Final_Judgment

725 Final Word? [627]
No American president was more concerned with
the danger of nuclear proliferation than John
Fitzgerald Kennedy. He was convinced that the spread
of nuclear weapons would make the world more
dangerous and undermine U.S. interests. He saw it as
his role to place nuclear arms control and
nonproliferation at the center of American foreign
policy . . . Kennedy reminded his advisers that more
was at stake than a piece of paper—without an
agreement, the arms race would continue and nuclear
weapons would proliferate to other countries. The only
example Kennedy used to make the point was Israel.
[Emphasis added by Michael Collins Piper]
Carefully note Cohen's words: "The only example Kennedy used to
make the point was Israel." Not the French or the Arabs. Only Israel.
Cohen's book also makes it quite clear that the French—who had
previously been the primary foreign enablers of Israel's secret nuclear arms
program—had withdrawn their support after former French President
Charles DeGaulle returned to power in 1958. Cohen writes on pages 73-74:
By June DeGaulle had become aware of what he
later termed "the improper military collaboration
established between Tel Aviv and Paris after the Suez
Expedition, which permanently placed Israelis at all
levels of French services," and he was determined to
end it. DeGaulle was taken aback when he learned of
the unorthodox manner in which the relations were
conducted . . . It took almost two years to translate
DeGaulle's determination into a new French nuclear
policy vis-à-vis Israel.
Cohen points out, however, that Israel's friend in France, atomic energy
minister Jacques Soustelle, resigned, and at that point DeGaulle learned that
the French assistance to Israel had continued, despite his orders. Thus, in
1960 "DeGaulle again demanded an end to this cooperation." Cohen adds:
The French decision caused consternation in Ben-
Gurion's inner circle. The end of French assistance
would put the entire Dimona project at Risk.
DeGaulle's decision was a sharp reversal from the
written and unwritten obligations of his predecessors.
. . . DeGaulle recognized how unprecedented the deal
[between Israel and France] was, and for this reason
refused to go along with it, reluctant to provide Israel
with a nuclear option. France was trying to regain its
position in the Arab world, and nuclear cooperation