cohen writes:<br />

On 22 November 1963 John F. Kennedy was<br />

assassinated and Lyndon B. Johnson became<br />

president. The transition from Kennedy to Johnson<br />

reminded Israelis of the transition from Ben-Gurion to<br />

[his successor] Eshkol . . . It also benefited the Israeli<br />

nuclear program."<br />

On page 196 Cohen added that Johnson "lacked Kennedy's interest in<br />

nuclear proliferation in addition to his personal and political reasons for<br />

supporting Israel," pointing out that "a confrontation with Israel on the<br />

nuclear weapons issue was therefore less likely than it had been during<br />

Kennedy's years." Cohen also pointed out on page 177 that "The transition<br />

from the Kennedy to Johnson administrations changed the character and<br />

function of the [inspections of the Dimona nuclear plant in Israel]<br />

significantly." On page 193 he described this further:<br />

President Johnson was also more flexible than<br />

Kennedy on the rules of the Dimona inspections. The<br />

Israelis were able to determine the rules of the visits,<br />

and the Johnson administration chose not to confront<br />

Israel on the issue, fearing that Israel would end the<br />

arrangement. [Inspector] Culler recalls that his<br />

assumption at the time was that the restrictions were<br />

agreed on at the highest level in both countries.<br />

Kennedy threatened both Ben-Gurion and Eshkol that<br />

non-compliance with his request could "jeopardize<br />

American commitment to Israel's security and well<br />

being," but Johnson was unwilling to risk an<br />

American-Israeli crisis over the issue . . . Unlike<br />

Kennedy, Johnson was looking for a compromise that<br />

would serve the interests of both nations." [Emphasis<br />

added by Michael Collins Piper]

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