Final_Judgment

108 Genesis [47]
According to Seymour Hersh: "Israel's bomb, and what to do about it,
became a White House fixation, part of the secret presidential agenda that
would remain hidden for the next thirty years." 106
As Hersh notes, quite profoundly we see in retrospect, this secret war
with Israel was never once noted by any of Kennedy's biographers. 107 If
indeed it had been, as we shall see, the mystery behind the JFK
assassination might have been unraveled long, long ago.
ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR AGENDA
There was an added wrinkle. Although Israel and the American CIA had
established a longtime close and ongoing working relationship, the CIA was
monitoring Israel's nuclear weapons development.
In March, 1963, Sherman Kent, the Chairman of the Board of National
Estimates at the CIA, wrote an extended memorandum to the CIA's Director
on the highly controversial subject entitled "Consequences of Israeli
Acquisition of Nuclear Capability."
According to Stephen Green, for the purposes of this internal
memorandum, Kent defined "acquisition" by Israel as either (a) a detonation
of a nuclear device with or without the possession of actual nuclear
weapons, or (b) an announcement by Israel that it possessed nuclear
weapons, even without testing. Kent's primary conclusion was that an
Israeli bomb would cause 'substantial damage to the U.S. and Western
position in the Arab world.' 108
According to Green's accurate assessment, "The memorandum was very
strong and decidedly negative in its conclusions" 109 which were as follows:
"Even though Israel already enjoys a clear military superiority over its
Arab adversaries, singly or combined, acquisition of a nuclear capability
would greatly enhance Israel's sense of security. In this circumstance, some
Israelis might be inclined to adopt a moderate and conciliatory posture . . .
"We believe it much more likely, however, that Israel's policy toward
its neighbors would become more rather than less tough. [Israel would] seek
to exploit the psychological advantages of its nuclear capability to
intimidate the Arabs and to prevent them from making trouble on the
frontiers." 110
In dealing with the United States, the CIA analyst estimated, a nuclear
Israel would "make the most of the almost inevitable Arab tendency to look
to the Soviet Bloc for assistance against the added Israel threat, arguing that
in terms of both strength and reliability Israel was clearly the only
worthwhile friend of the U.S. in the area.
"Israel,” in Kent's analysis, "would use all the means at its command to
persuade the U.S. to acquiesce in, and even to support, its possession of
nuclear capability." 111
In short, Israel would use its immense political power—especially
through its lobby in Washington—to force the United States to accede to
Israel's nuclear intentions.